Kant Van Cleve

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Van Cleve and the Neglectedlternative

Jeremy Delongniv rsity of Kansas

One of the most persistent worries voiced by students of Kant 'sCritique of Pure Reason is the neglected al ternat ive ob jec t io n (N A ).In sett ing out the components of his transcendental aesthetic , Kantexplicitly states that space and timerespectively, the outer and inner forms of sensible intuit ions that underlie al l our phenomenalexperiencesare merely pure forms of sensible intuit ion. By this hemeans that they do not have any objective reality as things in themselves (i .e. , they are not noumena). ' It is crucial for Kant's overallproject in theCritique, especially in relation to his C op ern ica n Revolutio n, that both space and t ime be given a priori for us as necessarycomponents of our exper ience. However , inferr ing from this thatthe independent existence of space and t ime can, or must be, deniedoutright seems irrelevant to Kant 's overall project and, more importantly, an unjustified dogma inconsistent with the claims of the overall project. I take it that Kant leaves readers with the following twogeneral questions:

1) M otivation If Kant thinks that space and time m ust necessarilybe a priori intuitions for our experiences, he must therefore deny the existence of space and time independent of ourperception. Are there deeper philosophical motivations for thisclaim, and is Kant's overall project threatened if this claim isundermined?1 See Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Norman Kemp Smith

(New York: Palgrave, 20 03 ) . A 49/ B6 6, A3 69 , A490-1/B5 18-19 to cite just a fewinstances.Auslegung30/1 13


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14 Auslegung30/12) lustification/Sou ndness No m atter Kan t's own reasons form aking the negative ontological claim regarding space and tim e,the qu estion remains w heth er Kant is at all philosophically justified in making the inference. Considerations here include, butare not limited to, the seemingly contradictory Kantian tenetthat we can have no knowledge of things in themselves. So, arethere any good reasons for us to accept his claim?In short, the NA asks both why Kant holds, and whether he is

justi f ied in holding that space and time could not be both a form o fintuition and a form of things as they are in themselves? 2 In otherwords, why could the world not possibly be similar to the scenariodes cribed in the red spectac les analogy ?that just be cau se on e iswearing red-tinted spectacles and thus perceives everything to bereddish, i t does not fol low that the world, once the spectacles areremoved, wil l not have been red to begin with. 3 These questions wil lserve as the background inquiry for this paper.

As this top ic has be en w ritten on extensively over the years, I amnot proposing to offer a particularly novel interpretation of how toexplain either (1) or (2) above, or even to offer much of a l i teraturereview regarding the issue. Instead, my focus is to examine JamesVan Cleve's treatment of the issue in his Problems from Kant. In analyzing Kant's transcendental idealism and some of the traditional objec tio n s against i t ( including th e NA ), Van Cleve explici tly prom isesto show that und er [his] interpretat ion o f the argu m ent from geom etry , Kan t has an sw ers . 4 It seems reasonable that any truly satisfyingtreatment of the neglected alternative should provide responses toboth ( 1 ) and (2 ) above. Van Cleve's proposed so lu tio n thus shouldbe judged by how w ell he addresses them .

However, less than one page later, when Van Cleve dismisses theNA outright on the basis of his particular empirical ly idealistic interpretation of Kant, i t is not at al l clear how Van Cleve's interpretation adequately responds to either, let alone both, aspects of theob jectio n. A t best , Van Cleve explains away the ob jec tio n on the basis

2 James Van Cleve. Problems from Kant. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1999) . Hereafter VC .} V C 2 6 7 n . l4 VC 3 6 .1 will subsequently refer to this as Van Cleve's pr om ise .


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n Cleve and the Neglected Alternative 15that it only exists due to naive understandings o f Ka nt 's co m m itm en tto idealism. However, when one attempts to apply Van Cleve's ownmore extreme interpretation of Kant 's idealism as a resolution to theobjection, it still remains mysterious why this is supposed to serveas an answer. This leaves the reader wondering if they are missingsomething important . Unfortunately , there is no help forthcomingelsewhere in Van Cleve's work, as these two pages contain the onlyexplicit references to the NA in Van Cleve's entire book. My purposeis to clarify why Van Cleve believes he has exp laine d away this o b jec tion so easily, and whether his proposal has any merit. I concludethat his proposal is completely devoid of merit, and there is no reason to think Van Cleve's particular idealist ic interpretation of Kantin any way helps resolve the N A .

As I am only concerned with answers to the problems raised bythe NA, Van Cleve's in particular, I will not engage with Kant's arguments for space and t ime being necessarily a priori for all our subjec tive experienceI will take it as given that Kant has succeeded inestablishing wh at Guy er refers to as Kan t 's tran scen de nta l the ory o fe x p e r i e n c e . 5 What is at question here is the justif ication of Kant 'stranscendental idealism How Kant can go from concluding that

space and t ime is necessary a priori for our percept ion of objects tothe conclusion that objects themselves necessarily lack spatial andtemporal properties. In addition, in keeping with other commentators on this issue, and Van Cleve in particular, the sp eci fic arg um en tsconsidered herein will relate only to space being denied ontologicalobjectivitythe similarity of the arguments with t ime should generally follow suit.V a n C l e v e ' s I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f K a n t

As Van Cleve's p ro m ise to resolve the N A explicit ly states thatthe answers will be forth com ing on his inter pre tation o f Ka nt 's argument from geometry, which it is reasonable to assume could somewhat turn on Van Cleve's overall perspective on Kant, it is necessary to first und erstand how Van C leve views K ant o verall. Van Cleve

5 Paul Guyer. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1987). 344.


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16 Auslegung30/1believes the app ropr iate way to interpre t Kan t is as an 'hon est-to -goo dn ess' ideal ist regarding the en tire world in space and t im e. 6VanCleve does not mean, of course, that Kant is atotal idealisteven VanCleve will not deny that Kant believed that there are really things outthere exist ing independent of us and thus committ ing him so somelevel of real ism (the noumenal realm, or things-in-themselves) . WhatVan Cleve is opposing are views of other Kant scholars that tend todescribe the phenomenal realm as merely the result of a particularlyhuman subjectivity imposing i ts particular viewpoint, composed ofcertain forms of intuitions, upon things-in-themselves. Here the phenom enal is jus t our way o f thinking a bou t, viewing, or the orizin gabout the actually existing world, and as such may be very differentfrom the way things actually are in themselves. This way of thinking about the phenomenal/noumenal dist inct ion is common in theone-w orld, dua l-aspect view of Kan t that has b ec o m e pop ular in

the recent decades.Why is this not enough for Van Cleve? These views do not yieldthe result of making phenomenal objects depend upon us for their

very existence. Instead, there is only one type of existent thing, a particular object, but two ways of describing ithow it really is (thenoumenal) and how we know i t in appearance ( the phenomenal) .Van Cleve thinks this level of realism is not supported by the text:

By transcendental idealism, I mean the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, representationsonly, not things in themselves, and that time and space aretherefore only sensible forms of our intuition, not determinations given as existing by themselves, nor conditions of objectsviewed in themselves. 7So , Van Cleve takes from this that space and time do not exist

in themselves, and thus no appearances do either, as al l phenomena are viewed by us as spatially and temporally extended. The veryexistence of space and t ime must depend upon something i f theydo no t grou nd themselves, and that som eth ing is us. Th us VanCleve's con clusio n that Ka nt is an ho nest-to -goo dn ess idealist, in

6 VC 4.7 Quoted in VC 5. KS 345. (A369) .


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n Cleve and the Neglected Alternative 17the Berkeleyan sense of esse est perdp/'-appearances are completelymind-dependent .

Furthermore, Van Cleve argues that appearances must have thissort o f mind-dep endence for Kant 's Cope rnican Revolution to w ork.For by Kant's revolutionary inversion of our perceptive model , theobject must conform to our knowledge rather than our knowledgeconforming to what is actually out there in the world. Van Clevethinks that no sense can be made of objects conforming to ourknowledge unless they also depend upon us for their very existence.The intuition seems to be something l ike this: i f objects exist independent of us, how could our knowledge possibly affect propertieso f that ob ject? How ever, i f we bring the ob jec t i tself into ex iste n cevia the faculties of our mind, one can understand how we can affectits properties; for we give it the apparent properties it has in ourcognizing i t . 8 Van Cleve puts it this way:

How is it possible for objects to owe any of their traits to ourmanner of cognizing them? The answer I find most satisfyingis this: the objects in question owe their very existence to beingcognized by us. An object can depend on us for its Sosein (itsbeing the wayit is) only if it also depends on us for its Sein (itsbeing, period). It is in this way that the Copernican Revolutionis bound up with idealism. I say mo re a bo ut how this is so in thenext section and elsewhere (especially chapter 3). 9This particular passage will prove to be the key to Van Cleve's

supposed solution to the NA , as is hinted at he re by the pa renth etical8 While virtually nothing Van Cleve says regarding the appropriate way tointe rpr et Kan t's idealism, he re and in what follows, is lacking in con troversy , asmy purpose is not to evaluate his perspective overall but to evaluate whetherhis view offers any positive contribution to the neglected alternative objection,

I treat all background information concerning Van Cleve as the antecedentto an hypothetical con ditiona l: I fV.C. is right about Kant holding x, y, and z,does it thereby follow that the neglected alternative objection loses its force?Since I hold the argument to be invalid, it would be superfluous to my purposes to evaluate for soundness by arguing against the controversial premisesthemselves rather than simply showing the conclusion fails to follow from thepremises.9 VC 5


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18 Auslegung30/1notation promising to take up the issue again in chapter 3 ( the onlyplace the NA is mentioned) .

Based upon the above considerations, Van Cleve concludes thatthe tradit ional two -wo rld view is a m ore app rop riate way to interpret Kantthat there are really two kinds of existent things inthe worldthe noumenal and the phenomenal. However, Van Clevedoes not acc ep t just any old two -wo rld view, as he rec og nize s manyproblems with this view as well. In attempting to avoid these problematic issues, his interpretation requires not only that there be twodif ferent kinds of ob jects , but that one kind ( the phenomenal) mustb e completely mind-dependent. W e only talk of these phenomenal objec ts as existing they are in fact m erely virtual o b jec ts , exist ingin relation only to our cognizing them, yet s imultaneously lackingany sort of independent being. They are mere representat ions thatmay supervene upon, or in a sense even be caused by, things in thereal world, but simultaneously lack any ontological existence themselves. M uc h as a tree's shadow m oves across the lawn on a sunny day,we can speak of the shadow and have it represented to us, but weare not then s imultaneously committed to posit ing the exis tence ofa new ob ject ca l led a shadow . A shadow's exis ten ce and ap parentmotion is completely dependent upon and expla ined by the otherthings and their relation between each other (e.g. the sun and itsown m ove m ent, th e lawn, and the shade tre e that stands be tw een thel ight f rom the former reaching the la t ter) . 1 0Fo r Van Cleve, I f Kantian appearances are virtual ob jec ts , the nto say that someone is aware of an appearance of a certain sort isonly to say that he is sensing or intuiting in a certain way. 1 1 W h i l ewe may pred icate things o f these o bj ec ts , and say that they ex is tin our awareness ( if only for the sake of convenience) , we are reallyonly saying that we are sensing a particular sensation, not that thesensation exists independently of our perception of i t . 1 2 Whi le thedetails of this view are somewhat complex and certainly controver-

1 0 VC 9. The significance of this particular example for Van Cleve seems tobe that shadows are not actually something, but in reality the lack of something(light) in a particular location, which only seems to be a separate existent thingdue to our perceptual apparatus.VC 9 .1 2 VC 9.


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n Cleve and the Neglected Alternative 19sial, the only im po rtant con cer ns herein are 1) app earan ces are virtual ob jec ts which do not in fact exist alongside noum ena l ob ject sout in the world but only occur in our minds, and 2) noumena areobjectively real , while appearances are mind-dependent. I wil l subsequently refer to this as Van Cleve's 2W 1 M D (two-world, 1 m ind-dependent) thesis .V an C l e ve 's T r e a t m e n t o f t h e A r g u m e n t f r o m G e o m e t r y

Th e secon d part o f Van Cleve's pr om ise relates directly to hisidealist ic interpretat ion of Kant 's argum ent from ge om etr y (orat least Van Cleve's particular reconstruction of Kant's argument) .Sin ce this argu m ent is wh at motivates Van Cleve con sidering the N Ain the f irst place, we must examine i t before continuing forward.

H er e is Van Cleve 's reconstru ct ion of the arg um en t: 1 31. W e can not con stru ct [visualize] any cubes with mor e thaneight corners (or, any polygons that do not have at least threesides, etc.)2. Th erefore , there cannot be any cubes with more than eightcorners.3 . Th e inferen ce from 1 to 2 must be legitim ateo therwise,there would be no accounting for our knowledge of geometrical truths such as 2.4 . How ever, the infer ence from 1 to 2 wouldnot be legitimateif cubes were things in themselves.5 . Th erefo re, cubes are not things in themselves, bu t only appearances [and so forth for all geom etrical figu res ]. 1 4The inference from 1 to 2 does seem to hold, as long as we real

ize that we are talking about some kind of logical contradiction inconstruct ing a cube (or any other geometric shape) with fewer orm ore co rn ers than required by i ts definition rathe r than som e fai lure

1 3 1 will again refrain from the inquiry into whether Van Cleve does Kant'sargument from geometry justicefor if Van Cleve's argument is to go through,it has to be valid on the parameters he establishes first, which I again deny.1 4 VC 35. Brackets mineadd qualifications VC himself makes to his argu

ment in subsequent passages.


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2 0 Auslegung30/1of our imagination. However, this likely requires an analytic view ofgeometry, while Kant is dedicated to geometr ical knowledge beingsynthetic. Either way, let us accept that this inference is a priori, as itdepends upon logical possibility, and grant the inference for the sakeof argument at this t ime.

The proposit ion in 3 invokes the necessity of such a priori knowledge for ge om etrica l knowledge for if the infe ren ce from 1 to 2were not legit imate, I could not know that no cube anywhere hasmore than eight corners , but . . . I do know this . 1 5 So a priori knowledge of geometrical figures is necessary for us to have any universalkno w ledge o f the m , or as Van Cleve puts it , th e validity o f the inference from 1 to 2 is a necessary condit ion of our having geometricalk n o w l e d g e . 1 6

In m oving from 3 to 4 , Van Cleve argues, Ka nt asks him self wh atwould be metaphysically necessary (in the world, not for us) for theinference from 1 to 2 to be valid. Kant's answer, mysteriously still , isthat space and t ime cannot be things-in-themselves. Thus, for now Iam will ing to grant premises 1-3 as true on whatever grounds Kantor Van Cleve wish they be accepted. The tr icky part here is how weget from premises 1-3 to premise 4: the denial of the inference from1 to 2 if cubes were things in themselves. This is the NAwhy mustthe necessity of our possessing certain knowledge of something apriori necessarily rule out that those very things we possess a priorias knowledge (or more correct ly for the NA, as pure forms of intuit ions) must be denied object ive reality in the realm of the noumenal?

Van Cleve considers two object ions to this argument, the first being the synth etic v. analytic dispute over the con cep tion o f ge om etry ,which as I mentioned above would undermine premise 3. I parallelVan Cleve and just accept that Kant is right about this, as for thepurposes of this inquiry as it has no bearing on Van Cleve's responseto the NA. Though it would certainly defeat the argument i f Kant iswrong about geometr ic knowledge being synthet ic , which he l ikelyis once non-Euclidean geometries are considered, my purpose is toaddress proposed solu tions to how and why Kant him self moves from

1 5 VC 35.1 6 VC 35. .


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n Cleve and the Neglected Alternative 21premise 3 to premise 4 in the historical context of Kant 's sole commitment to Eucl idean geometry.

T h e secon d o bject io n Van Cleve considers, however, is analogou sto the objection that is the focus of this paper:

Why does the legitimacy of the 1-2 inference preclude the possibility that some things in themselves are cubical? Could it notbe the case that the laws of geometry govern not only the constructions that are possible for human beings, but also the configurations that are possible among things in themselves. Perhaps (as Kant sometimes charges) that would be an implausiblypreestablished harmony, but what rules it ou t? 1 7H ere is w here Van Cleve draws the ap prop riate p arallel , acknow l

edging that this object ion to the argument from geometry is a special case of the NA. Here also is where we get Van Cleve's promiseto provide an answer to this objection. At the very least, we shouldexpect some sort of credible answer to the special case i f not themore generalized claim.A t t e m p t i n g t o E x p l a i n A w a y t h e N e g l e c t e d A l t e r n a t i v e

In procee ding with his argum ent for why the N A is no t a pro blemfor Kant, I would like to first point out that Van Cleve does ask someof the right questionsit is only in his answers that he goes astray.Van Cleve acknowledges that the specific object ion to the argumentfrom geometry has bite (and assumedly, he also thereby acknowledges the more general concern of the NA), as i t could certainlybe the case that the 1-2 inference could be truth-preserving if cubeswere things in themselves. 1 8 He then suggests that the question tobe answered is not whether it ispossible for the noumenal realm toalso b e spatial and tem po ral. Instead, ou r que stion.. .is un de r wh atconditions the 1-2 inference would be necessarily validnot just cont ingently truth-preserving. 1 9

1 7 VC 36.1 8 VC 36.1 9 VC 36.


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22 Auslegung30/1To add support to Kant's requirement for a necessarily valid proof,

Van Cleve suggests the reader consider:What further assumption would be needed to get from 1 to 2.The assumption that immediately suggests itself is this: cubes,and spatial figures generally, exist only in the construction of them.That is why the constraints on what we can construct are alsoconstraints on all spatial objects: such objects exist only in beingc o ns t r uc t e d .2 0To this imm ediately suggestive assum ption, Van Cleve m akes

the following qualifications1. A cub e (or other spatial ob ject) need not be con structe d inthe mindit can beperceived.2. Kan t seem s to allow that ob jects ex ist even if they have no tactually been intuitedVan Cleve saves his 2W1MD approachto Kan t by acknowledging that such objects can exist c onsistently with his idealism in that theywouldbe intuited u nder certa incondit ions.2 1Van Cleve then ignores the second objection (assumedly because

it is the one that actually threatens his basis for his entire project)and proceeds to cash out how making this simple assumption aboutKant (2W1MD) so lves the NA.

W ith the 2W 1 M D underw ri ting the inference from 1 to 2 as valid ,Van Cleve argues that this makes prem ise 4 qu ite co m p ell i ng . 2 2I take his reasoning to be this: since spatial objects only exist whenbeing constructed, and s ince we cannot possibly and correct ly construct any spatial objects that defy their defining qualities (cubes having more than eight corners) , and since we are the only ones thatconstruct spatial objects, there simply cannot be any spatial objectsthat defy our logical conception of them. If cubes were things in

2 0 VC 36.2 1 VC 36-37. One cannot help but think this is quite a blow to Van Cleve's2W1MDafter all, now we have objects existing independently as long as theywould be intuited were someone to come upon them and perceive them. Itseems someone much more committed to realism could hold the same thing,especially if they think that all things that exist are those that can be perceived.2 2 VC 37.


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Van Cleve and the Neglected Alternative 2 3themselves, things we cannot experience and have no a priori knowledge of, let alone indep end ent o f us for their existe nc e, the infe ren cefrom 1 to 2 would not be necessarily valid; we could never be certainthere were not cubes out there with more than e ight corners thatdefy our constructive capacities but nevertheless exist.M y R e s p o n s e

Something certainly seems f ishy, or unconvincing at best , withVan Cleve's pro of. O n e alm ost might have the feeling th at Van C leve'ssolution to the NA is abou t as unjustif ied as Kant's ou trigh t re je ctio nof the possibility in the first place. If this is the intuition the readerhas, I have successfully recounted Van Cleve's argumentfor in attempting to offer an answer to Kant's NA, Van Cleve has his ownne glec ted alterna tive prem ise that essentially begs the qu estion ,

and certainly does not establish the type of necessary validity of theinference from 1 to 2 that Van Cleve seeks. A formalization of VanCleve's argument should make help the unjusti f ied move clearer.A r g u m e n t f o r 2 W 1 M D :

P I . Ka nt is an hon est-to-goo dn ess idealist (i.e., Berk eleyan idealist)P2. All appearances are mind-dependent for their existence(from 1).P3. All appearances are spatial (and temporal) (i.e., a posterio-C I . All spatial (and temporal)appearances are mind-dependent.

Van Cleve's Revised Argument from Geometry:P 4: We cannot construct [visualize] any cubes with more thaneight corners (or, any polygons that do not have at least threesides, etc.)P5. Spatial figures exist only in the construction [visualization]of them (Assumed Premise)P6: Therefore, there cannot be any cubes with more than eightcorners.


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24 Auslegung30/1P7. T he infe ren ce from 1 to 2 m ust be valid for us to have know ledge of cubes (spatial figures).P8: The inference from 1 to 2 would not be necessarily valid ifcubes (spatial figures) were things in themselves (things thatwere not dependent upon us for their existence)C 2: Cubes are not things in themselves (and by analogy, neitherare space and time)First o f al l, no te th at ( C 1 ) is a conc lusion abo ut spatial appearanc

es.Van Cleve 's 2 W 1 M D only extends to the phenom enal realm w henm aking claims such as app earan ces being the way they are m eansthose very appearances (and their qua li t ies) , m ust com pletely dep endupon us for their very existence (qualif ied existence, of course, asvirtual objects ) . Van Cleve 's 2W1MD leaves the noumenal realm

completely alone, as things that do exist independently from us andabout which we can have no knowledge.

Second, note what fo l lows from (P4) and (P5) , keeping (CI)in mind. (P5) must be about appearances to be derived from VanCleve's idealism, for it is something we can construct via 1) pure intuition or 2) empirical intuition, and only appearances depend uponus on Van Cleve's view. 2 3 Since (P5) is in the same language as (P4),(P4) must be about appearances as well . However, this means thatwhat fol lows from (P4) and (P5) to justi fy (P6) in the proof is notthat there cannot be noumenal spatial figuresonly that there cannotbe phenomenal spatial f igures with m ore than eight co rn er s. Fo r anargument depending upon what we can construct , when we are thevery source of those constructions, only tel ls us what can or cannotbe for our constructions i t tel ls us nothing about the noumenal realmthat is admittedly independent of us.

Next, consider Van Cleve's move to f ind an assumption thatmakes the inference from 1 to 2 in his original version of the argum e n t necessarily valid.Th e inference only seems to m eet th e necessarilyvalid cri teria i f we have an assumption that completely rules out anypossibi l i ty for cubes with more than 8 corners. Kant certainly seemsto want to rule out noumenal spatial f igures, as beyond our empirical experience , f rom serving as a possible counterexample to our

V C 5, 36-37 .


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n Cleve and the Neglected Alternative 2 5certainty of geo m etric knowledge. However, Van Cleve 's 2 W 1 M D ,serving as the om itted assump tion, effectively locks K an t furt he r intoknowledge of only the phenomenal realm rather than transcendingto a negative ontological claim about the noumenal .

If Van Cleve's argument tempts anyone, i t is because of the ambiguous language of (P5) , suggesting that all spatial objects (phenomenal and noumenal) exist only when constructed, and thus i fwe cannot construct them and we are their source , there cannotontologically be any. This is why I say his assumed premise, servingambiguously, begs the questionit must be read as such, and thusbe g th e question , in ord er to go throu gh. O nly by reading it in the latter sense do you get a valid argument, necessarily valid or not. Readas it should be, it is simply invalid.C o n c l u s i o n

Considering all this as nothing more than an answer to the neglected alternative, just throwing out the argument that1) since al lspatial appea rances are mind-depend ent, and 2 ) that since we can no tconceive of spatial figures other than a certain way, that C) therefore no spatial objects can exist independently of ussimply doesnot follow or must beg the questionthat all spatial things are merelyapp earan ces. Even were we to grant that K ant was such a Berkeleyanidealist as Van Cleave m akes him ou t to b e, Van Cleve's to b e isto b e perceiv ed only con cer ns ap pearan ces. Van Cleave sti ll has toadmit, and does, that Kant is also a noumenalist . That appearancesmust depend on us for their Sein in order to depend on us for theirSosein (wh ich is highly controv ersial , bu t even IF it was the c as e) onlygrounds the assert ion that the existence of phenomena (Sein), aswell as the phenomena being spatial (Sosein) depends upon us. It saysnothing about the impossibility of noumena being spatial . Finally,the fur ther textual evidence Van Cleave offers for his inte rpr etatio n,as i t best supports the Copernican Revolution, gains no further tractionfor the 'ob jec ts' un der discussion in relation to K ant's revolut ion must a lso be phenom enal , not noum enal .

T h u s , Van Cleve simply does no t provide any helpfu l solu tions o rexplanations for the neglected alternative. He does not adequatelyaddress ei ther of the cri teria outl ined in my introduction for sub-


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2 6 Auslegung30/1stantively responding to the objection, though he does hint at Kant'smotivationthat Kant in some way seeks to establish certain synthetica priori knowledge (such as math, geometry, and science) as necessari ly val id in order to protect them from relativism. Whether VanCleve's hon est-to-go od nes s idealist interp retation o f Ka nt has m eri t in answering oth er pro blem s from Ka nt I leave to the read eror other commentatorsI am only certain i t does not and cannothelp with the infamous neglected alternative objection. Either way,Van Cleve's main problem for this inquiry is not (though it certainlydoesn't help) asserting esse est percipi. It attempts to make an argument valid viapetittio princippi.

Kant Van Cleve

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