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SESAT Alur terroristische netwerkenDonderdag de 20 augustus 2009 20:37Door: Irfan S Awwas

Uitbanning van terrorisme oorlog gevoerd voormalige Amerikaanse president George W. Bush,onder de vlag van de oorlog tegen het terrorisme, niet alleen niet te temmen van de weerstand van

moslims in Irak en Afghanistan. Integendeel, bevordert het meer daden van terreur, of begaan doorpersonen, bewegingen, en de staat.

Nu, Amerika onder president Barack Hussein Obama, probeert de indruk te wekken woedeverwijderen George W Bush. In de retorische toespraken aan de Universiteit van Cairo, Egypte, 4

juni, 2009, Barack Obama wordt verklaard,''De Amerikaanse regering niet zal ingrijpen in een land,maar zou een land te ondersteunen tegen het terrorisme en de democratie.''

In het kader van de mondiale politiek, werd deze verklaring Obama politiek geven twee dingen.Eerste, Obama probeerde het buitenlands beleid van strategie te veranderen door het verlaten vaneen achtervolgd paranode houding Bush en het nieuwe pad van de islam tegen de wereldwijde

krachten. Ten tweede, hoe maakt niet uit de Amerikaanse imperialistische karakter niet verlorenkunnen gaan. Obama wil nog steeds te domineren en de islamitische landen zonder militaireinterventie controle.Voor het uitvoeren van deze politieke agenda, met als doel efficinter en strategisch, de VerenigdeStaten te delegeren aan de islamitische heersers in hun respectieve landen in overeenstemming metzijn nationale werkelijke toestand. De doeltreffendheid van deze strategie Obama zal binnenkort tezien in sommige islamitische landen.

In Pakistan sinds president Asif Ali Zardari aan de macht, 9 september 2008, echtgenoot vanvoormalig premier Benazir Butho die werd gedood in een verkiezingscampagne, de jacht opislamitische bewegingen intensief uitgevoerd. Niet helemaal een jaar aan de macht, onder decontrole van de Amerikaanse overheid, is het regime van Ali Zardari van de PPP (Pakistan People'sParty) jacht op de Taliban Mujahideen, terwijl de Pakistaanse veiligheidstroepen bestormden deislamitische gemeenschap in de vallei van Swat, voor de veeleisende de toepassing van hetislamitisch recht.

Zelfs had beloofd om zijn troepen terug te trekken in Irak geleidelijk, Obama zelfs sturen meertroepen naar Afghanistan om de mensen van de Taliban omringen het kader van de NAVO-vlag.Intussen is de wreedheid van de dagelijkse doden door Isral van Palestijnen in de Gazastrook,waaronder de moord en verdrijving van Oeigoerse moslims in China, de regering Obama alleenstilte.

De politieke stijl van discriminatie is Uncle Sam, in het bijzonder met betrekking tot de uitroeiingvan het terrorisme pascaledakan II JW Marriot bombardementen en het Ritz Carlton, juli 2009,meer gerechtvaardigd, toen Amerikaanse inlichtingendiensten, de CIA, probeerde Indonesi enandere ASEAN-landen leiden tot een netwerk te vormen met veiligheid en defensie.

Dit idee doet ons denken aan het model van de samenwerking op veiligheidsgebied SEATO (Zuid-Oost Azi Collective Defensie-Verdrag). SEATO verdediging is een pact met Zuidoost-Azi,opgericht in 1954, ondertekend door Australi, Engeland, Frankrijk, Nieuw-Zeeland, Pakistan,Filipijnen, Thailand en de Verenigde Staten in Manilla. Het doel, om tegen eventuele agressie eninterne subversie in Zuidoost-Azi en de Pacific Northwest. Vanaf het begin, dit pact met de missie

van vermoedelijke Amerikaanse imperialisme, omdat het een all-in tegenstelling door Bung Karno.Een van SEATO product is berkobarnya de oorlog in Vietnam, 1960, naar aanleiding van deambities van U. S. president Jhon F Kennedy, met inbegrip van de afscheiding van Singapore van


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Maleisi. Daarom ASEAN plan van samenwerking bij de bestrijding van internationaal terrorismezal moeten nemen luisteren, omdat de negatieve gevolgen voor de aandeelhouders overwegen eendergelijke samenwerking met de beginselen van het buitenlands beleid in strijd is onafhankelijk enactief.

Tot nu toe, president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono probeerde te vinden van de juiste formule in

dienst van de Amerikaanse mondiale politiek. 6e president van de Republiek Indonesi, detoegewijde inspanning van intelligentie en vernuft om een verscheidenheid van problemen in hetland zo te beheren als niet te schaden Amerikaanse belangen.

TerrorismebestrijdingPolitie kijken naar de officile aankondiging, 12 augustus, 2009, die stelt, de terroristen die stierf inde invallen in Bekasi is Jati Asih Water (Ari?) Setyawan en Eko. Intussen is het slachtoffer die stierfthuis in het dorp Muzahri Beji, Temanggung, Midden-Java, niet M Noordin Top, maar de Ibrohim

bloemisten.

Toen, op een bommenwerper in het Hotel JW Marriott en Ritz Carlton, juli 17, 2009, waarvan 9

doden en 41 mensen gewond zijn geraakt? Tot nu toe wist niemand, geen andere kan biedenverduidelijking. Ibrohim architect vermoed bommenwerper in een ontploffing in het JW Marriot,was een van de slachtoffers gedood op 8/8/09, op slechts 88 anti-terreur densus nummers.Ondertussen heeft Noordin Top M niet is gevangen, verdween als een opgeslokt door de aarde.

Sinds de jacht op terroristen die door de politie, heeft vele leden van de gemeenschap die hetslachtoffer zijn van valse aanhouding, valse vuur, en een te doden, alleen omdat wordt vermoed dateen deel van terroristische netwerken.

Voor de politie,''Terroristen waren slechte mensen, dan doden ze onschuldige altijd en overal.''Dit isnatuurlijk uitgenodigd bezorgdheid en angst uitlokken in het midden van de samenleving.

In feite degenen die werden gedood waren, vrijwel zeker niet bewezen terreur te doen. Nieuw 'naarverluidt' een terroristisch netwerk. Dat het terrorisme moet worden uitgeroeid, ja. Echter, het dodenactie zonder tussenkomst van de rechter-proces, een duidelijke schending van de wet.

Er zijn mensen die zeggen,''zo niet voorafgegaan, vooraf aan de terroristen zullen doden depolitie.''Als deze logica wordt gebruikt, dan wat verschil maakt het de politie met de terroristen?Meer gevaarlijk, het stigma van schade aan het imago van de islam met terrorisme kaarten netwerk

per regio, familie, vrienden, onderwijsinstellingen. Zo heeft de regio geboorte gaf aan deterroristische stigma, de familie van terrorisme, terroristen kostscholen, en terroristische

organisaties.

Dit kan leiden tot nieuwe conflicten onvoorspelbare politieke gevolgen. Nog gevaarlijker isgepositioneerd als een Mujahid islamitische terroristen en in plaats daarvan overwegen demoedjahedien als terroristen. In zijn officile toespraak verwelkomen de acht monodon (64 jaar)Onafhankelijkheid, 16 augustus, 2009, president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono heeft verklaard dathet terrorisme een bron van achterstand, onrechtvaardigheid en armoede. President Susilo BambangYudhoyono heeft geen melding van de betrokkenheid van een bepaalde religieuze groep, of een

bepaalde religieuze leer als een trigger van het terrorisme in Indonesi.

Hoewel onder de indruk weg en wees voorzichtig, om geen godsdienst associren met terrorisme,

maar we kunnen begrijpen de richting van SBY toespraak. Dat wil zeggen, het SBY bestuur wil dekomende vijf jaar, tot een meer vriendelijke beleid met alle religieuze gemeenschappen in Indonesilopen, hoewel de gemeenschap wordt beschouwd als een fundamentalistische religie.


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Koppeling terrorisme en islamitische Law enforcement krachten in Indonesi, en vindt deislamitische moedjahedien als terroristen of anders gepositioneerd als een jihadistische terroristen,is een product van het denken Sukarno-regime (1959-1066) wordt gecondenseerd met een agendavan het communisme. Haat PKI (Indonesische communistische partij) tegen de Masyumi, moedigenze voortdurend aan een slecht imago van de islam te geven door middel van de Soekarno advies.

Soekarno regime met Nasakomnya is een klassiek voorbeeld van het opofferen van de belangen vanmoslims in de wereldwijde communistische tijdperk. Zo veroorzaakt veel islamitische geleerden encijfers in de gevangenis gegooid zonder proces.

Dan is de verandering van regime. Soeharto de teugels van de macht, de moslims afgeslacht als hetgeval Priok, Lampung bloeden, en de DOM in Atjeh. Zowel Soekarno en Soeharto's regime, diealtijd de slogan van de nationale belangen en de versterking van de eenheidsstaat RepubliekIndonesi niet kan worden onderhandeld. Soekarno en Soeharto logica's met een beetje glanslippenstift nog loopt op het moment van de Reformatie dit besluit.

Het zou beter zijn, als de resolutie zonder verstoring van religieus terrorisme, maar door verbeteringvan het welzijn van mensen, het bevorderen van onderwijs, recht en rechtvaardigheid zoals beloofd

president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.Schrijver: Tanfidziyah Vergadering Voorzitter Commissie voor de MujahideenBron: Harian Republika, donderdag 20 augustus, 2009

FEATURESTracking The Terrorist Money Trail

Police officers lead away a suspected terrorist in Vienna in September, 2007November 16, 2008International efforts to combat terrorist financing have lost momentum since successes thatfollowed the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States. Meanwhile, Al-Qaeda haschanged the way it raises and delivers money for terrorist activities -- relying more on privatedonations or criminal activities like the drug trade and using informal transfer methods outside ofthe global financial system.


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Those are the findings of a new study -- "The Money Trail: Finding, Following, and FreezingTerrorist Finances" -- by experts at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, in Washington,D.C. RFE/RL correspondent Ron Synovitz spoke about the report with one of its co-authors,Michael Jacobson, who has served as a senior adviser to the U.S. Treasury Department's Office ofTerrorism and Financial Intelligence and as counsel on the 9/11 Commission.

RFE/RL: You have spent the last year at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy focusing onthe strengths and weaknesses of financial measures to combat international terrorism. What do yousee as the most significant findings of your policy paper, "The Money Trail: Finding, Following,and Freezing Terrorist Finances"?

Surabaya

indonesia


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Michael Jacobson: The most important thing to note is that in the period after 9/11, there were a lotof improvements made throughout the world on the efforts to combat terrorist financing by theUnited States, by the Europeans, in the [Persian] Gulf, and by the private sector. But over the pastfew years, a lot of these accomplishments have been slipping. For example, the United Nations

played a very important role in the few years after 9/11 in improving the international environment.

They were able to pass a few resolutions that were very relevant to combating terrorist financing.And in that period after 9/11, when there was greater international willingness and cooperation oncounterterrorism, a lot of countries took steps to improve their own capabilities. As you've gottenfurther away from 9/11 -- as the threat seems less clear, and along with some specific feelings inforeign governments and in the private sector wondering about the importance of combatingterrorist financing -- I think you've seen the international effort slipping.

RFE/RL: Your study mentions increased contributions to Al-Qaeda from "private sources" incountries like Saudi Arabia. Is there any evidence that at least some private donations to Al-Qaedaare linked to the glut of petrodollars in the Mideast from oil prices that topped $150 per barrelearlier this year?


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Jacobson: I've never seen any convincing study or assessment done that ties directly the oil fundsand oil profits to terrorist financing. Of course, that would be a study that would be difficult toconduct. I worked on the 9/11 Commission and one of the things we were trying to figure out was"Where did Al-Qaeda get the funds for the 9/11 attacks?" We were able to figure out how much theattacks cost -- [about $500,000]. We were able to figure out who in Al-Qaeda provided the funds.But tracking it back further than that was very difficult. And that's after the fact with a lot ofrelevant information and intelligence in our possession. So it's a difficult area to always track thefunds back to the original source.

No Paper Trails

RFE/RL: Why has it become so difficult? Is it because these informal financial transfer mechanismsare being used more -- mechanisms that do not leave paper trails?


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Jacobson: That's one of the ironies of the success since 9/11. You've seen as the United States andthe Europeans and other governments have cracked down on the use of the formal financial systemof banks, you've seen a shift away from banks to terrorists using cash, to terrorists using cashcouriers, to terrorists using Hawala and other informal financial-transfer mechanisms. And even onthe technologically more sophisticated side, [they are] using things like cell phones to transfer

funds. While that is a credit to the international effort, it has also makes it more difficult to track themoney. It can become more difficult for the governments to figure out where the money is actuallygoing.

RFE/RL: What kind of policy recommendations does this lead you to make -- not just for theincoming administration of U.S. President-elect Barack Obama, but also for the European Union,the United Nations, or international organizations?

Jacobson: We have a number of policy recommendations in this study, including that countries needto understand why this is an area that should be an important part of the broader counterterrorismeffort. There is a need for more of an understanding about what terrorism financing is and whymoney is so important to terrorist organizations. The United States and its allies have to do a better

job explaining, not only to governments but to the private sector, what the threat actually is. Therehas been a lot of focus in the past since 9/11 on putting rules in place. So a lot of countries have

pretty good laws at this point to combat terrorism financing, but they're not actually sure even whatthey are looking for.

They can tell you all about the great laws that they have in place and the penalties that are availableto them now. But the reality is that if you don't know what you are looking for -- if you don't


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understand terrorist financing -- then you are not going to stop it. One of the things we recommend,now that they have this good rules-based structures in place, is that they have got to shift to more ofa risk-based structure. You've got to figure out whether countries are actually stopping it. Thatwould be an important shift.

RFE/RL: Your report mentions Syria and Iran as two countries that are state sponsors of terrorism.

But you also describe Iran as a "passive" supporter of Al-Qaeda -- turning a blind eye to terroristfinancing or other activity through its territory.

Jacobson: Iran is not a passive supporter. It is a very active supporter of terrorism when it comes togroups like Hizballah and Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The passive part comes when itgoes to Al-Qaeda. Iran has a very tenuous relationship with Al-Qaeda. It is a balancing act for them.They do not trust each other. They do not really like each other. But I think, at times, enemies of the

United States can find things to agree on. And so I think even before 9/11 you've actually seen Iranlet Al-Qaeda members go through Iran on the way to Afghanistan and Pakistan and not stamp their

passports so they wouldn't have a record of going into Afghanistan and Pakistan. That's more of thepassive kind of support that they have provided to Al-Qaeda in the past.

RFE/RL: Let's talk more about Afghanistan and Pakistan. What have you learned about terrorismfinancing there -- not just from your work on this study, but from all of your experience in counterterrorism financial intelligence in the U.S. Treasury Department and on the 9/11 Commission?


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Jacobson: It's shifted since 9/11. As of 9/11, you had Al-Qaeda central -- based in Afghanistan at thetime under the Taliban rule. It was really playing a very, very large role in directing plots, and a verylarge operational role and in funding plots. A lot of the big plots in the 1990s and the 9/11 attackswere directly funded by Al-Qaeda. The operatives would be given large sums of money to carry outthe operation. Since 9/11, as Al-Qaeda has been more on the run -- even though they do have a safehaven now -- the funding for operations have not been coming as much from Al-Qaeda core. But alot of the cells, for example in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, have been raising the fundsthemselves at this point. So you really have seen a shift from central control of the funding forterrorist cells and terrorist plots.

Criminal Activity

RFE/RL: You also mention that there has been a shift to criminal activity by local terrorist cells tofund their own activities. Why has that been happening?


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Jacobson: The shift to criminal activity has also been a real trend that we have seen since 9/11. Forexample, on the 9/11 attacks, Al-Qaeda decided they wanted to do everything to keep the operativesoff the law enforcement radar. The last thing they wanted was to have them involved in pettycriminal activity which could expose them to law enforcement or intelligence attention. As cells areraising the funds themselves instead of receiving the money from Al-Qaeda, a lot of the cells noware focused on how to raise those funds. And the answer has often come to criminal activity. The2004 Madrid cell that carried out the train attack there raised most of the money for the attack thruthe sale of hashish. A cell in the U.K. involved in the 7/7 attack raised money, in part, by defaultingon a bank loan. So there are all sorts of ways that individual cells are now raising money throughcriminal activity.

RFE/RL: What about reports by the United Nations that the Taliban is increasingly funded by

profits from illegal opium-poppy farming in Afghanistan?


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Jacobson: The drug trade is one of the major ways that terrorist organizations are making money atthis point. One of the reasons for that is the volume of drug trade in the world and the potential

profit. That dwarfs the scale of profits available in other types of criminal activity. The Taliban, ofcourse, has been at the forefront of this. They can make money from a lot of different aspects of thedrug trade -- guarding safe houses, taxing people as they go through on the [smuggling] routes, or alot of other aspects of the drug trade.


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RFE/RL: Another issue covered in your report is the use of some Islamic charities as a conduit forfunds that eventually are used for terrorist activities. What is happening in this area?

Jacobson: Charities have been a problematic area in terms of terrorist financing. Many countries arenot eager to take this on because, of course, one of the pillars of Islam is charity. And there is realconcern among a lot of governments that if they take action against charities it will look like theyare taking action against Islam in general. The United States has been much more aggressive on thisfront than anyone else. And the U.S. has designated about 45 charities overall [as being linked toterrorist financing.] Other countries, I think aside from the Israelis, have targeted very, very few.

RFE/RL: Your report concludes that the freezing of terrorist financing in the global financial systemcan not bring an end to terrorism on its own, but rather, can only slow down terrorist activity. Canyou explain those findings?


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Jacobson: The issue of freezing terrorist financing is what the public sees. This is one of themisunderstood areas of terrorist financing, where the public and the media tend to view the publicdesignations, the public blacklisting and the freezing as the sum total of what is being done in theterrorist financing area. To use that as the metric, I think, is misleading. It has to be coupled with areally aggressive and effective intelligence -- a "following the money approach." Without knowingwhat is going on, on both sides, I think, makes it hard for the public to judge what is going on. But Ithink, too often, it is viewed as the sum total of the governmental efforts.

RFE/RL: What about the use of financial centers in the Middle East by terrorist organizations, or byAl-Qaeda sympathizers, to transfer funds around the world for terrorist activities?


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Jacobson: One of the difficulties the U.S. has encountered in this area has been in terms of the Gulfcountries where they have made a lot of improvements since 9/11 but where a lot of improvementsstill could be made. There are a few problems in this area. One of them is that a few of the Gulfcountries -- like the United Arab Emirates and Qatar and Bahrain -- are very focused on trying tomake themselves international financial centers. Obviously, in that respect, it is very important todraw in capital from around the world and be an attractive place for money to come. But at the sametime, you've got to make sure that the money coming in is clean and that you've put adequate

controls in place to regulate. So I think that has been a hard balance to strike in the Gulf. I don'tthink they've always gotten it right in that respect.


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Comments 1-4 (of 4)by: secretslave from: earth March 09, 2009 01:03salaam,And they mention not the terrorist attacks of 1948 went to far back in accounts where be the line not

drawn until 2001 or was that 1992 Ruby Ridge?by: Michael from: USA November 17, 2008 19:05"...One of them is that a few of the Gulf countries -- like the United Arab Emirates and Qatar andBahrain -- are very focused on trying to make themselves international financial centers."


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These banks are acting in a typically Arabic manner - playing both sides against the middle until awinner emerges. Unless or until key financial institutions in the Gulf figure out that stoppingterrorist finance is in everyone's interest (including their own), that part of the world will continueas a problem area.

by: JM from: DC November 17, 2008 13:04Why is it that Michael Jacobson defended Quilliam Foundation's support of Mufti Gomaa whosupports Hezbollah? Why is it that Michael Jacobson claims wrote for West Point that Al-Sharif hasrenounced Al-Qaeda but ignores that Al-Sharif still calls for jihad against American troops inAfghanistan and Iraq?

Or isn't that news to the RFE/RL?

http://counterterrorismblog.org/2008/08/quilliam_responds.php

http://counterterrorismblog.org/2008/08/quilliam_foundation_and_gomaa.php

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/opedsPDFs/487faa39e38cb.pdfby: Erik November 17, 2008 02:50


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"I worked on the 9/11 Commission and one of the things we were trying to figure out was "Wheredid Al-Qaeda get the funds for the 9/11 attacks?" We were able to figure out how much the attackscost -- [about $500,000]. We were able to figure out who in Al-Qaeda provided the funds. Buttracking it back further than that was very difficult. And that's after the fact with a lot of relevantinformation and intelligence in our possession."

BS; the Commission ignored (not "debunked") the reports from Indian intelligence, apparentlyconfirmed by the FBI, that Saeed Sheikh wired $100K to Atta at the request of Mahmood Ahmedhttp://www.historycommons.org/searchResults.jsp?searchtext=ahmed+sheikh+%24100%2C000&events=on&entities=on&articles=on&topics=on&timelines=on&projects=on&titles=on&descriptions=on&dosearch=on&search=Go

Terrorist funds-tracking no secret, some sayCite White House boasts of tighter monitoring systemBy Bryan Bender, Globe Staff | June 28, 2006


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WASHINGTON -- News reports disclosing the Bush administration's use of a special banksurveillance program to track terrorist financing spurred outrage in the White House and on CapitolHill, but some specialists pointed out yesterday that the government itself has publicly discussed itsstepped-up efforts to monitor terrorist finances since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

On Monday, President Bush said it was ``disgraceful" that The New York Times and other mediaoutlets reported last week that the US government was quietly monitoring international financialtransactions handled by an industry-owned cooperative in Belgium called the Society forWorldwide Interbank Financial Communication, or SWIFT, which is controlled by nearly 8,000institutions in 20 countries. The Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and The Wall StreetJournal also reported about the program.


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The controversy continued to simmer yesterday when Senator Jim Bunning, a Republican ofKentucky, accused the Times of ``treason," telling reporters in a conference call that it ``scares thedevil out of me" that the media would reveal such sensitive information. Senator Pat Roberts, aKansas Republican, requested US intelligence agencies to assess whether the reports have damagedanti terrorism operations. And Representative Peter King, the chairman of the House HomelandSecurity Committee, has urged Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez to pursue ``possible criminal

prosecution" of the Times, which has reported on other secret government surveillance programs.The New York Times Co. owns The Boston Globe.

But a search of public records -- government documents posted on the Internet, congressionaltestimony, guidelines for bank examiners, and even an executive order President Bush signed inSeptember 2001 -- describe how US authorities have openly sought new tools to track terrorist

financing since 2001. That includes getting access to information about terrorist-linked wiretransfers and other transactions, including those that travel through SWIFT.

``There have been public references to SWIFT before," said Roger Cressey, a senior White Housecounterterrorism official until 2003. ``The White House is overreaching when they say [The NewYork Times committed] a crime against the war on terror. It has been in the public domain before."


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Victor D. Comras , a former US diplomat who oversaw efforts at the United Nations to improveinternational measures to combat terror financing, said it was common knowledge that worldwidefinancial transactions were being closely monitored for links to terrorists. ``A lot of people wereaware that this was going on," said Comras, one of a half-dozen financial experts UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan recruited for the task.

``Unless they were pretty dumb, they had to assume" their transactions were being monitored,Comras said of terrorist groups. ``We have spent the last four years bragging how effective we have

been in tracking terrorist financing."


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Indeed, a report that Comras co-authored in 2002 for the UN Security Council specificallymentioned SWIFT as a source of financial information that the United States had tapped into. Thesystem, which handles trillions of dollars in worldwide transactions each day, serves as a main hubfor banks and other financial institutions that move money around the world. According to The NewYork Times, SWIFT executives agreed to give the Treasury Department and the CIA broad access toits database.

SWIFT and other worldwide financial clearinghouses ``are critical to processing international

banking transactions and are rich with payment information," according to the 33-page report by theterrorist monitoring group established by the UN Security Council in late 2001. ``The United Stateshas begun to apply new monitoring techniques to spot and verify suspicious transactions. The group


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recommends the adoption of similar mechanisms by other countries."

Some worry that the new disclosures will nonetheless hamper US counter-terrorism efforts.

``I worked this stuff and I can guarantee that [revealing the SWIFT] information made adifference," said Dennis Lormel, a retired FBI special agent who helped establish the bureau's

Terrorist Financing Operations Section before leaving government in 2003. ``The disclosure willhave an adverse impact on investigations. It was used in two specific instances where it helped totrack terrorists. We also used it for lead value."

But the White House has also been very public about its efforts to track the overseas banking

transactions of Americans and other foreign nationals.

Less than two weeks after the 9/11 attacks, Bush signed an executive order calling for greatercooperation with foreign entities to monitor money that might be headed to terrorist groups. Theexecutive order was posted on the White House website.

The document called for ``cooperation with, and sharing information by, United States and foreignfinancial institutions as an additional tool to enable the United States to combat the financing ofterrorism."

Richard Newcomb , the head of the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control at the

time, later publicly credited the president for enabling US law enforcement and intelligenceagencies to nab suspected terrorists, including followers of ``Hambali, " Al Qaeda's leader inSoutheast Asia. The New York Times report said Hambali's capture in 2003 came with the aid ofinformation gleaned from SWIFT.

Administration officials have said this week that the disclosure of such details were particularlydamaging to US security.

Nevertheless, in July 2003 -- a month before Hambali was captured -- Newcomb told the SenateGovernment Affairs Committee in detail about a program initiated after 9/11 between his office andthe Pentagon to track Hambali's financial network in Southeast Asia. The scope of the project

included Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore, focusing on the finances of JemaaIslamiyah , the Al Qaeda group run by Hambali that was responsible for deadly bombings in Bali in2002.


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He said the operation ``identified the key leaders, fund-raisers, businessmen, recruiters, companies,charities, mosques, and schools that were part of [Jamaa Islamiyah] support network. Thus far, wehave imposed sanctions against two of these key nodes, and are coordinating action against severalothers," Newcomb told the committee.

Other public documents have also detailed post-9/11 efforts to follow terrorist money.

The Patriot Act approved by Congress after the attacks emphasized providing new authorities forthe Bush administration to track and choke off terrorist funds around the world. One part of the act,dealing specifically with terrorist money, was described by the Treasury Department as the most

``significant [anti-money-laundering] law" since a 1970 law requiring banks to report cashtransactions over $10,000.

That section of the Patriot Act required the Bush administration to ``adopt regulations to encouragefurther cooperation among financial institutions, their regulatory authorities, and law enforcementauthorities" to track terrorist-related money laundering.


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