Kenmerk: TEN DM-#192382 Zienswijze TAQA m.b.t ... Page 1 of 11 Autoriteit Consument & Markt Ter...

Registered in Alkmaar, The Netherlands Chamber of Commerce No. 27149802 VAT No. NL8204.09.480B01

TAQA Energy B.V. Kruseman van Eltenweg 1, 1817 BC Alkmaar, The Netherlands

P.O. Box 233, 1800 AE Alkmaar, The Netherlands T +31 88 8272 500

www.taqaglobal.com

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Autoriteit Consument & Markt Ter attentie van de Directie Energie Postbus 16326 2500 BH DEN HAAG Tevens per email [email protected] En per fax aan +31 70 7222 355

28 mei 2018

Kenmerk: TEN_DM-#192382 Zienswijze TAQA m.b.t. ontwerpcodebesluit ter uitvoering van NC-TAR - ACM/14/023224

Geachte ACM,

TAQA dankt de ACM voor de geboden gelegenheid om een zienswijze in te dienen met betrekking tot het ontwerpcodebesluit ter uitvoering van NC-TAR, gepubliceerd in maart 2018, hierna ook aan te duiden met: “OCB NCTAR”. TAQA is bijzonder geïnteresseerd in deze kwestie. TAQA is beheerder van twee grote gasopslagen (Bergermeer en Alkmaar PGI).

1. INLEIDING

1.1 Bij de huidige transporttarieven is het niet mogelijk gasopslagen onder economische voorwaarden te beheren, onderhouden en ontwikkelen. Voor de meeste eindgebruikers zijn transporttarieven gemiddeld belangrijk. Transport is nauw verbonden met de prijs van de commodity, het gas, en de (dagelijks fluctuerende) gasprijs is vele malen hoger dan de transportkosten. Transportkosten liggen gemiddeld rond één (1) procent van de all-in prijs. Anders gasopslagen. Voor gasopslagen zijn inkomsten het verschil tussen zomer en winterprijs van gas, met een kleine multiplier. Bij een (gemiddeld, opgeteld) entry plus exit-tarief van rond de één (1) euro per MWh en een huidig verschil in zomer en winterprijs van ongeveer gelijke hoogte, zijn de GTS-tarieven gelijk aan ongeveer 80% van de omzet, en is normale bedrijfsvoering niet mogelijk. Het Kyos-rapport 20171, gemaakt in opdracht van de ACM, bevestigt dit.

1.2 Het besluit van de Nederlandse regering om Groningenproductie te minimaliseren en geleidelijk ‘van gas af te gaan’, heeft grote gevolgen voor de transmissietarieven. Bij ongewijzigd ACM-beleid zullen de tarieven jaar op jaar stijgen. In de huidige ACM-methodologie staat prijs immers los van vraag. Prijsstijging bij afnemende vraag verhoudt zich slecht met het doel van tariefregulering. Tariefregulering dient om een prijs tot stand te brengen die vergelijkbaar is met een prijs bij efficiënte concurrentie. De prijs daalt in de regel bij afnemende vraag. De implementatie van NCTAR biedt mogelijkheden om de systeemfout (stijgende prijzen bij afnemende vraag) te adresseren. En de mogelijkheid om te proberen transportboekingen (GTS-omzet) op peil te houden. Bijvoorbeeld door transit te stimuleren.

1 Report “Assessment on the level of transport costs for gas storages in the Netherlands”, d.d. 26 sept. 2017.


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1.3 Het genoemde overheidsbeleid is mede ingegeven door milieu- en duurzaamheids-doelstellingen, en onderdeel van de energietransitie. NCTAR-implementatie biedt mogelijkheden om ook deze doelen te dienen. In het bijzonder door gebruik (exit) relatief zwaarder te belasten dan invoeden van gas (de 0/100 split).

1.4 Minimalisatie van de Groningenproductie leidt ertoe, dat de Nederlandse productie op afzienbare termijn niet meer voldoende zal zijn voor de Nederlandse vraag. En het leidt uiteraard tot afname van flexibiliteit in het GTS-systeem. Groningen vervulde immers altijd de rol van swing leverancier. Dit heeft veel negatieve gevolgen voor de gasmarkt. Leveringszekerheid. Piekcapaciteit. Maar ook afname van liquiditeit op de TTF-hub met negatieve gevolgen voor prijsvorming, en dus voor commodity prijzen en marktsignalen. NCTAR-implementatie zou ook gebruikt kunnen worden om dit risico te mitigeren. Opnieuw lijkt de 0/100 entry-exit split een geschikte methode. Enerzijds is de nul procent entry een stimulans voor Nederlandse kleine veldenproductie, en ontwikkeling van groen gas. Anderzijds is het gunstig voor de instandhouding van de huidige opslagcapaciteit. En voor het gebruik van deze capaciteit, zodat - als voorbeeld- het gas er daadwerkelijk in de opslag zit als het nodig is.

1.5 Tenslotte is aannemelijk, maar op dit moment nog in onderzoek, dat opslagen kunnen helpen ter beheersing van de te verwachten volumetekorten in Groningen-kwaliteit gas. Bijvoorbeeld door opslagen te gebruiken voor omzetting van hoog naar laagcalorisch gas. Ook vanuit dat oogpunt zou de tariefregulering oog moeten hebben voor instandhouding van de opslagcapaciteit. Dat gaat niet alleen over tegengaan van sluiten/ontmantelen van opslagen. Oók over de onderhouds- en ontwikkelingsinvesteringen en gebruik, zoals in het vorige nummer aangegeven.

2. GASOPSLAGEN

Algemeen, voordelen van gasopslagen voor het systeem

2.1 In deze zienswijze zal TAQA regelmatig verwijzen naar het vertrouwelijke rapport: Pöyry, gas storage market failures, d.d. september 2017, dat is aangehecht (“Pöyry”). De conclusies van het rapport zijn wel openbaar https://www.gie.eu/index.php/gie-publications/position-papers.

2.2 Gasopslagen bieden leveranciers en handelaren op de gasmarkt flexibiliteit. Deze partijen kunnen aardgas opslaan in een tijd dat de vraag naar gas of de marktprijs van gas laag is. Zij kunnen vervolgens gas uit de gasopslagen laten halen als de vraag naar gas hoog is (bijvoorbeeld in de winter). Gasopslagen in Nederland concurreren met gasopslagen in omringende landen. Tevens concurreren gasopslagen met andere vormen van flexibiliteit, zoals de import van gas, LNG en productieflexibiliteit (het tijdelijk verhogen of verlagen van de productie van gasvelden). Zie Pöyry slide 5.

2.3 Gasopslagen leveren een belangrijke bijdrage aan de leveringszekerheid van gas, de ontwikkeling en verdere integratie van de energiemarkten en een efficiënt netbeheer. Een gasopslag maakt het voor leveranciers van gas mogelijk gas fysiek op te slaan in de buurt van de eindverbruikers, waardoor onderbrekingen in productie- en importstromen opgevangen kunnen worden. Gasopslagen zijn daarnaast belangrijk voor de inpassing van hernieuwbare energie. Mede dankzij de flexibiliteitsfunctie van gasopslagen zijn elektriciteitscentrales die gas als brandstof gebruiken in staat de productie van elektriciteit


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snel op en af te regelen naar gelang de vraag, die sterk kan variëren als gevolg van het sterk wisselende aanbod van zon- en windenergie. De inzet van gasopslagen trekt verder gasstromen aan en verbetert de liquiditeit van de energiemarkten, waardoor een scherpere energieprijs tot stand komt. Dit leidt weer tot efficiënt gebruik van middelen. Zie Pöyry slide 6,

2.4 Gasopslagen zorgen er bovendien voor dat bespaard kan worden op de kosten van (de aanleg van) het gastransportnet: doordat gasopslagen worden gebouwd dicht bij de plaatsen waar veel vraag naar gas is, is minder transportcapaciteit in het gasnet nodig. Zie Pöyry slides 6/22.

2.5 In dit verband verwijst TAQA naar onderstaand schema, dat in het algemeen geldt voor gasopslagen, en vanwege de locatie voor TAQA’s opslagen in het bijzonder. Dit schema toont de dimensionering van twee systemen. Het rechter systeem heeft opslag, en kan daarom goedkoper en efficiënter zijn.

2.6 Deze gedachte is ook terug te vinden in de Initial impact assessment behorende bij de Framework Guidelines on Harmonised transmission tariff structures (pagina 18 en verder) van ACER:

“Gas storage is somewhat different from other entry-exit points, because it is not a net source of demand or supply but rather shifts consumption from one period to another. Suppose that gas must travel some distance from the border to a centre of demand, and that a storage facility is built close to the demand centre. Absent the storage, the TSO will have to size the import pipeline to supply the peak demand. With gas storage, the pipeline can be sized for the average demand, and the storage can make up the differences between the actual and average demand. In this way the storage allows a reduction in the size and cost of the required import pipeline.

2.7 Ook ACM heeft onderkend dat gasopslagen een besparing van transportkosten mogelijk maken. In dit verband wijst TAQA op paragraaf 31 van het besluit van ACM2 tot wijziging van onder andere de Tarievencode, waarbij een korting op de transporttarieven voor gasopslagen is geïntroduceerd met de volgende onderbouwing:

2 ACM, 12 december 2013, ACM/DE/2013/206684


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“In dit verband wijst ACM er op dat de verruiming van het aanbod van flexibiliteit door het gebruik van gasopslagen in Nederland met zich mee brengt dat de noodzakelijke capaciteit in het gastransportnet voor een groter gedeelte kan worden ingesteld op de gemiddelde vraag naar gas, dan op de piekvraag. Gasopslagen worden namelijk in de regel gevuld op de momenten waarop de vraag naar gas beperkt is (bij seizoensopslagen in de zomer, bij korte termijn opslagen in de nacht of het weekend). Dit leidt tot een beperking van de benodigde capaciteit en daardoor kunnen ook kosten worden uitgespaard voor uitbreiding van het gastransportnet. In dit opzicht draagt het voorstel dan ook bij aan een goed en doelmatig functioneren van het gastransportsysteem.”

2.8 In genoemd besluit erkent ACM de specifieke rol die gasopslagen hebben. ACM erkent ook dat gasopslagen leiden tot een beperking van de benodigde transportcapaciteit, waardoor GTS kosten kan uitsparen. De consequentie hiervan is niet alleen dat gasopslagen in aanmerking moeten komen voor een reductie op de transporttarieven ten opzichte van het transport van gas naar andere aansluitingen, maar - in beginsel - dat gasopslagen in de buurt van de concentratie van de vraag naar gas in aanmerking moeten komen voor lagere transporttarieven dan gasopslagen die ver van de concentratie van de vraag naar gas zijn gelegen. TAQA’s gasopslagen liggen nabij Amsterdam in Noord-Holland. In de buurt van de Randstad waar het grootste gedeelte van het aardgas in Nederland verbruikt wordt en de piekvraag met de grootste maatschappelijke invloed is. De ligging maakt dat TAQA’s gasopslagen de grootste kostenvoordelen voor het trasmissienet opleveren. Dit is een van de onderwerpen in de lopende (CBb) procedures over alle tarievenbesluiten vanaf 2014.

Tarieven voor gasopslagen

2.9 Een ongecorrigeerde tariefmethode laat gasopslagen dubbel betalen. NCTAR beperkt het dubbel betalen in artikel 9, dat de mogelijkheid geeft om 100 tot 50% korting vast te stellen. Bij de eerste binnenkomst in het transmissiesysteem wordt al entry betaalt. En als het gas het systeem van GTS definitief verlaat, wordt exit betaalt. Alles wat hier tussenin aan de gasopslag als entry- en exit tarief in rekening wordt gebracht is dubbel. Aldus licht de Duitse NRA ‘dubbel betalen’ toe, zie hieronder nr. 5.6. Het kan ook op een andere manier worden gevisualiseerd. Gasopslagen hebben, net als bijvoorbeeld industriepunt maar één aftakking van het gastransmissienet (aansluitpunt). Als de gasopslag op dat punt exit-capaciteit boekt, wordt daarmee al de volledige aan dat punt toe te rekenen kapitaalskosten van het net in rekening gebracht3. Als op hetzelfde punt ook entry wordt geboekt, en dat moet nu eenmaal bij gasopslagen, dan worden de via de entry boeking al betaalde kapitaalskosten nogmaals in rekening gebracht.

2.10 De inkomsten van gasopslagen zijn gebaseerd op de waarde van de flexibiliteit die zij aan de gas commoditymarkt leveren. Helaas worden eigenaren van gasopslagen niet betaald voor de bijdrage aan leveringszekerheid en systeemflexibiliteit, hierboven, en in NCTAR benoemd. Om dit marktfalen te corrigeren kunnen lagere transport-tarieven voor gasopslagen worden ingezet (Pöyry slide 11). Daarvoor is te meer reden omdat het in de huidige markt niet mogelijk is de opslagen economisch te exploiteren. Dat leidt tot afname van investeringen in bestaande gasopslagen, wat de betrouwbaarheid en innovatie schaadt, tot onderbenutting, en uiteindelijke tot sluiting van de gasopslagen.

3 Transportarieven zijn voornamelijk op kapitaalskosten gebaseerd.


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Cijfers

2.11 Onder de huidige tariefregulering zijn de gezamenlijke gasopslagen goed voor 15% van de omzet van GTS. TAQA’s gasopslagen zijn goed voor circa 5% van de GTS omzet. De TAQA GTS-omzet is in grootte vergelijkbaar met bijvoorbeeld de gezamenlijke omzet van de aangeslotenen die door VEMW worden vertegenwoordigd.

3. JURIDISCHE KADERS

3.1 NCTAR moet op 31 mei 2019 zijn ingevoerd. Omdat artikel 28(5) NCTAR regelt dat er geen tariefbreuk mag zijn voor het jaar 2019, is het wenselijk dat de nieuwe methodiek op 1 januari 2019 in gaat. Andere oplossingen om 31 mei 2019 te halen zijn omslachtiger, maar mogelijk.

3.2 Door implementatie van NCTAR zal de ACM eindelijk afscheid kunnen nemen van haar huidige ‘onnavolgbare methode’. ‘Geen navolgbare methode’ zijn de eigen woorden van de ACM waarmee ze haar eigen geldende methodologie omschrijft in het Informatie Document NCTAR 2018. Naar verwachting zal het CBb in de procedures over alle tarieven vanaf 2014 deze ‘niet navolgbare’ methodologie afkeuren. Wellicht kan de methode die uit deze consultatie gaat volgen, met terugwerkende kracht ook het verleden herstellen.

3.3 De nieuwe methodologie moet uiteraard aan NCTAR voldoen, maar ook aan de Gasverordening en de Gasrichtlijn, en andere EU-regelgeving van gelijke of hogere rang. Dit maakt dat de eerdergenoemde milieu- en duurzaamheidsdoelstellingen van de centrale overheid een rol mogen spelen, naast bijvoorbeeld de lijst van artikel 13 Gasverordening. Vgl. art. 12f lid 1 aanhef en onder b Gaswet. En ook de ACM-publicatie ‘de rol van de ACM in de Energietransitie’ (website ACM). Bij de nieuwe methodologie hoort een afweging tussen korte termijn en lange termijn baten voor consumenten. Het in stand houden van de bestande infrastructuur door uit te gaan van een redelijk rendement op investeringen daarin, is redelijk. In het algemeen geldt een dergelijk uitgangspunt voor gereguleerde infrastructuur, omdat de NRA daarvoor tarieven vaststelt. Vgl. in dit verband bijvoorbeeld de ACM-publicatie ‘Strategie ACM’, 2014 p.6 bovenaan (website ACM). Gegeven de significantie van de transmissietarieven voor het rendement van opslagen en de algemene nutfunctie van opslagen, geldt dit uitgangspunt ook voor tarieven ‘voor’ gasopslagen. D.w.z. de GTS-tarieven op de gasopslag entry- en exitpunten.

3.4 De belangrijkste keuzes voor de nieuwe referentieprijsmethodologie die nog open staan lijken te zijn:

3.4.1 Entry-exit split. NCTAR geeft daarvoor geen regels bij een postzegeltarief. Wel bij CGA: artikel 8.1(e) NCTAR; en

3.4.2 Korting voor gasopslagen. Artikel 9 NCTAR.

Deze worden hieronder eerst besproken.

4. ENTRY/EXIT SPLIT

4.1 Voor TAQA is de entry-exit split een zeer belangrijk onderdeel van het OCB NCTAR. (Ook) de entry-exit split moet redelijk, niet discriminerend en verklaarbaar zijn. Vanuit de huidige ontwikkelingen op de gasmarkt is een 0% entry, 100% exit split (het GTS-voorstel) het beste.


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4.2 Ook Elektriciteit heeft een 0/100 verdeling. Daar werkt het. En bij het maken van keuzes, is veel te zeggen voor uniformiteit.

4.3 De 0/100 split, tarifering van exit, is gunstig voor het terugdringen van gasgebruik. Dit is een belangrijke energietransitie-doelstelling. En het valt samen met het besluit tot minimalisering van de gaswinning uit Groningen, dat noopt tot beperking van gasgebruik. Ter beperking van het risico dat leveringszekerheid in gevaar komt. Sturing door beprijzen van gebruik, dus 100% belasting van exit, lijkt aangewezen.

4.4 Vanuit gasaanbod sluit verlaging van entry kosten aan op het beleid gericht op minimalisering van gaswinning uit Groningen. De belangrijke leverancier van gas en van flexibiliteit valt gedeeltelijk weg. Aangezien vermindering van gasverbruik achter zal blijven bij de vermindering van aanbod uit Groningen, is extra gasaanbod nodig. Het stimuleren van aanbod, bijvoorbeeld uit Nederlandse kleine velden, vermindert het risico op gastekorten. Hetzelfde geld voor piekcapaciteit. En een 0-entry tarief stimuleert de ontwikkeling van biogas en kan daarmee bijdragen aan de energietransitie.

4.5 De Gasrichtlijn geeft de NRA de taak om milieu, duurzaamheid en leveringszekerheid mee te laten wegen in de beslissing. En artikel 12f lid 1 aanhef en onder b Gaswet bepaalt dat de ACM het belang van het betrouwbaar, duurzaam, doelmatig en milieuhygiënisch verantwoord functioneren van de gasvoorziening in acht neemt bij de tarievencodewijziging.

4.6 Overigens vallen de netto-effecten voor de verbruikers van gas mee. Allereerst zal verlaging van entry kosten kunnen leiden tot een efficiëntere (lagere) groothandelsprijs. Vergelijk Brattle calculaties t.b.v. GTS (GTS website, NC TAR implementation process). Verder zal ook de door GTS voorziene toename van het gebruik van het transmissienet tot lagere eenheidsprijzen kunnen leiden. En uiteindelijk worden alle transportkosten, in beginsel, toch aan eindgebruikers doorbelast. Dit zou enigszins tegemoet kunnen komen aan de bezwaren van bijvoorbeeld VEMW.

4.7 In OCB NCTAR 64 overweegt de ACM dat de GTS kosten van de entry dienst min of meer gelijk zijn aan die van de exit dienst. Die (niet onderbouwde) veronderstelling is onjuist. En een daarop voortbouwende keuze voor een 50/50 split in strijd met de o.m. de Gasverordening. De exit punten zijn bij lange na niet verantwoordelijk voor 50% van de kosten. Om te beginnen zijn er maar circa 84 entry punten ten opzichte van circa 1031 exit punten (Bron: GTS tarieven 2018, als vastgesteld door de ACM). Verder is het Regionale net van GTS (in 2016 en 2017 ondergebracht in Gasunie Grid Service B.V.) vrijwel alleen in gebruik door afnemers, dus exit. Zowel vanuit kapitaalskosten als vanuit operationele kosten zou een 50/50 verhouding discrimineren en kruissubsidiëren en dus niet juist zijn, omdat ongelijke gevallen daarbij gelijk worden behandeld. Een nadere analyse van de kapitaalkosten en operationele kosten van GTS zoals vermeld in het jaarverslag van 2016 en 2017 komt tot een kosten verdeling in de orde van ~70% exit en 30% entry. Tenslotte, het woord ‘verplicht’ in OCB nr. 64 is niet zo gelukkig gekozen. De ‘verplichting’ is alleen het verschaffen van de informatie onder artikel 30 NCTAR.

4.8 Ook nr. 68 van het OCB NCTAR, hieronder geciteerd, is niet juist. Er is vanuit Europees perspectief niets op tegen om een 0/100 split in te voeren. Dit is het voorstel van GTS handelend als een onderneming in de efficiënte en concurrerende markt. De Europese regulering dient alleen te corrigeren waar GTS de tucht van de markt niet voelt. Niet, zoals


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hier, waar zij juist op grond van marktsignalen wil concurreren. Er is op het eerste gezicht geen aanleiding om verstoring van de grensoverschrijdende gashandel te verwachten, en zonder uitgebreide marktanalyse, die ontbreekt, is er geen enkele reden waarom de ACM dit zou moeten aannemen. Verlaging van tarieven op interconnectiepunten is in principe goed voor grensoverschrijdende handel. En het voorstel leidt naar alle waarschijnlijkheid tot beter gebruik van bestaande infrastructuur en valt ook daarom toe te juichen.

68. Tot slot merkt de ACM op dat het door GTS aangevoerde streven om gasstromen naar Nederland aan te trekken ook niet als een algemeen publiek belang kan worden beschouwd ter behartiging waarvan NC-TAR en de Gasverordening in het leven zijn geroepen. In tegendeel zelfs: het aantrekken van gasstromen, met het inzetten van niet daartoe geëigende instrumenten, ten koste van het volume van andere Europese transmissiesystemen, lijkt zonder meer in strijd met de Europese markt- en harmonisatiegedachte, en in strijd met het vereiste dat tarieven bevorderlijk moeten zijn voor de efficiënte handel en het verbod op verstoring van de grensoverschrijdende handel. De ACM kan bij het implementeren van NCTAR dit belang dan ook niet als algemeen publiek belang in overweging nemen.

4.9 Nr. 68 van OCB NCTAR inzake Julianadorp is niet proportioneel. Issues rond Julianadorp gaan niet boven het ontwikkelen van een goede methodiek. Mocht opheffen van de tarifering op Julianadorp al standhouden, wat niet waarschijnlijk lijkt, dan zijn er minder vergaande oplossingen dan het tegenhouden van de 0/100 split. De procedures over Julianadorp lopen nog, evenals de door de in april 2018 door de ACM-geïnitieerde codewijzigingsprocedure omtrent vaststelling van entry en exit punten.

4.10 TAQA steunt dus van harte het GTS-voorstel voor een 0/100 entry-exit split. Mocht de ACM niet zóver willen gaan, dan ligt er een compromis als 30/70 in de rede. Veelal wordt 35/65 genoemd als een realistische kapitaalskosten toerekening. De onzekerheid over de precieze allocatie van kapitaalkosten kan niet gebruikt worden om richting entry te schuiven. Schuiven richting 0/100 is daarentegen wel toegestaan als dit is gebaseerd op bovengenoemd beleid om verbruik te belasten, in het kader van duurzaamheid, milieu en het voorkomen van schaarste en gevaar voor leveringszekerheid, vandaar 30/70.

5. KORTING VOOR GASOPSLAGEN

50% korting is te laag

5.1 TAQA en VGN wijzen er al geruime tijd op dat een 100% korting redelijker en efficiënter zou zijn. Verwezen zij naar de betreffende stukken. Het valt op dat de ACM bij herhaling aangeeft geen grotere korting te willen geven omdat dat gevolgen heeft voor de allocatie van kosten aan anderen. Dat is geen geldige reden. En het miskent bijvoorbeeld dat de komst van Bergermeer in 2014 op de markt en de hoge tarieven voor Bergemeer een onverdiende meevaller van enkele procenten korting op hun tarief heeft opgeleverd voor alle andere gebruikers. Ook het tarievencodewijzigingsbesluit waarbij de 25% korting is ingevoerd4, weigert ten onrechte een hogere korting o.m. met een beroep op beperking van effecten op overige tarieven. Ook dit is onderwerp van lopende procedures over alle tarieven vanaf 2014.

5.2 Gasopslagen zijn in de huidige markt niet economisch. Maar leveren wel een bijdrage aan de consumentenwelvaart. Vgl. Pöyry slide 11. Het zou redelijk zijn het kortingspercentage

4 ACM, 12 december 2013, ACM/DE/2013/206684


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tenminste zodanig te stellen dat er een redelijk rendement gemaakt kan worden met bestaande opslagen. NCTAR biedt deze mogelijkheid. Ter voorkoming dat (teveel) gasopslagen sluiten. Vgl. (Pöyry slides 46-48. En ter voorkoming dat gebrek aan investeringen en innovaties leidt tot afname van beschikbaarheid, of dat de opslagen onvoldoende worden benut. In dat geval is bijvoorbeeld de beoogde ondersteuning van leveringszekerheid suboptimaal.

Bundersnetzagentur ontwerpbesluit: 75% korting voor gasopslagen

5.3 Ook Duitsland lijkt naar 75% korting te gaan. Ook vanuit een streven naar marktintegratie valt aansluiting op ’Duitsland’ te overwegen.

5.4 In mei 2018 heeft de Bundesnetzagentur, de Duitse NRA haar ontwerpbesluit over de implementatie van de NCTAR gepubliceerd. Hierin is een korting opgenomen van 75% voor gasopslagen:

https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/DE/Service-Funktionen/Beschlusskammern/1BK-Geschaeftszeichen-Datenbank/BK9-GZ/2018/2018_00001bis0999/2018_0600bis0699/BK9-18-610/20180515_Beschlussentwurf%20REGENT.pdf;jsessionid=A4DEBFDD3D0A5F45AD958CF1A6D53026?__blob=publicationFile&v=3.

5.5 Het Duitse ontwerpbesluit roept in nr. 87 in herinnering dat NCTAR voorschrijft dat rekening moet worden gehouden met de bijdrage aan leveringszekerheid en systeemflexibiliteit. En dat het dubbel aanrekenen van kosten moet worden voorkomen. In nr. 88 constateert de Duitse NRA dat de opslagen daadwerkelijk een belangrijke bijdrage geven aan leveringszekerheid en systeemflexibiliteit. Zij wijst daarbij ook op de ‘netvervangende functie’ van opslagen.

5.6 In nr. 89 verwoordt de Duitse NRA het dubbel aanrekenen van kosten als volgt. Bij de eerste entry in het net wordt al entry betaald, en bij exit bij de eindgebruiker of transit wordt al exit betaald. Als er dan ook nog bij entry en exit in en uit de opslag zou moeten worden betaald is er dubbele betaling.

5.7 Dat de Duitse NRA uitkomt op 75% procent korting (niet op 100%) lijkt ook enigszins een compromis tussen de verschillende voorstellen (nr. 91). Ook overweegt zij dat er toch wel enige belasting van het net zal zijn bij transport van en naar de opslagen. 100% korting komt daarom niet in aanmerking, aldus de Duitse NRA, terwijl de 75%-korting zodanig is dat het gebruik van de opslagen aantrekkelijker wordt, hetgeen de leveringszekerheid dient.

Moeten gasopslagen meebetalen aan hun eigen korting?

5.8 Gasopslagkorting mag niet worden tenietgedaan door doorbelasting van deze korting aan gasopslagen. De voorgestelde wijzigingen in de tarievencode laten per saldo de gasopslagen meebetalen aan hun eigen korting. Dat verlaagt de korting. Dit wijkt af van de huidige Nederlandse systematiek. En past niet binnen de Europese opdracht om dubbel aanrekenen van kosten te voorkomen.

5.9 Het lijkt bovendien wat vergezocht om deze doorbelasting van de kosten uit te voeren via herschaling (artikel 6.4(d) NCTAR). Om verschillende redenen. De 50% korting zit in OCB NCTAR ‘verstopt’ in de referentieprijsmethodologie (artikel 3.2.2.3). Maar korting van artikel


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9 is op tarieven. Tarieven zijn hetgeen resteert na vermenigvuldiging van de referentieprijs met de multiplicatoren. Bovendien noemt artikel 6.4 aanhef al aanpassing op grond van artikel 9. Dat 6.4(d) dan ook zou dienen voor een aanpassing in verband met artikel 9 is niet waarschijnlijk.

5.10 TAQA heeft een voorkeur voor 100% korting. Maar TAQA zou zich kunnen vinden in een 75% korting, waarover thans belangrijke mate van consensus lijkt te bestaan.

6. UNIFORM CAPACITEITS TARIEF DISCRIMINEERT GEBRUIKERS VAN GROTE CAPACITEIT

6.1 Het College voor Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven in haar beslissing van 21 juli 2017 (ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:287) een wanverhouding geconstateerd tussen postzegel-capaciteitstarieven en de werkelijke kosten bij grote capaciteitsgebruikers. Het betrof het BAT-tarief. Het staat de ACM niet vrij van dit oordeel van het CBb af te wijken.

6.2 Er is geen recht evenredige relatie tussen geboekte capaciteit en kosten, in die zin dat een grotere geboekte capaciteit altijd samenhangt met hogere kosten. Dat geldt met name bij de zeer grote geboekte capaciteiten (zoals gasopslagen). De kapitaalkosten voor grotere capaciteit zijn niet zo heel veel hoger dan die voor een lagere capaciteit. De aanleg van een pijpleiding visualiseert dit: de dikte van de pijp (de capaciteit) is maar een beperkt aandeel van de aanlegkosten. Dubbele diameter van de pijpleiding leidt geenszins tot dubbele kosten, maar vergroot de capaciteit met een factor 4 (~πr2). Operationeel laten de voordelen van één punt, boven meerdere punten met opgeteld dezelfde capaciteit zich ook indenken. Het op dezelfde wijze behandelen van deze ongelijke gevallen discrimineert, is geen afspiegeling van de werkelijke kosten, en kruissubsidieert.

7. VOLUMERISICO NIET TEN LASTE VAN EINDGEBRUIKER

Groningen besluit

7.1 Het Groningen-besluit zal tot vergaande veranderingen leiden. Het zal - in beginsel - ertoe leiden dat er minder gas door het GTS-netwerk zal stromen. Dit heeft diverse gevolgen. Het raakt de leveringszekerheid. Maar het heeft ook gevolgen voor de transportkosten onder het huidige systeem van tariefregulering. Minder capaciteitsboekingen leidt tot hogere tarieven, als de toegestane inkomsten niet wijzigen. Hogere transportkosten zullen er weer toe leiden dat minder capaciteit wordt geboekt, wat ook weer tot hogere kosten leidt. Etc.

Toegestane inkomsten moeten naar beneden

7.2 De tariefstijging is onwenselijk. Bovendien de hiervoor geschetste gang van zaken in strijd met artikel 7 aanhef en onder d van NCTAR. Die bepaling houdt in dat de referentieprijsmethodologie waarborgt dat een significant volumerisico, als het onderhavige, niet ten laste van de eindafnemer komt. De Nederlandse systematiek van regulering door middel van toegestane inkomsten, is een keuze. Niet wettelijk of verdragsrechtelijk voorgeschreven. En de vraag is of deze vorm van regulering voldoende robuust is voor de huidige ontwikkelingen. Maar de ACM kan met behoud van deze methode toch zorgen voor daling van de tarieven. Dat kan bijvoorbeeld door een verdere afboeking van de bestaande assets van GTS. Dit is in overeenstemming met o.a. artikel 13 van de Gasverordening, dat een ‘appropriate return on investments’ toestaat, maar niet een


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gegarandeerde return. GTS is (helaas) niet de enige in de gasindustrie die een ‘impairment’ in zicht heeft. De huidige winstgevendheid van GTS weerspiegelt nog iets te veel het oude ‘gasgebouw’.

8. ANDERE ONDERWERPEN

8.1 TAQA is graag bereid om constructief mee te werken aan een referentieprijsmethodologie waarover niet jarenlang hoeft te worden geprocedeerd. In dat verband zal TAQA niet te veel zeggen over de looptijd en seizoensmultiplicatoren (die beide hoog lijken en daarom inefficiënties oproepen, en seizoensfactoren die niet erkennen dat gasopslagen juist voor verlichting van de druk op het systeem zorgen). Afhankelijk van het ‘totaalpakket’ zal TAQA hier mogelijk later verder op in gaan, evenals op onderstaande punten.

Postzegel vs capaciteitsgewogen afstand

8.2 De gedachte dat postzegel redelijk is, omdat zij voor iedereen gelijk is, gaat niet zondermeer op. Het gelijk behandelen van ongelijke gevallen is immers discriminatie. TAQA komt minder gunstig uit met postzegel dan met CGA. Toch zou zij bereid zijn dit punt te laten rusten, als het totaalpakket uitkomt op een evenwichtige toerekening van GTS-kosten aan haar gasopslagen.

Lange-termijn contracten

8.3 Verschillende marktpartijen wensen opheffing van de lange-termijn contracten. De ACM kan daarbij een doorslaggevende rol te spelen. En TAQA zou deze opheffing steunen. Uiteindelijk zal er een gastransportmarkt moeten komen zonder (afgedwongen) lange-termijn boekingen bij GTS. Daarbij kan onderscheid worden gemaakt. Lange-termijnboekingen die in directe relatie staan met GTS-investeringen die de betreffende capaciteit mogelijk hebben gemaakt, en gebaseerd zijn op transparante informatie daarover, hebben een nuttig effect. Langetermijnboekingen omdat GTS geen andere keus bood (en waarbij GTS mogelijk misbruik van haar machtspositie maakte) verdienen geen, of minder bescherming.

Toegankelijkheid van de regelgeving

8.4 TAQA vraagt om aandacht voor eenvoudige formuleringen en eenvoudige structuur van de regelgeving. De huidige regelgeving is ingewikkeld, en de voorgetelde codewijzingen zijn moeilijk leesbaar. Dat brengt onnodige maatschappelijke kosten met zich mee. Hoge beheerskosten. Maar ook de kosten van verkeerde of uitgestelde beslissingen. NCTAR biedt de mogelijkheid om te vereenvoudigen en daarmee maatschappelijke kosten te drukken. TAQA zag graag dat de ACM daarvan gebruik maakt.

8.4.1 Bijvoorbeeld. Men zou zich voor kunnen stellen dat het wat overzichtelijker wordt als het nieuwe hoofdstuk 3.1 ‘algemeen’ van de Tarievencode (‘TC’), een korte uitleg geeft over ‘van referentieprijsmethodologie naar referentieprijs naar tarieven (en reserveringsprijzen)’. En 3.2.3 zou over tarieven voor binnenlandse punten kunnen gaan, terwijl de reserveringsprijzen voor interconnectiepunten dan in een volgend sub-hoofdstuk aan de orde komen. En 3.2.3.4 kan wellicht zo geschreven worden dat het begrijpelijk is zonder NCTAR te raadplegen (.. toe te passen op een looptijdsevenredig deel van de referentieprijzen..).


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9. CONCLUSIE

9.1 TAQA zou graag zien dat er een voor alle partijen aanvaardbare oplossing komt, die kan worden geïmplementeerd zonder CBb procedures. TAQA is daarom bereid om (gezamenlijk met VGN) een vaststellingsovereenkomst te tekenen als het tot een aanvaardbaar compromis komt. Het meest haalbare compromis lijkt een entry-exit split 30/70 met een 75% korting voor gasopslagen. TAQA zou bij die uitkomst o.a. afstand doen van haar aanspraak, gebaseerd op afspiegeling van werkelijke kosten, op afbouwende capaciteitstarieven voor grote afnemers en op erkenning van de gunstige ligging van haar gasopslagen.

TAQA is graag bereid tot verder overleg over deze materie. Om verrassingen en procedures te voorkomen zou de ACM kunnen overwegen om nog een extra consultatie-overleg te houden. De hoorzitting van 14 mei 2018 was een stap in de goede richting.

Hoogachtend,

TAQA Energie B.V., TAQA Gas Storage B.V., TAQA Onshore B.V. en TAQA Piek Gas B.V.

Legal Manager, advocaat Direct: +31 (0)88

@taqaglobal.com

BIJLAGEN:

Pöyry rapport (vertrouwelijk) Presentatie TAQA d.d. 14 mei 2018 (hoorzitting)

GAS STORAGE MARKET FAILURES A REPORT TO GIE September, 2017

TAQA -VERTROUWELIJK

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DISCLAIMER

Pöyry is an international consulting and engineering company. We serve clients globally across the energy and industrial sectors and provide local services in our core markets. We deliver management consulting and engineering services, underpinned by strong project implementation capability and expertise. Our focus sectors are power generation, transmission & distribution, forest industry, chemicals & biorefining, mining & metals, transportation and water. Pöyry employs over 5,000 experts across extensive local office networks. Pöyry’s net sales in 2016 were EUR 530 million and the company’s shares are quoted on Nasdaq Helsinki (Pöyry PLC: POY1V). Pöyry Management Consulting provides leading-edge consulting and advisory services covering the whole value chain in energy, forest and bio-based industries. Our energy practice is the leading provider of strategic, commercial, regulatory and policy advice to energy markets in Europe, the Middle East and the Americas. Our energy team of 200 specialists offers unparalleled expertise in the rapidly changing energy sector.

Copyright © 2017 Pöyry Management Consulting (UK) Ltd All rights reserved

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of Pöyry Management Consulting (UK) Ltd (“Pöyry”). This report is provided to the legal entity identified on the front cover for its internal use only. This report may not be provided, in whole or in part, to any other party without the prior written permission of an authorised representative of Pöyry. In such circumstances additional fees may be applicable and the other party may be required to enter into either a Release and Non-Reliance Agreement or a Reliance Agreement with Pöyry.

Important This document contains confidential and commercially sensitive information. Should any requests for disclosure of information

contained in this document be received (whether pursuant to; the Freedom of Information Act 2000, the Freedom of Information Act

2003 (Ireland), the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Northern Ireland), or otherwise), we request that we be notified in writing of the

details of such request and that we be consulted and our comments taken into account before any action is taken.

Disclaimer

While Pöyry considers that the information and opinions given in this work are sound, all parties must rely upon their own skill and judgement when making use of it. Pöyry does not make any representation or warranty, expressed or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the information contained in this report and assumes no responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of such information. Pöyry will not assume any liability to anyone for any loss or damage arising out of the provision of this report.

2 SEPTEMBER 2017

GAS STORAGE MARKET FAILURES TAQA -VERTROUWELIJK

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1. Introduction 4

1.1 Context and objectives 4

1.2 What is a market Failure 14

2. Potential market failures in gas storage 19

2.1 System value 21

2.2 Insurance value 32

2.3 Gas market liquidity facilitation 39

2.4 Long-term requirements 45

3. Conclusions 50

Annexes 53

3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SEPTEMBER 2017 GAS STORAGE MARKET FAILURES TAQA -VERTROUWELIJK

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1.1 CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVES


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BACKGROUND

Gas storage helps to deliver gas in the coldest/ highest demand days.

Having storage close to demand means that production, import and transport capacities do not need to be as big, have higher utilisation.

It also plays a vital role in balancing day-to-day and within-day variability in demand and supply throughout the year.

LNG, EU gas production and pipeline imports provide some flexibility, but nowhere near as much as storage.

Gas storage also provides an insurance against major supply losses. These events are rare but have a major impact on the economies of the countries affected.

Storage is therefore: – a competitive service provider of flexibility – an efficient piece of supply infrastructure and – a strategic asset for society

5

Gas storage plays and will continue to play a vital part in the EU gas market

Figure 1: European Gas Flows 2015-17

Source: ENTSOG Transparency Data, National Grid

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

TWh/

d

Gas storage Other LNG


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VALUE OF GAS STORAGE

Seasonal differences in our climate means higher demand in winter than summer:

– significant demand from heat sector. – lower solar output.

Upstream economics favours flat production.

Storage is a useful tool to balance the seasonal differences in demand and supply.

Daily/hourly supply/demand balance in a market is subject to outages, and unexpected events:

– Cold/warm weather driving demand up/down. – Still/windy weather driving demand up/down. – Outages and maintenance. – Geopolitical challenges.

Storage is a useful tool to balance the daily differences in supply and demand.

6

Gas storage provides value in a number of ways in a well-functioning gas market

Seasonality Flexibility

Transportation systems have to cope with the maximum supply and demand situations.

Supplying gas close to centres of gas demand means that smaller transportation networks are required.

Storage acts as an additional supply, close to the gas demand, reducing the need for investment in gas transmission systems, saving consumers money.

System

Major outages can have a significant impact on gas supply, requiring customers to be cut off and consequently impacting a region’s economy.

Thankfully, these events are rare.

Storage close to gas demand provides the ability to ensure continuity of supply in low probability high impact events.

Insurance

Arb

itra

ge

Va

lue

1

1. Storage provides a way of balancing the temporal arbitrage between one season and another or one day and another


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WHAT HAS INFLUENCED THE MARKET VALUE OF GAS STORAGE

Originally storage either had long-term contracts that helped to underwrite its construction or was a regulated asset, built as an integral part of the supply infrastructure.

A perceived shortage of storage capacity in the 2000’s, based on higher

demand and increasing reliance on imports, led to more facilities being developed.

The EC’s Third Energy Package brought in unbundling/vertical separation and the establishment of competition in gas shipping/supply from 2009.

Third party access to storage was improved through the Guidelines for Good Practice.

Development of trading hubs has provided a commercial value for the providers of flexibility in the form of seasonal spreads and daily and within-day volatility (see page 8).

In merchant markets, the long-term societal benefits of gas storage as efficient pieces of supply infrastructure and as strategic assets have been ignored and this value is not reflected in the short-term value of flexibility (see page 12), which, coupled with large barriers to market entry, may put long-term security of supply at risk.

7

More gas market players (shippers, suppliers and traders) and better access have

changed the nature of gas storage from long-term asset to short-term trading tool

Price of storage

reflected both

short-term and

long-term value

Liberalisation has

put emphasis on

short-term value

Storage starting

to close


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VALUE OF SEASONALITY AND FLEXIBILITY HAS DECREASED

In the past ten years, seasonal spreads and volatility have been driven down by: – Increased storage volumes, mostly with financial investment decisions made pre-2010 when spreads were

high (see page 9). – Reduced demand following the financial crisis in 2008 means there is more seasonality and flexibility available

than the market needs (see Annex A). – Improved third party access to storage through the 3rd Energy Directive and Guidelines for Good Practice for

SSOs. – Increased market liquidity, reliance

on the market to provide flexibility, and changing trading behaviour.

– Increased local deliverability and flexibility via investment in pipelines and LNG.

– Increased interconnection which broadens the area from which storage can be procured.

Without regulatory intervention, storage operators that we have spoken to need spreads of about 3-5€/MWh to cover costs.

Current spreads and volatility mean merchant revenues are too low for most storage companies without regulated revenues to survive in the long term.

8

Spreads have reduced to the point that some storage facilities may not even

recover operational costs

Change in

market

participants’

value of gas

storage

Figure 2: TTF summer-winter price spreads 2007-2016

Source: ICIS Heren data


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20

40

60

80

100

120

2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

EU

28 S

tora

ge V

olum

e (b

cm)

?

9

Insufficient revenue will drive a reduction in storage volumes, particularly where facilities need ongoing investment.

A reduction in storage volumes will drive up spreads and volatility.

At some point revenues should recover and storage volumes stabilise.

It is not clear how much storage will close or whether it will be the required type of storage or in the right location.

There is concern too much storage will close (either in some regions or across Europe) as the market does not currently compensate for the full value of storage.

While a spread recovery may support remaining storage, it will continue to not incorporate the full value of storage.

Storage’s capacity to support seasonality, flexibility, system operation and insurance will reduce.

This may endanger security of supply and/or require expensive future interventions to rebuild storage.

Figure 3: European storage volume evolution

THE EUROPEAN PROBLEM

Most gas storage operators cannot afford to stay open so more facilities will close

unless revenues improve

How much storage

will close?

See next page

Source: Analysis of IEA and GIE data 2006-2016. Pöyry analysis for 2017.


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CASE STUDY: HOW MUCH STORAGE WILL CLOSE?

10

Gas storage is a very capital intensive business. With relatively low operational costs (see Figure 4) and legacy contracts supporting many facilities, storage volumes will persist for several years until sustained losses or a need to invest capital to maintain assets leads to a sufficient number of closures to allow spreads to recover.

19% 75%6%

variable OPEX fixed OPEX CAPEX

Figure 4: Example of annualized storage costs1

Determining how much storage will close requires predicting how the market will respond to lower storage capacity, and what spreads are sustainable. Few independent players have modelled this in depth, but 3-4 €/MWh is generally considered the minimum level to maintain existing capacity with purely market-driven revenue. Pöyry investigated available information on storage costs and likely future need for capital expenditure, to estimate where storage facilities are likely to close, and used our gas model Pegasus to investigate the impact of reduced capacity on spreads. A simplified analysis, showing utilisation of storage at different costs of storage, is shown to the left. Pöyry’s initial modelling results, presented at Flame 2016, suggested that current market arrangements would mean the closure of at least 30 bcm from 2016 (or about 25 bcm extra from

Figure 5: Modelled storage utilisation by storage price1

2017, following recent closure announcements) without government intervention. Similar analysis by Wood Mackenzie in 2017 came to similar conclusions2. The picture is complicated by interventions in some parts of Europe, such as strategic storage and storage obligations, which are not fully taken into account in either set of modelling. Nonetheless it is clear that wherever storage provision is left to the market, significant volumes of storage will close.

1. Figures from Pöyry presentation to Flame, 2016, based on preliminary modelling exercise and analysis 2. European Gas Storage Operators under pressure by Wood Mackenzie


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CURRENT GAS MARKETS ARE MISSING PARTS OF THE VALUE

Temporal arbitrage between summer and winter. Value is visible as seasonal price spreads in well

functioning markets. These are only ‘reliable’ for liquid North-West

Europe markets and hubs that take them as references.

Valid in liberalised markets

Temporal arbitrage in balancing variable supply and demand across days or weeks.

Value is visible as volatility. Options & derivatives provide confidence limits

on future pricing, but much of the actual volatility relates to underlying fundamentals, e.g. reliability of assets, unpredictability of weather, etc.

Valid in liberalised markets

11

The full value of storage services are not remunerated, indicating market failure in

two important areas

Seasonality Flexibility

Increases network capacity at key bottlenecks and aids pressure and congestion management.

No EU legislation transfers the full system value to SSOs.

Some local practices (OBAs, load flow commitments) may transfer some value in some cases.

System

Avoidance of risks to security of supply and extreme prices driven by weather, failures or politics.

Governments and consumers usually require a higher level of insurance than the buyers of the service.

Security of supply obligations and strategic storage are sometimes used to address the physical need, but don’t always recompense the SSO

appropriately.

Insurance

Arb

itra

ge

Va

lue


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Individual Member States have made different interventions on storage regulation to compensate for missing System and Insurance value: – Market based – Regulated prices or revenue – Shipper security obligations – Strategic stocks

Shippers therefore look for the cheapest storage facilities in one country to satisfy their flexibility needs in another (taking transport costs into account).

Even some countries that have regulated prices are not recovering their costs as insufficient storage is being booked.

A non-uniform approach on obligations has created a non-level playing field for storage, driving inefficiencies in the market.

With storage leaving the market, there is a need for a consistent European approach to maximise European welfare.

INTERVENTIONS

12

Some governments and/or national regulators have intervened to try to compensate

SSOs for missing value and keep storage open

Figure 6: Interventions in European storage market1

Source: GSE SoS Map, 8 July 2014 1. Map does not show price regulation present in some markets. 2. Summaries of arrangements in Italy, France, Hungary, Denmark,

Poland and Spain can be found in Annex B

Supply standards only Strategic storage and supply standards2

Storage obligation and supply standards

Strategic storage, storage obligation and supply standards2

No data


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OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The study has been commissioned by Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE) on behalf of Gas Storage Europe (GSE) and a set of 12 GSE members.

It has been divided into two phases, and in this first phase the objective is to: – identify whether any market failures exist in the European storage market; – demonstrate the risk of market failures and consequences for SSOs and EU social welfare; and – provide input for the GSE’s response to the consultation on the EC’s Follow-up Study to the LNG

and Storage Strategy.

Given this has been achieved, the ultimate objectives are to: – identify relevant interventions to address failures as and where the risk is highest that they would

materialise; – develop an economic analysis in support of industry discussions; and – increase the EU social welfare;

which would take place in a second phase.

13

Identify whether any market failures exist in the European storage market


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1.2 WHAT IS A MARKET FAILURE


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WHAT ARE MARKET FAILURES?

In a (perfectly) competitive market, an efficient allocation is achieved through price signals that incentivise changes in production and consumption.

A market failure generally arises when such price signals are absent or incorrect (or participants are unable to respond to a price signal – e.g. there are barriers to entry/exit) and the consequence is that social welfare is not maximised.

There are several causes of market failure: – Ability to enter and exit the market. – Market power. – Externalities. – Informational failures. – Government/regulatory intervention.

15

Market failures lead to inefficient allocation of goods and/or services

Market Failure

Ability to enter and exit the market

Market power

Externalities not reflected in the market

price

Imperfect information available to participants

Government Interventions


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Market Failure

Ability to enter and exit the

market

Market power

Externalities not reflected in the market price



Market Failure


market

Market power




ABILITY TO ENTER AND EXIT THE MARKET

In the theoretical models, actors are assumed to be risk neutral. However, in reality, investors may be both risk averse and myopic (short-termist). This may lead to both a higher cost of investment and a bias against large infrastructure investments that have long

pay-back periods. Where an asset investment is very specific and there is limited scope to transfer use to other purposes (e.g. gas

storage) then the sunk-character of the investment means it is difficult to leave the market without writing off the investment, and an incentive to stay to avoid future re-entry costs. This gives the user bargaining power.

This can make the investment susceptible to future regulatory or political intervention – leading to a hold-up problem and reduction in efficient investment.

16

In a perfectly competitive market there are no barriers to entry or exit of firms but

long term investments and aversion to risk can inhibit this

MARKET POWER

If a company has market power it has the ability to increase prices/reduce output relative to the efficient market outcome.

This reduces welfare in several ways – e.g. too little gas is consumed because of high prices (static allocative inefficiency), inefficient investment in response to prices (productive inefficiency), and lack of innovation incentives.

In a perfectly competitive market super-normal/ excess profit cannot be sustained

as firms would enter until profits were again at a ‘normal’ level


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Market Failure


market

Market power




17

The private and social benefits and/or costs are not aligned, meaning that production of a good or service is not socially optimal.

Externalities may be positive (e.g. immunisation) or negative (e.g. pollution).

Positive externalities: – the level of production/consumption will be lower than is socially

optimal. For example, as shown in Figure 7, the marginal private benefit is lower than the marginal social benefit. This results in a level of production (QP) that is lower than is socially optimal (QS).

Negative externality – the lack of consideration of the additional costs imposed on

society means that the good/service is over-produced. As shown in Figure 8, the marginal social cost is higher than the marginal private cost. However, production is determined by the equalisation of the marginal private cost and benefit, resulting in an output level (QP) above the socially optimal level (QS).

One particular type of externality is a network externality, where other users are affected by the number of other users consuming the good. Again, this may be positive (e.g. a communication network benefits from having more users connected) or negative (e.g. too many people connected to a system may create system imbalances or congestion adding to costs and risk of non-delivery).

Figure 7: Positive externalities

Figure 8: Negative externalities

EXTERNALITIES

Externalities arise when the effect of the production or consumption of goods and

services imposes costs or benefits on others that are not reflected in prices


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Market Failure


market

Market power




Market Failure


market

Market power




IMPERFECT INFORMATION

Information asymmetries can result in adverse selection or moral hazard. Adverse selection refers to cases where imperfect information held by one or both parties leads to inefficient decision

making (such as if used a car buyer cannot ascertain the true condition of a vehicle). Moral hazard refers to the situation where informational asymmetries can lead to a change in the behaviour of actors

to the detriment of others (e.g. if I have cycle insurance I may be less likely to lock my bike, hence making it more likely the bike is stolen).

A potential issue here is the lack of reliable pricing in longer-term markets which may affect investment decisions (especially if there is similar lack of credibility in shorter-term markets).

There is no market failure in facility access: information about storage is sufficiently transparent.

18

When there is incomplete, imperfect or asymmetric information between market

participants, then the market solutions may not be efficient

GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS

However, we should be aware that government intervention is often in response to market failure, so there is some circularity in this argument.

Often government intervention is because there is a public good, i.e. a good for which it is impossible to charge consumers at the point of consumption (e.g. street lighting). For this to be the case, the good must exhibit two characteristics (non excludability and non-rivalry).

Because of these conditions, consumers will look to ‘free ride’ on the consumption of others, meaning that the good

will be under-provided for. In extreme cases of pure public goods, nobody would be willing to pay, despite there being a demand, and hence

there will be a missing market.

Government or regulatory intervention may prevent the market from responding

efficiently


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2. POTENTIAL MARKET FAILURES IN GAS

STORAGE

19 SEPTEMBER 2017


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POTENTIAL MARKET FAILURES IN GAS STORAGE

20

We have investigated potential market failures from externalities not being reflected

in the market price and imperfect information, others not considered relevant

Long-term requirement for storage not visible today.

Seasonal spread liquidity is time and region dependent but gives a realistic view of current value.

No market signal for future extrinsic value, but this is normal and not necessarily a market failure.

System value1: – Where gas storage is located

close to centres of demand, it lowers the costs of network investments.

– Under TAR NC, storage operators (or their users) are unable to access this value.

Insurance value – Ensures continuity of gas

supply during low probability high impact events.

– Provides tangible physical security.

Facilitation of gas market liquidity.

Inconsistent application of rules is causing differences in price of storage, but some intervention is necessary for public good.

Long-term capital intensive nature of storage assets means it is difficult to enter and to leave the market, but current excess is not considered a market failure.

Large number of buyers and sellers, so not really a market failure across Europe as a whole.

1Additionally CEER cites a benefit to production operations as providing system value, but we consider that this does not form part of the market failure and is accommodated in the prices of produced gas

Market Failure

Ability to enter and exit the market

Market power

Externalities not reflected in the market

price




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2.1 SYSTEM VALUE

21 SEPTEMBER 2017


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Without storage With storage

Peak day demand would have to be transported from supply sources to demand centres resulting in a

large transmission system.

Peak day demand is partially met by local storage withdrawal, lowering the costs of the transmission

system.

Win

ter

Su

mm

er

GAS STORAGE LOWERS COSTS OF TRANSMISSION

22

Because of the variable nature of demand, gas storage reduces the required size of

the transmission network

Demand Su

St

1. Revealed in a report Transportation Tariff Discounts for Gas Storage: A report to VGN, November 2012 that was submitted to ACER

Supply Demand

Su D D

Su St

Where is this value seen in the European network? Example on next page

In 2012, Pöyry carried out a study of the impact of intermittency on the European gas market and concluded that the EU transmission system is between 9% and 16% smaller than it would be if storage did not exist1.

Storage facilities are not explicitly remunerated for this.


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CASE STUDY: STORAGE OPERATIONS SUPPORT TRANSMISSION

23

The Danish transmission grid is broadly cross shaped, with import points to the south (Ellund from Germany) and west (Nybro from the North Sea), feeding pipelines that meet at Egtved and serve demand in the North and East, including exports to Sweden at Dragør. Two storage facilities are located in the North (Lille Torup) and East (Stenlille). The impact of storage on total system demand in 2015-16 can be seen in the graphs to

the left. As usual in Europe, winter consumption levels are significantly higher than summer (Figure 10), but storage injection helps raise system demand in summer and decreases required supply in winter (orange line, Figure 11). This clearly shows that storage reduces peak gas imports; this is capacity that would otherwise need to be met by transmission pipelines. Normal storage operations mean that the transmission grid could be smaller than would be the case without storage. Where storage competes on the market with scarce import capacity, it may be able to extract some value for the service. In the Danish case, there is no scarcity of import capacity, with the winter outlook (upper right) showing low expected imports through Ellund even on cold days. However, there are significant constraints North and East of Egtved – i.e. on the top and right arms of the transmission “cross”. Lille Torup lies behind a transmission bottleneck: on peak days, there is more demand in the north than can be met by the northern pipeline. Storage withdrawals help to meet demand, ensuring there is no loss of supply. To the East, the pipeline is able to meet peak Danish demand, but at peak times the pressure at Dragør would be too low to support exports to Sweden. Stenlille withdrawals provide pressure support, ensuring the system can continue to maintain Swedish exports. These services are part of normal storage operations, and are not remunerated except in the case of emergency support (e.g. supply disruptions, where the orange line drops near zero in lower left chart). This is a clear case where storage reduces the cost of the transmission network, but there is no price signal to incentivise storage to maintain the service.

Dem

and

(Nm

3 /d)

Jun Aug Oct Dec Feb Apr 2015 2016

Figure 10: Danish demand

Dem

and

(Nm

3 /d)

Jun Aug Oct Dec Feb Apr 2015 2016

Consumption

Demand net of injection/ withdrawal

Avoided import capacity usage

Figure 11: Danish demand net of storage operations

Danish transmission system and expected supply on a -13ºC day (winter 17/18). Source: Energinet Gas Security of Supply Report 2016.


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PART OF THE SYSTEM BENEFIT IS CROSS-BORDER

Existing storage facilities were constructed to service Europe’s population and lower the

costs of the European gas network, e.g.: – Polish transmission (transit) system is

smaller because of German gas storage. – Slovakian/Austrian transmission (transit)

systems are smaller because of German and Italian gas storage.

Consumers in the downstream market do not pay for the increased transit costs that would apply if they had no local storage.

Users are only paying for this service to the SSOs’ shippers through local price spreads,

which reflect the arbitrage value but not the value of allowing a smaller transmission system.

24

The European gas transmission network was built with storage as an integrated,

core element

Figure 12: Population density compared to approximate prevailing flows and major gas storage locations

Source: 2013 population density map (Eurostat, Nordregio)

approximate prevailing flows

approximate locations of major gas storage


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CURRENT EU POLICY DOES NOT REMUNERATE STORAGE

It is accepted that storage provides value to transmission system operation (see also Annex C). There is no system in place to assess or remunerate the value that a storage facility brings to the

system, other than general discounts on transmission tariffs, which benefit the storage users but not the operators.

TAR NC (EU/ 2017/460) – Obliges a “discount” on transmission tariffs of at least 50%. – This is a discount – e.g. “entitling a purchaser of a good or service to a reduction on the price”

(COM/2002/0585 final). – This does not allow for a transfer of value to the SSO or the SSO’s customers.

The lack of transfer means that SSOs customers are providing a valuable service for which they

are not recompensed. Future market arrangements, such as Quo Vadis, may remove transmission tariffs for all storage.

This does not compensate storage facilities for the system benefit that they provide – or help avoid the added system cost that closure would impose.

Without receipt of this value, some storage facilities may close, imposing additional costs (increased network infrastructure) on consumers.

25

Tariffs Network Code may hamper a transfer of value from transportation to storage,

distorting the market for flexibility, and proposed replacements do not address this

How does this compare to

arrangements elsewhere in the world? US example on next page


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CASE STUDY: STORAGE SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES

26

Monopoly protections introduced in the 1930s caused under investment and gas shortages in the 1970s, which led to incentives to invest in production and eventually deregulation of production pricing1. FERC 636 followed this in the early 1990s, enforcing vertical separation/unbundling of companies and requiring 3rd party access to interstate pipeline systems, which remained regulated2. Storage facilities were, and still are, considered an integrated part of the

interstate pipeline system, and so they were typically included in the regulated transportation companies. Suppliers, vertically integrated distribution suppliers, and traders, as well as pipeline companies themselves, all book capacity in and make use of storage. This means the full system value of storage is perceived, as well as the arbitrage value, while transmission and storage assets are generally exposed to the same regulated security standards. Significant price transparency in physical hub based markets also means peak demand can be met via demand side response from industrial consumers, alongside storage and other flexibility sources. FERC were given powers, in 2005, to deregulate gas storage prices3 – storage operators can apply to be able to set market based prices for storage, rather than have revenues/prices set by regulation. Because market prices are frequently higher than regulated prices – the opposite situation to Europe – a number of storage assets have applied for market status. While some storage operators are pipeline operators, and others are independent, the default premise is that storage is part of the transmission monopoly system, and should be regulated as such. Other arrangements exist as exceptions to this rule.

1. http://naturalgas.org/regulation/history/ 2. http://www.ngsa.org/download/analysis_studies/NGC-Reliable-Resilient-Nat-Gas-WHITE-PAPER-Final.pdf 3. https://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/storage.asp

Source: Energy Information Administration

Figure 13: US natural gas network


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IMPACT OF DIFFERENT SECURITY OF SUPPLY STANDARDS

Import capacity and upstream pipelines may compete with storage to provide flexibility. Under integrated ownership, a balance of storage and transmission were built. With storage exposed to market forces, storage capacity will adjust to the level of security that the

market requires. Transmission facilities are regulated and built to national levels of security. If national regulators desire a higher level of security than the market, a non-efficient outcome results.

27

Transmission and storage are subject to different revenue regimes, but may

inefficiently compete for flexibility supply

Transmission capacity

Storage capacity

Storage/transmission required for system security by regulator

Storage/transmission required for system security by market

Range of efficient

allocation

1) More flexibility than market requires => Low spreads => Storage closes

2) Insufficient transmission for security => Transmission capacity built

3) More flexibility than market requires => Low spreads => Storage closes

4) Insufficient transmission for security => Transmission capacity built

Where is this

visible?

See next page

Figure 14: Illustration of how storage and transmission compete to provide security


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CASE STUDY: HOW TRANSMISSION COMPETES WITH STORAGE

28

The Danish TSO has a regulatory responsibility to ensure security of supply, and to do so it balances a number of tools – including purchasing storage capacity – to minimise cost to the Danish consumer. In 2009, the TSO conducted an open season to indicate interest in expanding the transmission capacity from Germany to Denmark. The expansion would future-proof Denmark against declining domestic production, and enhance security of supply, with the extra capacity useable in emergencies. Indicative bids were placed for 450,000 Nm3/h of capacity; in line with recommendations to keep 30% of capacity free for short term bookings and a positive socioeconomic case, a 700,000 Nm3/h expansion was built. What does this have to do with storage? A substantial part of the socioeconomic case for expansion (see three options on right) was a reduction in costs for emergency supply, partly procured from storage (blue circles). Additionally, the positive socioeconomic case relied on EU funding (right, red circles). This means the expected impacts of the expansion were: - a small net decrease in costs to Danish consumers, improving

consumer welfare; - decreased use of storage for emergency supplies; - a significant EU payment to support the construction.

While the TSO fulfilled its obligation to minimise costs for Danish consumers, total EU welfare decreased by in excess of 1 billion DKK (€130 million), due to the costs of EU funding and lost storage welfare. While the peak pipeline flow since construction has been far below capacity, fees to storage have decreased significantly (left, dark green bars). This example is a clear case of transmission “crowding out” storage, with the case for

half of the expansion based on regulatory rather than market signals.

Figures copied from (above) the pipeline background report and (lower left) Gas Security of Supply Report 2016.

If the storage market was easy to enter/exit, this would not affect welfare as the storage would exit the market. Since most storage costs were sunk, part of the storage asset was stranded with significant welfare loss.



Flow patterns are likely to change. Further decline in North Sea production. Increased LNG importation. Average transportation distance likely to increase. Increased importance of storage to support transmission.

Increased need to manage system flows in response to different entry nominations. Does storage operation become an integral part of managing transportation

constraints?

Even without

Quo Vadis

With Quo Vadis

style change

THIS WILL BE A CROSS-BORDER ISSUE TOMORROW

Whatever the outcome of Quo Vadis1, flows to Europe will still need to get to the

consumers in Europe via the pipeline network

Including

storage

Transmission and storage operators should be exposed to price signals that produce an efficient balance of transmission and storage, without unduly favouring investment in one over the other.

Quo Vadis could be an opportunity to establish this. 1. A summary of the draft Quo Vadis report and potential impact on storage is included as Annex D


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SUMMARY OF THE MARKET FAILURE IN SYSTEM VALUE (1/2)

Storage provides a system benefit by regional availability of peak supplies, thus significantly reducing the requirement for transmission capacity, both in the same and upstream markets. – Benefits are frequently provided through normal operation, without the TSO needing to request or

control storage actions. – The benefit provided is different for each facility – some are critical to system function and carry

high value, while others provide little marginal benefit. This benefit was recognised under integrated planning and network development, but separation/

unbundling has meant that storage is not rewarded for reducing the network size and cost. Efficient storage investment/decommissioning decisions require a price signal that incorporates the

full value that storage brings the gas system; however, merchant assets have no market signal to continue providing the service: – Tariff discounts do not reflect a value to the system; they simply reduce the fee that storage users

pay while helping to balance supply and demand across the year. – Where the presence of storage reduces the cost of constructing a system to meet demand, they

should receive a price signal to continue doing so. – This price signal should be in line with the marginal system benefit, and may be zero where the

presence of a facility does not reduce pipeline requirements for a given level of system security. – Currently, storage is exposed to an inefficient market signal when deciding whether to

decommission, which may lead to more storage closures than is efficient, reducing EU welfare. Therefore merchant storage facilities should be exposed to the true value they bring to the system.

30

Storage is not paid for the system value it provides, and suffers crowding out from

competition with transmission under a regulated asset base


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SUMMARY OF THE MARKET FAILURE IN SYSTEM VALUE (2/2)

Storage competes with transmission for provision of flexibility and security, but storage prices are set by the market, while regulators with different standards regulate transmission charges. Consequently, they are exposed to different price signals, which affects the value of storage and is likely to produce an inefficient balance of transmission and storage.

Where transmission operators are not incentivised to consider storage (or non-network capacity) solutions in their network options assessment, then an inefficient balance may emerge.

These considerations will become even more important with an expected increase in demand volatility driven by the intermittency of renewable sources of electricity.

The system value that storage provides is also not considered in most gas market modelling, e.g. Follow-up study to the LNG and Storage Strategy (see Annex E)

31

Storage is not paid for the system value it provides, and suffers crowding out from

competition with transmission under a regulated asset base


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2.2 INSURANCE VALUE

32 SEPTEMBER 2017


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INSURANCE VALUE

What is insurance? – Insurance is a mechanism to protect against low probability, high impact events

(sudden loss of major supply, very high unexpected demand, etc.) that are unpredictable (weather driven, politically driven, physical asset failure, etc.).

– The insured party attains the benefit of certainty; the insurer can pool various risks. Who is being insured?

– The gas consumer is insured against involuntary interruption – security of supply. – Gas supplier is insured against financial losses via high imbalance costs when gas

is scarce – security of price. – Politicians are insured against bad press!

What is its value? – For consumers it is the value of lost load (VOLL) multiplied by the risk, although

VOLL is different for different consumers in different Member States: – vulnerable, small, domestic, hospitals, etc., as well as some larger consumers

(e.g. glass manufacturers) effectively cannot tolerate loss of supply – they blindly trust that “the system” will work.

– other large consumers may be able to switch to alternatives (direct physical backup such as alter-native fuels, e.g. petroleum, or market-based alternatives, e.g. CCGTs turned off in electricity market) – they may understand their costs of alternatives.

– For suppliers, it is the strength of capital requirements to cover market price exposure when market prices are very high multiplied by the risk

33

The value of insurance in the gas market is complicated by the differing values

placed on it by different parts of the value chain


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SECURITY OF PRICE IS DIFFERENT TO SECURITY OF SUPPLY

When gas supplies are tight, market prices increase until aggregate supply equals aggregate demand as: – demand voluntarily interrupts (DSR); and/or – more expensive supplies come online; or – market is centrally suspended in ‘command and control’ procedures; and/or – demand is lost – security of supply failure.

Storage acts as a physical supply of gas, reducing the risk of emergency action and lost load and reducing market speculation.

There is an obligation on suppliers to balance physical supply, with market-related imbalance penalties if they do not.

In the short-term, speculation can drive prices very high, very quickly; however, this is not necessarily related to fundamentals and the margin acts as a factor in assessing/ speculating about risk.

Storage closures may lead to: – increased volatility of tight markets, or markets with low capacity headroom, leading to higher

costs of hedging; – higher average prices in the wholesale markets.

Insecurity of price is not necessarily a market failure, provided shippers can react to price and consumers can choose whether to be exposed to price volatility.

34

Shippers use storage as insurance against high imbalance prices


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HOW MUCH INSURANCE DOES A SUPPLIER NEED?

When gas supplies are tight, market prices increase until aggregate supply equals aggregate demand

Storage acts as a physical supply of gas, increasing security and reducing market speculation

In some cases, markets or imbalance prices may have explicit caps, or strategic interventions that limit price rises.

• When the physical operator needs to intervene, market prices might be “frozen” at a price that is lower

than the relevant demand-side cost/VOLL.

35

Imbalance costs can be capped before real security of supply issues occur

Intervention (price cap)

Pric

e

Time

What level of market price exposure drives efficient provision of insurance?

• At what point does the TSO intervene to

physically balance? • Is the market “suspended”? • Does this price “freeze” limit my imbalance costs?

Is there a proper incentive to procure an efficient level of insurance?

• This is economically equivalent to a price cap, leading to deadweight loss and inefficient outcomes. • Uncertainty about frequency of price spikes, based on recent experience, may also lead to under-

provision of insurance against them.

Potential market failure Supplier’s questions

Figure 16: Illustration of capped imbalance price


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THE MARKET FAILURE IN INSURANCE VALUE

Shippers book storage as an option to use in case of extremely high demand or loss of supply (low probability, high impact events).

The benefit to society is the avoidance of the value of lost load (VOLL).

However, shippers are not exposed to the full costs of tight systems, typically facing costs well below VOLL, because imbalance prices may be capped at times of system stress. Thus shippers have a benefit (i.e. avoided cost) much lower than that of society.

Individual market participants have a short-term focus and are not incentivised to insure against rare events that would significantly impact the European economy.

In the absence of national obligations (see page 12 and Annex B), shippers are incentivised to procure sufficient insurance to cover their costs, but not the full societal costs.

Hence, there is a market failure in unregulated markets, as the price signals reflect only part of the insurance value of storage. 36

Merchant storage is not able to capture a market price that reflects the true

insurance value it provides

QP = Quantity for private equilibrium QS = Quantity for societal equilibrium

PP = Price for private equilibrium PS = Price for societal equilibrium

• Society puts a greater value on the benefit of storage (MSB) than the shippers (MPC), so left to its own devices the market would require less storage (QP) than society would want (QS).

• Assuming interventions, such as storage obligations, define the quantity of storage needed by society (QS), the market price would be much lower than the price society would be prepared to pay (PS) for the security of supply.

• The difference is the missing value of insurance.

Missing Insurance Value

Figure 17: Illustration of positive externalities

Electricity markets have

comparable features See next page


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CASE STUDY: EU CAPACITY MECHANISMS IN ELECTRICITY

37

At least 11 EU Member States have (or are planning) electricity capacity mechanisms despite an ‘oversupply’ of

capacity at an EU level. The mechanisms are a response both to local issues and widespread concerns over future security of supply, with market signals considered insufficient to encourage and maintain adequate capacity. The EC sector inquiry (2015/16) identified potential market and regulatory failures including:

– prices not reflecting value of security at times of scarcity;

– imbalance prices distorting market prices; – inefficient bidding zones removing locational signals;

and – ongoing uncertainty making investment riskier.

These features are also present in the European gas markets. However, the EC has noted that uncoordinated, piecemeal, development of capacity markets and poor mechanism design can create further distortions that increase costs to consumers, incentivise inefficient investment and deter enhanced interconnection. Where capacity mechanisms are to be introduced the following characteristics are considered beneficial: – The need for, and size of, any mechanism should be based on a robust economic reliability standard with

greater harmonisation of adequacy assessments across the EU – Broad eligibility/participation – the mechanism should (a) be open to all potential capacity/flexibility providers;

and (b) cross-border participants, to ensure competition and minimise long-term costs of EU security of supply.

Figure 18: Electricity capacity mechanisms in the EU


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SUMMARY OF THE MARKET FAILURE IN INSURANCE

38

Storage is not able to capture a market price that reflects the true insurance value it

provides

Shippers book storage as an option to use in case of extremely high demand or loss of supply (low probability, high impact events).

The benefit to society is the avoidance of the value of lost load (VOLL) Shippers are not exposed to the full costs of tight systems, typically facing costs well below VOLL,

because imbalance prices may be capped at times of system stress, thus shippers have a benefit (i.e. avoided cost) much lower than that of society.

In the absence of national obligations, shippers are incentivised to procure sufficient insurance to cover their costs, but not the full societal costs. Hence the price signals reflect only part of the insurance value of storage.

This will result in an inefficient volume of storage, i.e. too much storage is likely to close, and security of supply would be lower than socially desirable.

National obligations provide additional security where they are applied, but will not provide an efficient volume or regional allocation of storage across the EU, unless applied in a harmonised manner.

Full insurance value is not considered in most gas market modelling, e.g. Follow-up study to the LNG and Storage Strategy (see Annex E).


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2.3 GAS MARKET LIQUIDITY FACILITATION

39 SEPTEMBER 2017


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GAS MARKET LIQUIDITY FACILITATION

The 3rd Energy Package establishes: – Vertical separation & ownership/control restrictions on the monopoly transporter. – That commerce of molecules is a separate activity to transportation, and can become competitive.

The benefits of competition are well understood, and in line with European Commission policy. ACER’s Gas Target Model1 and the draft Quo Vadis study2 highlight the importance of a functioning

wholesale market. For competition/liquidity to grow in the gas market, it needs new market entrants; however, a barrier

to gas market entry is the ability to access flexible resources to ensure balancing does not rely on incumbent counterparties.

Storage, either directly connected to the balancing market, or indirectly connected to the balancing zone via interconnection, is an important part of the pool of flexibility with no barrier to entry for new entrants.

The question is how much of this is attributable to access to storage/flexibility and how much is it worth to the market?

40

Vertically separated gas markets cannot develop competition without access to

flexibility

1. http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/gas/gas-target-model/pages/main.aspx 2. Quo Vadis EU gas market regulatory framework – Study on a Gas Market Design for Europe preliminary report, June 2017, EY & REKK


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WHAT ARE THE CONSTITUENTS OF A GOOD GAS MARKET?

41

We might expect the Gas Target Model to provide some guidance, but this focuses

on outputs (effect) rather than inputs (cause)

“Input” indicators are limited to: – Different supply sources. – Residual Supply Index.

20bcm market size metric removed in GTM2 and replaced by measures of liquidity (an output).

Elements within regulatory control that might enable a good gas market to form include:

– Demand – assumed relatively inelastic. – Consumers who want to switch. – Supply – assumed sufficient for demand

but may be inefficiently contracted/ procured.

– Open access to network. – Alternative supply propositions. – New entrants with ability to balance

their portfolios.


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WHAT ABOUT NON-FUNCTIONING MARKETS?

42

Many of Europe’s gas markets are not well-functioning

ACER, 16/09/2016: ‘Annual Report on the Results of Monitoring the

Internal Natural Gas Markets in 2015’.

Reasons for TTF liquidity development – historical account

“…GasTerra increased its within-day and day- ahead product offerings at the TTF. These short-term products improved the access to flexibility and enabled market players to better adjust their gas purchases to the fluctuating gas demand in the short term. In addition GasTerra started to offer year products with a flexible component, allowing market parties to contract a seasonal profile on the hub. Furthermore, GasTerra introduced a new product for seasonal flexibility better known as virtual gas storage. It gave market players more seasonal flexibility to meet their seasonal demand profile. Since then traded volumes and the number of market participants have risen strongly and, bid-offer spreads have fallen both in within-day, day-ahead as well as future trades, showing that traders started to use the TTF for balancing as well as for hedging purposes.”

Impact of the implementation of the 3rd Energy Package is slow. Do we know whether it will be sufficient? The Dutch market already had most of the requisite features, but…

Availability of flexible supplies/gas storage is an essential component for establishing a liquid and competitive market


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NUMBER OF TRADES AND GAS STORAGE VOLUME

43

Liquid markets have gas storage, but don’t necessarily have large amounts

NBP and TTF had enough flexibility (from storage and production swing) to become liquid; however, many other markets have more storage available, but are less liquid.

Figure 19: Median number of trades per day Figure 20: Storage volume and liquidity

Source: ICIS gas market data Source: ICIS gas market data and GIE gas storage map

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

TTF

NB

P

NC

G

PSV

GAS

PO

OL

Z H

UB

PEG

NO

RD

CZE

CH

RE

PUBL

IC

TRS

Med

ian

num

ber o

f dai

ly tr

ades

Up to 30 days after*

Up to 90 days after*

Up to 365 daysafter*After more than 365days*

* Last day of delivery period compared to trading day


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GAS MARKET LIQUIDITY FACILITATION: ASSESSMENT

Development of liquid trading hubs is central to the EU’s development plans for the gas market. Providing new entrants with access to flexibility is an essential component to creating liquidity. Gas storage is a key, easy to access, form of flexibility. However: Storage operators get paid for the provision of flexibility through reference to summer/winter spreads

and volatility – hence there is not a clear market failure. Direct payments for ‘facilitating liquidity’ are unusual and typically only available to specific party(s)

(e.g. ‘market makers’). The level of storage required to facilitate liquidity development may be relatively low; there is no

evidence that additional storage brings a marginal benefit to liquidity, hence the benefit created by most existing facilities would be zero.

Storage volumes are not the main driver of liquidity (e.g. GB vs Italy or France).

44

We do not consider that there is a strong argument for the presence of a market

failure, or a need for intervention


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FUTURE REQUIREMENT FOR STORAGE

Storage facilities are long-term infrastructure assets, like pipelines and LNG facilities, that need a significant lead time and once built have a large sunk cost that is difficult to recover in a merchant market.

Decisions to develop or decommission infrastructure should be based on long-term demand, not just short-term demand.

However, for most storage facilities the only indication of value is based on summer/ winter spreads and volatility: – Even competitive markets like TTF and

NBP are only liquid a couple of years out, which is not surprising, given the risk on players’ knowledge of market share, and pre-existing long-term contracts.

– For illiquid markets the situation is even worse. – Volatility is only indirectly visible via options/derivatives, which provide confidence limits on future

pricing. The potential closure of storage facilities do not impact price signals beyond this horizon. There is a mismatch and long-term signals are missing.

46

Future requirement for storage may not be satisfied by decisions taken using short

term criteria

Figure 21: Trades by Hub and contract period


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Under current market prices, storage facilities are likely to close and the capacity in 2022 may be suitable for 2022 market conditions.

Predictions of future fundamentals indicate significant change compared to today: – Reduction in indigenous production,

increasing import dependence. – Decline in demand in Western European

markets (where storage is located). – Increase in demand in Eastern European

markets (where storage is NOT located). – Increase in intermittency of gas powered

electricity production.

1

2

3

4

5

6

2020 2025 2030 2035 2040EU

28 G

as D

eman

d (T

hous

ands

of T

Wh)

FUTURE REQUIREMENT FOR STORAGE NOT VISIBLE TODAY

47

Long-term demand for storage is uncertain, but is likely to increase between 2025

and 2030

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

2020 2025 2030 2035 2040

EU28

Gas

Dem

and

(TW

h)

REF2016Entso-g European Green RevolutionEntso-g Green EvolutionEntso-g Blue TransitionEntso-g European Slow ProgressionIEA Current Policies ScenarioIEA New Policies ScenarioIEA 450 Scenario

Figure 22: Range of gas demand projections

– Shift to a fewer trading zones (or even a single trading zone through Quo Vadis). – Potential conversion to support future hydrogen economies.

If there is greater demand in 2025-2030, then additional storage facilities will need to be built, which may be a more expensive outcome than keeping extra facilities supported until they are needed, thus having a greater cost to society.

Source: ENTSOG TYNDP 2017, IEA World Energy Outlook 2016 and EU Reference Scenario 2016


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SOCIETY VALUES FUTURE COSTS MORE THAN BUSINESS

Maintaining storage means incurring losses in the near future. Closing and rebuilding storage means large costs in the far future. The minimum cost solution at social discount rates (~ 4%) may be to maintain storage, while at

commercial discount rates (~ 10%) it may be preferable to close and rebuild. The current market could therefore produce a socially inefficient outcome, resulting in a greater long-

term burden on consumers (who would have to bear higher prices to pay for future storage construction) than if storage was maintained.

This is not a market failure – discount rates are up to market actors to choose. However, this creates a potentially strong argument for intervention, if it can be clearly demonstrated

that there is a future need for storage that will not be met efficiently (from a social perspective) by the market.

48

Different commercial and social discount rates may lead to different storage

closure decisions

Actor

(discount rate)

Investment Proposal

Close now, rebuild in future

Keep current facilities open

Society (~4%)

Private (>10%)


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FUTURE REQUIREMENT FOR STORAGE NOT VISIBLE TODAY

Like gas pipelines, gas storage is a long-term infrastructure asset. There is evidence that long term price signals are absent from the market and that future gas demand

may require more storage than is used at the moment. Preserving some storage at social costs could be a valuable ‘insurance policy’ for future policy

formulation. Optimal social and private economic decisions may be different, so there may be justification to

provide support now to avoid short-term private investment horizons contributing to greater long-term costs on society.

However: Most markets do not have a forward curve that is liquid over all geographies or investment horizons –

gas is not unusual. Future changes are forecastable by operators today, even if not tradeable; this provides uncertainty,

which is not necessarily evidence of ‘market failure’. Some indicators of volatility exist, many drivers are part of the market (e.g. weather, disruptions) and

value is typically reflected in existing storage valuations. Different outcomes under social and commercial discount rates is common to many markets; high

level of evidence would be required to justify intervention.

49

We consider that companies are already able to consider future developments, and

there is little evidence for a market failure, but there may be grounds for support



There is strong evidence of a potential market failure in allowing storage to access the benefits that storage brings to system operation:

– Storage provides value to the system which is not typically remunerated appropriately.

– More analysis is needed to understand the value each facility provides to the TSOs.

There may be a reason for intervention if long-term storage needs are demonstrated to be greater than short-term storage needs:

– Long lead times mean the market cannot wait for short-term price signals to recover. – This is a factor in many markets, not just gas storage.

There is some evidence that the full insurance value may not be priced into storage value: – Insurance value failure is not seen at the moment, as:

– Oversupply reduces the value of insurance and likelihood of loss of load or peak pricing.

– National level policies mask insurance value (e.g. obligations). – This may become an issue as more storage facilities close.

In our view, there is no significant market failure in the provision of flexibility services, as the value is seen through visible spreads and volatility. There is no evidence of market failure for the value in accessing storage’s contribution to

creating liquid hubs.

System value

Insurance value

Others

Visibility of long-term signals

CONCLUSIONS

Potential market failures exist in accessing system value and the full insurance

value


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CONCLUSIONS

52

Storage facilities are likely to close and if the potential market failures are not

assessed it is likely that too much or wrong storage will close

Merchant storage can only capture arbitrage value and part of the insurance value under current market conditions.

The revenue received from the arbitrage value, based on spreads and volatility, is not sufficient to keep most facilities open in the long term – some facilities have closed in the last year and many more are looking to do so.

The system value and full insurance value need to be considered, and, where material, regulatory intervention needs to be taken to correct the price signals seen by storage.

Not doing this could result in the closure of too much storage, and there is a danger that long-term security of supply and network support will be put at risk.

Urgent interventions may be needed to address the market failures in system and insurance value (if material) to ensure too much does not close.

The market failures in insurance are analogous to those identified in the Commission’s Sector Inquiry in electricity.

Quo Vadis and the Follow-up study to the LNG and Storage Strategy provide an opportunity for addressing the missing price signals for storage, particularly as storage is a long-term investment, but do not take the full value of storage into account. This leads to a risk that their conclusions are misleading.

There is a real risk that current opportunities may be missed, as a result of strategies not considering the full value of storage, and interventions taking place too late after storage has been closed.

How do we address

missing price signals? .


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ANNEXES

Annex A – Supply/demand for seasonality & flexibility 53

Annex B – Examples of interventions to show insurance value 55

Annex C – Examples of regulatory recognition of system value 57

Annex D – Potential impact of Quo Vadis on storage 59

Annex E – LNG & Storage Strategy follow-up modelling 60

53 SEPTEMBER 2017


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0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Demand Swing Available Supply swing

WG

V o

r equ

ival

ent (

bcm

)

Cold year LNG importsAverage year Pipe imports

Indigenous productionStorage

54

Figure 23: European seasonal flexibility (2016) Figure 24: Deliverability to Germany (2016)

In 2016 the EU had about 105 bcm of gas storage, 50% more than in 2006, with little change to underlying demand for flexibility (although this has now reduced to about 100 bcm with the loss of Rough and others).

This is more than capable of providing all required seasonal swing (see Figure 23) In many markets, this can provide the majority of peak day demand (e.g. Germany, see Figure 24).

ANNEX A – SUPPLY/DEMAND FOR SEASONALITY & FLEXIBILITY

Although storage is a vital part of the supply the EU has more storage than it needs

for seasonality and flexibility, if system and insurance values are ignored

IndigenousNorway

NordstreamPoland

NetherlandsAustriaBelgiumCzech

Storage

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

Sup

ply

(mcm

/d)

Peak demand ~500mcm/day

Import capacity

Estimated demand and supply of seasonal flexibility (winter supply minus summer supply) based on IEA historical data (2005-2015) for average and maximum demand swing and maximum observed supply swing, and GIE data for storage volumes. Vertical axis shows “working gas volume equivalent”; double this for “demand difference” (e.g. winter demand

minus summer demand). Analysis includes members of EU28 except for Bulgaria, Romania and Lithuania.

Deliverability based on GSE technical capacity for storage, ENTSOG data for interconnections and Pöyry assumptions for indigenous production. Maximum storage withdrawal rates depend on gas in store, and other countries rely on German exports, so the market is tighter than indicated, but deliverability remains well above demand.

>600mcm/day


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0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

TWh

Strategic storageWorking gas volume (TWh)Gas in storage (TWh)

In recent years, European gas storage has only been 85-90% full in October, and there is also 25%-35% left in store at the end of winter, so there is still volume available for colder conditions and/or supply outages.

As storage is an “option”, this is qualitatively expected,

but the market shows no indication of tightness

ANNEX A – EUROPE HAS AMPLE FLEXIBILITY

0

5

10

15

20

25

TWh/

d

Gas storage Withdrawal capacity

55

The full extent of deliverability or space is not currently used

Source: ENTSOG, GSE, National Grid

Figure 25: Historical storage flows & withdrawal capacity

As seen on page 5, Gas storage plays a vital part in the EU gas market; however, there is plenty of deliverability available that is not used.

Source: GSE AGSI+, National Grid, Stogit, MMBF, Enagas, Energinet.dk

Figure 26: Historical gas in store and technical capacity


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ANNEX B – INTERVENTIONS TO ENSURE INSURANCE PROVISION

56

The Italian National Energy Strategy

Regulation of gas storage has recently been reformed in Italy. All storage products are sold via auctions, but storage operators (SSOs) are entitled to receive a regulated amount of “allowed revenue” regardless of the auction price and

amount of storage sold. The missing money is recovered through a socialised cost added as a component to the gas transmission tariff. This scheme was established because interruptions to the gas supply are perceived as a significant problem to Italian electricity production and the safe operation of the Italian manufacturing sector. Because of the significant social costs of gas underdelivery, the Regulatory Authority for Electricity Gas and Water has chosen to socialise storage costs to ensure security of supply, rather than relying purely on the market to deliver an appropriate level of security.

The Italian system provides a market signal indicating the arbitrage value of insurance (via auctions), which would indicate any market need for new storage. In conjunction, it provides socialised support for sufficient storage to satisfy the Italian need for security of supply – beyond what is typically valued by the market – ensuring that Italian storage has sufficient revenue to continue operating.

[…] the incremental storage capacity (necessary to increase the security of supply margin

at peak time) [… is a] strategic initiative within the scope of SEN 2017. It is therefore

envisaged that these projects are subject to a regulatory regime guaranteeing the return on investments made even if the capacity is not fully utilised. This is achieved by introducing a tariff component charged to the system. - Consultation document for the 2017 Italian National Energy Strategy (Pöyry translation)

Source of the reform not a unique ‘Act’.

Relevant sources are: • http://www.autorita.energia.it/allegati/docs

/11/029-11arg.pdf • http://www.autorita.energia.it/allegati/docs

/14/295-14.pdf • http://www.autorita.energia.it/allegati/docs

/14/531-14all.pdf • In the latter interesting info on pre-tax

WACC (6%) • Assets lifetime – table 1 below (wells 60

years, buildings 40 years, pipelines 50 years.. )


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ANNEX B – INTERVENTIONS TO ENSURE INSURANCE PROVISION

57

European examples of intervention

French CRE1, despite urging the introduction of a regulation on gas storage tariffs, recognises that “The current system of storage obligations is designed to ensure security of supply at national level” . Both the proposed alternatives to the current system envisage either keeping a form of storage obligation or introducing auctions with a reserve price and regulated compensation charged to consumers.

Following the supply interruption in the aftermath of the 2006 Russia-Ukraine gas crisis, Hungary approved a law mandating HUSA to hold 1.2 bcm of strategic underground gas storage. The aim is to protect households as well as customers who cannot switch to other energy sources.

Denmark mandates that a storage company shall provide the necessary storage capacity to be made available for emergency purposes. Energinet.dk is responsible for security of supply and compensates the two storage companies to hold additional stock volume for emergency situations at its disposal.

Given the importance of gas in Spain for economic activities, the State mandates market players to hold as strategic storage at least the equivalent of 20 days of gas sales in the previous year. The number of days was increased in 2011 from 10 to 20 given: the volatility of energy markets, the increase of storage capacity and the cancellation of the obligation to maintain operating reserves. Spain also has an obligation to maintain LNG and/or UGS stock equivalent to al least 2 days of total import capacity into the system, with the objective to guarantee gas supply following demand spikes due to the seasonality of residential/commercial demand during cold spells.

To ensure security of supply, in compliance with EC legislation, Poland mandates to hold at least 30 days of average daily imports worth of gas as strategic storage.

1 Commission de régulation de l'énergie. Réponse de la Commission de régulation de l’énergie à la consultation publique de la Direction générale de l’énergie et du climat relative à

l’accès des tiers aux stockages souterrains de gaz naturel


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ANNEX C – REGULATORY RECOGNITION OF SYSTEM VALUE

CEER Final Vision on Regulatory Arrangements for the Gas Storage Market: – “CEER recommends that transportation tariffs should consider the benefits and costs that

storage facilities provide to the overall system”.

EC Tariffs Network Code Impact Assessment: – “Natural gas storage facilities add flexibility to the gas system and reduce the overall system

costs.” – “High tariffs at … gas storage facilities can constitute an important barrier for gas traders … [it]

can distort competition between storages and other flexibility sources. While such payments may be justified depending on the physical location of the storage or its use and consequent systemic effects, generally storages add flexibility to the system and reduce overall costs.”

– “The discount is set at 50% and the specific costs or benefits that the storage causes in the system, such as connection and compression, are added or extracted.”

– “Adopting common tariff rules applicable to storage entry and exit points is expected to significantly contribute to storages having the same level playing field in cross-border competition that an internal market should enable. Option 2 [TAR NC], by acknowledging both the benefits

(including the value of storage for security of supply) and the possible additional system costs of storage, triggers an essential assessment that allows keeping the necessary existing storage

facilities in operation.”

58

European policy makers agree that some gas storage lowers the costs of the

transmission system


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ANNEX C – REGULATORY RECOGNITION OF SYSTEM VALUE

The Tariff Network Code and associated impact assessment assume that individual member states will consider the costs and benefits in deciding on the appropriate level of discount from tariffs. However, whilst regional cooperation is encouraged and required, member states are not required to consider the impact on other member states.

The Gas Security of Supply Directive may have a role to play through: – Preventative Action Plans; – Emergency Measures; and – Use of supplies from neighbouring member states, which implies cross-border insurance value

(see page 31).

59

The prevailing EU policy does not require member states to consider the benefit to

downstream member states


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ANNEX D – POTENTIAL IMPACT OF QUO VADIS ON STORAGE

Shifting to a single trading zone is likely to: – Reduce shipper requirements for storage (only need to balance one zone); – Increase requirement for TSO balancing actions (market solution will be less optimum at

delivering within-Europe flows); and – Increase TSO requirements for storage, if storage usage is allowed to compete with reinforcing

transmission infrastructure. Depending on market arrangements in place, this – or other future design changes - may increase

the requirement for storage.

SEPTEMBER 2017 GAS STORAGE MARKET FAILURES 60

The preliminary Quo Vadis study report proposes a single EU trading zone

TAQA -VERTROUWELIJK

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ANNEX E – LNG & STORAGE STRATEGY FOLLOW-UP MODELLING

61

Simplifications in the modelling may misrepresent and underestimate the welfare

value of gas storage – this must be addressed in the Quo Vadis modelling (1/2)

Feature Concern Impact

Perfect foresight

The model optimises flows assuming a perfect visibility on all modelled elements and perfect information, which is unrealistic and not representative of reality. It also exacerbates the monthly resolution issues.

Monthly resolution & single cycle

The model appears to be operating on a monthly granularity, and assumes storage facilities operate only on a single cycle: the modelling misses both the shorter-term flexibility provided by storage facilities as well as their contribution to meeting peak day demands wherever they may occur. These are key components in understanding the role of gas transmission utilisation, cross-border flows, and storage utilisation especially given a future of increased intermittency.

Country granularity

The model is arranged into countries, not balancing zones or transmission networks. This will mean that the modelling disregards at least part of the locational value of storage.

Demand elasticity

The model assumes demand is uniformly elastic. Real demand may not all be elastic, and elasticity is certainly not uniform. Transparency on assumptions and results (i.e. how much demand is turned down in each country) would be helpful to demonstrate that the elasticity assumptions are not distorting the results.

Storage tariffs

The model assumes a storage tariff of 0.5 to 1.0 EUR/MWh which, especially when coupled to the perfect foresight nature of the model, will have the effect of capping resulting spreads. The model also assumes only single cycle storage operation

Scarcity rent

When a facility has high utilisation on a day then the price goes up due to its scarcity. This is not reflected in the modelling – some routes and facilities (e.g. ES, IE) are highly used but have no impact on price – this causes a distortion in the utilisation of all infrastructure, impacting on the value of volatility and location


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ANNEX E – LNG & STORAGE STRATEGY FOLLOW-UP MODELLING

62

Simplifications in the modelling may misrepresent and underestimate the welfare

value of gas storage – this must be addressed in the Quo Vadis modelling (2/2)

Feature Concern Impact

Storage capacity

The analysis does not consider reductions in storage capacity even though they recognise that the tariffs are too low for facilities to make money. This will impact on the long-term view of the future, perhaps significantly

Insurance and network value

The report acknowledges that storage provides network support and SoS support, but disregards this value and assumes that storage only receives value from arbitrage found in the modelling

Lack of reconciliation against actuals

The modelling is compared/reconciled against actuals (AGSI+ data), and all differences in storage utilisation are assumed to be explained by ‘long-term’ storage contracts. It should be relatively

straightforward to provide support for this by demonstrating that location of storage used by the model is consistent with known long-term storage contracts, however if the demonstration fails, the explanation is unsupportable.

LNG terminal aggregation

LNG terminals are aggregated nationally. This misses important geo-economics (some UK and French LNG regasification facilities are closer than some Iberian LNG facilities to the new LNG export facilities in the United States), which has important implications for locational storage utilisation and transmission utilisation

LNG terminal storage

The model assumes LNG regasification provides no storage/flexibility. There is direct evidence of LNG regasification facilities being used to react to shorter-term market price signals (e.g. in the UK market in response to a trip on the Langeled pipeline).


Consulting. Engineering. Projects. Operations. www.poyry.com

Andrew Morris Bradley Steel [email protected] [email protected] +44 (0)1865 812212 +44 (0)1865 812881 Gareth Davies Angus Paxton [email protected] [email protected] +44 (0)1865 812204 +44 (0)1865 812263

TAQA -VERTROUWELIJK

Hoorzitting NC TAR

TAQA – slides

Maandag 14 Mei 2018

28 May 2018 PGI+ Partner Workshop | CONFIDENTIAL 1

Introductie

2

TAQA

- Beheerder gasopslagen Bergermeer en Piek Gas Alkmaar.

- ~60 mio GTS transporttarief p/jaar. In grootte vergelijkbaar met bijv. VEMW.

NC TAR: kans op eerlijk transparant en eenvoudig systeem. Dank aan ACM voor voorbereidende werk. Tijd voor integrale afweging ‘compromis – ruil – afweging’

Grote ontwikkelingen in de gasmarkt:

- Afbouw van de Groningen productie (ook minder flexibiliteit)

- Energie transitie ‐ ‘van het gas af’

NCTAR 7(d). Volumerisico mag niet op eindgebruiker worden afgewenteld.Project “Morgan” moet dus: vandaag, bij implementatie NCTAR.

Gasopslagen nu niet economisch voor eigenaren. Eigenaren worden niet betaald voor maatschappelijk nut (verzekering, systeemfunctie).

Entry – Exit split 0/100TAQA steunt het originele GTS voorstel

3

0/100 Kosten verdeling is eerlijker- 84 entry punten tegen 1031 exit punten, dus de kapitaals‐ en beheerskosten zijn niet 50/50

- Regionale GTS net is puur ten behoeve van Exit punten dus niet 50/50

- Gelijk aan elektriciteit

Energie transitie ‐ Algemeen beleid- Leg de kosten neer bij de eindgebruiker; incentive om te veranderen; milieu

- 0 entry bevordert ontwikkeling groen gas, kleine Nederlandse velden en import

- 0 entry zorgt voor extra kleine velden ontwikkeling waardoor Groningen eerder omlaag gaat

- Aantrekken van transit stromen (goed voor liquiditeit, security of supply). NB dit is geen ‘verboden beïnvloeding grensoverschrijdende gashandel’! 50/50 heeft ook gevolgen voor gasstromen. Dit is GTS ‘als ondernemer’.

- Beter voor Gasopslagen die zorgen voor security of supply (remedie voor market failure)

Gevolgen- Eindgebruiker betaalt kosten sowieso, lagere entry tarief vertaalt zich in lagere commodity prijs.

- Extra gasstroom (GTS voorstel) = relatieve verlaging tarieven

TAQA ‘voorstel’

4

‘Totaalpakket’ ‐ een compromis, zowel financieel als qua kosten allocatie en complexiteit b.v:

- Entry / Exit : 0/100 ()- Opslag korting blijft minimum van 50% ()

- Postzegel tarief ()- Multiplicatoren en Seizoens factoren als per ACM‐ontwerp ()

- Geen staffelkorting voor grote capaciteitsboekers ‐ wanverhouding met kosten blijft – CBb uitspraak! ()

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