21

APP¢

rove or e ease: 2020/02/21 C03184153 _I‘Ul"_D'I'El€I-I- --1

7//{/////////////////{(€{/A///////////////////////////F

15 October 1959

\/

I

/E62 Q“ ”¢ V\ $7 QY »_»fi~.‘ ‘:3 Q 2 0

'2 ld Q POCUMENT NO. 6 ,

\

\

0 -JPIPVANGE ‘N CLASS‘ I

_..._______~_____

\.\ 0

“<9 1* ui;CL./\:'.~;SIFI£Q ‘

'r5q¥ CL/\E-3. CHANGED I73: T3 C NEXTREVJEWDATE: Q 5\ Q AU H- H1794; “ -----.._.__

9"‘ nsvrewen;

Copy Non C fig

J]

—'F9P—5EGRE1'— '////////////////1/-:?>r1'rqV<->;?1 f0fREI§a5e§'%5Z0L?>2_72i 9'0_5’>1.5{1 53’///////////////A

( )

Approved fqr Beleage: 2020102/_21 C03184153

1-nn c|:'t\nl:"l' Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153

:~0'i u I

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153

\ is

.- 15 OCTOBER 1959 i,

ll é '*;P\"»\ <x‘~\Y;“

1\ Ԥ\

= \\v I. THE COMMUNIST BLQC /

V

'

_ -‘N1 L‘_.’;pvJ/‘I ;~¢__,,* .

\ F // ‘

I» a r-_, ,4

.'

'3 \<;-\ x /§\V = rfl _r >4-‘ Q Seviet ambassador ®

//' »» 1,1;/;_ China, replaces.

‘:1

to Communist ._ -T ‘@ 3 ; _ _4_

,:\#;,»;;§g"‘?li;;~;“3U\P 1,) ~_A:?,;4fl A \

inistel‘, after , . 1' ~5// )/- Y ~¢ /> V;/’ _r

. /_

Indonesian foreign m visit to Peiping, sees China as grow- I

‘

-’\ ,- .

ing problem ior future in Asia. @ “ ‘J 5‘. AF

" 1, 1; ,

.2 X )\_ / / ‘>1 1

>~*>w~ .\ l “F->1 ¢\ /\- /1+ he,

<1 . ; >1 0 0 »@ \

Bloc continues to negotiate arms an I __

economic aid with UAR des ite irr1ta- ,

' ‘Q; " V’ _‘

!' "14? ::.f. _,».,____n! -J.» ,1

-' ‘

‘

,_

A ;Z\ i/' ~ elf, (5 . J. ~11 In 0 f

1 \ \\\l¢ -..\M4 em II. ASIA-AFRICA V

u \ ~ W 2

X2

Strained Saudi Arabian - ARAMCO re— “Q ‘

4

~

V‘ _. _

‘ ‘ ““‘" 0

” V

. = .

lations make shutdoum of TAPLINE 111- 2 ‘ ‘ xv) ‘ ‘

® \‘\ \ '

ivx »1\ \

\ ;

~ ,3 1 ,=; -

,!

X‘ \ "T "v‘\_)(~)\____§~’—'——+ -—r*1'“4‘ .- '

i *******

Ir!

- \ 1 1 l ,

Q,"

tion at Cairo's policies.

creasingly likely.

A

L.

UAR orders its missions to propagandize 1‘ , nt that he will accept UN ~

‘v Nasir's stateme 7‘_

resolutions if Israel does likewise. (TOP@_ \_ K

\\ \ /»+.~~~—s"1"-""'"1 ~—-+\\ 2 22/ / 4/ am of Y 000, -‘

Im _ R A

000 loan. @ '> ,/ l

, ’

. ,

oncerned over deteri0rat- \\(.\\ \

\ \ _

\ \

\ ‘_ ’/ /

\ IE

South Vietnam c ing security in southern Laos; plans to expand training of Laotian troops. Q)

*

~ / \ / \$_/1 \ I 1 \

\ \ \ \

K; :7 " .-\___

/,

‘

/ X . _ _

I

‘ H

\

\ \\

'/

' {/

/ if p

X/\ég<_4l;sn \

\

I Y

I

. \

4 .

1 _ W

‘

A

‘

'

¥‘)r~\,

>/ ‘/

____._n_. .

\F

_. \Ȣ'l /

5

I *5-"\,\*A /F

£2»

‘

A‘

/\/'

iv

/ X‘ ji Y 7, IJK \-\\,_\ \

, /\\ \<. /" ' ‘

~ X, /§§[ _\

, lob. q\e \ , ,2 -(fl/° \

.,~ 0 “I/“Q” / ~‘ig§-$5.,

. 1» "

Y 5213. ’°'

=

£9 Q '\ '

- .

<-_ H0

\ % __ \

‘Xv \ ’\ I/Z

- .\

e+>

- !

i u _ I <

e --* ~. > ,4

U 1/».

\

\\

em R /

>/

v

/

\

/. ‘ _/-+-—~~ __\ ‘~<‘ \ /_,

2 K ‘

/'.

/ .'

/\/i

//F”

/

f;_

\

S\#‘&‘

*2?

l\ _X

‘

\ \/\

\\/

\ \<

(,1 M‘/,k _//

)/ // 7 g

//‘ '/ //I

1 Z} /1

4

/ ¢ / f \ /

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153

15%

- rove or Release.

cENT§‘}§.i 'd|1i\lTE'l1l(;-El\5t|:"BU[i_ET|N

15 October 1959

DAILY BRIEF

5 1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR - Communist China: Pavel Yudin, Soviet ambassador to Communist China since December 1953, has been replaced by a relatively obscure Ukrainian party secretary, Stepan Chervo- nenko. Yudin, once one of the Soviet Union's top ideologists, was due for reassignment and has been absent from his post for long periods during the past two years. Chervonenko accompanied Khrushchev on the Chinese trip and was apparently designated for the job well in advance of the official announcement. Yudin's transfer, therefore, may be routine. However, the action, com- ing at a time when Sine-Soviet relations apparently are strained, and the obscurity of the replacement, could be further indica-

\\\\

tions of irritation between Peiping and Moscow,I

Indonesia - Communist China: Foreign Minister Subandrio's recent trip to Peiping resulted in a tentative agreement for theH establishment of a Sino-Indonesian working group for solvin the problem of the Overseas Ck’ se in Indonesia," MT This arrangement may even-

y involve some modification of Djakarta“s ban on alien mer- chants in rural areas.\ 'ng Peiping, SfibandrioLCh was taken aback by _ inese Communist arro- gance an seeming confidence and believes China will os increasing problem for Asia in the future“

(Page 1)

Bloc - UAR: ‘ne gotiations for long-term e and military aid are continuing in Mos- cow, even though there has been increasing irritation between th bl d Ca‘ o o r th ast; t 0 months. A Czech trade e oc an 1r ve e p w delegation is due to arrive in Cairo this week. It is expected to include officials who are authorized to negotiate a new mil- itary aid agreement with the UAR. The delegation will probably al “

' ptember offer of economic assistance. 2) I

HQP-seeks; \\\\

, .

I /.3.

i\. is

i

‘L g<.

,,_.

iv’

5 -~_.

fa

L3

n

3- a shutdown of the Tapline is increa ' likel\L. For further de-

1%? F"

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Saudi Arabia: l~'I‘he relations of the managements of ARAMCO and the Tapline Company with Prince Faysal and Petroleum Di- rector Tariki have become so strained by a number of issues that _

ils on this situation, see page 3;] \

UAR—Israel: ‘

the UAR has ordered its diplomatic missions aoro launch a large—scale propaganda campaign to exploit Nasir's 8

October press interview in which he stated willingness to accept all United Nations resolutions for settlement of Arab-Israeli problems, provided Israel also accepts them. The Israelis have dismissed his interview as "deliberate propaganda."

Nasir probably hopes his campaign will put Israel on the defensive, create an impression of UAR moderation, and im- prove his international prestige, particularly in the West. Some of his recent statements also suggest that he may have a row- ‘ res ect for the authority and effectiveness of the UN.S we 4»

Yemen- UAR: The Imam asked Nasir\ \

of 20,000,000 Egyptian pounds (about $58,000,- 000 at t e official exchange rate) to assist him in unspecified "projects" which he intends to undertake. Although Nasir has indicated willingness to help solve the Imam's financial difficul- ties, he is unlikely to furnish an amount of this size. He is likely to make a small-scale effort to assist in order to placate the Imam, who has

' of bein disturbed by UAR ac- tivities in Yemen. 5)

South_Vietnam Laos; Zijpe Diem regime in South Vietnam is becoming increasingly concerned over what it regards as

worsen- ing security conditions in adjacent southern Laos. South Vietnam reportedly intends, with Laotian cooperation, to expand its

traininggjj of Laotian military personnel and to send additional civilian

prop- \

aganda and welfare teams into Laos. Saigon's increasingly activist]

15 Oct 59 DAILY BRIEF ii

rove or ee - . , ,

. K

//

\\\

/1

/

,?%

f/

2/>4v

/

, 7;; .

5’ I" I .

;;-;:4;/ I

‘-

/I/

7»:

'.. ~ '31/14' ‘Z, /.1’?

[fole in Laos risks provoking countermeasures by North Vietnam affecting not only the Laotian situation but also South Vietnam‘s

. internal securi_§y_.] ( \

(Page 6)

Watch Committee Conclusions: [Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeop- ardize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East, par- ti 1

' Ir '5 cu arly in aq. Laos; [l§_i_ssident activity has remained at a low level“ The

-4 dissidentsi however, with probable North Vietnamese assist-

O ance, continue to have the objective of establishing themselves (\\ in a strong position which they could use as the basis for po1it- }

ical bargaining or ior the expansion of military operatiQn§_J Middle East: @1_Q situation. in Iraq remains tense. .Whi1e

order has been well maintained, factional strife may break out and further t mpts against Q isim are possible In these cir cumstances e UAR may become more deeply involved

15 Oct 59 DAILY BRIEF

% we-i \\\\

Apprpved f0r_ Release; 2_020/02/21 C03184153 ——!-6-F-bt(':‘flt'l'

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Indonesian Talks in Peiping Reported Unsuccessful

Indonesian Foreign Minister lhe had made no progress with Peiping on

the Overseas Chinese problem during his 7-11 October visit to China; he seemed incensed over the treatment he had re- ceived. Apparently he had made the visit at his own initiative, in an effort to overcome Chinese opposition to an Indonesian decree requiring withdrawal of alien merchants from rural areas. 5'j?rior to the trip, he had confided to the American am- bassador in Djakarta that Communist China was exerting "ter- rific" pressure for repeal of the decreeff

Subandrio speculated in Hong Kong that Communist China's strong position in behalf of Overseas Chinese stemmed from a desire to maintain them as a potential vehicle for new aggres- sive designs. He said he was taken aback by Chinese arrogance and seeming confidence, and believes China will be an increas- ing problem for Asia in the future. He felt the Chinese position was a denial of the Bandung declarations.

Despite failure to resolve difficulties over the decree, tentative agreement was reached for the establishment of a Sino-Indonesian negotiating grou for "solving the problem of Overseas Chinese in Indonesia,"

l

In addition to considering the problems posecfby Chinese merchants, this group may also address itself to implementation of the 1955 treaty abolishing dual nationality for Overseas Chinese in Indonesia. Ratifica- tion instruments putting the treaty into effect reportedly will be exchanged soon. The treaty requires Overseas Chinese to choose either Indonesian or Chinese citizenship within two years

15 m+ so APP.FQ\1‘?9lf_°.FR‘?'?fi$?5eZQZQ/PZQ1_CP§J§fl15.3 Page 1

_Appr0ved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153

Bloc-UAR Aid Negotiations Continuing

I

Ia Czech trade delegation is scheduled to arrive in the UAR this week and that the delegation will include negotiators "to conclude the military agreement."

The UAR last month asked Czechoslovakia to provide addi- tional military goods, including spare parts for the arms previ- ously received, At that time, Prague expressed its displeasure with Cairo's "discriminatory" policy on pricing cotton exports. UAR officials have since stated that once the cotton-pricing prob- lem is solved the arms agreement probably will be concluded. In addition to trade and arms, the Czech delegation presumably will discuss Prague's offer of last September to extend $28,300,000 in economic aid.

L J in addition, that negotiations

for ong-term Soviet economic an military aid are continuing in Moscow.“ The remaining contracts for projects called for under the Soviet $175,000,000 economic aid credit are being worked out. Moreover, the UAR armsrpurclhasing mission in Moscow now is con- tracting for the delivery of materiel under a new major agreement, the general terms of which were agreed to in August by Moscow and Cairo.

These negotiations are taking place against a background. of increasing irritation between the bloc and Cairo. On 10 October, Radio Moscow in an Arabic broadcast accused Cairo of seeking military aid from the West and apparently sought to imply that bloc aid programs might be affected if relations continued to de- teriorate. On 12 October, Cai;ro's Al Ahram replied with an ed- itorial accusing Radio Moscow of committing "several unpard.on- able blunders of late" and denying the UAR had requested Western arms.

15 Oct 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153

ARAg1§/IC[_Q's Position in Saudi Arabia Endangered §Re1ations of the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) and the Trans Arabian Pipeline Company (TAPLINE) with Prime Minister Faysal and Petroleum Director Abdullah Tariki have become so strained that a shutdown of the Tapline carrying Saudi

oil to the Mediterranean now appears increasingly likely. Tariki claims ARAMCO has been diverting profits and calculates that the company owes the government more than $180,000,000. He has rejected all company proposals to negotiate and apparently has Faysa1°s complete support for aplan ?'to own and operate ARAMCO or to destroy it."?

ffiince a settlement of the ARAMCO-Saudi dispute has been a precondition in TAPLINE's parallel negotiations with the UAR for increased transit fees for the pipeline passing through Syria, Cairo now may implement its earlier ultimatum to TAPLINE that it must pay these fees by the end of October or face the imposi- tion of a tax which will bring in the amount of money demanded. TAPLINE's position is that the proposed UAR tax is contrary to the company's concession agreement with the Syrian Region and will therefore be ignored, TAPLINE plans to continue opera- tions unless shut down by direct UAR action‘:

31:1 anticipation of such a shutdown, the owners of TAPLINE—- the same American oil companies which own ARAMCO-—have given orders to speed construction of a pipeline to increase Saudi oil export capacity at the Persian Gulflrl

§King Saud, who has been gathering political support in recent inonthls, may use the approaching oil crisis to provide additional justification for an attempt to reassert his ovm authority. There are signs of increasing frictions betwee aud and Faysal. For example, ‘Ljfilaud has issued orders to the di oforoaacastmg that no sta ement made by Faysal could be published until it had been cleared by himself. Concern that Saud might move to enhance his own authority has already caused the crown prince to put off a contemplated tri medical treatment of his serious stomach disorders}

15 Oct 59 ‘X|§|5r'o'v'E6 ¥or'|?a'eTEé§é72'o‘2b7cT2/51' 'éb:T1'éZ1i5s Page 3

Approvgilfor Release: 2020/02/21 003184153 1'

UAR Propaganda to Stress Willingness to Accept UN Resolutions On Israel

Cairo has instructed its diplomatic missions abroad to launch a large-scale propaganda campaign pegged to Nasir’s 8 October press interview advocating acceptance of all United Nations resolu- tions on Arab-Israeli problems and a UN commission for implement- ing the resolutions. Nasir specifically declared himself willing to accept the 1951 resolution on freedom of transit through the Suez Canal. He added the condition that Israel must also accept the resolutions. '

0

'

The Israeli reaction, as Nasir probably anticipated, was to dismiss his remarks as "deliberate propaganda." t Israel has frequently expressed its readiness to negotiate with t-he Arabs, but has consistently rejected any suggestion on implementation of the 1948 resolution on repatriation or compensation of the Arab refugees and--like the Arabs--has opposed implementation of the UN's 1947 resolution on the partition of Palestine. Nasir probably hopes to create the impression that he is sponsoring a moderate approach to the solution of Arab-Israeli problems and in this way to improve his international prestige, particularly in the West. He is almost certainly aware of the un- favorable picture of him fostered by his adamant stand against Israeli transit of the canal, and is also anxious to smooth the way for Western approval of his request to the World Bank for funds to improve the waterway. In some of his recent statements, how- ever, there has been an indication of a growing, genuine respect for the UN's authority aid ability to implement its decisions.

~i=e1=~sseR-5-1

15 Oct 59 c§,'Y§>T<'§"<§§ f$'Hl5E%L$i’F2'B'§<>7o2'7é%'&S§%'§'4153 Page 4‘

Approved for Release, @020/02/21 C03184153

Imam Requests $58,000,000 Loan From Nasir Imam Ahmad of Yemen asked UAR President Nasir

a loan of approximately 20,000,000 Egyp; poun a out $58,000,000) to assist him in unspecified "proj- ects." He had previously advised Nasir of his need for an in- definite sum, and apparently received Nasir's assurances of assistance. Nasir is unlikely to provide such a large amount, but probably will offer some assistance in order to avoid of- fending the Imam, who has shown signs of displeasure over recent UAR activities in Yemen.

The Imam's need for funds is known to be urgent, as re- flected in his recent decision to reduce the pay of civil servants and the army. The sum requested, however, is believed to be considerably more than that required for meeting usual govern- ment expenses. The reference to "projects" suggests new un- dertakings. There have been numerous reports that the Imam hopes to lessen his dependence on the Sino-Soviet bloc by draw- ing funds from the UAR, but there is no indication that he has actually adopted such a policy.

The Imam may also be considering some action against the British-supported federation of Arab states in the Aden Protec- torate. The request may be merely a maneuver, however, to get as much assistance from Nasir as possible, and the Imam probably has as little concern over repayment of this loan as he has over hisother international financial commitments.

15 Oct 59 Ap5Fdv'EJrbE RE|é§'§é:' 2350765/E1 "c'd§'1'§Ii?3'2, Page 5

\‘\\\‘QQ‘1Q1\§\‘.‘l'1\\.\§\\'\“‘l\."§\l\.“.‘.\‘\\\.“'\\“‘.\\\\\\\\\“\“.\‘.\\\\\\\\\‘\

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153 I \Jl LILJ\/.l\l.-1 I i J

-__-4

South Vietnam Increasingly Concerned Over »-1

[I_‘_h_e Diem regime, which has closely followed. developments in Laos since the outbreak of Communist hostilities. there in mid- July, is becoming increasingly concerned over stepped—up dissi- dent activity in the southern Laotian provinces adjacent to South Vietnam. Vietnamese leaders are particularly disturbed by the "vacuum" in southern Laos resulting from the commitment of the bulk of Laotian forces in the north. They fear that a critical situation inimical to South Vietnam's security is developing thefi

[The Diem government has been in close consultation with Laotian leaders during the past few months, and reportedly has engaged in contingency planning for joint anti-Communist efforts. President Diem recently informed American officials in Saigon that, in agreement with Lao officials, South Vietnam intends to expand its training of Laotian military personnel and to send ad- ditional "civic action" teams, made up of personnel trained in propaganda and welfare work, into Laos. Diem and his advisers additionally have long considered the covert introduction into southern Laos of Vietnamese troops disguised as civilians as a means of bolstering limited Laotian security assets?)

-»->-.--

Q/Ieanwhile, South Vietnam has augmented its representa- tion in Vientiane, and stepped up its intelligence operations in La

\ LSouth ' ' os_

newly appointed ambassador to Laos, is known as loyal supporter of the -_

tivist" vvixlgj

[S—gig0n“s increasing role in Laos risks provoking counter- measures by North Vietnam affecting not only the Laotian situa- tion but possibly also South Vietnam's internal securitgvg3

15 Oct 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 11111 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1'°;PF3FQV€d I05 R1e'§a§e_1 292°/_°2_/2] §°§’>1_84_1§3 . . . . . . . . - - -------

‘-““‘\\-__

____,.-.--‘___“-‘

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153 Q ~-~.J‘l¥ ;- us. J4. .1

THE PRESIDENT The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

The

The

The

The

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security qaerationst Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director

Atomic Energy C ommission The Chair man

National Security Agency The Director

National Indications Center The Director

if in E iF V,

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153

”/

fltA

/

/ ”% _

W

__

N‘

_

1

1_

/M

M_

ym

M_

flm

m

/m

m_

/M

M

/O

W

7%

M

I /R

r

/_m

*_m_

/d

d

i

/

y

”

W fl

”

/2 H

IR_

_

m

_m_

_

_

I

‘

fl

”