Annuario di storia della metafisicaAnnuaire dhistoire de la mtaphysique

Jahrbuch fr die Geschichte der Metaphysik Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics

Quaestio 15/2015

2015, Brepols Publishers n.v., Turnhout, Belgium 2015, Pagina soc. coop., Bari, Italy

Questo volume stampato con contributi parziali del Consiglio di Amministrazione dellUniversit degli Studi di Bari Aldo Moro e del Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici dellUniversit del Salento.

La pubblicazione rientra nel progetto scientifico Universality and its Limits: Strategies of Inclusion and Exclusion in the History of Philosophy and Contemporary Philosophical Debates (PRIN 2012).

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior permission of the publisher.

ISBN 978-2-503-56596-5

ISSN 1379-2547

D/2015/0095/225

edited by /a cura di Pasquale Porro & Loris Sturlese

The Pleasure of Knowledge

Il piacere della conoscenza

Quaestio 15/2015

QDirezioneCostantino Esposito (Universit degli Studi di Bari Aldo Moro) Pasquale Porro (Universit degli Studi di Bari Aldo Moro / Universit Paris-Sorbonne)Comitato Scientifico / Comit Scientifique / Wissenschaftlicher Beirat / Advisory BoardJean-Robert Armogathe (cole Pratique des Hautes tudes - Paris) Werner Beierwaltes (Mnchen) Giulia Belgioioso (Universit del Salento - Lecce) Enrico Berti (Padova) Olivier Boulnois (cole Pratique des Hautes tudes - Paris) Mario Caimi (Buenos Aires) Vincent Carraud (Paris-Sorbonne) Mrio Santiago de Carvalho (Coimbra) Jean-Franois Courtine (Paris-Sorbonne) Alain de Libera (Collge de France, Paris) Giulio dOnofrio (Salerno) Kent Emery, Jr. (Notre Dame) Jorge Gracia (State University of New York - Buffalo) Miguel Angel Granada (Barcelona) Dimitri Gutas (Yale) Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Albert-Ludwigs-Universitt Freiburg i.Br.) Norbert Hinske (Trier) Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen (Albert-Ludwigs-Universitt Freiburg i.Br. / Universitt Basel) Ruedi Imbach (Fribourg) Alexei N. Krouglov (Russian State University for the Humanities - Moscow) Jean-Luc Marion (Divinity School, University of Chicago) Jean-Marc Narbonne (Laval) Dominik Perler (Humboldt-Universitt - Berlin / Princeton) Gregorio Piaia (Padova) Stefano Poggi (Firenze) Paolo Ponzio (Bari Aldo Moro) Riccardo Pozzo (CNR Roma) Jacob Schmutz (Universit Paris-Sorbonne) William Shea (Padova) Andreas Speer (Kln) Carlos Steel (Leuven) Giusi Strummiello (Bari Aldo Moro) Loris Sturlese (Universit del Salento - Lecce)

RedazioneMarienza Benedetto Annalisa Cappiello A. Federica DErcole Marco Lamanna Francesco Marrone Evelina Miteva Michele Trizio

Quaestio is a peer-reviewed journal, open to unsolicited contributions. The articles sent to the Editors are normally assessed by a member of the Advisory Board and another specialist chosen by the Board, or by two external specialists. The Editors will maintain records of the reviewers, though their identity will not be made public.

Contributi e volumi per recensione vanno inviati alla Direzione di Quaestio / Please send contri-butions and review-copies to:

Costantino Esposito Pasquale PorroDipartimento di Studi Umanistici (DISUM) Universit degli Studi di Bari Aldo MoroPalazzo Ateneo - Piazza Umberto I, I-70121 - Bari (Italia)e-mail: costantino.esposito@uniba.it pasquale.porro@uniba.it

Abbonamenti / Abonnements / SubscriptionsBrepols Publishers, Begijnhof 67 - B-2300 Turnhout (Belgium), tel. +32 14 44 80 20 - fax +32 14 42 89 19e-mail: info.publishers@brepols.com

Contents / Indice

Pasquale Porro / loris sturleseForeword / Premessa xi

Plenary sessionsthomas ricklin Filosofia non altro che amistanza a sapienza 3

nadja GermannLogic as the Path to Happiness: Al-Fa-ra-b- and the Divisions of the Sciences 15

david luscombeOtto of Freising and Historical Knowledge 31

irene caiazzoNature et dcouverte de la nature au XIIe sicle : nouvelles perspectives 47

luisa valente Happiness, Contemplative Life, and the tria genera hominum in Twelfth-Century Philosophy: Peter Abelard and John of Salisbury 73

manuel lzaro PulidoSapere gaude! La fuente bonaventuriana de la literatura mstica del saber 99

catherine kniG-PralonG Omnes homines natura scire desiderant. Anthropologie philosophique et distinction sociale 121

roberto hofmeister Pich Infinite Creator 139

alessandra beccarisi Ex Germano in rebus divinis. Spekulative und deutsche Mystik im Kontext 169

vi Contents / Indice

The Byzantine and Georgian World

serGei mariev Theoretical eudaimonia in Michael of Ephesus 185

stamatios GeroGiorGakisTaking Pleasure in Knowing according to the Greek Commentaries of the Nicomachean Ethics after the 11th Century 193

tenGiz iremadzeDie erkennende Seele des Menschen und ihre Funktion im Porklos-Kommentar von Joane Petrizi 201

GeorGe arabatzis Daniel Furlanus on Michael of Ephesus and the Pleasure of Biological Knowledge 211

The Arabic-Islamic World

mokdad arfa mensiaLa connaissance vraie comme cause possible de souffrance perptuelle chez al-Fa-ra-b- 223

mikls marth Delight of Knowledge in al-Ma-ward-s View 235

francisco oreillyLa metafsica como perfeccin del deseo humano. Comentario a Philosophia Prima (IX, 7) del Avicenna Latinus 245

yassine amariAnalysis of Pleasure in Ibn S-na- 255

olGa lizziniAvicenna: the Pleasure of Knowledge and the Quietude of the Soul 265

terence j. kleven Ibn Ba-ggas Commentaries on al-Fa-ra-b-s Letter and The Five Aphorisms 275

francesca forteAverroess Aesthetics. The Pleasure of Philosophy and the Pleasure of Poetry 287

The Jewish World

edward c. halPerMaimonides on the Scope of Divine and Human Self-Knowledge 299

Contents / Indice vii

yehuda halPerAbraham Bibago on Intellectual Conjunction and Human Happiness. Faith and Metaphysics according to a 15th Century Jewish Averroist 309

The Latin-Christian World from Boethius to the 12th Century

taki sutoFrom Analysis of Words to Metaphysical Appreciation of the World: the Platonism of Boethius 321

renato de filiPPisDie Freude (an) der Rhetorik in Anselm von Besates Rhetorimachia 333

thomas hankeLust an der rectitudo. Erkenntnis, praktische Vernunft und Emotionen bei Anselm von Canterbury 343

chunG-mi hwanGboZur Teilhabe der Empfindung der Seele an der Gotteserkenntnis in Anselms Monologion und Proslogion 353

Guy hamelinVolont et habitus chez Pierre Ablard: un double hritage 363

Giacinta sPinosaPlaisir de la connaissance comme motion intellectuelle chez Hugues de Saint-Victor 373

hideki nakamuraSpiritualium gaudiorum plenitudo in der Erkenntnislehre Richards von St. Viktor 383

GeorGina rabassIn caelesti gaudio. Hildegard of Bingens Auditory Contemplation of the Universe 393

The Latin-Christian World in the 13th Century

briGitte saoumaLignorance des cathares daprs Izarn 405

aafke m.i. van oPPenraayMichael Scots Translation of Aristotles Books on Animals and the Pleasures of Knowledge 413

katrin fischerAvicennas ex-uno-Principle in William of Auvergnes De trinitate 423

viii Contents / Indice

isabelle moulin Les deux sources du bonheur humain : contemplation intellective et vision de Dieu. Avicenne, Albert le Grand 433

eileen c. sweeneyRoger Bacon and Albert the Great on Aristotles Notion of Science 447

henryk anzulewiczAlbertus Magnus ber die felicitas contemplativa als die Erfllung eines natrlichen Strebens nach Wissen 457

maria burGer Gotteserkenntnis im Aufstieg bei Albertus Magnus 467

Graziano PerilloLa contemplazione, principale caratteristica dellEvangelista Giovanni secondo Alberto Magno 477

andrea colli From sapientia honorabilissima to nobilitas animae. A Note on the Concept of Nobility in Ulrich of Strasbourgs De summo bono 487

jrn mllerMemory as an Internal Sense: Avicenna and the Reception of His Psychology by Thomas Aquinas 497

Gerald crestaBonaventure: Intellectual Contemplation, Sapiential Contemplation and beatitudo 507

toms machulaPer intellectum ad beatitudinem. Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure on the Role of Prudence in Human Life 517

alessandro GhisalbertiIl compimento della felicit in Tommaso dAquino 531

daniel de haanDelectatio, gaudium, fruitio. Three Kinds of Pleasure for Three Kinds of Knowledge in Thomas Aquinas 543

Pascale bermonPlaisir et coordination sensorielle des animaux chez Aristote et Thomas dAquin 553

oleG e. dushin Morality as Knowledge in Ethical Theory of Thomas Aquinas 563

carlos arthur ribeiro do nascimentoRenversant la hirarchie 571

andrey ivanovThomas Aquinas in Reference to the Beauty. The Two Definitions 581

Contents / Indice ix

ercole erculeiThe Souls Misery in the Fire according to Thomas Aquinas and Siger of Brabant 597

silvia neGriVeritatem humiliter investigare. Sul ruolo dellumilt in Enrico di Gand 607

Giulia sossiIl De laudibus divinae sapientiae di Egidio Romano e la possibilit per luomo di conoscere Dio 619

delPhine carron-faivreLa Rpublique romaine comme modle de la felicitas civilis chez Ptolme de Lucques (v. 1240-1327) 629

hans kramlCognitio substantiarum separatarum: Genitivus subiectivus oder Genitivus obiectivus? 639

The Latin-Christian World in the 14th Century

Maria manuela brito-martinsLa batitude et le dsir chez Duns Scot: beatitudo est frui summo bono 649

thomas marschlerFrui essentia non fruendo persona. Die Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus ber die Trennbarkeit von Wesenheit und Personen in der Gottesschau und ihre Kritik bei Wilhelm von Ockham 665

francesco fiorentinoThe Desire for Knowledge in Early Scotist Debate: William of Alnwick and John of Reading 675

john t. slotemakerWalter Chatton and Adam Wodeham on Divine Simplicity and Trinitarian Relations 689

vesa hirvonenWilliam Ockham on the Psychology of Christ 699

rodriGo GuerizoliPleasure and Knowledge in John Buridans Solution to the Debate over the Extension of the Aristotelian Supreme Good 711

amos corbiniFruitio et beatitudo entre volont et intellect selon Pierre de Ceffons 721

cal ledshamPleasure in Philosophy and the Pretext of Theology 729

The Latin-Christian World from the 15th Century to Early Modern Scholasticism

ueli zahndUtilitas als anti-spekulatives Motiv. Zur Rezeption eines Gersonschen Anliegens im ausgehenden Mittelalter 741

alessandra sacconDie natrliche Gotteserkenntnis in den Schriften der Klner Albertisten des 15. Jahrhunderts 751

mario meliadDe religiosa solitudine. Eimerico di Campo e una controversia tardo-medievale sulla clausura 761

isabelle mandrellaGaudium intellectuale: Die intellektuelle Freude bei Nicolaus Cusanus 773

ma socorro fernndez-GarcaEl deseo intelectual como constitutivo formal de la mente en Nicols de Cusa 783

francesco marroneLe dsir de connatre et la dmonstration de la primaut de la philosophie premire chez Dominique de Flandre 795

christian trottmannScience, sagesse et jouissance, dAugustin Charles de Bovelles 805

maria da conceio camPsThe Pleasures of seeing according to Manuel de Gois Coimbra Jesuit Commentary on De Anima (1598) 817

lidia lanzaLa beatitudo nei commenti cinquecentini di Salamanca alla Summa theologiae (Ia-IIae, q. 3, artt. 1-2) 827

nGel Poncela-GonzlezLa teora islmica del conocimiento proftico y la concepcin suareciana del intelecto 837

alfredo culleton La economa y el precio justo en la segunda escolstica 847

Index of Names / Indice dei nomi 857

Index of Manuscripts / Indice dei manoscritti 874

x Contents / Indice

Quaestio, 15 (2015), xi-xii 10.1484/j.quaestio.5.108585

Foreword / Premessa

This volume of Quaestio includes a selection of the contributions presented at the 13th International Congress of the Socit Internationale pour ltude de la Philosophie Mdivale (SIEPM), held in Freising from August 20 to August 25, 2012. It would be inappropriate, in this case, to speak of Proceedings: as a matter of fact, only 72 of the 261 papers originally listed in the program of the Congress are published here. This discrepancy is due to the fact that some of the participants preferred to publish their papers elsewhere, whereas some contributions were not accepted for publication after the peer-review process a process which has been in this case particularly complex, given the number of contributions, and has involved all the members of the SIEPM Bureau as well as external referees.

For the very same reasons, the structure of the volume does not correspond to that of the Congress. The different sessions of the Congress were organised on the basis of a thematic division; in this volume, all the contributions accepted for the publication have been distributed in eight different sessions: (i) Plenary sessions (five contributions originally listed in the program of the Congress are not published in this volume); (ii) The Byzantine and Georgian World; (iii) The Arabic-Islamic World; (iv) The Jewish World; (v) The Latin-Christian World from Boethius to the 12th Century; (vi) The Latin-Christian World in the 13th Century; (vii) The Latin-Christian World in the 14th Century; (viii) The Latin-ChristianWorld from the 15th Century to Early Modern Scholasticism.

This division is not only more fitting to the structure of an academic journal and to a redefinition of the original topic, but also allows the reader to grasp the distribution and evolution of different trends and interests in the current state of studies in medieval philosophy, thus preserving the documentary and histo-riographical function of a world Congress1. Even taking into consideration the

1 Cf. f. schmiGa / P. Porro, Transformations in the Study of Medieval Philosophy Documented by the Proceedings of the SIEPM Congresses: A Quantitative Analysis, in Bulletin de Philosophie Mdivale, 55 (2013), pp. 219-256.

xii Foreword / Premessa

statistical distortion caused by the selection of contributions, it is for example interesting to register the increasing attention paid to Arabic-Islamic philosophy and to Late Scholasticism, in contrast to the emphasis on the philosophy and theology of the Latin 13th century, which was predominant a few decades ago.

As editors of this volume, we would like to express our gratitude to the chief co-editor of Quaestio, Costantino Esposito, and the two chief organisers of the 13th Congress of the SIEPM, namely Marc-Aeilko Aris and Thomas Ricklin: it was especially Thomas Ricklin who elaborated the topic and the structure of the Congress. The first article of this volume basically reproduces Ricklins inaugu-ral speech at the Congress, and his illustration of the theme. We would also like to thank the General Secretary, Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, and all the members of the Bureau of the SIEPM. Many young colleagues have made possible the publi-cation of this volume: our warmest thanks go in particular to Marienza Benedet-to, Annalisa Cappiello, Angela Federica DErcole, Marco Lamanna, Francesco Marrone, Evelina Miteva, and Michele Trizio, who collaborated in the editing of the contributions and prepared the final indices. Moreover, Marienza Benedetto took care of the final proof-reading of the entire volume.

Finally we are grateful to the Board of Directors of the Aldo Moro University of Bari, which also in this case gave its support to the project of Quaestio2.

Bari-Lecce, August 2015

Pasquale Porro and Loris Sturlese

2 The publication of this volume of Quaestio falls within the project Universality and its Limits: Strategies of Inclusion and Exclusion in the History of Philosophy and Contemporary Philosophical De-bates (PRIN 2012).

Quaestio, 15 (2015), 265-273 10.1484/j.quaestio.5.110306

e dei saper che tutti hanno diletto / quanto la sua veduta si profonda / nel vero in che si queta ogne in-telletto. / Quinci si pu veder come si fonda / lesser beato ne latto che vede, / non in quel chama, che poscia seconda; / e del vedere misura mercede, / che grazia partorisce e buona voglia: / cos di grado in grado si procede (Par., XXVIII 106-114).

Important elements for understanding how Avicenna defines the pleasure of knowledge are to be found in the seventh chapter of the eighth book of his Meta- physics: in defining the Necessary First Principle as the best object of enjoy-ment (or pleasure or delight: ladda), Avicenna briefly explains what intellectual pleasure is. The enjoyment of a faculty consists in the realization of its own perfection: for the rational soul this is the becoming of an intellectual world in actuality1. As Avicenna himself ensures2, the meaning of this locution becomes clear further on in the text. In fact, the principal discussion of intellectual pleas-ure is to be found in the seventh chapter of the ninth book, the subject-matter of which is not knowledge and its attendant pleasure, but the destiny that awaits the human soul after its separation from the body. I cannot at present, for rea-sons of space, consider the whole of Avicennas discussion, which is, however, very interesting indeed. I will start my analysis from the implicit conclusion of Avicennas discussion: true intellectual pleasure is not to be had in this life but belongs to the heavenly dimension. True intellectual pleasure is in fact so perfect and intense (and also eternal) that we cannot experience it during our sublunary lives. We can be convinced of its reality, but we cannot feel it. We are like the deaf who are not able to imagine the delights of music but can be convinced of them: we imagine or, more precisely, posit the existence of delights of the intellect from the little tastes we experience in our lives3. Intellectual pleasure

1 ibn sn, Ila-h., VIII, 7, ed. Mousa / Dunya / Zayed, pp. 369, 4-10; 369, 17 - 370, 7.2 ibn sn, Ila-h., VIII, 7, ed. Mousa / Dunya / Zayed, p. 370, 3-4.3 ibn sn, Ila-h., IX, 7, ed. Mousa / Dunya / Zayed, pp. 424, 13 - 425, 2; avicenna, The Metaphysics of

The Healing, ed. Marmura, p. 349. A slightly different interpretation is to be found in avicenna, Le cose

Olga Lizzini

Avicenna: the Pleasure of Knowledge and the Quietude of the Soul

266 Yehuda Halper

is therefore not an available condition for the human soul, but a prospect (as, indeed, the separation of the human soul from its body is a prospect and not a condition). Moreover, since the desire for intellectual enjoyment depends on the perception that the soul has of that enjoyment, Avicenna also implicitly establishes a certain elitism: the desire to know is not a natural attribute of the human soul, but depends on the perception of the pleasure of knowledge that the soul manages to attain during its earthly life. In fact not all men by nature desire to know. One could summarize Avicennas position about knowledge by paraphrasing in negative terms the famous incipit of Aristotles Metaphysics4: knowledge is a perfection for the human soul and more precisely its own proper perfection but it is a possibility not everyone has and is not ones own by nature. In short, knowledge as a perfection appertains to those who desire5 and are ready to become perfect, i.e. philosophers6. The key element of intellectual happiness for people who want it and decide to pursue it, (in contradistinction to the misery experienced by those who cannot pursue the perfection of the soul), is in fact the awareness the soul attains of its ability to perceive the quiddity of the whole (ma-hiyyat al-kull), acquiring according to the method of logic a knowledge of what is unknown from what is known and achieving its perfection in act7. This awareness we should still bear in mind belongs to the soul not because of its own first nature (bi-l-t.ib al-awwal), but by virtue of some specific causes8.

In fact, the awareness of its own perfection dawns on the soul only when it has received a demonstration that there are things that it acquires by virtue of middle terms. This awareness or perception as Avicenna declares in Meta-

divine, ed. Bertolacci, p. 777. Avicennas discourse continuously refers to the shortcomings and disorders of the sublunary life (see e.g. ibn sn, Ila-h., IX, 7, ed. Mousa / Dunya / Zayed, pp. 424, 13 - 425, 7); at the same time, sublunary life allows us to imagine celestial pleasure or posit its existence by analogy; like the deaf, as mentioned above, who have never heard music (especially if we are immersed in sublunary pleasures); nevertheless, something in our sublunary life (for example finding the solution to a difficult theoretical problem) allows us to imagine how perfect intellectual pleasure might be (even ordinary souls can have this intuition; ibn sn, Ila-h., IX, 7, ed. Mousa / Dunya / Zayed, pp. 426, 13 - 427, 11). This raises the question of the definition of pleasure itself as an analogical concept: like life, pleasure is a concept related to the physical realm which must explain a purely intellectual context.

4 It is difficult to prove the existence of a translation of all of Metaphysics Book A, as opposed to the circulation of some doxographical or biographical text; see bertolacci 2005, pp. 257-269 and 268-269 in particular.

5 Supreme intellectual pleasure is not desired because one has a full awareness and experience of it (after all, if one knew it completely if one already possessed it one could no longer be in the position of desiring it and literally of being a philosopher; cf. hadot 2004, pp. 39-51.

6 Cf. ibn sn, Ila-h., IX, 6, ed. Mousa / Dunya / Zayed, p. 417, 12-13: being ignorant of philosophy (or geometry) indicates the lack of a secondary perfection, something which is unrelated to nature. Does this provide a further reason to prefer the reading la- s.ala-h.a to al-is.la-h. ? (Cf. avicenna, Metafisica, ed. Lizzini, n. 276, p. 1251; avicenna, Le cose divine, ed. Bertolacci, p. 127 e p. 764); avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing, ed. Marmura, p. 341 does not suggest that there is any problem here.

7 ibn sn, Ila-h., IX, 7, ed. Mousa / Dunya / Zayed, p. 428, 10-11.8 ibn sn, Ila-h., IX, 7, ed. Mousa / Dunya / Zayed, p. 428, 12-13.

Avicenna: the Pleasure of Knowledge and the Quietude of the Soul 267

physics IX, which is the textual basis of my analysis here9 belongs to the soul only because the soul has a certain vision (ray) that gives rise to the desire (awq, taawwuq) to know. But what does the term vision mean? It means we might say almost the same thing as conceptual representation (tas.awwur), and the desire (tasawwuq) to know is the desire to acquire another conceptual representation, which is not primary (awwal-) and is therefore not part of the natural background of the human psyche, but is acquired (muktasab):

The desire for their perfection [... comes to human beings] when it is demonstrated to them that it is a function of the soul to apprehend the quiddity of the whole by acquiring knowledge of the unknown from what is known and to become perfect in act. For this is not in it [as] a first nature, nor [is it] in the rest of the faculties. Rather, the awareness of most of the faculties of their perfections arises after [the occurrences of certain] causes. As regards the purely simple souls and faculties, they are as though they were prime matter posited as a subject that had not acquired this desire at all. [This is] because this desire comes into existence as [a new] event and [becomes] imprinted in the substance of the soul only if it is demonstrated to the psychological faculty that there are things here the knowledge of which is acquired through middle terms, as you have learned. Before this, however, it does not come about, because this desire is consequent on a vision (since every desire is conse-quent on a vision), and this vision does not belong to the soul as a primary vision but as an acquired vision10.

Now as one naturally feels prompted to ask what is this vision i.e. this representation, or, rather, how many representations does it include?11 Avicenna admits to not being able to give more than a vague answer to this question. At the same time, he lists the conceptual representations that are absolutely necessary for developing the souls desire to attain perfection and hence complete intel-lectual pleasure: the existence of the separate principles should be the subject of a representation to which one must give an assent dictated by demonstration; further subjects of conceptual representation are perforce the final causes of things that dwell in universal movement and not those dwelling in particular movement (which, in fact, are infinite and indeterminable) the arrangement of the whole and the relationship of the parts of the whole to one another, and the order in which each so to speak appears, starting from the First Principle,

9 Relevant passages for a further investigation can be found in ibn sn, Ila-h., VIII, 7 and for exemple in K. al-Naga-t, K. al-mabda- wa-l-maa-d, R. al-ad. h. awiyya, K. al-Ia-ra-t wa-l-tanb-ha-t.

10 ibn sn, Ila-h., IX, 7, ed. Mousa / Dunya / Zayed, p. 428, 14-18; avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing, ed. Marmura, pp. 352-353 (slightly modified). Avicenna is explaining why misery in the afterlife affects only those souls who were aware of the truth but did not follow it. In my reading, ray (which can also translate the Greek ) corresponds here to the more technical tas.awwur; the same is the case in I, I, p. 4, 2; on ray as a technical term in jurisprudence, see wakin / zysow 2004, pp. 687-690.

11 ibn sn, Ila-h., IX, 7, ed. Mousa / Dunya / Zayed, p. 429, 4-6.

268 Olga Lizzini

down to the lowest of existing things, each in its proper place. Moreover, the human soul must have a representation of the ways of providence and of the existence and unity which are ascribed to the Essence which is anterior to the whole; thus the soul comes to understand how the essence of the First Principle has knowledge, so that It does not undergo any multiplication or any change, in any respect; the soul will also understand how the relationship that existents establish with the Principle finds its own rank12.

This, then, is the extent of the knowledge one must acquire if one is to at-tain the perfection and the pleasure of the soul. That is to say, this is what is required in order to, as Avicenna says, become an intellectual world. In his conclusion, Avicenna emphasizes that the souls who acquire it are destined to be united with their essential perfection, to immerse themselves in real pleas-ure, and to rid themselves entirely of their focus on what will by then be behind them: both the sublunary realm to which they once belonged and their own bodies13.

Various observations may be made. First, one cannot help but notice that the limit of knowledge i.e. that which is known and which establishes the boundary between what does not and what on the contrary does allow the soul to have access to supreme pleasure corresponds exactly to the knowledge that is expressed and contained by Avicennas system. The lines in which Avicenna explains what the soul should know might be considered a summary of the es-sential elements of his metaphysics: the First Principle, the separate substances, the final ultimate causes of the universal motions, and then the ordered concat-enation of the whole and the direct knowledge of this arrangement, which must be ascribed to the First Principle, independently of the multiplicity of reality. Nevertheless, if these elements basically express the contents of Avicennas metaphysics, it is because they are demonstrated by logic.

And this element leads us to a second observation. The mechanism that explains the origin of the desire for knowledge and the pursuit of pleasure that is linked to it which means the mechanism that regulates the continuous suc-cession of desire and satisfaction of desire in knowing is described by Avi-cenna in terms of logic. In fact, Avicenna here explicitly refers to conceptual representation or conceptualization (tas.awwur) and assent (tas.d-q)14. The former corresponds to mere conception, the act of the soul by which we represent and signify things in our minds (or intellects or estimative faculties). Assent, on the

12 For this crucial passage see ibn sn, Ila-h., IX, 7, ed. Mousa / Dunya / Zayed, p. 429, 6-13. This relationship explains the divine attributes; see ibn sn, Ila-h., VIII, 7. On human and divine self-intel-lection, see adamson 2011.

13 ibn sn, Ila-h., IX, 7, ed. Mousa / Dunya / Zayed, p. 429, 13-15.14 ibn sn, Ila-h., IX, 7, ed. Mousa / Dunya / Zayed, p. 429, 4: tas.awwur al-maqu-la-t.

Avicenna: the Pleasure of Knowledge and the Quietude of the Soul 269

contrary, actually impinges on reality: indeed, assent is either given or denied in a judgment, precisely because of the connection which links our conceptual representation to reality. Thus assent is a sort of verification (which is, in fact, one of the translations of tas.d-q) of the representations or concepts that it itself entails15. Now, what seems particularly significant here is the connection and then the necessary concatenation Avicenna establishes between conceptualiza-tion and assent and therefore between a conceptualization and the desire for a new conceptualization. Logic proceeds from the known to the unknown syllogis-tically, and not only does this require a starting point (and therefore the premier position of the first principles of knowledge), but it also establishes, on the one hand, the necessity of a continuous concatenation between what is known and what is unknown (every bit of knowledge implies a question), and, on the other, the necessity of a final aim (and end)16. Every constituent element of knowledge implies the lack of another element and then the desire (awq) for it. As Avicen-na declares in his discussion of Menos paradox, undertaking research means that there is something one already knows (a rough conceptual representation exists or is realized in the soul) and means, at the same time, that there is something one does not know (so that one cannot achieve assent)17. In fact, what one seeks to know is the truth of a predicate that is related to a conceptualization and therefore to the validity of an assent. In this sense, any conceptualization implies the search for assent: this is what Avicenna means by saying that every vision or representation (ray) implies a desire18.

Representation and assent form knowledge, in fact, in a complementary man-ner. The former is what allows one to build a vision of things, a theory (and this could explain the use in this context of the term ray for what is usually called tas.awwur), the latter is what makes it possible to be convinced of this vision or believe in it. The kind of knowledge that is related to assent is obtained through syllogism (qiya-s) and, from a linguistic point of view, corresponds not only to the meaning of the term, but also to its outside referent and hence to the proposition. Assent is actually the act by which the soul recognizes the subject predicate composition which is true or which corresponds to reality. It concerns the con-ceptual content in its correspondence to reality, it refers to the composition of a

15 Avicenna makes the distinction by developing a traditional theme; a critical examination of it and of the related literature is to be found in lameer 2006, pp. 3-35.

16 The principles of knowledge are the starting point of knowledge; in so far as they imply the non-in-finity of knowledge they can be regarded as like the Prime Mover; however, this comparison could be applied, perhaps more appropriately, to the ultimate knowledge of the afterlife which is the final end and aim of human knowledge.

17 marmura 2009, pp. 47-62.18 ibn sn, Ila-h., IX, 7, ed. Mousa / Dunya / Zayed, p. 428, 16: kullu awqin yatbau rayan: literally:

every desire follows a representation.

270 Olga Lizzini

subject and a predicate and to the truth value that it expresses: thus, in a sense, it implies or even encompasses the concept, calming the soul by satisfying the desire that led to the quest; in another sense, it goes beyond the concept, opening the way to a new question and the desire to know more.

Knowledge is a chain, just as reality is. Indeed, acquiring knowledge reflects the hierarchical reality expressed by emanation, but by retracing its path in re-verse: every conceptual representation ends with an assent and leads to another representation, so that the process of knowledge just like reality needs both a final cause and an end. The pleasure of knowing experienced by the intellect coincides with a feeling of quietude (it involves not only conceptual representa-tions but also a definitive assent to reality)19 . Thus only something absolute can warrant the absence of a quest and therefore of desire, and the perception of pleasure that, since it is supreme, leads to no further desire. And this absolute thing can be found only in the heavenly afterlife.

Thus it seems that we can understand the ultimate meaning of Avicennas locution when he says that the human soul can become an intellectual world: the greatest pleasure corresponds to the knowledge of the whole, which is the only kind of knowledge that leads to no further desire. In other words, the heavenly dimension that Avicenna includes in his discussion has no other point than that of being the conclusion, and in a sense the very legitimation, of the relative kind of knowledge we have access to in the sublunary world.

Although Avicennas concept could be open to an interpretation of the notion of visio beatifica, his aim is to establish the possibility that the blissful soul can have knowledge of the First Principle, because this allows him to establish that the blissful soul may have knowledge of the whole, which consequently allows him to legitimate the partial and relative knowledge, with its attendant pleasure (and desire), available to us in this sublunary life20. Therefore the absoluteness of the celestial pleasure of the hereafter has the function of legitimating human knowledge in its relative and sublunary dimension.

We might then modify the implicit conclusion mentioned at the outset: true intellectual pleasure is not to be had in this life and belongs to the heavenly

19 One could say like the feeling of which Aristotle seems to be speaking in his De Int., 3 16b 20-21 when he writes of the verb that it is substantival and has significance, for whoever uses such expres-sions arrests the hearers mind, and fixes his attention or gives him peace ([...] , ); in the Arabic translation (K. al-Iba-ra, ed. Badawi, p. 102: al-qa-il la-ha- yaqifu bi-dihni-hi alay-hi wa-ida- samia-hu min-hu al-sa-mi qania bi-hi). Conceptual representation and assent as a quietude of the soul seem to be what Avicenna is referring to also in ibn sn, Ila-h., X, 2, ed. Mousa / Dunya / Zayed, p. 443, 6-7: the prophet should speak in a manner that [people] can conceive (yatas.awwaru-na) and in which their souls find rest (taskunu ilay-hi nufu-su-hum). For a relationship between the quietude of the soul and the activity of thought in Aristotle, see Problemata, 956 b 39 and ff.

20 This is the drift of Marths interpretation (marth 2008, p. 143). On the Islamic visio beatifica, see Qur., 75, 2223 (and against it 6, 103) and Gimaret 1995.

Avicenna: the Pleasure of Knowledge and the Quietude of the Soul 271

eschatological dimension21, but it also explains knowing and pleasure in life. In other words, it is from mans and particularly the philosophers point of view and in consideration of the pleasure connected to the knowledge he has that, according to Avicenna, the question of the pleasure of knowing has a meaning that cannot be restricted to human life and its attendant pleasures, but must be directly connected not only to the question of ethics specifically the relationship between the soul and the body22 but also to that of the eternal destiny of the human soul. Intellectual pleasure belongs to the human being not as regards individuals, but as regards the species (or the individuum vagum). This makes Avicennas elitism more comprehensible: the aim of human beings, which is knowledge, is realized by man to the extent that it is realized by some men. It is also as we have noted more a prospect than a current reality, also in the absolutely deductive character knowledge should always have. As is evi-dent, in the background there are at least two great subjects, richly developed by recent medieval historiography: intellectual or mental felicity and knowledge as conjunction with the agent intellect23.

Bibliography

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21 On Avicennas eschatology, see, for a start, avicenna, Epistola sulla vita futura, ed. Lucchetta; cf. blumberG 1979; michot 1986; schwarz 1995; stroumsa 1998.

22 In his discussion of the issue of pleasure and happiness in the afterlife, Avicenna discusses the role of the practical intellect, which must be reformed in order to attain theoretical felicity. In this context, Avicenna discusses virtues and ethics. See lizzini 2009.

23 For a critical evaluation and a first assessment of the subject of intellectual felicity, see fioravanti 2005 and bianchi 2005. Essential references to the question of conjunction (and then emanation vs. abstraction) in Avicenna can be found in lizzini 2012, pp. 266-273 and Gutas 2012.

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hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, transl. M. Chase, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA.)-London 2004, pp. 39-51.

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Avicenna: the Pleasure of Knowledge and the Quietude of the Soul 273

Abstract: In his Metaphysics of the Healing (IX, 7), Avicenna presents his ideas about the destiny of the human soul in the afterlife. Considered philosophically, the afterlife is intel-lectual (bodily afterlife is explained by religious law). The human soul achieves perfection by becoming an intellectual world in which the whole of reality may be reflected. Analysing the meaning of this statement helps to elucidate not only how Avicenna conceives intellec-tual pleasure in the afterlife, but also how he characterizes the very process of knowledge. Intertwined therewith are at least two important subjects, richly illuminated by recent medieval historiographical research: intellectual or mental felicity and knowledge as conjunction with the agent intellect.

Key words: Avicenna (Ibn Sn); Representation and Assent in Logic; Theory of Know-ledge; Intellectual Pleasure; Metaphysics.

Olga lizziniVrije Universiteit AmsterdamFaculteit der GeesteswetenschappenDe Boelelaan 1105NL - 1081 HV Amsterdam o.l.lizzini@vu.nl