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SUSAN HA.ACK

SCIENCE AS SOCIAL? - YES AND NO'

Ours is an age in which partial truths are tirelessly transformed into total falsehood

as revolutionary revelations [Thomas

Staszl.:

INTRODUCTION

Some feminist philosophers of science claim the insight that scienc

It is true that the co-operative and competitive engagement o

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need for some re-thinking of the presuppositions of this, as I sha

Deferentialist" approach.

Radical critics of the Old Deferentialist picture' the "New Cynic

that there

are no

objective epistemic standards and that there is noth

logically special about science. My view of the matter is much less e

are objective epistemic standards. As I argued in

Evidence and Inqui

dards are not internal to science; they are the standards by which

worth of empirical evidence, and the rigor and thoroughness of emp

generally. By those standards, science has succeeded astonishingly w

not epistemologically privileged, but it is epistemologically distinguis

It is important to distinguish standards for judging the worth of

standards for the conduct of inquiry. The two are run together

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SCIENCE AS SOCIAL YES AND NO

success; as having plausibly filled in long, central entries greatly im

prospects for completing other parts of the puzzle.

Science has done this. not in virtue of its possession of a uniqu

method of inquiry, but because of the ways in which it has strengthene

and extended the m ethod all of us use when we try to figure out som

question. There is no such thing as

-

the scientific method" in the nar

which the phrase purportedly refers to a set of rules which can be gu

produce true, or probably true, or progressively more nearly true,

mechanical procedure can avoid the need for discretion, good judge

revealed by the Popperian shift from: make a bold conjecture, test it a

possible, and, if counter-evidence is found, abandon it and start again

bold conjecture, test it as severely as possible, and, if counter-eviden

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obliquely interconnected, areas of the puzzle. Then again, some inqui

suited by taste and temperament for deep or broad theoretical specula

precise and patient observation, some for devising complex instrume

for elaborate statistical evaluation, and so forth (rather as if we h

anagrams, specialists in Shakespearean allusions, devotees of exotic

and so on, working together on part of a crossword).

The social character of science also helps to compensate for indiv

nesses and idiosyncrasies. I doubt that criteria of better and worse

yield a linear ordering, and I am sure that no mechanical decision-

theory-choice is to be anticipated. But a community of inquirers wi

usefully, include some who are quick to start speculating towards

when the evidence begins to disfavor the old one, and others w

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SCIENCE AS SOCIAL" - NTS AND NO

Thus far I have focused on how the social character of science co

success. But both its internal organization and the environment in

work is conducted may be more

or less

conducive to good, hon

scrupulous inquiry. When one thinks of potential hindrances, the dr

of Nazi and Soviet science come first to rnind.'

3

These represent e

how the politicization of science, by putting scientists under press

dence favouring a politically desired conclusion, rather than honest

what hypothesis is best warranted, impedes achievement of the g

Other potential hindrances include: pressUre to solve problems whic

as socially urgent, rather than freedom to pursue those most suscep

in the present state of knowledge; the necessity to spend large amou

energy on obtaining resources, and to impress whatever body provid

due course, with one's success; dependence for resources on bodies

in the research coming out this way or that, or in rivals' being deni

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course, very fallible and imperfect) factors which help to

keep acce

priately correlated with warrant, they insist on "science as socia

focusing on

acceptance at the expense of warrant.

In fact, quite a go

Op on these various radical interpretations is to classify them acco

play down w arrant and accentuate acceptance; ignore warrant a

acknowledge only acceptance; or attempt to replace the notion of wa

socio-political ersatz.

Those who play down warrant and accentuate acceptance insist

determination of theory by

evidence

and the inextricability of non-ev

in theory-choice. Hence the first of the radical interpretations

social" that I want to consider that social values are inseparable

inquiry.

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truth, to act as if the theory were true (which is the sense in which it

true that "we have to accept

something"))'

A closely related interpretation of the theme of "science as social

goal of science is the improvement of society."' There is a temptation t

pointing to the OED's: "research - endeavour to discover facts"; bu

miss the point, which is, I take it, that the goal of science

ought to be

ment of society. Even taken as proposing only that science focus its

socially urgent problems, this is dubious. Knowledge is interconn

predictable ways, so it is hard to be sure what research will bring so

and focusing scientific effort artificially on problem s perceived as soci

apt to mean w asted resources, for the problems w hich we m ost want s

always those most susceptible to solution in the current state of kno

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issue is: scientific knowledge is nothing more than the product

social negotiation.

2

This is doubly false. First: the processes t

scientific knowledge is achieved are not

merely a

matter of social n

are processes of seeking out, checking, and assessing the weigh

Second, not everything that has thus far survived those processe

what survives those processes is what counts as

knowledge, wh

as knowledge but not all of it

is,

necessarily, knowledge. Som

surviving those processes, not be warranted; some may turn out to b

Some hold not only that knowledge, but also that reality, is socia

thus committing the same kinds of confusion twice over. Scientif

devised, articulated, developed, by scientists; theoretical concept

gene, force,

and so forth, are, if you like, their construction. And the

in true scientific theories arc real. But it doesn't follow, and neithe

electrons, genes, forces, etc., are constructed by the activity of the

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the slightest tendency to support the idea that democracy could rep

supportiveness, independent security, and comprehensiveness o

epistemic values.

22

What, finally, of the thesis that the physical sciences are subordina

sciences? This would be a consequence of the claim that reality i

structed; if physical science were, as that claim has it, a kind of myth

indeed, anthropology would achieve a certain priority over physics.

sequence so grossly implausible as to amount to a

reductio - albeit

a

- of social constructivism.

23

In any event, I shall not linger over th

subord inate to sociology" thesis, since it now appears for w hat I

desperate last-ditch effort to save one or another of the radical inte

"science as social" by focusing attention on complications which, if

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competition, productive rivalry. And it evades the question, w

scientific knowledge stressing supposedly feminine qualities should

be a better truer, more adequate theory of scientific knowledge.

Most feminist philosophers of science, however, have been attrac

of "science as social" in one and/or another of the radical interpret

in section II. Longino and Nelson are com mitted to the thesis that s

inextricable from science, both urging that the underdeterminatio

data leaves "slack" to be taken up by political considerations.

27 He

connection with feminism is clear enough: "doing science as a

thought is, requires one to ensure that it is feminist values that info

But, in the relevant interpretation, the thesis that science is social is

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This inference is, of course, fallacious; but it is so ubiquitous that

name: I call it "the 'passes for' fallacy."

Its ubiquity is closely r

astonishing outbreak of sneer quotes one finds in the literature of fe

sophy of science ("knowledge," "truth," "reality," "objectivity," et

with the pull towards accounts which accentuate acceptance. i.e., wha

time taken to be scientific knowledge. over warrant. It is worthy of

"passes for" fallacy is encouraged by the idea which, to repeat. I

epistemic standards are internal to science.

The "passes for" fallacy is ubiquitous; but I want to focus for a

characteristic. instance. It occurs in a paper in the first half of which

explains why she believes that the claim that there are differences in br

and function between the sexes which explain the (as she adds, th

gender-related d ifferences in cognitive ability, is not well-warrante

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that it is not good, honest, thorough, inquiry; so I do not think it a

describe my epistemological position as "feminist"

anything.

The point is not that I don't think sexism in scientific theorizin

science; I do. It is not that I don't care about justice for women; I do.

don't think there are legitimate feminist questions ethical and poli

about science; I do.

34

It is, rather, that I see the aspiration to a fem

logy of science as pulling towards the politicization of inquiry; which

whether in the interests of good political values or bad, is always epi

unsound.

And it is no more sound feminism than it is sound epistemology.

another paper to spell out in detail why, in my opinion, what is prese

as "feminist philosophy of science" is contrary to women's interes

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SCIENCE AS SOCIAL? - YES AND NO

Questions,

8.1

Spring 1995. 20-31; to 'Towards a Sober Sociology of Science.*

Reason a nd Science.

cds Paul R. Gross and N orman Levitt. in

Annals of the Ne

Sciences,

775,

1996. 259-65, and forthcoming w ith Johns Hopk ins University Pr

and to 'The Puzzle of "Scientific Method".' forthcoming

in Revue Internationale de

6

Substantiar

here, should not be interpreted as meaning simply, "synthetic." Th

intended, substantial mathematical truths, and trivial empirical ones. In this

Collected Papers

4.91: "those who 'like myself] maintain that arithmetical t

necessary" are not

co ipso saying that they are verbal in their nature.'

7 I have given here a very brief summary of the much more detailed account to be fo

and inquiry.

Chapter 4. I note that this account acknowledges that there is such a

but-less-than-conclusive evidence, but does not require that there be a fornuilizable i

The analogy is due to Michael Polanyi, from The Republic of Science,' in

Kno

Marjorie Utile, University of C hicago Press. Chicago, IL, 1969, 49-62.

At the time of w riting

Evidence and Inquiry

pointed out the difficulty of extrapol

there offered of "A is more/less justified in believing

that p" to

the impersonal locu

The present paragraph offers an extrapolation to 'To is warranted within comm unit

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2t

The strategy is illustrated in a particularly striking way by the terms in which,

Whose Knowledge?

(Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY. 1991) Sandra Hardin

"justify" her theory. which unmistakably reveal that she has identified this with the q

her theory to this or that audience.

22

Some of those who think science would be better if it were more democratic ma

the epistemological issues on which l have focused, but questions of access to scien

they have run the two sorts of question together). Certainly it is desirable that no

excluded from science on the grounds of race, sex. eye-color. or any irrelevant factor

rather a meritocratic than a democratic one.

" Putting me in mind of C. 1. Lewis's shrewd description of the method -which the

applies": "he simply doesn't believe any evidence which is unfavorable to his bigote

any such is put forward, he will argue it away by using this same method over again

Nature of the Right,

Columbia University Press. New York. NY, 1955, p. 321.

4 The Science Question in Feminism,

Cornell University Press, Ithaca. NY. 1986. p.

25 So. in a minimal sort of way. did J. S. Mill. who qualifies as a feminist if any mal

But this obviously does not establish the required connection.

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SCIENCE AS SOCIAL ' YES AND NO

Man Field Belenky, Blythe Mcvicker Clinch

Nancy Rule Goldberger and J

tionven

i

li 'ays of

Knivinnk".

Basic Books. Ness York. NY. 190 - a remarkable ssor

.ctente. As antidotes. I recommend Carol Tay ris. The

sure 04 Woman.

Simon

York. NY and London. 1992. especially Chapter

2:

and Martha T. Mednick.

Psychological Constructs: Stop the Bandwagon, I Want to Get 011.'

Amen, an

-23.

Apropos. see Harriet Baher, The Market for Feminist Epistemology.'

The Mo

1994. 403-23.

r

That is preposterous sthic.h puts the last first and the first last... Valuing k

p,,,ierize

the idea and %a

,

servhodv shall produce written research in order to

decreed a know. ledge cAplosion

-

- Jacques Barrun,

The American University.

Har

York. NY. Iianston. IL. and London, 1968, p 221

See

also Susan Haack. "Pr

Cori ,cquoucs.'

Smith' Philosophy and Polies.

13.2. 1996. 296-315. and in

St

PhilosophA. and Public eds Ellen Frankel Paul

et rtt..

Cambridge University

19%.

296--315