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Regionaliteit

Modernising Dutch diplomacy

Progress report by the Advisory Committee on Modernising the Diplomatic Service

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Regionaliteit

Modernising Dutch diplomacy

Progress report by the Advisory Committee on Modernising the Diplomatic Service

ContentsIntroduction 4 Summary 6

Phase 1: exploratory study 8

Phase 2: in-depth study 142.1 Basic principles 142.2 A modern Dutch diplomatic service 182.3 Elaboration 20

Phase 3: assessment 27

Phase 4: recommendations and comments 28

Appendices• TermsofReferenceoftheAdvisoryCommitteeonModernisingthe 34 Diplomatic Service • Listofpersonsinterviewed(notavailableinEnglish) 37• Literature 43• Trendsindiplomacyandmissionnetworks:asurveyofeightforeign 45 diplomatic services

4 | Modernising Dutch diplomacy

Introduction

Inspring2013theMinisterofForeignAffairsrequestedtheAdvisoryCommitteeonModernisingtheDiplomaticServicetodrawupaprogressreport.Thereport,whichoutlinestheCommittee’sinitialfindingssinceitwasestablishedon9March2012,1 is intendedasinputintoreflectionsonthereformoftheMinistryofForeignAffairs.TheCommitteeemphasisesthatitwillelaborateonitsfindingsandcheckthemindialoguewithstakeholderswithinandoutsidetheMinistry,andinthelightoffurtherstudy.

TheCommitteeaimstoprovidetheMinisterofForeignAffairswithguidelinesonthemodernisationofthediplomaticservice.ItsadviceisthereforebasedonmeasuresdesignedtoensurethatDutchinterestsintheinternationalarenaaredefendedinthebestandmosteffectivemannerpossible.PursuinganambitiousinternationalagendainwhichDutchinterestsareparamount,asstatedinthepresentcoalitionagreement,mustbeaccompan-iedbyaproperlyequippedforeignserviceandappropriateinstruments.TheCommitteetakestheviewthatthemodernisationprogrammenecessarytoachievethis,asoutlinedbelow,willrequirefinancialinvestment.Itthereforerecommendsthatthecostsbeestimatedandacost-benefitanalysiscarriedout.2

Thisreportisdividedintofourparts.Part1brieflyoutlinestheCommittee’sfindingsafteraninitialexploratoryphaseuptomid-2012.InPart2theCommitteeexpandsonthesefindingstoproduceaframeworkformodernisingthediplomaticservice.Part3sketchesoutthenextphaseofassessment.Finally,Part4containsspecificrecommendations.

Thestructureandtimingofthisprogressreport–theCommitteeexpectstocompleteitsassignmentbythefirstquarterof2014–aredeterminedbypoliticalreality.TheRutte-Asschergovernment’scoalitionagreementnotonlygivestheMinistryofForeignAffairsaclear,strongpolicymandate,butalsorequiresittosaveagreatdealofmoney.Duringthedebateonthebudget,MinisterTimmermansagreedtopresentavisiononmoderndiplomacyandthenetworkofmissionsbythesummer.TheCommitteethereforewishesinthisreporttomakeanumberofearlyrecommendationsonthemodernisationofDutchdiplomacy.

1 The Committee has been appointed for a two-year period. Its brief is to produce ‘an in-depth analysis of the challenges facing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic service, in light of the new thinking on diplomacy which has been evolving in other countries.’ The focus is on (1) the diplomat of the future, (2) economic diplomacy and (3) processes of change within the organisation. The members of the Committee – Arthur Docters van Leeuwen (chair), Ko Colijn, Tineke Lodders-Elfferich, Pieter Marres and Victor Schoenmakers – were chosen for their expertise in various fields relevant to diplomacy and their years of direct experience with the Netherlands’ network of diplomatic missions. The Committee’s full terms of reference are set out in an appendix to this report.

2 See recommendations and comments (p. 28).

Modernising Dutch diplomacy | 5

ThisisnottosaythatnoactionhasyetbeentakensincetheCommitteebeganitsworkinMarch2012orthatnothingishappeningattheMinistry.TheCommitteecanseethateffortsarebeingmadeinmanyplacesandfieldstocreateanorganisationthatismoreinkeepingwithtoday’srealities.Promisingexamplesincludeco-locationofmissions,thecreationofcollaborativedigitalworkspaces,intensiveinteractiveuseofsocialmediaatanumberofmissions(suchasBucharest,ShanghaiandWashingtonDC)andMinistrydepartments(suchastheMultilateralOrganisationsandHumanRightsDepartment)andexperimentswithregionalisation,includingatpolicylevel(e.g.theCentralAmericanandBalticregions).TheCommitteeispleasedtonotethat,despitethechallengestheMinistryiscurrentlyfacing,manypeopleareworkingenthusiasticallytomodernisetheirorganisation.

Thefollowingquotefromthecoalitionagreementdeservesspecialmention:‘From1January2013theForeignServicewillfallundertheSeniorCivilService.’(p.19,Englishtranslation).ThechairoftheCommitteehasbeenaskedtoproducehisownadvisoryreportonthedetailedimplementationofthisdecision.


Summary: modernising the diplomatic service

Inthecourseofitsactivitiestodate,theCommitteehasbeguntoenvisageaforeignministrythat:

• essentiallythinksandworkslikeanetworkorganisation:openandflexible,andorganisedintogroupsofvaryingcomposition,aroundcross-borderregions,themesorinterests;

• cancopewiththehybridnatureof21st-centuryrelations,iscapableofnotonlyclassicbutalsonetworkdiplomacy(aswellascombinationsofthetwo).ItmakesthisexceptionalprofessionalexpertiseavailabletowhoeverwishestoserveDutchinterests;

• operatesinasinglevirtualspacetogetherwithitsdiplomaticservice;

• focusesonworkinginpartnershipwithotherministries,governmentbodies,businesses,civilsocietyorganisationsandindividuals,activelyseekingsuchpartner-shipsandensuringtheirquality;

• maintainsregular,systematiccontactsintheNetherlands,centredonacouncilworkinginthegeneralinterestandchairedbytheMinister,aswellaspanelsdealingwithspecificareas,whichconcludeandmonitoragreementsonthestandardofperformanceexpectedoftheMinistry;

• systematicallyensuresthattheDutchpublicisawareofitsactivities;

• iseasilyaccessibletobothDutchcitizensandnationalsofothercountries,primarilyonlinebutalsothroughhelpdesks.

Tothisend,theMinistryshouldcreatethefollowingorganisational,ITandmanagementconditions:

• Trainingthatfacilitatesandmaintainsprofessionalexpertiseofexceptionalquality.Thegoalshouldbetotrainfullyfledgeddiplomatsinsevenyears,withrefresherandspecialisttrainingthereafter.Therewillbeadiplomaticacademy,withadean.TheacademywillbeaccessibletoanyonewiththerightqualificationswhoservesDutchinterestsabroad,whetherinthegovernment,businesscommunityorcivilsocietyorganisationsorinstitutions.

• Apromotionandplacementpolicythatfocusesonassessmentanddevelopment,withaheavyemphasisonacquiredspecialistknowledgeandexpertise.


• SecureITsystemsthatallowinformalinternalcommunicationandworkingmethods,suchasprojectgroupsthatcanextendacrosstheworld.

• Policythatisdrawnupascloseaspossibletotheplacewhereitisintendedtomakeanimpact.StrategyandsupervisionwillremaininTheHague,however.

• Managementbasedontrustandplacingmaximumresponsibilityatlowerlevelsofthe

organisation.Managementruleswillbereviewedregularly.

• Thinkingonthecompositionandformofthenetworkofmissionsisbasedonamodelofregionalunitscontainingvariouslocalmissions.Thiswillallowefficient,effectivelocalrepresentationstobemaintained.Theaimistobephysicallypresentinasmanyplacesaspossible.Localembassiescompletewithchanceriesandresidenceswillnolongerbecreatedandmaintainedasamatterofcourse.Althoughambassadorshipswillbemorewidelyavailable,reflectingahigh-levelfunction,theywillnolongerbesynonymouswithprestigiousresidencesandchauffeurs.

Thehorizonmayseemalongwayoff,butbytakingboldstepsforwardtheMinistrycanquicklymoveclosertoitsgoals.


Phase 1: exploratory study

InJune2012,attherequestofthethenSecretary-General,theCommitteepresentedanexploratorystudyforinternaluse,containingitsinitialfindings(outlinedbelow).AlthoughtheCommitteeemphasisedthatthereportwasbasedonfirstimpressionsandthatfurtherstudywouldbeneeded,itmadeanumberofobservationsandrecommendations,arrangedundersixheadings,or‘pillars’.TheCommitteetentativelyconcludedthatthemodernisati-onprogrammedescribedinthesepillars(seebelow)wouldrequirefinancialinvestment.GiventhecutbacksintroducedbythefourthBalkenendegovernmentandthenewcutsimplementedbytheRutte1andRutte-Asschergovernments,theCommitteeisawarethatitwillbedifficulttofindthenecessaryfunds.However,itconsiderssuchfundingessential.

1st pillar: Diplomacy as a profession

Diplomacy is a profession. Diplomacy must be defined, communicated and maintained.

Itisessentialtocraftaclearprofileforthediplomaticprofessionthatspeakstoeveryonewhoisorwishestobeinvolvedininternationalactivities.Diplomatswillonlybeincludedinsuchactivitieswhentheirexpertiseisevidenttootheractors.ProfessionalswithstrongDutchrootsandknowledgeoflocalconditionsandcustomsinothercountriesareindispensablefortheNetherlands.

Diplomats’professionalexpertisemustbecontinuallyandvisiblymaintained.SuccessmustbeobjectivelyquantifiableinordertofurtherenhanceDutchdiplomats’quality,focusandeffectivenessandtokeeptheiraddedvaluevisibleanddemonstrable.

TheCommitteenotesthatthisfirstpillarwillrequirefurtherstudy,anddiscussesitinmoredetail in phase 2.

2nd pillar: Position and profile

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must have strong roots in central government and in society.

Foreignpolicyisnolongerastand-alonesectorwithaclearboundarybetween‘home’and‘abroad’.Domesticpolicywithoutaninternationalelementisnowathingofthepast.Thebusinesscommunityandgeneralpublicareactiveinternationallytoagreatandgrowingextent.TheCommitteenotesthattheMinistryhasceasedtobeautomaticallyinvolvedinallactivitiesrelevanttoitswork.Atinterministeriallevel,inParliament,inthemediaandamongtheDutchpublic,itisnolongeragiventhattheMinistrynaturallyhasapositionofsignificanceandaclearcontributiontomake.

TheMinistrymustthereforemakesystematiceffortstodemonstrateitsaddedvalue.Tothisend,itmustincreaseitsoutsidevisibility,notonlyinTheHaguebutalsoelsewhere.


TheCommitteenotesthatthissecondpillarwillrequirefurtherstudy,anddiscussesitinmoredetailinphase2,undertheheading‘Interaction’.

3rd pillar: The internet and digitisation

Cyberspace must be conquered.

Digitisationandtheinternetarethetoolsofchoiceinaninternationalenvironmentmadeupofeverincreasingnumbersofcontactsandcoalitionsthatarechangingincreasinglyrapidly.TheMinistryofForeignAffairsshouldbealeaderinspottingnewnetworksandthetrendswithinthem.

Tobeabletooperateaseffectivelyaspossibleinthiscontext,theMinistrymustbecomeanorganisationwithasinglevirtualspaceofitsown,easilyaccessibletoanyoneinoroutsidetheorganisation.Theinternetmustbethepublic’smaingatewaytotheMinistry’sservicesandexpertise.Itisalsoanessentialchannelforactivecommunicationwiththepublic.Useofsocialmediaasamatterofroutinewillprovideopportunitiesforinteractionanddialoguewhichmustbeseized.Amongotherthings,asinglevirtualspacewillalsoensurecontinuitywithintheorganisationbyunlockingaccesstotheMinistry’sinstitutionalmemory.Especiallyinanorganisationwherestaffregularlychangejobs,itisawastedopportunityifpeople’sexperienceandknowledgearelostwhentheyaretransferredelsewhere.Thesinglevirtualspacewillenablethisproblemtobetackled.TheexternalcontactsoftheMinistryanddiplomaticserviceinparticulardeservesuchcontinuity.

4th pillar: Substantive questions and dilemmas

Some key questions in Dutch foreign policy need clarification.

ForeignpolicyrisksbeingfragmentedamongdifferentactorsinTheHague.WithinthisprocesssomesubstantivequestionsandunresolveddilemmastouchonthedefinitionoftheroleoftheMinistryofForeignAffairsanditsdiplomats.

A. Economic diplomacy

TheCommittee’sfirstprogressreport,submittedtotheMinisterinJune2012,includedapassageoneconomicdiplomacy.Atthetime,thequestion‘Whatiseconomicdiplomacy,andwhatroleshouldtheMinistryofForeignAffairsplayinit?’stillneededtobeasked.

TheexploratorystudybytheCommitteeincludedanumberofrecommendations:• TheMinistryofForeignAffairsshoulddevelopaclearervisionof‘economic

diplomacy’,whichinthepasthastoooftenbeenexpressedinwoollytermslike‘theMinistry’seconomicfunction’.

• Economicdiplomacyshouldbebroaderthanjustcommercialdiplomacyorpromotionofexportsortrade.AmorecomprehensivepromotionofDutcheconomicinterestsinanycaseincludes‘Hollandbranding’andaccesstorawmaterials,highlyskilledlabourandinternationalpublicgoods.


• ResponsibilityforcoordinatingeconomicdiplomacyatDutchmissionsshouldbeassignedtotheambassador.Missionsectionsshouldbeintegratedtoencouragecooperationandcohesionatmissions.ManagementofthenetworkofmissionsispartoftheMinistry’scorebusiness.

• Steeringmechanisms,suchasthree-wayworkplanningbetweentheMinistryofForeignAffairs,theMinistryofEconomicAffairsandtheprivatesector(andifnecessaryincludingtheMinistriesofDefenceandofInfrastructureandtheEnvironment),regularconsultativeforumsandframeworksforassigningthemissions’tasks,shouldbeintroducedorperfected.

SincethisexploratorystudybytheCommittee,someprogresshasbeenmadeinaddressingtheinitialquestion,andorganisational,conceptualandpolicymeasureshavebeentaken,ornewideasintroduced.

• Organisational and procedural measures:TheRutte-Asschergovernment’scoalitionagreementclearlyconfirmstheroleoftheMinistryofForeignAffairs,asreflectedinthetransferoftheDirectorate-GeneralforForeignEconomicRelations(DGBEB)fromtheMinistryofEconomicAffairstotheMinistryofForeignAffairs.

• Conceptual measures:Initsdiscussions,theCommitteerepeatedlyheardthateconomicdiplomacyshouldmeanmorethansimplypromotingexportsorpromotingforeigninvestmentintheNetherlands,andthattheconceptshouldbeapproachedinbroadterms.

• Policy measures and instruments:Economicdiplomacyisbeingexpanded,butisstillinneedofimprovement.RepeatedrecommendationstotheCommitteeinthisconnecti-onare:- abroadlyratherthannarrowlybaseduseofeconomicdiplomacy;- afocusontheNetherlands’imageabroad:publicdiplomacy(‘Hollandbranding’);- customisedsolutions:insomecountrieseconomicdevelopmentisbusiness-driven;

inothersitisgovernment-driven,andadifferentapproachisrequiredineachcase;- choiceofcountries:beselectiveandfocusonpromisingoremergingcountriesand

regions.Sevenoftheworld’stenfastest-growingcountriesareinAfrica;- economicmissions:thestrategictravelagendaisagoodfirststep,butitneedstobe

furtherdeveloped,usingsmarterprinciples;- qualityofservice:thismustbecomelessdependentonindividuals,andsothe

standardmustberaisedacrosstheboard.Thebasisisgood(ascoreof8.6fromFenedex3),butstandardsmustbedevelopedforthewholenetwork.

3 Set up in 1954, Fenedex is a private association of Dutch exporters and other internationally operating businesses (www.fenedex.nl).


B. Position and funding of development cooperation

TheJune2012exploratorystudyincludedapassageonthepositionandfundingofdevelopmentcooperationanddefencewithinforeignpolicy.Atthetime,theCommitteenotedthefollowing:

ThechangingenvironmentwithinwhichdevelopmentcooperationisconductedanddecliningsupportforitamongtheDutchpeopleraisethequestionwhetherthecurrentbudgetaryrelationshipsbetweendevelopmentcooperation,defenceandforeignpolicyarestilljustifiable.TheCommittee’simpressionisthattheMinistryanditsnetworkofmissionsarefacingreducedfinancialfreedomcausedbyalackofflexibilityinshiftingresourcesbetweentheseareasofactivity.Differentwaysofstrikinganewbalanceamongthesebudgetscouldbeconsidered;intheCommittee’sview,alessrigidapproachmightpossiblyalleviatethecurrentstrain.Anotherpressingquestion,inviewofthelimitedbudgetaryresourcesforthemissionsandbilateralinstruments,iswhetheranotherlookshouldbetakenattheNetherlands’contributionstotheUNorganisations.

Therehavebeenanumberofdevelopmentssincethisinitialexploratorystudy.Thefieldofdevelopmentcooperationischangingrapidly:notonlyinitsdeployment,butalsoinitsmeaningandrole.Thisisapparentfromanumberofchoicesmadeinthecoalitionagreement:

• theappointmentofaMinisterforForeignTradeandDevelopmentCooperation,toaffirmtheimportanceofthelinksbetweenthetwopolicyfields.Giventhatthisportfolioisnowheldbyasingleperson,theCommitteeseespotentialforaconflictofministerialinterestsbetweentradeand‘moral’issues;

• theestablishmentofa€750millionrevolvingfund(fortheperiod2014-2016)tosupportinvestmentindevelopingcountries,especiallybySMEs;

• theestablishmentofa€250million‘peacefund’.Thisfund(possiblyinconjunctionwiththeexistingstabilisationfund),whichhasbeenintroducedbytheRutte-Asschergovernment,maylaythefoundationsforanew3-Dprofile4inforeignpolicybasedonarticles90and97oftheConstitution;

• thedecisiontocutthedevelopmentcooperationbudgetby€1billion.

Indrawingupitsfinalreport,theCommitteewilllookinmoredetailatwhatthesedevelopmentsmeanforthediplomaticserviceanditsmodernisation.TheCommitteeisawarethatthepolicydocumentbytheMinisterforForeignTradeandDevelopmentCooperationonDutchtradeanddevelopmentcooperationpolicyhasyettobefinalisedatthetimeofwriting.

4 Defence, Diplomacy and Development.


C. Position of the EU and the EEAS

ThethirddilemmatheCommitteeidentifiedinits2012exploratorystudywastherelati-onshipbetweentheMinistryofForeignAffairsandthedevelopmentoftheEuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS).ItwonderedtowhatextenttheexternalactivitiesoftheEU,especiallytheEEAS,complementthoseoftheMinistryofForeignAffairs,andtowhatextentthereisduplicationofeffort.ClearlytheEEASisstillevolving.ButwhatcantheMinistryexpectoraskofitatpresent?

AsecondvisittoBrusselsandadditionaldiscussionssinceJune2012havelefttheCommitteeevenmoreconvincedthattheEEAScannotprovideacompletealternativetotheMinistryofForeignAffairsintheshortormediumterm.AlthoughtheEEASisnowlargerthantheMinistry,itdoesnotyethaveasufficientlystablebasistobuildon.TheaddedvalueoftheEEAStotheDutchgovernmentcannotmatchthatofourownmissions.

DifferencesincultureandinterestsbetweentheEuropeanCommission,theEEASandEUmemberstatesarefrustratingtheachievementofasharedideologyandagenuineEUforeignpolicy.TheEEASprimarilyworksfortheHighRepresentativeandtheEuropeanCommission,andsoitsorganisation,workingmethods,designandcultureareareflectionofitsheadquartersinBrussels.Asidefromthisalreadycomplexreality,servingtheinterestsof27differentcountriesisanalmostimpossibletask.TheCommitteethereforerecom-mendsthatopportunitiesforcooperationwiththeEEASbeconsideredgraduallyandwithoutunduehaste,orexcessivelyhighexpectations.

AlthoughtheCommitteedoesnotseetheEEASbecominganalternativetobilateralmissionsinthemediumterm–orperhapseverinsomeareasofactivity(suchaspromotionofDutchtradeandsupportingDutchbusinessesabroad)–itdoesseeopportunitiesforfurthercooperationinspecificareas.Examplesinclude:

• politicalreporting• crisis aid• consular cooperation• EEASsupportfacilitiesforDutchdiplomatsincountrieswheretheNetherlandshasno

missionsofitsown.IntalkswiththeEEAS’sdeputychair,theCommitteelearnedthatanexperimentofthiskindhasbeenlaunchedinthecaseofSpain.TheCommitteerecommendsthatthisbemonitoredcloselyandthatasimilarDutchexperimentbelaunchedshouldtheopportunityarise.

Asforpoliticalreporting,theNetherlandscouldbenefitfromtheactivitiesoftheEEAS,whosegreatercapacityputsitinabetterpositiontogatherandprocessinformation.ThiscanbemadeavailabletoaDutchembassy,whichcouldthenassessthereportfromtheNetherlands’pointofviewandaddanyinformationofitsown.FormanythinlystaffedDutchmissionsthiswouldbeanincreasinglywelcomeadditiontotheirowninformationsupply.


5th pillar: Structure of the network of missions

In times of regionalisation and digitisation, the network of missions needs the best possible

structure.

ThestructureofthenetworkofmissionshasanobviousimpactontheeffectivenessofDutchdiplomacy.InresponsetothefinancialcutbacksintroducedbythefirstRuttegovernmentin2011andwiththesupportoftheHouseofRepresentatives,theMinistryofForeignAffairshasoptedforaleanbutextensivenetwork,attemptingtomaintainaDutchpresenceinasmanyplacesaspossible,withouttakingafundamentallookattheorganisati-onofthenetworkasawhole.

TheCommitteenotesthatthisfifthpillarwillrequirefurtherstudy,anddiscussesitinmoredetail in phase 2.

6th pillar: Leadership and management of the network of missions

Professionals need sufficient freedom to do their jobs. They need to work on a basis of trust, not

of fixed instructions. The management burden must be reduced.

TheCommitteenotedthatthemanagementburdenattheMinistryofForeignAffairsisexcessive.Itheardcomplaintsaboutthisinnearlyallitsconsultations.IntheCommittee’sview,onereasonwhythemanagementburdenhasgotoutofhandisthetrendtowardsalargenumberofsmallmissionsindirectcontactwithTheHague.Inaddition,managementisincident-oriented,andisinsufficientlyandinconsistentlybasedontrustandindividualresponsibility.Staffreductionsatthemissionsareonlymakingthesituationmoreurgent.TheCommitteehaslookedatthestructureoftheorganisationinmoredetailinphase2.

Conclusion

Inthelightofthisinitialexploratorystudy,theCommitteedecided,inthisprogressreport,tolookinmoredetailatsomeoftheareasmentionedabove:pillar1(professionalism),pillar5(structureoftheorganisationandnetworkofmissions)andpillar2(interaction-positionandprofile).Togethertheseprovideathree-pointframeworkformodernisingthediplomaticserviceasenvisagedbytheCommittee.

InthisconnectiontheCommitteehasheldmanytalksandconsultedtheavailableliteratureandreports,includingtheScientificCouncilforGovernmentPolicy(WRR)report‘AttachedtotheWorld’,theClingendaelreport‘FuturesforDiplomacy’,theconferencereport‘TheForeignMinistryataTippingPoint’,theUSStateDepartment’s‘QuadrennialDiplomacyandDevelopmentReview’(QDDR)andanexploratorystudyofeightdiplomaticservicesconductedbytheMinistryofForeignAffairsattheCommittee’srequest.5

5 See Appendix 3 (Literature).


Phase 2: in-depth study

2.1 Basic principles

Inits2010report‘AttachedtotheWorld’,theScientificCouncilforGovernmentPolicy(WRR)notesthattoday’sworldcanbestbedescribedas‘hybrid’.IntheCouncil’sopinion,thisnotionisbasedontwofundamentaldevelopmentsthatcallforareviewofforeignpolicy.TheCouncil’sanalysisalsoprovidesavaluablepointofdepartureforrethinkingormodernisingthediplomaticservice.

TherearetwodimensionstothehybridworlddescribedintheWRRreport.Ontheonehandthereisthe‘traditionalworld’ofgeopoliticsandnationstates,inwhichafundamen-talshiftintheglobalbalanceofpowerisnowtakingplace.WiththeriseofsuchcountriesasChina,IndiaandBrazilalongsidethosewithatraditionallystrongpowerbase,wearenowlivinginamultipolarworldinwhichsuchcountriesarerapidlygaininginfluenceandcomingtotheforeasnewleadersontheworldstage.Thisdevelopmenthasbeenenhan-ced,andhasbecomemorevisible,astheeconomiccrisisintheeurozonepersists.Andwecansensethis:theNetherlandsisbecomingasmallerpartofalargerworld.

Atthesametime,wehaveseentheemergenceofa‘networkworld’,withexplosivegrowthin,andcloselinksbetween,stateandnon-stateactorsandareasandchannelsofcooperati-on.Increasingly,thisistakingplaceininformalnetworks,andonavaryingscale.Nationalbordersarenolongernaturallimitstointeraction.Thesenetworksarespreadingacrosstheworld,incommunitiesthatmakecontactthroughsharedthemes,interestsorinterfaces,butoftenbecomevisibleinaregionalcontext.Inthisnetworksociety,theclassichierarchi-calorganisationofthestateanditscitizensislosingitsrelevance.Theincreasingcomplexi-tyofthenetworksocietyhashadaprofoundimpactonthepositionofgovernmentsandtheirwaysofworking.Nationalbordersarebecomingblurred.What’smore,thesedevelopmentsaretakingplacefasterandmoreextensivelythaneverbefore.

Inotherwords,weareseeingaparadigmshift:inadditiontothephysicalworlddictatedbytheclassicalrulesofinternationalrelations,thereisnowalsoavirtualnetworkworld–andthetwoareinteractingclosely.InThe Rise of the Network Society(1996),thefirstpartofhisinfluentialtrilogyThe Information Age,ManuelCastellsdescribeshowthedominantcontextinwhichmuchofhumanactivitytakesplacehaschanged.Drivenbytechnologicalinnovation,especiallytheriseoftheinternetandothercommunicationtechnologies,actionsandinteractionsareincreasinglydetachedfromanyspecificgeographicallocation.Thesharingofinformationisnolongerconfinedtoaphysicalplace(the‘spaceofplaces’),butflowsthroughnetworks(the‘spaceofflows’),solidifyingandbecomingmanifestatvarious places and times.

Amongotherthings,thishashadamajorimpactonhowtheworldeconomyisstructured.Multinationalbusinesses,financialinstitutionsandflowsofcapital,aswellastheproducti-


onofconsumergoodshavebecomedetachedfromtheirphysicallocationsandarenowdividedovernumerousplacesandseveralcontinents.Whereasbusinessesoncehad‘foreignoperations’,theyarenowscatteredovermanycountriesandareonlytiedtoagivenlocationforadministrativepurposes.Andwhatistrueofbusinessesisequallytrueofothertypesoforganisations.Thusterrorist‘organisations’arenowadayschieflynetworksofsmallcellsthatarescatteredacrosstheworldandmainlykeepintouchonline,boundtogetherbyagoalorsourceofinspirationthattheysharetoagreaterorlesserextent.

BesidesCastells’geographicaldetachment,anothertypicalfeatureofthenetworkworldisthechangeabilityortransienceofrelationshipsinandbetweennetworks.Thereis,sotospeak,a‘liquid’modernityalongsidea‘solid’modernity(ZygmuntBauman,2000).Organisationsandhumaninteractionsarenow,inasense,nomadic:theymove,theyaretemporaryandtheyarenottiedtoanyparticularplace.Thisisreinforcedbyathirdfeatureofnetworksinthe‘spaceofflows’:thephenomenonof‘unplanneddynamics’withinnetworks.Thisisinherentinthemanifestationofnetworksashorizontal,multiplestructureswithoutanyclearhierarchyorleadership.Reciprocalandtemporarylinkscandevelopinfinitelywithinthesenetworks,forexampleontheinternet.Concentrationsoraccumulationsofsuchlinks,orplaceswhereflowsmeet,thenappearwithinthenetworksashubsorcentresofgravity.Allthisleadstoagreatvarietyinnetworksandever-changingmanifestationsofnetworksincentresofgravity(whetherinform,placeortime).

Whatdoesthismeanforstatesandgovernments?Forgovernments,thedevelopmentofthishybridworldwithitsnetworkdynamicshasledtoasituationinwhichthestatenolongerhasaforeignpolicy.Whatusedtobedomesticaffairshavenowacquiredaforeigncomponent,andviceversa.Allkindsofgovernmentbodies–ministries,agencies,inspectoratesandsoon–nowoperateinternationally,withtheirownagendasandpolicies.Theyhavetheirownautonomouscross-bordernetworks.Intheinternationalarena,contactsarenolongermaintainedonlythroughheadsofstate,foreignministersordiplomaticchannels.Anne-MarieSlaughter,theleadingadviseronreformstotheUSStateDepartmentunderHillaryClinton,hasdescribedthissituationasthe‘disaggregatedstate’.Theresultisacomplexglobalwebofgovernmentnetworkswithoutcentralsupervisionofanykind.Whatwealsoseehereisstates’capacityfor‘softpower’–adegreeofinfluenceachievedthroughinformation,persuasivenessandaccessto,orparticipationin,suchnetworks.InthisconnectiontheWRRreportrightlynotesthatgovernmentsthatkeeptryingtocoordinaterelationswithothercountrieslikea‘gatekeeper’willbydefinitionlosetouchwithreality.Thehybridworldcallsforadifferentformofcontrolandcoordination.

Yetmanyofourgovernmentstructuresdatefromatimewhenorganisationswerelocallyanchoredandhadsufficienttimetodevelopintoinstitutionswiththeirownraisond’être,logicandfixedoutlook,withcorrespondingpatterns.InthecaseoftheMinistryofForeignAffairs,thesehavetraditionallybeenintheinternationalgeopoliticaldimension,withaclearhierarchy,fixedinstitutionalisedrelationsandfamiliar,accompanyinginternationalnetworkswithfamiliarmores.Withanorganisationandaculturethatarefirmlyrootedinthis‘fixed’orgeopoliticaldimension,theMinistryhascontinuedtooperateinthatworld,


andbyitsrules.Ithasthusfailedtotakeaccountoftheemergenceofthenetworkworld,whosepublicandsocietalimportancehasincreasedexponentiallyoverthepastfifteenyears.ShouldtheMinistrycontinuetogivethisnewworldsuchlowpriority,thenthedebatewillnotremainlimitedtomarginalisation,butwillbeaboutatrophy,andeventuallythelossofabilitytofunctionaltogether.Itisnoaccidentthat,intheinternationaldebateontheroleofdiplomacy,therearesomewhobelievethatforeignministriesareathingofthe past.

This,then,isthemainchallengefortheMinistryofForeignAffairs.Itmustadopttwoparadigms.Itmustcontinuetomeetthedemandsofthegeopoliticaldimension,butatthesametimeadapttothoseofthenewnetworkdimension.Itmustembracebothdimensionsofthehybridworld,anditsdiplomacymustbecomehybrid.

Infact,thenotionofpolycentrismandanoverpopulated,completelyheterogeneousmarketofinternationalrelationsimpliesnotonlylossesfortheMinistryofForeignAffairs,butalsofunctionalgains.Morethaninthegeopoliticalworld,thereareopportunitiesherefordiplomatsfromsmallcountriesbecausesoftpowerandqualityareofdecisiveimportan-ceinnetworks.Beingsmallcanevenbeanadvantage,becausegeopoliticalballastisthenlessimportant.Inthisenvironmentdiplomacyisrelativelyopenandunconventional,andisaboutbeingabletooperatehorizontally.Governmentscannotaffordnottoinvestinit–ifonlytoavoidbeingtakenunawares,andcompletelyoutmanoeuvred.

Intheworldasithasnowdeveloped,nationalinterestistoanevengreaterextentachangingpoliticalselectionofgoalstobepursued.Thisselectioninvolvesamatchofinterestsandcapabilities,reflectingthenationalcapacitiesforhardandsoftpower.Thismatchdeterminesthelevelofambition,whichremainsfluid.Ambitionscanbeexpressedasresultsfromthe‘geopoliticalhalf ’ofthehybridworld:securebordersandinstitutions,safecitizens,guaranteedprosperity.Buttheycanalsobeexpressedasintendedresultsfromthe‘networkhalf ’ofthehybridworld:knowledge,standards(bothindustrialandnon-ma-terialnorms),cybersecurity,humanrights,foodsecurity,climatemanagementandsoon.

ForeignpolicyisthusthesumtotalofgovernmentactivityaimedatusingbothDutchandnon-Dutchresourcestoservethenationalinterest.TheMinistryofForeignAffairshasalessandlesscoordinatingbutmoreandmorefacilitatingroleintheorchestrationoftheseactivities,which,moreover,areincreasinglytakingplaceinapolycentricworldinwhichnon-stateactorshaveanindispensableparttoplay.ThequestionishowtheNetherlandsintendstoorganiseitsinternationalfunction.TonegotiatesuccessfullyinmultilateralforumssuchastheEUandtheUN,effectivedirectionandasound,comprehensivestrategyare needed.

Ultimately,diplomatsareasmuchaseverthesovereignrepresentativesingovernments’foreignpolicies.Inthegeopoliticalhalfofthehybridworldtheyarestillthe‘vertical’linemanagersincommunicationwithotherstates.Inthedisaggregatedstate,theirrolehasbeenreducedbytheincreasedforeignpolicyfunctionofotherinstitutions;butatthesame


timetheroleofdiplomatshasbeenenhanced,becauseinthenetworkworldtheyarethe‘horizontal’facilitymanagersinnetworksofvitalimportancetotheNetherlands.Theyarealsoinapositiontoswitchbackandforthbetweenthegeopoliticalworldofstatesandthemanydiffuse,andsometimesinformal,internationalnetworks.Obtainingaccessandbeingaccessibletothesenetworkswillbeanindispensableprofessionalskillinthedefenceofnational interests.

Thereisthusakeyopportunityfordiplomacyattheinterfacebetweentheclassic,geopoliti-calworldofstatesandthenetworkworldwithitslackofgeographicalties,itschangeabilityanditsunplannedorunpredictabledynamics.Inthehybridworld,diplomacyisasimportantaseverasachannelforrelationships,influenceandunderstanding.Growinggeopoliticalcomplexity,theincreasingspeedanddensityofinformationflowsinonlineandothernetworks,andanevergreaterinterdependenceandneedforcollectiveactioninsuchareasastheenvironment,food,waterandinternationalcrimewillrequiremorediplomacyratherthanless.

Diplomacyisasrelevantasever,butitwillhavetodevelopintotrulyhybriddiplomacy.Thismeansthattheinstitutionalformofthediplomaticservicewillhavetoevolve.

TheCommitteebelievesthatthelevelofaggregationatwhichhybriddiplomacyshouldbedesignedistheregion.Ratherthanpreciselydemarcatedentities,regionsarenowarenaswithfluidboundarieswithinwhichactorscanoperateandagendascanbedeveloped.Thehybridworldisoftenmanifestedatregionallevel–acrossbordersandbeyondthenationalcontext–butitisnotall-embracing.Inpractice,thismeansthatoneoftheambassadorsinaregionwillbeassignedresponsibilityfortheregionaltask.

Wenowknowthatnetworks,onlineorotherwise,areattimesphysicallymanifestedandconcentratedin‘placestobe’.Thishappensatmajorconferenceson,say,humanrights,environmentaltreatiesandclimatetalks.Itcannotalwaysbepredictedwheresuchasingularitywilloccur.Ifsucha‘placetobe’shouldspringup,itisunlikelythatagivenmissioninagivencountrywillbeequippedtodealwithitalone.Greatercapacitywillhavetobeavailableintheregion.Thisiscrucial,foritispreciselyinsuchplacesthattraditionalandnetworkdiplomacycanblend.

Partofthesenetworksisabroadlocalpresencearoundtheworld;membershipof,andaccessto,anetworkareachievedlocallyandinthecourseofdirectcontacts.Thismeansbeingpresentontheground.Giventhechangeabilityandunpredictabilityofnetworks,itisalsoimportanttoidentifythechangingcentresofgravitywithinnetworks,respondandgainaccessasquicklyaspossible.Thiscanonlybedonethroughdirectrelationships.Paradoxically,buildingupthenecessaryrelationshipstakestimeanddependsonadegreeoffamiliaritywithlocalconditions.

Atregionallevel,advantagesofscalewillallowactorstooperateeffectivelyinthehybridworldanddiscoverinteractionsbetweentheworldof‘spaces’andtheworldof‘flows’.


Withinanetworkcontextitiseasiertodeterminewhereyouneedtobe,adaptandmoveflexiblyasneeded,respondtochangingcentresofgravityandidentify‘placestobe’ingoodtime.

TheMinistryofForeignAffairsanditsnetworkofmissionswillhavetobeorganisedthusinordertorespondtothedemandsofthe21stcentury.Thisisademandingtask,andafundamentallynewone.Therequirementsforamoderndiplomaticservicebasedonregionalisationwillbediscussedinthenextsection.

2.2 AmodernDutchdiplomaticservice:fromtoday’s MinistryofForeignAffairstoaneworganisationallogicTheworldisinmotion.Itisexperiencingmajorgeopoliticalchangesandhugelyincreasedinterdependence.Broad,fluidinternationalnetworks,onlineorotherwise,havefundamentallyalteredthedynamicsoftheinternationalorder.Thisshifttoanetworkedworldhasnotreplacedthetraditionalinterstateorderbuthasaddedanewdimension–andthiswillmeanmorework,ratherthanless,forthediplomaticservice.

TheMinistryofForeignAffairswillrequireadifferentorganisationalandinstitutionalformtomeettoday’schallenges:respondingtogeopoliticalchangesbymakingcapacityandresourcesavailableonthespot,poolingandreleasingresourcesandknowledgeinordertomeetmajorcross-borderchallenges,andidentifying,joiningandactivatingnetworks.Withoutapresenceontheground,thecatalyticeffectofaccessingnetworkscannotbeexploited.Withoutoperatingonanorganisationalscalethatgoesbeyondnationalbordersandisbasedonnetworkthinking,theimpactofthenetworkworldcannotbeusedtoitsfulladvantage.Withoutaregionalcontext,theorganisationwilllacktheflexibilityandspeeditneedstorespondtothechangingmanifestationsofwhataresometimesdisruptivenetworkdevelopmentsandtechnologies.

AbriefsurveyofvariousdiplomaticservicesshowsthattheMinistryofForeignAffairsisnotaloneinthisrespect.Manycountries’foreignministriesarenowreviewingtheroleofdiplomacyinthe21stcenturyanditsfundamentalprinciples.Variousdiplomaticservicesareinvolvedinmajorprocessesofchangeandareexperimentingwithnewformsofdiplomacy.Inmanycasesserviceshavetobecutback,butevendiplomaticservicesthatareexpandingareconfrontedwiththesameissues.Thereareanumberofinterestingsimilari-ties,asrevealed,forexample,inasurveyofeightEuropeanandnon-EuropeanforeignministriesconductedattheCommittee’srequest(seeappendix4).Manyforeignministriesarewrestlingwiththequestionofwhatpositiontheyshouldoccupyandmanyriskbeingmarginalisedbecauseoftheirfailuretoconnectwithnetworkdynamics.Theorganisation’sinteractionwith‘grassroots’opinion(i.e.thepublic),andbyextensionitslegitimacy,arehighontheagenda.Copingwiththeregionalscale,beingabletoswitchbetweenalargerandsmallerpresenceonthegroundandgainingaccesstonetworksarerecurringthemes.


Anotherfrequentissueisdiplomats’professionalismandexpertise–expressedintermsofknowledgeandskills,publicperformance,actingresponsiblywithinagivenmandate,andgivingtrust.Itisclearthatexpectationsofwhatdiplomatsshouldbe,andshouldbecapableof,arechanging.

Therearedifferencesbetweenthevariousdiplomaticservicesintheirdegreeofdefeatismand doubt about their raison d’être,butitisclearthatthoughtisbeinggivenworldwidetotheroleandidealformofdiplomacy.Theserviceswehaveconsultedareexperimentingwithformsofdiplomaticorganisationandrepresentationthatdifferfromthetraditionalones. Sometimes radical choices are made; sometimes earlier choices are revised; some-timesthefocusisonregionalisation.Inanycase,thegeneralimpressionisthatthearchetypehashaditsday–thoughthatisnottosaythattraditionaldiplomacynolongerserves its purpose.

Themodernisationofdiplomacythusinvolvesafundamentalshift(onethatisperceivedworldwide)intheroleandpositionofdiplomats.Itisnoaccidentthatmanydiplomaticservicesareaskingthemselvesthesamequestionsabouttheirownfunctionandrelevance–althoughtheydonotdoubttheirnecessity.Theymusttakeaccountoftheparadigmshifttoahybridworld,inwhichhybriddiplomatsmustoperateeffectively,representtheircountries and establish connections in both dimensions. A modern diplomatic service dependsontwobasicprinciples:(1)regionalisation(onlyamodelbasedonoperatingwithinnetworkunitsthatarelargerandmoreflexiblethanthetraditionalone-to-onerelationshipbetweenmissionsandMinistrycanrespondtothespeedanddynamicsoftoday’snetworks);and(2)presenceontheground(inaborderlessonlineworld,alocalpresenceanditsresultingaccesstonetworksarevitalassets).

ThereisthereforenodoubtthattheMinistryofForeignAffairsmustbereformedifitistomaintain,orregain,itsrelevance.

First,thereisanewworldorderwithageopoliticalandanetworkdimension(includingonline).Withinthegeopoliticaldimensionthereisashifttowardsamultipolarworldwithvariouscentresofpower.Furthermore,globalissuesandinternationalpoliticaldevelop-mentsnolongeronlyarisewithinorbetweenstatesorotherwisedemarcatedframeworks.Inthenewworldorder,cross-border,regionalanddynamicallychangingnetworkshavebecomeanorganisingprinciple.Thetraditionalmodelofdiplomaticmissionsisincompa-tiblewiththis,andisincapableofrespondingadequatelytodevelopments(thoughthemissionnetworkdoespossessthequalitynecessary).Initspresentformitisnotequippedforthefuture.

Second,regionalisationoffersnewbenefitsforaflexible,resilientandfuture-prooforganisation.TheCommitteehasreadanalysesofthepraiseworthyeffortsthathavebeenmadetokeepsmallmissionsopen.Despitetheseefforts,internalanalysesrevealthatthecurrentorganisationalmodelisnotadministrativelyviable,mainlybecauseofthemanage-mentburden.Manyoftheperceivedproblemscanbeaddressedusingaregionalisation


model.Localpresenceistheguidingprinciple,butthemodelforachievingthisneednotnecessarilybethesameeverywhere.Morecustomisedsolutionscanbefound,andtherequiredlevelofdiplomaticpresencecanbedeterminedcasebycase.Changescanbemadeinresponsetoneedswithinidentifiedregionsornetworks.Thiswillincreasetheorganisati-on’sflexibility,speedofactionandadaptability.Itwillalsoenhancethelevelofprofessio-nalismiftraininganddevelopmentarebroadenedanddeepenedsoastotakefulleraccountofregionalissuesandinteraction.TheCommitteealsobelievesthatefficiencycanbeincreasedbyregionalisation.

Third,therearealreadygoodexamplesofregionalisationwithintheorganisation–suchasthemissionsintheUSAandChina,withWashingtonDCandBeijingascentralhubsandanumberofconsulates-generalassmallermissionsinoneregion.ThisisamodelthattheCommitteebelievescanbeusedmorewidely–notnecessarilywithinonecountry,butwithinaregion.Experimentswithregionalisationarealreadytakingplace,forexampleintheCentralAmericanandBalticregions.

Whatsuchregionalarrangementswilllooklikeinpracticeisaquestionofcustomisedsolutions,aniterativeprocesswithroomforadjustment.Anydivisionintoregions–geo-graphicallyorthematically–needstofollowlogicaldemarcations.Notallnetworkswillbethesamesize.Thecompositionofnetworkswillvaryindegreeandtypeofpresence,inscopeandindensity.Aregionalnetworkmaybeadoptedforvariousreasons,whethergeopolitical(historical,cultural,geographical,economicetc.)orthematic(singleissuesreflectedinglobal‘placestobe’).

2.3 Elaboration

Allthingsconsidered,theCommitteebelievesthatmodernisationoftheDutchdiplomaticservicewillrequireorganisationalchangesinthreeinterrelatedareas.Conductedonthebasisofaniterativeprocess,themodernisationofthediplomaticservicewillchieflyinvolveprofessionalexpertise,organisationalconditionsandinteraction.Asillustratedinthefigurebelow,thesethreeelementsareconnectedandinfluenceoneanother.Toachievesuccess,changeswillberequiredonallthreesidesofthetriangle.


Professionalism Organisational conditions

Interaction

Modernising the diplomatic service

ProfessionalismTheCommittee’sfirstexploratorystudyinJune2012notedthatthepracticeofdiplomacyneedstobemoreclearlydefinedandmorevisible.Diplomacyisaprofession,andshouldbedefinedassuch.Itskeytasksareconnection,negotiationandrepresentation.Thecorres-pondingvaluesandexpertisemustalsobedefinedtotakeaccountofthedemandsofthehybridworld.IntheCommittee’sview,knowledgeofforeigncountries,forumsandlocalnetworks,andthenegotiatingandotherskillsrequiredtofindone’swayaroundthem,areinanycasekeytothefurtherdefinitionoftheprofession.

Today’shybridworldcallsfordiplomatswhocanswitchbackandforthbetweendifferentworlds–who,asitwere,havethechameleon-likeabilitytoadapttodifferentnetworks.Otheressentialskillsthattheyrequireinordertooperateinnetworksareenterpriseandanopenoutlook.Withintheorganisation,too,itisvitaltofindneworganisationalformsthataresuitedtotheopennessandelasticityofanetworkorganisation–suchasshifting,flexiblelinkswithinhorizontalnetworksofpeerswhendealingwithspecificprojectsortopics.

Theconceptofregionalisationalsohasanimpactonprofessionalexpertise,especiallywhenitcomestopoolingknowledge.TheCommitteenotesthatthe‘generalist’principlehasbeenparamountinstaffplacementpolicyattheMinistryofForeignAffairs.Accumulatedknowledgeandexpertiseareconsideredofsecondaryimportance,andeveryoneisexpectedtobecomeanexpertonanewsubjectwithinamatterofmonths.Wheneverstaffmembersaretransferred,theyeffectivelystartfromscratch.Thisisnotaculturedesignedtogenerateknowledgeontopicsoutsideone’sdirectresponsibility.TheCommitteeconsidersthissituationfarfromideal,andbelievesthattheMinistrycouldincreaseitsaddedvaluebyallowingitsstafftospecialiseinalimitednumberoffields,suchasagivenregion,theme,etc.Atthesametime,suchknowledgecanbepreservedwithintheorganisationthroughknowledgenetworksorcircuits,regardlessofwherethestaffmembernowhappenstobe.


Professionalexpertisemustalsobereflectedinthewaytheorganisationpromotesresults-basedmanagement.Openness,responsibilityandtrustasprinciplesofmanage-mentwillcreateanenvironmentinwhichdiplomatscanfunctionandperformtheirtaskstothebestoftheirability.Inaworldinwhichthespeedanddensityofinformationareincreasing,andinwhichspeedandanabilitytoimproviseandadaptareneededinordertorespondtolocaldevelopmentsappropriatelyandingoodtime,thediplomat’sprofessionwillbenefitfromahighdegreeofautonomyandindependence.Withinpredeterminedlimits,itisuptoambassadorsandtheirteamstodecidewhenandhowtheMinistryinTheHagueshouldbeinvolvedindecisions.Policyanddecisionswillbemadeinacoherent,cooperativemanner,onthebasisofaregionalmodel.Ofcourse,responsibilityandaccountabilityaretwosidesofthesamecoin.

Aclear,recurringthemeintheCommittee’sdiscussionswithstakeholdersinthediplomaticserviceistheirvaryingexperienceofpersonalcontactwithdiplomats.Therearegreatqualitativedifferencesinhowdiplomatsoperateinternationally.Norisitalwaysclearwhatcanbeexpectedofthem(seealso‘Interaction’).Individualimpactwillalwaysbeimportant(infactitistheorganisation’skeystrength)–providedthatthequalityofindividualactionishighanditisclearwhatcanbeexpected.Diplomats’professionalexpertisemustbemoreeffectivelyandmorevisiblymaintained.SuccessmustbeobjectivelyquantifiablesothatDutchdiplomats’quality,focusandeffectivenesscanbeenhancedfurther.Thiswilldependon clear standards that set the bar and that ensure added value remains visible and demonstrable.

Likeotherexpertssuchasdoctorsandlawyers,diplomatswillhavetopassthroughanumberofstagesintheircareerstoestablishtheirprofessionallevel.ThisisalreadythepracticetosomeextentattheMinistryofForeignAffairs.Thismeansthatdiplomatsmusthaveclearqualificationsfromtheoutsetandhavereceivedbasictrainingatanacademythatlaysdownclearcareerrequirements,isrunbyadeanandusesobjectivelyquantifiable‘diplomaticperformanceindicators’tosetclearstandardsandallowperformancetobeassessed.Theseven-yeardiplomattrainingprogrammenowbeingdevelopedbytheMinistryisagoodstart.

Organisational conditions for hybrid diplomacyIntheCommittee’sview,amoderndiplomaticservicethatcanrespondtothedemandsofthehybrid21st-centuryworldwillneedtofulfilthefollowingorganisationalconditions.Clearly,theMinistryofForeignAffairsdoesnotyetmeetthesestandards,and,asoutlinedbelow,considerableeffortwillbeneededinorderforittodoso.

First,itmustfunctionasasingleunittogetherwithitsnetworkofmissions.ThiswillrequireasinglevirtualspaceinwhichtheheadquartersinTheHagueandthenetworkofmissionscanoperate.Theorganisationwillbeasingleinstitutionwithinwhichallfunctionsarelocated,andcontinualeffortswillbemadetooptimisetheformoforganisati-onandtodeterminewherefunctionsshouldbelocatedandwhereknowledgeshouldbegatheredandputtouse.Optimumusemustbemadeoftheavailabletechnologytoallow


openinformationexchange.ThecurrentstrictseparationbetweenpolicymakingattheMinistryandimplementationatthemissionsisobsolete.Policywillalsobemade,aswellasimplemented,atthemissionsandintheregions;TheHague’staskisstrategyandsupervisi-onoftheNetherlands’internationalfunction.

Second,thenetworkofmissionsmustbestructuredinaccordancewiththeaforementio-nedregionalmodel.Thisadditionaldimensioninthinkingandorganisationiscrucialtoamodernnetwork.Embassieswillnolongerbestand-alone,individuallyoperatingmissionswhosemainlineofcommunicationiswithTheHague,butwillformflexiblyorganisedunitstogetherwithothermissionsinaregionalcontext.Ahub-and-spokemodelwillallowlargermissions–wherestaff,resourcesandpolicymakingareconcentrated–tosupportsmalleronesintheregion.Theresultwillbeavariednetworkofmissionswithineachregion,stillfocusedonon-the-groundpresencebutwithmoreflexiblewaysofachievingthat presence.

Inorderforthismodeltowork,the‘hub’mustbeadequatelystaffed.Itnolongergoeswithoutsayingthateachembassymusthaveitsownchanceryandresidence;instead,thescaleandformofdiplomaticpresencewilldependonlocalcircumstancesandasetofcriteriathatremaintobedetermined.Particularattentionshouldbepaidtoco-locationofmissions.Theresultwillbeafour-tiersystemoflocalpresencewithinregions:(1)regionalembassies,(2)medium-sizedmissions,(3)smallmissionsand(4)minimumstaffing(onediplomatpostedfromTheHague).6Becausethemissionswilloperateonaregionalbasis,changescanbeanticipatedrapidlyandappropriatelybyupscalingordownscalinglocalpresence.However,thebasicprincipleremainsthataminimumpresenceshouldbemaintainedinalargenumberofplaces,foronlythuscanlong-termrelationsbemaintain-edandconditionscreatedforoptimumuseofdiplomacy.Otherformsofdiplomacythatarenowbecomingmorecommon(suchasrovingbilateralambassadors7or‘laptopdiplomats’)areconceivablealternativestoon-the-groundpresence,butwillalwaysbeonlyasubstituteforpermanentpresence.Itisworthexaminingtheaddedvalueofanentirelyvirtualpresenceincountrieswherethereisnorepresentation,focusingontechnicalapplicationsthatwillallowspecifictypesofservice(suchasanonlinehelpdeskforconsularaffairs).

Theregionalisationmodelcallsforcustomised,variedapproaches.Thereisnosingleregionaltemplateforthewholeworld.WhatworksinCentralAmericawillnotnecessarilyworkinAsia;whatisappropriateforeconomicdiplomacymaynotbeappropriateforconsularaffairsorpoliticalissues.Forthenetworkofmissionsthiswillrequireavaried,flexibleapproachthattakesaccountoftheregionalandlocalcontext.Ahub-and-spokemodelwillhavetobeassessedagainstanumberofcriteria.Withoutattemptingtobeexhaustive,theCommitteeisthinkinghereofDutchinterestsinagivenregionand

6 The Committee has noted that this concept of regionalisation quickly gives rise to misunderstanding. The idea is to give one existing mission a broader task within a region – not to create an additional tier between the missions and The Hague.

7 Roving bilateral ambassadors serving the country to which they are accredited from The Hague, rather than thematic ambassadors (such as the human rights ambassador, special envoys and so on).


concentrationofcertainthemesordisciplinesinoneplace,aswellassuchpracticalfactorsasinfrastructure,acountry’sstability,andinternationallinks.

Third,modernisationofthediplomaticservicewillalsohaveanimpactontheMinistryinTheHague.Workingwithintheregionalisationmodelwillcallforadifferentkindoforganisation:anintegratedunitthatcanrespondrapidlyandappropriatelytoemergingprioritiesandcrises.TheMinistrywilloperateasanetworkorganisation,withpolicyteamsonspecifictopics,composedofpeoplewhocancontributeexpertisefromvariousplacesandbackgrounds.Thismakesitpossibletoassembleateamonagiventopicfromstaffatmissions,inTheHagueandatotherministries,andpeoplesecondedtointernationalorganisations.Surroundingthisteam,dependingonrolesandlocations,therewillthenbeacircleofnetworksandlinkstostakeholdersandotherrelevantparties.Thepossibilityoftransferringpolicymakingtomissionsasregionaloreventhematiccentresofexpertisecanthenbeconsidered,sothatpolicyisformulatedclosetowhereitisneeded.IfthinkingonagiventhemeisfocusedsomewhereoutsidetheNetherlands,thatisthe‘placetobe’wherepolicyshouldbemade.

TheMinistryofForeignAffairsinTheHaguewillbesmall,withakeyroleforitsinternatio-nalfunction.TheMinistrywillbethelinkbetweenTheHagueandthenetworkofmissions.Itsrolewillencompassstrategicmanagementandsettingoperationalframeworks.Thecurrentorganisation(includingthenetworkofmissions)doesnotmeetthiscriterion,andwillhavetochange.Atpresentitishighlyvertical(intermsofmissions,directorates-gene-ralanddirectors),whichisaseriousobstacletohorizontalcooperationandcoherence.TheCommitteeheardthiscomplaintdozensoftimesinthecourseofitsinterviews.Manyofthepeopleitspoketofeelthatthepracticeofhavingdocumentsinitialledbyseveralpeople–whichsupposedlyreflectsacoordinated,sharedpolicy–infactillustratesthecompart-mentalisationoftheMinistryandthelackofsharedprincipleswithintheorganisation.TheSecretary-Generalhassaidthattaskforcesarenowbeingusedtodealwithtopicsthatrequirecoherence.Manymissionsarealreadyusingintegratedteams.TheministersandseniorleadershiphaverecentlyexpressedtheambitionoftransformingtheMinistryofForeignAffairsintoanetworkorganisation.Itsstructurewillbeadaptedsothatresponsibi-litiesareclearlyassignedandevengreateruseismadeofflexible,horizontalteamswhichincludethemissionsundertheauthorityofthemostrelevantdirector-general.TheCommitteeseestheseasstepsintherightdirection,andrecommendsthattheorganisationbecomeevenmorehorizontal,andhenceatruenetworkorganisation.

TheCommitteebelievesthiswillrequireagreatdealofsustainedeffortfromallstaff,butaboveallfromtheseniorleadership.

Theaboveorganisationalconditionsprovidethebasisforavigorous,effectiveDutchdiplomaticservice,withasmall,flexiblecoreforstrategy,policyframeworksandtheinternationalfunctioninTheHague,andabroad,extensivenetworkofmissionscapableofadaptingcontinuallytofluctuatingcircumstances.ExchangeofstaffbetweentheMinistryofForeignAffairs,otherministries,theprivatesector,internationalorganisationsand


NGOswillenhancetheMinistry’snetworkfunction.Theregioncanserveasareservoirforthis purpose.

InteractionThethirdareathatneedstobetackledisthewaytheMinistryofForeignAffairsrelatestotheoutsideworld.Notonlyistheoutsideworldchanging,butsoistheMinistry’sinteracti-onwithit.Visibilityandpresentationareincreasinglypartofdiplomacy.Onemanifestationofthisispublicdiplomacy.

Thankstoconstantinnovationinmeansofcommunicationandvirtualexchange(ontheinternet),therearenowmanydifferentwaysofgainingbroadaccesstoknowledgeandestablishinganetworkprofile.Socialmedia,suchasFacebookandTwitter,andotherapplicationscanbeusedtoreachawideaudience.Forexample,a‘diplopedia’ofthekindsetupbytheAmericansallowsknowledgetobeeasilysharedandupdated.Theuseofsuchcommunicationresourcesisnowanindispensablepartofpolicy,butisstillinitsinfancy.

WhereaspeopleusedtoapproachtheMinistryofForeignAffairsonmattersrelatingtoothercountries,theboundariesbetweenhomeandabroadhavebecomeblurredandtheMinistrynolongerhasanaturalmonopolywithinthedisaggregatedstate.Atatimewhenserviceprovisionisincreasinglyparamount,thosetheCommitteeinterviewedrepeatedlymadeclearthattheMinistrydoesnothaveaclearsenseofwhatitsstakeholderswant. TheMinistryisroundlyaccusedbyitspeers–otherministriesandgovernmentbodies–ofbeingoblivioustotherestofTheHagueandtheDutchpeople.Recurrentcomplaintsarethatforeignministrystaffinvestconsiderableenergyintheirsubsequentpostings,thattheirinstantresponsetoquestionsandrequestsisstilltoooften‘itcan’tbedone’,andthatmissionssometimesobjecttocarryingoutgovernmentpolicy.TheCommitteeconsidersitalarmingthatthisisthepictureotherministriesnowhaveoftheMinistryofForeignAffairs.

AlthoughtheCoordinatingCommitteeonInternationalAffairs(CoRIA)statesthatthingsaredefinitelyimproving,atotherlevels(bothhigherandlower)theMinistryisseeninalesspositive,nottosaynegative,light.TheCommitteebelievesonereasonforthisisthatpeopledonotknowwhattoexpectoftheorganisation–atatimewhenthepublicclearlyexpectsmoreintermsoftransparency,serviceandresults.Interactionisthusafundamentalprerequisiteforthelegitimacyofthediplomaticserviceandpublicsupportforit.

Anetworksocietyisnotjustabouttransmittinginformation.Thetypicalfeaturesofanetworkorganisationareopennessandexchangeofinformationandcontacts.Toimproveitsrelationships,theMinistryofForeignAffairswillhavetobecomemorevisibletothreegroups:(1)theDutchpeople,orthe‘domesticmarket’(includingpublicdiplomacy),(2)thevarioussectors/stakeholdersand(3)politicians.

Todothis,itwillhavetotakeanumberofsteps,startingwiththedevelopmentofstan-dards.Itmustbemadecleartotheoutsideworldwhatcanbeexpectedofdiplomatic


missions–whattheycanandcannotdo.Suchstandardsarealsoaguaranteeofqualityandcontinuitythroughouttheorganisation–andthatiscrucialinanorganisationalmodelthatbyitsnatureisbasedonworkinginnumeroussmall,semi-independentunits.

Tothisend,theMinistrymustincreaseitsoutsidevisibility,notonlyinTheHaguebutalsoelsewhere.Onegoodstepinthisdirectionisthepracticeofhavingstaffgivetalksatschools.ConsularaffairsareareadilyidentifiablepointofcontactwiththeDutchpeople,andsocanbeusedtohighlightthisandotherministrytasks.FurtherdigitisationcannotonlyassistDutchcitizenswithconsularproblemsmorerapidly,andonline,butalsohelpDutchcompaniesfindtheirwayinothercountries.DigitisationprovidesavaluablewaytobridgethegulfbetweentheMinistryandtheDutchpeople.FornationalsofothercountriestheinternetshouldbetheinstrumentofchoiceforeasilymakingcontactwiththeMinistryandfindingtheirwayinDutchsociety(e.g.inlocatingbusinesspartners)usinginformationfromtheMinistryandthemissions.

TheCommitteealsorecommendstheestablishmentofanexternalcouncil,tobechairedbytheMinisterofForeignAffairs.ThiswillkeeptheMinistryintouchwiththevariouspartiesandawareofstakeholders’expectationsandwishes,sothatitcancheckwhetheritisontherighttrack.Byinstitutionalisinginteraction,theMinistrycanmakesureitstaysincontactand,atthesametime,usethisinteractiontocontinuallybuildpublicsupport.TheMinistryshouldsetuppanels,modelledontheUSStateAdvisoryBoard,thatrepresentthevariouspartiesandnetworksandareregularlyconsulted.

TheMinistryofForeignAffairshasaspecialfunctionwithintheDutchgovernment.Ithasaleadingroleinshapingtheinternationalfunction,andshouldtaketheinitiativeinsettingupappropriatedigitalorothernetworksforeachregion,themeandsoon.TohelptheMinistrydemonstrateitsaddedvalue,otherpartsofthegovernmentmustbeabletoobtainaccesstotheinformationthatisavailablethroughthenetworkofmissions.Thiswillrequirepersonalassistancefrom‘accountmanagers’toensurethatpeopleactuallyobtaintheinformationtheyneed.


Phase 3: assessment

ThisprogressreportprovidesasummaryoftheCommittee’sfindingssofar.Betweennowanditsfinalreport,whichisduebyMarch2014,theCommitteeplanstoassess,refineandelaboratethesefindings.

Thiswillinvolvethefollowingactivities:

• ConsultationswithpeopleoutsidetheMinistryofForeignAffairs.TheCommitteeisworking‘fromtheinsideout’,andmostofitsinitialinterviewswerewithintheMinistry.Ithasnowstartedtotalktorelevantexternalparties,andwillcontinuetodoso.Sofarithasmainlyspokentorepresentativesofotherministries,butitalsoplanstointerviewrepresentativesoftheprivatesector,thepoliticalsphere,academia,themedia,civilsociety,civicorganisationsandthediplomaticcorps.ThequestionsitwillaskconcerntheimageoftheMinistryofForeignAffairs,people’sexpectationsofthediplomaticserviceandtheMinistry’sorganisationalstructure.

• MembersoftheCommittee(workinginvariouscombinations)willvisitanumberofmissionstolearnmoreaboutthenetworkofmissions,theregionalfunctionandthevarietyofthemissions(intermsofbothstaffingandfunction).TripstoBrussels,Luxembourg,MoscowandBakuareplanned.TheCommitteehasalreadypaidvisitstoWashingtonDC,NewYork,Cairo,NairobiandBrussels.

• Inordertoproduceitsfinalreport,theCommitteebelievesitneedstoconductmorein-depthstudiesonanumberoftopics.ThesewillinanycaseincludetherelationshipbetweentheEU’sEuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS)andtheDutchdiplomaticservice,nowandinthefuture;therelationshipbetweendevelopmentcooperationandeconomicdiplomacy;andthedevelopmentoftheInternalSecurityFund(ISF)asatestinggroundforintegratedforeignpolicy.

• TheCommitteewillalsolookatworldwidenetworks.PresidentObamaissaidtohaveaskedwhich100networksaremostimportanttotheUSA.TheCommitteelikewiseintendstoexamine(1)whichnetworksaremostimportanttotheNetherlands,(2)howtheNetherlandscanaccessthemand(3)howtheNetherlandscanfindoutwhichnetworksexistandarerelevant,andwhatkindofmechanismcanbedesignedtohelpit do so.

• TheCommitteewillstudythetopicofprofessionalexpertiseingreaterdepth:whatformtrainingatadiplomaticacademyshouldtake,basedonthecontoursofthisacademyanditsdeanandontheseven-yeardiplomattrainingprogramme.

• TheCommitteewilllookinmoredetailathowthemanagementburdencanbereduced,andwillmakerecommendationsonthesubject.

• Finally,theCommittee’sfinalreportwillmakesuggestionsforthedevelopmentofstandards:whatcanstakeholdersexpectofthediplomaticservice?

• Ifthedevelopmentofstandardsinvolvesexceptionallevelsofadditionaleffort,theCommitteewillexaminewhetherthecostscanbepassedon.


Phase 4: recommendations and comments

TheMinisterofForeignAffairshasaskedtheCommitteetosubmitaprogressreport.TherewouldbelittlesenseinsuchanexerciseiftheCommitteedidnotnowmakeanumberofrecommendations.

TheCommitteeisconvincedthatthediplomaticservicemustbemodernised,andthatthisisanurgenttask.IftheMinistryistoremainrelevantratherthanbecomemarginalised,itwillhavetochange.TheCommitteethereforefullyendorsestheMinister’sreferenceattheambassadors’conferenceinJanuary2013toan‘existentialyear’fortheMinistry.

ThecoalitionagreementemphasisestheNetherlands’internationalorientation,basedonnationalinterestaswellasabroaderoutlook.Itincludesanambitiousinternationalagendathatwillcallformoreinternationalactionratherthanless.Therelevantpassageintheagreementshouldnotbeseeninisolation.TheCommitteenotesthatpoliticians,andtheDutchpeople,requireandexpectmoreofthediplomaticservice.Atthesametime,theCommitteeobservesthattheavailableinstruments–thediplomaticnetworkandfunding–arenowsubjecttoaseriesofmajorcutbacks,inwhichnewcutsunderthecoalitionagreementcomeontopofearlierones.Evenintimesofbudgetaryrestraint,onecannotnecessarilydemandthatmorebedonewithlessmoney.Inrecentyears,bodieslikethepoliceandRijkswaterstaat(theDirectorate-GeneralforPublicWorksandWaterManagement)havereceivedadditionalfundingtopayfortheextrataskstheyhavebeengiven.

Thisdiscrepancybetweenstatedambitionsandcutbacksontherequiredinstrumentsraisesquestions.DoestheNetherlandsintendtoretreatbehindthedykes?Ordoesthegovern-mentbelievethatthesameinternationalambitionscanbeachievedwithoutabroad,permanentinternationalpresencebasedonthepremisethattheNetherlandswillbestbeservedbyhaving“eyesandears”allovertheworld?

Recommendations• Themodernisationprogrammewillrequireinvestment.Thecostofabroader,

up-to-date,evolvingdiplomaticserviceshouldnotbeunderestimated.FurthermoreavirtualMinistryofForeignAffairswillrequireinvestment.TheCommitteenotesthattheorganisationhassofarbeenslowtocreateareadilyaccessiblevirtualspacebothwithinandoutsidetheorganisation.Suchaspacehasadualpurpose:asinglehelpdeskorcontactpointforDutchpeopleandasinglepointofaccessforforeignnationalsintheircontactswiththeNetherlands.Theprinciplebehindthisconceptisabetterorganised–i.e.decompartmentalisedandintegrated–diplomaticservice,withtheMinistryandthemissionsoperatingasasinglevirtualnetwork.


• Acostestimateandacost-benefitanalysiscoveringthenetworkofmissionswillberequired.AtthemomenttheCommitteelacksthedatatoassesstheapproximatecostsofamodernisationprogramme,especiallygiventhecutbacksprescribedinthecoalitionagreement.Thefirstcostswillbeincurredinbuildingupprofessionalexpertiseinaworldofhybriddiplomacy(includingthediplomaticacademy),thecreationofavirtualspaceaimedatusersbothwithinandoutsidetheMinistry,andtheregionalisationprocess.Theassociatedcapacityand‘teachingtime’willrequireinvestment.Eventuallythesemeasurescanbeexpectedtobenefittheorganisationdirectly:reducingthemanagementburden,increasingefficiencythroughvirtualworkspaces,reducinghierarchyandintroducingsmartworkingprinciples.Ingeneral,theaddedvalueofhavingamissioninplacehasnotyetbeencalculated.TheDutchprivatesectorhasmadeclearthatinmanycountriesbusinesseswillsufferifmissionsareclosed,buttheamountsinvolvedhavenotbeenestimated.Atthesametime,manybenefitsofthenetworkofmissionscannotbedirectlyexpressedinmonetaryterms.TheCommitteehastheimpressionthatthemissions’addedvalueliesoutsideratherthanwithinEurope,thoughthereisnohardevidencetothiseffect.Toallowabetterassessmentofthevalueandnecessityofthenetworkofmissionsandon-the-groundpresence,theCommitteethereforerecommendsthatacostestimateandacost-benefitanalysisbecarriedout.Thiswillprovideacontextforthedebateoncutbacksandthequestionofwhoshouldpayforthem–theprivatesector,othergovernmentbodiesortheMinistryitself.

• Achangeorganisationisneeded.Despitestrongproposalsandinitiativestoreformpartsoftheorganisationinrecentyears,essentialchangeshavenotyetbeenmade.Thelong-standingconsensusmodelintheMinistry’sseniorleadershipisnotsuitablefortheimplementationofradicalchange.FortheCommittee,thisisapointofconcern,forinprocessesofchangetheideaistoendwithconsensusratherthanstartwithit.TheradicalchangesnowrequiredattheMinistryarenotcompatiblewiththedivisionoftasksacrossseparatedomains.Theexistingdomainsarenotgearedtoareasofchangeandaccordinglythereisnochangecapability.TheCommitteebelievesthatthenecessarychangescannotbemadewithoutalsotacklingtheMinistry’scapacityforchange.Attheveryleastthiswillmeanabandoningthecurrentdecision-makingmodelandassigningresponsibilityforthechangeprocesstooneperson.ThismaybeeithertheSecretary-Generaloraseparateprojectmanager–providedthattheministerialmandateisclearandthepersoninquestionhasauthoritytoenforcedecisions.TheCommitteethereforenoteswithapprovalthattheSecretary-General,supportedbyaprojectteam,iscurrentlyrevisingtheMinistry’sorganisingprinciplesandwillpresentdetailedproposalsintheframeworkoftheMinister’slettertoParliamentonmodernisingthediplomaticservicebythesummer.Achangeorganisa-tionwillbesetupafterthesummertoimplementtheproposals.Currentchangeprocessesinthefieldofdigitisation,reformofsmallmissions,humanresourcespolicyandsmartworkingwillbeintegratedwithinit.


• Professionalism:- Setrequirementsfortheprofessionofhybriddiplomat:(1)coretasks:representati-

on,negotiationandconnection;(2)abilitytooperateinbothdimensionsandlinkthemtogether,especiallyin‘placestobe’.

- Investinknowledgeanddeploydiplomatsonthebasisoftheirknowledge.- Regionalisation:allowstafftousetheirknowledgeandexpertiseanddeploythemin

areaswheretheyhaveaccumulatedknowledge;staffshouldaimtowardsdevelopingandexpandingtheirexpertiseinaspecificnumberoffields.

- Introducediplomats’qualificationsandaccompanyingdevelopmentprocesses,aswithlawyers.Theseven-yeardiplomattrainingprogrammefornewrecruitsisagoodstart.

- Appointadeantoheadthenew‘diplomaticacademy’.- Theacademywillalsohaveatrainingprogrammeforlateralentrants,whowillhave

tomeetthesamestandardsasstaffenteringatthelowestlevel.- Diplomaticperformanceindicatorsmustbedevelopedtocreateclearstandardsand

allowperformancetobemeasured.- Titlescostnothing,andshouldbeconferrediftheyarefunctional(ambassador,

specialenvoy).- OneissuetheCommitteewouldsignalisstaffconditionsandtermsofemployment

withinthediplomaticservice.Initsinterviewsithasrepeatedlybeenconfrontedwithconcernsabouttheimpactofacareerinthediplomaticserviceonpeople’sprivatelives.Therecommendationsinthisprogressreporthavenobearingonthissituation–itisaproblemthatgoesbeyondthemodernisationofthediplomaticservicebutshouldbesignallednevertheless.

• Organisation:- Theorganisationshouldbesetupasasingle(virtual)spacethatincludesallthe

Ministry’sfunctionsandallowstheirapplicationtobeconsideredcasebycase.Thiscallsforaflexible,lessrigidsystemofHRmanagement.

- Aregionaldimensionshouldbeintroducedinthestructuringandorganisationofthenetworkofmissions.ThisregionalisationmodelisreflectedintheorganisationoftheMinistryinTheHague.Theaimistobuildupnetworksusingregional,thematicorissue-specificteamsthatarenotnecessarilyconfinedtooneplace.

- Adifferentseniorleadershipstructureshouldbeintroduced,withadifferentclassificationofdirectorates-general(atleastthosewithlineresponsibility).ToensurethatDGsarealignedwithinternationalstructures,DGsoutsidethelinemanagementstructurecanalsobecreated–titlescostnothing.

- Theorganisationmustbefuture-proof,resilientandabletovaryitslevelsofrepresentation.Thebasicaimison-the-groundpresence,butthespecificformofeachmissionmayvary.Ifnoalternativeisavailable,otherkindsofrepresentation(suchasrovingambassadors)areconceivablesubstitutes.

- Abetterratioofheadquarterstomissionstaffisneeded.ItiscurrentlyskewedinfavourofTheHague.Regionalisationwillensurethatmorepolicymakingtakesplaceat the missions.


- Anidenticalregimeshouldbeinplaceformissionstaffpostedabroad,regardlessoftheirministryoforigin.Staffpostedabroadandlocalstaffwillworkasasingleteamunderthesupervisionandguidanceoftheambassador.

- Coordinatingresponsibilityatmissionsforpolicyfieldslikeeconomicdiplomacyshouldbeassignedtotheambassadorandsectionswithinmissionsshouldbeintegratedtoencouragecollaborationandcoherence.

- Asstafflevelsatthemissionsshrink,actionmustbetakenregardingfixedprocedu-resandthemanagementburdentoensurethatstaffcanfocusonpolicypriorities.

- Theroleofinspectionsmustchange.Insteadofmonitoringanddistrustbeingtheguidingprinciples,inspectionsshouldbebasedontrustandassigningresponsibilityatlowerlevel.Itisimportanttostrikeabalancebetweenfreedomofaction,accountabilityandassessment.Importantquestionsherearewhetherresponsibili-tiesareproperlyassigned,andwhetherthereissufficienttrust.TheMinistryshouldmoveawayfromapreventivesystemofmonitoringthatissolelydesignedtoavoidmistakes–thisleadstoriskavoidance,whichcomesattheexpenseofresults.

• Interaction:- Panelsshouldbesetup:onegenericpanel,plusanumberofthematicpanelsfor

consularaffairs,culture,securityandtheinternationalruleoflaw,economicaffairsand development cooperation.

- Useshouldbemadeofsecondment(inbothdirections)amonggovernmentdepartments,theprivatesectorandcivilsocietyorganisationsandinstitutions.Inthisway,experiencecanbesharedandnetworkslinked.

- Sharinginformation:theMinistryofForeignAffairspossessesagreatdealofrelevantinformationgatheredfromallovertheworld.EmbassiesthroughouttheworldreportbacktoTheHaguearoundtheclock.ThisgivestheMinistryakeyfunctionwithintheDutchgovernment.Thehugevalueofthisglobalinformationgivesitscopetoengagewiththerestofthegovernment.ThisprovidesanexcellentopportunityformeaningfulinteractionbetweentheMinistryofForeignAffairsandthevariousotherministries,andforaddingvaluewheregovernmentpolicyisconcernedbyofferingaccesstothe‘diplomaticdatabase’.Tostartwith,themessa-gingsystemdatabaseshouldbemadeeasilyaccessibletoallpartsoftheDutchgovernment,withthefocusoninformationtailoredtokeydecision-makers(secretaries-general,directors-generalandsoon).Accountmanagersshouldalsobeappointedtoenablethebestpossibleuseofthisinformationservice.

- PolicymakinginTheHague(atotherministries)shouldtakeaccountoftheinternationalangleatanearlierstage.Atpresent,theinternationalcontextoftencomesintoplayonlywhenministrieshavealreadylargelydeterminedtheirpositions.AsaresulttheMinistryofForeignAffairs’inputmaybeperceivedasahindrance.TheCommitteerecommendsthatconsiderationbegiventomechanismsallowinginternationalfactorstobeidentifiedandtakenintoaccountatanearlystageofpolicymaking.ThiswillonlyworkiftheMinistryofForeignAffairsactuallyusesthisearlyopportunitytomakeacontribution.Asmorepolicymakingistransferredtothemissions,thiswillalsorequiremoredirectinteractionandcontactbetweenthenetworkofmissionsandotherministries.


• Noreasontodelay: Oncethewayaheadisclearthereisnoreasontodelay,andactionshouldbetakenwhereveritcanbe.ThegreatenthusiasmforchangewhichtheCommitteehasnotedinvariouspartsoftheorganisationshouldbeexploited,andthemanygoodinitiativesthattheCommitteehasobservedshouldbefollowedup.Taskforcesshouldbesetuptoaddfreshinputonprofessionalism,organisationalconditions,andinteraction,aswellastheaccompanyingstandards.Enthusiasticstaffshouldberecruited,throughopeninternalapplicationprocedures,totakepartinprocessesofchange.Availableideasshouldbeused,andexperimentscarriedouttoidentifythebestsolutions.TheMinistryshouldstartby:- settingupastakeholder’scouncilandthematicpanelstoactasexternalsounding

boards;- experimentingwithnewtypesofrepresentation,regionalisationandpartnership;- settingupanacademythatprovidesadditionalcoursesafterbasictrainingofnew

recruits,appointingadeanandconductingresearchstudies;- implementingtherecommendationsregardingthecareerservice,anddrawingup

anactionplanthattakesdueaccountofdevelopmentsconcerningtheSeniorCivilService;

- settinguptheMinistry’sownvirtualspace;- introducingsmartworkingprinciples,withnon-hierarchicalassignmentsandtask

forcesforwhichstaffcanapplyviathevirtualspace.

• Keepgoing!


Appendices

1.TermsofReferenceoftheAdvisoryCommitteeonModernisingtheDiplomaticService2.Listofpersonsinterviewed(notavailableinEnglish)3.Literature4.Trendsindiplomacyandmissionnetworks:asurveyofeightforeignservices


1 Terms of Reference of the Advisory Committee on Modernising the Diplomatic Service

TheMinisterofForeignAffairswishestodomoretomodernisetheDutchdiplomaticservice.InthisconnectiontherearevariousprojectsunderwayattheMinistryofForeignAffairs.TheWorksCounciliscloselyinvolvedinthisprocess.

TheMinisterhasrequestedthatanexternaladvisorygroup,knownastheAdvisoryCommitteeonModernisingtheDiplomaticService,besetuptoprovidehimwithindepen-dentadviceandpointoutrecentinternationaldevelopments.HehasaskedtheCommitteeforanin-depthanalysisofthechallengesfacingtheMinistryofForeignAffairsandthediplomaticservice,inlightofthenewthinkingondiplomacywhichhasbeenevolvinginother countries.

Thefocuswillbeon:• economicdiplomacy:howcanthenetworkofmissionssupportDutchbusinessas

effectivelyaspossible?CanafocusoneconomicdiplomacybefurtherembeddedintheMinistry’sstructure?HowshouldtheMinistriesofForeignAffairsandEconomicAffairsbelinked?

• thediplomatofthefuture:whatisexpectedofadiplomat?Whatarethecorevaluesofthediplomaticservice?Howcansocialmediabeusedeffectively?

• changestotheorganisation:theCommitteewillgivefeedbackontheprocessesofchangethathavealreadybeensetinmotionthroughregularchannels.ArethesechangesattheMinistrystilloncourse?

Members of the CommitteeThemembersoftheCommitteehavebeenrecruitedonthebasisoftheirlongandwide-rangingexperienceinvariousfields.

• ArthurDoctersvanLeeuwen,theCommittee’schair,isanexperiencedmanagerofprocessesofchange,withanextensivetrackrecordingovernmentandquasi-govern-mentalorganisations.

• TinekeLodders-Elfferichcontributesherextensivepoliticalandadministrativeexperience.

• KoColijnhasin-depthknowledgeofinternationaldiplomacy.• PieterMarresisaformerambassadorwithpersonalexperienceofallfacetsofthecraft

ofdiplomacyatthemissionsandattheMinistryinTheHague.• VictorSchoenmakersisDirectorofInternationalAffairsatthePortofRotterdam

Authority.


ThisbroadrangeofexperiencewillenabletheCommitteetoensurecross-pollinationamongdifferentapproachestointernationaldiplomacy.

StatusTheCommitteewillofficiallyadvisetheMinisterofForeignAffairs.PursuanttotheWorksCouncilsAct,theplannedestablishmentoftheCommitteehasbeensubmittedtotheWorksCounciloftheMinistryofForeignAffairsforitscomments.

TheCommitteewillmeetregularlyandwillalsoprovidetheMinisterwithfeedbackonitsfindingsatregularintervals.ItwillbesupportedbyanexecutivesecretariatprovidedbytheMinistry.

RoleTheCommitteewillfunctionasasoundingboard.Itwillnotbedirectlyinvolvedintheimplementationoftheexistingfinancialcutbacks.Itwillhaveanadvisory,activatingandgalvanisingrole,focusingonthegoals,outlookandtasksofthediplomaticserviceandmorespecificallyoneconomicdiplomacy.Wherenecessary,theMinistermayalsorequesttheCommitteetoadvisehimonspecifictopics.

TheCommitteewillactasanexternalthinktankfortheMinisterandwillreporttohim.ItisuptotheMinistertodecidehowherespondstotheCommittee’srecommendations.Whereappropriate,thesewillbefleshedoutthroughregularchannelswithintheMinistry,includingemployeeparticipation.

TimetableTheCommitteewillbeestablishedwitheffectfrom1March2012foraperiodoftwoyears,whichmaybeextended.

CommunicationTheMinisterwillfacilitateregularconsultationswiththeWorksCouncilontheappoint-mentoftheCommittee.AnycontactbetweentheCommitteeandthemediawillbesubjecttopriorconsultationwiththeMinistry.

ContactsTheCommitteeplanstointerviewbothindividualstaffmembersandstafforganisations.Itbelievesitshouldgatherinformationaswidelyaspossibleandtalktothepeopledirectlyinvolved,bothattheMinistryandatthemissions.

Onthesubjectofeconomicdiplomacy,fact-findingtalkswillalsobeheldwithstrategiccontactsintheprivatesector.Therewillbeinterviewsnotonlywithprofessionalorganisati-onssuchastheConfederationofNetherlandsIndustryandEmployers,theMinistryofEconomicAffairs,MKB-Nederland(thenationalassociationofSMEs)andFME(thenationalemployers’organisationforthetechnologicalindustry),butalsowiththeownersandchairsofindividualcompanies.MsMeinyPrins,whowasunabletoremainafull-time


memberoftheCommitteeowingtoothercommitments,willhelporganiseameetingwithinternationallyactiveSMEsthatfrequentlyworkwithDutchembassies.

TheCommitteewillalsofocusonforeignministriesinothercountries(whichhaveyettobeselected).Whereappropriate,itwilltalktoothergovernmentbodiesandcivilsocietyorganisationsintheNetherlandsandelsewhere.

TravelInthecourseoftheirassignmentthemembersoftheCommitteewill(oftenindividually)visitanumberofmissionstolearnmoreaboutthedifferentkindsofrepresentations–fromthosestaffedbyjustonediplomatandthosewithspecialisedtaskstolargemissionswithmulti-yearinterministerialpolicyframeworks.

RemunerationThemembersoftheCommitteewillbeappointedunderthestandardarrangementsapplicabletogovernmentaladvisorycommittees.TheCommitteechairwillbesubjecttoaworkinghoursfactorof10/36.Hewillreceiveafixedremunerationequivalentto10%ofthemaximuminsalaryscale18inAppendixBtotheCivilServants’PayDecree1984.TheotherCommitteememberswillbesubjecttoaworkinghoursfactorof7/36.Theywillreceiveafixedremunerationequivalentto7%ofthemaximuminsalaryscale18inAppendixBtothe1984CivilServantsPayDecree.Reasonabletravel,accommodationandotherexpenseswillbereimbursedbytheMinistryofForeignAffairs,subjecttotherulesapplicabletoDutchgovernmentemployees.

Implementation ordersIftheworkoftheCommitteegivesrisetoimplementationordersbytheMinisterthatrequireadviceorapprovalpursuanttotheWorksCouncilsAct,thesewillofcoursebesubmittedtotheWorksCouncilingoodtimeinaccordancewiththenormalprocedure.

4January2012


2 List of persons interviewed (not available in English)

DeAdviescommissieModerniseringheeftsindshaaroprichtingvelehonderdenformeleeninformelegesprekkengevoerdmeto.m.medewerkersvandeRijksoverheid,Europeseinstellingen,bedrijfslevenenmaatschappelijkmiddenveld.Metdebewindspersonenendeambtelijketop(d.w.z.hetSG/DG-beraad)vanhetministerievanBuitenlandseZakenheeftdeCommissieherhaaldelijkgesprokengedurendehaaronderzoek.OokvoerdedeCommissiegroepsgesprekkenmetVDBZ,FEEenVerYBZ.Naastvelebilateralegesprekkenendaarbijaansluitendeverdiepingssessies,heeftdeCommissieookopgetreden/gesprekkengevoerdtijdensgroteevenementen,zoalsdeMKBrondetafelbijeenkomstvandehavenvanRotterdam,deambassadeursconferentievan2013ende‘FuturesforDiplomacy’conferentievanInstituutClingendael.VoortsheeftdeCommissieverschillendedienstreizengemaaktnaaro.m.Brussel,Washington,NewYorkenCaïro.

Onderstaandoverzichtgeeft,wegensdegrotehoeveelheidgesprekken,voornamelijkdebilateralegesprekkenweerdiehebbenplaatsgevonden.

Ministerie van Buitenlandse ZakenNaam Functie/Organisatie*

Agotha, Tony Woordvoerder PV EU Brussel – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Alkemade, Ellen Lid FEE vrouwennetwerk BZ – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Arnoldus, Peter Directeur Financieel-Economische Zaken – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Baak, Mascha Lid FEE vrouwennetwerk BZ – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Barnard, Johan Hoofd ECOFIN-Coördinatie PV EU Brussel – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Beaujean, Jan Willem Plv. Hoofd Bureau Secretaris-Generaal – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Beer, Karel de Vml. DG Taakstelling – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Bekink, Rudolf CdP Peking – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Berg, Job van den Voorzitter Ondernemingsraad – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Bont, Emiel de Forward Strategy Unit – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Bonzel, Matthijs van Nederlandse ambassadeur in Boekarest – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Coppoolse, Ines Hoofddirecteur Personeel en Organisatie – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Daalen, Monique van DG Consulaire Zaken en Bedrijfsvoering – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Davidse, Koen Directeur Directie Multilaterale Instellingen en Mensenrechten – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Dijksterhuis, Robert Lid Onafhankelijken Ondernemingsraad – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken


Naam Functie/Organisatie*

Faber, Eeuwke Hoofd Afdeling Uitbreiding PV EU – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Fazili, Said Lid VerYBZ – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Flamand, Joost Vereniging Dienst BZ – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Frank, Paul Online Strateeg Directie Communicatie – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Geelen, Marloes Lid Abvakabo Ondernemingsraad – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Gerards, Marisa Plv. DG Politieke Zaken – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Gierveld, Aldrik Plv. Directeur Directie Multilaterale Instellingen en Mensenrechten – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Gooijer, Pieter de CdP Permanente Vertegenwoordiging bij de EU in Brussel – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Gregoire, Lise Antici - Permanente Vertegenwoordiging bij de EU in Brussel – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Groot, Jochem de Beleidsmedewerker Directie Multilaterale Instellingen en Mensenrechten – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Groot, Robert de DG Europese Samenwerking – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Hartogh, Karel Directeur Directie Azië en Oceanië – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Heijden, Barend van der Projectleider Kader Kleine Posten – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Heuvel, Maryem van den Directeur Directie Westelijk Halfrond – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Hornstra, Eimert PV NAVO Brussel – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Jones-Bos, Renée Secretaris-Generaal – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Kaai, Geran Hoofd V&J Brussel – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Kingma, Wepke Plv. PV EU Brussel – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Kliest, Ted Inspecteur Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Klompenhouwer, Kees Inspecteur Inspectie en Evaluatie Bedrijfsvoering – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Kok, Peter Nederlandse coördinator EU-topbenoemingen – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Kop, Dirk Jan Projectleider Kleine Posten – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Kronenburg, Ed Vml. Secretaris-Generaal – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Kuiper, Hanjo de Voorzitter Ondernemingsraad – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Kwaasteniet, Marjanne de Nederlands Permanent Vertegenwoordiger bij het Politiek en Veiligheidcomité van de EU in Brussel – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Meer, Jorn van der Lid VerYBZ – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken



Majoor, Frank CdP Nederlandse Permanente Vertegenwoordiging bij de NAVO – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Molen, Erik van der Lid Abvakabo Ondernemingsraad – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Nijhuis, Ivar Directeur Directie Communicatie – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Oosterom, Karel van DG Politieke Zaken – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Ploumen, Lilianne Minister voor Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking

Plug, Gilles Directeur Directie Noord-Afrika en Midden-Oosten – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Rebergen, Christiaan Plv. DG Internationale Samenwerking – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Reynders, Michiel Lid VerYBZ – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Röling, Tanja Voorzitter FEE vrouwennetwerk BZ – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Rosenthal, Uri Vml. Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken

Rosing, Jan Reinder Lid VerYBZ – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Roza, Vincent Lid VerYBZ – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Scheepers, Klara Hoofd SZW PV EU Brussel – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Schippers, Marjan Hoofd Afdeling OS PV EU Brussel – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Schouten, Erica Plv. PV NAVO Brussel – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Schuwer, Henne CdP Brussel – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Soest, Anne van Directie Multilaterale Instellingen en Mensenrechten – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Soons, Natascha Lid FEE vrouwennetwerk BZ – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Steeghs, Renilde Directeur Internationale Cultuur Eenheid – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Swartbol, Rob DG Internationale Samenwerking – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Tarqaat, Kenza Lid VerYBZ – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Timmer, Ed Lid Abvakabo Ondernemingsraad – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Timmermans, Frans Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken

Toorn, Willemijn van der Lid FEE vrouwennetwerk BZ – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Triest, Hermien van Hoofddirecteur Personeel en Organisatie – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Velde, Janna van der PV NAVO Brussel – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Versteeg, Jan Nederlands plv. Permanent Vertegenwoordiger bij de NAVO – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Voorneman, Blanche Lid VerYBZ – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken



Vos, Reinout Directeur Bureau Secretaris-Generaal – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Vries, Pieter de PV NAVO Brussel – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Wel, Frans van der Inspecteur Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Werner, Jaap Directeur Directie Europa – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Wiers, Jochem Hoofd Eenheid Strategische Analyse – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Wissels, Erlijne Lid VerYBZ – Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Andere Ministeries RijksoverheidNaam Functie/Organisatie

Barnard, Herbert Directeur Internationale Zaken – Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport

Berg, Marten van den** Plv. DG Internationale Betrekkingen – Ministerie van Economische Zaken

Blok, Stef Minister voor Wonen en Rijksdienst – Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties

Bonnet, Dirk Jan Hoofd Internationale Zaken – Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties

Buiteveld, Anke Directeur Internationaal Beleid – Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap

Dekker, Karin Hoofd Afdeling Mondiale Zaken – Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap

Donker, Marianne Directeur Publieke Gezondheid – Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport

Hammersma, Marjan DG Cultuur en Media – Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap

Hell, René van** Directeur Directie Internationaal Ondernemen – Ministerie van Economische Zaken

Jansen, Wim Plv. Directeur Buitenlandse Financiële Betrekkingen – Ministerie van Financiën

Leijten, Manon DG Algemene Bestuursdienst – Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties

Meijenfeldt, Hugo von Plv. DG en Klimaatgezant – Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu

Smits, Simon** DG Internationale Betrekkingen – Ministerie van Economische Zaken

Terstegen, Jan Directeur Europees en Internationaal – Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie

Twiss, Jack Raadsadviseur Kabinet Minister President – Ministerie van Algemene Zaken

Wall Bake, Jan Willem van den

Vervanger van Dhr. Jansen in de CoRIA – Ministerie van Financiën


Vertegenwoordigers Caribische KoninkrijksdelenNaam Functie/Organisatie

Candelaria, Robert Directeur Curaçao – Kabinet van de gevolmachtigde Minister van Curaçao

Geerlings, Perry Adjunct-Directeur Sint Maarten – Kabinet van de gevolmachtigde Minister van Sint Maarten

John, Shandra Wnd. Directeur Aruba – Kabinet van de gevolmachtigde Minister van Aruba

Maatschappelijk middenveldNaam Functie/Organisatie

Engel, Paul Directeur European Centre for Development Policy Management

Grotenhuis, René Chief Executive Officer Cordaid

Gruiters, Jan Chairman of the Board of Directors van IKV Pax Christi

Ham, Jack van Vml. Directeur ICCO

Koonstra, Anton Directeur Price Waterhouse Coopers

Pont, Yannick du Directeur organisatie Spark

Veldman, Dianda Directeur Rutgers WPF

Overige functionarissenNaam Functie/Organisatie

Achten, Dirk Secretaris-Generaal Belgisch BZ

Daele, Frans van Kabinetschef Van Rompuy

Doherty, Kathleen Deputy Assistant Secretary of State European and Eurasian Affairs

Geerkens, Frank Ambassadeur van België in Nederland

Grauls, Jan Belgische PV VN

Gualtieri, Roberto Lid van Europees Parlement

Hartingh, Thomas Mayer Oostenrijkse PV EU

Kaag, Sigrid Assistent Secretaris-Generaal voor UNDP

Kerchove, François de Kabinetschef Minister Reynders

Korte, Joost Plv. DG Uitbreiding – Europese Commissie

Middelaar, Luuk van Kabinet van Rompuy

O’Sullivan, David Chief Operating Officer – Europese Diplomatieke Dienst

Ross, Alec J. Senior adviseur voor innovatie van State

Verbiest, Hugo Kabinet van Secretaris-Generaal Dirk Achten

Wortmann, Corien Lid van Europees Parlement

Wouters, Dirk Belgische PV EU


Overige gespreksgenotenNaam Functie/Organisatie

Ham, Peter van Senior onderzoeker – Instituut Clingendael

Hocking, Brian Auteur rapport “Futures for Diplomacy”

Melissen, Jan Hoofd Clingendael Research/Auteur rapport “Futures for Diplomacy” – Instituut Clingendael

Okano-Heijmans, Maaike Senior onderzoeker – Instituut Clingendael

Putten, Frans Paul van der Senior onderzoeker – Instituut Clingendael

Quaedvlieg, Winand Secretaris Internationaal Economisch Beleid – VNO NCW

Scholte, Jan Aart Professor of Politics and International Studies bij Warwick University

Silvis, Lennart Directeur Netherlands Water Partnership

Slaughter, Anne-Marie Architect eerste Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review

Stienen, Petra Vml. BZ medewerker

Talbott, Strobe Vml. Deputy Secretary en president van Brookings

Ton, Ron Hoofd Clingendael Academy – Instituut Clingendael

Wheelock, Arthur Directeur National Gallery Washington D.C.

Wientjes, Bernard Voorzitter VNO NCW

Wilke, Paul Senior onderzoeker – Instituut Clingendael

* Gesprekspartners zijn vermeld met functie die zij ten tijde van het gesprek bekleedden.

** Gesprekspartners zijn overgegaan naar DG Buitenlandse Economische Betrekkingen van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken.


3 Literature

Beer,Karelde,Notitie Voortgang in de verdere uitwerking en implementatie van de Taakstelling postennet,2009(geenofficiëlepublicatie).

Castells,Manuel,The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume I: The Rise of the Network Society,Oxford:Blackwell1996.

Cohen,Roger,‘DiplomacyisDead’,New York Times,2013.

Coleman,WilliamenAlinaSajed,Fifty key thinkers on Globalization,NewYork:Routledge2012.

Colijn,Ko,‘DiplomatieindeNieuweWereld’,Internationale Spectator, nr.3(2013),pp.40-41.

Colijn,Ko,‘Nationaalbelangenbuitenlandpolitiek’,2013[geenofficiëlepublicatie].

DepartmentofStateUSA, Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review,2010.

Evans,AlexenDavidSteven,Organizing for Influence: UK Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty,London:ChathamHouse2010.

Hocking,Briane.a.,Futures for diplomacy: Integrative Diplomacy in the 21st Century, DenHaag:NetherlandsInstituteofInternationalRelationsClingendael2012.

InternationalRelationsandSecurityNetwork,The State in a Globalizing World, 2012.

Jacobs,Jane,Systems of Survival: A Dialogue on the Moral Foundations of Commerce and Politics,NewYork:RandomHouseInc.1992.

Kabalt,Joerie.a.,BZ als kennisintensieve Organisatie,Utrecht:Kessels&Smit,TheLearningCompany2012.

Knottnerus,J.A.e.a.,Aan het buitenland gehecht: over verankering en strategie van Nederlands buitenlandbeleid,RapportWetenschappelijkeRaadvoorhetRegeringsbeleidno.85,Amsterdam:AmsterdamUniversityPress2010.

KorthalsAltes,F.e.a.,Ongelijke Werelden: Armoede, Groei, Ongelijkheid en de rol van internationale samenwerking,AdviesraadInternationaleVraagstukken,2012.

Krasner,StephenD.,Sovereignity: organized hypocrisy,Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress1999.

Lohmeyer,Rudolph,Next Generation Strategic Management for Diplomacy: The Capabilities Required to Manage Strategic Capital and Drive Policy Innovation in a Radically Changing World,2011.

Lohmeyer,Rudolphe.a.,The Foreign Ministry of the Future Conference: The Foreign Ministry at a Tipping Point,2011.


Lunde,LeivenHenrikThune,National interest - foreign policy for a globalized world, the case of Norway,Oslo:CappelenDamm2008.

MinisterievanBuitenlandseZaken,Introductiedossier Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken,2010.

MinisterievanBuitenlandseZaken,Modernisering van de ontwikkelingssamenwerking,2012.

MinisterievanBuitenlandseZaken,Nota modernisering Nederlandse diplomatie,2011.

MinisterievanBuitenlandseZaken,Nota wat de wereld verdient: een nieuwe agenda voor hulp, handel en investeringen,2013.

MinisterievanBuitenlandseZaken,Organisatie in Balans 2005-2010,2011.

MinisterievanBuitenlandseZaken,Samen uit, Samen thuis: Kaderafspraken interdepartementale samenwerking op de Post,2010.

MinisterievanBuitenlandseZaken,Sociaal jaarverslag 2010,2010.

MKBServicedesk,Het diplomatieke postennetwerk voor ondernemers,2012.

Nye,JosephS.,The Paradox of American power,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress2002.

Schaik,Louisevan,‘TheGlassishalf-full:EEASseenthroughDutcheyes’,in:Balfour,R.and

Raik,K.(eds.)TheEuropeanExternalActionServiceandnationaldiplomacies,European Policy Centre,no.73(2013),pp.1-177.

Slaughter,Anne-Marie,A New World Order: Government Networks and the Disaggregated State,

Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress2004.

Slaughter,Anne-Marie,‘DisaggregatedSovereignty:towardsthePublicAccountabilityof

GlobalGovernmentNetworks’,Government and Opposition,vol.39(2004),pp.159–190.

Stienen,Petra,Het andere Arabische geluid. Een nieuwe toekomst voor het Midden-Oosten?, Amsterdam:NieuwAmsterdam2012.

Swartbol,Rob,Rapport aanpassingen plaatsingsproces,2011[geenofficiëlepublicatie].

Zaring,D.,‘Networkinggoesinternational:Anupdate’,Annual Review of Law and Social Science,vol.2,pp.211-229.


4 Trends in diplomacy and mission networks A survey of eight foreign services

TheMinistryofForeignAffairs(BZ)facesadifficulttaskoverthenextfewyears.TheRutteIandRutte-AsschercoalitionagreementslaiddowncutsattheMinistryof€107millionintotal,atleast€40millionofwhichwillbedirectedattheinterministerialmissionnetwork.BZhasappointedanindependentAdvisory Committee on Modernising the Diplomatic Service to adviseforeignministerFransTimmermanswithaviewtoimplementingthesecutbacksasefficientlyandeffectivelyaspossible.

TohelptheCommitteeinthistask,anumberofmissionswereaskedtoconsulttheirhostcountries’foreignministriesaboutdevelopmentsattheirmissionsandintheirpracticeofdiplomacy.FourEuropeanmissions(Denmark,Germany,theUnitedKingdomandSweden)andfournon-Europeanmissions(Australia,Canada,TurkeyandSouthKorea)wereconsulted.Anumberofoverarchingconclusionscanbedrawnfromtheresponsessubmittedbythemissions;ourinitialfindingsaresetoutbelow.

Itisimportanttonotethattherearewidevariationsbetweentheorganisationalstructureofmostforeignservicesandtheirmissionnetworks.Thismakesitdifficulttodrawcompari-sons.Itisclear,however,thatotherforeignservicesare–liketheNetherlands–facingdifficultdecisions.

1. Chronic underfunding vs. substantial investmentTheresponsesrevealedthat,liketheNetherlands,manyforeignministriesarebeingaffectedbycutstoalesserorgreaterdegree.Thishasresultedinreorganisationswithinministries,closureoforcutbacksatmissions(mainlyconsulates-general)andreductionsinstaffinglevels.Inadditionsomeareembarkingonco-locationarrangementswithothercountries,orareexploringthisidea.Whatevertheultimateoutcome,itisclearthatforeignministriesarewrestlingwiththequestionofwhatcutstomake,andhow.

Co-locationFouroftheeightministries–Canada,Denmark,GermanyandtheUnitedKingdom–refer-redtopossibleco-locationswithpartnercountries.

• Canadaiscurrentlyexploringthepossibilityofco-locationwiththeUnitedKingdom,AustraliaandNewZealand.Notmuchprogresshasbeenmadetodate;accordingtotheCanadianforeignministrytheconceptofembassiessharedbytwoorthreedifferentcountriesiscurrentlyanunrealisticambition.Forthetimebeing,cooperationwithothercountriesiscurrentlyfocusedonsharedservices.

• Denmarkisalsolookingintoco-location.Itsforeignministryisfocusingfirstonco-locationwithotherNordiccountries.Unofficially,theideaiscirculatingof‘asingleNordicambassadorsharingamissionwithrepresentatives(notambassadors)oftheotherNordiccountries’.


• Inprinciple,GermanyhasnopreferenceforEuropeanorbilateralcooperationwhenitcomestoitsmissionnetwork.Co-locationisanoptionforGermany,wherepractical.OneexampleistheplanandpreparationsforGerman-Dutchco-locationinRabat.

• TheUnitedKingdomhasmainlyfocusedonclusteringmissions.Forexample,theNordic-Balticnetwork(ofeightmissions)ismanagedbytheheadofmissioninStockholm,andtheBeneluxmissionsbytheheadofmissioninTheHague.

Deployment of local staffOnecleartrend,whichtosomeextentcanbelinkedtothewaveofcuts,istheuseoflocalstaffatthemissions.Insomecases,localstaffaccountfor50%ormoreofallemployees.ThisappliestotheUnitedKingdom,Germany,Denmark,Sweden,CanadaandSouthKorea.TheBritishforeignofficeemploysthemostlocalstaff:in2012/2013,10,500ofits15,000staffwerelocalemployees.

Other measures associated with cutbacksCertainmeasuresspecifictoforeignministrieswerementionedinadditiontothemeasuresreferredtoabove.Forexample,Denmark’s‘flexiblerepresentationinitiative’enablestheforeignministrytoadjustitsinternationalpresenceinlinewiththechangingexpectationsandwishesofitsexternalpartners.ThebasicprincipleisthattheadministrationofindividualDanishrepresentationswillberegionalised(forexample,intheBalticregion),resultinginsignificantcostsavings.

Sweden,ontheotherhand,hasoptedforStockholm-basedAmbassadors(SBAs).Therearecurrently10SBAs,covering33countries.Theyareassistedbyaspecialdepartment/supportofficeinStockholm.Althoughthisconstructionischeaperthanmaintainingembassies(anSBAcostsSEK2millionayear,comparedwithSEK10to12millionforanaverageembassy),Swedenhassaidthatinprincipleitpreferstohavepermanentambassadorsincountriesofaccreditation.

AustraliaandCanadahavealsobeenhitbycuts,butaretryingtosparetheirmissionswhereverpossible.Interestingly,inadditiontotraditionalmeasuresassociatedwithcutbacks,Canadaisturningtofar-reachingcooperationandregionalisationasawayofaccommodatingthecuts.Itiscurrentlyrunningapilotprojectinvolvingtworegionalservicecentres(inWashingtonandLondon),withthecentreinLondontakingresponsibili-tyforhumanresourcesinEurope,theMiddleEastandAfrica.Initialexperienceshavesofarbeenpositive,andthecentrewillundergoitsfirstevaluationinthespring.TheCanadianforeignministryalsochargesotherministriesfortheiruseofitsmissions,meaningtheyshareresponsibilityforrent,administrativesupportandfacilitiesservices;evenprinterpaperispaidforoutofajointbudget.

Substantial investment in mission network/foreign ministryNocutbacksarebeingmadeattheTurkishorSouthKoreanforeignministries.Infactthey(andtheGermanforeignoffice)haveaclearambitiontoleavealarge‘geographicfootprint’intermsoftheirmissionnetworks.Toachievethis,theyareinvesting,forexample,inmore


Comparing the two extremes‘In recent years, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has suffered from chronic under-funding. The Australian diplomatic network is the smallest of all the G20 countries.’

vs.

‘Turkey operates a wide network with ambitious levels of growth, and it is investing heavily in its missions. The rationale behind this is the wish to leave a clear geographic footprint.’

staff(Turkey)andinsocialmedia,onlinepresenceanddigitisation(SouthKorea).SouthKorearecentlyopeneda‘socialnetworkingservice/communicationchannel’toinformthepublicaboutforeignpolicy,providethemwithtraveladvice,etc.

2. Economic diplomacy: focus on BRICS?OneobservabletrendamongEuropeanforeignministriesistheestablishmentandexpansionofmissionsinstrategicareas,i.e.emergingmarkets(suchastheBRICScoun-tries,Next20etc.)Thisnewfocusispartlybeingfinancedattheexpenseofconsulates-gene-ralandembassiesinEurope.Thisisthecase,forexample,withGermanyandtheUnitedKingdom.

Inrecentyears,theGermanforeignofficehasbeenreducingthestaffcomplementatembassiesinEuropewhileincreasingstaffinglevelsintheBRICScountries,theNext20andcountriesrichinrawmaterials.Berlinhasalsostatedthatitbelievesinthepowerofitsownnetworkofmissions,especiallywhereGermaneconomicinterestsareconcerned.TheUnitedKingdomisclosingEuropeanconsulates-generalinordertofinancetheexpansionoropeningofmissionsinemergingmarkets.Itisalsoposting100‘prosperityofficers’toemergingeconomies.

InDenmarktherehasevenbeenashiftintheforeignministry’spolicypriorities:‘Thereislessfocusonpoliticalwork;prioritieshaveshiftedtopromotingtradeandemploymentinDenmark.’Accordingly,expandingpoliticalandeconomiccooperationwithAsianpartnershasbeenidentifiedasoneofthecountry’sfivepolicyprioritiesfor2013.

Non-Europeanforeignministriesarealsofocusingoneconomicdiplomacy:

• Turkeyaimstobeamongthetop-tenglobaleconomiesby2023.Consequently,itsforeignpresencewilllargelybedeterminedbytrade(thisisreflectedbythepresenceofTurkishChambersofCommerceinvariouscountries).

• SouthKoreanmissionsarenolongerfocusingasmuchonpolitics,turningtheirattentioninsteadtoeconomicdiplomacyand‘nationbranding’.Theaverageembassy


allocates50%ofitstimetotheeconomy,20%tocultural/publicdiplomacy,20%toconsularworkand10%topolitics.TheKoreaTrade-InvestmentPromotionAgency(KOTRA)–whichfallsundertheMinistryofKnowledgeEconomy–hasofficesinmanycountries,offeringKoreanbusinessesarangeofservices(e.g.matchmaking).

• DespitefacingsimilarlevelsofcutstotheNetherlands,Canadaisnotcuttingbackonconsularservicesortradepromotion/economicdiplomacy(e.g.inemergingmarkets).Infact,since2006,15newtradeofficeshavebeenopenedinemergingmarkets.

• EventheAustralianforeignoffice–whichhaslimitedmeansatitsdisposal–isstrivingtoachieveabiggerdiplomaticfootprintinAsiabyopeningmissionsinChengdu(China)andeasternIndonesia(potentiallySurabaya),andbyappointinganambas-sadortoASEAN(basedinJakarta).

3. The foreign ministry’s role within the governmentIntheirresponses,fouroftheeightministriesreferredtoashiftintheirlevelofinfluenceinsomeareas.Infact,theCanadianandTurkishforeignministriesarenolongerbydefinitionresponsiblefordeterminingforeignpolicyinallaspects.

TheDanishforeignministryisunusualintermsofitsclosecooperationwithparliament.Thesetiesarestrong,particularlywhenitcomestotheroleofDanishdiplomatsinnegotiationsbothwithintheEUandfurtherafield,andparliamentisconsultedoften.

InSouthKorea,theforeignministryistherecognisedcoordinatorofforeignpolicy,withlineministriesoftenresponsibleforthesubstanceofspecificpolicy.However,theforeignministry’spositionisreliantinpartonthepresident,whohasconsiderableexecutivepowers.

4. Image problemsSomeoftheministriesconsultedforthesurvey(Australia,CanadaandtheUnitedKingdom)areexperiencingthesamesortofimageproblemsastheDutchforeignministry.Theyarewrestlingwiththeissueofhowtomakediplomaticworktransparent,andhowbettertoexplainwhattheydo.Someservicesareworkingtopresentamorefrugalandbusiness-likepublicimage,forexampleintermsofthebuildingschosenasresidencesandoffices.

5. Human resources policy and outreach Itisnotablethatmanyministries(Turkey,Germany,Sweden,DenmarkandAustralia)donotprovideanyconcretedetailsintheirresponsesregardingtraining,orotherstaffdevelop-mentprocesses.Thereisalsolittleinformationonoutreachactivities.

TheSouthKoreanforeignministry,ontheotherhand,setsoutinmeticulousdetailitsideasonhowtoimprovehumanresourcespolicy,investmentintrainingandoutreach,andencouragingopencompetition.Byencouragingopencompetition,theministryhopestorecruitandretainstaffwhoareabletotakeadvantageoftheglobalchangesKoreahasobserved(includingtheriseofChinaandincreasingcompetitionforexportmarkets,energyandrawmaterials).TheaimisalsotouseopencompetitiontomakeKoreandiplomacy


moreeffectiveandsostrengthenthecountry’sinternationalposition.Interestingly,trainingcoursesattheKoreaNationalDiplomaticAcademy(KNDA)areavailablenotonlyfornewdiplomatsbutalsoformoreseniorofficialswithinthegovernment.Forexample,theKNDAoffersa10-monthexecutiveprogrammeformanagersatDGlevel.

6. Internet and digitisationMostministries(75%)areactiveontheinternetthroughsocialmedia,orareexploringtheoptionsfordigitisation.TheseactivitiesvaryfromTwitter/WeibotoonlinediscussionforumsandaCyberBusinessService.Thenon-EuropeanministriesappearmoreadvancedinthissensethantheirEuropeancounterparts,butonecannotdrawsuchaconclusionwithcertaintyasDenmarkandSwedendidnotrefertodigitisationintheirresponses.

SouthKoreahasoneofthemostadvancedministriesintermsofdigitisation.AllSouthKoreanmissionsusetheCyberBusinessService(forsupplyingKoreanbusinesseswithdigitalinformationoncertaincountries),plusthesocial-communicationchannelreferredtoearlier(forprovidingthepublicwithtraveladviceandinformationonforeignpolicy).

Itisworthnotingatthispointthatnoteveryministryisequallyopentotheuseofsocialmedia(forexample,becauseofsecurityconcerns).InAustralia,acautiousapproachistakentotheuseofsocialmediabyindividualministryofficials,andonlyalimitednumberofdesignatedambassadorshavebeengrantedpermissiontoTweet.

InCanada,too,theuseofsocialmediaisinitsinfancy,partlybecauseofstrictsupervisionfromabove.Thereislittlescopeforusingsocialmediaforprofessionalpurposes,andmanyelementsneedtobeagreedinadvance.Thismeansthereisatendencytokeepinformationgeneral,asthemostinterestingdetailsareperceivedtobetooconfidential.TheUKhasdecidedthattheforeignofficewillnotoperatethiskindofcontrol,workingontheprinciplethat,Ifyoucan’ttrustanambassadortoblog,howcanyoutrusthimtodealwiththepresident?

Advisory Committee on Modernising the Diplomatic Service

Members:Arthur Docters van LeeuwenKo Colijn Tineke Lodders-ElfferichPieter MarresVictor Schoenmakers

Executive secretaries:Margriet VonnoTanja RölingEnita Dautovic

29 May 2013

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