I was born in 1927. $ERiF MARD|N I was part of a generation … · 2016. 1. 6. · Avrapa Nerede...
Transcript of I was born in 1927. $ERiF MARD|N I was part of a generation … · 2016. 1. 6. · Avrapa Nerede...
Avrapa Nerede Bitfuor?Wherc does Europc end?
$ERiF MARD|NTtirkiye'de AvrupaEurope in Turkey
t.rtf l,l.rdlnSoqolQiprofesiirii,
Un;tdrit i'ud.gi;rcali,
Inanb*l'd.a
Tiirkitedoitrrtlu.
Prcfessot olSodolo8|,p.eserd/teod'hghPrin<M1Unfuetsitl,,ives ,n ,ttdrbu,ond P|it'raton,bo'7i h Tu*ey.
1927'de dogdum.Benim kuga$rmdan olanlan btiyiitiipyetigtirenlerin zihninde, Avrupa'mn veripverecesi en iyi gey oldu$una inamlan de$erionlara kazandrrmak tutkusu vardr. Bu anlayrgagdre Avrupa'nrn verece$i bu en iyi gey,Avrupa'nrn entelektiiel baqarrlanmn en kahctolanr anlamrna geliyordu: bilim, pozitivizm,nesnel bilgi. Batrl inanglann drdii$ii <iriimceka$rnr stipiirmek, o giinlerde hayata yaklagrmrntarzrm belirle me kte kullanrlan baEhcametafordu. Tembel ve sefahat diigkiiniipadigahlar, beceriksiz idareciler, ahlaksrzmemurlar, gegmi$te kalan Osmanhlmparatorlu$u'nu dtigiinmek iginbaEvurdu$umuz imgelerdi. Yeni cesur TiirkCumhuriyeti bunlan ebediyen tarihin gcipsepetine atml$tl. Osmanh lmparatorlugu'nungokiigiinden sonra, I920'lerin baqrndaTiirkiye gaprnda escn Cumhuriyetgilikideolojisi olan Kemalizm'in awentii'sini bufikirler oluEturuyordu. Bize bu fikirleriaqrlayanlarrn baqtnda, ailelerinin tarihindebirden fazla kitap sahibi olmayr bagaran ilkkugak olan idealist ilkokul <iSretmenle rimizgeliyordu. Ancak, ilkokul agamasr geridekahnca, <igretmenle rimizin yaklagrmlannln iizerimizdeki etkileri de azalabiliyordu.Kemalizm'in ideolojik cephaneliginin son silahr da muhtemelen milliyetgilikti. $imdi qimdi,
eski Osman-h lmparatorlu$u'ndan bize miras kaldr$rm segmeye bagladr$rm bir yurtseverlikledoluyduk, ama tartrEmadan kabul etti$imiz de$erler arastnda., onlarla i9i9e oldu$u igin, buyurtseverli$in varhgrmn farkrnda de$ildik. Gelgelelim, yeni Cumhuriyet segkinlerinrnyerlegtirdigi milliyetgilik bu yurtseverlilin hayli ilerisine gidiyordu. Okullarda, dersaneduvarlanna asrlmrg haritalarda, Avrasya haritalan iizerindeki lqzlllmtrak oklar, Orta Asya'dan,Batr Avrupa, Mezopotamya, Do$u ve Ban Asya y<inlerine uzanryordu. Bu oklar i-lk
I was born in 1927.I was part of a generation raised with a frameof mind largely constructed from what wasbelieved to be the best Europe had to ofrer.The bcst, in this case, meant the mostenduring of Europe's intellectualachievements: science, positivism, obiectiveknowledge - shaking the cobwebs ofsuperstition wes the major metaphor thataimed to anchor this approach to life. Indolentand self-seeking sultans, inefiicient of,icials,venal and duplicitous clerics wcre part of thepicture of a bygone Ottoman Empire whichthe brave new Turkish republic had foreverrelegated to the dustbin of history. This s€t otideas was the crcdo oI Kemolisn, the ideologyof Republicanism which swept th?ough Turkeybeginning with the | 920's, following the demiseof thc Ottoman Empire. Those of our mentorswho were most comPletely won over to theseideas were idealistic primary school teacherswho belonged to the tirst generation in theirfamily to have had more than one book in theirpossession, Past primary school, howeYer'approaches to the ornbicnt could begin to beless efiective. Possibly, first chink in theideological arms of Kemalism was thenationalism that came with it. }Ye had allinherited a patriotism which (l nowunderstand) was part and parcel of theprevious Ottoman world, althouth it was sodeeply embedded among the valucs we tookfor Sranted that we never realized itspresence. But the nationalism that the newrepublican elite had constructed went betondthis patriotism. On the walls of schoolrooms,maps of Eurasia showed a number of thickochre coloured regions originating in CentralAsia targeted \fvestcrn EuroPe, MesoPotamia,lvest and East Asia. The arrows showcd theways in which C€ntral Asia, our originalfatherland, Turan, had been the crodle of allknown civilization. Originally, the theory had
Wherc does EuroPe end?
Apr Da Nered.e Bitiyor?
'ERIF l.,rARDh{
anayurdumuz, Turan olan Orta Asya'nrn nastlbi.itiin uygarh$tn begi$i oldu$unugosteriyordu. Teori ashnda 19. y{izyildaAvrupa'da icat edilmig, oportunist tarihgilerbunu bizim kendi ihtiyaglarrmtza gore adapteetmigler, yaprcr bir rrktan geldi$imize dairgerekli giiven ve oviing duygusunuvermiElerdi. Teorinin bu yeni geklinde oklarTiirkliigU Islam'la organik iligkisindenkoparryor ve tarih Islam-oncesi Tiirklti$iinbaEanlannr <ilEii olarak yenidendegerlendiriyordu. Ilkokuldayken bubagarrlann gergekli$inden giiphemizolmaml$u; Avrupa'dan aldr[rmrz Eeylerin ilktohumunun atalanmrzrn katkrlanna kadaruzandr$rnr diigiinmekten krvang duyuyorduk.Ama gene de, lise ga$rna gelmiq gengler iginbu dtgiinceler biitiini.iyle inandrncrolmuyordu. Oniki yrlhk egitim programrnlnson srmflannda, uygarhgrmlzln Orta Asya'dando$muq olmasrmn ideolojik mahiyeti,ozellikle de yabancr dilde okuyabileno$renciler arasrnda tartl$ma konusu olmayabaglyordu. Bu aynr agamada, Kemalistideolojinin bazr bagka trrmalayrcr y<inleri dedikkatimizi gekmeye baghyordu. Yenimilliyetgilikle yetigtirilme stirecimizin birpargasr yeni bir Tiirk dilinin olugturulmasrnaadanmrgtr. Osmanhca, eski giinlerin o siislti.,agdah Tiirkgesi, br.irokratik bir kiEininkonugma aracr, daha ondokuzuncu yiizyrldasegkinci ve anti-demokratik olarak mahktmedilmigti. Yeni Trirkge, Osmanhca'daki Arapgave Farsga kcikleri tasfiye etmek ve "art"Ttirkge ile yeni bir edebiyat yagatmak iizere girigilmig popiilist gabamn bir pargasrydr.
Bu hareketin demokratik amaElannr onayladrk ve bu halkgr tarzda yazmtyt gahgtrk. Ama<i$renciler bile projenin giiglii$iinii g<irebiliyordu. Ortaokula bagladrgrmrz yrllarda co$rafya
"fiziksel coSrafya" olarak okutulurdu. Bize verilen *oz Tiirkge" metinlerde gok sayrda terim
igin gok sayrda yeni kelime tiiretilmigti. Gerek bu yeni kelimeler, gerekse onlan sarmalayanyeni soz dizimi, hem bizim igin, hem de <igretmenlerimiz igin, anlagrlrr gibi de$ildi. Sonunda
giriEim tamamen terkedildi ve oSrencilerin alay konusu haline geldi. Gene de, Kemalizm'in
kiiltiirel sermayesinin bu erozyonu hdli krsmi sayrlrrdr. Baghca inanglanmrz, yani bilim,
been imported from | 9th centurt EuroP€.Opportunistic historians had tailored it to ourown needs for dignity and reassurance that webelonged to a constructive race. In this newerversion, the arrows summarizcd a theory ofhistory which took the Tu?kish part out of itsorganic link with lslam and reevaluated it inrelation to the achievements of pre-lslamicTurks, In primary school we were convinced ofthese achievements and felt proud that theoriginal seed of what we had received fromEurope went back to the contributions of ourorvn ancestors. However there was somethingnot entirely convincing in this argument foradolescents of lyc6e age. Already in theterminal classes ofthis | 2-year program ofinstruction, the ideological nature of theCentral Asian origin of our ciyilization beganto be a subiect of discussion among students,particularlt those who prided themselves withreading in a foreign language. Other dissonantaspects of the Kemalist ideology also began toattract our attention at the time. Part of ourtraining in the new nationalism had been theconstruction of a new Turkish language."Ottoman", the flowery, adorned Turkish ofbtgone times, the instruments of a bureacraticclique had already been condemned in thenineteenth century as elitist andundemocratic. The newer Turkish was part ofa populist effort to excise Arabic and Percianroots from "Ottoman" and to create a newliterature of "pure" Turkish. We approved ofthe democratic goals of this movement andtried to write in the demotrc sttle. But thedifiiculti€s of the proiect were eyident even tostuden$. The first year of high school,geoSraphy was taught as physical geography.The text in "purified Turkish" which reachedus had a very large number of technical termsfor which neofogisms in pure Turkish had beenprovided. These neofoglsms and the way inwhich they were embedded in a new syntax
ApruPo Nerede Bitiyor?Whcre does Europe end?
tERIF irARDll{
'nesnel diiqtince" ve halkgrhk ayaktaydr.Ancak, iiniversite gaSrna geldi$imizde, birbagka gtigliik ortaya grktr ve baqhca tartr$makonumuz haline geldi: bu da, TtrkiyeCumhuriyeti'nde demokrasinin mahiyetiydi.Tiirk kdyltistlniin "efendimiz" oldu$uinancryla yetiqtirilmigtik. Kemalist ideolojinindrg krvnmlannda ya$ayan radikal inanghyazarlar bizi durumun boyle olmadr$rna iknaettiler. Gergekte Tiirk k<iyltisii sefil bir varolugsiirdiirmekteydi ve gehirli niifhsun iizerinebastrfr dayana$r oluEturuyordu. Ikinci DiinyaSavagr'nda, karaborsadan kazandrklanylaqehirlerde har lrrrup harman savuranlar buolguyu iyice goztimiize soktular. Ote yandan,Cumhuriyet rejiminin empoze ediligininotoriter yontemi de, Cumhuriyet'indemokratik olma iddialanm yalanhyordu.Tiirkge-konugmayanlann "oziimsenmesi" bupolitikarun bir yamydr. Demokrasi Tiirklerigindi ama her nasrlsa bugiinlerinin degil,yarrnlannrn bir pargasrydr. Cumhuriyetin ilkyrllanndan itibaren siyasi hayatr yonlendirenCumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin tek-partiliycinetimine ozgii sorumluluk eksikli$inebulduSumuz goziim., gok-partili rejimdi.Bciyle bir degigim 1946'dan sonra gergeklegtive gok-partilit siyasi hayati degigtirdi. Ama bude$igimin en ilging yanr, gok genel biranlamda, gok-partililik kurumlan yerlegirkenKemalizm'in temel gatrslnrn da zihnimizdekorunmug olmasrydr. Bu durumdaKemalizm'in daha kaba denebilecekdo$malan ortadan kalkmrg oluyordu.Nihayet, "gergek" Avrupahlar olabilecek a$amaya gelmigtik. $imdi, tarihte Anadolu'dayegermig kiiltiirleri - Yunan ve Roma ktiltiirleri - bizi Turan'rn varisi yapan teorilerden gok
daha fazla incelmiE bir anlayrgla kucaklayabilirdik. Bu anlamda kendimizi h0manist olarak,Ronesans'rn mirasgrlan - benim durumumda, Montaigne ve Voltaire gelene$indekihtimanizmin mirasErsr- olarak gordiik. Cumhuriyeti kuran atalanmrzdan daha ileri birincelmeye Cumhuriyet'in hedeflerine erigti$imize inanmanrn kolaycr rahath$r bazr onemliigsel bogluklan gizliyordu. Bir kere, Avrupa medeniyetini olugturanlann - ki Marx onlannarasrnda, on safta yer alrr - pozitivizmleri ve bilimcilikleri ne olursa olsun, varoluqsal
were incomprehensible both to us and to ourteachers. The entire enterprise was reiectedout of hand and became a subiect of students
iokes. Nevertheless, this erosion of the culturalcapital of Kemalism was still partial. The maintenets of our beliefs, science, "objective"thought, populism still held fast. One mainblockage however, became more €yident withtime end acquired a central place in ourdiscu3sions by the time we were of universityage and that was the nature of democracy inthe Turkish Republic. We had been instructedin the belief that the Turkish peasant was our"master". The authors with radicalpersuasions who lived in the interstices ofKemalism had convinced us that this was notthe case. The Turkish peasant eked out amiserable existance and in fact was thesupport for the urban population. Profiteeringduring the years of the Second World War, therise of a class of speculators flaunting theirgains in towns broutht this more clearly to ourattention. The democratic pretensions of theRepublic were also given the lie by theauthorization method by which the republicanregime was enforced. "Assimilation" of non-Turkish speakers was one aspect of this policy.Democracy was for the Turks but wassomewhere in their future not in their pr€scnt.Multi-partyism was the answer to the lack ofresponsibility, characteristic of one-party ruleand of the single political partl that directedpolitical life in the first years of Republic,namely, the Republican People's Party. Such achange did come about after 1946. Multi-partyism changed political life. The mostinteresting aspect of this change, however wasthat, in the most general sense, once multi-party democracy had been installed, thegeneral frame of Kemalism was kept intact inour minds. Th€ cruder touch of Kemalism hadbee n eliminated. Now, finally we had comearound to being "real" Europeans. We could
Where does Europe endl
Aprttb a N ere d e Bitil or ?
$ERIF ]'|ARDlil
sorunlarla bo$uqtuklannr, felsefe sorunlartnagetirdikleri nihai goziimlerin, ontolojiksorunlarla b<iyle bir miicadele sonucundabigimlendi$ini bizler kavrayamadrk. Islam veonun de$erler ve etik diinyasl bizimufkumuzdan qrkarrlmrgtr ve onun iginvaroluEsal $iiphe ve ikilemleri kavrayacakdurumumuz kalmamrgtr. Bu gibi sorunlarrngtndelik hayatrn dokusunun bir pargasrolabilece$i, ancak Tiirk Islamcrh$rmn yenidencanlanmasrndan sonra ilgi alanrmrza girdi.Ayrrca, s<izgeliqi tarihi ilerleme modeliniFransa'dan alanlarrmrz dahil, Fransakoyliilerinin Frrnsrz yap d$trzr, yoksa Fransakrrlanndaki niifu sun Montaigne'lerdenolugmadr$rnr da anlayamadrk. Katolikli$inortaya sorular attr$rnrn ve ona karqr ya daondan yana tavlr alan Franstz aydtnlartntnsilkelenip bunlara cevap bulmaya gahqtr$rnrnbilincinde degildik. Kendindcn-hognut,kendinden-emin Kemalizm'imiz, Avrupa, Batrdtigiincesinin inceliklerine niifirs etmemizeengeldi vc bu bzelliSiyle bir boyundurukoldu. BaErndan bugiine kadar, toplumun herkanndaki *modern" egitim gdrmii$ Ttirkler'in
Eo$uniuSunun, dqandan grnngalanmrg, amadipte yatan ideolojisi olarak iElev gtirmiiStiir.Bugiin hilA, tek rakibi Islam. Bu da en hafifsoyleyigle, yapilabilir sefir er alarunrn cpeydar olduSunu gdsteriyor.
now embrace the previous cultures heYintflourished on Anatolian soil -Greek and Romanculture - with a much more sophisticatedunderstandin8 than the theories which madethem heirs of Turan, In that sense w€ thoughtof ourselves as humanists, inheritors of thetredition, the Renaissance in my case thehumanism of l.lontaigne and Voltaire' ThissmuS contentment with having achieved thegoals of the Republic only with morerefinement than its founding fathers concealeda number of internal lacunae. For one we did.not r€alize that the fathers of Europeancivilization-whatever their Positivism andscientism - and Marr on the forefront of theirranks - had grappled with existential problems,that their ultimate solutions to philosophicalquestions were the outcome of such a combatwith ontological problems. lslam and its woddofvalues and ethics having been taken out ofour frame of reference, we had no aPPreciationof existential quandaries. That such Probl€mswere part ofthe fabric of everyday life onlycamc to our attention after the rise of theTurkish-lslamic revival. Secondly' we neverrealized (or those whose model of historicalprotress was France) that Catholicism hadraised problems which French intellectuals, foror against, had risen to answer. Our latent,self-satisfied Kemalism, this inability topenetrate the intricacies of the thinkint ofEurope, of the West, had been anextraordinarily and pervasive yoke. At thetime it functioned and continues to function todate as the latent, received ideology of themaiority of "modern" educated Turks on allleyels of society. Today its only rival is stil llslam, which is, to say the least, a restriction ofoptions.