Presentatie Echte2 Pff

8/12/2019 Presentatie Echte2 Pff

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Every emancipatory theory must explain at least two things. First, it must be able to explain a

social problem or the oppression of a certain group as an effect of a social structure. Poverty, for

example, would not be viewed as the fault of the poor man himself, but as a result of complex

economic structures that surpass the individual. At the same time, If an emancipatory theory

wants to inspire activism, it must be able to formulate a plausible possibility for agency. A

proper agent must be able to have a real effect on the structure that is identified to be flawed.

For that to be possible, it seems that it must conceptualize some space outside the social

structure, thus not completely determined by the structure, from where an Agent can have an

real effect on the structure.

For critique to be possible, this frst (pessimistic) description must be combined with a second

(optimistic) description which, basing itself on the historicist forms of the Enlightenment

project of liberation, points the succession of social orders in the direction of emancipation -

which assumes recourse not only to a philosophy of history, but also to a philosophical

anthropology more or less necessary to impart content to the idea of liberation. (Boltanski, On

Critique, 14)

In order to be truly critical, to articulate the struggles and wishes of our age, critical theory must

analyse power relations in all their depth and complexity, including the role they play in

constituting modes of subjectivity, but it must do so without undermining or giving up on the

possibility of theorizing the subjectscapacities for critical reflection and self-transformation.

Understood in this way, the project of critical theory has much to learn from Foucault.

For the liberal this poses no real problem, because for him this space exists in the form of the

autonomous subject. The liberal ideal is that every individual, in the end, can act free from every

determination but his own. This does not mean that this liberal subject is completely

independent from lager social structures individual autonomy can still be severely constrained

by the social world. However, The autonomous subject is not a mere effect of a social structure.

There always exist some point, be it human nature, or reason, on the basis of which the subjecthas the possibility to rise above social determination. From this point the subject can analyze the

situation, find a rational solution and solve the problem. Not surprisingly, social problems are

often formulated as a restriction of autonomy.

But, as we have seen, for a great deal of progressive theory it is not that simple.

Off course, the argument the poor are poor because their autonomy is severely restrained is

somehow convincing. Social structures are too determining, too powerful for them to make a

choice and to effectuate that choice. But perhaps more importantly, is the question whether the


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supposedly more powerful individuals of the world, the ones who seem not to be limited by the

social structures in the way the poor are, are really capable of acting autonomously. If a boss has

good reasons to fire a thousand employees, it seems that he can deliberately make that choice.

The poor employees may disagree, but, although they outnumber the boss, the social situation

keeps them from acting autonomously. From this perspective, the boss is capable of true agency,

but the agency of the employees is severely restricted.

es. Foucault argues that ideas such as subjectivity, personality, and the soul are just part

of a specific discursive formation produced by the operation of a specific power complex

on the body bevir 66

. Foucault argues that power is ubiquitous so a subject can come into being only as a

construct of a regime of power/knowledge. No society, culture, or practice possibly could

be free of power. No individual possibly could constitute himself as an autonomous agent

free from all regimes of power (Foucault remains in the symbolic)

e. A rejection of autonomy need not entail a rejection of agency: we can say the subject

always sets off against a social background that influences him, and still insist he then can

reason and act in creative, novel ways so as to modify this background. Bevir 68

Different people adopt different beliefs and perform different actions against the

background of the same social structure, so there must be at least an undecided space in

front of these struc-tures where individuals decide what beliefs to hold and what actions

to per-form

We can question whether the boss a true agent, in the sense that his act changes the social

structure? It seems that the boss can make this choice only because of a social structure that

supports it. The boss may claim he made a autonomous decision, not determined by anything

but himself, but he could only make it because the social structure made it possibly. We can even

imagine the boss explaining to the employees that he really had no choice, that in times of crises

nobody is sure of his job, that the company would go bankrupt otherwise. Even for the least

restricted individuals it is not very simple to act truly autonomously. From a sociological point of

view it is much more convincing that this supposedly autonomous action is strictly depended onthe lager social structure. We could, along with Foucault, follow this logic to the end and claim


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we presuppose a substantial subject behind the I. Lacan points out that we normally do not

find it problematic if someone says I am lying. If a say: thesun revolves round the earth. But I

am lying (enunciation) we know what I mean.I, who is Jorg, is lying. It points to the I who lied

just now. This is because the I ultimately refers to myself not as being, or the substantial

subject behind the enunciation, but to me as signifier, the subject of the enunciated. I am lying

is no different from Anke is lying. So, although it seems that there exist a substantial Ibehind

the enunciation, the one who utters the words, in language it refers only to another signifier.

This desire for a substantial subject behind the I, is contained in sentences like I am Lying

and I think, therefore I am. The subject has to presuppose that there exist a certain x that is the

bearer of all its significations. It is a subject that emerges from within our speech, through our

signifiers, and which differs from or contradicts the subject of the of the statement. Without

knowing it, the subject expresses certain desire for this x.

In Lacans reading It is the certainty of this x that Descartes is after. But he finds out that the

signifiers only refer to other signifiers. He keeps on doubting, which in the end is nothing but

shifting signifiers without finding stability. For Lacan, what Descartes discovers is exactly the

infinitly shifting of signifiers. However, on the basis of that radical doubt, he concludes that he is,

that there exist a substantial I.However, this last step cannot be made, the step where the

subject of the enunciated, the I think presupposes the substantial subject of the enunciation

behind it, therefore, I Am.. For Lacan the subject is the subject is nothing more than this lack

created by the shifting of signifiers, which Descartes tries to fill up a substantial I.

What is important is that the split subject is not reducible to the positive effect of subjectivation

by the social structure, as is the case with Foucault. The subject stands both in and outside the

symbolic order. On the one hand he come into being through language, on the other, he cannot

be fully determined by it. However, from the point of view of the symbolic order, it always seems

that he is fully included in. For the State, for example, the subject is synonymous with his

passport, a proper identity. But, as we have seen, the subject, does not coincide with thisidentity. Here, a possible outplace emerges, at the very place where meaning is refusedwhere

social identity and intelligibility disintegrate. On this account a true act is a renouncing of ones

symbolic identity. This is what Lacan calls the act of subjective destitutionof completely

forsaking one's allegiance to the symbolic order.

To quote Mari Ruti: This, incidentally, is the usual structure of heroic acts. somebody who, for a

long time, has led an opportunistic life of maneuvering and compromises, all of a sudden,


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inexplicably even to himself, resolves to stand firm, cost what it may.The paradox of the act

thus lies in the fact that although it is not intentional in the usual sense of the term of

consciously willing it, it is nevertheless accepted as something for which its agent is fully

responsible The subject thus accepts responsibility for its act even when this act is not

consciously willed or premeditated.Although the subject is frequently, afterwards, disturbed by

the act as well as incapable of coming to terms with it, there is something noble about its

readiness to surrender the customary coordinates of its identity for the sake of this act; there is a

heroism of committing an uncompromising act that cuts through the layers of maneuvering and

compromising that characterize human life as an opportunistic pursuit of social validation.

A real-life example of such an ethical act might be the refusal of Rosa Parks to sit in the back of

the bus or the resolution of Mohamed Bouazizi to set himself on fire, sparking the Tunesian

revolution.Both of these acts represented a deed of pure risk, of refusal, of persisting on one's

own. Neither Parks nor Bouazizi could possibly have predicted the outcome of their actions

neither could have known ahead of time that their acts would have tremendous collective

ramificationsyet this uncertainty did not keep them from acting.Their acts might have seemed

crazy from the viewpoint of the surrounding social order, yet these acts also possessed an

internal logic that made them necessary for the actors themselves.Moreover, both sparked

social rebellions with tremendous effects on the social structure.

The same goes for all those examples forbidden love.

This way, the subject has a true agency. The lacanian theory can conceptualize a space outside

the social structure, not completely determined by the structure, from where an Agent can have

an real effect on the structure.

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