Al Gepasseerd Terroristische Terrorist En Bekende Kanalen Geopend

8/14/2019 Al Gepasseerd Terroristische Terrorist En Bekende Kanalen Geopend

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Time to Know Your State TerrorismFalery Mustika

Tue, 01 Aug 2006 11:57:42 -0700

Weten dat het tijd is de staat Terrorismeby John Pilger

De wereld is verdeeld in twee strijdende kampen: de islam en? Ons??. Dat is deboodschap die zich van westerse overheden, de pers, radio en televisie. Voorde islam moeten lezen: terroristen. Dit zijn de overblijfselen van de koudeoorlog, toen de wereld is verdeeld tussen? Red Team? en wij, en zelfs hetverdwijnen van mensen is gerechtvaardigd indien gedaan voor de verdediging.Nu weten we, of we moeten weten, dat veel van het is gewoon eenwoordspeling; officile rapporten uitgegeven waarin wordt uitgelegd dat deSovjet-dreiging was gewoon voor publieke consumptie.

Elke dag weten we, zoals in de Koude Oorlog, is de spiegel een kant altijdgepresenteerd aan ons als een reflectie op de gebeurtenissen die gebeurd.Nieuwe bedreigingen worden altijd de nadruk op de terroristische gruweldadenbegaan, of het was in Beslan of Jakarta. Als vanuit de ene kant van de spiegel,onze leiders maakte een grote fout, maar hun goede bedoelingen geen twijfelbestaan. ? Idealisme? en?? fatsoen? een Tony Blair, die vaak klaagden over eenincident weergegeven in de media meer dan de werkelijke gebeurtenisplaatsvindt. Het is als een scne in een Griekse tragedie. Hebben deelgenomenaan het doden van 37.000 Iraakse burgers, die het nieuws dat de heer Blair isongerust gevoel over iets anders, niet de slachtoffers: vanaf het begin deconcurrentie met de minister van Financin Gordon Brown maakte, totdat hijeen klacht in om verdere opwarming van de aarde had. In de wrede

gebeurtenissen in Beslan, is Blair meer te zeggen, zonder ironie of eenafwijkende mening, dat niet? Het internationale terrorisme moet wordenvoortgezet?. Het is de woorden gesproken door dezelfde Mussolini snel nadathij gebombardeerd burgers in Abessini.

Slechts een paar mensen die zien de ene kant van de spiegel en al dieoneerlijkheid dat zal Blair en zijn medewerkers in de uitdrukking als een oorlogcrimineel te zien, zowel letterlijk als recht. Uitdrukking Blair toonde ook hetbewijs van cynische en geen gevoel bermoralnya, maar het uitzicht dat Blairnog maatschappelijk draagvlak, dat in mijn ervaring, deden hun politiekebewustzijn niet verbeteren. Dit kan het Britse publiek onverschilligheid of zelfsspelletjes en politieke belangen tussen de Blair / Brown.

Laten we eens enkele voorbeelden van hoe de wereld wordt weergegeven enhoe de wereld zou moeten zijn. Weergegeven als de bezetting van Irak? Chaos?in plaats van de Amerikaanse militaire incompetentie in de omgang metislamitische strijders daar. In feite is de bezetting is een systematische enwrede aanval op burgers door Amerikaanse militaire functionarissen dat slechtis, het recht krijgen om te doden door superieuren in Washington. In mei heeftde U. S. mariniers gebruikte tanks en gevechtshelikopters de aanval van desloppenwijken in Fallujah. Ze bekende het doden van 600 mensen, een aantal

dat veel groter is dan het totaal aantal burgers gedood door? Rebels? tijdens deoorlog vorig jaar.

De komende Amerikaanse generaals; bloedbad was wraakactie voor de moord


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van 3 Amerikaanse mariniers. Zestig jaar geleden, de deling van Duitsland, deSS Das Reich, doodde 600 Franse burgers in Oradour-sur-Glane als wraak voorde Duitse militaire officier penculilkan door opstandelingen. Wat een verschiltwee gebeurtenissen?

Op deze dagen, Amerikanen blijven raketten vuur in Fallujah en andere

gebieden zijn dichtbevolkt, ze doodde het hele gezin. Als het woord terrorismemoderne toepassing is het staatsterrorisme. Engeland had een andere stijl. Erzijn 40 gevallen bekend waarin orang2 Irak gedood in de handen van Britsesoldaten, maar slechts een soldaat is vereist. In de laatste uitgave van hettijdschrift De Journalist, Lee Gordon, een freelance journalist, schreef? Werkenals een Engels persoon in Irak erg gevaarlijk is, met name in de zuidelijkegebieden waar onze troepen hebben een slechte reputatie (maar nietgerapporteerd in het land) vanwege hun wrede behandeling.? ? Dit maaktbetreft de minister van Defensie, totdat hij de familie David McBride, 17bewogen-jarige soldaat, en vroeg hem te vertrekken toen hij weigerde om deoorlog in Irak te sluiten. Bijna alle families van soldaten gedood in Irak heeftzich verzet tegen de bezetting en Blair, dit alles is nog nooit eerder gebeurd.

Alleen door kennis van de staatsterrorisme dan kunnen we de terroristischeaanslagen gepleegd door groepen en personen die, hoewel keek wredebegrijpen, maar staat in vergelijking met terrorisme is niet veel. Bovendien, debronnen van nieuws over hen is de deskundige ambtenaren van terrorismewaar er geen medium voor deze bron. Zo heeft de staat Isral in staat geweestom veel buitenstaanders ervan te overtuigen dat hij het slachtoffer is vanterrorisme, terwijl het in feite terrorisme meedogenloos en gepland om te doenwas het resultaat van vergelding door Palestijnse zelfmoordterroristen. En toch

is er vaak verzet van Isral tegen de BBC? dat is een vorm van intimidatie? BBCverslaggevers maar nooit gemeld Isral als een terrorist: een specifieke termdie geldt voor Palestijnen opgesloten in hun eigen land. Dus geen wonder,zoals geopenbaard in het onderzoek universiteit van Glasgow dat veel tv-kijkers in het Verenigd Koninkrijk die geloven dat de Palestijnen zijn deindringers en aanvallers grond.

Op 7 september, een Palestijnse zelfmoordaanslag 16 Israli's gedood in destad Beersheba. Elke televisie nieuws gemeld dat de Isralische regeringwoordvoerders gebruik van deze tragedie tot de bouw van de muur apartheidte rechtvaardigen? want de muur is belangrijk om over het geweld van dePalestijnen te verminderen. Bijna elke nieuws markeert het einde van deperiode als een van vijf maanden? Rustig en vredig? en?? geweld verdwijnen??.Gedurende de vijf maanden was het stil en rustig, ongeveer 400 Palestijnenwerden gedood, 71 van hen gedood. Tijdens meredanya kekesaran, meer dan73 Palestijnen gedood anak2. Een 13-jarige jongen werd gedood door een kogeldie doorboorde zijn hart, een kind 5 jaar oud Ik schoot in haar gezicht toen inliepen arm in arm met zijn zus die twee jaar oud was. Lichaam van MazenMajid, een 14-jarige, verscheurd door 18 kogels als hij en zijn familie vluchttebulldozer naar het huis niveau.

Geen van de gemelde incidenten in het Verenigd Koninkrijk als terrorisme. Demeeste zijn zelfs helemaal niet gemeld. En het is rustig en vredig periode,meredanya geweld. Dd 18 mei tank2 en Isralische helikopter vuurde een kogelin de groep van de demonstranten, doden 8 van hen. Deze wreedheden


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hebben demostrasi belang en is onderdeel van de geweldloze beweging van dePalestijnse bevolking, die vaak wordt gezien doet vreedzaam protest metgebed langs de apartheid muur. De opstanding van deze beweging Gandhiontsnapt uit het nieuws in de media.

Waarheid over Tsjetsjeni ook werd onderdrukt op een vergelijkbare manier.

Datering februari 4, 2000, Russische gevechtsvliegtuigen vielen het dorp Katyr Yurt in Tsjetsjeni. Ze dragen? Vacum bom? die mengeluarakan olie en stoommenyedut longen uit, en is verboden in de Conventies van Genve. De Russenbombardeerden een konvooi van de overlevenden die droeg een witte vlag. Zevermoordde 363 mannen, vrouwen en kinderen. Dit is een klein deel vantalloze terroristische daden begaan in Tsjetsjeni, de Russische staat, waarvande leider Vladimir Putin, memiiliki "volledige solidariteit" van Tony Blair.

? Slechts een paar van ons? toneelschrijver Arthur Miller schrijft? diegemakkelijk kan geloven dat de samenleving moet doen wat zinvol is. Hetverlies van gezond verstand en het land te straffen zo veel mensen onbewustgetolereerd. Dus dat het bewijs moet worden afgewezen.?

Het is tijd om te stoppen met ontkent dit feit.

Bron: http://www.antiwar.com/orig/pilger.php (17 september 2004)

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Paper no. 1654

28. 12. 2005


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INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO 6LTTE EMULATES IRAQI RESISTANCE-FIGHTERS

by B.Raman

In my earlier paper of November 26,2005, on the likely scenarios involving the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the face of the repudiation by President Mahinda Rajapakse of thecommitments made by the previous Governments to work for a political solution of the Sri LankanTamil problem within a federal set-up ( http://www.saag.org/papers17/paper1628.html ), I hadstated as follows:

Quote What are the likely ground scenarios involving the LTTE?SCENARIO NO.1: The LTTE pockets its pride and agrees to the new conditions (sought to beimposed by Mr. Rajaspakse). Percentage of likelihood of the scenario---25 or even less.SCENARIO No.2: The LTTE resumes its conventional war against the Sri Lankan army. Percentageof likelihood---50SCENARIO NO 3: The LTTE steps up its acts of terrorism directed against important politicaltargets. Sixty per cent.SCENARIO No.4: The LTTE steps up its covert war against important strategic and economictargets. Seventy per cent.The future does not bode well for Sri Lanka. Unquote

2. While continuing to proclaim its adherence to the cease-fire agreement with the Government of Sri Lanka, which will shortly be four years old, and expressing its willingness to hold talks for areview of the cease-fire agreement with the Government under the auspices of the Norwegianfacilitators anywhere in Europe, preferably in Oslo, the LTTE has at the same time stepped upguerilla attacks against the Sri Lankan Army and Navy in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.These guerilla actions have been of a classical nature focussed on combatants and not involvingsuicide terrorism, in which the LTTE specialises. They have involved tactics such as the use of claymore mines and hand-held weapons. Since the beginning of December, about 70 persons (about40 of them from the Army and the Navy) have been killed as a result of the guerilla actionsmounted by the LTTE. The Sri Lankan Armed Forces have not so far been able to find an answer tothese guerilla actions.

3. The LTTE continues to follow its past policy of denying any responsibility for these actions.Instead, in emulation of the PSYWAR tactics followed by the Iraqi resistance-fighters, it has been

projecting them as spontaneous acts of resistance by autonomous cells of Tamil resistance

unconnected to any central command and control, in the Tamil areas under the occupation of the SriLankan Armed Forces. The responsibility for some of these actions has been claimed in the name of an organisation calling itself "the Roaring Tamil Force" or "the Roaring People's Force". Theseactions have come in the wake of intensified "search and capture" operations mounted by the SriLankan Armed Forces after Mr. Rajpaksa assumed office. To pre-empt any attempt by the LTTE toresume its "war" against the Armed Forces because of his hardline, the Armed Forces had allegedlymounted strikes against suspected pro-LTTE Tamils living in the areas under the control of theGovernment.

4. The Iraqi resistance has been directed as much against the Iraqis collaborating with the USoccupation troops as against the US troops themselves. Similarly, the resistance movement in the

Tamil areas is being projected as against the Sinhalese occupation troops as well as against theTamils collaborating with them, such as the Eastern Province's dissident group led by "Col".Karuna. It has not yet been directed against the Tamil-speaking Muslims collaborating with the


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Government, but there have been isolated acts of violence directed against the Muslims.

5. The LTTE, which has got a capability for terrorist strikes in Colombo, has not so far stepped upits operations in Colombo, apparently because there could be difficulty in projecting them asoperations of autonomous Tamil resistance cells not under the LTTE's control. But, it is only aquestion of time before it resorts to spectacular terrorist strikes in the capital.

6. The rigid stand taken by the Government as well as the LTTE on the question of the venue of the proposed talks to review the ceasefire agreement has led to a deadlock. The Government, whichwas initially insisting that the talks should be held in Sri Lanka, is now prepared to accept their

being held anywhere in Asia, but it continues to reject the LTTE demand for their being held inEurope. The Government is apparently afraid that if high-profile talks were held in Europe, theLTTE could exploit them for once again softening its image in Europe. The LTTE had come in for considerable negative publicity in Europe after the ruthless assassination of Laxman Kadirgamar,the former Foreign Minister, in August last. The LTTE has been strongly suspected in theassassination, though it continues to deny responsibility for it. After the assassination, the EuropenUnion (EU) Governments have taken a decision not to receive any visiting LTTE delegation infuture.

7. The principal sponsors and co-chairs of the so-called donors' conference held in Tokyo in 2003---Japan, the US and the EU --- have taken a much stronger line against the LTTE for its recentviolations of the cease-fire agreement than in the past and conveyed their concerns in strong termsto the LTTE. It is doubtful whether this would have any impact on the LTTE unless and until they

pressurise Mr. Rajapakse to reiterate the Government's commitment to finding a solution to the SriLankan Tamil problem within a federal set-up.

8. Despite the sharp deterioration in the ground situation since Mr. Rajapakse assumed thePresidency, he still seems to be confident that he can ultimately enforce his hard-line against theLTTE. His apparent calculation is that since the assassination of Kadirgamar, the internationalcommunity has been disenchanted with the LTTE and, as such, his hardline is unlikely to beopposed by the international community.

9. While strongly condemning the intensification of guerilla actions by the LTTE, India and other members of the international community should equally strongly reiterate their support for theformula followed by Mrs. Chandrika Kumaratunga, former President, and Mr. RanilWickremasinghe, former Prime Minister, of seeking a solution within a federal set-up. There cannot

be a solution within the present unitary set-up. The longer Mr. Rajapakse continues on his hard-line,the greater will be the bloodshed.

10. Since Mr. Rajapakse took over as the President, the Sri Lankan intelligence agencies andsecurity forces also seem to have stepped up their covert actions directed against the LTTE---notonly through the Eastern Tamil dissidents headed by Karuna, but also through Sinhalese extremistelements which had formed part of the coalition which had supported Mr. Rajapakse during therecent elections. The needle of suspicion for the brutal murder of Joseph Pararajasingham, a pro-LTTE member of the Parliament, at Batticaloa in the Eastern Province on December 25,2005, whilehe was attending X'Mas services in a local church, points to these elements and not to the LTTE, asalleged by some official sources.

(The writer is former Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently,

Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: [email protected])Back to the top


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Copyright South Asia Analysis GroupAll rights reserved. Permission is given to refer this on-line document for use in research papers andarticles, provided the source and the author's name are acknowledged. Copies may not beduplicated for commercial purposes.

Paper no. 1962

22.09.2006

READING MUSHARRAF BETWEEN THE LINES-INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO.126By B.RamanA careful reading of the various statements made by Pakistan's President Gen.Pervez Musharraf during his current world tour, which has taken him to Brussels, Havana for the non-aligned summitand for his summit with the Indian Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh and to the US for the UNGeneral Assembly session and his summit with President George Bush indicates two careful

evolutions in his thinking.2. The first relates to the on-going US-led war against international terrorism and Pakistan's role init and the second to Pakistan's stand on jihadi terrorism in Indian territory.

3. A significant change in Pakistan's perception on the US-led war against international terrorism isdiscernible. When he agreed to assist the US in its military action in Afghanistan after the 9/11terrorist strikes in the US, he did not question the US perception that both Al Qaeda and the Talibanconstituted terrorist organisations and that, therefore, the war against terrorism had to be directedagainst both.

4. He has now started making a distinction between Al Qaeda and the Neo Taliban as it has re-emerged since 2004. While he continues to project Al Qaeda as a terrorist organisation which needsto be combated militarily in the Afghanistan-Pakistan belt, he has begun viewing the Neo Taliban as


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an Afghan resistance movement, which should not be viewed with the same glasses as Al Qaedaand which needs to be combated more politically than militarily.

5. He avoids giving the impression that he is trying for a reinstatement of the Neo Taliban in power in Afghanistan. Instead, he wants that the Hamid Karzai Government should seek a politicalaccommodation with the Neo Taliban, which would give it a place of honour in the new Afghan

political landscape. He does not address the question as to how the Neo Taliban's advocacy of anIslamic state based on a rule according to the Sharia can be made compatible with a modern, liberaldemocratic state, which is the objective of the Karzai Government and its international backers.

6. The projection of the Neo Taliban as a resistance organisation and not a terrorist organisationalso tends to rationalise his inaction against the Neo Taliban elements operating from Pakistaniterritory. He is trying to hint to the US that the obligations assumed by him in the US-led war against terrorism in October,2001, will hereafter apply to Al Qaeda only and not to the Neo Taliban.

7. His sensational claim in a US television interview that during a meeting with Lt.Gen. MahmoodAhmed, the then Chief of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), who was in Washington DC inSeptember,2001, Mr.Richard Armitage, the then US Deputy Secretary of State, had threatened to

bomb Pakistan back to the stone age if it did not co-operate with the US against Al Qaeda and theTaliban, is meant to convey a message to the Americans as well as his own people that theobligations assumed by him under duress before the US started its military strikes in Afghanistan onOctober 7,2001, no longer apply and needed a revision.

8. While he would continue to co-operate with the US against Al Qaeda as before, his co-operationwith the US in relation to the Neo Taliban would be more political than military in order to pave theway for an ultimate dialogue between the Neo Taliban and the Karzai Government.


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9.His sensational claim is also meant to convey a message to his own people---particularly to theIslamic political parties whose support he will need to retain power at next year's general electionsin Pakistan---- that his co-operation with the US against the Taliban in 2001 was under duress,which could not be helped then, but which he would change now. The fact that he has openlyadmitted that he acted under duress indicates his confidence in the stability of his position in

Pakistan and in its armed forces. He is confident of managing any adverse reaction in Pakistan as aresult of his admission.

10. It is unlikely that he would have made such an admission without prior consultation with hissenior military officers before embarking on his foreign tour. It was not an indvertent admission in

passing, but a calculated, pre-planned admission as a prelude to his meeting with Mr.Bush.

11. There have been reports of simmering unhappiness in Pakistan's Armed Forces ever sinceMr.Bush's visit to Islamabad in March last over three aspects of the US attitude to Pakistan. Thefirst is the continuing criticism in the US governmental as well as non-governmental circles over what is perceived in the US as Pakistan's less than sincere co-operation in the war against terrorism.The second is the US reluctance to extend to Pakistan the same kind of civilian nuclear co-operationdeal as the US has extended to India. The third is the US attempt to sell to Pakistan what is viewedin Pakistan's GHQ as castrated F-16s to prevent their lethal use against India.

12. These are viewed in the GHQ as a failure on the part of the US to fulfill the obligations tosupport Pakistan assumed by it in return for the obligations assumed by Pakistan. In Pakistan's view,

since the US has not fulfilled its part of the obligations in toto, there is no reason why Pakistanshould not have a re-look at its obligations. The General's talks in Washington DC and thesubsequent statements by him and Mr.Bush might give the impression that everything remains as


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before, but it is not so.

13. There has been an interesting evolution in the General's position relating to jihadi terrorism inIndian territory too. As I had pointed out in my articles in the past, Musharraf and the ISI make aclear distinction between what India calls cross-border terrorism in J&K which Pakistan views as afreedom struggle and jihadi terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K. Even in the past, long beforehis meeting with Dr.Manmohan Singh in Havana, Gen.Musharraf and his spokespersons had no

problems in condemning jihadi terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K and in characterising it asterrorism.

14. In fact, after the written commitment given by him to Mr.A.B.Vajpayee, the then PrimeMinister, at Islamabad in January,2004, to stop the use of all Pakistani-controlled territory for acts

of terrorism directed against India, there was a significant drop in acts of jihadi terrorism in Indianterritory outside J&K, which continued till July,2005. The position has been reversed since July,2005, and over 300 innocent civilians have been killed in seven acts of jihadi terrorism since then.

15. Musharraf is now prepared to revert to the pre-July,2005 jihadi lull and co-operate with India inthe investigation of any acts which have taken place since July,2005, in return for Indian co-operation in dealing with what the Pakistani authorities project as cross-border terrorism inBalochistan. The Pakistani authorities have been consistently projecting the movement of theBaloch nationalists as cross-border terrorism, with alleged Indian support and Afghan complicity.

16. He wants to project the admission of Dr.Manmohan Singh that Pakistan has also been a victim

of terrorism as applying to what has been going on in Balochistan and not to the usual Shia-Sunnisectarian terrorism and the activities of Al Qaeda and its jihadi associates from Pakistani territory.He feels he does not need India's co-operation against sectarian and Al Qaeda terrorism.He intends


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making India's co-operation in putting down the Baloch nationalist movement a quid pro quo for hisco-operation against jihadi terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K.

17. While talking of "unease among intelligence agencies" over the proposed joint anti-terrorismco-operation mechanism agreed to during his talks with Dr.Manmohan Singh at Havana, he isreported to have said at New York on September 21,2006:"There is also certain apprehension aboutIndia sharing intelligence on Balochistan." ("The Hindu" of September 22,2006.

18. What he apparently means is that there is misgiving in Pakistan's intelligence agencies whether India would share intelligence on Balochistan under this joint mechanism. As officials of the twocountries sit down to discuss the nuts and bolts of the joint mechanism, Indian co-operation in

putting down the nationalist movement in Balochistan is likely to assume importance. This is a

purely indigenous movement with no external involvement and no Indian Government, which has aclear understanding of its national interests and its genuine allies in Pakistan, should even toleratesuch an idea.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: [email protected] )

Back to the top


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12/19


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Paper no. 1962

22.09.2006

READING MUSHARRAF BETWEEN THE LINES-INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO.126By B.RamanA careful reading of the various statements made by Pakistan's President Gen.Pervez Musharraf

during his current world tour, which has taken him to Brussels, Havana for the non-aligned summitand for his summit with the Indian Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh and to the US for the UNGeneral Assembly session and his summit with President George Bush indicates two carefulevolutions in his thinking.


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2. The first relates to the on-going US-led war against international terrorism and Pakistan's role init and the second to Pakistan's stand on jihadi terrorism in Indian territory.

3. A significant change in Pakistan's perception on the US-led war against international terrorism isdiscernible. When he agreed to assist the US in its military action in Afghanistan after the 9/11terrorist strikes in the US, he did not question the US perception that both Al Qaeda and the Talibanconstituted terrorist organisations and that, therefore, the war against terrorism had to be directedagainst both.

4. He has now started making a distinction between Al Qaeda and the Neo Taliban as it has re-emerged since 2004. While he continues to project Al Qaeda as a terrorist organisation which needsto be combated militarily in the Afghanistan-Pakistan belt, he has begun viewing the Neo Taliban as

an Afghan resistance movement, which should not be viewed with the same glasses as Al Qaedaand which needs to be combated more politically than militarily.


15/19

5. He avoids giving the impression that he is trying for a reinstatement of the Neo Taliban in power in Afghanistan. Instead, he wants that the Hamid Karzai Government should seek a politicalaccommodation with the Neo Taliban, which would give it a place of honour in the new Afghan

political landscape. He does not address the question as to how the Neo Taliban's advocacy of anIslamic state based on a rule according to the Sharia can be made compatible with a modern, liberaldemocratic state, which is the objective of the Karzai Government and its international backers.

6. The projection of the Neo Taliban as a resistance organisation and not a terrorist organisationalso tends to rationalise his inaction against the Neo Taliban elements operating from Pakistaniterritory. He is trying to hint to the US that the obligations assumed by him in the US-led war against terrorism in October,2001, will hereafter apply to Al Qaeda only and not to the Neo Taliban.

7. His sensational claim in a US television interview that during a meeting with Lt.Gen. MahmoodAhmed, the then Chief of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), who was in Washington DC inSeptember,2001, Mr.Richard Armitage, the then US Deputy Secretary of State, had threatened to

bomb Pakistan back to the stone age if it did not co-operate with the US against Al Qaeda and theTaliban, is meant to convey a message to the Americans as well as his own people that theobligations assumed by him under duress before the US started its military strikes in Afghanistan onOctober 7,2001, no longer apply and needed a revision.

8. While he would continue to co-operate with the US against Al Qaeda as before, his co-operationwith the US in relation to the Neo Taliban would be more political than military in order to pave theway for an ultimate dialogue between the Neo Taliban and the Karzai Government.


16/19

9.His sensational claim is also meant to convey a message to his own people---particularly to theIslamic political parties whose support he will need to retain power at next year's general electionsin Pakistan---- that his co-operation with the US against the Taliban in 2001 was under duress,which could not be helped then, but which he would change now. The fact that he has openlyadmitted that he acted under duress indicates his confidence in the stability of his position inPakistan and in its armed forces. He is confident of managing any adverse reaction in Pakistan as aresult of his admission.

10. It is unlikely that he would have made such an admission without prior consultation with hissenior military officers before embarking on his foreign tour. It was not an indvertent admission in

passing, but a calculated, pre-planned admission as a prelude to his meeting with Mr.Bush.

11. There have been reports of simmering unhappiness in Pakistan's Armed Forces ever sinceMr.Bush's visit to Islamabad in March last over three aspects of the US attitude to Pakistan. Thefirst is the continuing criticism in the US governmental as well as non-governmental circles over what is perceived in the US as Pakistan's less than sincere co-operation in the war against terrorism.The second is the US reluctance to extend to Pakistan the same kind of civilian nuclear co-operationdeal as the US has extended to India. The third is the US attempt to sell to Pakistan what is viewedin Pakistan's GHQ as castrated F-16s to prevent their lethal use against India.

12. These are viewed in the GHQ as a failure on the part of the US to fulfill the obligations tosupport Pakistan assumed by it in return for the obligations assumed by Pakistan. In Pakistan's view,since the US has not fulfilled its part of the obligations in toto, there is no reason why Pakistan

should not have a re-look at its obligations. The General's talks in Washington DC and thesubsequent statements by him and Mr.Bush might give the impression that everything remains as

before, but it is not so.


17/19

13. There has been an interesting evolution in the General's position relating to jihadi terrorism inIndian territory too. As I had pointed out in my articles in the past, Musharraf and the ISI make aclear distinction between what India calls cross-border terrorism in J&K which Pakistan views as afreedom struggle and jihadi terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K. Even in the past, long beforehis meeting with Dr.Manmohan Singh in Havana, Gen.Musharraf and his spokespersons had no

problems in condemning jihadi terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K and in characterising it asterrorism.

14. In fact, after the written commitment given by him to Mr.A.B.Vajpayee, the then PrimeMinister, at Islamabad in January,2004, to stop the use of all Pakistani-controlled territory for actsof terrorism directed against India, there was a significant drop in acts of jihadi terrorism in Indianterritory outside J&K, which continued till July,2005. The position has been reversed since July,2005, and over 300 innocent civilians have been killed in seven acts of jihadi terrorism since then.

15. Musharraf is now prepared to revert to the pre-July,2005 jihadi lull and co-operate with India inthe investigation of any acts which have taken place since July,2005, in return for Indian co-operation in dealing with what the Pakistani authorities project as cross-border terrorism inBalochistan. The Pakistani authorities have been consistently projecting the movement of theBaloch nationalists as cross-border terrorism, with alleged Indian support and Afghan complicity.

16. He wants to project the admission of Dr.Manmohan Singh that Pakistan has also been a victimof terrorism as applying to what has been going on in Balochistan and not to the usual Shia-Sunnisectarian terrorism and the activities of Al Qaeda and its jihadi associates from Pakistani territory.He feels he does not need India's co-operation against sectarian and Al Qaeda terrorism.He intendsmaking India's co-operation in putting down the Baloch nationalist movement a quid pro quo for hisco-operation against jihadi terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K.

17. While talking of "unease among intelligence agencies" over the proposed joint anti-terrorismco-operation mechanism agreed to during his talks with Dr.Manmohan Singh at Havana, he isreported to have said at New York on September 21,2006:"There is also certain apprehension aboutIndia sharing intelligence on Balochistan." ("The Hindu" of September 22,2006.

18. What he apparently means is that there is misgiving in Pakistan's intelligence agencies whether India would share intelligence on Balochistan under this joint mechanism. As officials of the twocountries sit down to discuss the nuts and bolts of the joint mechanism, Indian co-operation in

putting down the nationalist movement in Balochistan is likely to assume importance. This is a purely indigenous movement with no external involvement and no Indian Government, which has a

clear understanding of its national interests and its genuine allies in Pakistan, should even toleratesuch an idea.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: [email protected] )

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Al Gepasseerd Terroristische Terrorist En Bekende Kanalen Geopend

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