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FM 90-36

MCRP 3-16.1F

NWP 2-01.11

AFJPAM 10-225

TARGETING

THE JOINT TARGETING PROCES

AND

PROCEDURES FOR TARGETIN

TIME-CRITICAL TARGETS

JULY 1997

DISTRIBUTIONRESTRICTION: Approvedfor public release; distribution unlimited.

ARMY, MARINE CORPS, NAVY, AIR FORCE

AIR LAND SEAAPPLICATION

CENTER

MULTISERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

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FOREWORD

This publicat ion ha s been pr epared un der our direction for use by our respective

comma nds an d oth er comma nds as a ppropriate.

WILLIAM W. HARTZOG

General, USA

Commander

Training an d Doctrine Comman d

PAUL K. VAN R IP ER

Lieutena nt Genera l, USMC

Comma nding General

Marine Corps Combat

Development Command

MICHAEL L. BOWMAN

Rear Admiral, USN

Commander

Naval Doctrine Comma nd

BY ORDER OF THE

SECRE TARY OF THE AIR FORCE

JOHN P. J UMPE R

Lt Gen, US AF

DCS/Plans and Operations

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PREFACE

procedures , gu idance , and in format ion .

However , i t i s no t i n t ended fo r t h i s

publication to supplant any higher joint or

combatant command directives.

3 . A p p l i c a t i o n

This publicat ion provides JF Cs an d th eir

opera tional sta ffs un classified guidance for

the joint t ar geting process an d sur face TCT

ta rgeting operat ions. Plan ners can use this

publication to coordinate, deconflict, and

synchronize target ing operat ions among

com ponen t s a s s i gned t o a j o i n t fo rce .

Accordingly, this document serves as a

corn erst one for pla nn ers t o build an d execut e

coordina ted an d int egrated joint operat ions.Also, it will assist component tr ain ing efforts

when tasked to support multiple theaters.

F i n a l l y, t h i s pu b l i ca t i on p rov i des a

persp ective on how oth er componen ts d efine

their service targeting process.

This pu blicat ion is a ppr oved for u se

by the Un ited Sta tes Arm y, Mar ine Corps,

Na vy, and Air Force.

4 . I m p l e m e n t a t i o n P l a n

Participating service command offices of

primary responsibility (OPRs) will review

this publication, validate the information,

and reference and incorporate it in service

m anua l s , r egu l a t i ons , and cu r r i cu l a a s

follows:

A r m y . The Army will incorporate the

procedures in this publication in US Army

t r a i n i n g a n d d o c t r i n a l p u b l i c a t i o n s a s

d i r e c t e d b y t h e c o m m a n d e r , U S A r my

Training and Doctrine Command. Distribu-tion is in a ccorda nce with DA For m 12-11E.

M a r i n e C o r p s . The Marine Corps will

incorpora te th e procedur es in this publication

in US Marine Corps training and doctrinal

publicat ions a s directed by th e comman ding

g e n e r a l , U S M a r i n e C o r p s C o m b a t

Developmen t Comma nd. Distribu tion is in

accord an ce with MCPDS.

1 . S c o p e

This publ ica t ion descr ibes the jo in t

t a rge t i ng p roces s and p rov i des t ac t i c s ,

t echn i ques , and p rocedu res (TTP) fo r

targeting surface (lan d or sea) tim e-crit ical

t a rge t s (TCTs ) . I t des c r i bes s pec i f i c

procedur es for joint force componen ts in t he

coordination, deconfliction, and synchro-

nization of ra pid targeting and a tta cks in a

joint environmen t. Though n ot prescript ive,

this publ icat ion recommends procedures

w h e n m u l t i p l e c o m p o n e n t s h a v e t h e

capa bility to locate, iden tify, tr ack, att ack, and

evaluate targets in overlapping areas of

re spons ibility. The overa ll objective of th ispubl icat ion is to provide the joint force

comma nder (J FC) and st aff TTP t o destroy

sur face TCTs a nd coordina te, deconflict, an d

synchronize the ent ire joint effort. By doing

so, th e J FC can min imize duplication of effort

a n d t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r f r a t r i c i d e w h i l e

accomplishing th e objective of rapid r esponse.

2 . P u r p o s e

This publicat ion ha s been prepar ed under

the direction of the commander, US ArmyTra ining an d Doctrine Comma nd (TRADOC);

comma nding general, Mar ine Corps Combat

D e v e l o p m e n t C o m m a n d ( M C C D C ) ;

com m ander , Nava l Doc t r i ne Com m and

(NDC) ; and com m ander , A i r Com ba t

Comma nd (ACC). It sets forth mu ltiservice

TTP t o guide th e activities an d perform an ce

of their commands when conducting joint,

multina tiona l, an d intera gency operat ions. It

provides guidance for geograph ic comba ta nt

comma nders, J FCs, and th eir staffs. It is not

the intent of this publicat ion t o restrict t he

au t hor i ty of the J FC. The JFC ha s fu l l

au th ority to organize th e force an d execut e

t he m i s s i on i n a m anner deem ed m os t

appr opriate to ensur e un ity of effort in th e

accomplishm ent of th e overa ll mission. This

publ ica t ion augments and complements

existing joint doctrine and joint TTP by

providing additional operat iona l warfight ing

M a r i n e C o r p s : P C N 1 4 4 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0

A i r F o r c e D i s t r i b u t i o n : F

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N a v y . The Navy will incorporate these

procedures in U S Na vy training and doctrina l

publications as directed by the commander,

Na val Doctr ine Comm an d. Distr ibution is in

accorda nce with MILSTRIP Desk Guide an d

NAVSOP Pub 409.

A i r F o r c e . H e a d q u a r t e r s A ir F or c ed e l e g a t e d a p p r o v a l a u t h o r i t y f o r t h i s

publication to the commander, Air Combat

Comm an d. Air Force units will validat e and

i n c o r p o r a t e a p p r o p r i a t e p r o c e d u r e s i n

a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a p p l i c a b l e g o v e r n i n g

directives. Distribut ion is in accordan ce with

AFI 37-160

5 . U s e r I n f o r m a t i o n

a . The TRADOC-MCCDC-NDC-ACC

Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center

developed this publication with the joint

par t i c ipa t ion of the approving serv ice

comm an ds. ALSA will review an d upda te

th is publicat ion as necessar y.

b. We encoura ge recommended chan ges

for improving th is pu blicat ion. Key your

c o m m e n t s t o t h e s p e c i f i c p a g e a n d

par agra ph a nd pr ovide a r at iona le for ea ch

recomm enda t ion . Send comm ent s an d

recomm enda tion directly to

Army

C o m m a n d e r

U S A r m y T r a i n i n g a n d D o c t r i n e C o m m a n d

A T T N : A T D O - A

F o r t M o n r o e V A 2 3 6 5 l - 5 0 0 0

D S N 6 8 0 - 3 1 5 3 C O M M ( 7 5 7 ) 7 2 7 - 3 1 5 3

Marine Corps

C o m m a n d i n g G e n e r a l

U S M a r i n e C o r p s C o m b a t D e v e l o p m e n t C o m m a n d

A T T N : C 4 2

3 3 0 0 R u s s e l l R o a d

Q u a n t i c o V A 2 2 1 3 4 - 5 0 2 1

D S N 2 7 8 - 6 2 3 4 C O M M ( 7 0 3 ) 7 8 4 - 6 2 3 4

NavyN a v a l D o c t r i n e C o m m a n d

A T T N : N 3

1 5 4 0 G i l b e r t S t

N o r f o l k V A 2 3 5 1 1 - 2 7 8 5

D S N 5 6 5 - 0 5 6 3 C O M M ( 7 5 7 ) 4 4 5 - 0 5 6 3

E - m a i l A d d r e s s : n d c j o i n t @ n c t a m s l a n t . n a v y . m i l

Air Force

H Q A i r C o m b a t C o m m a n d

A T T N : X P J

2 0 4 D o d d B o u l e v a r d S u i t e 2 0 2

L a n g l e y A F B V A 2 3 6 6 5 - 2 7 7 8

D S N 5 7 4 - 7 7 6 3 C O M M ( 7 5 7 ) 7 6 4 - 7 7 6 3

E - m a i l A d d r e s s : a c c x p j @ h q a c c x p . l a n g l e y . a f . m i l

ALSA

A L S A C e n t e r

A T T N : D i r e c t o r

1 1 4 A n d r e w s S t r e e t

L a n g l e y A F B V A 2 3 6 6 5 - 2 7 8 5

D S N 5 7 4 - 5 9 3 4 C O M M ( 7 5 7 ) 7 6 4 - 5 9 3 4

E - m a i l A d d r e s s : a l s a d i r e c t @ a l s a . l a n g l e y . a f . m i l

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c. This publication reflects current joint

and service doctrine, command and control

organizations, facilities, personnel, respon-

sibilities, an d procedur es. Cha nges in service

protocol, appr opriat ely reflected in joint an d

s e rv i ce pub l i ca t i ons , w i l l l i kewi s e be

incorpora ted in r evisions to this docum ent .

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F M 9 0 - 3 6

M C R P 3 - 1 6 . 1 F

N W P 2 - 0 1 . 1 1

A F J P A M 1 0 - 2 2 5

F M 9 0 - 3 6

US Army Training and Doctrine CommandFort Monroe, Virginia

M C R P 3 - 1 6 . 1 F Marine Corps Combat Development CommandQuantico, Virginia

N W P 2 - 0 1 . 1 1 Naval Doctrine Command

Norfolk, Virginia

A F J P A M 1 0 - 2 2 5 Air Combat Command

Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

25 JULY 1997

TARGETINGThe Joint Targeting Process

andProcedures For Targeting Time-Critical Targets

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................. v i

CHAPTER I THE JOINT TARGETING PROCESSBa ckground ................................................................................................. I - 1

J oint Target ing Process .............................................................................. I - 2

Organ izing for th e Joint Tar getin g Pr ocess ............................................ I - 1 0

CHAPTER II PROCEDURES FOR TARGETING TIME-CRITICAL TARGETSSu rface Time-Crit ical Ta rget s ................................................................... I I - 1

Ta rget of Opport un ity ................................................................................ I I - 2

Atta cks Against Su rface TCTsThe Ch allen ge ......................................I I - 2

J FC 's Objectives an d Guida nce for Su rface TCTs ................................... I I - 4

Availability of Su rface TCT Capable Att ack Asset s ................................ I I - 4

Det ermin at ion of "Best Ca pa ble" Su rface TCT Asset ............................. I I - 5

Plan ned Procedur es for Atta cking Sur face TCTs .................................... I I - 6

Comma nd an d Cont rol St ru ctu rin g ........................................................I I - 3 4

Batt le Man agem ent Syst em In ter conn ectivity ...................................... I I - 3 6

APPENDIX A CONTINGENCY THEATER AUTOMATED PLANNINGSYSTEM (CTAPS) ................................................................................... A - 1

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APPENDIX B ADVANCED FIELD ARTILLERY TACTICAL DATA

SYSTEM (AFATDS) .................................................................................. B - 1

APPENDIX C AUTOMATED DEEP OPERATIONS COORDINATIONSYSTEM (ADOCS) ................................................................................... C - 1

REFERENCES ....................................................................................................... R e f e r e n c e s - 1

GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................. G l o s s a r y - 1

INDEX ................................................................................................................................ I n d e x - 1

FIGURES I-1 Gener al Ta rget Ca tegories an d Subcat egories .................................... I-1

I-2 The J oint Tar get ing Process ................................................................. I-3I-3 The Army/Marine Corps Tar geting Pr ocess Overlaid onto the

J oint Ta rge tin g Process ..................................................................... I-3

II-1 Surface TCT Relationship to Planned a nd Immediate Targets ........ II-2

II-2 TOO Relationship to Surface TCTs and Im mediat e Targets ............ II-3II-3 St and ar d Baselin e Gr id Box .............................................................. II-16II-4A Four Qua dr an t Su bdivision Option .................................................. II-17

II-4B Nin e Sector Su bdivision Option ........................................................ II-17II-5 Exa mple Th ea ter Layout ................................................................... II-18

II-6 Grid Box La beling an d Iden tificat ion ............................................... II-19II-7 Grid Box Subd ivision F our Qua dra nt ............................................... II-20II-8 Grid Box Su bdivision Nine Sector .................................................... II-20

II-9 Grid Box Ta rge t Refinem en t ............................................................. II-21II-10 Separ a te Grid Box Syst ems ............................................................... II-22

II-11 Multiple Component Attack Opera tions Using a SingleGr id Box Referen ce Syst em ............................................................ II-23

II-12 Bullseye Reference System ................................................................ II-26II-13 Bullseye Exam ple #1 .......................................................................... II-27II-14 Bullseye Exam ple #2 .......................................................................... II-27

II-15 ATACMS PAH (ROZ) ........................................................................ II-29II-16 ATACMS TAH (ROZ) ........................................................................ II-31

TABLES A-1 CTAPS Applications an d Cap abilities ................................................A-1

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TARGETINGThe Joint Targeting Process

and

Procedures for Targeting Time-Critical Targets

Overview

Joint force commanders (JFCs) require common joint targeting procedures to deconflict

targeting operations, prevent duplication of effort, and reduce the potential for fratricide

th roughout t he fluid, dynam ic bat tlespace. This is especially tr ue wh en joint force componen ts

have ar eas of operat ions t ha t potentially overlap, as well as mu tua l interests an d capabilities

to strike ta rgets of common inter est. The J FC or component comma nder m ay designa te th ese

ta rgets a s time-critical, priority ta rgets. E ach component h as t he a bility to view the batt lespace

with a multitude of surveillance and reconnaissance assets (organic, joint, and national).However, complicatin g th is pr oblem is th e fact th at componen ts lack common tar geting

references for t he bat tlespace. Few common ta rgeting reference systems exist t ha t en sure a ll

ta rget s possess discret e reference nu mber s un iversally recognized by all joint force componen ts.

One such system is the basic encyclopedia (BE) nu mber ing system. Alth ough th is system is

norm ally limited to fixed ta rget s, BE nu mber ing can be modified for mobile tar gets. Some

th eat ers ha ve used locally produced BE num bers for tr acking such ta rgets. However, th ere is

no stan dar dized joint p rocedur e to do th is. The Na tional Militar y Tar get Int elligence Committ ee

(MTIC) is working solutions to standardize such procedures and developing concepts for

un iversal common ta rget nu mbers (CTNs). But u nt il th ose concepts are appr oved, the J FC

ha s no comm on joint syst em for mobile tar gets. Ins tea d, individual componen t nu mber ing

systems dominat e the en vironment an d ar e not tra nslata ble from one component t o an other.

Fu rt her complicat ing this problem is the fact tha t a lthough cur rent component systems ar e

robust an d cont inue t o grow ra pidly, they ar e consider ably "stovepiped" and n ot inter operable.

Cur ren tly, th e component s can not rapidly sha re comm on ta rgeting inform at ion. Fu tu re

systems (such as the Cont ingency Theat er Aut oma ted P lann ing System [CTAPS] linked with

the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System [AFATDS]) could correlate individual

component t ar get num bers an d commu nicat e th em simulta neously to all components. Those

future systems, combined with joint force targeting procedures, will facilitate effective and

efficient u se of all at ta ck asset s.

Joint doctrine a ddres ses th e need for t ar get coordina tion, deconfliction, an d synchr onization

between componen ts. Unfort un at ely, it does not adequ at ely explain "how" to ra pidly conduct

th is coordina tion. Likewise, joint ta ctics, techniqu es, an d procedu res (TTP) does not specificallyoutline joint t ar geting procedur es. Ins tea d, it defines overa ll concepts without delinea tin g

TTP. As a result, each combat an t comma nder h as developed procedures th at a re th eater

dependen t ta rget ing processes. As an example, th e procedur es govern ing J oint Tar geting

Coordin at ion Board s (JTCBs) and gu idan ce, apportionmen t, an d ta rget ing cells (GATs) var y

from thea ter t o th eat er. While th is ma y work for forces perm an ent ly ass igned to a combata nt

comm an d, it requ ires nonass igned un its to ada pt consider ably to th eat er specific procedures.

Augmentees a dapt ing to th eat er/CINC specific procedur es will spend time ada pting to thea ter

un ique coordin at ion processes before execut ing tim e-crit ical m issions.

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Components m ust under sta nd t he joint t ar geting process to fulfill the J FCs intent an d

objectives. Effective coord ina tion, deconfliction, and synchr onizat ion maxim ize force aga inst

th e enemy while redu cing th e poten tia l for frat ricide. Componen ts mu st have effective joint

tar geting procedures tha t ensure

Compliance with J FC guidan ce an d objectives.

Coordinat ion, deconfliction, and syn chronization of at ta cks.

Rapid r esponse t o surface time-critical t ar gets (TCTs). Pr evention of fra tr icide.

Minimal du plicat ion of effort.

Contr ol of taskings for mut ua lly accessible tar gets.

Expeditious combat a ssessment.

Common perspective of all ta rgetin g effort s.

Ea ch component m ust un dersta nd t he perspective an d ta rget pr iorities of other component

ta rgeting effort s th roughout th e cam paign. Component t ar gets may n ot n ecessarily be joint

ta rget s; th erefore, coordina tion requirem ent s may seem minima l. However, th ere ma y be

situa tions where component organ ic weapons may be ea sily available, yet not t he m ost capa ble.

In s uch cases, coordina tion with oth er componen ts m ay allow more efficient destr uction of theta rget th rough the synchr onized use of oth er available assets. In almost every situat ion, if

component attacks affect the operations of another component, coordination, deconfliction,

an d synchronizat ion mu st occur. Th e only exception would be th ose ra re inst an ces identified

by the JFC where overriding concerns (such as theater ballistic missiles [TBMs] equipped

with weapons of ma ss destr uction) warr an t bypassing norma l coordina tion t o affect imm ediate

response. The J FC should make such exceptions only after balancing the thr eat with t he

potent ial for fra tr icide.

This publicat ion explains th e funda ment als of the joint ta rgeting process a nd intelligence

sup port to tha t pr ocess. It a ddr esses th e coord ina tion, deconfliction, and synchronizat ion of

at ta cks a gainst su rface TCTs. The conn ection is th at th e joint t ar geting process serves as t he

foundation for the surface TCT targeting procedures.

The Joint Targeting Process

Joint targeting fundamentals are the functions, steps, and actions accomplished when

conducting joint t ar geting operat ions. Joint ta rgeting fun damen ta ls include th e definition of

a t ar get, explan at ion of wha t joint t ar geting is as a whole, an d description of th e joint t ar geting

process. Joint Pu blicat ion 1-02 succinctly describes a ta rget a s a geograph ical a rea, com plex,

or installation planned for capture or destruction by military forces. H owever, t ar gets also

include t he wide ar ra y of mobile an d sta tionar y forces, equipmen t, capa bilities, an d functions

th at an enemy comma nder can use to conduct operations. Joint t ar geting is selecting tar gets

an d mat ching the appr opria te response to them t o meet a specified objective. The joint t ar getingprocess has six basic phases/functions: commander's object ives and guidance, target

developme nt, weaponee ring assess ment, force appl icat ion, execution planning/force

execu tion, and combat assessm ent.1 Although commonly referred to as a "cycle," the joint

targeting process is really a continuous process of overlapping functions independent of a

par ticular sequen ce. Joint t ar geting significan tly affects th e theat er campaign as th e JF C

must synchronize target ing efforts throughout the joint force to ensure the effect ive

accomplishm ent of th eat er campa ign objectives. Fu rt her complicat ing this is tar geting occur s

at all levels within a joint force by all forces capable of at ta cking tar gets. Ther efore, it mu st

be deconflicted, coordina ted, an d pr iorit ized am ong componen ts to ensu re success.

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Organizing for t he joint t ar geting process is extr emely dependent on th e situat ion. J FCs

may establish and task an organization within their staffs to accomplish broad targeting

oversight functions or may delegate this responsibility to a subordinate commander.2 Th e

J FC m ay assign certa in responsibilities associated with t ar geting to agencies on t he st aff. In

addition, the JF C may appoint a J TCB. The J FC defines the role of th e JTCB.3 JTCB

responsibilities a nd a uth ority ar e defined by JF C directives and should ensure fulfillment of

J FC objectives and intent with respect to ta rgeting. Most importan tly, the J FC should direct

mea sur es to coordin at e joint t ar geting effort s among componen ts. Regar dless of how the J FCestablishes procedures for joint targeting operations, the procedures must follow the basic

prin ciples of the joint t ar geting process and be flexible enough t o resp ond to rap idly chan ging

situat ions in the fast tempo of modern warfar e.

Procedures For Targeting Time-Critical Targets

A surface TCT is a lucra tive, fleeting, lan d, or sea ta rget of such h igh pr iority t o frien dly

forces tha t t he J FC or component comma nder designa tes it a s requiring immediate r esponse.

Sur face TCTs requ ire su ch immedia te r esponse because t hey pose, or will pose, a s ignifican t

th rea t capa ble of inflicting casu alt ies on friendly forces an d civilian s. Surface TCTs, left

un serviced, could significan tly delay achievement of th e J FCs th eat er objectives. Sur face

TCTs can either beplannedor immediate, requ iring ra pid response by the joint force. Target sof opport un ity (TOOs) ar e similar to sur face TCTs (tha t is, lucra tive or fleeting), but th ey may

or may not ha ve been designat ed a high priority by th e JF C or componen t comm an der. For

examp le, an exposed, moving en emy comm an d vehicle, spott ed by a p assin g frien dly aircra ft,

could be defined as a TOO. Although t he opport un ity to at ta ck it is fleeting, it is n ot techn ically

a surface TCT unless the JFC or component commander has designated enemy command

vehicles as high priority tar gets. The distinction is a sma ll but import an t one. The key is

J FC/componen t comm an der designa tion as a pr iorit y. Oth erwise, th e joint force could not

distinguish between TOOs and sur face TCTs.

Procedures and techniques assist the joint force in the conduct of warfare, especially in

rega rd t o sur face TCTs. Pr ocedur es dealing with sur face TCTs include J FC guida nce, joint

battlespace control and coordination measures, "grid box" and "bullseye" techniques, and

weapon specific procedures. Additiona lly, th e JF C must st ru ctur e comma nd an d contr ol as

well as interconn ect batt le man agement systems t o ensure optimum conditions for successful

operat ions against sur face TCTs.

Summary

The pr ima ry goal of joint ta rget ing is to pr ovide th e most efficient use of joint force as sets

an d capita lize on t heir syn ergistic effects. Elimina tin g duplicat ion of effort an d frat ricide is

an importa nt par t of th at efficiency. Likewise, elimina tin g th e fog of war is critical t o meeting

th e fra tr icide cha llenge while increa sing a joint forces opera tional tem po. The J FC mu st

ensu re effective an d efficient a tt acks a gainst high pr iorit y sur face TCTs, as well as exercise

due cau tion to avoid fra tr icide and d uplication of effort. Regar dless of the th rea t, a joint force

must be able to rapidly execut e leth al an d nonlethal at ta cks against sur face TCTs using thesynergistic power t ha t component s cont ribut e, all th e while considering th at when components

work together, they each have responsibilities (functional and/or area) that may intersect.

Each must depend on and leverage the capabilities of the others to be decisive in battle.

Applicat ion of these capa bilities is enh an ced thr ough clear, concise joint ta rgetin g procedur es

allowing the JFC and components to rapidly coordinate information, deconflict operations,

an d synchronize a tta cks. Common t ar get nu mbers, reference systems, and common pictures

of th e bat tlespa ce ar e developing technologies tha t will support joint t ar geting procedur es in

th e fut ur e. Th is mult iservice TTP offers a pr ocedura l fix unt il those capa bilities fully evolve.

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NOTES

1 J t P ub 3-56.1, Comm and and Control for Joint Air Operations, Novem ber 14 , 1994 , p IV-1

2 J t P ub 3-0,Doctrine for Joint Operations, Febr ua ry 1, 1995, p III-26

3 Ibid

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PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS

The following comman ds a nd agencies part icipated in t he developmen t of this pu blicat ion:

Joint

J oint Sta ff - Penta gon, Wash ington DC

J -8 (Joint War fighting Assessmen ts Division)

J-7 (Joint Doctrine Division)J -33 / J -38 (STOD)J -2P/T (DIA Doctrin e, Pla ns, an d Policy Division)

J oint War fight ing Cen ter, Doctrin e Division - Ft Monroe, VA

J oint Comm an d a nd Cont rol War fare Cent er, OTS - San Ant onio, TXJ oint TMD Att ack Opera tions - Kirtlan d AFB, NM

Joint Warfare Analysis Center, J-8 - Dahlgren, VA

Unified Command

US Atla nt ic Comm an d - Norfolk, VAJ -72; J -5; J -3; J -2; J oint Ta rget ing School

US Centr al Comma nd - Tam pa FLCCJ -5; CCJ -33-PP; CCJ -2

US Special Operat ions Comman d - Tampa F LJ SOFI (Doctrine Directora te)J SOC- J -3 / FSEJ -2

US E ur opean Comma nd - Vaih ingen, GEECJ 5-D; ECJ 2

US Pacific Command - Camp Smith, HIJ-38; J-2

US Southern Comma nd - Qua rr y Heights, PNSCJ-5-PS

US St ra tegic Comma nd - Offut , NEJ -51 (Str at egy an d Policy Division)

US Sp ace Comma nd - Peter son AF B, COJ-5X

US Tra nsport at ion Comma nd - Scott AFB, COTCJ-5-SR

US F orces Ja pa n - Yokota AB, J AJ -3

Combined

ROK-US Combin ed Forces Comma nd - Yongsan, ROKHQ Fifth Allied Tact ical Air Forces - Vicenza , IT

CAOC (Operat ions Division / FAIT- Int elligence Division)

Army

HQ Depa rt men t of the Army, DAMO-FDQ - Pent agon, Wash ington DCHQ Forces Comm an d, CG - Ft McPh erson, GAXVIII CORPS, 1st BCD - Ft Bra gg, NCXVIII CORPS FSE -Ft Bragg, NCV CORPS FSE - Fr an kfurt, GEI CORPS FSE - Ft Lewis, WAEigth USA BCD - Osan AB, ROKUSA Eu rope BCD - Heidelberg, GEUSA Field Art illery School - Ft Sill, OK

WIDD; TSM-FSC3; D&SA BL

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USA Air Defense Art illery School, CATD - Ft Bliss, TX

USA Armor School. 16 Ca v Rgt - F t Knox, KY

USA Spa ce Comm an d, TMD Cell / ATMDE Atta ck Oper at ions - Colora do Springs, CO

USA Int elligence Center - Ft Hu achu ca, AZ

ATZS-TD

USA Command and General Staff College - Ft Leavenworth, KS

ATZL-SWW-L; ATZL-CTB-D

USA Trainin g an d Doctr ine Comma nd, Ft Monr oe VAATDO-A; ATCD-G (C4I)

Pr ogram Mana ger AFATDS - Ft Monmouth , NJ

111th Militar y Int elligence Bde - Ft Hu achu ca, AZ

Marine Corps

HQ USMC, DCS for P lan s, Policy, and Opera tions - P ent agon, Was hingt on DC

HQ USMC Forces Eu rope, G-5 (Sout her n Region Pla ns Division) - Boblingen, GE

Mar ine Corps Combat Developmen t Comma nd, C42 - Qua nt ico VA

Mar ine Corps Combat Developmen t Comma nd, MSTP - Qua nt ico VA

1 Mar ine E xpeditiona ry Force, G-5, Camp Pendlet on, CA

Navy

Depar tm ent of th e Na vy, CNO, N511 - Penta gon, Wash ington DC

Na val Doctr ine Comm an d, N3 - N orfolk VA

Na val War College, J MO Depart men t - Newport , RI

CINCPACFLT N5 - Pear l Ha rbor, HI

Air Force

HQ USAF/ XOXD / XOFI / XORC - Pentagon, Washington DC

USAF Doctrine Cent er - Lan gley Air Force Base, VA

HQ Air Combat Command - Langley Air Force Base, VA

XPJ D / XP-SAS / SMO-I / INXU / IN AA / DRAC / DRC

HQ Un ited St at es Air Forces Eu rope - Ram stein AB, GE32 Air Oper at ions Gr oup / 32 Air Oper at ions Squ ad ron

HQ Un ited Sta tes Cent ra l Comma nd Air Forces - Shaw AFB, SC

A5-DOXP (Plans and Operations)

HQ E lectr onic System s Comma nd, TDIS - Ha nscom AFB, MA

HQ Seventh Air Force, Plans Division / Intel Division - Osan AB, ROK

HQ Twelfth Air Force - Davis-Mont ha n AFB, AZ

Air Oper at ions Cen ter (Comba t In telligence Division)

Spa ce War far e Cen te r, DOZ - Falcon AFB, CO

727th Air Cont rol Squadr on (CIC), Hurlbur t Fld, FL

USAF J oint Pr ogra ms Office - Ft Sill, OK

USAF AF E lement - Ft Leavenwort h, KS

USAF Air E mploymen t S tu dies Office, USAWC - Car lisle, PA497 Intelligence Group, INOT - Falls Church, VA

Air Comm and a nd S ta ff College, War gam ing Division - Mont gomery, AL

Other

Advanced Resear ch P rojects Agency (ARPA) - Arlingt on, VA

Ballistic Missile Defense Organ ization (BMDO) - Pent agon, Wash ington, DC

Consolidat ed Missile Sup port Activity (CMSA) - Norfolk, VA

Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) - Pentagon

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Chapter I

THE JOINT TARGETING PROCESS

"I t i s n o t t h e o b j e c t o f w a r t o

a n n i h i l a t e t h o s e w h o h a v e g i v e n

provocat ion for i t , but to cause them

to mend the i r ways ."

- Polybiu s

Histories (2nd century B.C.)

1 . B a c k g r o u n d

a . Wh a t i s a T a r g e t ? A t a rge t i s a

geographical area, complex, or installation

planned for captu re or destr uction by military

forces.1

Targets include the wide array ofmobile and stationary forces, equipment,

capabili t ies, and functions that an enemy

comma nder can use t o conduct operat ions at

an y levelstr at egic, opera tional, or ta ctical.

Targets fal l in to two general categories ,

plannedand immediate (Figure I-1).

(1) Planned targets are tar gets that

areknown t o exist in a n operational a rea and

against which f i re or at tacks have been

scheduled in adva nce or on-call. Exam ples

ra nge from ta rgets on joint t ar get lists (JTLs)in appl icable campaign plans , to targets

detected in sufficient time to list in the air

ta sking order (ATO) or fire support p lans .

(2) Immediate targets are targets

which fire or at ta cks h ave not been s cheduledan d norm ally detected too lat e to be included

in th e norma l ta rgeting cycle. Imm ediate

targets have two subcategories: unplanned

or unanticipated.

(a) U n p l a n n e d i mme d i a t e t a r -

ge ts are those which are known to exist in

an opera t ional a rea bu t no t de tec ted or

located in s ufficient time.

(b) U n a n t i c i p a t e d i m m e d i a t e

t a r g e t s a re t hos e t ha t a r e u n k n o w n orunexpected to exist in an operational area.

Chapter II discusses planned an d immediate

targets in relation to surface time-critical

targets (TCTs) and targets of opportunity

(TOOs).

b. What is Targeting? Targeting is th e

process of selecting ta rgets a nd m at ching th e

appropriate response to them taking into

a c c o u n t o p e r a t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s a n d

capabilities. 2 Tar geting occurs at all levels

of command within a joint force and isperformed at all levels by forces capable of

delivering fires or at ta cking ta rgets with both

l e t h a l a n d n o n l e t h a l d i s r u p t i v e a n d

Figure I-1. General Target Categories and Subcategories

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I - 2

destru ctive means.3 Tar geting is a function

shared by both operations and intelligence.

However, the requirement to deconfl ict

duplicat ive effort s of different echelons within

th e same force and t o synchronize th e at ta ck

of those tar gets with other componen ts of th e

joint force complicates th e t ar geting pr ocess.

Therefore, an effective and efficient jointta rgeting process is essential for th e J FC an d

components to plan and execute operations.

2 . J o i n t T a r g e t i n g P r o c e s s

The joint t ar getingprocess determines t he

employment of military force to achieve a

desired objective. It integr at es capabilities

of national assets, geographic combatant

c o m m a n d s ( t h a t i s , u n i f i e d c o m b a t a n t

com m ands ) , s ubo rd i na t e j o i n t fo rce ,

mu ltinat iona l, an d component comma nds, all

of which possess varying capabilities and

requiremen ts. The joint t ar geting process is

descr ibed as a "cycl ica l p rocess"4 wi t h

s equen t i a l phases . However, th e joint

targeting process is really a continuously

operat ing ser ies of closely relat ed, int era cting,

a n d i n t e r d e p e n d e n t f unct ions . The s i x

functions/phases arecommander's objec-

t ives and guidance, target developmen t,

w e a p o n e e r i n g a s se s sm e n t , fo r c e a p p l i -

c a t i o n , e x e c u t i o n p l a n n i n g / f o r c eexecution, and co mbat asse ssmen t (CA).

Joint targeting is not a static, inflexible

process but rat her a dyna mic process tha t

mu st be fluidly applied. Ea ch fun ction/phase

of the process can direct ly affect other

funct ions/phases of the process without

rega rd to an y specific order. For example,

C A d i r e c t l y a f f e c t s s u b s e q u e n t f o r c e

a p p l i c a t i o n i f m i s s i o n r e s u l t s p r o v e

i nadequa t e . L i kewi s e , w e a p o n e e r i n g

a sse s sme n t directly affects e x e c u t i o n as

weapons will drive execution tactics. Inadd ition, specific timelines do not const ra in

th e joint t ar geting process. Depending on th e

situat ion, th e entire pr ocess can last from a

few minutes (as in the case of a theater

missile defense [TMD] scena rio), t o several

days (such as in th e developmen t of an initial

J TL for a CIN Cs campa ign plan for a ma jor

operat ion), to several months (as in the

d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e S i n g l e I n t e g r a t e d

Opera tions Pla n [SIOP ]). Figure I-2 depicts

th e six basic fun ctions of th e joint t ar geting

process that appl ies universal ly to each

component of a joint force. Equa lly impor-

tan t to understan d is tha t Army and Mar ine

Corps service doctrine traditionally defines

the ta rgeting process as having four steps:

DECIDEDETECTDELIVERASSESS (D3A)

At first glance, when compared to the joint

targeting process, the Army/Marine Corps

serv ice t a rget ing process appears qu i te

differen t. However, alt hough labeled with

different terms, the Army/Marine Corps

service targeting process incorporates th e

same fundamental funct ions as the joint

targetin g process (Figure I-3). The functions

of th e Arm y/Mar ine Corps ta rget ing process

can be easily tr an slated to th e functions of

th e joint ta rgetin g pr ocess. Note th at D3Afunctions flow fluidly across th e six functions

of the joint ta rgetin g process. (Not e: In som e c a s e s , t h e f u n c t i o n s o f D 3 A m a y a l s o

overlap . For fur ther inform at ion on D3A,

see FM 6-20-10/MCRP 3-1.6.14, TT P f or t he

Target ing Process .) Although components

may n ot desire to elimina te or r eplace service

u n i q u e d o c t r i n a l d e f i n i t i o n s f o r t h e i r

ta rgeting process, there m ust be a common

joint ta rget ing lexicon to eliminat e confusion

an d pr ovide a common perspective. D3A,

once t rans la ted in to the jo in t t a rget ing

process, supports this common lexicon and

un iversally r ecognized "joint lan guage."

a. Comma nde rs Objectiv es a nd Guid-ance . Targeting responds to the objectivesand guidance tha t originate at the n ational

level as br oad concepts. Object ives are the

desired position or purpose. Sta rt ing at the

na tional level as broadly defined st at ement s,

objectives become m ore specific and dyna mic

as comma nders interpret an d tran slate them

int o specific plan s of act ion. G u i d a n c e pro-vides th e fra mework for employing forces to

a ch i eve t h e ob jec t i ves. J o i n t force

comma nders (J FCs) refine na tiona l guid-

an ce an d p rov ide com m an der s i n t en t ;

guidan ce; an d clear, mea sur able, at ta ina ble

objectives th at become sp ecific plan s of act ion.

J FCs esta blish br oad plan ning objectives an d

guidance for attack of enemy strategic and

o p e r a t i o n a l c e n t e r s o f g r a v i t y a n d

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I - 3

WEAPONEERINGASSESSMENT

EXECUTIONPLANNING /

FORCEEXECUTION

COMBATASSESSMENT

COMMANDERSOBJECTIVES &

GUIDANCE

TARGETDEVELOPMENT

FORCEAPPLICATION

Figure I-2. The Joint Targeting Process

Figure I-3. The Army/Marine Corps Targeting Process Overlaid onto theJoint Targeting Process

WEAPONEERINGASSESSMENT

EXECUTIONPLANNING /

FORCE

EXECUTION

COMBATASSESSMENT

COMMANDERSOBJECTIVES &

GUIDANCE

TARGETDEVELOPMENT

FORCEAPPLICATION

D

ECIDE

DET

ECT

DELIVER

ASSE

SS

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interdiction of enemy forces as an integral

p a r t o f j o i n t c a m p a i g n s a n d m a j o r

operations.5 Tar geting m at ches objectives

with input s from int elligence, operat ions, an d

other fun ctiona l area s (such as logistics an d

communicat ions) , to ident i fy the forces

available an d necessar y to accomplish the

mission.

(1) The N at iona l Comm an d Aut horities

( N C A ) c o m m u n i c a t e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y

objectives thr ough th e Chairm an of th e Joint

Chiefs of Sta ff (CJCS) to t he geograph ic

combatant commander (unified CINC) as

broad campaign objectives. Th e un ified CINC

t r a n s l a t e s t h e n a t i o n a l g u i d a n c e a n d

provides clear, measurable, and attainable

o b j e c t i v e s t o e s t a b l i s h e d J F C s a n d

component commanders. ( Note: In some cases , the unif ied CINC and JFC are one

i n t h e sa m e . Fo r t h e p u r p o s e o f t h i s

pub l ica t ion , the t e rm J FC wi l l be used t o

r e p r e s e n t t h e c o m m a n d e r o f a n y j o i n t

force.) Part of the objectives includes the

art iculat ion of damage levels and s tates

desired for a specific period of operat ions. The

more specific an d mea sur able th e objectives,

th e great er t he likelihood joint force plann ing

staffs and executing component forces will

achieve an economy of force t ha t will enable

the most effective use of assets against theenem y. The objectives an d guidan ce ar e

sha ped by th e pr inciples of war, th e Laws of

Armed Conflict (LOAC), an d established

ru les of enga gement (ROE).

(2) Intel l igence preparat ion of the

bat tlespace (IPB) provides the J FC a specific

context to further specify objectives and

guidan ce. IP B is a systema tic, cont inuous

p r o c e s s o f a n a l y z i n g t h e t h r e a t a n d

environment in a specific geographic area.

Included in the production of IPB is the

deta iled an alysis of all available opera tional

and intelligence information, to include the

enemy s i tuat ion, capabi l i t ies , s t rengths ,

composition, disposition, and locat ions. IP B

also addresses possible courses of action,

enem y perception of friendly vulner abilities,

a n d e n e m y o p e r a t i o n a l s u s t a i n m e n t

capabilities.

(3) With th e advice of th e componen t

comm an ders, the J FC set s priorities, provides

target ing gu idance , and determines the

weight of effort for various operat ions .

Subordinate comma nders r ecommen d to the

JFC how to use their combat power most

effectively to ach ieve th e J FCs objectives.

Weight of effort for any aspect of jointt a rget ing may be expressed in t e rms of

percen tage of to ta l avai lab le resources ,

priorities for resources used with respect to

the other aspects of the theater campaign,

or a s oth erwise determ ined by the J FC.6

(4) The JFC consults often with the

componen t comma nder s to assess th e results

of the warfighting effort and to discuss the

direction and futu re plans. This provides

component commanders an opportunity to

introduce recommen dat ions, sta te support

requirements, and provide their ability to

support other components.

(5) The J FCs objectives and guida nce

i d e n t i f y t a r g e t i n g p r i o r i t i e s , p l a n n i n g

guidan ce, an d procedur es. For exam ple, th e

J FC sta tes guidance in the air apportionmen t

decis ion. See J oint Pu bl icat ion 3-56.1,

Co m m a n d a n d Con t r o l f or Join t A i r

Operations, for more informat ion on ai r

apportionment.

b. Target Developmen t. This par t of the

process i s the sys temat ic evaluat ion of

potent ial ta rget systems, individua l tar gets,

an d the element s of each ta rget. Targets are

s y s t e m a t i c a l ly e v a l u a t e d f or m i l i t a r y,

economic, and political importance. Target

d e v e l o p m e n t c l o s e l y e x a m i n e s e n e m y

doctr ine an d order of batt le as well as t akes

into account operational concerns such as

f r i end l y s chem es o f m aneuver , a s s e t s

a v a i l a b l e , a n d b a t t l e s p a c e g e o m e t r y /

ma na gement . Ident ificat ion of center s of

gravity (COGs), such as key target systems

an d th eir critical nodes, is an essential par t

of this pr ocess. Personn el ta sked t o perform

t a r g e t d e v e l o p m e n t m u s t i d e n t i f y a n d

analyze key target systems relevant to the

J FCs chan ging objectives a nd gu idan ce.

Target validation, target list prioritization,

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I - 5

and collection also occur during this phase.

Tar get developmen t is a n objective an alysis

conducted independently of munitions or

plat form availability.

(1) Target development has severalsteps:

(a) Establish inform at ion require-ments

( b ) I d e n t i f y p o t e n t i a l t a r g e tsystems

(c) Iden tify critical nodes and theiractivities and fun ctions

(d) Develop t ar get system modelsand uti l ity measur es

(e) Valida te t ar gets a nd "No-Hit"lists.

(f) Define pr oduction r equirem ent s

(2) Target development inputs are

(a) Operat ion Plan Joint Target

Lis t (OPLAN J TL) Ann ex. For a given

operational area, the OPLAN JTL Annex

constitu tes a tar get baseline. OPLAN JTLs

a r e s u b s e t s o f t h e m i l i t a r y n a t i o n a l

intelligence integrated database/integrated

da ta base (MIIDS/IDB) modified to meet joint

f o r c e r e q u i r e m e n t s i n v a r i o u s r e g i o n s

th roughout t he world. The OPLAN J TL is a

"dynamic"dat abase. During peacetime, th e

un ified comma nd J -2 modifies this dat aba se

via input s from both na tional agencies as well

as ass igned componen t forces.

(b) Batt lespace Geometry Ma na ge-

men t. Assessment of bat tlespa ce geomet ry

allows intelligence planners to accuratelydeve l op t a rge t s bas ed on r eg i ona l and

geographic characteristics.

(c) Al l source nat ional agencysupport.

(d) E nem y order s of bat tle (EOBs).

( e ) Enem y m i l i t a ry capab i l i t y

studies.

(f) Current intel l igence assess-

ments.

(g ) C o m p o n e n t t a r g e t n o m i -nations.

(h) J oint Target ing Coordinat ion

Boar d (JTCB) input s (if established).

(i) Exist ing ba sic en cyclopedia

(BE) numbered t ar gets.

(3) Target development outpu ts a re

(a) JTL.In war time, th e OPLAN

JTL Annex is updated and serves as an

initial list of campa ign ta rgets. The J TL is

the ma ster ta rget list th at su pports t he J FCs

objectives, guidance, intent, and courses of

action. Also, it norm ally lists high-valu e

ta rgets (HVTs), which are lat er incorpora ted

as high-payoff target (HPT) nominations

during component wargam ing.

The J TL is normally constr ucted

by the unified command with support from

components a nd with inputs from the J oint

S t a f f a n d o t h e r n a t i o n a l a g e n c i e s . 7

Component commanders will identify and

select fixed an d mobile targets t ha t m eet th e

J FCs objectives/guida nce an d subm it th em

for inclusion in the J TL. Ea ch componen tdevelops such targets to support i ts own

assigned mission.

The J TL is not a pr ioritized list

of targets but contains priorit ized target

ca tegor ies (command and cont ro l [C2] ,

air fields, lines of comm un icat ions, and other s

as a ppr opriat e) listing specific ta rget s.8 Th e

J F C s h o u l d p r i o r i t i z e t h e J T L t a r g e t

categories according to the campaign plan

and focus the intell igence/target material

production effort. Upon direction of th e J FC,

the J TL is upda ted daily or a s required via

target information report (TGTINFOREP)

messa ges from componen ts. Maint ena nce of

th e J TL may be condu cted by th e J FCs sta ff

or a s directed by th e J FC (e.g., J TCB).9

(b) Jo in t In tegra ted Pr ior i t i zed

Target List (JIPTL). Joint doctrine allows

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the use of a JIPTL for prioritizing specific

t a r g e t s . ( N o t e : I n C o m b i n e d F or c e s

Command, Republ ic of Korea, th is l i s t i s

d e s i g n a t e d t h e s i n g l e i n t e g r a t e d

p r i o r i t i z e d t a rg e t l i s t [ S IP T L ] .) Th e

J I P T L i s a J F C l e v e l p r o d u c t u s u a l l y

produced by the joint force air component

comm an der (JFACC). Pr iorit ization referst o a t a r g e t s r e l a t i v e i m p o r t a n c e a n d

significance within a specific target system

an d to oth er ta rgets. Pr ioritization does not

necessarily denote operational sequencing.

See Joint Pub 2-01.1, JTTP for Intelligence

Support to Targeting, an d J oint P ub 3-56.1,

Co m m a n d a n d Co n t r o l f or Join t A i r

Operations, for additiona l inform at ion on th e

JIPTL.

(c) Inputs to int elligence collection

plan.

(d) Restricted targets lists (ta rgets

not to be s t ruck due to ROE, LOAC, or

exploitat ion requiremen ts).

(e) IPB event templat e.

(f) Est ablished Tar get Selection

Sta nda rds (TSS). TSS are criteria, applied

to enemy a ctivity (acquisitions a nd ba tt lefield

information), used in deciding whether theactivity is a tar get. TSS break nominations

into two categories: targets and suspected

t a r g e t s . Ta r g e t s m e e t a c cu r a c y a n d

t i m e l i n e s s r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a t t a c k .

Suspected ta rgets must be confirm ed before

any at tack.

(g) Tar get In form at ion. Gener ally,

ta rget in form at ion consist s of

General locat ion (area ).

Target type (category).

Common tar get number (CTN),

if available.

Specific locat ion.

Disposition.

Disposition size.

Target velocity and direction.

Surveyed tar get data.

Target ident ificat ion s pecifics.

Unit ident ificat ion.

(4) The J-2 supports target develop-

ment wi th resources of the theater Joint

Intelligence Center (J IC) at the geographic

combatan t command level , o r the jo in t

intelligence support element (JISE), at the

subordinate joint task force (JTF) level .

C o m p o n e n t i n t e l l i g e n c e a s s e t s a n d

i n t e l l i gence o rgan i za t i ons , a l ong w i t h

augmentat ion from nat ional intel l igence

agencies, also contribute. The theater JIC

provides the coordination of intell igence

resour ces, report ing, an d ser vices to supp ort

the ta ctical comma nders.

c. Weapone ering Assess ment . The pur-

pose of the weaponeering assessmen t phase

is to pr ovide var ious force a pplicat ion opt ions

for each target based upon desired results.

The pr ocess depen ds on deta iled int elligence

a n a l y s i s o f t a r g e t c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d

vulnerabilities combined with operationalasses smen ts of weapons effects an d delivery

pa ra m et e r s . Weaponee r i ng a s s es s m en t

determines the quantity, type, and mix of

lethal and nonlethal weapons required to

produce a desired effect. It is an a na lysis of

th e best weapon combina tion for economy of

force (tha t is, th e best "ban g for th e buck").

T i m e l i nes s i s a l s o a c r i t i ca l f ac t o r i n

weaponeer ing decisions. The short dwell

n a t u r e of T C T s r e q u i r e s t h e t i m e l y

a v a i l a b i l i t y o f a n a t t a c k a s s e t b e a n

importa nt factor in weapons selection.

(1) Using the JTL from the target

developmen t pha se, intelligence plan ner s

c o n d u c t d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s o f t a r g e t

c o n s t r u c t i o n , s y s t e m a n a l y s i s , a n d

in terconnect iv i ty wi th o ther sys tems to

revea l key vulner abi l i t ies . In tel l igence

planner s also provide an an alysis of thr eat

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s ys t em s as s oc i a t ed w i t h each t a rge t t o

i den t i fy s i gn i f i can t r i s k s . Opera t i ona l

plann ers fuse the ta rget and th reat ana lysis

with Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manu al

(J MEM) data and oth er n onletha l effects in

order to ass ess expected resu lts. If desired

destruction criteria will be met, and other

factors are favorable (such as weapons anddelivery system availability), a variety of

options with weapons r ecommenda tions ar e

ass igned to t a rget s on the JTL. Recom-

mendations prescribe the amount and type

of ordn an ce as well as t he nu mber a nd t ype

of delivery parameters to achieve desired

effects.

(a) Lethal fo rce weaponeer ing

para meters include t a rget vu lnerab i li ty,

weapons effects, a impoint selection, delivery

err ors, weath er, dam age criteria, and weap on

reliability.

(b) Nonlethal force weaponeering

assessment is the assessment of the ability

of fr iendly systems to observe act ivi ty ,

deceive, jam, affect (as in psychological

operat ions [PSYOP]), disrupt , or deny a ccess

t o c r i t i ca l f r i end l y t a rge t s . Non l e t ha l

weaponeering is a significant part of C2

attack analysis conducted by the joint force

command and control warfare (C2W) cell.The C2W cell performs nonlethal targeting

and weaponee r i ng ( e f f ec t s and m eans )

an alysis to identify an d ma tch a dversary C2

targets to fr iendly C2W and operat ional

objectives.

(2) Weaponeering assessment is not a

p r e d i c t i o n o f r e s u l t s b u t a s t a t i s t i c a l

probability of weapons effects. It includes t he

detailed study a nd r efinement of aimpoints,

fuse delays, impact angles and velocities,

weapons trajectories, number and type ofweapons for employmen t (both air-to-surface

and surface-to-surface), and recommended

dama ge criteria. Depending on th e assets of

the component att acking the tar get, nat ure

of the target, and time available to engage

the target , weapons/muni t ions select ion

pr ocedu res can var y. In some cases very

d e l i b e r a t e p r o c e d u r e s c a n b e u s e d t o

weaponeer at ta ck asset s. In oth er cases,

quick (often computer assisted) decisions

must be made as to what attack assets will

be employed. However, requ isite as sum p-

tions in the prediction process may or may

not match actual operational conditions, as

variat ions in a ctu al force employment may

cau se the resu l t s to vary grea t ly. Thisdepends on t he t ype of ta rget , type of weapon,

delivery system, weath er, threa t, and ra nge

to th e ta rget. The result in weaponeering

as s es s m en t i s a p robab i l i t y o f dam age

a g a i n s t t h e d e s i g n a t e d t a r g e t a n d t h e

recommended weapons or weapon systems

required to achieve the required level of

damage.

d. Force Application . Force ap plication

is th e selection of leth al or n onletha l forces

for th e mission. It integra tes previous pha ses

i n t h e c y c l e a n d f u s e s w e a p o n e e r i n g

as sessm ent with availa ble forces. Force

app l i ca t i on i s p r i m ar i l y an ope ra t i ons

f u n c t i o n , b u t i t r e q u i r e s c o n s i d e r a b l e

i n t e l l i gence s uppo r t . In t e l li gence an d

opera tions st affs work closely to optim ize the

force necessary to achieve the object ive

considering operat iona l realities an d data

(available assets). With guidan ce from the

JFC, component commanders conduct force

application planning to fuse target, weaponsys tem, muni t ions , and nonle tha l fo rce

options. This phase result s in th e jointly

coordina ted selection of forces and a ssociat ed

weapon systems or platforms.

(1) The primary objectives of force

application are to sequence target attacks

an d synchr onize the a pplicat ion of letha l or

nonleth al force.

(2 ) Dur i ng fo rce app l i ca t i on , t he

components identify primary resources toexecute missions and supporting require-

men ts. To accomplish force packa ging and

ta sk organ izat ion, th e plan ners mu st have a

concise l is t of assets to include various

component resources avai lab le fo r JTL

ta rgets. Dur ing this pr ocess, force packa ging

and task organization may group various

targets based on geographic locat ion to

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facilita te economy of force an d u nit y of effort .

Likewise, a relatively high priority target

may go unserviced because of situational

factors that render the target too force-

inten sive to execute.

(3) In tell igence provides plan ner s

updat ed thr eat a nalysis for intended ta rgets.This includes air a nd ground thr eats en route

to tar gets. Int elligence estima tes of the th reat

must reveal si tuational factors indicating

whether or not the threat is too high for

successful mission accomplishm ent . If so, the

ta rget ma y require reevaluation for either a

d i f feren t weapon sys tem to a t t ack i t ; a

different target in the target system; or

postponement of the attack until the threat

is diminished. In either case, an a ccur at e

intelligence assessment of the curr ent thr eat

is a critical aspect of the force application

process.

(4) The key products from the force

application ph ase ar e the m aster air a tta ck

plan /ATO shell for the a ir effort or an at ta ck

guidance ma tr ix (AGM) for t he ground effort.

e. Execut ion Planning/Force Exe cut ion .

The JFC wi l l i s sue miss ion type orders

directing component comm an ders t o execut e

th e operat ion.

(1) Execution Planning. Component

comm an ders a nd t heir st affs, upon receipt of

the execution order from the JFC, conduct

m i s s i o n p l a n n i n g a n d p r e p a r a t i o n f o r

enga gement . The ATO and AGM guide

respective components in the preparation of

schedules, missions, route planning, and

ta ctics to execut e att acks. Due to inevitable

changes in the enemy situat ion (thereby the

assumptions used in the force application

pha se), int elligence an d operat ions personnelneed to ana lyze the ATO and AGM to validat e

whether or not they accurately address the

current enemy situation. This analysis and

v a l i d a t i o n a r e a n o n g o i n g f u n c t i o n

th roughout execut ion plan ning, as IP B is a

cont inu ous pr ocess. IP B can significan tly

enhance the targeting process for surface

TCTs by identifying the probable locations

or operat ing area s where su rface TCTs may

emer ge. Depending on th e seriousn ess of th e

threat , resources avai lable, and level of

con f i dence i n t he IPB, com ponen t

comm an ders m ay elect t o position or postu re

ta rget acquisition an d strike asset s to rapidly

respond to the forecasted areas . During

execution planning, intelligence also closelymonitors target status in order to update

final planning before execution. It mu st

identify chan ges required to current ta skings,

as well a s pr ovide cha nges t o follow-on t ar get

deve l opm en t phas es and weaponee r i ng

pha ses. Inpu ts from intelligence plann ers

u p d a t e e n e m y t h r e a t a s s es s m en t s a n d

directly impact a broad area , such a s ta sking

orders, operations orders (OPORDs) and

associated annexes , deconfl ict ion plans ,

decision su pport t empla tes (DSTs), schedu les

of fires, an d support OP ORDs. Int elligence

planners also play a major role in mission

plann ing suppor t . This includes th rea t

locations, target materials, graphics, maps,

cha rt s, geodesy products, an d sur veyed dat a

points.

(2) Force Execution. As directed , com-

ponents and their assigned forces execute

their operat ions whi le moni toring other

componen ts. Component s report lat era lly to

e a c h o t h e r a n d v e r t i c a l l y t o t h e J F C .C o m p o n e n t c o m m a n d e r s m o n i t o r t h e

execu t i on phas e and p rov i de r ea l - t i m e

recommendations for redirection of forces,

reat ta ck, an d other t askings as th e situ at ion

warr an ts. I nt elligence mu st also monitor th e

execution of the plan and be prepared to

provide immediate thr eat a nd ta rget updates

should a cha nge in th e plan occur. Mission

execution requires the flexibility to impact

un foreseen sur face TCTs. The intelligence

ar chitectur e an d collection plan mu st r apidly

address t hese types of threa ts.

f. C o mb a t A sse s sme n t . CA directly

affects all oth er ph ases of th e joint ta rgetin g

cycle. CA is th e det erm ina tion of the overa ll

effectiveness of force employment during

military operations.10 At t he J FC level, the

CA e f fo r t s hou l d be a j o i n t p rog ram ,

supported at all levels, designed to deter mine

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i f the required effects on the adversary

envisioned in the campaign plan are being

achieved by the joint force components to

meet th e J FCs overa ll concept.11

(1) CA seeks to deter mine if th e J FCs

objectives for a n opera tion ar e being or h ave

been met a nd pr ovides informa tion t ha t h elpsdeter mine if th ey need to be modified. Thr ee

questions ma ke th is determin at ion: Were th e

strategic operational and tactical objectives

met by force employment ? Did th e forces

employed per form as expected? If th e above

answers are no, what will fix the problem?

CA provides the JFC information on past

perform an ce so opera tions can decide how to

apply fut ure planning.

(2) CA is accomplished a t a ll levels in

th e joint force. J FCs should esta blish adynam i c s y s t em t o s uppo r t CA fo r a l l

componen ts . Norm ally, th e joint force J -3 will

be r esponsible for coordina ting CA, assisted

by th e joint force J -2.12 Also, the JTCB (if

established) should receive CA information

i n o r d e r t o f u l f i l l t h e i r a s s i g n e d

responsibilities.

(3 ) In t e l l i gence s uppo r t s CA by

provid ing ob jec t ive assessments on the

overall impact of milita ry opera tions against

adver sar y forces, possible enem y cour ses ofaction (COAs), and predictions of enemy

inten t . These assessm ents come from a

var iety of sources, to include mission report s

( M I S R E P s ) , a i r c r a f t i n - f l i g h t r e p o r t s

( INFLTREPs ) , r econna i s s ance r epo r t s ,

intelligence sum ma ries (INTSUMs), na tional

s ys t em s , and r epo r t s f rom j o i n t r econ -

n a i s s a n c e , s u r v e i l l a n c e , a n d t a r g e t

acquisition (RSTA) system s.

(4) CA includes bat tle dama ge asses s-

ment (BDA), munitions effect assessment

(MEA), and reattack recommendation (RR).

( N o t e : S o m e s e r v i c e s a l s o i n c l u d e t h e

evo lv ing concept o f miss ion assessment

[MA] as p ar t of the CA phase .)

(a) BDA. BDA i s a p r in c ipa l

subordin at e element of CA. BDA at tem pts

to determine t he impa ct of operat ions a gainst

individual ta rgets a nd t ar get systems. BDA

is the estimate of physical, functional, and

target system damage resul t ing from the

application of milita ry force, eith er letha l or

nonletha l, against a predeter mined objective.

A l t h o u g h p r i m a r i l y a n i n t e l l i g e n c e

responsibility, accur at e BDA depends on th e

c o o r d i n a t i o n a n d i n t e g r a t i o n b e t w e e noperat ions an d int elligence. BDA uses all

sour ce intelligence t o assess ta rget da mage

an d response. Dur ing each pha se of th e BDA

process, determinations are made on what

adjust men ts, if an y, are r equired in oth er

pha ses of th e joint t ar geting process.

Pha s e I BDA-In i t i a l. Phas e I

BDA is an initial analysis, based primarily

on v i sual observat ion of the t a rget and

usu ally derived from a single source. In put s

come from aircrew MISREPs and debriefs,

w e a p o n s y s t e m s v i d e o , m a n n e d a n d

unmanned imagery reconnaissance , and

oth er sour ces. The uni t cont rol ling th e

weapon sys tem develops Phase I BDA.

Reports should state whether a t arget was

hit or missed and include an initial estimat e

of dam age. Ph ase I i s usu al ly th e f irs t

indicator of problems with weapon systems

or ta ctics a ssessed dur ing MEA.

Pha se II BDA - Supplemental .Phase II BDA reviews all phase I damage

a s s e s s m e n t s a n d a m p l i f i e s t h e i n i t i a l

ana l y s i s . Phas e I I d raws on a l l s ou rce

i n t e l l i g e n c e a n d o p e r a t i o n a l d a t a t o

determine functiona l damage to a tar get and

an est imate of impact on th e tar get system.

This phase requires t he integrat ion of th eater

an d nat iona l sour ce inform at ion. Th e thea ter

J IC has access to th ese sour ces an d provides

significan t supp ort . Signals intell igence

(SIGINT), ima gery int elligence (IMINT), an d

measurement and s ignature in te l l igence(MASINT) sources are useful during this

phase.

Ph ase III BDA - Tar get System

Assessment. Pr imarily performed in lar ge-

scale operations, Phase III BDA produces a

t a rge t s y s t em as s es s m en t by fu s i ng a l l

supplemental BDA with the experience of

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subject mat ter experts. It provides the J FC

w i t h a n e s t i m a t e o f t h e r e m a i n i n g

capabi l i t i es o f the t a rgeted sys tem. I t s

fun damen ta l use is an input for determ ining

if objectives are being met. The funda men ta l

determination made during phase III BDA

is how successful effort s ha ve been to degrade

or depr ive the en emys warfighting capability.The bottom line quest ion isHow successful

have our efforts been to degrade or deprive

the enemys warfighting capability?

(b) MEA. MEA pr ovides feedba ck

on how wel l o rdnance , t ac t i cs , weapon

systems, and plat form s perform ed in comba t.

M E A i s p r i m a r i l y a n o p e r a t i o n s

responsibi l i ty requir ing inputs from the

int elligence comm un ity. MEA is cond uct ed

concurrently and interactively with BDA toevaluate o rdnance , weapon sys tem, and

tactics performance and continues over an

extended period of time beyond the BDA

process. MEA evaluates weapons para meters

such a s delivery accur acy, fusin g, and da ma ge

m echan i s m s (b l a s t , f r agm en t a t i on , and

penet ra tion). In the MEA process, an alysts

iden t i fy weapons and tac t i cs /muni t ions

deficiencies. Once a deficiency is iden tified,

the analysts make recommendations either

for procedural changes, different tactics, or

system modificat ions.

(c) RR. RR i s a combined

opera t ions an d intel l igence funct ion. I t

provides the J FC sp ecific advice on r eat ta ck

of targets and further target select ion to

achieve object ives . RR develops recom-

mendations on which targets may require

reat ta ck, based upon t he en emys r emaining

capab i l i t y , capac i t y , and po t en t i a l fo r

recuper at ion. In doing so, it also at tem pts

to solve deficiencies identified during theBDA an d MEA processes. Reasses smen t of

objectives, target selection, vulnerabilities,

t iming, tact ics , weapons, and muni t ions

fac tors in to the new recommendat ions .

Reatt ack recommen dat ions a re pa ssed back

into the joint targeting cycle at the target

developmen t, force a pplicat ion, an d execut ion

plann ing/force execut ion pha ses. In a ddition,

RR provides significant indications for the

fur ther exploita tion of th e ongoing operat ions,

thu s "resta rt ing" th e ta rgeting process with

the development and defini t ions of new

objectives.

(d) MA. Though not a form ally

recognized part of CA, some services are

beginn ing to use t he evolving concept of MAto address the effectiveness of the overall

opera tion in ligh t of comm an der s objectives

an d guidan ce. MA gives th e JF C a broad

perspective of the comprehensive impact of

operat ions against t he enemy and evaluat es

mission accomplishmen t on t he enemys

war fighting a nd war sust aining capabilities.

3 . O r g a n i z i n g f o r t h e J o i n t T a r g e t i n g

P r o c e s s

The JFC conducts the joint target ing

process with in an esta blished organizat iona l

f r a m e w o r k o p t i m i z e d f o r t a r g e t i n g

opera t ions . A prim ar y consider at ion in

orga nizing t his fra mework is th e joint forces

ab i l i t y t o coo rd i na t e , decon f l i c t , and

synchronize joint ta rgetin g operat ions. The

s t ruc t u re e s t ab l i s hed by t he J FC m us t

f a c i l i t a t e t h e j o i n t t a r g e t i n g p r o c e s s

t h r o u g h o u t t h e e n t i r e s p e c t r u m o f

an t icipated ta rget ing t imel ines . I t must

conduct effective joint targeting for long-

ter m, daily, and ra pidly cha nging t ime-critical

situat ions. The JFC defines th is stru ctu re

based upon assigned, attached, supporting

forces; th rea t; mission; and opera tional ar ea.

The str uctur e must focus on enem y COGs to

expedite cam paign success. It must a lso

identify those critical vulnerabilities that

directly or indir ectly lead to the degr ada tion

of enemy COGs. Also, it mu st be re sponsive

enough to react to rapidly changing events.

A t a r g e t i n g s t r u c t u r e t h a t q u i c k l ycoordina tes an d synchr onizes joint t ar geting

operat ions wil l effect ively counter high

pr iorit y, tim e-crit ical thr eat s. Likewise, it

should execute a l l pha ses of th e join t

ta rget ing process efficiently and contin uous ly.

a . Intel ligence Division (J-2). The J -2

oversees the intelligence operations of the

joint force and provides intelligence to all

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levels of the command for plan ning, directing,

an d condu cting operat ions. The J-2 is th e

sta ff agency with t he prim ar y responsibility

for prioritization of intelligence collection

effort s, ta rget detection, validat ion, an d BDA

for all oper at ions . Also, th e J-2 is a ma jor

par ticipant in t he detection of ta rgets an d the

target prioritization process.

b. T h e a t e r J I C . The t hea t e r J IC i s

located at combatant command level and

integrat es all na tiona l and DOD supporting

capabilities to develop a curr ent intelligence

p i ct u r e . T h e N a t i o n a l M i li t a r y J o in t

Int elligence Center (NMJ IC) support s t heir

efforts. The th eater J IC is the center of

intelligence activities supporting t he J FC,

J -2, and components and provides the all-

source analys i s and target mater ia l s to

support th e tar geting an d BDA process. Atthe subunified command and JTF level, a

J ISE a ssists in coordina ting J IC operat ions.

c. Operations Division (J-3). The J-3

ass i s t s the commander in the d i scharge

responsibility of the direction an d cont rol of

operat ions, beginning with th e plann ing and

follow-th rough un til specific opera tions a re

completed . In th is capacity, th e J-3 plan s,

coordinat es, an d integr at es operat ions. The

flexibility and ra nge of modern forces requ ire

c l o s e coo rd i na t i on and i n t eg ra t i on fo r

effective un ity of effort. Wh en th e joint sta ff

includes a P lans Divis ion (J -5), it also

perform s th e long ra nge or futu re plann ing

responsibilities. 13

d. Join t Targeting Coordination Board.

J FCs may establish an d task an organization

wi th in the i r s t a f fs to accompl i sh broad

ta rgeting oversight functions or ma y delegat e

t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o a s u b o r d i n a t e

comm an der. Typically, JF Cs organ ize JTCBs.If the JFC designates, a JTCB may be an

integrating center for this effort or a JFC-

level review mecha nism . In either case, it

needs to be a joint activity composed of

r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s f r o m t h e s t a f f , a l l

c om p o n e n t s , a n d , i f r e q u i r e d , t h e i r

subordinate un its. J FCs ta sk comma nders

or sta ff officers with t he J TCB fun ction based

on th e J FCs concept of operat ions a nd t he

ind iv idu a l s exper ience , exper t i se , a nd

si tuat ional awareness appropriate to the

situat ion. The J FC defines the role of th e

J TCB. Typically, th e JTCB reviews ta rget ing

inform at ion, develops ta rget ing guidance and

priorities, an d ma y prepar e an d refine J TLs.

The J TCB should also mainta in a complete

list of restricted targets and areas wherespecial operat ions forces (SOF) ar e operat ing

t o avo i d endanger i ng cu r ren t o r fu t u re

operations.14

(1) The JTCB maintains a macro-level

view of the a rea of res ponsibility (AOR)/joint

operat ions ar ea (JOA) an d ensures t ar geting

nominations ar e consistent with t he J FCs

campa ign plan.15 This view encompa sses al l

component operations and all joint force

ta rget in g (not solely ai r tar get ing). I ts

p r i nc i pa l focus i s on t he s t r a t eg i c and

opera tiona l level of war.

(2) T h e J T CB m u s t m a in t a i n a

campaign-level perspective and should not

involve itself at levels of detail best left to

t h e c o m p o n e n t c o m m a n d e r s , s u c h a s

selecting specific targets and aimpoints, or

development of attack packages.16 They do

not write mast er air atta ck plan s, develop

ATOs, develop AGMs, o r make appor-

t i on m e n t d e c is i on s . C om p o n e n t s a r eresponsible for pla nn ing an d execut ion.

(3) The J TCB genera l ly focuses on

opera tions beyond a 24-hour cycle. It m ay

have difficulty monitoring operations short

of a 24-hour period and m ay have little or no

a b i l i t y t o a f f e c t r e a l - t i m e t a r g e t i n g

op e r a t i o n s . O t h e r s ol u t i o n s , s u c h a s

componen t t o componen t dir ect coordin at ion,

m us t occu r t o fu l f i l l t he ro l e o f r ap i d

decon f l i c t i on , s ynch ron i za t i on , and

coordination.

(4) The JTCB as a planning support

function helps componen ts follow t he J FCs

intent in the execut ion of operat ions by

preparing targeting guidance, refining joint

tar get lists, an d r eviewing t ar get inform at ion.17

(5) The JFC may direct the J TCB to

maintain the JTL.18

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(6) The J TCB may serve as a focal point

to coord ina te joint force/componen t t ar geting

operations with other operations, such as

logistics an d space/nat iona l asset support.

(7) In mu lt inat ional operat ions , the

J TCB may be subordinat e to a Multinationa l

Tar geting Coordina tion Boar d, with J FCs ortheir agents represent ing the joint force on

the multinational board.19

e. C o m p o n e n t C o m m a n d e r s . Com-

ponent comman ders are instru mental in t he

execut ion of ta rget s resu lting from t he joint

targeting process and identifying targets

c r i t i ca l t o t h e i r op e r a t i o n s . T h e y a r e

i n s t r u m e n t a l i n a s s i s t i n g t h e J F C i n

form ulat ing guidan ce, cont rolling ma ny of the

co l lec t ion asse t s , execu t ing opera t ions

against targets, and providing feedback as

par t of combat assessment . These functions

remain constant regardless of joint force

o rgan i za t i on ( func t i ona l o r s e rv i ce ) .

Coordination and communication between

components are especially critical in regard

t o TCTs. J FCs est ablish comm on pr ocedur es,

c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , a n d t a r g e t r e f e r e n c e

systems t o ena ble them t o quickly react when

a TCT presen ts itself. Joint P ub 3-0,Doctrine

for Joint Operat ions , provides f u r t h e r

i n fo r m a t i o n on c om p o n e n t c om m a n d e r

ta rgetin g resp onsibilities. J oint Pub 3-56.1,

Co m m a n d a n d Con t r o l f or Join t A i r

Opera t ions , e x p l a i n s J F A C C t a r g e t i n g

res ponsibilities. Joint Pub 3-05.5 , S pecial

Operat ions Target ing/ Miss ion Plann ing

Responsibi l i t ies , exp l a i n s j o i n t s pec i a loperat ions task force (JSOTF) target ing

responsibilities.

f. Delegation Of Targeting . JFCs will

normally delegate t he a uth ority t o condu ct

execu t i on p l ann i ng , coo rd i na t i on , and

deconfliction associated with targeting and

will ensure that this process is also a joint

ef for t involv ing appl icab le subord inate

comm an ds. Whoever is designa ted this

responsibility mu st p ossess or ha ve access to

a suf f ic ien t C2 in f ras t ruc ture , adequate

facil i t ies, and ready availabil i ty of joint

plan ning expert ise. Should such an agency

be charged with joint functional command

responsibilities, a joint ta rgetin g mecha nism

is also needed t o facilitat e th is process at th is

level. All componen ts a r e norma lly involved

in ta rgeting and should establish pr ocedures

and mechanisms to manage the targeting

function.20

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I - 1 3

NOTES

1Jt Pub 1-02,DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, March 23, 1994, p 364

2 J t P ub 3-0,Doctrine for Joint Operations, Febr ua ry 1, 1995, p III-25

3 Ibid

4 Ibid, p III -26

5 Ibid, p III -25

6 Ibid, p III -26

7 J t P ub 3-56.1, Comm and and Control for Joint Air Operations, Novem ber 14, 1994, p IV-8

8 Ibid

9

Ibid

10 J t P ub 3-0,Doctrine for J oint Operations, Febr ua ry 1, 1995, p IV-16

11 Ibid

12 Ibid

13 J t P ub 0-2, Un ified Action Arm ed Forces (UN AAF), Febru ar y 24, 1995, p IV-20

14 J t P ub 3-0,Doctrine for J oint Operations, Februa ry 1, 1995, p III-26

15 J t P ub 3-56.1, Comm and and Control for Joint Air Operations, November 14, 1994, p IV-2

16 CSAF/CSA Article, T he Arm y-Air Force Team: Leveraging Ou r S trengths, p 5

17 Ibid

18 J t P ub 3-56.1, Comm and and Control for Joint Air Operations, November 14, 1994, p IV-8

19 J t P ub 3-0,Doctrine for J oint Operations, Februa ry 1, 1995, p III-26

20 Ibid, pp III-26 an d III-27

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I I - 1

Chapter II

PROCEDURES FOR TARGETING TIME-CRITICAL TARGETS

b. S u r fa ce T C T s m a y a l s o b e fi xe d

targets, such as operational-level command

c e n t e r s t h a t , o n c e t h e i r l o c a t i o n i s

determined, must be destroyed quickly to

allow fur th er friendly force actions. Oth er

f i xed - s u r face TCTs m ay be nuc l ea r o r

chem i ca l weapons depo t s , (when

t ranspor ta t ion of the s to red weapons i s

i m m i n e n t , o r i f h i d d e n , o n c e t h e y a r e

detected), or fixed surface-to-surface missile

(SSM) sites (when det ected a nd t hr eaten ing

to lau nch). Un der certa in circum sta nces,

o r d i n a r y f i x e d - s u r f a c e t a r g e t s m a y b e

classified as time-critical if they present al u c r a t i v e o p p o r t u n i t y t h a t t h e J F C /

component comman der deter mines is a

priority. For example, an enem y airfield ma y

become a surface TCT if it is determined

(through intelligence sources) it will soon

s u p p o r t a i r c r a f t e q u i p p e d w i t h W M D .

Likewise, a bridge, previously left st an ding

to cha nn el enemy movement , ma y become a

sur face TCT once the comma nder determ ines

it is time to destr oy it and sea l off an avenu e

of escape.

c. Surface TCTs are classified as either

planned or immediate (Figure II-1).

(1) P l a n n e d surface TCTs a re

ordin ar ily fixed tar gets, known t o exist in an

operational area, that have been upgraded

to time-critical sta tu s due to J FC/component

comm an der priority. This is norm ally due to

a newly acquired "short dwell" status that

p res en t s an excep t i ona l ope ra t i ona l o r

ta ctical opport un ity. Fires and at ta cks are

placed on-call aga inst plan ned s ur face TCTs.Gener ally, sur face TCTs (as plan ned t ar gets)

ar e limited in n umber.

(2) I m m e d i a t e surface TCTs are

mobile TCTs against which fire or attacks

have not been schedu led. Some fixed TCTs

may also be immediate. Immediate sur face

TCTs have two subcategoriesunplanned

and una nticipated.

"When you see a ra t t l esna ke p oi sed to

s t r i k e , y o u d o n o t w a i t u n t i l h e h a s

s t ruck before you crush him . "

-Franklin D. Roosevelt

11 Sep tembe r 1941

1 . S u r f a c e T i m e - C r i t i c a l T a r g e t s

A TCT is a lucra tive, fleet ing, air, land , or

sea target of such high priority to friendly

forces tha t t he J FC/component comma nder

d e s i g n a t e s i t a s r e q u i r i n g i m m e d i a t e

re s pons e . TCTs pos e , o r w i l l pos e , an

imminen t th rea t to friendly forces or pr esent

a n e x c e p t i o n a l o p e r a t i o n a l o r t a c t i c a l

opport un ity. Oth er a djectives commonly used

to describe a TCT ar e em erging, perishab le,

high payoff, short d well, or tim e-sensitive (as

defined in Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary

of Milita ry and Associated Term s). This

chapt er dea ls exclusively with surface (land

or sea) TCTs. Most su rfa ce TCTs typically

m ove r ap i d l y and h i de t h roughou t t hebat tlefield, limiting th eir exposure time. In

term s of th e joint t ar geting process, the J FC/

component comma nder sets sur face TCTs as

priorities du rin g th e comm an ders objectives

and guidance phase. Target development

d e d i c a t e s s e n s o r s f o r d e t e c t i o n a n d

identificat ion, a nd weaponeering assessmen t

provides th e J FC options for at ta ck. Force

applicat ion a ssigns att ack asset s, after wh ich

th e execution plann ing/force execut ion pha se

em ploys force. CA follows thr ough with

feedback for subsequent engagements.

a . Examples of sur face TCTs include

mobile rocket lau ncher s (MRLs), mobile high

t h rea t s u r f ace - t o -a i r m i s s i l e s (SAM s ) ,

th eat er ba llistic missiles (TBMs), supportin g

l a u n c h e r s , m o b i l e w e a p o n s o f m a s s

dest ru ction (WMD), or m obile C2 vehicles an d

facilities.

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I I - 2

(a) Unplanned immediate sur-

face TCTs are those known to exis t in

operat iona l area s but have no fire or a tt acks

scheduled. They ar e genera lly th e lar gest

category of surface TCTs. They requireesta blished procedures for p roactive, timely

a c q u i s i t i o n b y s e n s o r s a n d i m m e d i a t e

response once acquired. The JF C directs

component comma nders to assign a dequate

attack assets to respond to all unplanned

immediate surface TCTs in an operational

a r e a . I n s i t u a t i on s w h e r e a J F C or

c o m p o n e n t c o m m a n d e r d o e s n o t h a v e

sufficient at ta ck assets, prioritization mu st

occur.

(b) Unant i c i pa ted i mmedi a te

surface TCTs are those surface TCTs not

expected or unknown t o e x i s t i n a n

operat iona l ar ea. This cat egory of sur face

TCT is the most dangerous as response is

extremely reactive due to the element of

s u r p r i s e . E s t a b l i s h e d p r o ce d u r e s f or

proactive, timely acquisition a nd imm ediat e

response are still required. JFC/component

commanders can minimize this element of

sur prise by ensu rin g procedur es ar e flexible

to responses against th is type of ta rget,rega rdless of ta rget location o