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Gabriel Bollant 7115

Paul Boling

CT 491

2/21/2015

Nietzsche's Insistence upon Suffering Unto Resignation

Tracing Nietzsche's ideas is a topic of understanding that has defined a large portion of

modern philosophy. His ambiguity due to his parabolic nature combined with his revolutionary

ideas has mystified the postmodern generation, captivating their interest. Books have been

written clarifying his ideals, and more have been written denouncing his ideas. Not only did

Nietzsche capture the imaginations of the modern generation, but since the first decades

following his writings, philosophers, psychologists, philologists, and many other scholarly

schools have been captivated in the same way. Influential thinkers and political leaders such as

Freud, Marx, Derrida, Foucault, and even Hitler have all been large proponents of his writings.

In this thesis I wish to draw out an ascetic ideal within Nietzsche's philosophy, and trace

it back to Eastern ideologies. The hinge that completes the trace will be the philosophy of

Schopenhauer and the influence that he had over Nietzsche at a young age. I wish to show that

while Nietzsche was still young and malleable, he was significantly influenced by Schopenhauer,

and that that influence never left him. Particularly, I wish to show it in the area of his insistence

upon suffering unto resignation. I claim that Nietzsche's insistence upon suffering unto

resignation was originally an Eastern idea traceable to the Upanishads through Schopenhauer.

The meaning of insistence upon suffering unto resignation is of great importance. In

tracing the argument, all of these philosophies positively affirmed that resignation from desire—

denial of the will—was accomplished through suffering. I will show that they all affirmed this

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ascetic idea, and that it encouraged a resignation from desire. Moreover, I will show that

Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Eastern philosophy encouraged suffering as an ideal show of

piety.

Such a trace will clarify the interpretation of Nietzsche's ideologies, but it will also reveal

their possible origin. Within this thesis, I will trace the potential of the idea to Eastern thought,

but not to finding origins of the ascetic idea. This would require another thesis. The focus of this

essay is upon Nietzsche himself, and the origin of his idea for his own thought. This thesis will

shed further light upon his philosophy influenced by the Eastern perspective. It could also lead to

further studies being done, including a study of Schopenhauer's specific influence and the

potential origin of the idea in Eastern thought. However, the focus of this essay is on Nietzsche.

Nietzsche was born in Rocken, a small town in Saxony, Prussia. His father was a

Lutheran minister coming from a generational line of ministers. He was christened with the name

Friedrich Wilhelm after the name of the Prussian king. Nietzsche would later shed this name

along with nationalism and religion, but not before both the king and Nietzsche’s father went

insane; an uncanny foreshadowing of his own insanity to come. Most experts, however, agree

that his illness was not inherited. ((Kaufmann 21-22)).

Nietzsche’s father died when he was five years old and his mother moved the family to

Naumburg. He began attending a renowned boarding school on full scholarship, which was a

significant scholastic achievement. After graduation, he attended the University of Bonn, initially

studying theology and classical philosophy. It would not be long before he would give up

theology and follow his teacher Friedrich Ritschl to Leipzig. This relationship proved to be a

victory for Nietzsche, as it would be on Ritschl's glowing recommendation that he would begin

teaching philology at the University of Basel (Kaufmann 23-24).

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Wilkens and Padgett interpret Nietzsche's work as a reaction against his childhood. They

point out that Nietzsche had not yet fulfilled the requirements for a doctorate when he began

teaching (Wilkens & Padgett). This shows that it was clearly on recommendation alone that

Nietzsche was awarded the position. His time at Basel would not be long, as he retired ten years

later at thirty-four years old due to poor health. He spent the last eleven years of his life

struggling with insanity, commonly attributed to syphilis.

Before beginning my particular argument, it is important to note Nietzsche's contradictory

nature. While it might be simple and apparent to argue Schopenhauer's insistence upon suffering

unto resignation, it is not simple to argue Nietzsche's. His philosophy is parabolic by nature, and

he is at constant contradiction with himself. Karl Jaspers, a prominent translator and scholar of

Nietzsche, affirms "All statements seem to be annulled by other statements. Self-contradiction is

the fundamental ingredient in Nietzsche's thought. For nearly every single one of Nietzsche's

judgments, one can also find an opposite” (Jaspers 10). Due to this contradictory nature, it is

either gratuitously simple or overly impossible to make claims about Nietzsche's ideas. I will

argue his insistence upon suffering unto resignation by outlining it within his philosophy, and

showing his dependence on Schopenhauer.

Given the outcome of Nietzsche's own life, his philosophy inevitably would deal with

suffering. Eleven years took him from the prime of his life into excruciating pain. Days when he

was free from the debilitating pain were spent in writing. In the final years of his life the illness

began destroying his mind. His final works were written while racing against his own destruction

(Melchert 533). As he struggled with illness disintegrating his body and mind, he would seek to

understand his own suffering.

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To understand Nietzsche's view of suffering, there is need to first understand his view of

religion. Religion to Nietzsche, particularly Christianity and Buddhism, was the possibility of

minimizing or abolishing suffering. Nietzsche understood religion to be merely a means to

alleviate personal suffering.

God created man happy, idle, innocent, and immortal: our actual life is a

false, decayed, sinful existence, an existence of punishment— Suffering,

struggle, work, death are considered as objections and question marks against life,

as something that ought not to last; for which one requires a cure—and has a

cure!—

From the time of Adam until now, man has been in an abnormal state:

God himself has sacrificed his son for the guilt of Adam, in order to put an end to

this abnormal state: the natural character of life is a curse; Christ gives back the

state of normality to him who believes in him: he makes him happy, idle and

innocent. (The Will to Power 224)

Nietzsche here critiques the ethic of Christianity as a means of solace from suffering. By looking

towards the next life as reward for actions in this life, Christianity escapes. Redemption will ease

the pain of suffering in this world by providing hope for a future.

This same concern with suffering is reflective in many religions. Kogen Mizuno, in his

explication of basic Buddhist concepts, writes, “The major purpose of all religions is to cure the

illness of the spirit and create a wholesome, integrated psychological condition . . . [their] major

task is the essential improvement of the psychological being to ensure spiritual health and

immunity to spiritual illness” (105). In the traditional story of Buddha's discovery of the path to

enlightenment, he is shaken from his ignorance by observing the suffering of sickness, old age,

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and death: “that life is suffering, that ignorance is the cause of suffering, that suffering can be

eliminated, and that the Eightfold Path is the way to eliminate suffering” (106). Buddhism views

suffering as a hindrance from experiencing happiness; that through the path to enlightenment,

there is freedom from suffering through its cessation. This view of religion, as a means to

freedom from suffering, may not be universally accepted; it actually tends more towards an

Eastern concept. Schopenhauer also reflected on these same ideas, as we will see further on. For

now, we need to note Nietzsche's ascetic ideal.

In the third essay of the Geneology of Morals, Nietzsche describes the ascetic ideal.

Essentially, it is a means through religion that provides meaning to suffering (Genealogy of

Morals, III 28). This is important, because it is Nietzsche's understanding of the pathway to

enlightenment. This is his freedom from suffering. The significance of Nietzsche defining his

means of freedom from suffering through the ascetic ideal is that it connects to his views of

religion. More importantly, it connects to his views of Buddhism. It is in this view of Buddhism

that I wish to connect Nietzsche's thought to Eastern philosophy, particularly by connecting him

to Schopenhauer. It is also in this view of suffering that I wish to connect Nietzsche's thought to

the idea of suffering unto resignation. I affirm that Nietzsche states such an ascetic view of

suffering leading to the ascetic ideal.

The ascetic ideal is achieved by means of the ascetic priest, a shepherd who guides the

herd to freedom from suffering. The wretched are guided by the ascetic priest, as he has

dominion over suffering (Genealogy of Morals, III 15). Nietzsche says that the priest is “a tool

for the creation of more favorable conditions for being here and being man—it is precisely this

power that enables him to persuade to existence the whole herd of the ill-constituted, disgruntled,

underprivileged, unfortunate, and all who suffer of themselves” (Genealogy of Morals, III 11).

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The wretched, the “. . . ill-constituted, disgruntled, underprivileged, unfortunate . . .” are guided

to freedom from suffering. Nietzsche understands that this is done in many ways. He divides

these ways into two categories: the ‘innocent’ and the ‘guilty.’

The first way, the innocent, is carried out by reducing life to avoid suffering: “If possible,

will and desire are abolished altogether . . . no love; no hate; indifference; no revenge; no wealth;

no work; one begs; if possible, no women, or as little as possible; in spiritual matters . . .”

(Genealogy of Morals, III 17). Such a cessation will produce a kind of euphoria. Nietzsche

provides the example of the Buddhist doctrine of becoming one with Brahma (Genealogy of

Morals, III 17). By denying oneself all desire, one achieves freedom from suffering.

The second way of the ascetic priest is through the guilty. Suffering and envy of the

healthy accumulate a resentment, which can have an explosive effect on the wretched individual.

The priest shepherds the wretched away from this resentment by providing a cause, a culprit to

which the wretched can vent their feelings. Even out of friends and family, the sufferer makes

culprits for himself to ease the pain of his suffering (Genealogy of Morals, III 15).

The ascetic priest redirects resentment by means of a lie. By informing the wretched that

they are their own cause for suffering, the priest provides the sufferer with a means to deaden the

pain, and more importantly he provides a meaning to suffering. Nietzsche determines the

problem of suffering is not in the pain of suffering, but in the lack of meaning in it: “[Man's]

problem was not suffering itself, but that there was no answer to the crying question, ‘why do I

suffer?’” (Genealogy of Morals, III 28).

Therefore, the ascetic ideal is self-denial: “The three great slogans of the ascetic ideal are

familiar: poverty, humility, chastity” (Genealogy of Morals, III 8). Humans naturally desire, they

crave and want, and these go against the ascetic ideal. Seeing this, the ascetic priest provides

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meaning for suffering either in an afterlife or in some reward, or more importantly as punishment

for going against the ascetic ideal: “He should look for it within himself, in guilt, in a piece of

the past, he should understand his suffering itself as a condition of punishment” (Genealogy of

Morals, III 20). In this, the ascetic ideal is complete. There is freedom from suffering, and even

more suffering is encouraged: “one no longer protested against pain, one thirsted for pain; ‘more

pain! more pain!’ the desire of his disciples and initiates has cried for centuries” (Genealogy of

Morals, III 20).

The ascetic ideal is key in showing Nietzsche's view of religion and suffering, and while

he has some harsh words to say about religion, his view of the ascetic ideal shapes the creation of

his own alternative ideal. Nietzsche is living in the post-Darwin world. Darwin's Origin of

Species, published in 1859, set forth a new era. His publication resulted in the development of

evolution, which gave means to some of the first cosmological models which did not necessitate

the existence of a god. Nietzsche finds in it the reality that God could no longer exist (“Human

All Too Human” This is the documentary).

To Nietzsche, science had developed past the need for God, and the ability to even

believe in God. The truth of science eradicated belief in God, and the realization of this

discovery was dramatic. Observe in Nietzsche's publication, The Gay Science, the scene

portrayed by his parable of the madman:

Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours,

ran to the market place, and cried incessantly: "I seek God! I seek God!"—As

many of those who did not believe in God were standing around just then, he

provoked much laughter. . . . Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying, as

through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not

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become colder? Is not night continually closing in on us? Do we not need to light

lanterns in the morning? Do we hear nothing as yet of the noise of the

gravediggers who are burying God? Do we smell nothing as yet of the divine

decomposition? Gods, too, decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we

have killed him. (sect. 125; 119)

This realization left Nietzsche with a task to create a new ascetic ideal, one which did not

necessitate the existence of God.

“Dead are all Gods: now do we desire the superman to live” (Thus Spake Zarathustra 1,

sect. 22, 83). Nietzsche's alternative ideal comes under the title of ubermensch, translated

‘superman’ or ‘overman.’ The ubermensch describes a character, an ascetic priest, who shepherds

the herd, and gives a new ascetic ideal. This new ideal does not rely upon the lies of God or

‘guilty.’ He is a character who can provide meaning to the herd by giving them the ascetic ideal.

Essentially, he is a new era in evolution, and he will guide man as a “bridge” in the process of

evolving higher (Thus Spake Zarathustra sect. 4, 8). There are many different characteristics of

the ubermensch, but the two we need to dwell on are the doctrines of faithfulness to the earth and

affirmation of eternal recurrence.

These two characteristics show Nietzsche's insistence upon suffering unto resignation.

Nietzsche's demands to remain “faithful to the earth” are going to show his insistence upon

resigning from desire, and eternal recurrence will show that suffering is going to be the key to

this resignation.

The first characteristic, faithfulness to the earth, is a matter of remaining firm on the

limited nature of life. An ubermensch has no business looking beyond this life to define his

meaning. It is not the true world Nietzsche is describing. The true world1, a term referring to the

1 For further understanding on the true world, see Kant’s ideas on Phenomena as described in Critique of Pure

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way the world empirically represents itself to man, is just as much of a metaphysical theory as

belief in gods. For in Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche proclaims “How the 'True World' Finally

Became a Fable.” Here he describes it as “useless and superfluous” (“How the 'True World'

Finally Became a Fable”). Instead, Nietzsche is speaking about remaining faithful to non-

metaphysical ideas. The ubermensch should have no desires for otherworldly lies (Thus Spake

Zarathustra sect. 4, 9-10).

It is here in this doctrine that Nietzsche is espousing resignation. The ‘true world' is

something to be resigned to. It is an empty, cold shell that can never be grasped. Nietzsche's early

works, particularly The Birth of Tragedy attempted to reconcile a Schopenhauerian metaphysical

theory. Nietzsche has thrown off the reigns of metaphysical ideas, and has labeled them

worthless. The ubermensch must resign to such ideas, including the idea of the true world.

Nietzsche provided a test to measure a true ubermensch: the affirmation of eternal

recurrence. If a man could affirm an existence of perfect repetition, then he would be an

ubermensch. In other words, if life repeated itself over-and-over again without change or

anything new, the same sufferings and the same joys, and if a man could embrace it, even “love”

it, then he would be an ubermensch. Nietzsche calls it “my formula for greatness in a human

being: amor fati” (Ecce Homo 258). Amor fati means the love of fate; to embrace the

completeness of fate is, in essence, the new ideal. The test proves whether or not one truly

embraces all of fate, because despairing at the idea of repetition would reveal a desire for more.

It is desire, desire for more than what is, desire for an afterlife and higher calling, that the

ubermensch resigns from. These desires are the lies of metaphysical ideas, and they are not

worthy of an ubermensch. It is not only these grand desires that one resigns from. He resigns

from desire of all things: from pride, from comfort, from the things of weakness (Thus Spake

Reason.

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Zarathustra 1, sect. 1 23). He becomes an ascetic priest, free from the desires of this world, and

completely accepting of fate.

And how does the ubermensch resign from such desires? By none other than suffering.

Observe in Thus Spake Zarathustra Nietzsche's description of the first stage of the three

metamorphoses. The ubermensch must undergo the stages of three metamorphoses to become the

true ubermensch. The first stage is that of the camel. The picture here is that he must embrace

suffering and hardship in order to become strong and resign from desire. As a camel is strong, so

must the ubermensch be strong, carrying as much burden and hardship that is physically

possible. He must always take the hard way, assuming the “heavy.” But “what is heavy?”

Nietzsche says, “To humiliate oneself in order to mortify one's pride. . . . To exhibit one's folly in

order to mock at one's wisdom. . . . To desert our cause when it celebrateth its triumph. . . . To be

sick and dismiss comforters, and make friends of the deaf, who never hear thy request” (Thus

Spake Zarathustra 1, sect. 1 23).

It is here that Nietzsche is proclaiming the endurance of suffering in order to resign from

desire. Amor fati, love of fate: one must love what is immediately in front of him, and not desire

things beyond himself, just as Nietzsche says, “in order to mortify one's pride.” The ubermensch,

the new ascetic priest, Nietzsche's alternative ideal, must be someone who does not feel pride,

accept comfort, or celebrate triumph. Instead, he must seek hardship for himself in order to

achieve resignation.

Soren Kierkegaard, a Christian Existentialist philosopher, encourages a very similar

philosophy. As a Christian, Kierkegaard encourages it for very different reasons. However, in his

book, Fear and Trembling, he describes an ideal character. This character, the knight of faith, is a

man entirely resigned from the desires of the world. Even as a stepping stone, the knight of faith

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must first become the knight of infinite resignation. At that moment the knight has completely

resigned from all the desires of the world. However, he only becomes the knight of faith when he

can graciously accept the things of the world, while still maintaining a resignation of desire for

them. Observe this passage where Kierkegaard describes such a knight:

One can discover nothing of that aloof and superior nature whereby one

recognizes the knight of the infinite. He takes delight in everything, and whenever

one sees him taking part in a particular pleasure, he does it with the persistence

which is the mark of the earthly man whose soul is absorbed in such things...

Toward evening he walks home, his gait is as indefatigable as that of the postman.

On his way he reflects that his wife has surely a special little warm dish prepared

for him, e.g. a calf's head roasted, garnished with vegetables. If he were to meet a

man like-minded, he could continue as far as East Gate to discourse with him

about that dish, with a passion befitting a hotel chef. As it happens, he hasn't four

pence to his name, and yet he fully and firmly believes that his wife has that

dainty dish for him. If she had it, it would then be an invidious sight for superior

people and an inspiring one for the plain man, to see him eat; for his appetite is

greater than Esau's. His wife hasn't it–strangely enough, it is quite the same to

him. (Kierkegaard 82-83)

Nietzsche, sharing much of existentialist philosophy, is describing his ideal in terms of these

same qualities. His ubermensch is resigning from the desires of the world, as well as any

afterlife, and remaining faithful to the earth, or fate. This is accomplished by assuming suffering,

as a camel assumes a “heavy” load.

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Brian Leiter, in his Nietzsche on Morality, argues that eternal recurrence necessitates a

rejection of suffering and any meaning behind it. Such a claim stands in opposition to my thesis.

The acceptance of a repetitive eternity, Lieter says, “is to recognize that there is no such

meaning” (Leiter 288). However, coming from Nietzsche, such a claim is arguable. Even in Thus

Spake Zarathustra he says, “It was suffering and incapacity that created the afterworlds” (Thus

Spake Zarathustra 1, 143-145). Metaphysical ideas, which need to be thrown off, are the result of

suffering and those who suffer (Nietzsche on Morality, 287-8).2

George Wrisley does not agree with Leiter; he refutes Leiter on the grounds that

Nietzsche encouraged suffering. First of all, Nietzsche claimed that joy necessitates suffering.

The two are intimately tied. Secondly, he said suffering makes one strong, in a “what doesn't kill

me, makes me stronger” type fashion. Wrisley uses these points to argue Nietzsche's

encouragement of suffering, refuting Leiter's claims (Wrisley 13-21).3

Thus far it has been established that Nietzsche affirmed suffering unto resignation. Now

in order to show that such an idea is in fact an Eastern philosophy derived from Schopenhauer, I

will begin by drawing out Nietzsche's connections to Buddhism.

There have not been many studies drawing Nietzsche's connection to Buddhism. In a

paper connecting Nietzsche to Paul Duessen, Hans Rollman, a professor in the Department of

Religious Studies at the Memorial University of Newfoundland, states, “No monograph dealing

with the lifelong friendship between Friedrich Nietzsche and the German indologist Paul

Deussen has yet appeared” (125). This is significant because Paul Deussen was famed for

translating Eastern philosophy and was a lifelong friend of Nietzsche's. If such connections

establishing Eastern philosophy's impact over Nietzsche were well researched, such a monograph

2 For more on Leiter’s argument see Nietzsche on Morality.3 For more on Wrisley's refutation see Nietzsche and the Value of Human Suffering - Two Alternative Ideals

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would surely be needed. However, there have been a handful of studies drawing the similarities

between Buddhism and Nietzsche, and a pool of research exists that draws his connection to

Schopenhauer.

Many Nietzschean scholars connect Nietzsche to nihilism, against the philosopher's

perspective of himself. Such a contradiction between his writings and scholarly claims

surrounding them is characteristic of Nietzsche. For this reason, it is plausible to look to

establishments beyond his own words to justify his philosophy. Establishing this idea—that

Nietzsche had Buddhist influence over his philosophy—is significant as it would connect him to

Buddhism and show his contradictory nature.

Guy Richard Welbon has researched the potential connections between Nietzsche and

Buddhism. Observing Nietzsche's life, Welbon points out that he likely studied Sanskrit while at

Leipzig, under Hermann Brockhaus. Welbon even suggests that due to his training Nietzsche

would have been one of the most well read and firmly grounded scholars on Eastern philosophy

for his time period. This is significant, as it might suggest a large influence from these

philosophies upon Nietzsche's own writings.

Welbon draws parallels between Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence and the

Buddhist vale of Samsara existence, Nietzche's Zarathustra and the Buddhist bodhisttava, his

program for transvaluation of values and Nirvana.4 Welbon further concludes, “I am insisting

that there is no basic conflict between Nietzsche and Buddhism on several important issues, and

that there is sufficient evidence to indicate that Nietzsche's presentations do witness Buddhist

influences” (Welbon 185-89).

Another author who draws a similar Buddhist influence over Nietzsche, Benjamin Elman,

suggests that Nietzsche was against many scholarly claims, in fact a nihilist, and that the nihilist

4 For more on these doctrines and Welbon's connection see Buddhist Nirvana and Its Western Interpreters.

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tendencies of Eastern thought show his connection to them. Elman concludes this by shifting the

understanding of Nietzsche's thought away from the traditional understanding of the Western

intellectual milieu defined by men such as G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), Karl Marx (1818-1883),

and Charles Darwin (1809-1882). In this traditional view, Nietzsche greatly influenced these

men. Elman suggests such a view introduces philosophic blinders due to Western interpretive

bias. Instead, he proposes viewing Nietzsche's philosophy in light of the vistas of Eastern

influence where, according to Elman, Nietzsche explicitly attacked Buddhism as a nihilistic

religion; Elman remains insistent upon this connection (671-673).

If the ideas of Welbon and Elman are correct, this would reveal not only significant

Eastern philosophic influence on Nietzsche, but also the legitimacy of his contradictory nature

when attacking Buddhism. This idea provides a stepping stone, establishing Buddhist influence,

which will lead into his connections with Eastern philosophy. In order to connect Nietzsche's

idea of suffering unto resignation to Eastern philosophy, I will draw out the same idea in Eastern

philosophy, first by drawing the connection of the idea to Schopenhauer. The next step in this

process is connecting Nietzsche to Schopenhauer himself.

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While Nietzsche was a university student at Leipzig, Schopenhauer left his mark upon

him. At that time, Nietzsche picked up a book at an antiquarian shop and was beguiled instantly.

He later wrote about the experience in Untimely Meditations. “I belong to the readers of

Schopenhauer,' Nietzsche says, 'who after they have read the first page of him know with

certainty that they will read all his pages, and they will listen to every word that he has said”

(Dolson 241-242). Nietzsche became a professed follower of Schopenhauer.

Neal Dolson, a professor of Philosophy at Wells College, describes Nietzsche's encounter

with Schopenhauer as a highly influential one. Once a proselyte, Nietzsche began making

converts of his friends. They began a circle of disciples, committed to the philosopher as

worshipers to a deity. When one among them would struggle, the other offered appropriate

passages from the works of Schopenhauer. He was to them the incarnation of an ideal

philosopher. Later, when Nietzsche accepted the position at Basel, he expressed his intention of

specifically infusing Schopenhauerian philosophy with the philology program. In an essay in

which Nietzsche attempted to express the meaning Schopenhauer had over him, instead of

repeating Schopenhauer's philosophic principles, he discussed the “physiological influence,” as

Nietzsche called it. In the essay he describes Schopenhauer as fulfilling the test of a true

philosopher by being genuine and true to his principles. He not only spoke his philosophy, but

Nietzsche says that he expressed it in his life (Dolson 241-246). Ironically, Schopenhauer was

known for many things, but fulfilling his own philosophy was not one of them. Nietzsche was

without a doubt infatuated with the philosopher.

Nietzsche's divorce from Schopenhauer comes resolutely. In his own words, he passes

from referring to himself as a follower and speaking highly of him to denouncing him and

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comparing him to the lowest order: Christianity. Observe this passage from one of Nietzsche's

early works, Schopenhauer as Educator:

I judge a philosopher by whether he is able to serve as an example. . . .

[Schopenhauer's] greatness is the fact that he faces the picture of life as a whole in

order to interpret it as a whole. . . . Schopenhauer's philosophy should be

interpreted . . . by the individual . . . in order to gain insight into his own misery,

needs and limitations and to know the antidotes and consolations; namely,

sacrifice of the ego, submission to the noblest intentions, and above all, justice

and mercy. He teaches us how to distinguish between real and apparent

advancements of human happiness, how neither becoming rich, nor being

respected, nor being learned can raise the individual above his disgust as the

valuelessness of his existence, and how the struggle for all these good things is

given meaning only by a high and transfiguring goal: to win power in order to

come to the help of nature, and to correct her foolishness and clumsiness a little

— at first, admittedly, solely for oneself, but eventually for everybody. . . . This is

a struggle which in its deepest and innermost nature leads to resignation. (25-26)

In this passage, the adoration that Nietzsche had for Schopenhauer is clearly felt. His expression

of high esteem is vividly evident. However, fifteen years later, with the publication of Twilight of

the Idols, Nietzsche would express a different tune. His adoration for Schopenhauer has waned

with his maturity by the time he composes this passage:

Schopenhauer . . . is for a psychologist a case of the first order: namely, a

mendacious attempt of genius to marshal, in aid of a nihilistic total devaluation of

life, the very counter-instances, the great self-affirmations of the 'will to live', the

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exuberant forms of life. He interpreted in turn art, heroism, genius, beauty, grand

sympathy, knowledge, the will to truth, tragedy, as phenomena consequent upon

the 'denial' of or the thirst to deny the 'will' — the greatest piece of false-coinage

in history, Christianity alone excepted. Looked at more closely he is in this merely

the heir of the Christian interpretation: but with this difference, that he knew how

to take what Christianity had rejected, the great cultural facts of mankind, and

approve of them from a Christian, that is to say nihilistic, point of view (- namely,

as roads to 'redemption', as preliminary forms of 'redemption', as stimulants of the

thirst for 'redemption'). (79-80)

The comparison to Christianity is one of the lowest degradations that could from Nietzsche. For

him, the Christian ethic was a disgust to all of society, and he described it as “life's nausea” ((The

Birth of Tragedy 23). To compare Schopenhauer to Christianity was in itself the greatest insult.

By the time he wrote this second passage, Nietzsche, in his own perspective, had completely

thrown off the influence of Schopenhauer. The change in perspective over these years shows a

reverse in his opinion.

Despite Nietzsche's insistence upon having thrown off the reigns of his previous master,

the evidence of the influence was still apparent. Nietzsche could not stand the idea of having

been accountable to someone else's philosophy. He loved the idea that he had carved his own

ideas out of the untouched rock face. Even as a young boy this same mentality was in his mind.

This mentality can be observed in a letter from his mother, when he was at boarding school. His

mother was concerned that his growing rebellious nature was derived from school peers, young

Nietzsche responded with, “There is no question of anybody exercising any influence over me,

for in order for that to happen I must first get to know people whom I feel to be my superiors”

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(Reyburn 22). This same mentality of superiority carried over into his later years, as he took on

almost no mentors outside of Schopenhauer and Richard Wagner. However, his philosophy

continued to bear resemblance to Schopenhauer after his alleged separation. Understanding the

world as will, and fashioning titles like the Will to Power after clear Schopenhauerian ideas, such

as the will to live, would remain permanently in his works.

Dolson agrees, Nietzsche never truly separated from Schopenhauer. He believes that even

after Nietzsche had divorced his allegiance, he continued to fill Schopenhauer's forms with ideas

of his own. Doubting that this position was merely a result of Nietzsche's youth, he argues that

Nietzsche never appreciated the idea that he had once been subject to another philosopher's

views. Dolson concludes that the evidence from Nietzsche's books is against his claims of

divorce, and that “it is safe to assume Schopenhauer's influence was a real and important one”

(Dolson 242).

Schopenhauer's influence over Nietzsche is thus established. While Nietzsche was still

young, and easily malleable, Schopenhauer left a significant mark upon him. Now in order to

reveal the connection between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche’s insistence upon suffering unto

resignation, it is necessary to reveal Schopenhauer's affirmation of the same idea.

Schopenhauer, in the preface of his master work, The World as Will and Representation,

encourages the reader to read three things before reading any further in this work. First of all, the

reader should read an earlier work by Schopenhauer that he describes as the introduction to this

work, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Philosophical Essay (x). The

second thing Schopenhauer encourages to be read are the writings of Kant. Schopenhauer

describes him in a glorious light, even referring to him as “the great Kant” (xii). The last thing

Schopenhauer makes reference to, and which is most important for this essay, are the writings of

Bollant 19

the Upanishads (xi-xiii). Throughout this master work, Schopenhauer will draw connections

between the ideas of Kant and the ideas of Vedanta philosophy. Schopenhauer’s influence from

Eastern philosophy is clear and self-proposed, and his own insistence upon suffering unto

resignation is starkly locatable. In fact, the conclusion of his master work is essentially affirming

asceticism through denial of the will.

The reason for these prerequisites is that Schopenhauer is going to marry the philosophies

of Kant and the Upanishads together into his own philosophy. John David Ebert gives a summary

of this work, The World as Will and Representation, and describes this marriage. Ebert describes

how Schopenhauer used Kant's philosophy of the noumenal world and the phenomenal world5,

and proposed a relationship between them and the Upanishad philosophies of Maya and Brahma.

Together, these philosophies influenced Schopenhauer's own idea: that all things existed in a

cosmic will-to-live (“On Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy 1/3”).

Schopenhauer's cosmic will-to-live essentially can be described as a cognitive apparatus

that consumes all of nature. Space, time, and causality determine all of existence, and even

animals have the presuppositional understanding for how to interpret reality. The only separation

between human beings and animals is their cognitive function for reason. Humans can reason,

which to Schopenhauer is merely abstractions upon the cognitive apparatus that interprets reality.

Ebert describes Schopenhauer's philosophy of ideas as, “the metaphysical substratum by means

of which the will pours itself forth and manifests itself in space and time” (John David Ebert on

Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy 2/3).

Most important to this essay is Schopenhauer's ascetic freedom from the will. Since the

will is constantly driving both humans and animals, the whole world is in never-ending

5 These terns are initially introduced in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. For simple explanations of these terms see alternate sources.

Bollant 20

enslavement to the will. The only lasting freedom from it is by means of asceticism, or denial of

the will. From Schopenhauer's own words:

We therefore find in the lives of saintly persons that peace and bliss we have

described, only as the blossom resulting from the constant overcoming of the will;

and we see the constant struggle with the will-to-live as the soil from which it

shoots up; for on earth no one can have lasting peace . . . Therefore we see also

those who have once attained to the denial of the will, strive with all their might

to keep to this path by self-imposed renunciation of every kind, by a penitent and

hard life . . . Indeed, we may assume that most men can reach it only in this way,

and that it is the suffering personally felt, not the suffering merely known, which

most frequently produces complete resignation, often only at the approach of

death. (World as Will and Idea I 506-507)

Schopenhauer, in this statement, is affirming my thesis. To summarize according to

Schopenhauer's philosophy leading up to this quote, everything is will. Will is a presuppositional

cognitive interpretation of reality. To will is to suffer. Willing must inevitably lead to desire, and

any unfulfilled desire is suffering. Therefore, the lasting escape from suffering is to deny the will.

In the quote above, Schopenhauer states that the only lasting freedom from suffering is to deny

the will, and that those who have attained such a denial, strive with everything to maintain “self-

imposed renunciation.” And finally, Schopenhauer affirms my thesis by stating the pathway to

complete resignation is “by a penitent and hard life” through suffering unto resignation.

“If I were to take the results of my philosophy as the standard of truth, I would have to

consider Buddhism the finest of all religion” (The World as Will and Representation II 186).

Schopenhauer himself had clear Eastern influences and He traced his own ideas to Eastern

Bollant 21

influence. He found certain schools of Indian philosophy to nearly reflect his originally Western

philosophy.

Most importantly, it is necessary to recognize that no matter how much Schopenhauer's

philosophy might have strayed from Eastern thought, the purpose of suffering as a pathway to

resignation is cemented in both his ideas and in Eastern Buddhist philosophies from which he

derived his own philosophy. The Upanishads were old philosophies that Schopenhauer relied

upon, and these ideas were forged from many ascetic practices. The practice of yoga was

inspired by the idea that austerity killed sin. This view of such practices was embedded in

Brahamic religion in the Upanishads, and it gained a prominent role in the practices of the Yogas

and the Jainas. According to Jainism, liberation is only possible when all passion has been

exterminated, and a key pathway to that extermination is through suffering.

("Religious Asceticism"). Suffering unto resignation is an easily recognizable idea in the

philosophies and practices of many Eastern religions, and especially in those which

Schopenhauer relied upon.

It is here that the argument finds its rest. Insistence upon suffering unto resignation has

been traced through the philosophies of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer and into Eastern thought.

Nietzsche insisted upon it both in his understanding of an ascetic priest and in his own ascetic

ideal, the ubermensch. Schopenhauer heavily insisted upon it, and he noted that it was a

derivative of Eastern philosophy. His master work concluded this, and in it he clearly stated the

pathway to such resignation.

On the part of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, this thesis is largely complete. Due to the

nature of Nietzsche's contradictory writings, the argument for his insistence upon suffering unto

resignation cannot be taken much further. On the part of Schopenhauer, it is obvious that it is not

Bollant 22

necessary to take it further. However, further extension of this idea in the area of Eastern

philosophy would not be unmerited. The origin of the ascetic idea could potentially be traced to

specific Eastern ideologies, and this evidence could solidify Nietzsche's original influence by

Schopenhauer and his Eastern philosophies.

It is most important to recognize the immediate influences on Nietzsche and the fact that

Schopenhauer's influence over him never died. As mentioned earlier, Paul Deussen was a

lifelong friend of Nietzsche's, and no monograph on their relationship is in existence. Such a

monograph could have importance in tracing this idea and similar ideas to Eastern thought as

well. Furthermore, Paul Deussen could potentially be traced to significant Eastern Philosophical

influences upon Nietzsche.

In conclusion, Nietzsche insisted upon suffering unto resignation. He espoused this in his

own works, and is shown through his philosophy. Nietzsche had significant connections to

Buddhism, and this stepping stone provides the path to describing his Eastern influences. This

path, however, is mainly through the influence of Schopenhauer. The German philosopher

clearly stated his own connections to Eastern thought in his philosophy. Most importantly,

Schopenhauer established his own insistence upon suffering unto resignation, and its origins in

Eastern thought. Eastern thought affirms the truth that the idea can be expressly found within its

philosophies. Therefore, it is sufficient to say that the idea of insistence upon suffering unto

resignation is traceable from Nietzsche to the Upanishads through Schopenhauer.

Bollant 23

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