CLALS Whitepaper F

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C L A L S W H I T E P A P E R S E R I E S | N O . 1

Religion and Violence in Latin America

Te El Salvador Gang ruceand the Church

What was the role of the Catholic Church?

by Steven Dudley

M A Y 5 , 2 0 1 3


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Table of Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 2

I. Te Church and Violent Conict in El Salvador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

II. Te Rise o Gangs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

III. Gangs and the Church . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

IV. Te ruce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 15

V. Te Church and the ruce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

VI. Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

Cover photo courtesy o the Federal Bureau o Investigation


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1

Religion and Violence in Latin America

T

his white paper is one o a series produced by American Universitys

Center or Latin American and Latino Studiesmulti-year project

o research and structured dialogue on religion and violence in Latin

America. In light o the consequences o criminal violence or the re-

gions democracies, the project seeks to better understand how religiousactors are responding today, when they are less prominent than during the previous

period o political, largely state-sponsored violence. Fresh research on Brazil, Chile,

Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru allows comparative analysis be-

tween dierent countries as well as past and present. Tese studies will be published

as a scholarly volume.

Project white papers aim to bridge and catalyze dialogue between scholarly and

policy communities, religious practitioners and human rights activists. Tey are de-

signed to inorm the ongoing eorts o religious leaders, policymakers and advocates

in civil society who seek eective strategies to diminish violence in contemporary

Latin America and empower its victims.

Research scholar in residence Alexander Wilde co-directs the project with CLALS

Director Eric Hershberg and University Chaplain Joseph Eldridge. Te project is

supported by the Henry R. Luce Initiative on Religion and International Afairs o

the Henry Luce Foundation.

For ongoing project developments, see:

http://www.american.edu/clals/Violence-and-Victims.cm

Steven Dudley is the director o InSight Crime, an initiative based at American UniversitysCenter or Latin American and Latino Studies that investigates organized crime in theAmericas. Additional reporting and assistance was provided by Oscar Martnez, who is thedirector o Sala Negra, the wing o the Salvadoran-based online media outlet El Faro, whichinvestigates organized crime in Central America.
http://www.american.edu/clals/index.cfmhttp://www.american.edu/clals/Violence-and-Victims.cfmhttp://www.hluce.org/hrlucerelintaff.aspxhttp://www.hluce.org/hrlucerelintaff.aspxhttp://www.hluce.org/hrlucerelintaff.aspxhttp://www.hluce.org/hrlucerelintaff.aspxhttp://www.hluce.org/hrlucerelintaff.aspxhttp://www.american.edu/clals/Violence-and-Victims.cfmhttp://www.american.edu/clals/index.cfm


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2 A U C E N TE R FOR L A T I N A M E R I C A N & L A T I N O S TU D I E S

Abstract

E

l Salvador and its Central American neighbors are experiencing a terrible

tide o criminal violence. Homicide rates are some o the highest in the

world. Tis scourge o violent crime is a major concern o policymakers

both in the region and in Washington, DC. Indeed, through regional

security initiatives the U.S. government has invested more than $500

million in violence reduction programs during the last ve years. European develop-

ment agencies and international NGOs, similarly, have privileged violence reduction

in their programs o nancial and technical assistance to El Salvador and neighbor-

ing countries. Until recently, however, no policy initiatives seem to have made a

signicant dent in the problem. Tis paper addresses one development that has been

portrayed in some circles as game-changing, and that now constitutes a critical point

o reerence or violence reduction programs going orward. Te truce among rival

gangs in El Salvador worked out in March 2012, which has held since that time,

has reduced homicides to hal their previous levels. Te paper examines in particular

the widely held belie that the Catholic Church brokered that truce in light o the

wider set o actors actually responsible and considers the various ways that religion

may have an impact on contemporary violence in the region.


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the Church hierarchy. His participation was, in essence, a nod rom the countrys

Catholic Church that brokering this truce was in the interest o El Salvador, despite

misgivings rom some o his colleagues. It seemed to help legitimize the process to

the public and the countrys elite. Colindres is rom the Churchs more conservative

wing, thus his participation may also serve as a means to involve the business com-

munity in what is an ongoing process.

Te Bishop said he had decided to participate without consulting the Catholic

Conerence o Bishops, the collective body o the hierarchy, and that he was moti-

vated by the Churchs long-standing humanitarian role, specically in improving the

conditions or prisoners. However, the Churchs role appears to be more symbolic

than real. Colindres was not Munguas or Mijangos rst choice, and the negotiators

openly stated that they needed a Church representative in order to legitimize the

truce. Te Conerence o Bishops, while it voiced its support o its Bishop initially,

has stayed mostly quiet since and even, to a certain extent, distanced itsel rom

Colindres, leading many to believe there is a deep divide within the Church over

how to deal with the truce.

Tere are many other actors in play that have led to divisions within the Church

over Colindres decision to participate in the truce. Colindres appears content

to play this small, even symbolic role. Others in the Church would like to play a

more active role in shaping the truce and implementing the programs to sustain it;

or, at the very least, establish conditions upon which the Church will participate.

Colindres has isolated himsel and the process with the gangs, keeping the rest o the

Church at arms length. Te Bishop seems oblivious to the possible political conse-

quences or the Church should the truce unravel, and the Church seems powerless

to stop him rom participating.

Tis paper attempts to untangle Colindres and the Churchs role in the truce.

Despite its success in lowering homicide rates by hal a remarkable accomplish-

ment by any measure and moves into the next phases o implementing job training

and other economic programs, the truce is not universally popular. Polls show most

people are skeptical o the gangs intentions and the truces possible consequences,

particularly as they relate to the countrys political uture. Te international commu-

nity is also divided. Te United States government has expressed concern, while the

Organization o American States has sent emissaries to acilitate the ongoing process.

Te paper starts by exploring the history o the Church in El Salvadors multipleviolent conicts to date. It then looks closely at the gangs, their history and develop-

ment in the country. Finally, it delves into the Churchs past and current work with

gangs and its attempts to broker a truce between them. Te story is still developing,

so this paper is as much a chronicle as it is an analysis.

Te paper starts byexploring the history o theChurch in El Salvadors

multiple violent conicts todate. It then looks closelyat the gangs, their historyand development in thecountry. Finally, it delvesinto the Churchs past andcurrent work with gangsand its attempts to broker atruce between them.

4 A U C E N TE R FOR L A T I N A M E R I C A N & L AT I N O S TU D I E S | INTRODUCTION


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I. The Church and Violent Confict in El Salvador

I . TH E C H U R C H A N D V I OL E N T C ON FL I C T I N E L S A L VA D OR | A U C E N TE R FO R LAT I N A ME R I C A N & LAT I N O S TUD I E S 5

T

he Church in El Salvador is, in many ways, a reection o the polarized

country it inhabits. El Salvador is a country o inequalities, most nota-

bly the unequal distribution o land and wealth. Tis Central American

nation was amously called the country o the 14 amilies. Te descrip-

tion was not ar rom the truth. Going back to the colonial days, the

countrys land was concentrated in the hands o a ew amilies who used it to service

the cacao, indigo, and later, the international coee markets. Te countrys mono-

culture economy gave these amilies outsized inuence in the government, which in

turn backed them with state security orces. By the early 1900s, or instance, coee

plantations were assigned National Guard units.

For its part, the Church had institutional and progressive wings. Te institutional

wing aligned itsel with the political and economic powers, even during long spells

o dictatorships and rigged elections. Meanwhile, the Churchs more progressivewing reached out to the disenranchised. In the 1930s, the Catholic Church began

advocating a social Catholicism which encouraged priests to tackle problems, such

as poverty. Among its chie advocates was Luis Chvez y Gonzlez, the Archbishop

o San Salvador rom 1939 to 1977. In the 1950s, Chvez encouraged the ormation

o cooperatives and sent priests to study Canadian models. His work also contrib-

uted to what would become the Christian Democratic Party in 1960, and laid the

groundwork or the next, more radical phase o the Churchs participation in the

countrys struggles.

As was the case in many parts o Latin America, El Salvador was ertile ground

or what would become known as liberation theology. In addition to the naked

inequalities, the priest to laity ratio was an estimated 10,000 to 1. So it was that dur-

ing the late 1960s and early 1970s inspired by Vatican II and the Latin American

Bishops Conerence in Medellin priests in rural areas began creating Christian

Base Communities (Comunidades Eclesisticas de Base CEBs). Hundreds o

CEBs emerged and trained thousands o religious laymen to preach the preerential

option or the poor.


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Te CEBs were caught up in an increasingly violent dynamic. Te military began

arresting and torturing their lay members and some priests. It expelled numerous

oreign clergy that it said were omenting the CEBs and the work o radical priests.

In response to the increasing repression, members o the Christian Democrat youth

party ormed the core o what would become the Ejrcito Revolucionario del Pueblo

(ERP). Other guerrilla groups also emerged. ogether, they would eventually orma coalition o ve groups known as the Frente Farabundo Mart para la Liberacin

Nacional (FMLN).

Te countrys civil war had begun and clergy ound themselves in the middle. In

1979, at the second Latin America Bishops Conerence in Puebla, Mexico, the

liberal wing o the Church reiterated its support or the core tenets o liberation the-

ology, in spite o the calls o John Paul II and others to cease their depictions o Jesus

as a revolutionary. Inside El Salvador, a similar debate was playing out concern-

ing the role o the Church. In 1977, a Salvadoran priest, Rutilio Grande, was killed

under mysterious circumstances. San Salvadors new archbishop, Oscar Romero, a

sot-spoken priest who his colleagues believed would maintain a centrist line, reused

to appear with government ofcials in public until they did an investigation into the

murder. It was the beginning o a more radical, publicly critical path or Romero.

Soon he was condemning the governments repressive tactics on his weekly sermons

broadcast live on the radio.

Te act that Romero could take such a hard line was a result o the way in which

the Church operates in El Salvador. It is more horizontal than hierarchical. Its clergy

takes its cues rom the Vatican and the Conerence o Bishops, but the individual

bishops have relative autonomy. Tus Romeros decision to criticize the government,

the political elite and the military was made without the consent o the conerence.Not surprisingly, as Romeros critique o the countrys governing elite sharpened, his

support among the Church hierarchy dissipated.

Among those who backed Romero were the Bishops Gregorio Rosa Chvez and

Arturo Rivera y Damas. Te three aced an uphill battle. On the one side, John Paul

II was calling or the Church to help the poor but via charity, in the style that would

later make Mother eresa an international Catholic hero. On the other side, priests

urged the Church to get more directly involved in politics by helping with the

armed rebellion spreading across this tiny nation. Romero tried to push or unity,1

but his calls or justice were getting too loud or the radical right. Fittingly, in his

last sermon, on March 24, 1980, he called on the military to stop killing your own

ellow peasants.2 Te next day, the archbishop was assassinated. However, this ten-

sion between those in the Church who advocate or undamental social change in

1 ombs, David, Archbishop Romero and Reconciliation in El Salvador, in Latin America betweenConfict and Reconciliation, Ed. Martin Leiner and Susan Flamig (Bristol, C: Vandenhoek &

Reprecht, 2012).2 Berryman, Phillip, Liberation Theology: Essential Facts about the Revolutionary Movement in Latin

America and Beyond, emple University: Philadelphia, 1987, p. 2.

Te act that Romerocould take such a hardline was a result o the

way in which the Churchoperates in El Salvador. Itis more horizontal thanhierarchical. Its clergy takesits cues rom the Vaticanand the Conerence oBishops, but the individualbishops have relativeautonomy.

6 A U C E N TE R FOR L AT I N A M E R I C A N & L A T I N O S TU D I E S | I . TH E C H U R C H A N D V I OL E N T C ON FL I C T I N E L S A L V A DOR


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D

uring the countrys civil war, one in six Salvadorans were displaced

rom their homes. Many moved to the United States where they took

up residence in cities, notably Los Angeles. Tere they ound a com-

petitive job market and the cutthroat social dynamics. Te city waslittered with street gangs, among them the Mexican Maa and the

18th Street gang. For some Salvadoran youth, the situation was oppressive, and they

sought reuge in the gangs. Initially, it was the 18th Street gang. In contrast to the

Mexican Maa, which restricts membership to Mexican nationals, the 18th Street

gang, or Barrio 18, was more open. But other Salvadorans created their own gang,

which gave homage to their country. Tey called themselves the Salvatruchas, which

loosely translated, means street smart Salvadorans.3

For years during the 1980s, the two gangs the Barrio 18 and the Salvatruchas

coexisted on the streets o Los Angeles. Tey went to the same parties, attended the

same schools. Te two eventually became part o a larger alliance o gangs known

as the Sureos, which is led by the Mexican Maa. o this day, they both have to

pay tribute to the Mexican Maa, or the Seores, as they are known. In homage

to the Seores, the Salvatruchas tacked the number 13, as M is the 13 th letter in the

alphabet, to their name and became the Mara Salvatrucha 13 or MS-13. Te two

gangs also grew, especially the Salvatruchas, as their population increased during the

1980s. Tey integrated ormer rebels into their ranks and became brutally eective

at controlling and usurping territory.

Sometime in the early 1990s, though, a rit emerged between the two gangs. Te

origins o this rit are not clear, but what started as a ght between small actionsquickly enguled portions o the city and then the region where both groups oper-

ated. Members o each gang were jailed as their ghting spilled into view o the

authorities. It was inauspicious timing. Te United States passed an immigration

reorm law in 1996, which expanded the categories or which an immigrant could

be deported.

3 For a detailed look at the MS-13 origins, see, Logan, Sam, This is or the Mara Salvatrucha: Inside thMS-13, Americas Most Violent Gang, Hyperion: New York, 2009.

II. The Rise o Gangs

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I I . TH E R I S E OF GA N GS | A U C E NT E R FOR L AT I N A ME R I C A N & LAT I N O S T UD I E S 9

In the years that ollowed, the ood o ex-convicts to the region was unprecedented.

El Salvador alone received 40,429 ex-convicts between 2001 2010, many o these

gang members.4

Te new arrivals brought with them a blend o style baggy clothes, tattoos, ban-

danas bravado and international afliation that was appealing to the Salvadoranyouth. Tey were not just a gang. Tey were a brand, like the Nike shoes that had

been arriving en masse ater the war. Te MS-13 and Barrio 18 took advantage o

this status and began usurping local gangs power. Tey ound ertile ground or

their expansion.

At the time, El Salvador was struggling with its transition rom war to peace.

Following the countrys brutal civil war, it took years to sort through the carnage,

reestablish government institutions and adjust to a new reality: the country was sud-

denly more urban than rural. Demobilized ghters searched or jobs while the gov-

ernment pushed or increased ree market economic policies. Te peace agreement

allowed or the FMLN to orm part o the new police orce, but it was years beorethey were ully integrated. Unemployment and crime soared. Families struggled to

adjust to city lie, small street gangs emerged, and San Salvador became one o the

deadliest places on earth.5

Te spread o these gangs at rst took the Salvadoran government by surprise. When

it realized it could not easily control them with traditional enorcement, though, it

turned to more repressive measures. In 2004, ony Saca was elected on the security

platorm o mano dura, or hard line.6 Te essence o his policy was rounding up

suspected gang members en masse and jailing them or prolonged periods. Tese

policies, however, were not eective. In act, they seemed to strengthen the gangs.Te prison population tripled to over 27,000 an estimated one-third o which

were gang members and prison authorities, in an eort to stop the deadly ghting

between the Barrio 18 and MS-13, separated them into dierent jails.7

Tere, the gang leaders could reassert control over their members rom the relatively

sae environment o the prisons. Tey could also coordinate criminal activities, such

4 United States Department o Homeland Security, Oice o Immigration Statistics, 2010 Yearbooko Immigration Statistics, August 2011, pp. 97 101. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2010/ois_yb_2010.pd5 In 1995, the murder rate peaked at an astounding 139 per 100,000 inhabitants. In contrast, El Sal-

vador had the worlds second highest rate o 71 per 100,000 people in 2011, ater Honduras. U.S.Department o State, ravel Warning, January 23, 2013. http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_5871.html6 It was a regional trend. Honduras and Guatemala also implemented new laws. he subsequentpopulation explosion in the jails crippled these prison systems and led to a prolieration o crimeemanating rom the jails themselves.7 For more on this evolution post-mano dura, as well as gang activity in general, see Steven Dudley,Drug raicking Organizations in Central America: ransportistas, Mexican Cartels, and Maras, inOrganized Crime in Central America: The Northern Triangle, Ed. Cynthia J. Arnson and Eric L. Olson,18 61 (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center or Scholars, November 2011).http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/deault/iles/LAP_single_page.pd

In 2004, ony Saca waselected on the securityplatorm o mano dura, or

hard line. Te essence ohis policy was rounding upsuspected gang members enmasse and jailing them orprolonged periods. Tesepolicies, however, werenot eective. In act, theyseemed to strengthen thegangs.


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as extortion and kidnapping. Government authorities had little control over many

o these prisons, which in some cases were old schools and actories. Te govern-

ment, seemingly blind to these eects, implemented super mano dura, eectively

ampliying the previous eorts. However, this only accelerated this process o gang

consolidation. According to the police, gang membership, or instance, is now close

to 65,000.

Te violence around gang activity is multilayered. Gangs ght one another or

patches o territory where they can extort everyone rom shop owners to public

transport and private delivery companies. Tey are increasingly ghting or control

o drug distribution points as well. In the last ew years, they have obtained more

sophisticated weaponry and grenades, which they use to battle authorities or enorce

their tax code on the locals.

Teir ght with the government has also evolved. Gangs have become more calculat-

ing and political. Tey have allied themselves with non-governmental organizations

that oten advocate on their behal. Tey have ormed associations that work or bet-

ter conditions in the jails. Tey have inltrated community associations where they

live and possibly control the voting o the residents. Tey have also organized coor-

dinated attacks on public transportation systems and threatened to boycott elections

in an attempt to inuence current anti-gang laws and uture anti-gang legislation.

Tis apparent turn toward politics coexists with a broader view o the gangs as a

criminal phenomenon primarily bent on securing short-term prots in low-level

operations. Tis is a shortsighted and shallow view that only begins to address the

complexity o the gang issue or the ways in which this issue can be resolved in the

long term. But the gangs reinorce this image by recruiting ever-younger membersand targeting the most vulnerable to urther their ends. Tus, any negotiation with

them or attempts to reintegrate them into society will inevitably ace strong opposi-

tion rom a society that is conditioned to see them in this narrow way.

10 A U CE N TE R FO R LAT I N A M E RI CA N & LAT I NO S TU DI E S | I I . TH E R I S E OF GA N GS

Teir ght with thegovernment has alsoevolved. Gangs have

become more calculatingand political.


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III. Gangs and the Church

T

he gangs relationship with the Catholic Church is complicated. Most

o the members come rom Catholic amilies, but they carry with them

(and oten on their bodies in the orm o elaborate tattoos) conicted

ideas about religion. While the Church represents amily and tradition,

it is also a representation o the status quo, exclusion and repression.

It is, in many ways, a reection o their own larger dilemma: they see themselves as

both victims and victimizers. In an interview, Barrio 18 leader Carlos Mojica said

that gang members are spiritual in their own way.

Tere are some who question our belie in God, Mojica said. Because o the way

o lie we have. We dont think anyone can question what is in our hearts. In reality,

we are the only ones who know what is inside us.8

Mojica, who is known as Viejo Lin and leads the Sureos action o the Barrio 18

in El Salvador, typies these contradictions. He is in jail or murder, including the

mutiliation o three women.9 Still, he has a tattoo o Jesus Christ that covers two-

thirds o his chest, which he says is my eeling (mi sentir), or what I believe.

Mojica said the Church had also sacriced or El Salvador and played a role in its

conicts. He later said, almost as i rehearsed, that priests had been killed or being

communists and practitioners o liberation theology.

But the reality is that the Evangelical churches have a higher standing in gang

culture in El Salvador than the Catholic Church. Te Evangelicals have more gang

programs, and there is a tacit understanding that when a gang member enters anEvangelical rehabilitation program, he or she is o limits. Te same cannot be said

about the Catholic Church.

8 Author interview, October 27, 2012, Coyutepeque Penitentiary, El Salvador. Unless indicated, allother citations rom this source are rom this interview.9 El Faro, Estos son los Estos son los 30 pandilleros trasladados del penal de mxima seguridad,March 22, 2012. http://www.elaro.net/es/201203/noticias/8075/

But the reality is that theEvangelical churches havea higher standing in gangculture in El Salvador thanthe Catholic Church. TeEvangelicals have moregang programs, and thereis a tacit understandingthat when a gang memberenters an Evangelicalrehabilitation program,he or she is o limits. Tesame cannot be said o theCatholic Church.

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1 2 A U C E N TE R FOR L A T I N A M E R I C A N & L A T I N O S TU D I E S | I I I . GA N GS A N D TH E C H U R C H

o some extent this is because, much as during the civil war, the Catholic Church

has been o two minds when it comes to the gang question. At the top, the Church

has sided with the governmental policy omano dura. But on other levels, it created

programs to give legal assistance and advocate or better conditions in the prisons.

Tese are not geared specically to gang members, but there are some indirect ben-

ets or them.

Catholic Relie Services, a United States-based organization, has also designed pre-

vention and rehabilitation programs. Te most notable o these rehabilitation pro-

grams is run by Father Antonio Rodrguez. He is a Spanish national who has been in

El Salvador since 2000. He has seen the gangs grow and evolve, and he has watched

in disgust as the government has employed increasingly hard line policies. Rodrguez

is also the author o what many believe is the rst attempt to create a gang truce.

Rodrguezs parish is in Mejicanos, a gang stronghold in San Salvador. Beginning in

the early 2000s, Rodrguez started a rehabilitation program or ormer gang mem-

bers. Te program integrates members who renounce their afliation with the gang.Te role suits him and his theological approach. Rodrguez is a Passionist priest who,

in his congregation, emphasizes the sacrices o Christ as a means to salvation. Tis

includes how he approaches even the most violent o gang members, who he says

can all be orgiven or their sins, especially as they embrace the teachings o Jesus

Christ.

We have limits with regards to orgiveness, he explained. As they get close to

Jesus, these limits begin to recede.10

Tis question o orgiveness is essential in any peace and reconciliation process, but

carries particular weight with regards to the gangs. In contrast to the guerrillas oreven their rivals in the government, the military and the right-wing death squads

where ideology is perceived to play a role in their actions, the gangs are seemingly

devoid o political meaning. In principle, they act as they do or sel-preservation,

which, in the case o El Salvador and elsewhere, has become a pretext or rabid

expansion and extreme violence against their rivals and the civilian population.

Forgiveness comes easier rom those who have clearer justications or their actions.

Te gangs, however, have no clear justication.

However, some, such as Rodrguez, and those who work with him, see most in neigh-

borhoods like Mejicanos as victims, even the gang members themselves. He says thereis no line between the victims and the victimizer. Tey are, he believes, not just

victims o vicious crimes by rival gang members and security orces, but also victims

o the most vicious capitalist system I had ever encountered in my lie. Te lack o

jobs, amily structure, and basic necessities are what leads them down a path toward a

gang. o Rodrguez, the gang members deserve a helping hand, not a stern slap.

10 Author interview, October 26, 2012, San Salvador, El Salvador. Unless indicated, all other citationsrom this source come rom this interview.


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I I I . GA N GS A N D TH E C H U R C H | A U CE NTE R FOR L AT I N A M E R I C AN & L AT I N O S TU D I E S 1 3

Tere is not violence because there are gangs, he says. Tere are gangs because

there is violence.

Rodrguezs approach is openly political, though not in a partisan sense. He says

he has the obligation to ask the hard questions about the violence and the policies

that he believes lead to them. In this he represents the action-oriented wing o theCatholic Church in El Salvador that stretches back to the Archbishops Chvez,

Romero and Rivera y Damas, and to the days when liberation theology shaped

perception and action on the ground in this country. Tis inuence is apparent.

Rodrguez quotes rom Romero when he talks. And like Romero, he speaks most

oten about the victims, which he believes lead us all to salvation.

Rodrguezs approach caught the eye o the FMLN, which had by 2009 transormed

itsel into a political party with a strong presidential candidate, Mauricio Funes.

Ater Funes won the election, his administration asked Rodrguez to work with

them. His ofcial capacity was as part o a commission to look or children who

had been disappeared during the war, but Rodrguez said he used his post to test thewaters with the gangs about a possible truce. Te year was 2009, and violence was

reaching unprecedented levels. Te government was becoming desperate, and open,

to new approaches to the gang question.

In this regard, Rodrguez said he worked closely with members o the Funes admin-

istration to develop a plan: 1) negotiation; 2) truce; 3) dialogue. He saw the Church

as a mediator in the talks. In Rodrguezs mind, other groups civil society, media,

gangs, victims, government would all be part o the process. alks began and had

some progress, Rodriguez said, but quickly ell apart or reasons that are not clear.

Rodrguez blames the Funes administration, which he says turned its back on some ohis allies, including Hato Hasbn, the presidents rst secretary, and Manuel Melgar,

the security minister.11 As Melgar and Hasbn became isolated, Rodrguez became

isolated. Rodrguez made matters worse by openly contradicting Funes in a meeting.

Funes began to return to a hard line approach. Military personnel were sent into the

prisons. Gang members were tortured. Privileges and visits were cut. A new anti-gang

law went beore Congress, and in September 2010, the gangs organized an armed

strike o the public transport system to protest the governments actions, which para-

lyzed close to hal o the buses in and around San Salvador. One bus was burned and

prisons in various parts o the country erupted in riots. Cornered and discredited, the

gangs turned to Rodrguez, who read their joint statement to the public.

We are ready to make a commitment to society so that together we can create a bet-

ter country, he read, in what can only be seen now as a preview o negotiations to

come. We are calling on the Church, private business, non-governmental organiza-

11 Even beore Melgar who is a ormer FMLN guerrilla assumed his position in the administra-tion, the United States government pressured to have him isolated rom the Funes administrationbecause o his alleged participation in attacks on U.S. personnel during the countrys civil war.


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14 A U CE N TE R F OR LAT I N A M E R I CA N & L AT I NO S TU DI E S | I I I . GA N GS A N D TH E C H U R C H

tions and society in general to create, together, a real project, restructuring the jails

so the prisoners have job training and can help their amilies; so we can reduce the

general lack o productivity, and we can stop the extortion and crime that emanate

rom the jails; to create technical vocational training centers where all poor youth

have access; to bet on prevention and rehabilitation o gang members and together

nd solutions that reduce the violence.12

Te government dismissed Rodrguez rom his post. Te Church hierarchy was

stunned but remained largely silent. Te Archbishop o San Salvador said there

would be a commission that would investigate the matter, but no investigation was

ever made public. For his part, Rodrguez was unbowed.

No one told me to read that press release, he told El Faro in an interview shortly

ater the incident. I read it because o the contact I had with some rehabilitated

youth who I believe when they say they are ready to change. 13

Still, Rodrguez looked nave. Even worse, to many it appeared as i Rodrguez wascondoning the gangs violent actions. Parts o the Church distanced themselves rom

him. And renewed dialogue between the government and the gangs, mediated by

the Church, appeared remote.

12 Accessed via the blog Hombres contra la violencia at: http://hombrescontralaviolencia.blogspot.mx/2010/09/comunicado-de-las-mara-ms13-y-la.html13El Faro, Este gobierno tambin crey en dilogo con los pandilleros, September 17, 2010. http://

www.elaro.net/es/201009/noticias/2487/


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For their part, the gangs agenda was less clear. Mojica said that the majority o the

gang members were Catholic and that this inuenced their decision about whether

to include the Church. He said they were also inuenced by the act that members

o the Church had given their lives during the Salvadoran civil war, and that they

had played a role in conict resolution. He mentioned liberation theology but

claimed ignorance as to what it meant aside rom illustrating that the Church hasalways been concerned with injustices.

Mijango added that the gangs were tired o dealing with government interlocutors and

political parties who they elt had betrayed them. Tis was reected in the document

the gangs emitted ollowing the truce in which they said the political class only made

things worse.22 Tey elt the Church gave the process a serious nature, he said.

Te Church gave [the gangs] a lot o condence, Mijango added.

At least some Church authorities seemed to realize how Mijango and Mungua

might be using the Church. Mijango told El Faro that he and Mungua spent all oDecember looking or a representative rom the Church.23 Te rst candidate was

the Archbishop o San Salvador, Jos Luis Escobar Alas. Ater Escobar declined, they

asked Bishop Rosa Chvez, who also said no. Tey then went to Raael Urrutia, the

head o the Miramonte Parish, and he declined as well. None o them explained why.

Not one bishop wanted to step up [ningn Obispo se motiv], Mijango said.

Finally, they approached Bishop Fabio Colindres. Colindres was an interesting and, as

it turns out, propitious choice. He was a very dierent gure than Father Rodrguez

or Bishop Rosa Chvez. He is the military chaplain in San Salvador and, beore the

talks, had had little contact with jails and gang leaders. But as has become clear, hehas cachet with the Salvadoran elites and the business community. He was also will-

ing to take a personal risk that could aect his standing in the Church and the larger

community. For Mijango and Mungua, he could not have said yes ast enough.24

Te Monseor arrived when wed already advanced a lot [in the talks], Mijango

told El Faro. And he arrived to ll a critical credibility gap.

Gang leaders welcomed Colindres in the talks that were occurring in the maximum-

security acility in Zacatecoluca. Mijango, who had been discussing these possibili-

ties with the gangs since at least December, played the role o one-time social

22 Communiqu: Los voceros nacionales de la Mara Salvatrucha MSX3 y Pandilla 18, March 19,2012. http://www.elaro.net/attachment/395/comaras.pd?g_download=123 his story was recounted to El Faro in detail by Mijango and Mungua in, La nueva verdad sobrela tregua entre pandillas, September 11, 2012. (http://www.salanegra.elaro.net/es/201209/croni-cas/9612/) However, Mijango would not reconirm the details to InSight Crime investigators, andMungua did not consent to an interview.24 In an interview with the author, Colindres disputed El Faros timeline, and said Mijango did notapproach him, Mungua did. He added that the three men talked and saw their mutual interestsoverlapping, which is why they decided to move orward with the plan.

18 A U CE NTE R F OR L AT I N A M E R I CA N & L AT I NO S TU DI E S | IV . THE TRUCE


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Despite these encouraging statistics, the truce is very unpopular. In a poll released in

July 2012 by the echnological University o El Salvador, 58 percent o respondents

said they had no condence in the truce, 26 percent said they had little con-

dence, and only 13 percent said they had a lot o condence.31 A more recent poll

in February 2013 had similar numbers, with 69 percent saying they did not trust the

gangs would hold their end o the deal.32

United States government ofcials have privately expressed concern about the

dangerous precedent the truce sets.33 Tis ear was perhaps most clearly delineated

in a paper by Douglas Farah or the Center or International and Strategic Studies

in which Farah says the gangs were, Surprised and pleased with the results o the

negotiations.

Teir leaders are beginning to understand that territorial control and cohesion

make it possible or them to wring concessions rom the state while preserving the

essence o their criminal character, he wrote. Tey are already discussing backing

certain candidates or local and national ofce in exchange or protection and theability to dictate parts o the candidates agenda.34

However, the Salvadoran government, sensing something o a political victory with

the dropping homicide rates, quickly began to reposition itsel. It opened the doors

or the Organization o the American States and the United Nations to observe and

participate in some meetings with gang leaders to see how they could help. And the

government eventually admitted it had acilitated the process.35 In a way, this was

related to the coming presidential elections, as both Funes and Mungua positioned

themselves and their parties or 2014.

Te institution that had a harder time dealing with its participation in the pact,however, was the Church.

31 Centro de Investigacin de la Opinin Pblica Salvadorea, Resultados de la encuesta LVI de

opinin pblica 20, 21, y 22 de julio 2012, Universidad ecnolgica de El Salvador. http://www.utec.edu.sv/utec_news/2011/BOLEINENCUESA5624dejulio2012.pd32La Prensa Grica, regua entre dudas, March 7, 2013. http://www.laprensagraica.com/regua--entre-dudas33 Author interviews with various State Department oicials, December 2012.34 Farah, Douglas, he ransormation o El Salvadors Gangs into Political Actors, the Center orStrategic and International Studies, June 21, 2012. http://csis.org/iles/publication/120621_Farah_Gangs_HemFocus.pd35InSight Crime, Govt-acilitated Gang ruce in Salvador Sets Dangerous Regional Precedent,March 29, 2012. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/el-salvador-president-denies-negotiating

with-gangs

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V. The Church and the Truce

T

he gang truce put the Church in a difcult position. In the public eye, it

aligned the institution with a visible and unpopular actor. For the more

enlightened, the gangs are an unortunate socio-economic phenomenon

that has let thousands o youth marginalized; or many more, they are an

illegal irregular army that preys on the most vulnerable population. Te

gangs are not strong supporters o the Churchs work and their acts contradict most o

what the Church teaches. I the Church espouses the cause o this volatile actor, it risks

alienating its most powerul backers and its most ervent ollowers.

However, many others believe the Church must act on this issue. Te negative

consequences o the gangs activities, as well as those o the governments hard line

response to these criminal acts, have devastated Salvadoran society. Many in the

Church, including Colindres, believe its mandate is to oster peace by assisting the

most downtrodden and marginalized. And the Churchs years o work in prisonsprovided a rationale or Colindres to participate in the truce.

Still, it is important to note that the decision to participate was not made by the Churchs

hierarchy. Te Churchs organizational structure is hierarchical but also horizontal. While

it has institutions, such as the Catholic Conerence o Bishops, that steer the Churchs

message and others, in particular the Pope, who have the ability to sanction those

that veer too ar rom its course its individual bishops are somewhat autonomous.

Colindres, or example, said he had decided to participate in the gang mediation process

on his own, something his colleague, Bishop Gregorio Rosa Chvez, conrmed.

Colindres says he accepted the invitation on purely religious grounds, and he cites tworeasons. First, Colindres emphasized the role the Church has played in advocating or

the poor and disadvantaged. In El Salvador, this role includes advocating or better

conditions and care or prisoners. Specically, it was what Colindres called a health

concern: Colindres says he saw terminally ill prisoners who were not getting the right

care and that the relatives o these prisoners were clamoring or better medical atten-

tion. He urther links this concern or the poor to assisting conict resolution.

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I cant say i there are people who are sabotaging the process but I do eel that there

are interests that are not seeking to help or understand the process that we are do-

ing, he explained. One o the motives is political. Te other is ego, and this is the

worst o all because the human element in this is huge.

Parts o the Church also began to publicly question Colindres solo initiative andwonder aloud whether the Church had been used by Mijango and Mungua.

Te Church is not participating, Rodrguez said. We have reduced the Church to

one person who doesnt even have the support o the Church.

Complaints also came rom the Conerence o Bishops. Colindres, it appears, has

not put any conditions on his participation and appears content to allow Mijango

to steer the substantive part o the process. Whats more, Colindres has not included

the Church in his actions or attempted to integrate other parts o the Church in the

process going orward. Tis has widened the chasm between him and the rest o the

Church.

It seems like a good initiative, Rosa Chvez told El Faro. And it was supported at

two dierent times: in a press release rom all the bishops and then the archbishop in

a press conerence. But I thought the process would have a more inclusive dynamic

that would take advantage o the Churchs experience and capacity. However, what

happened later is that ater the announcement o the process, the Church has not

been inormed or involved.

However, Colindres bristles at these contentions, especially that the Church has been

used. For him, it is enough to be acting within ones conscience and in good aith.

Inclusion is not part o his mandate. And judging others motives is not part o hismodus operandi.

Tis type o assertion startles me in the sense that the Church has always acted in

a humanitarian way and or the common good, he said. Whatever it believes is

necessary. I someone thinks to use the Church or believes they are using the Church

as a puppet or their own ends this would, in the end, be on the conscience o the

person who was doing it. What I can tell you is that the Church will not lend itsel,

nor has it lent itsel, to this end. Te Church is simply acting in a conscious and cor-

rect way or the common good and or the most needy.

Regardless o their perceptions o the role the Church has played in the truce,Colindres and the Church are connected in this process. Perhaps in part because

o this, as the process has consolidated, the two have sought to reconcile, or at least

looked or some type o middle ground. In November, numerous churches partici-

pated in a Day o Peace, to support the truce.39 In December, Colindres and Rosa

Chvez celebrated mass together.

39La Prensa Grica, Iglesias celebrarn en San Salvador jornada por la paz, November 14, 2012.http://www.laprensagraica.com/Iglesias-celebraran-en-San-Salvador-jornada-por-la-paz

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V. T HE CH UR CH A N D T HE TR UC E | A U CE N TE R F OR LAT I N A M E RI CA N & L AT I NO S TU DI E S 2 5

In March, Father Antonio Rodrguez, the same priest who designed the earlier

truce, joined the eort to strengthen the process. Tis came just days ater one gang

member who had joined his Church in the Mejicanos neighborhood had been killed

by suspected members o the Barrio 18 gang. In an email exchange with the author,

Rodrguez seemed more amenable to what the truce represented, characterizing it as

a reduction in homicides that could convert into a ull-edged peace process. 40

I have not joined the truce, he said, reerring to the gangs agreement amongst

themselves to stop ghting. I am joining the eort to reduce homicides and

criminality.

Rodrguez described himsel as a mediator or the various strategies. Undoubtedly

that includes the multiple positions within the Church, which Rodrguez said is still

split between the political and the practical wings o that institution. Te political

wing, he said, is pushing or the Church to maintain its distance rom the process,

driven, in part, by personality clashes. Te practical side which he considers him-

sel a part o is participating because o the incredible potential the truce has toreduce the violence in El Salvador. He added that some eight bishops were sending

priests to work under the table with the process.

However, these overtures have not led to a uller rapprochement rom the Church

hierarchy. While the truce has progressed, the Church has remained divided, and

Colindres continues to act without any urther public backing rom the Bishops

Conerence or other parts o the Church. Even Rodrguez emphasized that he was

very aware o the possible pitalls in the process and would maintain his critical

stance towards certain aspects o it.

I am taking part (in the process) despite my criticism, doubts, questions, he said inthe email exchange.

Te government, meanwhile, has designated 14 municipalities as peace zones (muni-

cipios santuarios). In these zones, the gangs have promised crime ree areas to acili-

tate the implementation o the social and economic programs or gang and non-gang

members alike. Te government, with the help o Colindres and the Organization or

American States, has also created a non-governmental organization to begin channel-

ing unds into social and economic programs or the gangs. And it is trying to line up

donors to help und rehabilitation programs and employers to do job trainings.

In March, the government started sending delegates to Washington, DC to get more

international support or the truce. Mijango, Colindres, Mungua and President

Funes himsel all made trips to the U.S. Tese eorts culminated in a public speech

Funes made at an event in mid-April hosted by the World Bank and the Inter-

American Development Bank in which Funes called the truce an opening.

40 Father Antonio Rodrguez, email message to author, May 1, 2013.


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26 A U C E NT E R FOR L AT I N A ME R I C A N & LAT I N O S T UD I E S | V. TH E CH U RC H AN D TH E TR U CE

We saw in the truce an opportunity or our country, he told a standing-room-

only crowd at a World Bank auditorium in Washington, DC. Te truce is not the

solution, but it creates a dierent environment to try to nd other solutions that are

more proound, integral, and structural.41

Yet there are already problems and many hurdles to overcome. Extortions in ElSalvador continue and may even be on the rise.42 Murders allegedly related to gang

activity, including several in the countrys rst peace zone, have shaken condence

in the gangs ability to hold their members in check and honor the truce.43 Polls

show that the publics condence is still low and trust in the gangs is scant. Te gang

leaders public posture is that o peace, but those living in gang areas say extortions

continue apace.44

Tose running job training and micro-lending programs already in motion many

o them with non-gang members worry that the new money coming in will go

unevenly towards gang-heavy programs. Veteran social workers also wonder how

they will integrate rival gang members into these programs. Analysts are speculatingthat the gangs will begin to exert the considerable political capital they have gathered

during this process. Troughout this time period, the gangs have not renounced

their way o lie and some worry they may simply be using this as a period o recu-

peration and reorganization.

Tese next phases are critical. Te truce has held but appears ragile. Te govern-

ment is pushing or programs but struggling to organize these eorts and convince

donors to move quickly. ime is a actor but the means by which the government

has gotten this ar have been ad hoc and ill-planned, making the next phases even

more difcult.

Te government needs help, but a divided Church does not appear ready to step

into the chasm on a more institutional level. o be sure, the way government nego-

tiators handled the Churchs participation as virtually an aterthought and as a way

to ll a critical credibility gap and used it to legitimate its eorts with the gangs

without ully integrating its members may backre. Colindres participation may

have, in other words, bought the government time but not necessarily created a rm

base or uture cooperation needed to sustain the process.

41 Mauricio Funes, speech to World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank, April 19, 2013.42InSight Crime, Rising extortion Signals rouble or El Salvadors Gang ruce, March 18, 2013.http://www.insightcrime.org/news-bries/rising-extortions-trouble-salvador-gang-truce43InSight Crime, Is Uptick in Murders Eroding El Salvador Gang ruce? February 21, 2013. http://

www.insightcrime.org/news-bries/vengeance-killings-undermine-el-salvador-gang-truce44El Faro, Si me van a zampar preso, que tambin zampen a Mauricio Funes y a Mungua Pays,March 11, 2013. http://www.elaro.net/es/201303/noticias/11312/


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V I . CO NC LU S I ON S | A U C E N TE R F OR L A T I N A M E R I C A N & L A T I N O S TU D I E S 2 7

T

he Catholic Church in El Salvador has a tumultuous history. It has long

been stuck between warring sides in a country marred by inequalities

and violence. It has been internally divided by what role it is supposed

to take amidst these longstanding conicts. On the one side, there are

advocates o direct, political action that address perceived injustices. On

the other are proponents o spiritual, humanitarian deeds that address basic human

necessities.

Te latest debate about which path the Church should take occurred ater Bishop

Fabio Colindres, a military chaplain, took part in an eort to develop a truce

between the two largest street gangs in El Salvador who were responsible or a large

portion o the violence in this country. Te truce, which took eect in March 2012,

has halved the murder rate in one o the most violent countries on the planet. In

return, the government transerred 30 gang leaders to other prisons and promisedsocial and economic programs to begin what it hopes will be the beginning o the

end o their gang issues.

But striking a deal with the gangs is a tricky issue. Many Salvadorans and outside

observers question the truce as a good long-term strategy to curb the violence and

integrate the gang members into society. Critics, which include some members o

the Church and the United States government, among others, believe this truce

could set a dangerous precedent and give the gangs an increased political role that is

based on the perverse notion that more homicides equal more political capital. Te

gangs are also very unpopular and do not seem to represent much beyond them-

selves and their immediate amilies.

Te convoluted, opaque way the Church became involved in this process is trou-

bling, and the exact role that Colindres played is unclear. Te government seemed

to go to the Church as a way to plug a political and moral gap when the gangs were

ready to sign a truce but the government was not ready to take ownership o it. Tey

asked at least two others in the Church hierarchy, as well as a prominent capital

priest, who all said no. Colindres, however, said yes.

VI. Conclusions


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28 AU CENTER FOR LATIN AMERICAN & LATINO STUDIES | V I . C ON CL US I O NS

From the beginning, the Bishop has claimed that he was concerned with the condi-

tions inside the countrys prisons but also said that he, and his civilian counterpart in

these talks, Ral Mijango, were mediators. He says he is motivated by humanitar-

ian concerns but also that he has personal connections to many o those aected by

the gang problems, specically the military and the police who were being killed in

the ght to contain the gangs themselves. But he has also acted independently romthe Church hierarchy, distancing himsel rom Church leaders even while claiming

to represent the Church as a whole.

Te contradiction has put the Church in a difcult position. Te Church now nds

itsel implicated in a process that it is not ready to take institutional ownership o,

despite its initial successes. Ater initial support, the Conerence o Bishops and the

Papal Nuncio have gone largely silent. Many people speculate about rits inside the

Church that range rom the personal to the political to the religious.

Colindres continues to participate, albeit without the public backing o his col-

leagues and seemingly oblivious to their concerns that the process remains opaqueand exclusive. He traveled to Washington, DC in April with Mijango to sell the

truce to the U.S. government and the international donor community. He continues

to shuttle messages o goodwill between the gangs and the private sector. And he

remains a credible interlocutor, particularly or the Salvadoran military.

However, inside and outside o the Church, there is the perception that Colindres,

and by extension the Church, was used by Mijango and Security Minister David

Mungua, who engineered the strategy and the talks, to legitimize these eorts.

Tese critics include some o Colindres colleagues who worry that the actions o

one man may tarnish the Churchs image and are not representative o the Churchsposition on this matter. In these critics eyes, the Church is nothing more than a

puppet, even though its role could and should include a more hands-on approach to

the actual construction o the agreements and the implementation o the accords.

For his part, Colindres deends his actions and says the naysayers are jealous o his

role. It is a role he seems to embrace even as the truce moves into its next phase: the

creation o peace zones where the gangs say they will ban homicides and extortion by

their members, and the government says it will implement social and economic pro-

grams. Ironically, the governments callous use o the Church and Colindres isolation

rom its hierarchy may play a role in the truces undoing. Neither the government nor

Colindres can implement the next phase o the truce without the backing o institu-tions like the Church. However, at this point, that ence may be too hard to mend.

Te Church now ndsitsel implicated in aprocess that it is not

ready to take institutionalownership o, despite itsinitial successes.


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CLALS Whitepaper F

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