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Suffering

Their criminalization of suffering precludes us from finding meaning in and growing from

our pain. We must refuse moral condemnation of suffering in order to promote innerpeace.

Van Hooft, 1998, Stan Van Hooft, Stan is professor of philosophy at Deakin University,

Melbourne, 1998, The Meanings of Suffering,http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=17&sid=9bcfda3c-98ba-4d27-a336-

e3eecab55613%40sessionmgr110&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#db=rlh&AN=1178447,

7/04/2012, [AR]

Are such ways of giving meaning to suffering available in a postmodern secular age? What meaning is available for people without religious or

even humanistic faith? A schematic answer can be found in the ancient Stoic philosophers and in Nietzsche, who in different ways

embraced a tragic sense of life. They held that there is no plan, no purpose, and no meaning toexistence arising from reality itself. The cosmos does not run in accordance with a divine plan or an

inherent goal. There is no overarching fate or justice. The world is just a vast dynamic system of

change and becoming. Everything becomes what it is and changes in systems of mutual interaction and effect. Human beings

are subject to "the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune."Whatever happens is caused by blind and purposeless

processes. It is appropriate to do what we can to protect ourselves from bad luck and evil, but if we

become victims we can only accept what has happened as inevitable. There is no transcendent

meaning to be given to it. Nonetheless, to accept suffering as the result of blind fate, or even to love

fate, as Nietzsche would put it, is to give meaning to one's suffering. To see suffering this way is still to

exercise the contemplative and meaning-giving side of our existence, since to adopt such a view is still

to insert our suffering into a larger theory of reality. It gives suffering the meaning of tragedy even

while it says that suffering is meaningless. And so the tragic view of life is a real alternative among the various ways that the

contemplative aspect of our being gives meaning to suffering. The Stoic philosophers encapsulated their view in saying

that we shouldlive life "in agreement with nature? By this they variously meant that we should live in accordance with human virtue or

with natural law. To be moralwas all. This in turn meant that we should seek good things, shun bad things,

and be indifferent to things that are indifferent.Among the indifferent things is health, since it can be used for good or forbad and so is in itself morally neutral.[ 9]Good things make us morally good and bad things make us morally bad, but of itself, health does

neither. And so it is with the opposite of health. As Seneca put it, "That which is evil does harm; that which does harm makes a man

worse. But pain and poverty do not make a man worse; therefore, they are not evils."[10]Epictetus offers

similar advice in paragraphs eight and nine of his Manual: Ask not that events should happen as you will, but let your

will be that events should happen as they do, and you shall have peace. Sickness is a hindrance to the

body, but not to the will, unless the will consent. Lameness is a hindrance to the leg, but not to the will. Say this to yourselfat each event that happens, for you shall find that though it hinders something else it will not hinder you.[ 11]Epictetus's thought is, first, that

those people who accept everything that befalls them in the physical world will live with equanimity,

and second, that illness, lameness, and other forms of suffering are physical events; they affect thebody but not the will or moral being of a person. Provided this moral being is kept intact, the person

will experience inner freedom and peace. Acceptance of fate, along with a focus on one's inner

existence, are the guarantees of a peaceful mode of being. In this conception, suffering is something

toward which the victim should remain indifferent. It is neither good nor bad. It is to be given no

meaning. The contemplative dimension of our being should not trouble itself with it and should look

beyond it toward an eternal and changeless natureconceived as moral and transcendent. We can see the influence ofPlato's Socrates on this view. The tragic view of life, as articulated by the Stoics, leads to a life that secures our moral being and integrity by
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=17&sid=9bcfda3c-98ba-4d27-a336-e3eecab55613%40sessionmgr110&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#db=rlh&AN=1178447http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=17&sid=9bcfda3c-98ba-4d27-a336-e3eecab55613%40sessionmgr110&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#db=rlh&AN=1178447http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=b6fbaa51-a4aa-40a7-874c-50fb28ef14b5%40sessionmgr11&vid=1&hid=19&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#bib9http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=b6fbaa51-a4aa-40a7-874c-50fb28ef14b5%40sessionmgr11&vid=1&hid=19&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#bib10http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=b6fbaa51-a4aa-40a7-874c-50fb28ef14b5%40sessionmgr11&vid=1&hid=19&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#bib11http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=b6fbaa51-a4aa-40a7-874c-50fb28ef14b5%40sessionmgr11&vid=1&hid=19&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#bib11http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=b6fbaa51-a4aa-40a7-874c-50fb28ef14b5%40sessionmgr11&vid=1&hid=19&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#bib10http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=b6fbaa51-a4aa-40a7-874c-50fb28ef14b5%40sessionmgr11&vid=1&hid=19&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#bib9http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=17&sid=9bcfda3c-98ba-4d27-a336-e3eecab55613%40sessionmgr110&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#db=rlh&AN=1178447http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=17&sid=9bcfda3c-98ba-4d27-a336-e3eecab55613%40sessionmgr110&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#db=rlh&AN=1178447


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withdrawing from our worldly existence. But it is not likely to be useful to us today. While we may view it with admiration, its emphasis on

withdrawal ensures that it will not have much appeal to our modern sensibilities


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Morality

The 1AC's drive towards eradicating suffering is an example of becoming enslaved to a

totalizing system of morals for the sake of preserving value- this is inherently lifenegating and turns case

Scott 98, Jacqueline Scott, Associate Professor Philosophy Department Loyola

University Chicago, 1998, Nietzsche and decadence: The revaluation of morality7/04/12, [AR]

For Nietzsche then , the best type of rationale is one whose goal is self-enhancement by way of an

affirmation of oneslife, and it is only the healthiest individuals who will be able create and live by

such a rationale. It is their opposites, those who are distressed and weak, who have traditionally

created rationales for preservation which they labeled systems of morality . According to Nietzsche,

the philosopher was the man of the most comprehensive responsibility who has the conscience of the

over-all development of man, and he will make use of religions for his project of cultivation and

education. Thephilosopher, then, is responsible for creating the rationales for existence which are

necessary for the over-all development of man. Nietzsche claimed that modern morality, as opposed

to creating the conditions for both the enhancement of the species and for the production of people

of great deeds, was leading to stagnation and even the decay of the species.This diminution was the

greatest danger for everyone because it signaled the inability to carry out our most fundamental,

distinctly human task. Our moralities no longer served to provide us with rationales for existence.

Instead, modern moralities only made us feel a certain weariness for this world and for the species in

general.The worst type of decadent,though, is one,like the Christian, who teaches that one must

blame oneselfthis choice of being harmful to oneself is the formula for decadence. It teacheshatred of oneself, particularly hatred of ones instincts. One is taught that in order to do penance forthe past sins of other humans, one must selflessly devote ones life to serving others and to havingpity for them, because one is not worthy of ones own attention. Nietzsche referred to this as un-selfing or self-denial and contended that such an approach was unhealthy because the priestlyleaders who created it made self-destruction a sign of value and duty. A symptom of this type of

decadence is assigning the unegoistic an absolute value, and considering the egoistic abhorrent.


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Securitization

By constructing the fantasy of a stable world to which we must aspire, the affirmative

participates in a hegemonic securitization of reality. This will to order vilifies life bypositing suffering and uncertainty as inherently defective aspects of existence that

must be eliminated.

Saurette 96(Paul, associate professor, University of Ottawa, I Mistrust allSystematizers and Avoid Them': Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in

International Relations Theory, Millenium Journal of International Studies 25,http://mil.sagepub.com/contentI25/1/1.citation - oliver g)According to Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation of a society is the set of ideas which give

meaning to the phenomenon of human existence within a given cultural framework. As one

manifestation of the Will to Power, this will to meaning fundamentally influences the social and

political organisation of a particular community.' Anything less than a profound historical

interrogation of the most basic philosophical foundations of our civilization, then, misconceives the

origins of values which we take to be intrinsic and natural. Nietzsche suggests, therefore, that to

understandthe development of our modern conception ofsociety and politics, we must reconsider

the crucial influence of the Platonic formulation of Socratic thought. Nietzsche claims that pre-

Socratic Greece based itsphilosophicaljustification of lifeon heroic myths which honoured tragedy

and competition. Life was understood as a contest in which both the joyful and ordered(Apollonian)

and chaotic and suffering(Dionysian) aspects of life were accepted and affirmed as inescapable

aspects of human existence.' However, this incarnation of the will to power as tragedy weakened,

and became unable to sustain meaning in Greek life. Greek myths no longer instilled the self-respect

and self-control that had upheld the pre-Socratic social order. 'Everywhere the instincts were in

anarchy; everywhere people were but five e steps from excess: the monstrum in animo was auniversal danger'.' No longer willing to accept the tragic hardnessand self-mastery of pre-Socratic

myth, Greek thought yielded to decadence, a search for a new social foundation which would soften

the tragedy of life, while still giving meaning to existence. In this context, Socrates' thought became

paramount. In the words of Nietzsche, Socrates saw behind his aristocratic Athenians; he grasped

that his case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was no longer exceptional. The same kind of degeneration

was everywhere silently preparing itself: the old Athens was coming to an endAnd Socrates

understood that the world had need of him his expedient, his cure and his personal art of self-

preservation.' Socratesrealised that his searchfor an ultimate and eternal intellectual standard

paralleledthewidespread yearning for assurance and stability within society. His expedient, his

cure?An alternative will to power. An alternate foundation that promised mastery and control, not

through acceptance of the tragic life, but through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent,and the problematic. In response to the failing power of its foundational myths, Greece tried to

renounce the very experience that had given rise to tragedy by retreating/escaping into the

Apollonian world promised by Socratic reason. In Nietzsche's words, 'Nationality was divined as a

saviourit was their last expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws

itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to

perish, or be absurdly rational....' Thus, Socrates codified the wider fear of instability into an

intellectual framework.The Socratic Will to Truth ischaracterised by the attempt to understand and


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order life rationally by renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence and privileging an idealised

Apollonian order. As life isinescapably comprised of both order and disorder, however, the

promise of controlthrough Socratic reason is only possible by creating a 'Real World'of eternal and

meaningful forms, in opposition to an 'Apparent World' of transitory physical existence. Suffering

and contingency is contained within the Apparent World,disparaged, devalued, and ignored in

relation to the idealorder of the Real World.Essential to the Socratic Will to Truth, then, is the

fundamental contradiction between the experience of Dionysian suffering in the Apparent World and

the idealised order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, thisdichotomised model led tothe

emergence of auniquely 'modern' understanding of life which could only view suffering as the

result of the imperfection of the Apparent World. Thisoutlook created amodern notionof

responsibility in which the Dionysian elements of life could be understood only as a phenomenon

for which someone, or something, is to blame. Nietzsche terms this philosophically-induced

condition ressentiment, and argues that it signalled a potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing

the central contradiction of the Socratic resolution. This contradiction, however, was resolved

historically through the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to

Nietzsche, ascetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomisation by employing the Apparent

World as the responsible agent against which the ressentiment of life could be turned. Blame for

suffering fell on individuals within the Apparent World, precisely because they did not live up to God,the Truth, and the Real World. As Nietzsche wrote, I suffer: someone must be to blame for it' thinks

every sickly sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic priesttells him: 'Quite so my sheep! someone must

be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for yourself,- you alone

are to blame for yourselfThis is brazen and false enough: but one thing is achieved by it, the

direction of ressentiment is altered." Faced with the collapse of the Socratic resolution and the

prospect of meaninglessness, once again, 'one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish,

or be absurdly rational....' The genius of the ascetic ideal was that it preserved the meaning of the

Socratic Will to Power as Will to Truth by extrapolating ad absurdium the Socratic division through

the redirection of ressentiment against the Apparent World! Through this redirection, the Real World

was transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escape into a model towards which

the Apparent World actively aspired, always blaming its contradictory experiences on its ownimperfect knowledge and action.This subtle transformation of the relationship between the

dichotomised worlds creates the Will to Order as the defining characteristic of the modern Will to

Truth. Unable to acceptthe Dionysian sufferinginherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic

ressentimentdesperately searches for 'the hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest

sleep, in short absence of suffering'.` According to the ascetic model, however, thisescape is

possible only when the Apparent World perfectly duplicates the Real World. The Will to Order,

then, is the aggressive need increasingly to order the Apparent World in line with the precepts of the

moral Truth of the Real World. The ressentiment of the Will to Order, therefore, generates two

interrelated reactions. First, ressentiment engenders a need actively to mould the Apparent World

in accordance with the dictates of the ideal, Apollonian Real World. In order to achievethis,

however, the ascetic ideal also asserts that a 'truer', more complete knowledge of the Real World

must be established, creating an ever-increasing Will to Truth. Thisself-perpetuating movement

creates an interpretative structure within which everything must be understood and ordered in

relation to the ascetic Truth of the Real World. As Nietzsche suggests,[t]he ascetic ideal has a goal

this goal is so universal that all other interests of human existence seem, when compared with it,

petty and narrow; it interprets epochs, nations, and men inexorably with a view to this one goal; it

permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies, affirms and sanctions solely from

the point of view of its interpretation:4 Thevery structure of the Will to Truth ensuresthat

theoretical investigation must be increasingly ordered, comprehensive, more True, and closer to the


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perfection of the ideal. At the same time, thisunderstanding of intellectual theory ensuresthat it

creates practices which attempt to impose increasing order in the Apparent World.With this

critical transformation, the Will to Order becomes the fundamental philosophical principle of

modernity.

The concept of security erects what it tries to defeatin its name, wars were wagedand WMDs developed all in this search for complete securityDer Derian 98(James, Prof of PoliSci at the U of Massachusetts, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx,Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," Cianet, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html]

The rapidity of change in the international system, as well as the inability of international theory to

make sense of that change, raises this question: Of what value is security? More specifically, just how

secure is this preeminent concept of international relations? This evaluation of security invokes

interpretive strategies to ask epistemological, ontological, and political questions--questions that all

too oftenare ignored, subordinated, or displaced by the technically biased, narrowly framed

question of what it takes to achieve security. The goal, then, of this inquiry is to make

philosophically problematic that which has been practically axiomatic in international relations. Thefirst step is to ask whether the paramount value of security lies in its abnegation of the insecurity of

all values. No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor

commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears,

rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves

from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its

name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national

interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact.And, less often noted in international

relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has

been furthered and intellectual dissent muted.

Security creates a self fulfilling prophecy in which the rest of the world is an enemy tobe destroyedturns caseDer Derian 98(James, Prof of PoliSci at the U of Massachusetts, "The Value of Security:

Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," Cianet,

http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html]We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori argumentthat proves the

existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a

widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history

of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center

for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified."1 From God to Rational Man,

from Empire to Republic, from King to the People--and on occasion in the reverse direction as well,for history is never so linear, never so neat as we would write it--the security of the center has been

the shifting site from which the forces of authority, order, and identity philosophically defined and

physically kept at bay anarchy, chaos, and difference. Yet the center, as modern poets and

postmodern critics tell us, no longer holds. The demise of a bipolar system, the diffusion of power

into new political, national, and economic constellations, the decline of civil society and the rise of

the shopping mall, the acceleration of everything --transportation, capital and information flows,

change itself--have induced a new anxiety. As George Bush repeatedly said--that is, until the 1992
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Presidential election went into full swing--"The enemy is unpredictability. The enemy is instability."2

One immediate response, the unthinking reaction, is to master this anxiety and to resecure the

center by remapping the peripheral threats.In this vein, the Pentagon prepares seven military

scenarios for future conflict, ranging from latino small-fry to an IdentiKit super-enemy that goes by

the generic acronym of REGT ("Reemergent Global Threat"). In the heartlands of America, Toyota

sledge-hammering returns as a popular know-nothing distraction. And within the Washington

beltway, rogue powers such as North Korea, Iraq, and Libya take on the status of pariah-state and

potential video bomb-site for a permanently electioneering elite. There are also prodromal efforts to

shore up the center of the International Relations discipline. In a newly instituted series in the

International Studies Quarterly , the state of security studies is surveyed so as to refortify its borders.

3 After acknowledging that "the boundaries of intellectual disciplines are permeable," the author

proceeds not only to raise the drawbridge but also to caulk every chink in the moat.4 Recent

attempts to broaden the concept of "security" to include such issues as global environmental

dangers, disease, and economic and natural disasters endanger the field by threatening "to destroy

its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important

problems."5 The field is surveyed in the most narrow and parochial way: out of 200-plus works

cited, esteemed Third World scholars of strategic studies receive no mention, British and French

scholars receive short shrift, and Soviet writers do not make it into the Pantheon at all. The author ofthe essay, Stephen Walt, has written one of the better books on alliance systems;6 here he seems

intent on constructing a new alliance within the discipline against "foreign" others, with the

"postmodernist" as arch-alien. The tactic is familiar: like many of the neoconservatives who have

launched the recent attacks on "political correctness," the "liberals" of international relations

make it a habit to base their criticisms on secondary accounts of a category of thinking rather than

on a primary engagement with the specific(and often differing) views of the thinkers themselves.7

In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off

anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has

noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can

illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' "8 By the

end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics havetriggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control.

The affs constant search for security forces us to live life in a seatbeltaction isdiscouraged because of fear of the unknown

Der Derian 98(James, Prof of PoliSci at the U of Massachusetts, "The Value of Security:

Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," Cianet,

http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html]

The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in

which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protectionagainst contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and

everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the

strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative

relationship in The Twilight of the Idols : The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by,

the feelingof fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as

for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. . . . That which is

new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thusone not only
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searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, butfor a particularly selectedand

preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the

strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations.38 A safe life requires

safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil,

and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security.The "influence of timidity," as

Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the

"necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of

mistrust and evil experiences."39 The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained

by reason is relegated to the off-world. "Trust," the "good," and other common values come to rely

upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling of security such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong

in being able to trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of

being protected by a god."40 For Nietzsche, of course, only a false sense of security can come from

false gods: "Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error : in every single case,

cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing something to be

true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its causes."41
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Economic Rationality

Their reduction of humanity to utility-seeking creatures reeks of herd mentality and

renders itself unable to comprehend the noble few that commit themselves to goalsthat do not economically benefit them.

Rony Guldmann, PhD from Michigan and Professor of Philosophy @ Hofstra, 2010,

Between Cynicism and Idealism: Nietzsche and the Slanderers of Human Natureaccess via:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1651505Nietzsches plain hostilityto utilitarianism reveals that his sympathy for psychological egoism coexistswith a powerful aversion to the notion that human beings are rational calculators of self-interest who,

in the spirit of homo economicus, tough-mindedly employ social institutions, if not social interaction

itself, as mediums through which to maximize gains. He famously claims that *m]an does notstrive after happiness;only the Englishman does that. T33 Although Nietzschesometimes suggests

that individual egoism indirectly benefits the species,16 he does not have anything like Adam Smithsinvisible hand in mind. Rather than being a Darwinian jungle in which the strongest, wiliest, or most

adaptable prevail, commercial society represents the triumph ofasceticism and herd instinct over self-

realization and individuality. Only the contemptible bourgeois, not man as such, is a cool, cautious

calculating machine.In The Gay Science, Nietzsche suggests that this overly pessimistic moral

psychology is the hallmark of common natures :

Common natures consider all noble, magnanimous feelings inexpedientand therefore first of

all incredible. They blinkwhen they hear of such things and seem to feel like saying: Surely,

there must be some advantage involved; one cannot see through everything. They are

suspicious of the noble person, as if he surreptitiously sought his advantage. When they are

irresistibly persuaded of the absence of selfish intentions and gains, they see the noble person

as a kind of fool; they despise him in his joy and laugh at his shining eyes. How can one enjoybeing at a disadvantage? How could one desire with ones eyes open to be disadvantaged?

Some disease of reason must be associated with the noble affection. Thus they think and sneer,

as they sneer at the pleasure that a madman derives from his fixed idea. What distinguishes the

common type is that it never loses sight of its advantage, and that this thought of purpose and

advantage is even stronger than the strongest instincts; not to allow these instincts to lead one

astray to perform inexpedient actsthat is their wisdom and pride.17

The powerful pursue the fulfillment of values, not the attainment of valuable objects.

Rony Guldmann, PhD from Michigan and Professor of Philosophy @ Hofstra, 2010,

Between Cynicism and Idealism: Nietzsche and the Slanderers of Human Natureaccess via:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1651505

The slaves resented the masters not only for wounding their self-esteem but, more importantly, for

weakening their conviction in their right to self-esteem. Unlike homo economicus, Nietzschean agents

are ultimately concerned with their value, not merely with getting things of value. As Robert Solomon
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1651505http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1651505http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1651505http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1651505


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put it, Nietzsche holds that human beings ultimately prefer a sense of self-importance to mere

satisfaction.24 Retaining this sense requires that one be partial to whatever worldview endows onesparticular qualities with significance, and seek to convince oneself and others of its truth, even in the

face of ones own doubts.


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Deterrence

The imminent threat of nuclear annihilation has literally become a non-event, for the

explosive energy of the nuclear has been programmatically integrated into the

strategies of social and political implosion. The technologies of the nuclear, of adeterrence without any boundaries or objectives, are a fixture of a global power that

levels out the possibility of any true conflict or event in order to incorporate the

political into the totalizing logic of security. Even the most peaceful anti-nuclear

movements are neutralized by the models of nuclear deterrence, which operate at the

level of molecular and programmatic control

Baudrillard 95(Jean, Simulacra and Simulation: The Precession of Simulacra, pp. 34-37)The apotheosis of simulation: the nuclear. However, the balance of terror is never anything but the spectacular slope of a system of

deterrence that has insinuated itself from the inside into all the cracks of daily life. Nuclear suspension only serves to seal

the trivialized system of deterrence that is at the heart of the media, of the violence without

consequences that reigns throughout the world, of the aleatory apparatus of all the choices that are

made for us.The most insignificant of our behaviors is regulated by neutralized, indifferent, equivalent signs, by zero-sum signslike those that regulate the "strategy of games" (but the true equation is elsewhere, and the unknown is precisely that variable ofsimulation which makes of the atomic arsenal itself a hyperreal form, a simulacrum that dominates everything and reduces all"ground-level" events to being nothing but ephemeral scenarios, transforming the life left us into survival, into a stake without

stakes - not even into a life insurance policy: into a policy that already has no value). It is not the direct threat of atomic

destruction that paralyzes our lives, it is deterrence that gives them leukemia. And this deterrence comes

from that fact that even the real atomic clash is precluded - precluded like the eventuality of the real in a system of signs. The

whole world pretends to believe in the reality of this threat (this is understandable on the part of the

military, the gravity of their exercise and the discourse of their "strategy" are at stake), but it is

precisely at this level that there are no strategic stakes. The whole originality of the situation lies in

the improbability of destruction. Deterrence precludes war - the archaic violence of expandingsystems. Deterrence itself is the neutral, implosive violence of metastable systems or systems in

involution. There is no longer a subject of deterrence, nor an adversary nor a strategy - it is a planetary structure of the

annihilation of stakes. Atomic war, like the Trojan War, will not take place. The risk of nuclear annihilation only serves

as a pretext, through the sophistication of weapons(a sophistication that surpasses any possible objective to such an

extent that it is itself a symptom of nullity), for installing a universal security system, a universal lockup and controlsystem whose deterrent effect is not at all aimed at an atomic clash (which was never in question, except without a doubt in the veryinitial stages of the cold war, when one still confused the nuclear apparatus with conventional war) but, rather, at the much greaterprobability of any real event, of anything that would be an event in the general system and upset its balance. The balance of terror is

the terror of balance. Deterrence is not a strategy, it circulates and is exchanged between nuclear

protagonists exactly as is international capital in the orbital zone of monetary speculation whose

fluctuations suffice to control all global exchanges. Thus the money of destruction(without any reference to

real destruction, any more than floating capital has a real referent of production) that circulates in nuclear orbit sufficesto control all the violence and potential conflicts around the world. What is hatched in the shadow of this

mechanism with the pretext of a maximal, "objective," threat, and thanks to Damocles' nuclear sword, is the perfection of the

best system of control that has ever existed. And the progressive satellization of the whole planet

through this hypermodel of security. The same goes for peaceful nuclear power stations. Pacification does not distinguishbetween the civil and the military: everywhere where irreversible apparatuses of control are elaborated, everywhere where the notionof security becomes omnipotent, everywhere where the norm replaces the old arsenal of laws and violence (including war), it is thesystem of deterrence that grows, and around it grows the historical, social, and political desert. A gigantic involution that makesevery conflict, every finality, every confrontation contract in proportion to this blackmail that interrupts, neutralizes, freezes them

all. No longer can any revolt, any story be deployed according to its own logic because it risks


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annihilation. No strategy is possible any longer, and escalation is only a puerile game given over to the

military. The political stake is dead, only simulacra of conflicts and carefully circumscribed stakes

remain. The "space race" played exactly the same role as nuclear escalation. This is why the space program was so easily able toreplace it in the 1960s (Kennedy/Khrushchev), or to develop concurrently as a form of "peaceful coexistence." Because what,ultimately, is the function of the space program, of the conquest of the moon, of the launching of satellites if not the institution of amodel of universal gravitation, of satellization of which the lunar module is the perfect embryo? Programmed microcosm, wherenothing can be left to chance. Trajectory, energy, calculation, physiology, psychology, environment - nothing can be left to

contingencies, this is the total universe of the norm - the Law no longer exists, it is the operational immanence of every detail that islaw. A universe purged of all threat of meaning, in a state of asepsis and weightlessness - it is this very perfection that is fascinating.The exaltation of the crowds was not a response to the event of Rinding on the moon or of sending a man into space (this would be,rather, the fulfillment of an earlier dream), rather, we are dumbfounded by the perfection of the programming and the technicalmanipulation, by the immanent wonder of the programmed unfolding of events. Fascination with the maximal norm and themastery of probability. Vertigo of the model, which unites with the model of death, but without fear or drive. Because if the law, withits aura of transgression, if order, with its aura of violence, still taps a perverse imaginary, the norm fixes, fascinates, stupefies, andmakes every imaginary involute. One no longer fantasizes about the minutiae of a program. Just watching it produces vertigo. The

vertigo of a world without flaws. Now, it is the same model of programmatic infallibility, of maximum security

and deterrence that today controls the spread of the social. There lies the true nuclear fallout: the

meticulous operation of technology serves as a model for the meticulous operation of the social. Hereas well, nothing will be left to chance, moreover this is the essence of socialization, which began centuries ago, but which has nowentered its accelerated phase, toward a limit that one believed would be explosive (revolution), but which for the moment istranslated by an inverse, implosive, irreversible process: the generalized deterrence of chance, of accident, of transversality, offinality, of contradiction, rupture, or complexity in a sociality illuminated by the norm, doomed to the descriptive transparency of

mechanisms of information. In fact, the spatial and nuclear models do not have their own ends: neither thediscovery of the moon, nor military and strategic superiority. Their truth is to be the models of simulation, the

model vectors of a system of planetary control (where even the superpowers of this scenario are not

free - the whole world is satellized).*9 Resist the evidence: in satellization, he who is satellized is not who one might think.Through the orbital inscription of a spatial object, it is the planet earth that becomes a satellite, it is the terrestrial principle of realitythat becomes eccentric, hyperreal, and insignificant. Through the orbital instantiation of a system of control like peacefulcoexistence, all the terrestrial microsystems are satellized and lose their autonomy. All energy, all events are absorbed by thiseccentric gravitation, everything condenses and implodes toward the only micromodel of control (the orbital satellite), as conversely,in the other, biological, dimension, everything converges and implodes on the molecular micromodel of the genetic code. Between

the two, in this forking of the nuclear and the genetic, in the simultaneous assumption of the two fundamental

codes of deterrence, every principle of meaning is absorbed, every deployment of the real is

impossible.


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Fear of Prolif

The belief that nuclear proliferation will result in sporadic and unprecedented

accidents masks the underlying nature of the nuclear era. The expansion of nucleartechnologies into all corners of the world is not a strategy of acceleration and

imminent catastrophe, but one of implosion and technical control.

Baudrillard 95(Jean, Simulacra and Simulation: The Precession of Simulacra, pp. 41-42)This is why nuclear proliferation does not increase the risk of either an atomic clash or an accident - savein the interval when the "young" powers could be tempted to make a nondeterrent, "real" use of it (as the Americans did inHiroshima - but precisely only they had a right to this "use value" of the bomb, all of those who have acquired it since will be

deterred from using it by the very fact of possessing it). Entry into the atomic club, so prettily named, very quickly

effaces(as unionization does in the working world) any inclination toward violent intervention. Responsibility,

control, censure, self-deterrence always grow more rapidlythan the forces or the weapons at our disposal: this isthe secret of the social order. Thus the very possibility of paralyzing a whole country by flicking a switch makes it so that the

electrical engineers will never use this weapon: the whole myth of the total and revolutionary strike crumbles at

the very moment when the means are available- but alas precisely because those means are available.Therein lies the whole process of deterrence. It is thus perfectly probable that one day we will see nuclear powers export atomic

reactors, weapons, and bombs to every latitude. Control by threat will be replaced by the more effective strategy

of pacification through the bomb and through the possession of the bomb.The "little" powers, believing thatthey are buying their independent striking force, will buy the virus of deterrence, of their own deterrence. The same goes for theatomic reactors that we have already sent them: so many neutron bombs knocking out all historical virulence, all risk of explosion.

In this sense, the nuclear everywhere inaugurates an accelerated process of implosion, it freezes

everything around it, it absorbs all living energy. The nuclear is at once the culminating point of

available energy and the maximization of energy control systems.Lockdown and control increase in directproportion to (and undoubtedly even faster than) liberating potentialities. This was already the aporia of the modern revolution. It isstill the absolute paradox of the nuclear. Energies freeze in their own fire, they deter themselves. One can no longer imagine what

project, what power, what strategy, what subject could exist behind this enclosure, this vast saturation of a system by its own forces,now neutralized, unusable, unintelligible, nonexplosive - except for the possibility of an explosion toward the center, of an implosionwhere all these energies would be abolished in a catastrophic process (in the literal sense, that is to say in the sense of a reversion ofthe whole cycle toward a minimal point, of a reversion of energies toward a minimal threshold).

Anthropology and discourse analysis is key to studying nuclear sciencesocialsciences are a fundamental aspect of understanding the global society

Gusterson 2008(Hugh-, Associate professor at MIT, currently an anthropologist at

GMU, specializes in nuclear culture and the anthropology of science, The virtualnuclear weapons laboratory in the New World Order, American Ethnologist Volume

28 Issue 2, 01/07/08, Acc: 07/05/12, LD)I am not attempting to predict the future, but to make the point that anthropology has a special contribution to make

to the kinds of policy debates on nuclear proliferation and the international systemanalyzed here, and thattheir discussion by anthropologists will enrich anthropology. The last decade in anthropology has seen the emergence of both theanthropology of science and the anthropology of the global system as energetic new fields of inquiry. In this article, located at the

confluence of these two fields, I seek to show new kinds of questions that anthropologists might now investigate. If there is a

danger in the current rash of interest in globalization, it is that anthropologists will enact their new

interest in studying global society in a way that subtly reinforces old disciplinary divisions of labor in

the academy while producing a skewed vision of global society. While the current global system is, as Arjun


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Appadurai (1996) has pointed out, characterized by flows of migrants, capital, and culture that undermine the integrity of the

nation-state and produce intriguing new forms of global hybridity, there are also processes at work that are

increasing the power and reach of state apparatuses, expanding the military firepower of national

governments, and deepening the psychic hold of nationalist ideologies. The emergent neoliberal world

order will surely be characterized not only by unprecedented mobility of capital, culture, and people,

but also by new arms races, wars, and militarist ideologies. By coining the new term (adapted from Appadurai's

own neologistic vocabulary on globalization) "securityscape," I have explored this second set of processes and joined those whocaution against prematurely hailing the supposed withering away of the state in the era of globalization. For too long,

anthropologists have conceded the study of security to political scientists, with unfortunate

consequences for both anthropology and discussions of security. This disciplinary division of labor emerged inthe academy after World War II and was reinforced by the painful fiasco of anthropology's secret involvement in Vietnama fiasco

that, once revealed, produced an allergic response to security issues in many anthropologists. But armies, weapons, wars,

and military ideologies are also important facets of the new global system taking shape as Fordism

and the Cold War security structure collapse and are remade by scientists, military officers, national

bureaucrats, and NGOs. Until anthropologists make the evolution of post-Cold War military institutions and ideologiesintegral to their narratives of globalization, they are not getting the whole story.

New methods of nuclear technology development privilege the international elite

Gusterson 2008(Hugh-, Associate professor at MIT, currently an anthropologist at

GMU, specializes in nuclear culture and the anthropology of science, The virtualnuclear weapons laboratory in the New World Order, American Ethnologist Volume28 Issue 2, 01/07/08, Acc: 07/05/12, LD)His understatement of the gross physical menace of nuclear weapons backhandedly legitimates the system of deterrence he claims to

oppose. Nevertheless, there is an important evolutionary insight in his writings on war, namely that, in an international

system partly organized aroundwhat Timothy Luke (1989) calls "postwarring," the use value of nuclear

weapons has been superseded by their exchange valuesuch that Strategic nuclear forces can be seen as elements of

a code, texts enscribed with meanings. . . . Nuclear weaponshave not been, and are not, called upon for use as weapons.

Instead, they are made operational to be continually exchanged. . . in "shows of force," "displays of capability,""proofs of credibility," or "displays of determination." [Luke 1989:219, 223] Of course, "postwarring" is a luxury not everyone canafford. 16 Against Baudrillard's tendency to speak of the hyperreal as a blanket condition that has fallen uniformly on the world, Iwould counterpose the insight of Der Derian (1994) and Kroker (1994) that virtual spaces are spaces of power not accessible to allalike. Just as within nations, some spaces at the side of the roadto use Kathleen Stewart's (1996) evocative phraseare left behind

by the information superhighway, so within the international system, some nations cannot afford the massive

simulacra of death the nuclear powers have used to sublimate their contests for precedence. And now,

just at the moment when rogue states threaten to upset the stratification of the international system

by acquiring nuclear weapons(the ultimate symbols of upward mobility in global society), a new zone of

stratification has been added. Whether one sees stockpile stewardshipas a way to develop new nuclear weapons orjust as a way to keep the old ones in good order, this new development in the international nuclear potlatch opens a space where

India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea cannot easily follow. A privileged few will have expensively maintained,

highly simulated advanced nuclear weapons supported by a massive infrastructure of weapons

scientists kept in top shape by their nuclear exercise machines, while the rest willunless willing to risk theopprobrium of their betters by engaging in the vulgar practice of nuclear testingbe left to cobble together crude devices too largeand clumsy to fit on missiles.


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Marxism

Their rejection of the capitalist world as a bad one ignores that we only have one

world- their pushes toward utopia ignore that we have to enjoy our world now

Buccola 09(Nicholas, Political Science Professor at Linfield College, The Tyranny of theLeast and the Dumbest: Nietzsches Critique of Socialism, Quarterly Journal ofIdeology, Jstor]

Socialism is another in a long line of idealist systems that are, on Nietzsches view, inherentlyflawed. Idealists, in short, reject this world and embrace another. The mischief of idealism beganwith Socrates and Plato, who created a world of Truth, or realm of Being, and in so doing broughtabout a denaturalization of moral values. As you will see below, this move is problematic for Nietzsche

for many reasons. For now, it will suffice to say he believed that overthrowing other-worldly ideals

was central to his craft. Idealism, in his view, deprived reality of its value, its meaning, itstruthfulness and, as such, Socrates represents a moment of the profoundest perversity in the history

of values (EH 2 and WP 430). The Grandfather of Socialist Thought: Christianity Although much could

be said about the relationship between Christianity and socialism, I will limit my consideration to two

major points of contribution. First, I discuss the relationship between Christian and socialist idealism.

This will include brief reflections on the striking parallels Nietzsche sees in the Christian and socialist

rejection of this world. Second, I explore the socialist adoption of the Christian idea of the equality of

souls before God. I will conclude this section with an exploration of why Nietzsche thought the socialist

ideal represents nothing but a clumsy misunderstanding of *the+ Christian moral ideal (WP 340). First,

Nietzsche identifies Christianity as an idealist philosophy that, like Platonism, rejects this world for

another. While Socrates and Plato contended that the realm of the Forms, or the World of Being, is

what really matters, Christians emphasize the importance of an eternal Kingdom of Heaven for

believers (WP 161). In both cases, it is worth noting that Bliss is not necessarily something that can be

achieved through a transformation of this world. Rather, both Plato and Jesus can be interpreted as

offering individuals a philosophy of life that they can establish within themselves. The essential point for

Nietzsche is this: the Christian, in typical idealist fashion, condemns, disparages, *and+ curses theworld (WP 373). According to Nietzsche, Christs emphasis on personal transformation was not sharedby St. Paul. Whereas primitive Christianity is, on Nietzsches reading, possible as the most private

form of existence, the Christianity of St. Paul is much more public and, thus, more like a political

doctrine (WP 211). Once we begin to view Christianity as a social doctrine instead of a personal one, we

can see how it can be read as a forerunner to socialism. Nietzsche saw the Christian slave revolt in

morality as quite similar to later political revolutions. Christianity offers the poor and lowly a gateway

to happiness and, for Nietzsche, to this extent the rise of Christianity is nothing more than the typical

socialist doctrine. The things of this world that the gospel passes judgment upon property, gain,fatherland, rank and status, tribunals, police, state, church, education, art, the army are all typical of

the socialist doctrine (WP 209). The second foundational contribution of Christianity to the socialist

doctrine is the idea of equality of souls before God. It is important to point out that Nietzsche is not

arguing that socialists accept the tenets of Christianity as a matter of faith. Rather, like so many political

actors throughout history, he thinks socialists are adept at using Christian ideas for their own

purposes: The socialists appeal to the Christian instincts; that is their most subtle piece ofshrewdness (WP 765). In The Antichrist, Nietzsche calls the equality of souls before God the pretext


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for the rancor of all base-minded, this explosive of a concept which eventually became revolution,

modern idea, and the principle of decline of the whole order of society (AC 162). Nietzsche traces the

warpath of this idea quite explicitly in Will to Power: mankind was first taught to stammer the

proposition of equality in a religious context, and only later was it made into morality: no wonder that

man ended by taking it seriously, taking it practically!that is to say, politically, democratically,

socialistically (WP 762). With these two foundational contributionsthe rejection of this world andthe equality of all soulsestablished, we can now turn to consider why it is that Nietzsche concludesthe socialist ideal is nothing but a clumsy misunderstanding of *the+ Christian moral ideal. While it istrue that Nietzsche identified socialism and other progressive theories as cults of Christian morality

under a new name, he thought that they fundamentally misunderstood Christianity (WP 340). What

was it that he thought the socialists misunderstood about the Christian moral ideal? These doctrines

represent misunderstandings of the Christian moral ideal because they transfer the arrival of the

kingdom of God into the future, on earth, in human form (WP 339). In Nietzsches mind, the

emergence of socialism and similar theories can,in part, be contributed to the death of God.Without the hope of glory in the next world, socialists and others seek to transform this one (WP 340).

The emergence of the socialist ideal is, in Nietzsches mind, part of our payment for having been

Christians for two thousand years (WP 30). For the complete development of the doctrine of this-

worldly transformation, though, we must turn away from the Christians and to the philosopher whoNietzsche identified as the bridge between Platonic-Christian idealism and the socialist idealism of the

nineteenth centuryJean-Jacques Rousseau.

Socialism/Communism is terrible it perpetuates political violence, rejects liberty, itsvery reactionary, and generates terrorism.

Schutte 84(Ofelia Schutte,1984, Professor of Existentialism at University of South

Florida, Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche Without Masks, Published by University of

Chicago Press, 7/4/12, K.H.)

Nietzsche's objections are twofold: firstly, he regards socialism as a doctrine of political violence that is

dangerous because it is based on a naive 'Rousseauian' morality of natural goodness; and, secondly,

he considers the socialist ambition of abolishing private property to represent a serious and un-

necessary attack on the liberty of the private person. He draws a connection between Plato and

socialism, and argues that both attempts to get rid of the individual right to own private property

would result in the destruction of the sentiments of vanity and egoism which must be allowed to play

their part in social life. He argues, that' Plato's Utopian basic tune, continued in our own day by the socialists,rests upon a defective knowledge of man' (WS 285). If all property is to become communal, then the individual will

not bestow on it the same care and self-sacrifice as he would if he owned il himself; instead he will treat it 'like a

robber or a dissolute squanderer' (ibid.). Nietzsche does not seek a completely politicized existence in which a

private realm of existence is abolished. On the contrary, he wishes to preserve a private/public di stinction. His

quarrel with modern liberal society is that, although its ideology of the privatisation of politics allows individuals a

tremendous degree of private freedom, it does so at the cost of undermining notions of culture and citizenship. A

second and more serious charge Nietzsche makes against socialism is that in its deepest instincts and

tendencies it is a reactionary ideology. It is, he argues, 'the fanciful younger brother of the almost

expired despotism whose heir it wants to be'(HAH 473). The reason for this, according to Nietzsche, is thatin order to bring about the transformation of society it desires, which will require a massive extension of social

control over the private life of individuals (in order to guarantee that they are 'good socialists'), socialism must desire

the kind of abundance of state power that one would normally associate with the most fearful despotism. He writes,

socialism outbids all the despotisms of the past inasmuch as ii expressly aspires to the annihilation of the individual,


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who appears to it like an unauthorized luxury of nature destined to be improved into a useful organ of the

cammuniljf,.. it desires a more complete subservience of the citizen to the absolute state than has ever existed before,

(ibid.). The real danger of socialism, Nietzsche argues, lies in its extreme terrorism. Given that religion

has declined and there is no longer any ethical or divine basis to the state, socialism, considered as an

impious and irreligious creed bent on the abolition of all existing states, can only exist through the

exercise of terrorism. Nietzsche attacks socialists for cultivating an atmosphere of fear and for 'driving

the word "justice" into the heads of the half-educated masses like a nail so as to rob them of theirreason... and to create in them a good conscience for the evil game they are to play'(ibid.).


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Universal Equality

Attempts to universally dismantle hierarchy are symptoms of a hostility towards life.

Only the alternative allows us to reject society without also rejecting reality.

Owen 02(David, Professor of Social and Political Theory at the University of

Southampton., Fall 2002, Equality, Democracy, and Self-Respect: Reflections on

Nietzsche's Agonal Perfectionism, Journal of Nietzsche Studies, No. 24,

http://www.jstor.org/stable/20717793 - oliver g)The different degrees of repression to which nobles and slaves are subject have two consequences to

which Nietzsche draws our attention. The first fea ture to which Nietzsche directs us is that precisely

because the slave is more deeply repressed, "[a] race of such men of ressentiment will inevitably end up

cleverer than any noble race, and will respect cleverness to a quite dif ferent degree as well: namely, as

a condition of existence of the first rank" (GM . 10). It is in this respect that Nietzsche comments: "The

history of mankind would be far too stupid a thing if it had not had the intellect [Geist] of the powerlessinjected into it" (GM .7). The initial significance of this cleverness emerges with respect to the second

issue of importance, namely, the slave revolt in morality. In contrast to the noble's consciousness of

power, which emerges from the pathos of distance that attends the social order of rank, the slave is

characterised by a consciousness of lack of power, which is expressed as ressentiment. The need to

make sense of their suffering as a class, on Nietzsche's account, drives the slaves both to reject the

noble style of valuation in which the slave is figured as lacking value (GM 1:10) and to identify the nobles

as the evil agents of their suffering (GM 1:13)?a move that requires the radical separation of agent and

act, which raw bad conscience makes possible. The cleverness of the slaveis given expression in the

cre ative moment of ressentiment which says "no" to the hostile, external world and fabricates the

idea of the freely choosing subject to allow the slave to engage in self-affirmation, albeit of a reactive

type(GM . 10). It is precisely through the fiction of the freely choosing subject that the impotence ofthe slave can generate "that sublime self-deception" which construes "weakness itself as freedom, and

their particular mode of existence as an accomplish menf (GM 1:13) andwhich simultaneously allows

the construal of the noble as evil(the claim that Nietzsche mocks in the parable of the lamb and beasts

of prey). The point I want to stress here is that the "imaginary revenge" through which the slave

compensates for "being denied the proper response of action" (GM 1:10) involves apathos of imaginary

distance, a reactive consciousness of power predicated on an imaginary inversion of the social order of

rank in which the highest virtues are those of "choosing" weakness(i.e., humility, patience, pity,

obedience, etc.)?the attributes that characterise the slave?and the lowest virtues are those of

"choosing" strength (Le, cruelty, murder, etc.)?the attributes that characterise the noble (particularly

from the slave's perspective). The importance of this point for the purposes of this essay becomes clear

with the movement from the slave revolt in morals to the construction of the ascetic ideal in Nietzsche's

account. The relevant feature of this movement is the development of a transcendental notion of the

freely choosing subject in which the slave's devaluation of the hostile external world is heightened

and secured through the construction of the distinction between real and apparent worlds. The

imaginary inversion of the social order of rank is constituted as revealed metaphysical truth?"the first

shall be last and the last shall be first." However, while this priestly move secures the reactive self-

affirmation of the slave, it makes possible a further development that resolves a problem raised by

the slave revolt in morals.The problem is that a mass characterised by ressentiment is unstable, facing

"the ever-present threat of the disintegration of the herd" (GM 111:15). This instablity is the result of


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ressentiment itself in the context of the slave's experience of Ufe as suffering (GM 131:15). Hence,

ressentiment threat ens sociality as such. It is to this problem that the priest's transcendental move

provides a solution. The separation of soul and flesh, mind and body, rational will and empirical desires,

allows the priest to redirect ressentiment: suffer, someone or other must be guilty' and every sick sheep

thinks the same. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest, says to him, 'Quite right, my sheep! Somebody

must be to blame: but you yourself are this somebody, you your self alone are to blame for it, you

yourself alone are to blame for yourself . . . That is bold enough, wrong enough: but at least one thing

has been achieved by it, the direction of ressentiment is, as I said?changed. (GM 111:15) Thus, the priest

exploits "the bad instincts of all sufferers for the purpose of self-discipline, self-surveillance and self-

overcoming" (GM 111:16). Why is this important? The cost is clear?a more thorough-going and radical

devalu ation of this-worldly existence. But this redirecting of ressentiment has a fundamental

implication for the possibility of a nobility (Le., standing to oneself as a sovereign individual)in which

the overhuman is not tied to the inhuman. The implication is that the redirecting of ressentiment

divorces the pathos of distance from any necessary relation to the social order of rank. Thus, while the

original creative thrust of ressentiment is expressed through an imaginary inversion of the social order

of rank, the consciousness of power that is manifest as "self-discipline, self-surveillance and self-

overcoming" is articulated through a pathos of metaphysical distance in which the opposition of spirit

to flesh, mind to body, rational will to empirical desires is given hierarchical and imperative form.What is crucial about this development is that it involves a reflexive ethical relationship of the self to

itself, which is not mediated through forms of social hierarchy.The significance of this devel opment is

twofold. On the one hand, it raises the possibility of a form of noble morality in which the

consciousness of power is similarly not predi cted on relations of social hierarchy. On the other hand,

it cultivates the capacities requisite to this possibility. Hence, the point of Nietzsche's presentation of

the figures of the overman (i.e., one who stands to himself as a sovereign individual) and the last man

(i.e., one who does not stand to him self as a sovereign individual) is to recommend an order of rank

appropriate to our post-moral situation that allows for the reflexive construction of "inner distance"

and, thus, in no way requires that the political form of society is aristocratic.


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Revolutions

Their notion of revolution is ignorant to the inevitable resurfacing of violence and

conflict.

Schutte 84 (Ofelia Schutte,1984, Professor of Existentialism at University of SouthFlorida, Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche Without Masks, Published by University of

Chicago Press, 7/4/12, K.H.)

t is here that Nietzsche first begins his archaeological excavation of the historical evolution of moral concepts and

judgements. Casting off the comforts of Schopenhauerian metaphysics he now supports modern philosophy in its

attack on all unexamined authority, whether that authority be religious and metaphysical, moral or political. He

supports the Enlightenment, but condemns any attempt to develop a philosophy of revolution out of

its challenge to illegitimate authority. An opposition between 'enlightenment' and 'revolution ' is

presented in terms of a contrast between Rousseau and Voltaire. For Nietzsche a philosophy of

revolution surfers from the delusion that once a social order has been overturned then 'the proudesttemple of fair humanity will at once rise up of its own accord*. The modern theory of revolution is

derived from Rousseau's belief that beneath the layers of civilisation there lies buried a natural

human goodness; the source of corruption lies not within man, in human nature, but in the

institutions of the state and society, and in education. Against this theory Nietzsche offers the

following warning and advice: The experiences of history have taught us, unfortunately, that every

such revolution brings about the resurrection of the most savage energies in the shape of the long-

buried dreadfulness and excesses of the most distant ages: that a revolution can thus be a source of

energy in mankind grown feeble but never a regulator, architect, artist, perfector of human nature.Itis not Voltaire's moderate nature, inclined as it was to ordering, purifying, and reconstructing, but Rousseau's

passionate follies and half-lies that called forth the optimistic spirit of the Revolution against which I cry:'Ecrasez

Tin/ame J* It is this spirit that has for a long time banished the spirit of Enlightenment and of progressive evolution:

let us see - each of us within himself - whether it is possible to call it back! {HAH 463)


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Breaking Down Hierarchies

Hierarchy and domination are inevitable aspects of existence. Strides toward

democracy and egalitarianism are merely consequences of a distortion of the will topower.

Aydin 07(Ciano, professor of Philosophy at Delft University of Technology and UD at

University of Twente. 2007, Nietzsche on Reality as Will to Power: Toward an"OrganizationStruggle" Model, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 33,http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v033/33.1aydin01.html -

oliver g)Commanding is essential in both the concept of power and the concept of will. The "to power"does

not add a separate element to the concept of will but, rather, accentuatesan essential feature of it,

namely, the always-being-on-the-way toward subduing another will."Will" and "power" presuppose

and imply each other. "Will to power" is one word.4 A question that emerges here is whether obeying,

the antonym of commanding, should be taken as a separate quality. That such is not the case is already

implied by the inherent relationality of the will to power. Identifying a power quantum as commanding

or as obeying depends on which relations are taken into account: in its relation to a weaker power

quantum it is commanding, whereas, at the same time, in its relation to a stronger power quantum it is

obeying. Another and probably a stronger argument against the conception that obeying is a separate

quality is that obeying cannot be taken as a fundamental drive, motive, or "ground" of existence.For

Nietzsche the "ground" of all living is activity; obeying is something secondary, an effect or result of

that primary quality.5 That a will to power is subdued by another will to power is, in other words, not

something that lies in its nature but, rather, is the result of their interaction(see KSA 13:14[79]). Both

are intrinsically inclined to command, but the stronger subdues the weaker. Moreover, "submitting

yourself" can,according to Nietzsche, sometimes also be a strategic move.6This also expresses thatthe desire to command is the only primary motive. The same applies to another form of reactivity,

which Nietzsche condemns frequently, namely, adaptation. According to him, "[L]ife is not adaptation of

inner to outer conditions, but will to power, which from within subordinates and incorporates ever more

of the 'external'" (KSA 12:7[9]). This does not change the fact that "hierarchical order," an order of

commanding and obeying, has cardinal importance in Nietzsche's doctrine of the will to power.

Hierarchical order is the result of an interaction between wills to[End Page 28] power, which is

accompained by reciprocal assessment(cf.KSA 11:25[426]). According to Nietzsche, we have to

attribute to all force a kind of intelligence, which he denotes as a preconscious "recognizing and

inferring" (KSA 9:10[F101]). This recognizing and inferring involves reciprocally assessing or judging

wills to power on the basis of strength, whereupon "decisions" are made to subdue or be subdued.

This is no passive exploring, but rather involves immediate action. Recognizing and inferring is a unifiedprocess in which both elements are executed at the same time.These elements cannot be expressions

of two different qualities; there is only one quality, one motive: the desire to overpower.A second

implication of Nietzsche's homogenization of reality is that there is no fundamental difference between

the organic and the inorganic: "the will to power [. . .] also dictates the inorganic world, or rather, [. . .]

there is no inorganic world" (KSA 11:34[247]; cf. KSA 11:26[274], 11:36[21]). The notion of recognizing

and inferring presupposes that all forces are similar; otherwise recognizing and inferring would not be

possible. The result of the reciprocal judging, accompanied by processes of submission, is a


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hierarchical order that manifests itself in different forms of reality. All reality is the result of these

processes of measuring and subduing, respectively, of a continuously changing hierarchical order, of

smaller and bigger coups(see KSA 13:14[81], 13:14[98]). Change can be the symptom of both the

establishment of a new hierarchical order (which I call "substantializing") and the collapse of an old

order (which I call "de-substantializing"). One should continuously keep in mind here that all these

processesmeasuring, order, (de)substantializing, and the rise and fall of different forms of reality that

accompany themhave no reality beside or outside the will to power. They are all manifestations of

it. Will to power individualizes itself in different appearances.7Nietzsche's ontology aims to clarify

how the processes of individuation proceedthat is, how a variable and relational multiplicity arranges

itself, decays, and rearranges itself in different directions and in multifarious ways, how different

functions and phenomena form and decay, which we can see in Nietzsche's conception of organization.


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Animals/Nature are people too!

Treating nature like an interactive subject is just a trick to solidify humanisms ability

to determine the ontological status of all things. Let nature be an object, free ofresponsibility and expectations.

Jean Baudrillard 94(L'Autre par lui-mme , or professor at, Universit de Paris-X

Nanterre, The Illusion of the End: Maleficent Ecology, Stanford University Press, Dec1, 1994, ISBN: 0804725012, p 80)-JN-WE DO NOT ENDORSE GENDERED LANGUAGE.

Hence the recent proposal, following this same logic, from the moment it achieved the status of virtual waste-product, to accord nature

international recognition of its rights, to elevate it to the status of a subject in law. Thus the contra nature" amounts to a definitive recognition

of nature as waste. Just as, in bygone days, the recognition of the rights of the unfortunate meant not their

emancipation as citizens, but their liberation as the unfortunate.It is always the same with rights: the

right to water, the right to air, the right to existence, etc.It is

whenall

thesefine

things have disappeared

that the law arrives to grant their disappearance official recognition.The law is like religious faith. If God exists, there

is no need to believe in Him. If people do believe in Him, this is because the self-evidence of his existence has passed away. Thus, when

people obtain the right to life, the fact is that they are no longer able to live.When nature is

recognized as a subject in law, as it is by Michel Serres, we have objectified it to death, and this ecological

cover merely asserts our right to go on doing so.All this has been brought about by the highly dubious way in which the

concept of nature has evolved. What was initially matter became energy. The modern discovery of nature consists in its

liberation as energy and in a mechanical transformation of the world.After having first been matter,

and then energy, nature is today becoming an interactive subject.It is ceasing to be an object, but this is bringing it

all the more surely into the circuit of subjection. A dramatic paradox, and one which also affects human beings: we aremuch more

compromised when we cease to be objects and become subjects.Thisis a trick that was pulled on us long

ago, in the name of absolute liberation.Let's not pull the same one on nature.For the ultimate danger is that,

in an interactivity built up into a total system of communication, there is no other; there are onlysubjects- and, very soon, only subjects without objects.All our problems today as civilized beings originate here: not in an excessof alienation, but a disappearance of alienation in favour of a maximum transparency between subjects. An unbearable situation, all the more

so for the fact that, in foisting on nature the status of a subject in law, we are also foisting on it all the vices

of subjectivity, decking it out, in our own image, with a bad conscience, with nostalgia (for a lost object which, in this case, can only beus), with a range of drives - in particular, an impulse for revenge.


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Environmentalism Link/Impact

Feeling bad about exploiting nature and attempting to reconcile with nature causes

humans to hate themselves because we fail to stop catastrophes. We wonder why

nature hurts us with catastrophe after catastrophe. This leads to biological andnuclear destruction because we begin to desire mass suicide.

Jean Baudrillard 94(L'Autre par lui-mme , or professor at, Universit de Paris-X

Nanterre, The Illusion of the End: Maleficent Ecology, Stanford University Press, Dec1, 1994, ISBN: 0804725012, p 81-84)

The 'balance' we hear so much of in ecology('out of balance') is not so much that of planetary resources and

their exploitation as the metaphysical one between subject and object.Now, that metaphysical subject

object balance is being upset and the subject, armedas he is with all the technologies of advanced

communication(technologies on whose horizon the object has disappeared), is the beneficiary. Oncethat balance is

disrupted, itinevitably sparks violent reactions on the part of the object. Just as individuals counter the transparencyand virtual responsibility inflicted on them as subjects with unexplainable acts, acts of resistance, failure, delinquency and collective disorder,

so nature counters thisenforced promotion, this consensual, communicational blackmail, with various forms of behaviour

that areradically other, such as catastrophes, upheavals, earthquakes and chaos.It would seem that nature

does not really feel a sense of responsibility for itself, nor does it react to our efforts to give it one. We

are, admittedly, indulging in" a (bad) ecological conscience and attempting, bythis moral violence, to stave

off possible violence on nature's part.But if, by offering it the status of subject, we are handing it the

same poisoned chalice as we gave to the decolonized nations, we ought not to be surprised if it

behaves irrationally merely so as to assert itself as such.Contrary to the underlying Rousseauist ideology, which argues

that the profound nature of the liberated subject can only be good and that natureitself, once emancipated, cannot but be

endowed with natural equilibrium and all the ecological virtues, there is nothing more ambiguous or perverse than asubject. Now, nature is also germs, viruses, chaos, bacteria and scorpions, significantly eliminated from Biosphere 2 as though they were not

meant to exist. Where are the deadly little scorpions, so beautiful and so translucent, which one sees in the Desert Museum not far away,

scorpions whose magical sting certainly performs a higher, invisiblebut necessary function within our Biosphere 1: the incarnation of evil, of

the venomous evil of chance, the mortal innocence of desire (the desire for death) in the equilibrium of living beings? What they have

forgotten is that what binds living beings together is something other than an ecological, biospherical

solidarity, something other than the homeostatic equilibrium of a system: it is the cycle of

metamorphoses.Man is also a scorpion, just as the Bororo are araras and, left to himself in an expurgated universe, he

becomes, himself, a scorpion. In short, it is not by expurgating evil that we liberate good. Worse, by liberating

good, we also liberate evil.And this is only right: it is the rule of the symbolic game. It is the inseparability of

good and evil which constitutes our true equilibrium, our true balance.We ought not to entertain the

illusion that we might separate the two, that we might cultivate goodand happiness in a pure state and expel

eviland sorrow as wastes. That is the terroristic dream of the transparency of good, which very quickly ends in its opposite, the transparency

of evil. We must not reconcile ourselves with nature. It seems that the more the human race reconcilesitselfwith nature, the less it is reconciled with itself.Above and beyond the violence it inflicts on others, there is a violence specificto the human race in general, a violence of the species against itself in which it treats itself as a residue, as a survivor - even in the present - of a

coming catastrophe. As if it too were ready to repent of an evolution which has brought it such privileges and carried it to such extremes. This is

the same conjuncture as the one to which Canetti refers, in which we stepped out of history, except that here wehave not stepped out of

history, but have passed a point beyond which nothing is either human or inhumanany longer and what is at

stake, which is even more immense, is the tottering of the species into the void.It isquite possible that, in this

process, the speciesitself is commencing its own disappearance, either bydisenchantment with - or ressentiment

towards- itself, or out of a deliberate inclination which leads it here and now to manage that disappearance as its destiny. Surreptitiously,


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in spite of our superiority(or perhaps because of it), we are carrying over on to our own species the

treatment we mete out to the others, all of which are virtually dying out. In an animal milieu which has reached saturation point,

species are spontaneously dissuaded from living. The effects produced by the finite nature of the earth, for the first time

contrasting violently with the infinity of our development, are such that our species isautomatically switching over to

collective suicide.Whether by external (nuclear) violence or internal (biological) virulence.We are

subjecting ourselves as a human species to the same experimental pressure as the animal species in our laboratories. Manis without

prejudice: he is using himself as a guinea-pig,just as he is using the rest of the world, animate or inanimate. He is cheerfully

gambling with the destiny of hisown species as he is with that of all the others.In his blind desire to know more,

he is programming his own destruction with the same ease and ferocity as the destruction of the

others.He cannot be accused of a superior egoism. He is sacrificing himself, as a species, to an unknown

experimental fate, unknown at least as yet to other species, who have experienced only natural fates. And, whereas it seemed that, linkedto that natural fate, there was something like an instinct of self-preservation - long the mainstay of a natural philosophy of individuals and

groups - this experimental fate to which the human species is condemning itself byunprecedented, artificial

means, this scientific prefiguring of its own disappearance, sweeps away all ideas of a self-preservation instinct.Theidea is, indeed, no longer discussed in the human sciences (where the focus of attention would seem, rather, to be on the death drive) and

this disappearance from the field of thought signals that, beneath a frenzy for ecological conservation

which is really more to do with nostalgia and remose, a wholly different tendency has already won

out, the sacrificing of the species to boundless experimentation.


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Survivalism

Our obsession with survival is unnaturaldeath is the natural part of life. We areforced to live a dead life to survive. In our fear of death, we attempt to stabilize the

earth, embalming ourselves in life. There must be some sort of accident, a break fromthe system, which smashes our stasis.

Jean Baudrillard 7(L'Autre par lui-mme, or professor at, Universit de Paris-X

Nanterre, IJBS, Volume 4, Number 2; July, 2007; Darwins Artificial Ancestors and theTerroristic Dream of the Transparency of the Good; Jean Baudrillard; Paris, France)-JN-

WE DO NOT ENDORSE GENDERED LANGUAGE.

It is generally thought that the obsession with survival is a logical consequence of life and the right to

life.But, most of the time, the two things are contradictory.Life is not a question of rights, andwhat

follows on from life is not survival, which is artificial, but death.It is only by paying the price of a

failure to live, a failure to take pleasure, a failure to die that man is assured

Nietzsche K UNT 2012

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