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CHAPTER 1

THE DIVISION

The division is a large Army organization thattrains and fights as a tactical team. Largely self-sustaining, it is capable of independent operations.The division is a unit of maneuver, organized withvarying numbers and types of combat, combat sup-port (CS), and combat service support (CSS) units.It may be armored, mechanized, medium, light in-fantry, airborne, or air assault; each can conductoperations over a wide range of environments. Thesuccess of Army operations depends on the successof its divisions.

ROLE OF THE DIVISION

Historical Review

Prior to World War I, the regiment was theArmy’s largest fixed administrative and tacticalcommand. During World War I, regiments com-bined into brigades to form infantry divisions. Eachdivision had two infantry brigades; each brigade hadtwo regiments. Field artillery and service units sup-ported each brigade.

World War II divisions were infantry, armored,

cavalry, airborne, and motorized. Brigade head-quarters were eliminated to streamline the divisions.This meant the division commander directly com-manded three regiments, supported by engineer andservice units and four field artillery battalions. Regi-ments were still responsible for their own admini-stration and logistics.

Combat commands replaced regiments in somearmored divisions. Each combat command had at-tached tank and armored infantry battalions. Com-bat commands were tactical operations controlheadquarters. The logistics and administrative op-

erations extended from division level directly to thebattalions. Battalions cross-attached companies toform task forces. Cavalry provided reconnaissanceand security and was grouped as the situation de-manded. Armored field artillery battalions and en-gineer companies normally supported the combatcommands.

In the late 1950s, the Army reorganized eachinfantry division into a “pentomic division” with

five battle groups in preparation for tactical nuclearwar in Europe. These groups were, in effect, largebattalions. Each battle group had five rifle compa-nies, a combat support company, and appropriatefield artillery and service support. The battle groupswere self-sustaining, could be employed singly orin combinations, and remained largely unchangedduring the 1950s.

The pentomic division structure was abandonedin the early 1960s when the Army adopted for alldivisions the combat command organization of thearmored division. Combat commands were re-named brigades. Each division had three brigadeheadquarters into which various numbers of battal-ions could be grouped. All divisions were similarly

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organized. Some were heavy (armored or mecha-nized) and some were light (infantry and airborne),depending on the mission and types of battalionsassigned. In the mid-1960s, the Army added the airassault division. Principal differences between divi-sions were in the types of battalions assigned andthe composition of the division base. Divisions alsodiffered in how they entered into combat. The warin Vietnam was fought primarily with airmobile andinfantry divisions.

During the 1980s, the Army fielded a motorizeddivision and several light infantry divisions. Themotorized division could rapidly deploy to a contin-gency area, establish or expand a lodgment, anddefeat enemy forces ranging from light infantry totank and motorized forces. Light divisions providedversatility and strategic flexibility through their ca-pability for rapid deployment.

The early 1990s brought significant changes tothe world and the Army. The motorized divisionwas deleted from the force structure. The dissolu-tion of the Soviet Union and the apparent end of theCold War presented threats that were more ambigu-ous and regionally focused. Most of the Army wasreassigned to the continental United States(CONUS) and given a mission to rapidly respond toworldwide regional crises. Force projection has be-come our chief strategy for supporting the power-projection element of US national security. Force

projection applies to the Total Army (active, re-serve, and civilian), based within or outsideCONUS.

The US Army’s current warfighting doctrine re-flects the nature of modern warfare. It is inherently

joint doctrine, recognizing the teamwork requiredof all the services. US Army divisions conductArmy operations both in war and other than wararenas. Their prime focus is warfighting—the useof force. Their frequent requirements to use force orto provide forces in operations other than war(OOTW), however, make versatility critical. The

unique capabilities of armored, mechanized, infan-try, light infantry, airborne, and air assault divisionsprovide the US Army the flexibility to serve thenational interest worldwide.

As Part of a Corps

Army corps are tailored for specific missions.Once tailored and deployed, corps contain all the

organic combat, CS, and CSS capabilities to con-duct and sustain operations for a considerable time.Corps plan and conduct major operations and bat-tles. They synchronize the maneuver and support of their units. Corps may be assigned divisions of anytype required in war and OOTW.

Traditionally, divisions have operated as part of a US corps. (Currently the 2d Infantry Division isassigned to a Republic of Korea corps.) In corpsoperations, divisions normally comprise 9 to 12maneuver battalions, organic artillery battalions,and supporting CS and CSS units. Divisions per-form a wide range of tactical missions and, forlimited periods, are self-sustaining. Corps augmentdivisions as the mission requires.

All divisions must be able to deploy and conduct

offensive, defensive, and retrograde operations, andoperations other than war. Airborne and air assaultdivisions must be able to conduct force entry opera-tions. (See pages 1-4 to 1-8 for specific divisioncapabilities.)

As Part of a Joint Task Force

The division may deploy as part of a joint taskforce (JTF) without its traditional corps headquar-ters and supporting corps units. In these types of operations, a division often works directly for the

joint force commander (JFC). Therefore, divisionsmust know joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, andprocedures. (See joint manuals in references.) Divi-sions are not normally designated as a joint taskforce headquarters.

A JTF comprises assigned or attached elementsof two or more of the military services. Typically, aJTF is established for a specific purpose in responseto a crisis and is limited in scope and duration.Divisions assigned to a JTF normally conduct tra-ditional tactical operations but may be involved innontraditional actions, such as interagency opera-

tions or operations with the host nation.A division in a JTF requires experienced liaison.

The division may operate with or receive supportfrom joint, multinational, interagency, or nongov-ernmental agencies. It will receive joint supportsuch as joint fires, joint air defenses, national intel-ligence, and theater and national communications.Competent liaison to coordinate with these agen-cies and other headquarters helps ensure properly

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executed operations. Liaison duties and require-ments are addressed in Chapter 3 of this manualand detailed in FM 71-100-1, FM 71-100-2, andFM 101-5.

As an ARFOR Headquarters

A JTF may designate a division under its com-mand and control as the Army forces (ARFOR)headquarters-the senior Army headquarterswithin the JTF. It may provide support normallyassociated with the Army service component withinthe operational area. For example, the Army nor-mally operates ports and delivers bulk class I andclass III to other service logistic bases. The ARFORis normally responsible for all Army forces assigned

in the area of operations (AO). The ARFOR desig-nation may also bring with it specific joint forcesupport, training, and administrative responsibili-ties that vary from theater to theater. The responsi-bilities of an ARFOR headquarters greatly surpassthe division’s organic capabilities. The division will

require augmentation based on a mission, enemy,terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T)analysis.

A division will often be designated as an ARFORheadquarters during OOTW. When the 10th Moun-tain Division (Light Infantry) was alerted as theARFOR for Somalia in 1993, the JFC initially as-signed to it forty-plus ARFOR tasks. These tasksincluded the initial deployment of all Army forces,command and control (C

2) of coalition ground

forces, civil affairs throughout the AO, and commu-nications support for the JTF. Figure 1-1 depicts the10th Mountain Division headquarters’ initial aug-mentation as the ARFOR for its mission in Somalia.

The division commander could also be responsi-ble for all land combat forces through his appoint-ment as the joint force land component commander(JFLCC). As the JFLCC, the division commandercontrols all Army, Marine, and multinationalground forces in the AO.

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TYPES AND CAPABILITIES

Armored and Mechanized Divisions

The US Army’s armored and mechanized divi-sions provide mobile, armor-protected firepower(Figure 1-2). Armored and, mechanized divisionsare normally employed for their mobility, surviv-ability, lethality, and psychological effect (shock)on the enemy. These divisions destroy enemy ar-mored forces. They can seize and secure land areasand key terrain. During offensive operations, ar-mored and mechanized divisions can rapidly con-centrate overwhelming lethal combat power tobreak or envelop enemy defenses or offensive for-mations. These divisions then continue the attack to

destroy fire support, command and control, andlogistics elements. Their mobility allows them torapidly concentrate, attack, reinforce, or block en-emy forces. Their collective protection systems en-able them to operate in a nuclear, biological, and

chemical (NBC) environment. Armored andmechanized divisions operate best in open terrainwhere they gain the advantage with their mobilityand long-range, direct-fire weapons.

Because of strategic lift requirements, armoredand mechanized forces are slow to deploy fromhome or staging bases into an AO. They have highconsumption rates of supplies, can deploy relativelyfew dismounted infantry, and have limited use inrestrictive terrain.

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Light Infantry Division

The light infantry division is one of our mostrapidly and strategically deployable divisions. Itfights as part of a larger force in conventional con-flicts and conducts missions as part of a joint forcein OOTW. (See Figure 1-3.) Its command and con-trol structure readily accepts any augmentationforces, permitting task-organizing for any situation.The factors of METT-T largely determine the aug-mentations required for the division.

The optimum use of light forces is as a divisionunder corps control, its mission capitalizing on itscapabilities. The division exploits the advantages of

restricted terrain and limited visibility. It achievesmass through the combined effects of synchronizedsmall-unit operations and fires rather than throughthe physical concentration of forces on the battle-

field. Light division forces physically mass onlywhen risk to the force is low and the payoff is high.The division deploys as an entity, widely dispersedto conduct synchronized, but decentralized, opera-tions primarily at night or during periods of limitedvisibility.

Light force limitations include their austere CSand CSS systems, their requirement for supportfrom the corps or joint force headquarters based onMETT-T, and their need for prepared and covered

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fighting positions for their survivability. Addition-ally, they have limited NBC protection for operatingin an NBC environment.

Airborne Division

The airborne division can rapidly deploy any-where in the world to seize and secure vital objec-tives. It conducts parachute assaults to captureinitial lodgments, execute large-scale tactical raids,secure intermediate staging bases or forward oper-ating bases for ground and air operations, or rescueUS nationals besieged overseas. It also can serve asa strategic or theater reserve as well as reinforce-ment for forward-presence forces. (See Figure 1-4.)

The airborne division can assault deep into theenemy’s rear areas to secure terrain or interdictenemy supply and withdrawal routes. It can seizeand repair airfields to provide a forward operatingbase and airheads for follow-on air-landed forces.It is capable of all other missions assigned to lightinfantry divisions.

The airborne division uses its strategic and opera-tional mobility to achieve surprise on the battlefield.Its aircraft range and its instrumentation capabilityenable the Air Force to accurately deliver the air-borne division into virtually any objective areaunder almost any weather condition. All equipmentis air transportable. Most is air-droppable. All

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personnel are trained for parachute assaults andairborne operations.

Engagements with enemy armored or motorizedformations require special consideration. The divi-sion does not have sufficient armored protection todefeat heavier armored formations at close range.Antitank weapons in the division compensate for,but do not completely offset, this deficit.

Air Assault Division

The air assault division combines strategic de-ployability with tactical mobility within its AO. Itattacks the enemy deep, fast, and often overextended distances and terrain obstacles. The

airmobile division of the Vietnam era provided theUS Army the operational foundation, experience,and tactics for today’s air assault operations. Airassault operations have evolved into combat, CS,

and CSS elements (aircraft and troops) deliberatelytask-organized for tactical operations. Helicoptersare completely integrated into ground force opera-tions. Air assault operations generally involve inser-tions and extractions under hostile conditions,opposed to mere air movement of troops to and fromsecure locations about the battlefield. Once deployedon the ground, air assault infantry battalions fight likebattalions in other infantry divisions; however, normaltask organization of organic aviation results ingreater combat power and permits rapid aerial rede-ployment. (See Figure 1-5.) The rapid tempo of

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operations over extended ranges enables the divi-sion commander to rapidly seize and maintain thetactical initiative.

Medium Division

On 26 April 1994, the Army Chief of Staff ap-proved a concept for medium divisions in the ArmyNational Guard. These divisions will be patternedafter the 2d Infantry Division in Korea. The currentdivision design consists of one armored, one mecha-nized, and one light infantry brigade with traditionaldivision CS and CSS units. (See Figure 1-6.) Thisdivision is designed to provide commanders withoperational flexibility. When fielded and trained,the medium division’s strengths and limitations

should be similar to that of armored divisions.

ORGANIZATION OF DIVISIONS

All divisions are generally organized with a simi-lar basic design (Figure 1-7, page 1-9). This designcomprises a division headquarters and headquarterscompany (HHC), three ground maneuver brigades,an aviation brigade, a division artillery, a supportcommand, a cavalry squadron, an air defense artil-lery battalion, an engineer battalion or brigade, asignal battalion, a military intelligence battalion, amilitary police company and, in most cases, achemical company.

The division headquarters provides commandand control for the division’s organic, attached, orsupporting units. The headquarters company pro-vides logistics support and personnel for thedivision headquarters and staff sections. Ministry

teams in each division unit provide religious support

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to soldiers and their families. These teams provideworship opportunities, pastoral care, religious edu-cation, and spiritual fitness. The headquarters com-pany is normally located near the division’s maincommand post (CP).

Ground Maneuver Brigade

The maneuver brigade headquarters provides theC

2facilities necessary to employ maneuver and

fires. The only unit permanently assigned to thebrigade is the brigade headquarters and headquar-ters company. The necessary combat, CS, and CSSunits to accomplish the brigade mission are at-tached, under operational control (OPCON), orplaced in support of the brigade. The brigade’sheadquarters company furnishes logistics support(including equipment and personnel) and securityfor the brigade headquarters staff sections. The

brigade normally controls from two to five attachedmaneuver battalions. It can be employed in autono-mous or semiautonomous operations when properlyorganized for combat. FM 7-30 and FM 71-3 con-tain details on employment of the brigade.

Ground maneuver battalions and additionalunits are placed in a command relationship to thebrigade headquarters. This allows the division toaccomplish missions in any environment. As units

are added to brigades and the division, the divi-sion support command is modified to meetchanges in the division’s supply, maintenance,and medical requirements.

Aviation Brigade

The aviation brigade is a maneuver force of or-ganic, attached, and supporting Army aviation units.

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They include attack, air assault, reconnaissance,electronic warfare (EW), and general support units.The division and aviation brigade commanders cantailor the brigade for virtually any combat, CS, andCSS operation to accomplish division missions.

The brigade is most effective when its aerialforces concentrate at critical times or places to de-stroy units and exploit enemy vulnerabilities. Thebrigade extends the division capability to simulta-neously strike the enemy throughout his depth andfrom multiple directions. When employing theaviation brigade, the division commander considersthat—

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Attack helicopters are significantly less effectivewhen employed in direct attacks against enemyforces in prepared defensive positions.

Aviation units have limited NBC decontamina-tion capabilities.

Adverse weather, such as extreme heat and cold.blowing snow and sand, and heavy rain or fog;may hinder aviation operations.

• Currently, only a portion of the aviation brigade’shelicopter assets are fully night capable.

• Aviation units have only a limited ability to task-organize below battalion level.

• With proper support or augmentation, the avia-tion brigade headquarters is capable of planningfor, employing, and controlling a task-organizedcombined arms force.

The aviation brigade commander may be requiredto operate over great distances with his forces spreadthroughout the division’s AO. This makes timelyand accurate coordination difficult. Coordination isthe aviation brigade staff’s most important function.

Echelons above corps (EAC) and corps aviationassets are organized into tailored brigades or regi-

ments. These aviation brigades may augment orsupport the division. Aviation units in these organi-zations include attack helicopter and assault heli-copter battalions, medium helicopter and theateraviation companies, and command aviationbattalions.

FM 1-111 is the doctrinal base for aviation bri-gade operations.

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Division Artillery

The division artillery (DIVARTY) is the divi-sion’s primary organic indirect fire support organi-zation. It normally comprises cannon and rocket

artillery. When available, close air support, attackhelicopters, EW assets, artillery resources of higherheadquarters, and naval surface and missiles aug-ment the DIVARTY’s fires. Fire support systemsneutralize, suppress, or destroy enemy forces.

The DIVARTY provides close support, interdic-tion, and counterfire fire support to division opera-tions. Additionally, the DIVARTY—

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Controls organic and attached field artillery units.

Provides fire support elements (FSEs) capable of continuous operations to the division’s main, tac-

tical, and rear CPs.Acquires targets through ground and air observa-tions, and weapons-locating radars.

Provides liaison sections as required and fire sup-port sections and fire support teams (FISTs) todesignated maneuver elements of the division.

Assists maneuver commanders in integrating andsynchronizing all fire support assets with theirscheme of maneuver.

Supervises FSEs during the execution of the fireplan.

The division artillery commander is the principaladvisor to the division commander on fire supportmatters. As the fire support coordinator(FSCOORD), he prepares, plans, coordinates, andsynchronizes lethal and nonlethal fires with thedivision commander’s intent and concept of opera-tion. The division normally receives additional fieldartillery support from the corps or joint force com-mander. This support could include cannon andmultiple launch rocket system (MLRS) battalions orbrigades. Although the corps or joint force com-mander may keep some field artillery under his

direct control, he normally—• Attaches field artillery (FA) brigades or battal-

ions to the division.

• Assigns tactical missions to FA brigades andbattalions, making them more responsive to thefire support needs of the division.

Corps 155-millimeter and MLRS battalions areorganized similar to divisional artillery battalions.

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However, the corps artillery battalions have no or-ganic FSEs, FISTs, or target acquisition means. Thedivision usually provides supporting corps artilleryunits with target acquisition. Corps artillery battal-ions have a liaison section to liaise with supportedunits.

FM 6-20-2 provides further detail concerningDIVARTY operations.

Engineer Brigade

Divisional engineers accomplish mobility, coun-termobility, survivability, and limited general engi-neering missions and tasks. Additionally, theyperform infantry combat missions and tasks whenrequired. Armored and mechanized divisions havean organic engineer brigade; light, airborne, and airassault divisions have only an engineer battalionorganic to the division. Divisional engineers—

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Provide a C2headquarters for all engineers oper-

ating in support of the division.

Prepare and maintain essential combat routes inthe forward battle area to include timely repair of essential bridges, fords, and culverts.

Provide, maintain, and emplace short-gap assaultbridges for the division. (Light, airborne, and airassault divisions have no organic bridging. Ar-mored and mechanized divisions have no organicfloat or fixed bridging.)

Assist in the assault breach of obstacles and for-tified positions.

Perform obstacle reduction as part of breachingoperations.

Conduct engineer reconnaissance and providelimited military geographic information.

Provide field engineering advice and assistanceto all divisional elements, and provide equipmentsupport to maneuver units in preparing selected

strongpoints and battle positions for weaponsystems.

Emplace, and assist in emplacing, tactical mine-field.

Prepare and execute other tactical obstacles todegrade enemy mobility.

Prepare reserve targets for demolition, such asbridges, roads, railroads, and airfield runways.

• Perform area damage control and repair air land-ing facilities within their capabilities.

• Conduct infantry operations when required.

• Provide limited general engineering.

A division, when fully committed, normally re-quires a corps combat engineer battalion and a com-bat support equipment company to augment itsorganic engineer units. Corps provide additionalengineer units based on a METT-T analysis. Theairborne, light, and air assault divisions have limitedhaul and earth-moving capabilities. This reducestheir capacity for obstacle creation and reduction,protective shelter construction, and combat routemissions (mobility, countermobility, andsurvivability).

The engineer brigade commander (the engineerbattalion commander in lighter divisions) serves asthe division engineer. He coordinates the efforts of all engineers working within the division sector. Herequests support from a higher headquarters basedon his engineer estimate and the commander’s con-cept for the operation. The division engineer recom-mends the engineer task organization to support alldivision plans. Additional assets may be attached,under OPCON, or in direct support (DS) of thedivision.

Corps engineer units often reinforce a division. Inaddition to being attached, placed under OPCON,or in direct support, corps general support (GS)engineer units may perform GS missions in a divi-sion’s area. Corps or EAC engineer units availableto support the division include combat and combatheavy engineers, medium girder bridge (MGB)companies, and float bridge companies. Combatsupport equipment companies, additional terrainanalysis and topographic detachments, and mission-designed engineer teams are also available.

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operations.

Division

details division engineer

Support Command•

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The division support command (DISCOM) pro-vides division-level CSS to all organic assigned andattached elements of the division. It furnishes lim-ited CSS to nondivisional units in the division area.The DISCOM routinely performs the functions of

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arming, fueling, fixing, moving, and sustaining sol-diers and their systems.

The DISCOM commander’s role is complex. Heis a brigade-level commander and the division’sprincipal CSS operator. He exercises full command

authority over organic units in the support com-mand. He also has a close relationship with thedivision G4 and the assistant division commanderfor support (ADC-S) because of their overlappinginterests. Although the division G4 has coordinatingstaff responsibility for logistics planning and devel-ops division-level plans, policies, and priorities, theDISCOM commander advises the division staff dur-ing the formulation of plans, estimates, policies, andpriorities. The ADC-S, on the other hand, com-mands and supervises all rear area operations.

The G3, with the G4, and DISCOM commander

normally locate the CSS elements in the divisionrear area. The forward support battalions (FSBs)provide direct support to brigades and are positionedin the brigade support areas (BSAs). The remainingDISCOM units are located in the division supportarea (DSA) to provide area support to divisionalunits in the DSA and backup support to the FSBs.Elements from the FSBs and DSA may beecheloned to temporarily provide support forwardof their support areas. These forward elements arecalled FLEs (forward logistics elements). (See Fig-ure 1-8.) FLEs for BSAs may be critical whenrapidly advancing over great distances. A FLE from

the DSA may support division security forceoperations. Additionally, corps support organiza-tions may use FLEs for special support require-ments and to rapidly resupply as far forward aspossible.

The DISCOM provides the following combatservice support:

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Support of class I (to include water purification,and limited distribution), II, III, IV, V (transfer),VI, VII, VIII, and IX supplies.

Personnel to operate one ammunition transferpoint (ATP) per FSB. (Ammunition supply points(ASPs) and ATPs in the division rear area areoperated by a nondivisional ammunitioncompany.)

Direct support maintenance and reinforcing sup-

port of FSBs for authorized division equipment.

Material (supply and maintenance) managementfor the division.

Surface transport for personnel, mail, supplies,and equipment to accomplish division logisticsand administrative missions, to include supple-mental ground transportation to support emer-gency requirements.

Automatic data processing (ADP) support fordivision CSS activities.

Material collection and classification facilities.Limited capability to carry reserve supplies basedon a METT-T analysis (normally for three-to-eight-day operations).

Specific aviation maintenance support for theaviation brigade in armored and mechanizeddivisions.

CSS information and advice, except for divisionmanning and personnel service support (PSS), tothe division commander and his staff.

Division-level combat health support on an area

basis. This includes medical treatment, intradivi-sion evacuation of patients, medical logistics, andunit-level maintenance of medical equipment.

Operations to protect enemy attempts to disruptCSS operations.

Stores of unclassified maps for distributionwithin the division.

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The DISCOM depends on the following:

Corps medium helicopter units for airlift neededto support logistics requirements of the divisionwhen such airlift capabilities are not organic tothe division or airlift requirements exceed thedivision’s capabilities.

Nondivisional field service or appropriate teamsfor laundry, bath, clothing, and mortuary affairsservices unless organic augmentations areauthorized.

Appropriate elements of the corps and divisionfor legal, personnel, administrative, and financeservices.

Corps support group (CSG) elements that support

larger attached-units (normally battalion-sized) ornondivisional units which are operating in thedivision area.

Although the division has its own organic CSSunits, it relies on corps and corps support command(COSCOM) units to sustain the division for con-tinuous operations. (It may also coordinate throughcivil affairs staff for available host nation (HN)support.) Subordinate to the COSCOM are CSGs, amedical brigade, and a transportation group. Corpssupport groups provide the command and control of the COSCOM’s logistics units with one CSG sup-

porting each committed division and one CSG sup-porting the corps rear. Typically, the forward CSGprovides direct support to the division while the rearCSG provides both DS and GS. Each CSG includessupply and services, transportation, and intermedi-ate direct support maintenance (IDSM) units.

The medical brigade supporting the corps pro-vides hospitals in general support of the division anddirect support air and ground medical evacuation.The medical brigade’s general support to the divi-sion also includes medical logistics, blood, andother health services as required. FMs 63-2, 63-2-1,

63-20, and 63-21 detail division support operations.

Division Cavalry Squadron

The division cavalry squadron performs recon-naissance and security for division operations. Thishelps the division commander to maneuver his bri-gades and battalions and attack the enemy at themost critical points.

The division cavalry squadron, consisting of ground and air troops, is highly mobile. It is ideallysuited for economy of force missions as well asreconnaissance and security missions. It must beproperly task-organized, augmented, and sup-ported, however, to perform guard and cover mis-sions. During combat operations, the cavalrysquadron normally works for the division com-mander and usually performs missions as onesquadron vice detached troops. The squadron—

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Provides the division commander with real-timeinformation on the enemy and terrain duringoperations.

Performs security operations, providing timelywarning and force protection to the division. Thispreserves combat power and prevents prematuredeployment of the division.

Fills gaps between units and establishes physicalcontact with divisional units and adjacent units.

Facilitates the division’s movement with recon-naissance, establishing contact points and pas-sage points, and coordinates with higher andadjacent headquarters.

Performs reconnaissance and security operationsin the division’s rear area.

Performs damage control and combat operationsin the division’s rear area when tasked-as, or aspart of, a tactical combat force (TCF).

FM 17-95 details cavalry squadron operations.

Air Defense Battalion

The division air defense artillery (ADA) battalionretains the division’s freedom of maneuver, protectscritical division assets, destroys enemy aircraft be-fore they release their ordnance, and denies theenemy aerial reconnaissance. To accomplish thesemissions, the division ADA battalion—

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Engages and destroys very low enemy helicop-ters, fixed-wing “leaker” aircraft, and unmannedaerial vehicles (UAVs).

Denies enemy aircraft local air superiority overthe division AO.

Disseminates early warning.

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• In some situations, provides fire against surface targets when

its systems are not required in the air defense (AD) role.

• Provides air defense and airspace coordination and liaison to

each maneuver brigade and division command post.

• Denies enemy reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and

target acquisition (RISTA) activity.

The division commander sets the priorities for air defense protection andallocates available ADA resources. He considers the relative criticality

of each unit or asset to his concept of operations, the vulnerability andrecuperability of units or assets, and the anticipated threat. The ADA

battalion commander integrates coverage of ADA weapons systems in

and adjacent to the division area. He is the division commander's

principal advisor on air defense.

Corps and EAC systems significantly expand the density, altitude, and

range of air defense coverage over the division. This coverage may

include joint and combined fixed-wing interceptors, high-altitude ADA

missile units, and forward area low-altitude airspace units. Corps air

defense brigades contain both forward area air defense (FAAD) andhigh-to-medium-altitude air defense (HIMAD) units. FAAD and

HIMAD assets protect corps assets and reinforce the division's air

defenses. The division's ADA battalion commander is the air defense

coordinator (ADCOORD). He integrates the division's AD plan with both corps and EAC air defenses and integrates any OPCON AD units.

FM 44-100 details AD operations and procedures.

Military Intelligence Battalion

The military intelligence (MI) battalion provides the division dedicated

intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), and EW support, including

communications intercept, direction finding (DF) capability, and

electronic attack. The MI battalion responds to both the G2- and G3-

assigned intelligence, CI, and EW requirements and missions. The MI battalion receives, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence information

for echelons above division (EAD) as well as from assets within the

division.

The battalion can provide-

• An MI company in direct support of each ground maneuver

brigade and one company in general support to the division.

• Ground surveillance radar coverage (AN/PPS-5B or likeradar).

• Enemy prisoner-of-war (EPW) interrogation,

counterintelligence, and operations security (OPSEC)

support.

• Ground-based intercept and DF of enemy tactical

communications. Intercept systems at division include theAN/PRD-12, the AN/TRQ-32A(V)2 (Teammate), and the

AN/TSQ-138 (Trailblazer). Follow-on to these systems is the

ground-based common sensor (GBCS) capable of intercept,

DF, and jamming of enemy communications systems, andDF of noncommunication systems.

• Ground-based electronic attack of enemy communications

through such systems as the AN/TLQ-17A(V)3 (Trafficjam).

The follow-on system will be the GBCS.

• Airborne intercept, direction finding, and electronic attack ofenemy communications through the AN/ALQ- 151(V)1

(Quickfix).

• Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) through

the remotely monitored battlefield sensor system

(REMBASS).

• Joint surveillance target attack radar system (JSTARS)

ground station modules (GSMs) or common groundstations (CGSs) to brigade level capable of receiving

JSTARS and UAV down-linked imagery.

• A commander's tactical terminal (CTT) capable of

receiving Guardrail-collected signal intelligence

(SIGINT).

• Receipt of national level imagery intelligence (IMINT)

and SIGINT through the mobile integrated tacticalterminal (MITT).

• Access to national and theater intelligence through aTrojan special purpose integrated remote intelligence

terminal (SPIRIT). The Trojan SPIRIT provides access toworldwide, multiechelon data bases. It also provides

reporting and dissemination via voice, data, and facsimile.

• Long-range surveillance (LRS) units in some divisions

(by MTOE).

• An MI company in direct support of each ground

maneuver brigade and one company in general support to

the division.

• Ground surveillance radar coverage (AN/PPS-5B or like

radar).

• Enemy prisoner-of-war (EPW) interrogation,

counterintelligence, and operations security (OPSEC)support.

• Ground-based intercept and DF of enemy tactical

communications. Intercept systems at division include the

AN/PRD-12, the AN/TRQ-32A(V)2 (Teammate), and theAN/TSQ-138 (Trailblazer). Follow-on to these systems is

the ground-based common sensor (GBCS) capable of

intercept, DF, and jamming of enemy communications

systems, and DF of noncommunication systems.

• Ground-based electronic attack of enemy communicationsthrough such systems as the AN/TLQ-17A(V)3

(Trafficjam). The follow-on system will be the GBCS.

• Airborne intercept, direction finding, and electronic attack

of enemy communications through the AN/ALQ- 151(V)1(Quickfix).

• Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT)through the remotely monitored battlefield sensor system

(REMBASS).

• Joint surveillance target attack radar system (JSTARS)

ground station modules (GSMs) or common groundstations (CGSs) to brigade level capable of receiving

JSTARS and UAV down-linked imagery.

• A commander's tactical terminal (CTT) capable of

receiving Guardrail-collected signal intelligence

(SIGINT).

• Receipt of national level imagery intelligence (IMINT)

and SIGINT through the mobile integrated tactical

terminal (MITT).

• Access to national and theater intelligence through a

Trojan special purpose integrated remote intelligence

terminal (SPIRIT). The Trojan SPIRIT provides access to

worldwide, multiechelon data bases. It also providesreporting and dissemination via voice, data, and facsimile.

• Long-range surveillance (LRS) units in some divisions

(by MTOE).

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Emerging technology will soon enable provision of UAVs.

The division MI battalion conducts G2-taskedintelligence collection operations according to the

division commander’s priority intelligence require-ments (PIR) and information requirements (IRs)through the analysis and control element (ACE).The ACE is organic to the MI battalion, and operatesunder the direction of the G2. Additionally, the MIbattalion conducts G3-tasked EW operations mis-sions per the commander’s EW priorities.

The MI battalion coordinates and directs corpsand EAC intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW)assets supporting the division. An MI brigade per-forms IEW support at the corps level. It providesgeneral support to the corps and, on occasion, may

reinforce the division’s intelligence efforts. Whenrequired, intelligence, imagery, EW, OPSEC sup-port, and interrogation assets directly support thedivisions.

FM 34-series (military intelligence) manuals pro-vide the foundations for MI operations.

Signal Battalion

Signal support to the division is a collective andintegrated application of communications, automa-tion, and information services and systems. Thesignal battalion uses three distribution systems tocover the division’s AO. They are the area commonuser system, the combat net radio (CNR) system,and the automatic data distribution system. Theirintegrated operation forms the division communi-cations system.

•

•

•

The signal battalion’s primary missions are—

To install, operate, and maintain a division com-munications system that supports C

2, intelli-

gence, fire control, CS, and CSS communicationsrequirements.

To provide internal communications at all eche-lons of the division headquarters, to include thedivision tactical, main, and rear CPs and the DSA.

To provide special staff and technical assistanceto the commander and staff for planning andemploying all division communications assets.

The division signal battalion commander man-ages information resources for the division

commander. He recommends communication pri-orities and employment to the commander and G3based on the tactical situation, frequencies, andequipment available. He plans, coordinates, andprovides staff supervision of communications-elec-tronics and associated activities, official mail, dis-tribution, and publication reproduction within thedivision. The signal battalion commander directsand controls the division’s signal support resourcesand activities to meet all commanders’ informationrequirements. Signal units attached to or supportingthe division will be under OPCON of the divisionsignal battalion commander unless otherwise as-signed or attached.

The hub of the division’s communications sys-tem is the divison’s mobile subscriber equipment(MSE). This communications equipment provides—

•

•

•

Common user and dedicated circuits for supportof units in the division area.

Gateway circuits to corps, joint service, or othernations’ communications systems.

Capability to respond to changes in division or-ganization for combat and relocation of units,CPs, and installations.

The corps signal brigade links the division com-munications system to corps and higher echelons.

The resulting architecture provides deployed forceswith secure global, voice, and digital data commu-nications. If required for special missions, corps andEAC signal assets can augment the division’s exist-ing signal capabilities.

Specific responsibilities for the signal staff andthe signal battalion are contained in FM 101-5 andFM 11-50.

Military Police Company

The division military police (MP) company per-forms four primary missions in support of divisionoperations:

• Battlefield circulation control (BCC), includingroute reconnaissance and surveillance, mainsupply route (MSR) regulation and enforce-ment, straggler and refugee control, intelli-gence collecting and reporting, and informationdissemination.

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•

•

•

Area security, including rear area reconnaissanceand surveillance; security of designated criticalassets, special ammunition, personnel, units, con-voys, facilities, and MSR critical points; areadamage control operations; intelligence collec-

tion; NBC detection and reporting; rear security;antiterrorism; response force operations; andbase and installation defenses.

EPW and civilian internee operations, includingcollection, evacuation, temporary internment,strength accounting, and EPW accountability.

Law-and-order operations, including law en-forcement, criminal investigation, and US mili-tary prisoner confinement.

One MP platoon is normally placed in direct

support of or attached to each committed maneuverbrigade for limited BCC, area security, and EPWcollection support. Remaining MP platoons providegeneral support to the division rear area.

If tasked as a response force, the division MPcompany will task-organize available assets. Thismay require reprioritizing other MP missions be-cause of limited MP assets within the division. Thisweighting of MP support may require a reductionof MP direct support to committed maneuver bri-gades and augmentation from the corps MP brigade.

Augmentation from the corps MP brigade is alsorequired when the division conducts a river crossingor passage of lines operation. If augmentation is notavailable, MP platoons in DS to committed maneu-ver brigades revert back to MP company control forthe duration of the operations.

The provost marshal (PM) is a division specialstaff officer. He decides which missions are criticaland prioritizes them based on the division’s mission,concept of operation, and commander’s intent. Hetasks available MP assets to meet mission priorities.The division PM usually operates from the rear CP.He coordinates, monitors, and advises the command

on all MP operations. The MP company commandernormally collocates with the division rear CP in theDSA to direct the use of his MP unit.

Finally, the division normally receives one corpsMP company to support sustained operations. Likethe divisional MP company, this attached corps MPcompany works under the staff supervision of theprovost marshal. FM 19-1 details MP operations.

Division Chemical Company

The division chemical company is found in alldivisions except light infantry. It reduces the effectsof enemy NBC weapons and counters enemy sensor

systems by using smoke and obscurants on divisioncombat operations. Its primary focus is NBC recon-naissance, decontamination, and smoke generation.

The division chemical officer and his staff arenormally included in the chemical company table of organization and equipment (TOE). The chemicalofficer advises the division commander on NBCdefense procedures, employment of smoke, NBCreconnaissance, and decontamination. He estimatesthe effects of enemy nuclear detonation, makesfallout predictions, and operates a 24-hour NBCwarning and reporting system at the main CP. He

also advises the commander on the use of supportingchemical units. He exercises staff supervision overthe division chemical company and chemical de-fense units placed in support of the division.

Several NBC organizations and detachments pro-vide added NBC defensive capabilities to the divi-sion. Corps chemical units may support corps CSand CSS units operating in the division area and mayreinforce the divisional chemical company. Othersources for chemical support to divisions aremechanized or motorized smoke units, NBC recon-naissance units, NBC decontamination units, and

dual purpose (light divisions only) smoke and de-contamination companies. When additional compa-nies are attached to or under OPCON of a division,a separate chemical battalion headquarters andheadquarters detachment may be needed for com-mand, control, and coordination (C

3). It will report

directly to the division chemical officer for opera-tional taskings.

FM 3-100 provides the doctrinal base for chemi-cal company operations.

Division Band

The division band enhances unit cohesion andsoldier morale and supports civil-military, multi-national, and recruiting operations with its music.During OOTW, the band can support civil affairsand psychological operations. Division bandactivities often improve national and inter-national relations.

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During battles and engagements, when the band’smusical role is impractical, the commander maydirect that the band perform other missions or tasks.These could include division main CP security,perimeter defense, and EPW security at the divisioncollecting point. In these roles, the band is normallyplaced under OPCON of the appropriate unit com-mander or staff and, if possible, employed as asingle unit. The band must be able to reassembleand perform its primary mission, music, when cir-cumstances permit. In February 1991, during Op-eration Desert Storm, the 3d Armored DivisionBand played musical marches along the Kuwaitiand Iraqi border as the division’s troops began theground campaign.

OTHER SUPPORT

Air Support

The theater air force component commander or joint force air component commander normally pro-vides air support. Combat air forces are organized,equipped, and trained to support ground operations.This support may come from US Air Force, Navy,and Marine units or supporting air assets from othernations. Air missions that support the divisioninclude—

• Counterair, both offensive and defensive.

• Air interdiction (AI).

• Close air support (CAS).

• Surveillance and reconnaissance.

• Airlift.

Offensive counterair operations normally sup-port the division throughout the enemy territory.Targets may include forward arming and refuelingpoints, forward operating bases, and aviation C

3

facilities.

Defensive counterair operations destroy threataircraft attempting to penetrate friendly airspace.These operations are closely integrated with divi-sion FAAD operations. They protect ground forcesand permit freedom of operations.

Air interdiction operations destroy, neutralize, ordelay the enemy’s military potential before it can beused against friendly forces. AI is keyed to thecommander’s overall operation, but particularly to

the division deep fight. The division identifies, pri-oritizes, and nominates AI targets to its higher head-quarters for attack. Mission-type air requests for AIprovide the tactical air force flexibility in planningand executing these missions. AI, like other firesupport, is most effective when its effects are syn-chronized with the division commander’s schemeof maneuver and it supports his plan for simulta-neous attacks throughout the enemy’s depth.

Close air support is an air action by fixed- androtary-wing aircraft against hostile targets in closeproximity to friendly forces. CAS requires detailedintegration of each air mission with the fires andmovement of the supported force. CAS can there-fore occur many places on the battlefield. CASassets may come from the Air Force, Navy, orMarines, or multinational units. Regardless of whoprovides the assets, CAS responds to the needs of ground commanders.

Within the division, CAS planners are fire sup-port personnel and members of the tactical air con-trol party (TACP), along with the G3. Generally, thecorps allocates several planned CAS sorties to thedivision in response to division requests and priori-ties. The division G3 may further distribute sortiesto subordinate brigades. Planned requests are sched-uled or on-call. Immediate CAS normally respondsto a ground commander’s request in emergencies.

Surveillance and reconnaissance provide timelyand accurate information on the location, composi-tion, activities, and movement of enemy forces andmonitor the results of friendly operations. Visual,imagery, electronic, and weather air reconnaissancesupport is available to the division. Tactical surveil-lance and reconnaissance are essential for assessingdivision CAS and AI missions. The division G2coordinates all fixed-wing surveillance and recon-naissance requirements.

Airlift increases the division’s mobility and rap-

idly delivers supplies and equipment to divisionforces. The G3 has primary responsibility for com-bat airlift requirements. The G4 administers andsupervises airlift support to current and future op-erations. CSS use of airlift includes the movementof replacement personnel and supplies and theaeromedical evacuation of patients.

See Chapter 3 for air request procedures.

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Navy and Marine Support

Combat units normally submit requests for navalgunfire or aviation support through the air and navalgunfire liaison company (ANGLICO). (If anANGLICO is not attached, units submit requeststhrough normal fire support channels.)

The ANGLICO provides qualified Navy and Ma-rine Corps personnel to advise on the capabilities,limitations, and employment of naval gunfire andnavy and marine aviation support. They also adviseon organization and communications needs torequest, direct, and control this support. One liaisoncompany supports one division. Requests forANGLICO support go to the corps, JFLCC, groundforce commander, or JFC, as appropriate. JP 3-09and FMs 6-30 and 6-20-30 detail requestprocedures.

Special Operations Forces

Special operations forces (SOF) include ArmySpecial Forces (SF), Rangers, special operationsaviation (SOA), psychological operations(PSYOP), and civil affairs (CA) units. (SOF supportmay also include special operations forces fromother services.) PSYOP and CA activities habituallysupport both conventional and unconventional unitsthroughout the battlefield. Doctrinally, SF, Rangers,and SOA are theater-level assets that help accom-

plish strategic, operational, or tactical objectivesthrough special operations.

Rangers, SF, and SOA normally operate under thetheater’s special operations command (SOC) or JTFheadquarters, but there may be exceptions. In anoffensive operation, a division could link up with,and have temporary tactical control (TACON) of,an SF unit. In this situation, the SF unit may assistthe division with tactical missions (reconnaissance,intelligence). Normally, a special operations com-mand and control element is attached to the divisionand provides the interface between deployed SFunits and the division headquarters. Finally, thedivision can nominate targets to corps for executionby SF and Ranger units.

Psychological Operations

Echelons above division PSYOP units influencepolitical, military, economic, and ideological ac-tions that support both long-term and immediate

division objectives. A tactical PSYOP companyfrom the corps PSYOP battalion is normally at-tached to or placed in direct support of the division.The PSYOP company is normally controlledthrough a division PSYOP support element (DPSE)

located with the division’s main CP. The divisionmay coordinate additional operational- andstrategic-level PSYOP assets to assist in the missionif needed.

The EAD tactical PSYOP companies use loud-speakers, audiovisual equipment, and leaflets toinfluence specified target groups of people withinthe division’s AO. Under supervision of the divisionG3, the tactical PSYOP teams disseminate propa-ganda designed to lower the morale and combatefficiency and fragment the loyalty of enemy mili-tary forces throughout the division battlefield. The

company may also support division deception op-erations. In the division rear area, PSYOP forceswork closely with civil affairs units to gain the trustand confidence of the local civil population andminimize civilian interference with divisionoperations.

Civil Affairs

During operations, the division normally has acorps CA battalion attached. Under staff supervi-sion of the division G5, the battalion headquarters

analyzes the division mission for CA requirementsand prepares the CA annex to the division plans andorders. It provides and facilitates civil-military co-operation and interface between the division andforeign civil authorities or foreign military forces.

The battalion provides specialized CA technicalsupport throughout the division area and normallyattaches CA teams to each major subordinate ele-ment of the division. These teams function as CAstaff elements for the units to which they are at-tached. They plan, coordinate, and supervise thesupported commanders’ directed CA activities.

Civil affairs personnel assist the division by iden-tifying available local resources, facilities, and sup-port required to accomplish the mission. Theycoordinate US requirements for and assist in acquir-ing these resources. CA units minimize local popu-lation interference with military operations and helplocate and identify population centers in the divi-sion’s area of operations.

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The CA element also assists the commander inmeeting legal and moral obligations to the localpopulation. This assistance requires civil affairspersonnel to know international agreements (Hagueand Geneva Conventions, status of forces agree-

ments), national laws, US laws, and executive di-rectives that define the commander’s moral andlegal responsibilities to civil populations.

Finally, civil affairs personnel review currentplans and future operations with applicable laws andagreements, provide advice, and assist the com-mander in meeting his obligations. (See Army and

joint CA publications in references.)

In geographic regions where the indigenous gov-ernment remains operational during US militaryoperations, CA personnel working for the G5 inter-face with the local government officials. This inter-face allows the commander to coordinate with thecivil sector for logistics support and populationcontrol as well as to gain information and intelli-gence from host nation contacts.

Other Support Relationships

Army, joint, and multinational units or elementsmay perform missions within the area of operationsof a corps, division, brigade, or battalion with whichthey have no formal command or support relation-ship. (See Figure 1-9.) Parent units sustain their

elements dispersed throughout the battlefield unlessthey are attached for support. When missionrequirements exceed the support capabilities of theirparent units, dispersed elements may coordinate forsupport with the division controlling the area of

operations. These units are responsible for the ter-rain they occupy and are integrated into the overalloperational plan. The division rear CP assigns acoordinating staff and or a host unit as the nondivi-sonal unit’s point of contact (POC) with thedivision.

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CHAPTER 2

FUNDAMENTALS OF DIVISION OPERATIONS

Today’s Army operations reflect the changingnature of modem warfare. Within these operations,divisions remain versatile organizations that per-form a wide range of missions. Today’s divisionsmust deploy, in total or in part, anywhere in theworld with little notice. Additionally, divisions mustoperate within a joint, multinational, or multiagencyenvironment, synchronizing all available sys-tems—air, land, sea, space, and special opera-tions—to be successful. Division commanders usea battlefield framework to make this synchroniza-tion work.

Fighting and winning battles and engagementsremain the division’s primary purpose. Divisioncommanders think and fight in depth. Commandersattack the enemy simultaneously. They mass effectsof combat power when and where necessary toquickly defeat or deter an enemy. The intent is todeny an opponent any chance to escape or retaliate.Combat should not be viewed as a fair fight betweenrelatively equal foes.

Although this manual contains some changes todivision doctrine, the way divisions attack, defend,

and conduct retrogrades has changed little. How-ever, operations are now designed to exploit ourtechnological assets across all the battlefield oper-ating systems. Army divisions use precision tiresand the maximum range of all organic and support-ing systems to set conditions for maneuver forces,which deliver the decisive blow, while minimizingrisk to our soldiers. Reconnaissance and securityremain crucial in division operations. Also crucialare actions to preempt and counter the enemy’sreconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and tar-get acquisition efforts. Deception (aligned with thecorps or joint force plan) and OPSEC continue to

mislead the enemy commander, prompting him toact prejudicially to his interests. Sound logisticsoperations sustain the force.

This chapter discusses fundamentals of divisionoperations under five main topics. It addresses divi-sion doctrine for force-projection operations. It de-scribes division operations in depth and battlefieldvisualization. It depicts a framework for

battlefields. Lastly, it discusses the battlefield oper-ating systems as they apply to division operations.

FORCE PROJECTION

The Army today maintains only a small foward presence as opposed to large forward-deployed ele-ments in regions vital to our national interests. For-ward-presence forces can defend for a short time butdepend on reinforcements from the CONUS, otherareas, or other nations. Forward presence requiresan Army that can rapidly project forces globally for

a wide range of missions associated with regionalcontingencies. Once deployed, forces must have theoperational capability to successfully complete theirmissions. Today, all divisions must be able toquickly respond to missions anywhere in the world.

Force projection is the demonstrated ability torapidly alert, mobilize, and deploy and operate any-where in the world for war or operations other thanwar (OOTW). Force-projection operations rangefrom mobilization and deployment of forces, toredeployment and (in some cases) subsequent de-mobilization. Previous doctrine limited such opera-

tions to a few quickly deployed units. Today all USArmy divisions must be prepared to perform force-projection operations.

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Force projection usually begins as a contingencyoperation—a rapid response to a crisis. Occasion-ally it may involve a deliberate, slow buildup anddeployment. A force-projection operation may be

planned at the division headquarters but only in-volve a smaller force, such as a battalion task forcewith appropriate logistics assets. During peacetime,the division trains and plans for war and specificallyassigned missions, to include force-projectionoperations.

Divisions execute force projection in generalstages (Figure 2-1). Many situations require deploy-ing commanders to have units in more than onestage simultaneously. The following paragraphs,however, describe each stage separately. (AppendixC provides additional guidance in preparing fordivision force-projection operations.)

Mobilization

During mobilization, all or part of the armedforces are brought to a state of readiness for war orother national emergency. This includes activatingassistance reserve components (RC) and the

2-2

assembling of supplies and material. (RC units facesignificant challenges during mobilization. Specif-ics may be found in FM 100-17.) Strategic mobili-zation includes industry. Although there are five

levels of mobilization, the process is continuous andnot necessarily sequential. The levels are—

•

•

•

•

•

Selective mobilization.

Presidential selected reserve call-up.

Partial mobilization.

Full mobilization.

Total mobilization.

The five levels of mobilization are further detailedin Appendix D.

Divisions rarely have specific predesignated re-sponsibilities for mobilizing RC forces. Division(and corps) commanders, however, monitor the mo-bilization of units that will provide key support totheir operations. Nondeployed corps and divisionsmay be tasked to support the mobilizations of RCunits. US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM),with assistance from state area commands

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(STARCs) and the continental United States armies(CONUSAs), is responsible for Army RC mobili-zation. In some situations, the division commandermay request activating specific RC units for specificmissions (such as his rear operations cell) or indi-

vidual mobilization augmenters (IMAs) to roundout his staff. These requests are based on missionanalysis and forwarded through the corps headquar-ters. Appendix D and FM 100-17 provide specificson the Army’s mobilization process.

Predeployment Activity

Predeployment activities and mobilization gen-erally occur simultaneously. Both begin with analert process that sets into motion actions necessaryfor deployment and subsequent employment of forces. Predeployment activities include planning,

organizing the division’s forces, and preparing per-sonnel and equipment for deployment.

When alerted, the division initiates predeploy-ment crisis-action planning, modifying existingplans as necessary. Modifications may include re-adjusting task organizations for initial entry andfollow-on forces into the area of operations (AO),sequencing forces into the objective area, and refin-ing sustainment requirements. Intelligence systemsshift to meet the planning needs of deployingcommanders.

Key to the division’s deployment is task organiz-ing, echeloning, and tailoring its forces. Task orga-nizing forms combined arms task forces withlimited self-sustainment capability for rapid deploy-ment. Task-organized units develop close trainingrelationships to facilitate both deployment and em-ployment. Echeloning is organizing and prioritizingunits for movement. Echelons are often divided intoelements such as advance parties, initial combatforces, follow-on forces, and closure forces. Eachechelon has a designated echelon commander. Taskorganizing and echeloning occur during initialplanning.

Tailoring is adding to or subtracting from plannedtask organizations. It is situational dependent andoccurs after the commander and his staff completea thorough METT-T assessment. Divisions tailorforces after identifying initial strategic lift, pre-positioned assets, and host nation and or contractservices or assets.

Following receipt of a mission, the division pre-pares its personnel and equipment for deploymentthrough preparation for overseas movement (POM)activities. The division normally requires adminis-trative and logistics support from the corps to ac-

complish POM actions. These activities ensure thatdeploying units meet all requirements to deploy intoanother theater of operation as well as those directedby Army regulations and local authorities.

US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)provides strategic lift (movement) for divisions inCONUS through the Military Traffic ManagementCommand (MTMC), the Army’s component of USTRANSCOM. The division’s installation trans-portation office links the deploying units andMTMC. Based on MTMC’s movement directive,operational plans, and commanders’ guidance, G3sand transportation staff backward-plan the divi-sion’s departure from the installation.

Prior to a deployment, the division commanderexecutes planned actions to transfer his installationresponsibilities to the installation commander orFORSCOM control. Even when deployed, how-ever, the division commander’s total missionawareness includes the division’s home station. Hemay retain some responsibility for units and activi-ties not deployed, such as the division’s rear detach-ment and family support.

DeploymentDeployment is the movement of forces and their

support bases from any location to an AO in re-sponse to a military need or crisis. Division unitsdeploy via ports of embarkation (POEs). (SeeFigure 2-2, page 2-4.)

The careful sequencing of forces into an AO helpsstabilize the situation, allows for rapid buildup of capabilities, and maintains a viable force-protectioncapability. The arrival of the division’s personneland equipment is programmed by time-phased forcedeployment data (TPFDD). Generally, heavy equip-ment moves to a seaport of embarkation (SPOE) byrail or heavy truck transport. Lighter equipment andtroops in deployment configurations may move toan aerial port of embarkation (APOE) by truck andbus.

Deploying units may process through an interme-diate staging area (ISA) located between the POE

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and the port of debarkation (POD). Deployed units

arrive in a theater at an aerial port of debarkation(APOD) and or seaport of debarkation (SPOD).Division units then move rapidly out of the PODsthrough the marshaling areas, staging areas, and intotactical assembly areas or logistics bases beforeexecuting operations.

Entry Operations

Entry is the sequencing of forces into an area of operations. The division arrives into the AO aseither an entry force or a follow-on force. Entry

forces are lethal and survivable, tailored to carry outinitial combat operations to secure the lodgment.Follow-on forces expand lodgments and build upcombat power to conduct extended combat

operations. The division’s entry may be opposed byan adversary or it may be unopposed.

During opposed entry operations, division forcesconduct forcible entry into an area that may contain

hostile forces. The division normally secures anairhead or a beachhead for the arrival of additionalforces; however, it could be tasked to conduct im-mediate combat operations to defeat the enemy. Ineither situation, early entry forces are predominatelycombat units.

During unopposed entry operations, the divisionmay serve as a deterrent, act as the advance detach-ment for a much larger deployment that will follow,or participate in noncombat operations. During un-opposed entry operations under hostile conditions,the division deploys into an AO where combat is

underway or imminent, but the APODs and SPODsare secure and under friendly control. In both op-posed and unopposed entry, commanders take ac-tions to secure their forces. The composition of theinitial entry forces depends on the commanders’analysis of the situation.

Successful entry operations result from goodplanning and coordination. Following receipt of amission, commanders conduct mission analysis.They determine both the mix of forces and arrivalsequence. As deployment nears, timely theater-specific intelligence, operational data, and logistics

information must flow directly to the units conduct-ing the early entry operations. Initially, the forcecommander depends on national, theater, joint, andspace-based systems for “pushed” intelligence and

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targeting information. However, it is critical that thedivision’s intelligence architecture can “pull” anyspecific information to meet the division’s needs.

During entry operations, joint or multinationalfires provide the division’s core fire support andinterdiction capabilities. Once the division estab-lishes a lodgment and force packaging allows, or-ganic assets augment joint fires. In entry operations,

joint fires capabilities are critical to protect theforce.

Entry forces are primarily active component (AC)forces. Specialized RC units may be mobilized if needed. Specific RC capabilities include seaport-and airfield-related units, civil affairs units, mortu-ary affairs units, and terminal operations and trans-fer units. Additionally, special operations forcesmay precede and link up with entry forces.

Operations

Operations comprise actions that lead to or di-rectly contribute to accomplishing the combatantcommander’s mission. The operations phase of force projection may occur immediately or after along buildup.

Division commanders conduct both combat andnoncombat operations to achieve their higher com-mander’s intent. During combat operations, divi-

sions conduct offensive, defensive, and otheroperations detailed in subsequent chapters of thismanual. The division may conduct or participate innoncombat operations as part of OOTW, describedin Chapter 8.

War Termination and PostconflictOperations

Successful operations lead to accomplishing thecombatant commander’s mission. War terminationand postconflict operations restore conditions in thearea of operations favorable to US national policy.

As hostilities terminate in parts of the AO, unitsoccupying those areas may reorganize and transi-tion to planned postconflict activities. During thisperiod, the division focuses on securing its force andending hostilities throughout the entire AO. Divi-sion operations stabilize the area. The division mayrestore order, establish or reestablish essential infra-structure, and prepare for redeployment of its

forces. Often, this transition begins even if someresidual combat is still underway.

Planning is vital for successful postconflict ac-tions, beginning well before combat operationscease. The division commander and elements of hisstaff consider adjusted rules of engagement, force-protection measures, interagency and host nationissues, as well as the transfer of authorities andresponsibilities.

Versatility is also vital to postconflict activities.Division units may be tasked to do things for whichthey are not specifically trained, but can accomplish.Postconflict tasks include controlling indigenouspersonnel, whether hostile or friendly, in and aroundthe unit locations; assisting with EPW control; andassisting in civil affairs. Civil affairs tasks includedeveloping populace and resources control meas-ures designed to deny the enemy access to thepopulace, assisting local civil police, and develop-ing property control measures. These activities helprestore order and protect the local population. Ad-ditionally, the division may assist with civil-militaryoperations which include foreign nation assistance,populace and resource control, humanitarian assis-tance, military civic action, and civil defense. Thedivision will also begin retraining its own forces oncritical tasks.

With proper augmentation and planning, the di-vision can provide specialized skills and training toassist the host government. Generally, these skillsare found within CS and CSS units, such as staff

judge advocate, PSYOP, medical, engineer, lawenforcement, signal, transportation, maintenance,civil affairs, and ministry teams. The division mayalso be tasked to initiate nation-assistance activitiesand humanitarian assistance.

The division may transfer specific responsibili-ties within its AO to nongovernmental organiza-tions (NGOs), and or private volunteerorganizations (PVOs). For example, the Interna-tional Red Cross may assume responsibility for

medical treatment of all non-US military personnel.The corps or JTF commander may deploy special-ized nondivisional military forces to reestablish andcontrol law and order. This action may involvemany US and international agencies.

Transferring responsibilities may involve merelywithdrawing from a previously occupied position.In other cases, the transfer may be more

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complicated. Whatever the situation, the divisioncommander ensures an orderly, disciplined transferwithin the area of operations and begins preparingunits for redeployment or action elsewhere.

Redeployment and Reconstitution

This stage includes two major functions: deploy-ment back to CONUS or to another theater, andreconstitution of division units as appropriate.

Redeployment begins as directed and as the situa-tion allows. Initially, the division quickly redeploysadvance parties and less essential units, personnel,and equipment. Preparation for redeployment be-gins as division units start assisting other organiza-tions with postconflict missions. Redeploymentrequires task organizing and echeloning similar todeployment. During this stage, unit strength andequipment status may change often, but accurateaccountability is key to the reconstitution effort.Additionally, commanders carry out training pro-grams to maintain individual and unit mission es-sential task list (METL) proficiency. Protection of the force remains critical.

Reconstitution is rapid preparation for follow-onmissions. Reconstitution goes beyond normal day-to-day force-sustainment actions. It is defined asextraordinary actions that are planned and carriedout by commanders to restore units to a desired levelof combat effectiveness commensurate with mis-sion requirements and availability of resources.

Reconstitution may include reestablishing or re-inforcing command and control; cross leveling orreplacing personnel, supplies, and equipment; usingcommand priorities to allocate resources; conduct-ing essential training; and reestablishing unit cohe-sion. Reconstitution may be required for anycombat, CS, or CSS unit and must be anticipated atall levels of command. (See FM 100-9.) Reconsti-tution could begin during postconflict activities.Some reconstitution actions may be completedquickly while other actions require many days tocomplete.

Division commanders use one of two reconstitu-tion options to return units to a specified level of combat capability—reorganization or regeneration.Reorganization shifts internal resources within adegraded unit to increase its combat effectiveness.Regeneration rebuilds a unit through large-scale

replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies;reestablishes or replaces essential command andcontrol; and conducts mission-essential training.The decision to regenerate is normally made at leasttwo levels above the unit being regenerated. Recon-

stitution of units is significant and is done only withcareful planning. Appendix E of this manual; theFM-63 series (combat service support) manuals;and FM 100-9 detail division redeployment andreconstitution actions.

Demobilization

Demobilization is the transfer of units, individu-als, and material from an active to an inactive status.Generally, demobilization applies to RC units. Re-serve component units face the challenge of ensur-

ing compliance with a myriad of regulationsconcerning demobilization. (See FM 100-17.)

An active division’s involvement is minimal indemobilizing RC units; however, division person-nel may assist. Commanders are responsible fortimely award recommendations as well as evalu-ation reports for RC units and individuals that wereattached or assigned during the deployment. Addi-tionally, the division may maintain and or safeguardstrategic reserves of supplies and equipment untilthey are returned to the US Army MaterielCommand.

OPERATIONS IN DEPTH

New Focus

Our AirLand Battle doctrine of 1986 emphasizedthe sequential attack of an approaching enemyforce. At the operational level, deep operations in-cluded efforts to isolate current battles and to influ-ence where, when, and against whom future battleswould be fought. At the tactical level, the Armyfought deep to shape the close battle.

AirLand Battle doctrine has evolved into today’sfull dimensional warfighting doctrine. Advances intechnology and the exploitation of space-based plat-forms have increased the range, lethality, and accu-racy of military systems. Modern-day commandershave the ability to conduct operations simultane-ously throughout the enemy’s depth to gain syner-gistic effects of modern-day systems.

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lethality. Today’s division commanders must thinkas well as fight in depth.

Operations now set the conditions for maneuverforces to deliver the decisive blow. Our technologi-cal assets and precision fires minimize risk to oursoldiers while increasing our lethality. These ac-tions place multiple critical enemy functions at riskat the same time. They desynchronize the enemy’splan and his ability to generate combat power. Theyalso deny an enemy cohesion to execute his plan. Insum, division commanders degrade the enemy’swill and capability to fight.

Expanded Battlefield

Operations in depth are not the same as deepoperations. Operations in depth expand the battle-field in purpose, space, time, and resources andallow the division commander to completely domi-nate the tempo of the battle. Commanders strive tocontinuously engage the enemy throughout thedepth and breadth of the battlefield.

With access to national reconnaissance, intelli-gence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA)assets, corps and divisions acquire deep and im-proved real-time targeting information. The divi-sion commander can employ fires and maneuverdeeper than ever before in history. Soon, such firesmay include the Army tactical missile system(ATACMS), Tomahawk land attack missile(TLAM), as well as multinational deep attack assets.

Long-range, real-time acquisitions, combinedwith precision fires, help the division defeat ene-mies at great distances or reduce enemy combatcapability before joining the close fight. ATACMS,MLRS, TLAM, and fixed- or rotary-wing aircraftmay support operations day or night, under mostweather conditions, and at significant stand-off ranges. Improved munitions, such as dual-purposeimproved conventional munitions (DPICM) andfamily of scatterable mines, increase the division’s

At all echelons in the division, a commander’svision and intent drive the use of forces throughoutthe battlefield. The division commander translates

his vision into a clearly articulated commander’sintent that provides subordinate commanders theoverall purpose and the desired end state of theoperation. (See FM 101-5.) The intent statementguides the force as a whole. The more fluid the battleand the more dynamic the tempo of operations, themore important it is for subordinate commandersthroughout the battlefield to understand the opera-tion’s purpose. This allows them to act with initia-tive and agility under changing circumstances.

Division commanders attack opposing enemyforces in multiple dimensions. Early doctrine fo-

cused on the destruction and or defeat of enemymaneuver forces in the close battle. Those com-manders conducted deep operations to shape theclose fight or to control the rate at which enemyforces entered the close tight. Now, commandersattack the enemy simultaneously as part of jointoperations.

The division commander can engage (using ma-neuver or lethal and nonlethal fires) the enemy usingcounterfire against his fire support systems. Simul-taneously, the division can attack the enemy’s com-mand and control (C

2) using fires or EW and attack

the enemy’s reserve with a full complement of long-range joint tires. Deception, PSYOP, specialoperations, and similar means are integrated tomaximize synergistic effects. The enemy is con-fused and frustrated, incapable of generating com-bat power or sustaining his tempo, gaining theinitiative, or executing any course of action.

Division commanders and staffs think of a com-pressed battlefield (deep, close, and rear) and onefight, occurring during a single window of time.Commanders leverage technology and informationto improve the assimilation, production, and distri-

bution times of key information (intelligence, tech-nical fire support, and C2). Automated systems

provide near-real-time connectivity from “sensor toshooter” required to effectively and safely conductsimultaneous attacks in depth.

Additionally, operations in depth allow divisioncommanders to control the tempo of friendly andenemy operations. As the tempo increases beyond

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the enemy’s ability to react effectively, command-ers exploit these conditions through aggressive jointfires (destructive and disruptive) and maneuver.This results in prioritized, multidimensional attacksat decisive points and critical times on the battlefield

at the time and place of the division commander’schoosing.

Resources available to division commanders arelimited. Therefore, each commander must best usewhat is available to successfully conduct operationsin depth. Competition for strategic lift assets willrequire hard decisions and careful prioritization of requirements. Future operations require a vision of the integrated employment and support from manyorganizations, such as national, joint, multinational(particularly host nation), and interagency.

As part of a joint force, divisions may have thesefires available:

• Artillery fires.

• Air support.

• Naval surface fire support.

• Missiles.

• Electronic warfare support.

By their nature, these fires are delivered primarilyby joint or multinational forces and enable simulta-neous attacks in depth. As with all fires, care is taken

not to damage protected targets.PSYOP forces plan, conduct, and support military

operations (war and OOTW) at the strategic, opera-tional, and tactical levels. PSYOP activities aretailored to meet the type of operations the divisionconducts. During the defense, PSYOP forces canassist an economy of force capability through de-ception operations at the same time the division isconducting a counterattack into the enemy’s flanks.

Electronic warfare uses electromagnetic or di-rected energy to degrade, neutralize, or destroy en-emy combat capability. Electronic warfare(nonlethal attack) includes jamming and electro-magnetic deception. Division commanders can useEW to jam enemy AD radars and C

2nets during air

assault operations.

The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) appeared inOperation Desert Storm. Using UAV imagery toconduct air and artillery strikes is an effective meansto attack deep targets. UAVs have the potential for

performing such tasks as situation development,target development, intelligence gathering, and bat-tle damage assessments (BDAs).

As commanders conduct operations throughoutthe depth of the battlefield, our logistics systemintegrates supply and transportation functions. Theright supplies must be delivered at the right time andplace to avoid logistic culminating points. The tim-ing and delivery of supplies depends on—

• Real-time monitoring of corps and division op-erations.

• In-transit visibility over logistics.

Mobility of sustainment assets.•

Future requirements must be anticipated to enabletimely, consistent resourcing of operations, while

reducing backlogs and stockpiles.

BATTLEFIELD VISUALIZATION

Battlefield visualization is a key aspect of battlecommand. It is the process whereby the commanderdevelops a clear understanding of his current state,envisions a desired end state, and then subsequentlyvisualizes the sequence of activity that will movehis force from its current state to the end state. Oncethe commander has been assigned an area of opera-tions (AO), he begins to visualize the operation hewill conduct before any mental constraints (bounda-ries, phase lines, and fire control measures) areemplaced.

The first aspect in the commander’s visualizationis gaining an understanding of the current state of his unit and that of the enemy. This includes gainingan awareness of the enemy and friendly full status,to include combat readiness, logistical status, loca-tion, speed of advance, tempo of operations, knownvulnerabilities, and probable course of action. Alsoincluded for both the enemy and friendly force areenvironmental factors such as terrain and weather,human factors such as morale and fatigue, and lesstangible influences such as culture, religion, andsimilar factors.

The second aspect of the commander’s vision ishis ability to clearly discern a desired end state.Initially, this involves foreseeing a feasible outcometo the operation which results in mission success andleaves the unit postured for the next mission.

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The third aspect of battlefield visualization is the

commander’s ability to envision a sequence of ac-tions (an intellectual war game) that will cause hisforce to arrive at the desired end state. Included inhis visualization are the contingencies (branches)and follow-on missions (sequels) which the com-mander might encounter when conducting the op-eration. Ultimately, the commander articulates hisbattlefield vision to his subordinates and staff through his commander’s intent statement whichguides the development of his concept of operations.

The ability to visualize a battlefield is an essentialleadership attribute of our commanders. It is learnedand attained through training, practice, experience,wisdom, and available battle command technolo-gies. It is critical to accomplishing the mission.

Battlefield visualization is fundamental to theestablishment of a battlefield framework. A battle-

field framework for any operation results from, and

is a natural extension of, this process.

BATTLEFIELD FRAMEWORK

A battlefield framework helps commanders relatefriendly forces to one another and to the enemy interms of time, space, and purpose. The concept of abattlefield framework is not new, but the prolifera-tion of military and advanced technology, and theinfluence of joint doctrine, have caused the battle-field framework to evolve.

The battlefield framework is relevant to any bat-tlefield, to include those in military operations otherthan war (OOTW). However, the following discus-sion applies primarily to conventional combatoperations.

The battlefield framework consists of four inter-related components: area of operations, area of

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interest (AI), battlespace, and a specific battlefieldorganization. As a result of the battlefield visualiza-tion process, and given his AO, the commander cantranslate his vision into his framework.

First, the commander mentally establishes an areain which he must focus his intelligence gatheringmeans to ensure he is aware of those factors whichmay have a near-term impact on his operation. Thisis called the area of interest.

Next, the commander determines the three-dimensional area in which he seeks to dominate theenemy. This volume is referred to as the com-mander’s battlespace. Finally, he lends structure tothe AO through a specific battlefield organizationusing boundaries, phase lines, and similar measures.

Figure 2-3 depicts the battlefield framework. Twoof the components are depicted with military opera-tional graphics. These are the area of operations andthe battlefield’s organization within an area of op-erations. The other two components, battlespaceand area of interest, are not depicted as operationalgraphics. They are mental constructs which com-manders use to form an orderly arrangement of thebattlefield in order to gather information and domi-nate the enemy.

Area of Operations

A commander is assigned an area of operationsby his higher commander. An AO is a three-dimensional volume, prescribed by boundaries on

the ground, and includes the airspace above.The size of the AO depends on METT-T, but must

be large enough for the commander to accomplishhis mission and to protect the force. Boundaries mayrequire frequent adjustment based on the actual andprojected rate of maneuver and the operational en-vironment. Areas of operations may be used todivide large areas into smaller geographical areas inwhich tactical-level battles are fought. However,due to advances in technology and capabilities of our battlefield systems, an assigned area of opera-tions may not necessarily allow the commander to

employ all his organic, assigned, and supportingassets to their fullest capabilities.

Area of Interest

The area of interest is a geographical area fromwhich information and intelligence are required toexecute successful tactical operations and to planfor future operations. Because staffs need time toprocess information and to plan and synchronizeoperations, the tactical commander’s area of interestis normally larger than his battlespace and area of operations. Normally, the area of interest includesany threat or characteristic of the battlefield envi-ronment that will significantly influence a com-mander’s current or future mission. A commander’sarea of interest also includes areas adjacent to thearea of operations (forward, flanks, and rear) inwhich enemy actions and the environment will af-fect current and future battles. Each commanderdetermines his own area of interest.

Battlespace

Battlespace is the volume in which the com-mander seeks to dominate the enemy. It is throughhis battlefield visualization that a commander de-cides where, when, and how he will dominate theenemy within his battlespace.

A commander’s battlespace expands and con-tracts in relation to the ability to acquire and engagethe enemy with joint or multinational forces. It canchange as the commander’s vision of the battlefield

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changes. It is influenced by time, tempo, depth, andsynchronization.

Battlespace is not assigned by a higher com-mander. Although not depicted on a map or on acomputer monitor, it usually extends beyond thecommander’s area of operations, and may overlapwith the battlespace of other commanders. At thetactical level, the area in which a commander domi-nates an enemy, his battlespace, is normally smallerthan his area of interest.

Key considerations in determining the size of battlespace include the depth and resolution of sup-porting intelligence, the commander’s concept foremploying both organic and supporting weapons,and the disposition of the opposing force.

Battlefield Organization

Three closely related sets of activities charac-terize operations within an AO—deep, close, andrear (see Figure 2-4). Commanders think throughand fight throughout the depth and breadth of theirAO in a way that deep, close, and rear operationsappear to the enemy as one continuous operation.Simultaneous operations in depth seek to attack theenemy concurrently throughout the battlefield.

Tactical commanders consider all aspects of three-dimensional battle and use standard control

measures to organize battlefields within their AO.Battlefields may be linear, asymmetrical, or

noncontiguous (see Figure 2-5, page 2-12). Gener-ally, tactical battles include deep, close, and rearcomponents. Each is part of the entire tactical bat-tle—each operation is part of the whole. Intrinsic toeach operation is a fight to protect the division’s

force.At higher echelons (for example, divisions, corps,

JTFs), phase lines or forward boundaries separatecorps or joint force deep attack areas from thedivision’s deep attack area. More important, com-manders at these echelons agree on actions, respon-sibilities, effects, and desired outcomes relative totheir deep operations. The following paragraphsdiscuss this organization of tactical battlefields as itrelates to division operations.

Deep Operations

Deep operations are normally those conductedagainst the enemy’s forces or resources not cur-rently engaged in the close fight. They prevent theenemy from using his resources where and when hewants to on the battlefield. Deep operations are notnecessarily y a function of depth, but rather a functionof what forces are being attacked and the intent of the operation. Division deep operations dominatethe enemy by nullifying his firepower, disruptinghis C

2

, disrupting the tempo of his operations, de-stroying his forces, preventing reinforcing maneu-

ver, destroying his installations and supplies, andbreaking his morale. Maneuver, precision fires, andcommand and control warfare (C

2

W) supported byintelligence can be combined to execute deep op-erations. Divisions conduct deep operations in boththe offense and the defense.

Deep operations normally occur forward of ground reconnaissance and security forces. Theymay—

•

•

•

•

•

Limit the enemy’s freedom of action.

Alter the tempo of operations in favor of thedivision.

Deny the enemy the capability to concentrate hisforces.

Isolate the close operation.

Destroy the enemy’s will to fight.

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Whether in the offense or defense, deep opera-tions perform one or more of the followingfunctions:

•

•

••

Interdict enemy lines of communication.

Prevent the employment of enemy counterattackor follow-on force.

Destroy units and critical targets.Cut off routes of withdrawal.

Division deep operations that focus on the ene-my’s lines of communication not only disrupt hissupply (effects may not be immediately felt), butalso cut off his avenue of retreat. The destruction of forces or supplies affects the enemy both physicallyand psychologically. Deep operations may not al-ways require the physical destruction of the enemyforce, the disruption of his lines of communication,or the interdiction of his reserves to decisively affect

the close operation.Deep operations will often occur simultaneously

with other operations (close and rear), or they mayoccur sequentially. Simultaneous deep and closeengagements prevent the enemy from concentratinghis strength. These engagements force the enemy tofight in one direction and protect himself in another.This causes the enemy to commit his forces wherenot intended and weakens both his overall posture

and his plan. Simultaneous operations allow com-manders to control the tempo of the battle; sequen-tial operations “shape the battlefield.” Sequentialoperations are normally designed around the com-mander’s concept for the close fight.

The commander and staff must clearly under-stand the purpose and objectives of deep operations.

They must recognize the potential benefits of a deepoperation versus an operation against committedforces on the forward line of own troops (FLOT).More important, the commander must have the ex-perience to appreciate or justify the risks involvedin sending a force deep. To recognize which objec-tives are worth those risks and when to take themcomes from experience, training, and knowledge of the capabilities and intent of friendly and enemyunits.

Deep operations are often joint operations, com-bining a variety of service systems to achieve the

best possible results. Systems and forces may in-clude field artillery, missiles (joint and multina-tional), air interdiction (joint and multinational),attack helicopters, air assault forces, airborneforces, ground maneuver forces, special operationsforces (joint and multinational), and C

2W assets

(joint and multinational).

Deep Maneuver. Maneuver forces can attack deep. Both armored and light forces have utility in

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a deep maneuver, depending on the factors of METT-T. Division aviation units are also capableof conducting deep maneuver. Because divisionshave relatively few attack aircraft, commandersmust weigh the risk to deep attacking helicopters

against expected results. They also consider theplanned use of and unexpected need for Army avia-tion units throughout the battlefield.

Fire support, tailored according to the mission,accompanies the deep maneuver forces. When re-quired, artillery can accompany deep maneuverforces through its self-propelled or towed capabil-ity, or through the use of aviation lift assets. How-ever, if possible, supporting fires should be firedfrom the friendly side of the FLOT. Without accom-panying indirect fire support assets, the deep ma-neuver force is smaller and more mobile, requiring

less ammunition and other classes of supply. Arapidly moving offensive force requires special co-ordination to provide close air support (CAS) inroute, and in the objective area. All air requirementsmust be identified early in the planning process toallow time to request and coordinate the support.

Generally CSS is provided to the deep maneuverforce through self-sustainment or lines of commu-nication (LOC). If the force is task-organized to beself-sustaining, its endurance and range are limitedto the quantity of supplies it can carry. The primaryconstraints will be class III and class V, and medical

evacuation for the division. Keeping the lines of communication open to the maneuver force andproviding support from the rear area increase theendurance and range of the force but require addi-tional forces to secure the LOC from vulnerability.

Infantry forces used in a deep maneuver role mayremain behind in the enemy rear as “stay behind”forces, use infiltration, or be inserted by airborneand air assault operations. Armored forces are usedwhen a penetration or an envelopment of the for-ward edge of the battle area (FEBA) is made. Unlessrequired, the deep maneuver force does not conductits own penetration; rather main battle area (MBA)units on the FEBA accomplish this mission. Finally,the division commander must carefully consider thetime and resources required for the deep maneuverforce to strike and return or link up with the mainbody. Misjudging either can result in loss of the deepforce or failure of the force to accomplish itsmission.

Deep Fires. Commanders normally conduct deepfires with organic and supporting Army field artil-lery and joint fires-both air and ground. Fires of sufficient intensity, even without maneuver, candisrupt and force changes in the enemy plan. Divi-

sion deep fires must focus on developed high-payoff targets.

Division deep operations often require packagedflights of Air Force, Marine, or Navy aircraft withthe fill complement of munitions, electronic com-bat, joint suppression of enemy air defenses(JSEAD), and force protection against enemy air.

Deep Command and Control Warfare. Com-mand and control warfare (C

2W) is a relatively new

joint term and new to Army doctrine. It is a keycomponent of information warfare. (See FM100-6.) C

2W integrates OPSEC, military deception,

jamming, and physical destruction to deny informa-tion to an enemy; to influence, degrade, or destroyan enemy’s C

3

capabilities; and to protect friendlyC

3

capabilities against such enemy actions. C2

Wsupports the tactical plan. C

2

W disrupts the enemy’stroop control process, increases enemy decisiontimes, and reduces his ability to concentrate forcesthroughout the battlefield.

One component of C2

W is electronic warfare.Electronic warfare enables the division to protect itsown electronic systems while electronically attack-ing those of the enemy. During deep operations,

commanders use EW assets for jamming, electronicdeception, and targeting to degrade, influence, ordestroy enemy electronic capabilities. The goal is toidentify high-value C

2

nets and to disrupt enemyelectronics and communications activities at criticaltimes during his decision cycle.

OPSEC, deception, and jamming result in a com-bination of lethal and nonlethal attacks on the en-emy. These attacks disrupt enemy targetacquisition, intelligence gathering, and commandand control systems while simultaneously protect-ing the division’s own C

3

system from similar en-

emy activities. The object is either to completelydestroy the enemy’s C2

system or to create ambigu-ity and interrupt the enemy’s ability to decide andtransmit plans and orders.

To be effective, C2

W must be part of top-downplanning in concert with the commander’s overallconcept of operation. Based on the mission and thecommander’s concept for C

2

W employment, the

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commander and operations officer use intelligenceassets to select and prioritize targets to support thecontinuous nature of planning and execution in theoperation.

Deep Command and Control. All resources at-tacking deep must understand the commander’sintent. Nowhere is this need greater because thecommander rarely, if ever, leads a deep force him-self. A clear intent, mission-type orders, and de-tailed, but simple, plans are the keys to successfuldivision deep operations.

Deep operations are normally planned and con-trolled where the most information is available tothe staff—the division’s main CP. Subordinateheadquarters establish a temporary CP, if required,near the main CP to further coordinate and augmentthe division’s C

2

efforts.

Once the division’s commanding general decidesto execute deep operations, planning and coordina-tion are normally done from a division’s deep op-erations coordination center (DOCC) at the mainCP. The DOCC may be formed by linking selectedstaff members from the appropriate main CP cells,either physically or electronically, under the direc-tion of the division chief of staff. (See Figure 2-6.)The G3 assists in coordinating the deep operations.The division commander determines the configura-tion of the DOCC from his assessment of mission

requirements, available personnel, and equipmentcapabilities. However, the DOCC is not ad hoc. Itis a trained entity. The DOCC continuously syn-chronizes all BOS functions.

The DOCC is often configured to monitor closeand rear operations and continually assess theirrelationship with planned deep operations. Nor-mally, the division DOCC requires a Warrior termi-nal, communications, and automation equipment.The deep operations coordinator is given the requi-site authority to plan and integrate specified deepoperations. The DOCC concept provides the com-mander with a means to focus the activities of allthe units, agencies, and cells involved in supportingdeep operations. The overall responsibility for thesynchronization of all operations---deep, close, andrear—remains with the main command post.

Close Operations

Close operations are those in which friendlyforces are in immediate contact with the enemy.Commanders defeat an enemy with precision firesand maneuver, concentrating the effects of all avail-able combat power. Commanders should strive todictate when, where, and against what enemy unitsclose fights will occur. A division’s close operationsnormally include the deep, close, and rear opera-tions of its subordinate brigades and battalions.

Close operations consider and include reconnais-sance and security actions, a main effort, and reserveactions. Reconnaissance and security are critical tobattles and engagements.

Reconnaissance in the division is continuous. Itmust precede all operations. Reconnaissance ac-tions yield information on terrain and the enemyforce. Effective reconnaissance allows the com-mander to gain and maintain contact with the enemyand to direct friendly units into the fight. Reconnais-sance units normally orient their movement on themovement of the enemy. They fight for informationbut usually avoid decisive combat.

Security protects and conserves the combatpower of friendly units. It denies the enemy knowl-edge of current and future friendly force actions.Security is inherent in all military operations. At thetactical level, security actions protect the commandagainst surprise attack and hostile air and groundobservation. While all units conduct security ac-tions, specific units are tasked to conduct security

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missions (such as screen, guard, cover, and areasecurity). Security forces orient their movements onthe force or facility to be secured. Appendix Adiscusses reconnaissance and security in detail.

The main effort is assigned to only one unit at atime. It accomplishes an action critical to the overallmission. The commander applies combat power asnecessary to support his main effort. Subordinateand supporting commanders focus on the main ef-fort to link their actions with those around them.This part of a commander’s concept permits initia-tive but maintains direction and cohesion. Support-ing the main effort requires synchronization of combat, CS, and CSS resources.

Reserves give a commander options and flexibil-ity, providing an edge against uncertainty. Reserves

exploit successes, gain opportunity, and expeditevictory. They are used to weight the main effort tomaintain momentum, provide security, and defeatenemy counterattacks. Note that reserve actions arenot solely in response to unforeseen enemy actions.

See Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 for information onclose operations in the offense, defense, retro-grades, and other division operations.

Rear Operations

The objective of rear operations is to ensure free-

dom of action and continuous operations. Rear op-erations are numerous, complex, and never ending.Commanders and their staffs synchronize the rearoperations functions of sustainment, terrain man-agement, movement control with close and deepoperations, and security in consonance with thecommander’s concept and intent.

The assistant division commander for support(ADC-S) plans and controls division rear operationsfrom the division rear CP. He exercises his respon-sibilities through the division rear CP and theDISCOM CP which is normally collocated for lifesupport, local security, and ease of coordination.

Sustainment. Rear area operations include plan-ning and directing sustainment. Synchronizingthese actions with the concept of operation is criticalto the success of close and deep operations. Rearoperations also ensure that sustainment is not de-graded by, and does not limit, the force com-mander’s freedom of maneuver and continuity of operations. The rear CP and the DISCOM

anticipate, plan, and coordinate the relocation of CSS units in rear areas as the situation changes. CSSfacilities disperse to minimize the effect of threatattacks.

Normally, the rear CP plans and coordinates thesustainment effort while the DISCOM focuses onits execution. The DISCOM recommends the loca-tion of the division support area (DSA) and thepositions of units within the DSA. The DISCOMdirects subordinate units, monitors their ability toprovide support, and makes rear operations recom-mendations to the rear CP. The G5 works with therear CP and the DISCOM to procure any neededhost nation sustainment support. (See Appendix Efor further discussion of sustaining divisionoperations.)

Terrain Management. While G3s and S3s haveoverall responsibility for terrain management, rearCPs usually position supporting units in rear areasto support both current and future operations. Theirlocation depends on their missions, the division’sconcept of operation and concept of support, andcurrent rear area intelligence preparation of thebattlefield (IPB).

The positioning of the DSA is key in terrainmanagement. The rear CP, with the G3 and theDISCOM commander, designates the DSA. All

units entering or desiring to relocate within thedivision rear must coordinate with the rear CP toensure that their proposed locations do not conflictwith current or projected operations, positioning, ormovement priorities.

Once positioned, these units form bases (unit ormultiunit positions with a definite perimeter) andbase clusters (mission grouping of bases or securityrequirements lacking a clearly defined perimeter).The rear CP commander normally designates thesenior commander within each base or base clusteras its commander. Base and base cluster command-

ers are responsible for positioning units within theirrespective areas of responsibility. Bases and baseclusters fall under the control of the division rear CPfor positioning, security, and movement within thedivision rear area. Additionally, the division rear CP(through the division G5) coordinates with HNauthorities to ensure that HN facilities or units donot conflict with the division’s concept of operationor concept of support.

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Movement Control. Movement control includesthe planning, prioritizing, deconflicting, and execu-tion of movement plans, both internal and external(other US forces and host nation) to a unit. G3s andS3s are responsible for the movement of tacticalunits through or within areas of operations. RearCPs are generally responsible for administrativemoves. Additionally, they prioritize and deconflictmovements within rear areas as well as plan for thesustainment of tactical movements within thedivision.

The G4 recommends main supply routes (MSRs)to the G3 and the commander. The G4 controls useof MSRs within the division and coordinates supplyroutes for supporting corps units. He identifies criti-cal points along MSRs to the G3 who coordinateswith the division provost marshal and the assistant

division engineer (ADE) for security, area damagecontrol, and MSR maintenance. The G4 coordinateswith the ADCOORD for air defense coverage of MSRs.

The G3 establishes priorities for movementsalong division MSRs based on the overall sustain-ment priorities in support of the operation. Move-ment priorities are passed to the division provostmarshal who enforces them.

Security. The rear operations cell coordinates andassigns specific security responsibilities to all forces

in the rear area to ensure sustainment is not inter-rupted. Rear area security includes intelligence andearly warning actions, response operations, baseand base cluster self-defense, and rear area firesupport.

The rear CP is responsible for maintaining andupdating the rear area IPB. The intelligence cell atthe main CP produces IPB products used and up-dated by the rear operations cell. The rear operationscell then produces a predictive intelligence estimate,identifying likely threat targets and intentions. Thisestimate, along with information on the current

threat situation, is sent to all units in the division reararea. It forms the basis for planning and conductingthe other three components of rear securityoperations.

The rear CP gathers, and disseminates to all reararea units, early warning information regardingthreat air activities. The rear operations cell collectsinformation from the Army airspace command andcontrol (A

2

C2

) element at the division main CP. It

also collects information from division and corps airdefense artillery units located in the division reararea, Air Force TACP airlift element at the rear CP,other Air Force control teams that may be operatingin the division rear, and other rear area units. Thisearly warning information is required to anticipatethreat airborne and air assault insertions in the rearareas.

Division rear area operations must be able torespond simultaneously to a wide range of rear areathreats. The rear CP plans and coordinates actionswhen enemy activity is discovered in the division’srear area. The division commander’s concept andintent, the rear area IPB, and the ADC-S’s estab-lished protection priorities drive response forceplanning. The rear CP melds this information withits own IPB. It positions itself in the division area

where it can best provide timely support to thehighest-priority facilities—those most likely to beattacked by threat forces.

Rear area threats are shown in Figure 2-7. Baseor base cluster self-defense provides Level I re-sponses to small, localized enemy threats such as—

• Enemy-controlled agent activities.

• Enemys empathizers and saboteurs.

• Terrorist activities.

• Electronic intelligence collection devices.

Normally MP units (with appropriate supportingfires) respond to Level II threats. These threatsexceed base or base cluster self-defense capabilitiesbut do not require commitment of a TCF. MPs candefeat—

•

•

•

Unconventional forces-conducted diversionaryand sabotage operations.

Small combat unit-conducted raid, ambush, andreconnaissance operations.

Special warfare intelligence collection and opera-tional missions.

When the MP response force encounters or en-gages threats beyond its ability to defeat, it imme-diately notifies the rear CP. The response forcemaintains contact with the enemy and continues todevelop the situation until the rear CP commits thedivision’s TCF.

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The TCF responds to Level III threats. The TCFis normally a combined arms organization. Its spe-cific size and composition, however, is determinedby a METT-T analysis. The TCF can counter lim-

ited enemy—•

•

•

•

•

Heliborne operations.

Airborne operations.

Amphibious operations.

Infiltration operations.

Ground force attacks in rear areas.

The G3 may designate a TCF as part of thedivision’s overall task organization to respond torear area threats. The designation of the TCF is

based on a rear IPB, an analysis of METT-T, andthe division commander’s assessment of the overallenemy capabilities. It receives fire support fromeither DS field artillery units or fires from the divi-sion’s GS and general support reinforcing fieldartillery units. The TCF will often have aviationsupport. When the TCF is designated, the com-mander coordinates with the ADC-S and divisionrear CP to develop multiple contingency plans forits employment in the division rear area.

The TCF is normally allocated to rear operationsand committed by the ADC-S. Its premature com-

mitment may rob the division of the flexibility andinitiative required to counter the most significantenemy actions in the division’s area. This decisionis made when the ADC-S determines that both baseor base cluster defense forces and Level II responseforces are unable to counter a threat incursion or thatthe threat poses such a risk to the success of thedivision’s rear operations that commitment of theTCF is necessary.

When appropriate, the TCF task-organizes itsunits and maneuvers them to where they can bestinterdict or engage the enemy force. The TCF fo-cuses on those threat targets critical to the divi-sion—ground and air avenues of approach, drop

zones, and landing zones.

The TCF coordinates with response forces (nor-mally MPs) regarding the exchange of reconnais-sance information, battle handover procedures, andcontingency plans for TCF operations. The rear CPensures that movements in the division rear do notimpede TCF operations.

When the TCF is committed, its movements takepriority over all other movement and sustainmentactivities. If the tactical situation warrants, the rearCP or the main CP requests additional corps assets

to assist the TCF. Such assets include other maneu-ver units, fire support assets, assault helicopters, andCAS. All requested support for TCF operations isinitially placed OPCON to the TCF commander.

When the TCF is committed, the rear CP desig-nates an AO for the TCF. At that time, units, bases,and base clusters within the designated TCF area of operations are OPCON to the TCF for tactical op-erations until the threat is eliminated.

Base and base cluster commanders develop a baseor base cluster defense plan designed to detect anddefend against enemy actions. Each commanderbases his plan on the division rear CP IPB, his ownIPB, the current intelligence situation, and an analy-sis of his unit’s mission requirement. To maximizeunit mission accomplishment, defense plans areflexible and allow for differing degrees of securitybased on the probability of threat activities. Defenseplans should clearly delineate C

2. This includes

detection of threats through the use of observationposts (OPs) and patrols; assignment of defense sec-tors of responsibility to subordinates; integration of available weapons into the defense plan; identifica-tion of unit response forces to bolster the defenseduring an attack; obstacle, area damage control,internal air defense, and fire support planning; andair, ground, and NBC attack alarm systems.

Defense plans are given to MP units providingarea security or battlefield circulation control nearthe base or base cluster. Defense plans are also givento forces designated to respond to attacks beyondthe base or base cluster self-defense capability, andto the rear operations cell for integration into the

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overall division rear defense and the support plans.Defense plans are coordinated with adjacent basesor base clusters to maximize mutual support and toprevent fratricide.

Base or base cluster commanders establish anoperations center capable of maintaining 24-hourcommunications with the division rear operationscell for intelligence, tactical information, and direc-tion and with their parent organization for unit mis-sion guidance. Additionally, base or base clustercommanders establish communications with, anddirect defensive operations of, other units occupy-ing terrain within their base or base cluster.

The operations cell within the rear CP is respon-sible for planning rear area fire support operations.The operations cell collates base and base cluster

fire plans and response force fire support plans. Therear FSE coordinates the composite rear operationsfire support plan with the division FSCOORD andthe FSE at the division main CP.

BATTLEFIELD OPERATINGSYSTEMS

A variety of functions help commanders build andsustain combat power. These functions, calledcom-bat functions, are described fully in TRADOC Pam-

phlet 11-9 and FM 100-5. Division commanders andtheir staffs translate combat functions into morespecific strategic and operational functions whenconducting theater- or operational-level missionsand tactical-level functions when conducting tacti-cal operations. The majority of division operationsare tactical; operational-level missions are rare.Strategic theater-level missions for a division aremore rare. The strategic level of war major func-tions, the strategic operating systems, occur at thenational military and theater strategic levels per-formed by civil and military organizations and uni-fied, joint, and combined strategic forces forsuccessfully executing strategic plans and theatercampaigns.

The operational level of war major functions, theoperational operating systems (OOS), are definedas those occurring in the theater (or area) of opera-tions, performed by joint and combined operationalforces, for successfully executing subordinate cam-paigns and major operations to accomplish the stra-

tegic objectives of the unified commander or highermilitary authority and operational objectives.

The tactical level of war major functions, thebattlefield operating systems (BOS), are defined as

those occurring on the battlefield, performed by theforce to successfully execute operations (battles andengagements) by the Army to accomplish militaryobjectives directed by the operational commander.(See Figure 2-8.)

Intelligence

Intelligence is a continuous process that occurs inpeacetime as well as in war or conflict. Corps, joint,and national intelligence systems support the divi-sion intelligence effort. Collectively, this flexible

array of systems and units provides the capability tolocate and track the threat in support of close, deep,and rear operations. This intelligence architectureplans and directs, collects, processes, produces, anddisseminates the information and intelligence com-manders need to make timely decisions.

Tactical-level intelligence is required for plan-ning and conducting tactical operations. It focuseson enemy formations, local terrain, and weather. Itattempts to predict enemy tactical courses of action(COAs). Division and brigade commanders drivethe intelligence they receive. Commanders focusintelligence primarily through priority intelligence

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requirements (PIR) and designation of high-payoff targets. During war gaming, the G2 developsinformation requirements (IR) for each friendlyCOA. Each IR is linked to a specific enemy actionthat requires a friendly response. PIR are those

information requirements critical to the accomplish-ment of the mission. The commander incorporatesPIR into his commander’s critical information re-quirements (CCIR).

The commander is intimately involved with PIR.He personally selects and updates them. He ensuresthey are tied directly to the maneuver scheme andhis foreseen decisions. Because of limited collectionassets, PIR must be limited to only his most criticalneeds. Organic collection systems may not satisfyall the commander’s PIR. In that case, commandersmust aggressively seek higher echelons’ intelli-

gence collection of, and answers to, their PIR. Sincelimited assets require tough decisions, some subor-dinate commanders will not have all their priorityinformation requirements answered.

Commanders view the battlefield through intelli-gence. They tailor intelligence assets to get theinformation they need. Division intelligence assetsare not normally held in reserve. Commandersweight their main effort with intelligence support.Intelligence assets are employed to their maximumcapability.

Division intelligence accomplishes its missionsthrough six primary tasks that tailor products forcommanders and their staffs. (For detailed informa-tion on these tasks, see FM 34-1.)

Indication and Warning

The indication and warning task provides timelycombat information and intelligence necessary forplanning to many users. To prevent surprise to theforce, it provides as much early warning as possible.It detects enemy actions that prove or run counter toplanning assumptions, thereby alleviating risk. Indi-

cation and warning tasks intelligence systems, proc-esses and analyzes information, and produces andrapidly disseminates intelligence to commanders andstaffs to support planning and ongoing operations.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

The IPB is a continuous process that integratesthe operational environment, weather, and terrain

with the enemy’s capabilities and doctrine. IPB isthe responsibility of commanders. It allows com-manders at all levels to understand the battlefieldand synchronize all operating systems. The IPBresults in products used by commanders and staff

that display both enemy and friendly capabilitiesand vulnerabilities and predict potential enemyCOAs. The IPB process is detailed in FM 34-130.

Situation Development

Commanders and staff use IPB products to pro-vide an estimate of the enemy’s combat effective-ness and present enemy courses of action. Situationdevelopment products confirm or deny enemyCOAs. These products help the commander “see”the battlefield and provide a basis for prosecuting

his plan or making appropriate changes.

Target Development

Target development products provide targets andtarget identification for attack with fire (lethal andnonlethal) and maneuver. The commander uses cus-tomized collection system downlinks and targetingproducts with fires to destroy, suppress, or neutral-ize targets.

Battle Damage Assessment

Battle damage assessment is an analysis of theresults of a military operation for physical damageand its impact on enemy combat effectiveness. Itestimates the enemy’s combat effectiveness andcapabilities needed to assess his probable COAs. Asa function of the targeting methodology, BDAmeasures progress toward accomplishing the target-ing effort.

Force Protection

Force protection seeks to identify and counter

enemy intelligence collection capabilities and toassess friendly vulnerabilities and risk to the force.It includes all-source counterintelligence efforts,OPSEC, threat evaluations, and early warning.

The division’s collection and jamming capabili-ties include—

• The ground-based communication intercept, di-rection finding, and jamming.

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•

•

•

•

Aerial communications intercept, DF, and jam-ming (Quickfix).

UAV.

Ground surveillance radars (GSRs).Counterintelligence and interrogator personnel.

Ground-based EW systems, when combined withQuickfix, provide communications intelligence(COMINT), intercept, and, in the near future, UAVto provide near-real-time electro-optical orforward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) imagery.

The division’s mobile integrated tactical terminal(MITT) can receive and exploit secondary imageryand SIGINT from corps processors as well as othersystems. JSTARS and UAV downlink data and

Guardrail-collected SIGINT are available to thedivision and brigades via the ground station module.Brigades will also be able to receive secondaryimagery through the GSM. As in the corps, the AllSource Analysis System (ASAS) is the backbone of division analysis with ASAS terminals at the bri-gades ensuring a common view of the battlefield.Trojan SPIRIT ensures reliable intelligence com-munications connectivity with corps and EAC.

Maneuver

The maneuver elements of a division are itsground brigades, attack helicopter battalions, andcavalry squadron. The objective of maneuver is togain positional advantage over an enemy and, whenthe conditions have been met, to strike the finaldecisive blow—that is, to close with and defeat theenemy while minimizing risk to our soldiers. Ma-neuver units avoid head-on encounters. Maneuverunits purposefully strike vulnerable enemy flanksand rear areas to achieve superior combat power andinflict the greatest damage upon the enemy.

Reconnaissance and SecurityReconnaissance and security operations are sub-

sets of the maneuver BOS. reconnaissance allowscommanders to gain and maintain contact with theenemy and to develop the situation for the employ-ment of other assets and units. It provides informa-tion on terrain and the enemy to commanders andtheir staffs. Reconnaissance verifies or refutes ana-lyzed information in IPB products. It is

accomplished by ground (mounted or dismounted),air, or technical means.

Ground reconnaissance near the enemy is oftenrisky. Technical and air assets, rather than soldiers,

are used to gather information when possible. How-ever, all division units can and do perform someground reconnaissance in the conduct of their op-erations to provide the commander with an all-weather, eyes-on-target capability.

Air reconnaissance assets are lower in risk, butsubject to extreme weather conditions. These sys-tems can, however, cover large areas relativelyquickly. Using technical means is relatively low inrisk and can cue other reconnaissance assets. Tech-nical assets can cover extremely large areas or focuson very precise targets. The complementary use of

all these assets provides commanders an accuratepicture of the battlefield.

Reconnaissance does much more than provide in-formation. Reconnaissance missions include route,zone, area, and reconnaissance in force. Reconnais-sance orients on an enemy force or area in enemyterritory. NBC reconnaissance supports the main ef-fort or is positioned to encounter the most likely useof enemy NBC weapons. Reconnaissance is discussedfully in Appendix A.

Security operations orient on friendly forces and

focus on providing the division forces reaction time,maneuver space, and protection. When properlytask-organized, augmented, and supported, any ele-ment assigned to or supporting the division mayperform security operations. There are four generalsecurity missions: screen, guard, cover, and areasecurity. However, the division conducts other se-curity actions as part of tactical operations that alsoprotect the force and its mission. These actionsinclude (but are not limited to) electronic attack,electronic warfare support, deception operations,OPSEC, and cover and concealment. Security op-erations are also detailed in Appendix A.

Armored, Mechanized, and Aviation Forces

Armored and mechanized maneuver units arenormally used in the division close operation toclose with and destroy enemy forces. Attack heli-copter units are integrated, as part of the combinedarms effort, into deep, close, and rear operations.

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The division employs these units as part of its secu-rity operation in both the offense and the defense.

Armored, mechanized, and aviation forces areparticularly appropriate as reserves because of their

mobility, lethality, and firepower. They can strikethe enemy at critical times and places to seize orregain the initiative through destruction of the en-emy force. They can also stop sudden enemy pene-trations or incursions into the division rear. Thedivision may, on occasion, commit armored andmechanized maneuver forces and its aviation bri-gade in support of deep operations.

Light Forces

Although light forces can operate in any environ-ment, they are best used to exploit restricted terrain,limited visibility, adverse weather, and urban war-fare. Light forces depend on terrain for their survivalin both the offense and the defense. In the offense,light maneuver forces are employed in restrictiveterrain. They infiltrate at night or conduct stay-behind operations to secure limited objectives andto attack high-payoff targets. They are well suitedfor air assault operations. They also close with anddestroy the enemy. In the defense, light maneuverbrigades position battalions laterally and in depth tomake the best use of terrain. Even in the defense,light forces conduct air assault and infiltration

operations.Light divisions are augmented based on METT-T

factors. They require additional artillery, engineer,and antiarmor forces and mobility augmentationwhen defending against heavy enemy forces in openterrain. Light forces will normally not be task-organized below brigade level. However, the lightbattalion can be attached to armored units to conductspecific special operations for a short time.

Fire Support

Fire support is the collective and coordinated useof the fires of armed aircraft, land- and sea-basedindirect fire systems, and EW systems againstground targets to support land operations at both theoperational and tactical levels. Within the division,these systems include field artillery, mortars, EW,tactical fixed-wing aviation, PSYOP and, whenavailable, naval surface fire support and SOF directactions. The division fire support plan is

synchronized with and integrated into the schemeof maneuver. The plan must be consistent with thedivision commander’s intent.

Fires supporting the division allow the com-

mander to mass combat power quickly at appropri-ate times and places. Fires aid in seizing theinitiative deep, close, and rear. Fires destroy, dis-rupt, and delay the enemy. The commander allo-cates fires to support his maneuver elements. Insome cases, he may allocate maneuver elements toexploit his fires.

The key to receiving timely and effective jointfires is understanding the joint targeting process. Attactical levels, the commander and staff use a tar-geting methodology based on the decide, detect,deliver, and assess functions. (See Figure 2-9.) Eachfunction occurs both simultaneously and sequen-tially. Target tracking is not a separate function, butis inherent throughout the targeting process. Targettracking must be planned simultaneously with thedevelopment of the intelligence collection plan (de-cide). It is executed during the targeting function of detect and supports both targeting functions of de-liver and assess. For more detailed discussion, seeFM 6-20-10.

The Army does not fight alone. The Armyachieves victory more quickly and with fewer casu-alties with the integration of its own capabilities

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with sister services and allied partners. Joint andmultinational fires enhance Army division opera-tions. (Army corps and divisions may also providefires for the joint or multinational force.) No targetmodel exists in joint doctrine however. The joint

targeting process is described in Joint Publication2-01.1. To obtain efficient joint fire support, divi-sion planners must comply with the sister servicetime requirements for submitting requests. All theserequests should be prioritized.

Mobility and Survivability

The mobility and survivability BOS includes bothengineer and NBC functions. Specifically, it ad-dresses mobility, countermobility, survivability,smoke, and NBC defense operations. These actions

provide mobility to the division units, degrade theenemy’s ability to move on the battlefield, andprovide protective emplacements for personnel andequipment. Plans for mobility, countermobility, andsurvivability operations are consistent with thecommander’s intent and complement the concept of operation. Engineers normally mass to support themain effort. They normally require support from ahigher supporting headquarters. They support thedivision’s deep, close, and rear fights and must beactive players in the IPB process.

Mobility operations generally breach both

friendly and enemy minefield and obstacles. Theyalso conduct gap crossing, maintain supply routes,prepare combat trails between battle positions, andsupport forward aviation units.

Countermobility operations attack the enemy’sability to execute his plan. These operations useterrain, friendly and enemy-emplaced obstacles,and fires. Slowing enemy movement creates oppor-tunities that other combat systems can exploit. Com-manders and their staffs ensure that obstaclessupport the intent, mission, scheme of maneuver,and branches and sequels to the operation but that

they do not degrade their mobility. Well-plannedcountermobility operations are combat multipliers,enhancing the effects of friendly direct and indirectfires.

Survivability operations incorporate vulnerabil-ity analysis and countermeasures. These counter-measures include contamination avoidance,protection, decontamination, and use of smoke andobscurants.

This battlefield operating system is also con-cerned with international and host country environ-mental laws that impact on the operation.Commanders consider these regulations and inte-grate appropriate directives into their plans and

orders. Environmental law has now become a costof doing business. For specific guidance, see ArmyRegulations (ARs) 200-1 and 200-2.

Air Defense

Division air defense operations consist of all pas-sive and active measures that degrade the effects of enemy air attack on friendly units, supplies, andfacilities and include Air Force, Navy, and Marineaviation direct and indirect fires. Passive AD meas-ures include camouflage, concealment, dispersion,

and deception. The best self-defense against airattack is to avoid being seen. Active air defense isdirect defensive action taken to destroy or reducethe effectiveness of enemy air attack.

The division air defense system is capable of prioritized protection of division forces and must beintegrated with the corps and JTF air defense plan.Ideally, the air defense system identifies and en-gages enemy aircraft before friendly forces can beattacked. This integrated system has the capabilityto engage targets simultaneously to support divisionclose, deep, and rear operations.

The current joint approach for air defense opti-mizes each service’s AD capabilities against a vari-ety of targets. These range from high- andlow-speed aircraft at various altitudes, to long- andshort-range ballistic missiles, to an emerging UAVthreat. The air defense BOS is also concerned withaerial IPB, predictive assessment of enemy ADweapons in accordance with the commander’s pri-orities, early warning of an impending air threat, andmassing of AD fires.

Combat Service SupportThe division CSS system must support the overall

intent and concept of the commander. Sustaining thedivision fight requires all CSS elements to adhereto the logistics characteristics of anticipation, inte-gration, continuity, responsiveness, and improvisa-tion. The division CSS system can support deep,close, and rear operations simultaneously. DivisionCSS elements are integrated into the division C

2

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system so that they can shift support effort to thecritical place and time to weight the battle. Sustain-ment operations enable the division commander tomass combat power.

Prior to tactical operations, the division com-mander establishes criteria for withdrawing unitsfor reconstitution. The reconstitution effort focuseson reorganizing organic assets to quickly returnthem to combat. Coordination between the G1 forpersonnel replacements and the G4 for equipmentallows combat systems to be distributed in a ready-to-fight configuration. The division commander al-ways sets priorities for distribution for replacementsand supplies. His unit’s combat capability is directlyrelated to available leadership, manned and oper-able systems, and morale.

This BOS includes both public affairs (PA) ser-vices and civil affairs. These activities are locatedas the commander deems appropriate, based on thenature of the operation. The commander employshis public affairs activities to communicate the

policies, US resolve, and actions through US andinternational news media. PA and CA efforts (aswell as PSYOP) must be coordinated through theplanning process and information exchanged con-tinually during current operations. Although PA,

CA, and PSYOP each has some discrete audienceswith tailored messages, the information overlap be-tween their audiences is growing. The differentmessages must not contradict one another or thecredibility of all three is lost.

Command and Control

The concept of battle command was introducedin the 1993 edition of FM 100-5, and expands theArmy’s notion of command and control (C

2). Battle

command includes our previous thoughts, but incor-porates the art and the science of decision makingand leadership to accomplish missions. Chapter 3applies the concept of battle command to divisionoperations in detail.

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CHAPTER 3

DIVISION BATTLE COMMAND

Battle command is the art and science of battle-field decision making, leading, and motivating sol-diers and their organizations into action toaccomplish missions at least cost to soldiers. Battlecommand has three basic elements: decision mak-ing, leading, and controlling operations.

Military theorists have long acknowledged theprimacy of the art of command (decision makingand leading). Commanders must have the ability tomake right and timely decisions even under difficultcircumstances or with incomplete information.General Frederick M. Franks, Jr. noted that—

Battlefield leadership at all levels is an ele-ment of combat power. It is difficult to meas-ure but, none the less, is present and adecisive contributor to victory in battle.

Control is inherent in battle command. The divi-sion battle command system enables commandersto lead, prioritize, and allocate assets required toemploy and sustain combat power. It allows com-manders to see further, receive and process infor-mation faster, and strike more quickly and preciselythan the enemy. The battle command system must

provide commanders with timely and accurate in-formation on which to base decisions.

Battle command involves acquiring, interpreting,and displaying the information products that resultin commanders’ decisions and directives. All unitscontinually acquire information about METT-T.This information is sent and received; the means of communicating the information is managed; and theinformation is filtered and maintained in a formconvenient to the decision-making process.

Battle command is a continuous process of mak-ing estimates, assigning tasks and missions, execut-ing tasks and missions, and acquiring feedback.Missions, tasks, and concepts are derived and for-mulated from the commander’s intent. Courses of action are then developed and analyzed. The com-mander decides on a single COA (or changes anexisting one) based on the most accurate availableinformation. Plans and orders are issued as input tothe battle command process at the next lower eche-lon. Subordinate unit actions are monitored.

Feedback from subordinate units assists in control-ling the operation to its successful conclusion andis the basis for the next iteration of the battle com-mand process—an ongoing cycle.

Through battle command, commanders trans-form potential combat capabilities into combatpower. The battle command system—

•

•

•

•

•

Allows division commanders to lead their forces.

Provides commanders and staff timely and accu-rate information and orders.

Is flexible, redundant, and survivable in order tosynchronize the division’s combat operations andrequirements for CS and CSS.

Allows commanders to clearly sense the totalbattle, then transmit orders to adjust quickly andtake advantage of battlefield opportunity.

Is responsive throughout the division’s area of operations, controlling units in deep, close, andrear areas simultaneously.

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• Provides the commander with a capability to organization look to him for timely decisions as wellmove and mass the effects of combat power fromanywhere on the battlefield.

(See Figure 3-l.)

ROLE OF THE COMMANDERAND STAFF

The division commander’s leadership providespurpose and direction to both soldiers and units. Thecommander is responsible for everything his unitdoes or fails to do. He is accountable to seniorcommanders for accomplishing assigned missions.His leadership is central to the success of the divi-

sion, and his actions have far-reaching impact.The division commander motivates his soldiers

and staff to accomplish difficult tasks in both warand operations other than war. He inspires andmentors subordinates through his presence andface-to-face communications. He positions himself where he can see the battlefield. He establishesinterpersonal relationships with his staff and subor-dinate commanders. All members of the

.as informal feedback.

The division commander teaches, coaches, and

encourages. He cares, is technically and tacticallycompetent, and trains subordinate units and sol-diers. He develops excellence in the soldiers and inthe units he commands by setting, and demandingadherence to, tough, clear, achievable, and mean-ingful standards. He takes responsibility for thegood, the bad, the right, and the wrong within hisorganization.

The division commander sets into motion forceson the battlefield to win battles. He decides whereand when to place forces and concentrate combatpower based on missions assigned from the corpsor joint task force commander. He develops hisconcept of operation based on the higher com-mander’s concept and intent.

Battlefield visualization is the intellectual processthat assists commanders in developing plans to ac-complish the mission while protecting the force. Thedivision commander starts with his vision—a mentalimage of successful mission accomplishment. This

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vision is his personal concept of what the divisionmust do and be capable of doing at some futurepoint. It is essential to developing combat power.This vision provides an end state toward which allactivities are planned and executed. Battlefield visu-alization expands the commander’s thinking aboutthe current METT-T process. He can more preciselyanalyze and synchronize the combined effects of theenvironment in which the operation is executed andthe resources which could potentially be brought tobear. For military operations, the commander ex-presses his vision in his plans, orders, commander’sintent, and concept of operation.

The division commander’s intent expresses thepurpose of the operation. It describes the desired endstate and how it can transition to future operations.

Although brief, the commander’s intent is a unify-ing focus for subordinate elements, telling themwhat has to be accomplished to achieve suc-cess—even when plans go awry. The idea of com-mander’s intent is not new. During the Civil War,Major General Halleck sent the following to MajorGeneral Sheridan:

Lieutenant General Grant wishes a posi-tion taken far enough south to serve as abase for further operations upon Gordons-ville and Charlottesville. It must be strongly fortified and provisioned. Some point in the

vicinity of Manassas Gap would seem best suited for all purposes . . . .

The concept of operation unifies subordinate unitactions with the division commander’s intent. Theconcept describes how subordinate unit actionscombine to accomplish the division’s mission andhow the commander plans to apply combat power.The concept of operation is the basis for task organi-zation, scheme of maneuver, tasks to subordinates,terrain organization, synchronization, and identifi-cation of critical collateral operations. Success in itsexecution requires the personal attention and perse-verance of the commander and his ability to recog-nize, and to make and implement, necessarychanges. The commander may have to formulate anew concept or revise the old one when the missionor situation changes. His concept must be suffi-ciently detailed so that his staff can develop work-able plans and subordinate commanders can achievethe desired end state in the absence of subsequentguidance.

Within the division, coordinating staff officersare the commander’s principal staff. Each staff of-ficer is responsible for a broad category of assis-tance and support. The staff ensures that allactivities of subordinate staff sections and support-ing and augmenting units are integrated and coordi-nated within their particular staff area. Coordinationlinks the division staff with maneuver brigades staff and the senior headquarters to which assigned. Anaustere division staff relies more on automation andhigher headquarters for many types of support.

The division commander trains his staff to helptranslate his intent and decisions into fully coordi-nated and supported operations. Staff members insync with their commander can—

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Accurately determine the current situation.

Anticipate what the commander feels needs to bedone.

Develop sound courses of action.

Meaningfully assess courses of action for thecommander.

Issue the necessary orders and instructions.

Monitor how well the orders and instructions arebeing executed.

Alter the plan in accordance with unit feedback,commander’s guidance, and commander’s intent.

Plan future operations.

Synchronize actions prior to combat operations.

The commander, however, still decides, monitors,and drives the operation.

The division staff is expected to operate with agreat deal of freedom and responsibility. From in-formation available, it must discern what is essentialto the commander’s decision making. It must coor-dinate the entire division effort to support the com-mander’s decision and concept of operation.Normally, the commander issues guidance andmakes tactical decisions from field locations, thenmoves to the point of the division’s main effort. Thestaff develops orders and conducts necessary coor-dination between subordinate units and higher head-quarters to execute the commander’s decision andcommander’s intent.

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DIVISION COMMAND POSTS

Divisions currently command and control opera-tions through a command group and three commandpost (CP) facilities:

• Division tactical (TAC CP).

• Division main (main CP).

Division rear (rear CP).•

Each CP is configured to maintain flexibility, redun-dancy, reliability, survivability, and mobility forcontinuous combat operations. Additionally, somecommanders temporarily control operations froman assault or a jump CP. This section discusses rolesand general functions of CPs. Division CP opera-tions and alternate CPs are discussed further in

FM 71-100-l, FM 71-100-2, and FM 101-5.

Command posts allow the commander to gowhere he can best influence actions while maintain-ing continuity of the overall division operation.Command posts must be efficient. Simplified staff operations and communications through the elimi-nation of elaborate formal daily briefings, nonessen-tial comforts, and nonproductive staff proceduresallow greater flexibility and freedom of movement.Command posts are priority targets for enemy at-tack; therefore, they must be as small and as mobileas possible. They provide the physical facilities and

systems interfaces that allow commanders to seeand direct the battle, allocate and position resources,and plan future battles.

Command Group

The command group consists of the division com-mander and designated staff members. Normally,this includes a G3 officer, a G2 representative, a firesupport element (FSE) representative, and the airliaison officer (ALO). The command group is not apermanent organization. The mission and staff

available dictate its makeup. The command grouplocates well forward where it can see and influencethe battle with rapid decisions and orders.

The commander may choose to fight the battlefrom his command group. If so, he normally posi-tions himself initially with the main effort. Thecommand group requires communications to enterthe corps command, division command, brigadecommand, and division operations and intelligence

nets. It also requires communications with subordi-nate maneuver commanders, higher commanders,and the division TAC CP. For their security, thecommand group uses the same type of vehicles thatthe maneuver brigades fight, with no distinguishingsignature.

Tactical Command Post

When fully active, the TAC CP controls the closeoperation. The division TAC CP is a small, highlymobile, and survivable CP normally located closeto the forward brigades. It synchronizes combat, CS,and CSS in support of close operations. The TACCP contains only those elements and informationthat directly contribute to the conduct of currentclose operations. It provides the minimum neces-sary staff support. Typical TAC CP organizationsare shown in Figures 3-2a and 3-2b.

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When the TAC CP controls the close operation,it maintains immediate intelligence and combat in-formation, controls maneuver forces, coordinatesfire support, controls engineer forces and synchro-nizes engineer obstacles, monitors the logistics situ-

ation, is aware of enemy and terrain obstacles,coordinates airspace, controls forward air defenseoperations, and controls changes to the current closeoperation. The assistant division commander formaneuver (ADC-M) or his designated repre-sentative normally supervises the TAC CP when itcontrols current operations. The division TAC CPdisplaces as required to remain well forward tomaintain control of the close operation. When dis-placing, control of the close operation may tempo-rarily shift to the division main CP.

Main Command Post

The main CP is the division’s primary commandpost—the heart of the division’s operation. It main-tains the pulse of the division battle by receivinginput from the TAC CP; rear CP; and higher, lower,and adjacent units. It controls all units not specifi-cally controlled by the TAC or rear CP. Typicalmain CP organizations are depicted in Figures 3-3aand 3-3b, page 3-6.

The main command post plans, coordinates, inte-grates, synchronizes, monitors, establishes priori-

ties, and allocates resources to support the division’ssimultaneous conduct of deep, close, and rearoperations.

The main CP is usually located out of the rangeof the enemy’s medium artillery. It is mobile. Itquickly displaces but can maintain continuity of operations. The division’s chief of staff (CofS) su-pervises the main CP’s three cells:

Command cell.•

G3 cell.•

• G2 cell.

The Command Cell

The command cell contains and operates the com-mand center and the command group. An informa-tion and synchronization hub, the command centernormally comprises the commanding general,CofS, secretary of the general staff (SGS), liaison

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officers, and supporting personnel. It is the CofS’snormal place of duty. The command center—

• Synchronizes main CP functions to support theentire division battle.

• Is the central source of information concerningthe conduct and status of the division battle.

• Is the information center for the divisioncommander.

• Provides and accepts liaison teams.

Accepting and dispatching liaison teams are criti-cal functions of the command cell. Liaison officersprovide and receive timely, important commandinformation. They represent adjacent, attached, orOPCON units at the main CP.

The G3 Cell

The G3 cell synchronizes the division battle. Itnormally comprises G3 operations, plans, deep op-erations coordination cell (DOCC), A

2C

2, fire sup-

port, division signal operations, and NBC.Representatives from the ADA battalion, engineerbattalion or brigade, G1 and G4, aviation brigade,and Air Force also perform functions within the G3section. The G3 arranges battlefield activities intime, space, purpose, and resources to producemaximum combat power at the right place and time.

Operations Element. The G3 sees the battlefieldand synchronizes battle requirements through theG3 operations element. The operations element—

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Coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes or-ganic and supporting combat, CS, and CSS assetsto support current and future deep, close, and rearcombat operations for the division.

Allocates resources and establishes priorities insupport of the division battle.

Prepares and issues warning and fragmentary or-ders (FRAGOs) to support the current operation.

Monitors the operations of higher, lower, andflank units.

Monitors deep, close, and rear operations.

The operations element serves as the division netcontrol station. It responds to communications fromthe TAC CP, rear CP, and uncommitted combat andCS units. It maintains current combat situation data,as received from the TAC CP, for friendly forces. Itworks closely with the plans element to synchronizefuture operations and transition from the currentoperation to a future division battle without loss of momentum and unit tactical integrity. When neces-sary, the operations element assists the DOCC insynchronizing and controlling the division’s deepoperations. The operations element works with theTAC and rear CPs to effectively manage the divi-sion’s terrain.

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The G1 and G4 representatives in G3 operationsare direct links to the CSS cells in the rear CP. Theyensure timely responses to immediate tactical re-quirements of the current operation and coordinatepersonnel and logistics support for a future

operation. Plans Element. The only plans element in the

division CP structure is located within the main CP.It comprises all BOS representatives. It is equippedand manned for—

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Parallel planning with the G2 and G3 elements totransition from current operations to future opera-tions plans.

Planning, integrating, coordinating, and synchro-nizing all future operations.

Producing OPLANs and warning orders for thetransition to future operations.

Continuously monitoring current operations andanticipating and, as necessary, adjusting futureplans.

Deep Operations Coordination Cell. The DOCCplans, coordinates, synchronizes, and executes thedivision’s deep operations. Deep operations requirethe commitment of several people (DIVARTY, G3plans, G2, and aviation) and equipment. (See Figure3-4.) Other staff elements assist as required, toinclude the deputy fire support coordinator(DFSCOORD), electronic warfare officer (EWO),air defense artillery officer (ADAO), ALO, G3 air,PSYOP, G5, and ADE. The DOCC works directlyfor the chief of staff. The chief of staff and thedivision commander approve all deep operations.The DOCC plans, synchronizes, and identifieshigh-payoff targets to be tracked and attacked. Itboth monitors and supports the execution of deepoperations.

A 2

C 2

Element. The division A2

C2

element coor-dinates and integrates division airspace. It normallylocates near the FSE to allow continuous, critical,

and face-to-face coordination. The A2C2 elementcontinuously monitors deep, close, and rear opera-tions. It also deconflicts division airspace for usingair support, Army aviation, UAVs, ADA, FA, andEW assets. Special operations aviation (SOA) ac-tivities, as part of a division mission, are coordinatedthrough the corps and joint force airspace manager

just as any other air mission encroaching on divisionairspace. The A

2

C2

element—

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Coordinates airspace within the division’s AO tosupport tactical and logistics operations.

Integrates and coordinates Air Force air support,marine, naval, civil, UAV, and Army aviationsupport for deep, close, and rear operations.

Integrates, coordinates, and synchronizes the di-vision’s organic and supporting ADA assets insupport of the division’s battle.

The A2C

2element works directly for the G3. It

comprises representatives from the G3 air, an AD

element, an aviation element, the Air Force TACP,and the supporting air traffic control platoon.

Fire Support Element. The main CP FSE plans,coordinates, and integrates all fire support for divi-sion operations. The DIVARTY personnel, assis-tant division engineer officer, EW officer, andrepresentatives from the TACP, AD, division avia-tion, and ANGLICO man the FSE. The FSE—

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Synchronizes all organic and supporting lethaland nonlethal fire support for division deep,close, and rear operations.

Establishes priorities and allocates available firesupport resources to support the division battle.

Plans and controls all deep fires in support of division deep operations.

Provides field artillery intelligence officers to theanalysis and control element (ACE) to facilitatethe division targeting process.

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Responds to requests for additional fire supportfrom the TAC CP, rear CP, or other subordinateFSEs.

Participates in and supervises the routine activity

and coordination of the targeting process withinthe division main CP.

Coordinates with the A2C

2element regarding

current artillery firing unit locations, changes tofire support coordination measures, and signifi-cant fires which may impact airspace users.

The FSE continuously interacts with the G2 andG3 operations cells to plan, coordinate, and inte-grate fire support for current and future operations.Additionally, it provides the command cell withcurrent decision information. The FSE may alsoreceive artillery liaison officers or representativesfrom other fire support means. The FSE includes theengineer section, directly linking it to bothDIVARTY and the engineer battalion or brigadeheadquarters. The FSE engineer section ensures thatobstacles throughout the division AO are synchro-nized and covered with fires. Additionally, the FSEengineer section—

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Coordinates fire support for breaching operationsand the employment and recording of scatterablemines.

Maintains the location of bridging assets (not

including armored vehicle launched bridges(AVLBs)).

Tracks enemy, friendly, and terrain obstacles.

Monitors current engineer priorities, efforts, andsupport in the division sector.

The EW section also locates in the FSE. Underthe DFSCOORD, the EW section plans, coordi-nates, and monitors nonlethal EW operations withthe FSE, A

2C

2, G2 and G3 current operations, and

plans elements. The EW section works with theassistant division signal officer (ADSO) to imple-

ment electronic protection and manipulative elec-tronic deception. With the G2 and MI battalionACE, the EW section continually evaluates the vul-nerability of enemy emitters to electronic attack. Itadvises the G2, G3, and DFSCOORD on recom-mended courses of action. It recommends enemytargets vulnerable to effective electronic attack tosupport current and planned operations and tasks theappropriate supporting EW unit. Additionally, the

EW section recommends to the G3 direct support(DS) and general support (GS) asset priorities for

jamming in current or future battles. The EW sec-tion integrates, coordinates, and synchronizes allEW assets in support of the division battle.

ADSO Element. The ADSO’s personnel andequipment are organic to the division’s signal bat-talion. Supporting the main CP, the ADSO-

Coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes all or-ganic and supporting communications assets (in-cluding satellite communications) to support thedivision battle.

Allocates resources and establishes priorities fordeep, close, and rear operations.

Anticipates and plans for the employment and

positioning of communication assets for futureoperations (including requests for positioning of space-based support).

Provides technical automation support (for exam-ple, troubleshooting local area network (LAN)and automation hardware problems). Each func-tional staff section is responsible for user-ownedand -operated automation equipment.

The ADSO normally works for and reports to theG3. It is the primary staff coordination elementbetween the main CP and the signal battalion andother supporting signal elements. It synchronizescurrent signal operations, future signal operations,and signal deception and signal support to EWoperations. In addition, it sets policy and proceduresfor distribution, reproduction, publication, and offi-cial mail.

An emerging concept calls for the developmentof a G6 staff section. The G6 will be the principalstaff officer for the commander in all matters per-taining to signal support (communication, automa-tion, visual information, records management, andprinting and publishing). Manning for G6 elementswill require 24-hour operations at the division TAC,main, and rear CPs.

NBC Center. The NBC center recommends theallocation of resources and establishes priorities fordivision NBC support. The NBC center also oper-ates the division NBC warning and reporting sys-tem. It prepares NBC estimates, and monitorsequipment status and the host nation’s NBC supportrequirements. It coordinates the use of deliberate

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smoke for current and future tactical operations. TheNBC center disseminates contamination overlaysand NBC reports to all units.

The G2 CellThe G2 cell at the main CP requests, collects,

analyzes, produces, and distributes weather infor-mation, intelligence, and time-sensitive combat in-formation about the enemy for the division’s deep,close, and rear current and future operations. Itcomprises a G2 operations element, an ACE, an AirForce weather team, and a division terrain team. TheG2 cell—

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Provides intelligence to commanders and staffs insupport of division operations.

Coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes intelli-gence, counterintelligence collection, all-sourceproduction, intelligence dissemination, specialsecurity office (SSO) services, weather services,and terrain team topographic operations.

Coordinates with the division’s staff to ensureintelligence operations support maneuver andtargeting.

Coordinates for and directs tactical reconnais-sance and surveillance operations.

Develops IPB products to support division

operations.The G2 and his staff provide critical information

on the enemy for divisional operations. They ana-lyze the data presented concerning the enemy forceand, using US doctrinal concepts, translate it interms understandable to the commander. The G2staff is critical in developing targeting guidance.

The division’s intelligence system links the divi-sion to selected national, theater, and corps intelli-gence systems. Organic collectors at division levelinclude—

• Ground-based SIGINT.• Quickfix.

• UAV.

• Ground surveillance radars (GSRs).

• Counterintelligence and interrogator personnel.

• Long-range surveillance detachment.

The ground-based systems and Quickfix provideintercept and direction finding, as well as commu-nications jamming. The UAV provides near-real-time electro-optical (EO) or forward-lookinginfrared radar (FLIR).

Through the mobile integrated tactical terminal(MITT), the division receives and exploits imageryand SIGINT from corps and EAC assets. JSTARSand UAV downlink data are available to the divisionand brigades via the ground station module (GSM)or common ground station (CGS). The division alsoreceives Guardrail SIGINT data via the com-mander’s tactical terminal (CTT). Brigades receivesecondary imagery through the GSM. The AllSource Analysis System (ASAS) is the backbone of division analysis with ASAS terminals at the bri-gades ensuring a common view of the battlefield.

Operations Element. The G2 operations celldirects and coordinates intelligence, counterintelli-gence, division SSO, staff weather team, and terrainteam operations. It coordinates the daily operationsof the G2 staff within the division main CP, provid-ing intelligence to the division commander, coordi-nating staff, and special staff. It ensures theintelligence requirements to support current opera-tions are satisfied, to include the dissemination of intelligence and combat information. It coordinatesclosely with the G3 operations branch and FSE toensure that intelligence and CI operations are inte-

grated with and support the commander’s schemeof maneuver and the targeting effort.

Analysis and Control Element. The analysis andcontrol element (ACE) combines the missions andfunctions of the former technical control and analy-sis element (TCAE) and division tactical operationscenter support element. The ACE is a new organi-zation organic to the MI battalion and operatingunder the control of the G2. It supports conventionaland force-projection operations and integratesASAS and other automated systems at the tacticallevel. The ACE focuses intelligence resources and

produces and disseminates intelligence based onprioritized intelligence requirements from sup-ported and subordinate commanders. It developsand tracks critical targets, performs all-sourceanalysis, manages collection, and produces andmaintains IPB products.

The ACE consists of three sections—all source-intelligence synchronization, single-source analysis,

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and planning and coordination. It translates intelli-gence requirements into collection missions for in-telligence assets supporting the division. It receives,analyzes, consolidates, and assigns priorities to cur-rent and future tactical operations-generated intelli-

gence and electronic warfare (IEW) requirements.It disseminates combat information and intelligenceto the right user at the right time. The ACE alsosynchronizes and focuses intelligence assets to de-tect and track high-payoff targets (HPTs) throughtheir collection management process. The ACE de-pends on the ASAS, a grouping of computer-drivenequipment that receives, processes, and dissemi-nates intelligence within the division.

Field artillery intelligence officers (FAIOs)within the ACE’s targeting team pass target nomi-nations to the appropriate FSE for engagement by

lethal or nonlethal fires. Two field artillery officerswork within the ACE—normally one per shift. Avital link in the rapid identification and attack of time-sensitive HPTs, FAIOs understand the threat,the target development process, and targetingprocess actions. The FAIOs—

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Are key participants on the targeting team.

Provide the interface between the targeting teamand the ACE.

Help the G2 section translate targeting time re-quirements into guidance for collection and en-

sure the collection plan focuses, in part, ondetecting HPTs.

Provide attack guidance matrix and target selec-tion standards to the ACE.

Provide the G2 section with expertise on FA targetacquisition systems capabilities and limitations.

Nominate valid targets to the FSE for attack. TheFAIO may pass identified HPTs and other targetsdirectly to the fire control element at theDIVARTY CP or, if command cell-approved,directly to a firing unit.

The ACE also plans, directs, and coordinatesmultidiscipline counterintelligence (MDCI) opera-tions throughout the division’s AO. It coordinateswith corps counterintelligence elements and variousdivision elements to satisfy support requirements. Italso works with the G3 operations to developOPSEC to protect essential elements of friendlyinformation (EEFI).

Staff Weather Officer Element. A US Air Forceweather team provides weather observation andforecast support throughout the division’s AO. Thestaff weather officer (SWO) works for and reportsto the G2. The weather team works with the ACE

and terrain team to integrate weather informationinto the IPB.

The weather team supports the division’s currentand future operations in trafficability, maneuver-ability, visibility, and soldier comfort. It providesthe G2 a daily 24-hour operations forecast andcontinuous input to the IPB process as well asproduces basic wind data for the NBC center. Theweather team obtains its weather information fromsources both internal and external to the division.

Using integrated meteorological systems(IMETS), the weather team has 24-hour contactwith weather satellites. It combines surface andupper air observations, theater forecasts, and recep-tion of satellite cloud imagery of current conditionsto make forecasts. The team also communicateswith the corps weather team element, and the divi-sion brigade and battalion S2s for current weatherinformation in their AOs. The SWO also uses divi-sional and Air Force transient aircraft for pilot re-ports of weather encountered enroute or exitingfrom a target area. Collectively, information fromall available sources provides the most accurateforecast possible to support tactical operations.

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Division Terrain Team. The division terrain teamis normally located near the main CP. The teamconsists of eight soldiers to support continuousoperations.

The terrain team supports the IPB process throughproduction of the combined obstacle, and relatedterrain analysis, overlays. It supports the planningcell with analysis of trafficability, routes, chokepoints, zones of entry, and obstacles. The teamsupports the G2 collection manager with visible areainfiltration route, helicopter landing zone (HLZ)and drop zone (DZ), cover and concealment analy-sis for sighting intelligence collectors, and develop-ment of long-range surveillance detachment(LRSD) target folders. It supports targeting withline-of-sight (LOS), mobility, and cover and con-cealment studies, and with structural information on

man-made targets. The team also responds to terrainrequests for information.

Rear Command Post

The rear CP controls all elements functioning in,residing in, or transiting through the division reararea. It also synchronizes rear operations for thedivision battle. Before units leave the corps reararea, they coordinate with the appropriate move-ment control and corps rear area operations center(RAOC). These elements in turn coordinate with the

division rear CP. The rear CP clarifies and approvesroutes and locations of proposed bases or base clus-ters. It integrates this information into the divisionsecurity plan and addresses requirements for CSSof new or transiting units. The division rear CPpasses this type of information to the main CP.

The rear CP and the DISCOM CP normally collo-cate in the established DISCOM base within the DSAin the division rear area. This collocation does notimply that together they constitute one command post;they are two separate and distinct CPs with differentcritical fictions requiring close cooperation and co-

ordination. The rear CP’s main concerns are terrainmanagement; security of the rear area; tactical, per-sonnel, mail, and logistics movement within andthrough the rear area; and synchronization and direc-tion of CSS. The DISCOM CP’s main concern is theexecution of CSS. (Figures 3-5a and 3-5b, page 3-12,show typical rear CP organizations.)

Both the rear CP and the DISCOM CP analyzefuture division plans for their impact on current and

future rear area operations. They work together toprovide logistics and personnel support when andwhere needed. The rear CP deconflicts tactical andadministrative moves and controls them when re-quired. It manages the terrain in the rear area. It

assigns units to bases, designates base clusters whennecessary, and appoints commanders for bases andbase clusters. The rear CP coordinates and synchro-nizes rear security operations. It integrates basedefense plans and coordinates actions of the tacticalcombat forces (TCFs).

The rear CP monitors activity in the brigade’srear, adjacent divisional rear areas, and corps reararea to prevent potential conflicts with the division’srear operations. It also monitors close and deepoperations. When augmented, it may assume con-trol of the fight if the main and TAC CPs can no

longer function. The rear CP normally containsthree cells—headquarters, operations, and CSS.

Headquarters Cell

The ADC-S, normally a brigadier general, func-tions as the rear operations commander and is re-sponsible for all rear operations. The ADC-Sensures coordination among the operations cell,CSS cell, and DISCOM CP. He normally remainsat the rear CP, but when required, he travelsthroughout the rear area to synchronize operations.

His primary concern is to sustain the division’sdeep, close, and rear operations.

Operations Cell

The rear operations cell is responsible for ter-rain management, security, and movement decon-fliction and control. Initially small, the cellbecomes fully capable when augmented in crisiswith reserve component personnel. This cellmonitors current division operations and ensuresthe division’s rear responds to current and future

requirements.Until augmented, the operations cell accepts

risk in the functions it can perform. The opera-tions cell is normally divided into threeelements—operations, intelligence, and fire sup-port. Responsibilities include—

• Coordinating response and TCF and host nationassets.

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Working closely with the PM operations elementlocated nearby. (The PM element coordinatestraffic control measures when needed, EPW andCI operations, security of designated critical as-sets, and employment of MP assets.)

Coordinating (through the G5) host nationassistance.

Coordinating the positioning, status, and securityof units which are placed under control of thedivision rear CP.

Updating rear area IPB. (The rear CP supple-ments IPB products received from the main CPto illuminate rear area terrain, enemy capabilities,and the enemy’s most probable COAs within therear area.)

Managing the overall division CI effort in thedivision rear area; coordinating closely with thePM and G5 to accomplish refugee screening andrear area intelligence collection.

Monitoring the interrogation facility and the divi-sion EPW collection point.

Coordinating fire support for the rear area.

The division’s signal battalion provides a smallADSO element to the rear CP for signal support. Itsfunctions are the same as those for the main CP.When engineer, AD, or other units are under control

of the rear CP, the rear operations element directlycontrols each unit. Each unit either establishes acommand post near the rear CP or provides a liaisonofficer (LNO) to ensure the unit’s activities areproperly integrated, synchronized, and coordinated.The PM element and the G5 also work under thesupervision of the rear operations cell.

The division civil military operations center(CMOC), under the staff supervision of the G5,assists the division commander and his staff. TheCMOC serves as the primary interface between thedivision and the local civilian population, humani-

tarian organizations, nongovernmental organiza-tions, private voluntary organizations, UnitedNations, and other international agencies. TheCMOC passes requests for assistance and othercommunication it receives from these agencies tothe G5 staff in the rear or main CP for action andresponse. The center is staffed by members of theG5 staff, augmented with CA fictional expertsfrom the supporting CA battalion. The CMOC is

normally located near the rear CP and PM elementsto further coordinate host nation activities. Its posi-tioning is flexible and locates where the commanderdeems most appropriate, based on the nature of theoperation. The G5 normally requires augmentation

from division assets until the arrival of an EAC orUSAR civil affairs element.

CSS Cell

The major functions of the CSS cell are to planand coordinate sustainment operations— man, arm,

fuel, fix, move, and sustain soldiers and their sys-tems. (See Appendix E.) This cell also interfaceswith the main CP, the rear CP operations cell, andsubordinate units. The CSS cell has two major ele-ments—logistics and personnel.

The logistics element comprises the G4 and divi-sion transportation office (DTO) sections. The G4plans, coordinates, directs, and synchronizes thedivision’s arm, fuel, fix, and move operations. TheG4 coordinates logistics support that exceeds theDISCOM’s capability with the corps rear CSS celland corps support command (COSCOM).

During movement operations involving the entiredivision, DTO and PM personnel may locate tem-porarily at the TAC or main CP. There they assistthe assault CP staff in monitoring the move andcoordinate any contingencies that occur. The DTO,

DISCOM movement control officer (MCO), andPM representative help plan and enforce movementpriorities.

The G1 section plans, coordinates, directs, andmonitors all personnel operations. In support of combat operations, the G 1 focuses on personnelreplacement, strength, and casualty management;coordination of external support requirements(postal, morale, welfare, and recreation); and medi-cal evacuation. He develops replacement prioritiesfrom G3 input.

The G1 section comprises a plans officer and apersonnel management center (PMC), which maybe task-organized to support deployment as part of the TAC CP. The PMC consists of two branches:personnel readiness and personnel operations.These branches normally are located within the G1support element in the rear CSS cell. The PMCmission is to sustain division personnel readinessand direct division-wide personnel systems,

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synchronize the efforts of the personnel network,manage replacement activities, and ensure com-manders, soldiers, civilians, and other joint or alliedpersonnel receive essential personnel services.

The G1 support element, located near the rear CP,coordinates and executes the personnel elementfunctions. This element comprises the major sec-tions of the G1 and special staff (such as inspectorgeneral (IG), chaplain, surgeon, and staff judgeadvocate (SJA)). This support element coordinatesstrength management, casualty reporting, replace-ment operations, combat health support (CHS), re-ligious support, and legal services. It alsocoordinates morale, welfare, recreation, and com-munity support activities; coordinates postal ser-vices; and monitors finance support. A corps fi-nance battalion supports the division and other units

in the area. The positioning of the public affairsofficer (PAO) and the PA section is flexible. Theyare located where the commander deems most ap-propriate, based on the nature of the operation. Thedivision band provides music to promote troop mo-rale and unit esprit, and to support civil militaryoperations. In combat, the band often fills otherroles when properly trained and supervised.

Assault Command Post

During contingencies, the assault CP (or jump

CP) normally controls temporarily all operationsuntil the main CP deploys into an AO. The assaultCP’s design, normally austere, is METT-T drivenand may vary from deployment to deployment.

The assault CP must be air-deployable and arriveearly in the division’s deployment. It controls thecurrent fight of division forces on the ground andsynchronizes the flow of follow-on units into theAO, phasing them into the fight to expand andsecure the airhead. It also plans for future opera-tions. The assault CP serves as the link betweendivision forces on the ground, in the air, and at home

Normally, the assault CP includes G3 operations,plans, G2 operations with a deployable intelligencesupport element (DISE), a fire support element withan ALO, a signal element, and G1 and G4 operationswith an SJA. These functions require sufficientpersonnel for effective continuous operations. Thesize of the assault CP may also depend on thenumber of airframes available.

The assault CP is built from the division TACCP. It “peels off’ functions as the main and rear CPsestablish operations. The example assault CP de-ploys with eight high-mobility multipurposewheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), eight standardizedintegrated command post system (SICPS) shelters,and sufficient personnel to perform critical battlecommand functions. The HMMWVs contain allcommunications and computer equipment hard-mounted. Personnel use this equipment either in theHMMWV, remoted to the SICPS shelter, or in acombination of both.

station and the higher-corps or JTF headquarters. Itcontinues this function until the remainder of thedivision’s command and control system closes into SPLIT-BASED OPERATIONSthe AO. As the assault (TAC+), main(-), and rearCPs arrive, they begin to perform their normal An emerging concept is that of split-based opera-

functions. tions (Figure 3-7). Split-based operations provideversatile, deployable, and expansible unit config-

The assault CP has no standard design. Each urations to support the deployed force. Technolo-situation or contingency mission may have different gies now being developed enable the separation of requirements. An example is at Figure 3-6. forward and rearward functions. The division’s

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increased access to automation and satellite-basedcommunications and intelligence systems, the con-straints on deployment assets, the reduction of forces and resources, the fast-paced operationaltempos, and other variables are leading the Army toconsider this approach in division battle command.Note, however, that split-based operations requirerobust long-haul, high-volume communications.Without such support, they will rarely be feasible.

Intelligence, logistics, and C2

have all success-fully demonstrated the split-basing capability. Forexample, intelligence assets must deploy early. TheDISE (a tailorable forward element that can deployand set up quickly) goes with the deploying force.At a minimum, the DISE consists of communica-tions, automated intelligence fusion, and broadcastdownlinks. A large, and relatively immobile,intelligence-support base performs the bulk of theprocessing and analysis at home station or deployedin a sanctuary. This intelligence-support base pro-vides dedicated and detailed full-time support.

The following discussion focuses on commandand control, however, the techniques and principlesapply to other functions. Split-based C

2is designed

around two zones or areas—a secure area and thecombat zone area. In a secure area, the division’srearward CP and the sustaining base (DISCOM andCOSCOM) are relatively safe from high-levelthreats. The rearward CP locates in the theater(where threat levels are low); the sustaining basemight locate in CONUS. They would probably

never depart the division or corps cantonment areas.The rear CP and sustaining base are informationrepositories where detailed planning coordinationand analysis occur.

The rearward CP and sustaining base collect,process, store, and ship data as required. Electronicpipelines link the forward and rearward CPs to-gether and to the CS and CSS facilities at the homestation. The CSS staff responds to forward CP re-quests for information, providing analysis, target-ing, graphics, and future predictions. Thesplit-basing concept requires reliable communica-tions means and access to significant amounts of intelligence and logistics data. Rearward CPs arestatic and must be secured.

The forward division CP is agile and immediately

responsive to commanders. It commands currentoperations or adjusts plans for future operations. Itcoordinates the development of plans, synchronizesdeep operations to establish conditions for closeoperations, and produces intelligence of immediateconcern to the commander. Coordination, analysis,and integration at the forward CP are limited so thatthe CP remains highly mobile. Detailed staff workis best accomplished at the static, secure rearwardcommand post.

A forward and rearward CP concept assumes thetwo CPs maintain reliable communication links.

Distance then becomes relatively unimportant.Many division functions can remain at home withstaff work passing electronically to and from thefield CPs in the division’s area of operation.

Under this concept, the commander continues toposition himself where he can best influence thesituation. He must have the necessary communica-tions and automation capabilities to remain elec-tronically connected to a number of informationsources—his forward CP; higher, adjacent, and sub-ordinate warfighting commanders; and broadcastsensors. These systems assist him in commanding

and controlling his division.

JOINT, MULTINATIONAL, ANDINTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

Our division warfighting doctrine, decision-making processes, and capabilities make Army di-visions effective in joint, multinational, and

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interagency operations. Army divisions focus onfighting and winning battles and engagements aspart of a joint force anywhere in the world. Theirorganization, capability, and flexibility allow themto conduct OOTW in multinational and interagency

operations as well as in joint operations. Chapter 8discusses division actions in OOTW. This sectiondiscusses battle command in joint, multinational,and interagency environments.

Joint Operations

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 and JP 5-00.2 detail joint task forces operations. This section providesonly a brief overview. Division commanders andtheir staffs must be familiar with key joint publica-

tions. The most likely employment of divisions in

the future will be as part of joint forces. (SeeReferences.)

Joint task forces (JTFs) comprise assigned orattached forces from two or more services. They

may be established by the secretary of defense, acommander in chief (CINC), a subordinate unifiedcommander, or the commander of an existing JTF.Commanders of JTFs (CJTFs) are responsible to theestablishing authority. They exercise command andcontrol through a flexible range of command rela-tionships. Normally temporary in nature, JTFs aredisestablished on completion of their mission. JTFsare organized along a variety of command lines.Figure 3-8 depicts a common JTF design.

JTFs are normally supported through CINC ser-vice components. Regardless of the organizational

and command arrangements within joint

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commands, service components retain responsibil-ity for certain service-specific functions affectingtheir forces. These include internal administration,training, logistics, and service component intelli-gence operations. One component may support an-

other with a variety of forces, services, or operationsin addition to logistics support arrangements.Within joint operations, divisions will often beARFOR headquarters. (See Chapter 1.)

Multinational Operations

From the American victory at Yorktown in 1781and throughout our history, multinational opera-tions have remained central to the US Army’s ex-perience. World War II, the Korean War, theVietnam Conflict, and the Persian Gulf Conflict areexamples of our participation in multinationalefforts.

Two or more nations conducting operations to-gether to accomplish a single mission is multina-tional operations. In the future, US Army divisionswill again participate in multinational operations.They may be in response to major events (such asregional conflicts) or comparatively minor events(such as Multinational Force and Observer (MFO)missions). The following should help units operat-ing in a multinational environment.

CommandUS corps and divisions have participated in, and

will continue to participate in, United Nations (UN)-type missions and multinational force warfighting.Thus, the division leadership must understand battlecommand in multinational organizations. Leadersmust expand their battle command skills and learncommand and control in a multinational force.

Multinational operations may be alliances basedon formal agreements designed for broad, long-termobjectives, for example, the ACE Reaction Corps(ARRC) in Europe. Multinational operations may

be coalitions based on temporary (possibly infor-mal) agreements to accomplish common, usuallyshort-term, and focused objectives. Operations inDesert Storm and UN forces in Somalia, Bosnia, andCambodia are examples of multinational coalitions.

Multinational operations provide the divisioncommander some unique advantages. They allow abroader perspective and intelligence base on the

enemy. They may offset a lack of time or resources.They provide new and different capabilities. Theenemy may experience multiple dilemmas whenfaced with an organization of differing equipment,tactics, procedures, and capabilities.

The division may participate in multinational op-erations in several ways. The division could—

Be part of an operation that is multinational at theechelons above the division (division operates“pure”). The combined nature of this type opera-tion could be transparent to the division.

Operate with multinational forces fighting on itsflanks, requiring extensive liaison, communica-tions, and control measures.

Receive specified support from or provide sup-

port to the armed forces of another nation.Operate with integrated forces, that is, multina-tional forces under the control of the divisionheadquarters or one of the brigades.

Decision Making

The estimate process described in FM 101-5 re-mains the basis for division planning. However,when the division controls multinational forces, thecommander and staff may need to conduct an “upfront” analysis. This identifies the similarity, famil-

iarity, and interoperability with and between multi-national forces. The analysis should include thefollowing areas.

Existing Agreements. Within multinationalforces, some coordination will have been done, andsome standardization agreements may already exist.With coalitions, there may be little documentationand agreement on standards. In either situation, thedivision commander and staff must understand whatagreements already exist.

Differences in Goals and End States. The com-manders must determine differences in goals and

end states (and any hidden agendas) of the partnersin the operation. Unity of effort requires agreementin objectives and end states. To design workablecourses of action, commanders must identify andresolve areas of friction and force inconsistencies.

FM 100-5 provides US keystone doctrine relatedto end states. End state is the common thread linkingall operations, from the tactical through the

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operational to the strategic levels of war. This threadis found in the US corps commander’s intent state-ment, a formal part of field plans and orders. Divi-sion commanders write intents for their(multinational) forces after full consideration of

national, theater, strategic, and operational endstates.

Achievement of Unity of Effort. In some multi-national forces and most coalitions, the division willnever achieve unity of command. Unity of effort isthe critical element. In some circumstances, thedivision may achieve unity of effort using tradi-tional C

2relationships—tactical control (TACON),

OPCON, and attachment. Other circumstances mayrequire different relationships with the leaders of each multinational force. These, in turn, may leadto shared leadership decision making and C

2struc-

ture. Integrity of units is important; unity of effort,vital. To achieve unity of effort, division command-ers must—

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Focus on common objectives and interests.

Coordinate for communications, intelligence,and liaison.

Learn organizational structures.

Understand agreed-upon procedures.

Recognize the significance (good or bad) of

precedents.Understand partners’ points of contention.

Develop patience and trust.

Differences in Communicating Intentions.Overcoming language differences and determiningthe primary or common language for the operationare significant problems in multinational opera-tions. Language differences and capabilities deter-mine the complexity of orders. Language needs willalso determine requirements for LNOs. Divisionleaders must understand and consider differences in

unit C

2

processes and leadership styles, as well ascultural and religious differences and nationalsensitivities.

The US Army uses doctrine; tactics, techniques,and procedures (TTP); and jargon to communicatequickly. Though using these methods becomes sec-ond nature, misunderstandings still occur. Thechances for miscommunication increase in a multi-national or joint environment, and even more so in

a coalition, even with well-established stan-dardization efforts. Among the nations, identicalmilitary terms (or terms of reference) may havequite different meanings. Division commandersmust personally make their intents and decisions

understood among all partners in the multinationalforce.

Leadership styles will differ significantly withina multinational force. The superior-subordinate re-lationship in one nation’s army may differ fromwhat a US Army officer expects. Military leadersfrom other countries may have strong expectationsabout their armed forces’ role and will be sensitiveto perceived cultural or national slights.

Force Capability. Commanders must know thecapabilities and limitations of each force they direct,and the differences in equipment. The combatpower of another country’s unit can be significantlyhigher (or lower) than its approximate US equiva-lent. Individual weapons systems will differ fromUS weapons systems in maneuverability, surviv-ability, firepower, and ranges. Communicationsequipment and procedures may or may not be com-patible with US equipment and procedures. In somecountries, the capabilities of a subordinate unit mayexceed those of its higher headquarters.

Commanders must also know the training readi-

ness of personnel and units within the multinationalforce. They assess each unit’s training and profi-ciency levels. They consider recent combat experi-ence as well as the intensity, frequency, and focusof unit training. They assess the fighting spirit of each force and the degree of its leadership supportto military operations.

Mutual and Viable Support Options. Finally,commanders must identify viable support require-ments and arrangements. Commanders considersupport within all the battlefield operating systems.The easiest, but least efficient, method is supportindependence (each force obtains its supportthrough its own national channels). Support mayalso be one-way (one force supports all otherforces), or interdependent (each force providessome support to other forces). The commander’sanalysis considers what degree of mutual support ispossible and desirable based on the compatibility of equipment, connectivity of systems, and culturaldifferences.

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Control

The division commander may not always have theoption to determine the command structure of themultinational force. In an alliance, some formal

document may designate the command structureand command relationships. In a coalition, thehigher commander who organized the forces maydesignate the command relationship.

Some operations, however, may require the divi-sion commander to negotiate a command structurefor the multinational force. The politics of eachcountry participating will be a primary factor. Onone hand, a nation supplying a brigade (commandedby a colonel) to operate within a corps may agree toplace the brigade under the OPCON of a US divi-sion. Such an arrangement follows traditional task-

organization principles in the US Army; however,it requires enhanced liaison and coordination.

Conversely, a nation may resist, or have lawsagainst, formally placing its units under the com-mand of another nation. This might occur when thestructure of the units approaches equality (for ex-ample, a major general commanding a multinationalbrigade working with a US division). In this case, acommand structure that emphasizes unity of effortwith some degree of shared command may be ap-propriate. The nature and personalities of the com-manders involved may determine the nature of the

shared command. A command and control integra-tion center may be required to coordinate efforts.

Special command and control implications ariseif the US force is under a coalition headquarters.Division commanders must understand clearly theintent of the National Command Authorities (NCA)with respect to both the command relationship andthe US end state.

Further, a tactical headquarters (such as the divi-sion) that is designated a multinational headquarterswill require augmentation in all functional areas to

control activities affecting its multinational forces.The division may have to perform roles and mis-sions previously reserved for EAC units, particu-larly if the number of multinational forces involvedis small.

Liaison is vital to multinational operations. De-pending on cultural differences and force capabili-ties, liaison may involve more than exchangingpersonnel between headquarters. Liaison elements

may actually become advisory elements whether ornot they are trained, manned, and equipped for suchroles.

Liaison elements must have good language skills.

They will normally require dedicated, secure com-munications (voice or data) and transportation.Chapter 2, FM 71-100-2, provides a checklist forliaison operations.

Liaison elements must keep informed of boththeir parent unit’s and host’s situations. Liaisonbetween individual staff elements ensures betterlinkages and better understanding of each staff area’s limitations, requirements, and intent. Specialfunctional teams also enhance connectivity, such asa communications team to improve signal connec-tion. Commanders of tactical multinational forces

may find their liaisons are the primary means forcommunication and control of the force.

Leadership

Commanders of forces operating in multinationalenvironments face many unique challenges. Differ-ences in culture, religion, and warfighting doctrine;language barriers; and political, economic, and so-cial factors require the deliberate, but careful, appli-cation of battle command. Providing a clear visionof how the multinational force will operate and

building a climate of teamwork that fosters successare key.

Although he will find the task more challenging,a US commander must articulate his vision to mul-tinational forces just as in any other operation. Hemust be aware of all factors that can impact on theforce’s readiness and teamwork, to include the na-ture of the operation and the effect of internationaldifferences on its execution. He must greatly expandtotal mission awareness. He must know all eventsaffecting the forces he directs—both within the areaof operations and in their nations. Total mission

awareness is critical to mission analysis, planningguidance, and execution in war and OOTW.

Unity of effort and teamwork begin with the forcecommander’s personal involvement with com-manders of other nations. He sees firsthand thedifferences in the multinational force and gainsinsight into synchronizing the various elements. Heensures intents are understood and orders are clari-fied. He may also learn of potential disruptions.

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Unity of effort and teamwork are reinforced whenthe commander develops, implements, and focusesunit and staff training. Commanders foster coopera-tion. Demonstrated proficiency builds force confi-dence. A robust liaison enhances unity of effort aswell as force control.

Finally, as in any military operation, the com-mander must inspire his forces. Inspiration flowsfrom the warrior commander who shows courage,who is well-forward and seen on the battlefield, andwho demonstrates trust, confidence, and patiencethrough effective delegation of responsibility andauthority.

Other Implications

Commanders must reexamine all BOS in light of a multinational forces’ capabilities and limitations.Intelligence and maneuver require specialconsiderations.

Intelligence. The threat holds a multinationalforce together. As long as nations perceive a signifi-cant threat or a long-range benefit to their interests,they willingly participate in multinational opera-tions. However, the partners’ commitments differaccording to their perception of the threat. (Thegreater the threat; the greater the commitment.) Tohelp cement unity of effort, commanders of multi-

national forces must keep their units focused on thethreat and the agreed-upon response to the threat.

The intelligence staff must share appropriate in-telligence within multinational forces. This is acomplex task. Different nations are allowed varyingaccess to US intelligence. The staff must recom-mend, and the commander must approve, a fair (butnot necessarily equal) system of access to and dis-tribution of intelligence information and products.Commanders must also establish clear and simplerules on the equally difficult task of the handling,disposition, and exploitation of captured personnel,

equipment, and documents. To ensure adequate in-telligence support to the entire force, the intelli-gence staff must micromanage these areas.

Finally, the best in-county intelligence may notbe from United States assets. Each partner will haveintelligence-systems strengths and limitations orunique and valuable capabilities. While the UnitedStates usually has the greatest amount of technicalsystems and capabilities, many coalition partners

bring a wealth of human intelligence (HUMINT)and counterintelligence to the field. The intelligencestaff must establish a system to effectively attain,evaluate, and distribute available non-US tacticalintelligence.

Maneuver. The best military course of actionmay not necessarily be the most prudent. In multi-national operations, political factors and decisions,such as keeping coalition partners in the fight, oftentake priority over military factors, such as unit ca-pabilities. Commanders may be required to executea workable, rather than the best, military course of action.

When estimating movement times, maneuverstaff officers consider differences in vehicle speeds,unit formations, unique standing operating proce-

dures (SOPs), and unit operating norms. These willvary within the force.

Multinational operations result in more and dif-ferent units and equipment. This increases the capa-bilities of the overall force and decreases limitationsof US units and equipment. The staff must under-stand how to exploit the capabilities and advantagesof non-US units and their equipment.

Cultural and language disconnects and unfamiliarequipment increase the rates of fratricide. The im-pact (political and military) of a fratricide on a

multinational force may be immense. Fratricide pre-vention is key to maintaining high unit morale.Commanders must be aware of those tactical ma-neuvers and terrain and weather conditions thatincrease the probability of fratricide. They mustlimit fratricide occurrences with disciplined opera-tions, detailed situational awareness, and strongcommand climate. They must know the correct wayto deal with fratricide events. A commander’s state-ments and actions may vary according to the cultureassociated with the casualty.

Interagency OperationsInteragency relationships are important aspects of

battle command in both war and 00TW. The pri-mary purpose of interagency operations, however,is to promote, support, and defend US nationalinterests without becoming involved in war. Politi-cal agencies establish policies, determine strategies,and lead in their execution. In most cases, the mili-tary role is to support this political process. Decisive

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action is taken by the Department of State or othercivilian government agencies, rather than by thearmed forces. The objective of interagency opera-tions is to integrate the effort of several agencies ina common effort.

Interagency relations must be established throughnegotiation. Agreements should be in writing, asmemoranda of understanding or terms of reference,to ensure understanding and avoid confusion. Mostagreements will be made at the unified command orJTF level. Within divisions, the SJA and G5 playmajor roles coordinating actions for the com-mander. Local military commanders can and shouldcooperate with their civilian agency counterparts.That includes the division or its elements. Onecaution is in order— the serious legal restrictions onthe use of military personnel and equipment, espe-

cially in 00TW. Therefore, the commander shouldconsult his SJA in developing cooperativeagreements.

Relations with other agencies of government andinternational and private organizations are so im-portant to 00TW that the division commander mustdevote much of his personal attention to them. Heshould entrust day-to-day operations to a deputycommander, chief of staff, or executive officer andprovide the necessary commander’s intent so thatthe officer can function effectively. The commandershould periodically check on the conduct of opera-tions to assure himself they are progressing satisfac-torily, but he should focus on interagency matters.

Normally, the division commander does not giveorders to other agencies. Instead, he participates inconsensus-building-one voice among equals. Hemust present the military view persuasively but alsobe ready to compromise. Other organizations willaccept his arguments and preferences only if hepresents them convincingly and in a spirit of coop-eration. Other government and private agency offi-cials will be inclined to accept the commander’sexpertise in military matters and to listen attentivelyto his opinion on the overall operation.

The key to success in interagency operations (asin multinational operations) is liaison. Commandersmust identify participating agencies and establishregular liaisons with them. Some may be reluctantto be identified with military activity. They must bepersuaded that they stand to gain through coopera-tion. This is especially true of private volunteer

organizations that fear being identified with violentoperations. The requirements for liaison will usuallyexceed personnel and equipment strengths author-ized in TOE. Liaison personnel in interagency op-erations require maturity of judgment inpolitical-sensitive situations. They must be selectedcarefully. They must be language-qualified or ableto operate effectively through interpreters.

Most civilian organizations, whether governmen-tal or private, do not have command, control, com-munications, and computer (C4) equipmentcomparable to the Army ’s. What they do have maybe incompatible. Therefore, the Army may have toprovide equipment and operators to ensure unity of effort. The 7th Infantry Division DIVARTY’s FSEsand FISTs (personnel with their organic equipment)were used as liaison teams to nonmilitary agencies

during Operation Garden Plot in May 1992. Thiswas the federal response to the Los Angeles riots.Chapter 8 of this manual, FM 100-19, and FM100-20 have additional information on inter-agency operations.

ORDERS AND INTENTS

Mission-type orders direct division battles. Or-ders, therefore, are explicit and direct. Whether oralor written, a good order is clear to those who must

carry it out. Clarity and promptness are more impor-tant than form. The Army’s doctrinal reference forplans and orders is FM 101-5.

The initial order explains the situation, mission,and intent of the commander clearly so that addi-tional FRAGOs can meet the changing situation.Warning orders are routinely used to reduce thereaction times of subordinates and allow for parallelplanning. Fragmentary orders may be as brief as afew words spoken over the radio, or they mayconsist of a map overlay or sketch with some ex-planatory text. Orders convert plans and decisionsinto instructions for subordinate commands. Theamount of detail in written orders is often relativeto the time available for troop leading. Above all,orders are timely and flexible.

The tactical requirements of division combat op-erations dictate the task organization, area of opera-tions, and missions specified in the order. Thedivision commander configures his brigades intocombat, CS, or CSS units, according to the role they

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will play in the battle. Habitual training and supportrelationships and a thorough (and rehearsed) divi-sion tactical SOP greatly enhance an effective taskorganization. Brigades attached to or under OPCONof another division or higher unit are task-organizedwith a normal allocation of combat support andcombat service support assets.

The division places a higher premium than everbefore on maneuver and offensive spirit. This re-quires orders flexible enough to shift rapidly withchanging conditions. Such conditions require a de-centralized command and control system. To oper-ate decentralized, leaders must have a clearunderstanding of the commander’s overall intentand vision of the unit’s end state.

The commander’s intent statement is part of thedivision commander’s operations order (OPORD).It is the commander’s personal expression of whyan operation is being conducted and what he hopesto achieve. The intent links the commander’s visionand concept of the operations. The intent may begiven verbally, or within the written order in theconcept of operation. It enables subordinate com-

manders to exercise initiative without jeopardizingthe mission or the division. The division com-mander should explain his intent to his subordinateswhenever possible. He does this when he issuesorders to subordinate commanders. Mission-oriented orders enable the division to seize andmaintain initiative and to set the terms of battle.They allow subordinate leaders to exercise inde-pendent judgment and exploit changing situations.

Warning orders notify subordinate commands of new tasks before the planning and issuing of ordersare completed. The advance information permitssubordinates to initiate time-consuming activities,such as reconnaissance, repositioning of units, re-

constitution of units, resupply, and preparation forcombat.

Fragmentary orders enable the commander toissue orders quickly and in the order of their ur-gency. FRAGOs inform elements of all missionsand provide common information to establish abasis for synchronized action.

Prior to a tactical operation, normal practiceshould be to issue orders to assembled commandersas far forward as possible. Commanders should notassemble for the issuing of orders during operations.

Rather, the commander or his representative shouldarrange to meet the involved subordinate at a con-venient location—preferably the subordinate’s op-erational area.

CONTROL OF TACTICAL

MOVEMENT

The success of tactical marches is fundamental todivision operations. The division commander can-not concentrate his forces to fight, maneuver toavoid combat, or benefit from successful tacticalactions unless the division can move quickly, se-curely, and efficiently. The division is prepared formoves within the local theater area, movement fromone part of a theater to another, and administrativemovements from ports or equipment sites to stagingareas.

Retaining the flexibility to execute a variety of attack plans until late in the enemy’s planning cycleis a goal of movement planning. Detailed and prac-ticed division movement SOPs and standard taskorganizations simplify march planning, provideflexibility and greater responsiveness, and provide

a smoother cooperation through habitual relation-ships. However, the use of standard divisional taskorganization precludes having carefully tailored or-ganizations for each contingency.

For tactical movement, planners must understandthe size of units and the related time and spacefactors for most movement operations. Changes inunit strength because of maintenance failures and

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repairs or small-scale combat losses are unpre-dictable. Planners should not try to keep up withthese normal fluctuations. They should know thetime it takes the division to pass on multiple routesat a designated speed (a division normally will move

on at least four routes), general pass times, columnlengths, and fuel requirements of corps elements.They must also appreciate the effects of weather andthe engineer effort necessary to move a divisionover different types of roads.

For efficient movement, the division is organizedinto a serial of march units that are of uniform size.A standard march unit normally corresponds to thesize of a maneuver company or team or matches theunit’s rapid refueling capability. This is amanageable-sized element for CSS commanders,movement planners, and traffic controllers.

The MP company; ADA, engineer, reconnais-sance, and MI collection elements; select CSS units;division-controlled artillery; jamming teams; liai-son parties; and TAC CP move before the main bodyto synchronize and coordinate the division’s move-ment. They identify problems in advance, controlmarch units, provide communications while themain body moves, clear and repair the route, andensure smooth movement in and out of positions ateither end of the route.

Not all of the division’s units can move at once.CSS battalions are not 100-percent mobile and re-quire multiple lifts (or transportation augmenta-tion). The aviation brigade’s movement requiresspecial consideration since forward arming and re-fueling points (FARPs) or support areas are estab-lished prior to commitment of the brigade’shelicopters.

In a corps movement that schedules one divisionbehind another on the same routes, displacing thedivision’s support areas and coordinating multipleroutes are complicated. Traffic control, area respon-sibilities, air defenses, communications, and tiresupport are meticulously coordinated.

While on the move, the division must be ready tomeet threats from any direction and to attack fromthe march if necessary. To retain this flexibility,brigades and battalions march in formations thatprovide all-around (and overhead) security. Accom-panying CS and CSS units are interspersed in thecolumn where they can support the force withouthindering its maneuver. Protecting CS and CSS

units is important to armored and mechanized divi-sions that depend on almost continuous support fortheir own mobility.

When the entire division marches, leading bri-

gades should move on multiple routes. Battalionsoptimally march on single routes in column forma-tion. Battalion commanders arrange their marchorder to secure their trains while moving and to droptheir trains quickly if ordered to attack from themarch. Mortar platoons and scouts march in posi-tions that allow prompt support of the force. Othercombat units of a battalion or task force move in astandard order that permits fast actions on contactand rapid movement onto and off of designatedroutes.

Deployment to and from the column should be a

well-rehearsed battle drill. Forward of their attackpositions, committed battalions or task forcesshould have at least two routes to deploy quickly.As a rule, the time allowed for deployment shouldnot be less than the pass time of the leading compa-nies or teams that must bring their trail platoons online to support the leading units.

Brigades organize differently. If expected to de-ploy and fight, they need at least two routes, evenwhen marching in the rear area. A division with twobrigades on the move needs at least four routes forsecurity and for rapid deployment at its destination.CS battalions may march on separate routes evenduring approach marches, but need standardizedinternal arrangements within the division to

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simplify planning, to routinize coordination, and tospeed up movements.

In a crisis, a division in reserve, unencumberedwith forces in contact or other missions, should be

able to stage its units forward from assembly areasto attack positions over a period of hours. By pre-positioning some of its critical C

2elements and CS

units ahead of its combat forces, the division candeliver a coordinated attack with just a few hours’notice.

In a deliberate attack, a division commander canreasonably expect 24- to 48-hour advance noticeprior to his commitment. With this much notice, hecan send brigade CPs forward in advance. He canalso arrange for division-controlled artillery andcrucial CS and CSS elements to be in place before

moving his brigades, main support forces, and CPsforward. Multiple routes are necessary to move anattacking division from an assembly area to itsattack positions with acceptable speed and security.In planning the move from attack positions to theline of departure (LD), operations officers considertravel time from assembly areas to attack positions,numbers of routes required per battalion, deploy-ment times, and movement times from attack posi-tions to the LD. Instructions for brigade movementsfrom assembly areas through attack positions to theLD must be specific. They normally include loca-tions of all march objectives, routes, contact points,

passage lanes, and friendly units. The staff alsosupplies information about the support that the de-fending units whose rear areas must be traversedwill provide. Brigade, division artillery, and avia-tion brigade staffs refine this initial coordinationfurther, arranging the final’ details of their move-ment from attack positions to the LD with the in-place unit.

Because road space and support areas are usuallylimited around the LD, the division can expectaccess to the minimal routes necessary for move-ment. Everyone in the division must move in strictaccordance with published march tables. This re-quires a strong organization and a high level of training and discipline in small units.

Depending on the situation, the march from theTAC CP may be controlled by the division G3; theoperations cell of the division main CP; or an ad hocmovement control headquarters consisting of repre-sentatives from the G4, DTO, PM, division signal

officer, division engineer, and other staff sections.No matter who controls it, march planning mustinclude the following minimum requirements:

•

•

•

Reconnaissance of primary and alternate routes

and assembly areas.The prompt dispatch of liaison teams to otherheadquarters.

Standing teams of communicators, traffic con-trollers, and quartering elements,

When rerouting units becomes necessary, suit-able alternate routes must be available. Reroutingmay be unavoidable, but it usually affects arrivaltimes in forward areas and can also change the orderof march into attack positions or assembly areas.Alteration of the movement plan will be of imme-

diate interest to the commander since he may haveto reconsider timing or dispositions.

CONTROL OF AIRSPACE

A2

C2

Element

The division A2C

2element oversees the airspace

control function. Airspace control facilitates the useof airspace by all users, assists AD identification,and safely expedites air traffic flow. The A

2C

2

element synchronizes the use of airspace and en-

hances the command and control of those forcesusing airspace within the division’s area of operations.

A2

C2

elements (corps, division, and maneuverbrigade) form a vertical and horizontal channelthrough which airspace control requirements, plans,orders, and information are coordinated, dissemi-nated, and synchronized with the tactical plan. (Al-though no special staff element is dedicated to A

2C

2

at battalion, the A2

C2

function is performed at alllevels.) FM 100-103 has detailed information con-cerning the organization and functioning of the

A

2

C

2

system and techniques and procedures forairspace control in a combat zone.

The division A2C

2element comprises designated

representatives from the G3 section, ADA element,aviation element, FSE, Air Force TACP, and thesupporting air traffic control platoon. They are col-located to perform fill-time A

2

C2

functions. Theseelements synchronize the airspace requirements of their parent unit, and other airspace users of the

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combined arms team and supporting services, withthe division’s tactical plan.

The G3 air supervises the 24-hour, day-to-dayoperations of the A

2C

2element. Primary tasks

include—•

•

•

•

•

Identifying and resolving airspace user conflicts.

Coordinating and integrating airspace user re-quirements within the division area of operationsand with other services and adjacent units.

Maintaining A2C

2information displays and

maps.

Developing and coordinating airspace controlSOPs, plans, and annexes to division OPORDsand OPLANs; and disseminating airspace controlorders, messages, and overlays.

Approving, staffing, and forwarding to corps re-quests for special use airspace.

The A2C

2element at the main CP is the focal point

for all airspace control activities related to divisionrear operations and deep operations, and to theplanning for future close operations. Airspace con-trol activities supporting close operations are pri-marily accomplished at the TAC CP with the A

2C

2

element at the main CP providing support. Theirclose coordination ensures that airspace require-ments are met timely and effectively.

The TAC CP has no formal A2C

2element. Des-

ignated representatives from selected staff and liai-son elements accomplish airspace control functions.A G3 officer is responsible for the A

2C

2effort with

assistance from a fire support officer (FSO), anaviation representative, an ADA representative, andan Air Force fighter liaison officer (FLO).

Division airspace control methodology stressesprocedural control—relying on standing opera-tional procedures, selected use of theater airspacecontrol measures, and compliance with the theater

airspace control plan and unit SOPs. FM 100-103discusses tactics, techniques, and procedures for thecoordination and control of airspace used by mod-ern systems.

Systems vying for airspace include ATACMS,UAVs, and special electronics mission aircraft(SEMA). With ATACMS and JSTARS, Armycommanders can detect and destroy deep targetsbeyond the FLOT in excess of 100 kilometers.

Planned ATACMS missions are coordinated well inadvance and may be included on the air taskingorder (ATO) for coordination purposes. ATACMSmissions against targets of opportunity generallyrequire 15 to 30 minutes to process. An example of

airspace deconfliction procedures for ATACMScan be found in FM 100-103-1.

The Army generally uses six steps for airspacecoordination of UAVs and SEMAs:

•

•

•

•

•

•

The G2 collection manager tasks the UAV orSEMA unit with intelligence requirements.

The UAV or SEMA unit develops the missionand forwards airspace requests to the A

2C

2

section.

A2C

2coordinates airspace with division units and

forwards airspace requests to corps.The battlefield coordination element (BCE) actson the requests and submits them for approval tothe airspace control approving authority.

If approved, they are entered on the ATO andairspace control order (ACO).

Corps monitors and informs divisions of approvalor disapproval. Division A

2C

2informs the UAV

or SEMA unit.

A2C

2inside the ATO cycle takes a dedicated

effort. Liaison may be required from UAV andSEMA units to expedite coordination and ensure itis done and, on time. The division as the ARFORheadquarters has diverse responsibilities in the air-space arena. Historically, corps and divisions haveworked with the Air Force for air support and inter-diction. In larger unit operations where the divisionwas subordinate to an Army corps headquarters, thedivisional A

2C

2element worked with the corps

A2C

2element and the air support operations center

(ASOC). The corps A2C

2element reported to the

BCE and the ASOC reported to the air operationscenter (AOC). The BCE works for the senior Army

commander and is normally collocated with theAOC. Additional information on the BCE can befound in FM 100-103.

Deployment planning must include ground liai-son officers (GLOs) with all supporting equipmentto be recalled, as necessary. The division com-mander may need to discuss airspace control re-quirements with his senior commander. He mayrequest the TACP remain with division to provide

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the air support with the service providing the sup-port. Additional information about joint airspacecontrol can be found in JP 3-52, JP 3-56.1, andFM 100-103, with its techniques and proceduresmanuals, FM 100-103-1 and FM 100-103-2.

Finally, battlefield structure (linear or noncon-tiguous) impacts on the integrated use of maneuver,fire support, and airspace control measures. Thedivision commander, as an ARFOR commander,may find specific guidance in established SOPs anddirectives from the combatant commander.

•

•

Air Support

Air missions that support the division include—

• Counterair, both offensive and defensive.

• Air interdiction (AI).

• Close air support (CAS).

• Tactical surveillance and reconnaissance.

• Tactical airlift.

Since air support is normally a theater asset, thepriorities of the theater commander and the seniorArmy tactical commander generally influencewhere, when, and to what degree air support will beavailable to the division. Other factors that impacton air operations include—

••

•

•

•

•

Air superiority.Threat air defenses.

Weather and limited visibility.

Airspace control and usage.

Identification, friend or foe (IFF).

Electronic warfare.

Air operations are fully integrated and synchro-nized with ground operations. The following haveassigned responsibilities:

• The G3 supervises all matters pertaining to CAS.• The FSE coordinates supporting fires, including

CAS, on surface targets.

• The G3 air, the ALO, and the theater airlift liaisonofficer (TALO) (with the G2, G3, G4, and FSE)coordinate and integrate air support with tacticaloperations and provide a central facility throughwhich requests for CAS are processed.

The TACP advises the ground commanders onthe use of CAS and controls employment of CAS.A TACP deploys to an alternate division CP if themain and TAC CPs are destroyed or renderedineffective.

The FLO assists the units in preparing DD Form1972, Joint Tactical Air Strike Request, whenrequesting CAS. Units that normally do not havea FLO or an ALO will request assistance asrequired from the G3 air for specific missions.

CAS Requests andCoordination Channels

Planned and immediate requests for CAS can beinitiated at any level of command. Planned missions

are those for which a requirement can be foreseen.They permit detailed planning, integration, and co-ordination with the ground tactical plan. Plannedmissions are most desirable because commanderscan tailor munitions precisely to the target and com-plete mission planning. (See Figure 3-9.)

Requests for planned CAS missions originatingat the maneuver battalion and brigade levels areforwarded to the division FSE. They are reviewedby the G3 air, the FSCOORD, and the ALO todetermine the suitability of the target for air attackand for potential airspace conflicts. The FSE may

recommend attacking the target with another sys-tem. As a minimum, the FSCOORD will integrateCAS and AI into his fires plan. The G3 air eliminatesduplications, consolidates the remaining requests,and prioritizes the requests. He then forwards theconsolidated requests to the corps G3 air at the corpsfire support element.

The corps G3 air evaluates each division’s re-quests and coordinates with the FSCOORD and theASOC commander. The G3 air then assigns priori-ties to approved requests for each category of airsupport. If CAS sorties have been distributed to thecorps, the G3 air approves CAS requests that do notexceed his distribution. If his CAS requests exceedthose distributed, he sends a prioritized list of CASand AI requests to the ARFOR or JFLCC, petition-ing for additional air support. At the same time, thecorps G3 air notifies all commanders and staffsconcerned of the status of the division’s requests.

Immediate requests generate missions that strikeunanticipated or fleeting targets. Maneuver

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commanders can use CAS to quell unforeseen cri-ses, or to exploit opportunities. Details of the mis-sion generally are coordinated while aircraft areairborne. Immediate missions are processed primar-ily through Air Force communication channels.

Requests for immediate missions that originate atmaneuver battalions, brigades, and division rear CPare forwarded immediately via their TACP to theASOC (at the corps or JTF headquarters). Eachintermediate Army echelon monitors the transmis-

sion and subsequent action. TACPs at these inter-mediate headquarters quickly coordinate the requestwith their S3 or, G3 air and the FSCOORD toapprove or disapprove the request (normally deter-mined by SOP). Unless a disapproval is sent withina specified time period, silence indicates approvalof each intermediate TACP. If any echelon abovethe initiating echelon disapproves the request, theTACP at that echelon notifies the ASOC and theinitiating TACP, giving reason for the disapproval.The ASOC passes a copy of the request to the corpsG3 air in the collocated corps main CP for coordi-nation with the FSCOORD. When the request is

approved, the air support operations center ordersthe mission flown. Immediate missions involvelaunching air alert sorties, on-call CAS, plannedCAS, and or diverting aircraft from other missions,such as air interdiction.

FM 100-26 has additional information concer-ning air-ground operations, to include the proceduresinvolved in requesting and processing air support.

DIGITIZATION OF THEBATTLEFIELD

Automation Architecture

The division is supported by the Army BattleCommand System (ABCS). This system providescommanders and their staffs at corps and divisionautomation tools to facilitate functional processesand access the force level information (FLI) database. The data base provides the information neces-sary to develop a comprehensive view of the combatpicture.

ABCS will link strategic, operational, and tacticalheadquarters and interoperate with theater, joint,and combined C

2

systems across the full range of BOS functions. The system will afford access andquery capability by BOS and will be responsive toMETT-T considerations. The system architectureallows for increased flexibility and does not tiecommanders to static command post structures butrather to a dynamic capability where access to criti-cal information is available on demand at anyechelon.

The ABCS network architecture allows globalconnectivity. It integrates automated subsystemsand functional software applications over the divi-sion communications architecture that support theforce-projection cycle at any echelon. These auto-mation and communications systems will supportstreamlined battlefield information processing over

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seamless, tailorable, and simple-to-use communica-tions links regardless of where they are located onthe battlefield.

•

•

•The current Army Tactical Command and Con-

trol System (ATCCS) will be modified to increaseits capability to evolve into the ABCS. Severalupgrades are required. First, retransmission of un-wanted information must be minimized. Second,warfighters need to have immediate access to pro-cessed information from mobile as well as staticcommunications terminals. Third, the Army needsimproved methods to distribute information fromhigher to lower levels, especially at battalion andbelow.

The communications architectures (the interlock-ing and overlapping spheres) listed below are tech-

nically integrated and interoperable. These systemsshare data through the exchange of force levelinformation:

• Maneuver Control System (MCS).

• Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System(AFATDS).

All Source Analysis System (ASAS).

Air Defense Command and Control System(ADCCS).

Combat Service Support Control System

(CSSCS).

See Figure 3-10.

The larger circle represents the seamless environ-ment. Users connected to this environment will nowtransfer information regardless of the communica-tions means used. Broadcast, as a common informa-tion service capability, has been added to thecomponents that make up the ABCS architecture.Broadcast does not eliminate the need for the othercomponents; it just mitigates the stress currentlyplaced on them. Other key adjustments will include

updated automation to properly support the war-fighters and their forces, improvements in sourcedata entry, visual display and projection of graphics,three-dimensional terrain visualization, and mapoverlay and graphics as required.

The impact of broadcast information in OperationDesert Storm (for example, position and navigation

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information) provides a simplified look at futurebroadcast technology. Position and navigation ca-pabilities are now being integrated into many sys-tems—aviation, field artillery, mounted anddismounted use, communications, and automation,

to name a few. However, there are wider-rangingapplications of broadcast information techniques.Some are logistics, planning, imagery, interactivevideo, news, and weather.

Some corps and division units have already expe-rienced the value of broadcast sensor-to-shooterinformation. (JSTARS moving target indicators,TENCAP video imagery, Guardrail communica-tions and electronics intelligence (COMINT/ ELINT), and UAV video were some of the systemsexperienced.) Significant intelligence is already be-ing broadcast. The challenge is to properly integrate

current and forthcoming systems, paint a commonpicture, and disseminate information to warfightersin near real time.

Another example of new technology is the crea-tion of a “warfighter net.” This net uses singlechannel tactical satellite (TACSAT) terminals. Itdirectly links corps and division commanders withmajor subordinate warfighting commanders, corpsand division command posts, and liaison officers.This net virtually eliminates the distance constraintsof terrestrial-based combat radios.

Corps play a unique role in the Army BattleCommand System as the integrators of higher-levelcombined and joint systems with the tactical sys-tems. Corps provide the link between ABCS and theEAC command and control system, the ArmyGlobal Command and Control System (AGCCS).The corps is also the link between tactical systemsand the theater army command and control systemfor sustainment.

New technologies may change the way we controlforces. However, no matter how sophisticated tech-nology becomes, commanders still make decisionsand provide leadership.

Digitization

Advances in technology continue to affect howwe conduct warfare. The pace of operations is nowgreater than ever before. Communications connec-tivity, line-of-sight limitations, map and compassnavigation, hierarchical flow and bottlenecked

information, and static command posts are all givingway to new technologies and procedures as wedigitize the division’s battlefield. Digitization is oneway the military services have chosen to modernizetheir forces. Digitization is defined as near-real-time

transfer of battlefield information between diversefighting elements to permit the shared awareness of the tactical situation. Digitization leveragesinformation-age technologies to enhance the art of command and facilitate the science of control. Con-tinued insertion of digital (data) technology intosensors, intelligence fusion systems, communica-tions systems, and smart munitions will increase ourability to rapidly and globally manage, process,distribute, and display C

2information.

Microprocessing and space-based technologieshave combined to permit almost real-time distribu-

tion of battlefield information. Broadband transmis-sion systems, modular communication components,and automated decision support systems enablehigh-speed data distribution to all levels of the C

2

structure. Facsimile, video, global positioning infor-mation, and graphic overlays for digital mapping areexamples of information that can now be used tosupport commanders even at lower echelon units.These capabilities will help to give commanders andsoldiers access to timely and accurate data about thebattlefield. The new communications system archi-tectures will allow them to rapidly and effectivelyreact on this data.

When fully implemented, the technology can pro-vide commanders near-real-time information on theoperational and logistics status of friendly units aswell as a current picture of the enemy. Graphicoverlays for digital map displays will be automat-ically updated, giving subordinate units completeknowledge of the friendly and enemy situ-ation—thus a common view of the battlefield. Thisreal-time common picture and situational awarenesswill permit commanders at all echelons to maketimely decisions based on accurate information tobetter control forces, synchronize battlefield sys-tems, and achieve decisive victories with minimalcasualties.

Future integrated digital computer networks willprovide commanders, staffs, sensors, and shootersa great technological advantage. Through digitalinformation exchange, systems can automatically“share” information between data platforms andweapon systems, including relative positioning,

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CHAPTER 4

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The offense is the decisive form of battle. Divi-sions seize and retain the initiative through offen-sive action. Divisions normally fight offensivebattles as part of a corps or joint force operation with

joint support. Surprise, concentration, tempo, andaudacity; the initiative of all commanders; and theapplication of simultaneous, violent combat powerare intrinsic to decisive division offensiveoperations.

With today’s technology, division commandersprefer offensive operations that find and destroy theenemy. They use the maximum range of available

assets to set the conditions for precise maneuver.They leverage technological advantages to gain in-telligence and employ lethal and nonlethal precisionfires as a precursor to maneuver, and the decisiveblow. Division commanders apply combat power atthe time and place of their choosing, while minimiz-ing risk to their soldiers.

The aim of offensive operations is to destroy theenemy’s ability and will to resist. This is done bydefeating the integrity of his defensive system; cap-turing his territory; and destroying his supportingfire systems, command and control systems, com-

mand posts, reserves, and logistics support. Offen-sive operations may also secure key terrain, deceiveor misdirect enemy forces, deprive the enemy of resources, fix or isolate enemy units, gain informa-tion, or spoil an enemy’s offensive preparation.

This chapter provides doctrinal concepts for theemployment of the division in offensive operations.The factors of METT-T will influence and modifytheir specific application.

FUNDAMENTALS

Simultaneous Operations

The Army’s vision of fighting battles sequentiallyhas evolved to emphasize conducting operationssimultaneously to gain their total, synergistic effect.Tactical commanders may have to fight sequentiallyto secure advantages for later engagements, but thepreferred method is to overwhelm an enemy forceduring a short period of time throughout the depth

of the battlefield. Multiple attacks place severalcritical enemy functions at risk all at once. Suchattacks deny the enemy the ability to synchronize orgenerate combat power. They also deny him anyunit cohesion to execute a plan. Simultaneous at-tacks in depth induce friction into the enemy’sscheme of maneuver and significantly degrade hiswill to fight.

Simultaneous attacks cause destruction, confu-sion, and demoralization of the enemy, givingfriendly commanders the opportunity to strike deci-sively. Simultaneous attacks allow our commanders

to completely dominate the tempo of the battlefield.Thus, friendly commanders control their own tempoand, through synchronized operations, influence thetempo of the enemy. This allows us to gain (orretain) initiative and freedom of maneuver. Whenwe strike at the time and place of our choosingthroughout the battlefield, we cause the enemy com-mander multiple, critical problems—little warningtime, compressed planning, poor decisions, and nogood courses of action.

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Forms of the Offense

When executing offensive operations, the divi-sion uses four general forms of offense. These aremovement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pur-

suit. Although it is convenient to think of theseactions as sequential, they may not be. Offensiveoperations are fluid; they ebb and flow from oneform of maneuver to another.

Movement to Contact

Division offensive operations may start with amovement to contact. This form of the offensedevelops the situation and establishes or regainscontact with enemy forces. The search and attack isa variant of the movement to contact. Divisions useelectronic detectors to determine enemy location,

dispositions, and capabilities. When appropriate,the commander attempts to make initial contact withthe enemy using the smallest possible friendly force.The bulk of his force is then available to respondimmediately when and where needed. (SeeFigure 4-1.) Once contact is made, the commanderfurther develops the situation, concentrates the ef-fects of his combat power, and transitions to a hastyattack (or in some cases a hasty defense). The com-mander continually analyzes the situation based oncurrent reports and intelligence. He integrates CSSunits with tactical units for needed support.

Reconnaissance assets find the enemy. Once theenemy is found, the division’s covering force (if employed) develops the situation. The coveringforce is self-sustaining and operates well forward of the division’s main body. The covering force pre-vents unnecessary delay of the main body, destroysenemy resistance where possible, secures key ter-rain, and contains enemy forces. When the divisionmarches as part of a larger formation, the corps orJTF headquarters normally provides and controlsthe covering force. In this case, the division advanceguard (often the cavalry squadron) maintains con-tact between the division and the higher headquar-

ter’s covering force.

In movement to contact, the division always es-tablishes an advance guard. The leading element of the main body usually furnishes and controls theadvance guard, which is task-organized to securethe division’s uninterrupted movement. METT-Tanalysis determines the organization of the coveringforce and advance guard. Both normally include

engineers, intelligence collection assets, andartillery.

Flank and rear security forces protect the divi-sion’s main body from ground observation and sur-prise attack. These forces are strong enough todefeat small enemy units or to delay a strongerenemy attack. Flank security travels on routes par-allel to the main body and occupies key terrain alongroutes where appropriate. Rear security follows thedivision’s main body. (Security operations are dis-cussed in Appendix A and FM 17-95.)

In movement to contact, march dispositions of themain body must allow maximum flexibility for ma-neuvers during the movement and when contactwith the main enemy force is established. Themovement to contact is characterized by high con-sumption of petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL);high vehicular maintenance requirements; and lowammunition expenditure. The speed of the operation

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and the POL consumed require careful combat ser-vice support planning to sustain the division’s unin-terrupted movement.

Hasty attacks usually follow movements to con-

tact, but other courses of action are possible. Thecommander may choose to fix the enemy force andbypass with the bulk of his division. He may chooseto transition to a defense or to a deliberate attack.Whether attacking or defending, at the point combatforces collide, the commander must generate andsustain overwhelming combat power to rapidly de-feat the enemy.

Elements of the main body may be committed toreduce enemy bypassed or contained by the cover-ing force. (These pockets of enemy may also be leftfor follow and support units.) Elements of the cov-

ering force containing enemy units are normallyrelieved as rapidly as possible. They rejoin thecovering force to avoid dissipating its strength. Thecommander monitors the progress of the leadingand engaged combat units. He anticipates their re-quirements. When his units encounter resistance, hecommits the combat power necessary to maintainthe momentum of the advance.

Fragmentary or oral orders are normally usedonce the movement to contact begins. However, intheir absence, leaders take appropriate action toachieve the division commander’s intent. While

leaders rely on initiative, the decision to commit theentire force or to halt the attack remains with thedivision commander.

Attacks

Hasty attacks most often follow movements tocontact. (However, a movement to contact mayterminate in a hasty defense, a deliberate attack, oreven a retrograde. Commanders direct the appropri-ate action based on their analysis of the situation.)In combat, the force that first deploys and assaultsits enemy with maneuver and fires normally gainsan initial advantage.

Division commanders launch hasty attacks withminimum preparation. Hasty attacks are used toseize an opportunity or destroy an enemy before heis able to concentrate forces or establish a coordi-nated defense. They may be force-oriented orterrain-oriented, but commanders prefer force-oriented attacks because they allow greater freedom

of action. Terrain-oriented attacks secure key ter-rain, the occupation of which will significantly im-pact on the outcome of the battle. When conductinghasty attacks, the division—

•

•

•

Envelops one enemy flank while the enemy forceis fixed from the front.

Envelops both enemy flanks while the enemyforce is fixed from the front.

Conducts a frontal attack.

In contrast to hasty attacks, deliberate attacksinvolve much more detailed planning. Deliberateattacks fully synchronize the support of every avail-able asset to defeat an enemy force. Detailed recon-naissance, thorough planning and rehearsal, violentconcentration of combat power, rapid exploitation

of enemy weaknesses, and positive, aggressiveleadership at all echelons of command characterizethe deliberate attack.

Fire support during the attack is critical. Firesupport planning is continuous. Covering, prepara-tory, and on-call fires are planned in detail and mustbe extremely responsive. Generally artillery posi-tions well forward to exploit weapon ranges andpreclude untimely displacement when fires areneeded most. Field artillery normally positions wellforward with the attacking brigades to ensure themajority of fire support assets support the attack.

Engineer support is also critical to the attack.Engineers reduce obstacles as part of a combinedarms breaching operation, assisting the movementof maneuver elements and supporting units. Theyassist in the assault of strongpoints, create obstacleson avenues of approach to protect friendly flanks,maintain routes, and assist in organizing capturedground against counterattacks. Engineer vehiclesand launch bridges locate forward where they cansupport leading elements of the brigade.

Other types of attacks include counterattack,spoiling attach, raids, feints, and demonstrations.

Friendly forces counterattack to defeat an enemyafter he has launched his attack, revealed his maineffort, or exposed an assailable flank. Spoiling at-tacks, on the other hand, normally strike an enemywhile he is preparing for his attack or on the moveprior to crossing his line of departure. A raid is avery limited-objective attack, normally conductedby smaller combat elements in the division. Com-manders destroy key enemy installations and

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conduct a local pursuit or be used as the directpressure or encircling force for the corps or JTF.(See Figure 4-2.)

Forms of Maneuver

The basic forms of offensive maneuver used byArmy divisions are envelopment, turning move-ment, penetration, and frontal attack. (The doubleenvelopment is a variation of the envelopment.) Theinfiltration is a form of maneuver seldom used bythe division as a whole. However, divisions helpplan infiltrations for companies and battalions. Theturning movement is similar to an envelopment. Theturning movement is normally conducted by corpsand larger units. Rarely will divisions conduct aturning movement by themselves.

The corps or higher commander seldom dictatesthe division’s form of maneuver. The division’smission, characteristics of the area of operations,disposition of opposing forces, and relative combat

power of the opposing forces determine the bestform of maneuver for a particular operation. Ter-rain, available time, own dispositions, ability tosupport the attack, and the enemy situation alsoimpact on choosing the form of maneuver. The

division commander specifically addresses in hisOPLAN or OPORD the form of maneuver that thedivision will use.

Envelopment

An envelopment causes the enemy to fight in twoor more directions simultaneously to meet converg-ing attacks. In the envelopment, the division at-tempts to pass around the enemy’s main defensivepositions, avoiding the enemy’s strength. Envelop-ments attack an enemy’s flanks or secure objectives

in his rear that cut his lines of communication andescape routes. Supporting frontal attacks and pene-trations often hold the enemy in position during theenvelopment. In a corps envelopment, the divisionmay be the fixing force, the corps’ reserve, or thecorps’ enveloping force. In a division envelopment,brigades perform these functions. Figure 4-3 illus-trates a division conducting an envelopment.

An envelopment normally requires the friendlyforce to find or create an assailable enemy flank.Success depends on agility, surprise, and the abilityof supporting attacks and deception to hold the

enemy in place. Rapid and unimpeded movement

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of enveloping forces and deep attacks are essentialto prevent the enemy’s reserves from counterattack-ing or occupying prepared positions. Mobile secu-rity elements, scatterable mines, attack helicopters,air cavalry, and obstacles secure the flanks of envel-

oping forces. The division commander uses avia-tion, airborne, air assault, armor, and mechanizedunits to envelop.

Fire support during the envelopment is unrelent-ing. When within range, supporting fires areplanned in detail; however, as the envelopmentdevelops, fires may have to come from many placeson the battlefield. The primary fire support maycome from the supporting attack force or artilleryattached directly to the enveloping force.

An envelopment involves minimum control

measures. A zone of action, checkpoints, or an axisof advance clarify the division commander’sscheme of maneuver. They also simplify movementand coordination among supporting units. An aerialenvelopment also requires control measures (suchas an air axis) and normally local air superiority,JSEAD, and suppressive fires.

A double envelopment normally consists of twoenveloping forces and a supporting attack force. Thedivision normally conducts a double envelopmentonly when there is very strong fire support or a veryweak enemy. However, an initial envelopment of

one flank may create conditions favorable to com-mitting the division reserve around the other flank,resulting in a division double envelopment. To exe-cute this type of maneuver, the amount of combatpower required for two enveloping forces, a sup-porting attack force,division.

Turning Movement

and the reserve will tax the

The division participates in a turning movementas part of a larger force. The turning movement

normally is not directed at destroying the enemy.Rather its purpose is to secure vital areas deep in thehostile rear that will prevent an enemy’s escape orreinforcement. It is used when an opportunity existsto secure decisive terrain in the enemy’s rear caus-ing the enemy to abandon his prepared defenses. If the enemy occupies a strong defensive position, theturning movement offers a means to fight on groundmore favorable to the attacker.

A turning movement normally uses twoforces—turning and fixing. Each force will operatebeyond the other’s mutual support, so each willrequire sufficient organic combat power andmobility.

Penetration

Commanders use penetration when enemy flanksare not assailable. The division masses its combatpower, normally at a single point, to overwhelm theenemy. The division ruptures the enemy’s defense,holds the rupture open, and allows additional divi-sion forces to continue the attack through the rup-ture. (Figure 4-4.) Because penetration attacks intothe strength of an established defense, it may becostly in casualties.

Divisions plan and execute a penetration in threestages: 1) rupture the enemy’s defensive position,2) widen the gap, and 3) overrun or secure objectivesthat will destroy the continuity of the enemy’s de-fense. If the penetration is successful, the divisionmoves immediately into a planned exploitation.

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Follow and support forces continue to widen therupture, clear enemy in the zone, and secure theflanks of the main attack.

Frontal AttackA division frontal attack is the least desirable form

of maneuver. It is used to overrun, destroy, or cap-ture a weaker enemy in position or to fix an enemyforce in position. A frontal attack may be appropri-ate, however, when attacking through an enemy’ssecurity area to destroy forces and secure lines of communication.

The division frontal attack strikes the enemyacross a wide area within the zone of action. Thefrontal attack is only favored against a weak ordisorganized enemy when the situation is not fully

developed, when the attacker has overwhelmingcombat power, when the time and situation requireimmediate reaction to enemy action, or when themission is to fix the enemy in position, deceive him,or assist the main attack. Frontal attacks squandercombat power. Unless the attacker has overwhelm-ing strength, frontal attacks are seldom decisive andare costly in resources and casualties. Conse-quently, the division rarely uses this form of maneu-ver against prepared enemy defense.

Infiltration

Infiltration is the covert movement of all or partof the attacking force through enemy lines to anobjective in the enemy’s rear. The division assignsthis form of maneuver to forces to support othermaneuvers. Divisions themselves seldom infiltrate.An infiltration is a slow operation and requiresstealth. Infantry or cavalry company/troop or battal-ion/squadron units are best suited for infiltrationoperations. However, small armor or mechanizedunits may also infiltrate taking advantage of faultyenemy dispositions, gaps created in obstacles, anddiversionary attacks.

Organization of Battles

We view tactical offensive battles as operationsin depth that consist of three interrelated parts-onebattle consisting of three interdependent operations.These are—

• Deep operations.

•

•

Close operations, which include reconnaissanceand security actions, main effort, and reserveactions.

Rear operations.

In divisions, all are equally important. It is thesimultaneous application of combat power withindeep, close, and rear operations and the divisioncommander’s ability to protect his forces that bringvictory in division battles.

Deep Operations

The division commander thinks and fights indepth. He visualizes the requirements of both to-day’s and tomorrow’s engagements. He uses deepoperations to destroy, delay, disrupt, or divert criti-

cal enemy elements not currently engaged in theclose fight. Specifically, he attacks key enemy func-tional nodes such as command posts, logistics sites,and air defenses to create vulnerabilities that hisdivision can exploit. Deep operations attack high-payoff targets such as enemy artillery, enemy ma-neuver forces, air defense artillery, air forces, andenemy sustainment units whose destruction willcontribute directly to the success of the division’soffensive operation. All divisions execute deep op-erations as part of division battles. As the close fightmoves forward, the division refocuses its deep op-

erations on appropriate targets.Deep attacks may be completely decisive by

themselves or secure advantages for the divisioncommander in his current and future engagements.That is, the division commander often takes actionduring today’s fight (given available resources) thatwill significantly affect tomorrow’s fight.

To ensure unity of effort, the division coordinatesits deep operation with corps or joint force deepoperations. Normally, these operations complementeach other. Forward boundaries usually separate thecorps or joint force’s deep operational area from that

of the divisions. In some circumstances, phase linesmay reduce the complexities of deep operations.These operations have many moving parts; theirsynchronization is vital to overall success. Divisionsstrike deep (after obtaining needed intelligence)with a combination of organic and supporting artil-lery, attack helicopters, infantry task-organized toconduct air assault operations, air interdiction,armored and mechanized maneuver forces,

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supporting joint fires, and EW. Chapter 2 of thismanual, FM 71-100-1, and FM 71-100-2 have moreon division deep operations.

Close OperationsA division’s close offensive operations normally

secure the friendly force, find the enemy and de-velop the situation through reconnaissance, attackto fix enemy forces adjacent to our main effort,envelop or penetrate in the main attack sector, andexploit and then pursue enemy forces.

Reconnaissance locates the enemy and providesinformation on terrain. The division relies on thecomplementary capabilities of organic and support-ing reconnaissance assets. Technical reconnais-sance yields low-risk, multispectral, large-areaintelligence information. Ground and air reconnais-sance provides “eyes on” intelligence information.Ground and air reconnaissance units make contactwith the enemy, develop the situation, and orient themovement of maneuver friendly forces to exploitweaknesses in the enemy’s defenses. The divisionuses cavalry, Army aviation, maneuver units,UAVs, scouts, electronic means, and other assets inreconnaissance roles. Additionally, the division ac-cesses EAD systems for intelligence information.

In the offense, as in all operations, the divisioncommander secures his force. Surveillance, fires(lethal and nonlethal), OPSEC, the effective use of obstacles, as well as security forces protect thedivision. Assets employed for reconnaissance mayalso be employed in security roles.

Security in the offense prevents unexpected en-emy force interference with our attacking forma-tion. Division security forces orient their movementon the division’s main body. Frequently, however,the best security is the violence and speed of theattack itself. It keeps the enemy so involved that hehas neither the time nor means to endanger theattack’s success. The retention of a reserve provides

the commander flexibility but also enhances hissecurity. (Appendix A discusses reconnaissanceand security.)

In close operations, the division normally estab-lishes a main effort, a main attack, and supportingattacks. The main effort achieves a critical task at adecisive point in the division commander’s conceptof operations. It is assigned to only one unit at a time.

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However, as battles ebb and flow, the main effortmay occasionally shift from one unit to another. Allother elements, including those assigned secondaryefforts, support the unit that is assigned the maineffort.

The main attack is the principal attack into whichthe commander throws the full weight of his offen-sive power. The main attack seizes the division’sprincipal objective or destroys a designated forcewhich will significantly contribute to the enemy’sdefeat. The attack’s momentum is maintained untilthe mission is accomplished. Mass concentrationsof fires, coupled with rapid, violent, and bold ad-vances supported by dedicated CS and CSS, char-acterize the main attack. Subordinate andsupporting commanders focus on the main attack tolink their actions to the actions of those around them.

This part of the commander’s concept permitsinitiative but maintains cohesion. Except duringextraordinary times in a battle (air assaults, airborneassaults, and deep aviation attacks), the main attackwill be the division commander’s main effort.

Enemy actions, minor changes in the situation, orlack of success of other elements should not divertforces from the main attack once it is launched. Theapproval to bypass enemy units, however, rests withthe next higher commander. Bypass criteria is nor-mally included in the division’s OPLAN orOPORD. Once bypass is approved, forces are left

in contact with the bypassed enemy and reports sentto adjacent and follow and support units. (See page4-9 for follow and support actions.)

Supporting attacks assist the success of the mainattack. Supporting attacks seize key terrain, fix theenemy in position, prevent enemy disengagement,deceive the enemy on the location of the mainattack, and force commitment of enemy reservesearly or at an indecisive point. Supporting attackscan be deliberate, hasty, or limited objective. Theycan be feints or demonstrations. Units conductingthese attacks have fewer resources than unitsconducting the main attack. Fire support, however,is essential for a supporting attack’s success.

Reserve forces provide the division commandera hedge against uncertainty and are best used toexploit success. They are used to expedite victory,not merely to blunt enemy penetrations. Divisioncommanders maintain the momentum of the attackwith their reserves. Reserves can provide security,

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weight the main effort, exploit opportunities, regainthe initiative, and defeat enemy counterattacks. Re-serves are not a committed force until committed bythe division commander. For planning purposes, thereserve is assigned “be prepared missions.”

Dispersal of the reserve into multiple assemblyareas or march columns reduces vulnerability toattack. The reserve is located—

•

•

•

To permit rapid movement to points of probableemployment.

To support the main attack or to exploit support-ing attack success.

To provide additional security to the attack formation.

The commitment and size of the reserve is acommander’s decision, based on the most accurateinformation available. The size, although deter-mined by METT-T factors, generally increases withthe amount of uncertainty.

Rear Operations

Division rear operations in the offense help pro-vide the commander and committed forces freedomof action. They enhance the commander’s ability toinfluence the close fight. Rear operations consist of

terrain management, security, movement, and sus-tainment. Rear units anticipate critical requirementsand prepare to secure and move (push) sustainmentpackages forward. The division rear CP and theDISCOM monitor attacking brigades and redirectthe priority of CS and CSS to support changes to thedivision main effort. Division rear operations arediscussed in Chapter 2 and detailed in Appendix E.

Additional Considerations

Sequence of Attack

When preparing for an attack, the division com-mander determines how he will attack through hiszone in each phase of the operation and how he muststage his units through forward assembly areas tothe objective. The normal attack sequence requiresdivisions—

• To move from rear to forward assembly areas (orfrom staging areas to tactical assembly areas).

• To deploy and initiate their attacks either throughdefending friendly units or through earlier com-mitted divisions.

• To fight through their own zones between the line

of departure (LD) and their objective area.

Approach March

Commanders conduct approach marches whenthey are relatively certain that enemy locations aresome distance from their approaching friendlyforce. By using detection systems to determine theenemy’s location, disposition, and capabilities, theyavoid committing large formations to gain detailson every location and disposition.

Follow and SupportFollow and support is not a form of the offense

but rather a mission. Follow and support units re-lieve elements of the exploiting force left to blockor contain enemy forces, or continue the mission of the exploiting force. Commanders of follow andsupport units and the exploiting force maintain closeliaison. Elements of the follow and support unit mayeven be attached to the exploiting force. Follow andsupport force tasks include—

•

•

•

•

•

Destroy bypassed units.

Relieve units halted to contain enemy forces.Block enemy reinforcements.

Secure lines of communications, or key areas.

Secure prisoners of war and refugees.

The entire division may be assigned a follow andsupport mission in a corps or joint force offensiveoperation. Division may also assign follow andsupport missions to its brigades as part of the divi-sion’s offense. Note that the follow and supportforce is not a reserve. It is a committed force that isprovided the appropriate amount of combat, CS, and

CSS forces to perform its mission.

Follow and Assume

Follow and assume, like follow and support, isnot a form of the offense. A follow and assume forceis also a committed force. It plans and prepares totake over the complete mission of the force it isfollowing. This mission is common in offensive

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operations. A follow and assume force often followsthe main attack.

Contingency Plans

The division staff prepares contingency plans thatallow the division to shift from one type of offensiveoperation or from one form of maneuver to anotherwith minimal delay. These are called branches to thecurrent operations. The division staff also developssequels, the next major division operation. Plans arerefined as intelligence confirms or denies the loca-tion and composition of defending enemy units.This information could require modifying the taskorganization and combat, CS, and CSS priorities.

Deception

Division deception activities support a higherheadquarters’ deception operations. Division ac-tions are designed to mislead an enemy commander,prompting him to plan and conduct his activities ina manner that serves the division commander’sobjectives. The division’s deception story and planare coordinated with higher-level deception plans toensure unity of effort. Techniques such as feints,demonstrations, displays, and ruses, combined witha variety of deception means and measures (camou-flage, decoys, smoke, electronic means), are syn-

chronized to portray a deceptive picture. Deceptionallows the division to surprise an enemy on thetiming, location, and strength of the pending attack.A good deception story reinforces the enemy com-mander’s perceptions about the disposition and in-tentions of the division.

•

•

•

•

Support of Brigades

The division resources the close fight around itsbrigades. Attacking brigade commanders normallyfight their battalions, which use direct and indirectfires and maneuver against the defending enemy.Attack helicopters, combat engineers, electroniccombat, air defense weapons, field artillery units,and joint fires support maneuver battalions indestroying enemy units. The division provides ad-ditional combat, CS, and CSS assets to brigadeswhere needed. The main effort most often receivesadditional tactical units, engineers, air defense,CSS, reinforcing artillery fires, and joint fires. The

division ensures that every available resource sup-ports the main effort.

The division commander does not limit his at-tacks to the vicinity of the FLOT. He supports the

main effort brigade throughout the depth of thebattlefield. He uses fires and supporting maneuversthat reach deep into the enemy’s zone of action andstrike vulnerable, high-payoff targets or engage un-committed enemy forces.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

The corps or joint force commander assigns thedivision offensive missions in broad terms that leavethe division commander the greatest possible free-dom of action. The division commander plans for

the synchronization of all combat, CS, and CSSunits to close with and destroy the enemy and exploithis successes with additional forces and fires. Asnecessary, he adjusts the direction of the attack.

The division launches its attack from either anassembly area, a lodgment, or an assigned defensivesector, or from the march. All require a concertedplanning effort. When attacking from an assemblyarea, the commander considers—

Movement times.

Road networks.

March orders (sequencing).

Passage of lines.

Attacking from an occupied defensive sector mayrequire the division to thin its forces from forwardpositions to mass attack formations. If this cannotbe done, division units move directly from theirdefensive positions into the attack. Attacking froma march formation requires a responsive and flex-ible command and control system to respond rapidlyand aggressively through battle drills without losingdivision momentum.

Intelligence

All IEW collection means gather detailed infor-mation that provides the basis for sound offensiveplans. The MI battalion’s effort is to gain real-timeinformation on the location, identification, size, andcomposition of enemy units, and to disseminateintelligence rapidly to maneuver and fire support

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units. Priority intelligence collection focuses on en-emy units most likely to influence the division maineffort. The division commander is particularly con-cerned with the location of uncommitted enemyforces and enemy air defense units, command posts,

artillery, mortars, and rocket forces. The divisioncommander weights his main attack with appropri-ate intelligence support.

Maneuver

Application of Maneuver Forces

The division’s maneuver forces are generally in-fantry, armored, or aviation. Light or dismountedinfantry forces can defend rugged, restricted terrainand conduct infiltration attacks to secure key objec-tives that block enemy counterattacking forces. In-

fantry forces are effective in built-up areas,mountains, and thickly wooded or jungle environ-ments. Their ability to air assault provides divisionor corps commanders a rapidly deployable force toseize initiative on battlefields.

On the other hand, armored and mechanizedforces concentrate their lethality, survivability,ground mobility, speed, and offensive shock effectsto defeat or destroy enemy forces. Armored andmechanized units are particularly effective in con-ducting mobile combat against enemy armoredforces in open terrain.

Finally, the division’s aviation forces conduct thefull range of combat, CS, and CSS operations. Avia-tion units are especially skilled in conducting at-tacks, air assaults, reconnaissance, and securityoperations.

Army Aviation

Attack helicopters are most effective at nightagainst exposed threat forces on the move, and leasteffective against threat forces in prepared defensivepositions. In offensive operations, aviation units are

normally integrated into the scheme of maneuverand given missions similar to those of othermaneuver units. Attack helicopter units are alsoused as deep attack assets, security forces, or thedivision’s reserve.

As the offensive operation transitions to the ex-ploitation and pursuit, Army aviation becomes ex-tremely effective. As the enemy evacuates hisdefensive positions and displaces to his rear, his

unprotected unit formations are ideal for helicopterattacks. During the exploitation and pursuit, theaviation brigade attacks through or around penetra-tions to envelop and destroy enemy forces. Detailedplanning is necessary to effectively synchronize

ground force elements with aviation assets.

Cavalry

During offensive operations, the division’s cav-alry squadron normally performs reconnaissance orsecurity operations. (See Appendix A.) The cavalrysquadron conducts area, zone, route, and reconnais-sance in force operations. Additionally, the squad-ron makes initial contact with enemy forces,develops the situation, and can direct attacking ma-neuver brigades to the optimal point of attack. The

cavalry squadron also conducts security missions toprotect the force and to prevent premature deploy-ment of uncommitted brigades. The squadron cancontrol terrain, delay or destroy enemy forces, or beused in an economy of force role. The squadron isnormally under division control during offensiveoperations.

Fire Support

Artillery

The division artillery commander organizes sup-porting artillery for combat after considering re-quirements for—

• Counterfire.

• Direct support.

• Covering fires.

Preparatory fires•

• Interdiction (deep fires),

• Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).

The artillery task organization and fire supportplan provide the capability to rapidly shift firesduring the attack. The fire support plan is designedto isolate, suppress, and destroy enemy units. It laysout how the maneuver commander intends to inte-grate all tire support, both lethal and nonlethal, intohis operation.

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Combat Air

Air support to the division during offensive op-erations consists of CAS, AI, tactical surveillanceand reconnaissance, and tactical airlift. Indirectly,

the theater air forces support division operationsthrough their counterair campaigns. These cam-paigns attain air superiority and protect groundforces and their freedom to maneuver.

CAS and AI support are integrated and synchro-nized with the division’s organic and attached firesupport assets. The fire support element, along withthe TACP, plans for the use of joint air support. CASand AI are included in the commander’s fire supportplan.

During offensive operations, the main attack re-ceives priority of fires. If the division is conducting

the corps main effort, CAS sorties normally aredistributed to the division for planning. Corps andEAC commanders appropriately prioritize divisionAI target nominations or mission-type air requests.CAS sorties normally go to the maneuver brigademaking the main attack. Follow and support, re-serve, and supporting attack brigades must be pre-pared to accept and employ CAS sorties if theybecome the division’s main effort. The divisioncommander retains some CAS sorties to influencethe battle at decisive times.

CAS and AI should be planned against enemy

forces whose destruction or delay would have thegreatest potential to unhinge the enemy com-mander’s plan or operational tempo. Priority targetsfor CAS and AI are high-payoff targets identifiedthroughout the targeting process. AI can add depthand shape the battlefield. It can help isolate the battleby interdicting avenues of approach and lines of communication that lead to the division’s axis of advance and objectives.

The division fire support system and the A2

C2

element coordinate JSEAD airspace coordinationareas, ingress and egress routes, and other airspace

requirements to deliver aerial and surface-deliveredfires simultaneously into a given engagement areaor target area.

The division engineer is important in developing thedivision’s scheme of maneuver. He consults withthe G3, FSO, ADA officer, ALO, PM, chemicalofficer, aviation officer, G2, and G4 to plan engineersupport. The division engineer plans and coordi-

nates mobility, countermobility, and survivabilitytasks to support the offensive mission. He is the linkbetween engineer planning at corps and division andthe execution of engineer tasks throughout the divi-sion’s AO. In offensive operations, priority of engi-neer support is to mobility missions. Engineer assetsare task-organized with maneuver units to breachobstacles, maintain forward momentum, and ensureroutes are open for logistics support.

In the offense, corps engineers usually augmentthe division. The main attack is weighted with en-gineer capabilities. Lead brigades normally receive

at least one battalion of combat engineers for mo-bility support. Countermobility planning includesthe coordination of family of scatterable mines(FASCAM) employment between the division FSE,engineer, G2, and G3. In the offense, FASCAMblocks potential flank avenues of approach, fixesenemy counterattack forces, and closes enemy re-treat routes. Although survivability missions havelower priority during the offense, survivability be-comes important during operational pauses and con-solidation objectives.

ChemicalIn the offense, chemical companies perform

chemical reconnaissance, decontamination, andsmoke operations to support the division. Airborneand air assault divisions have only decon and smokeplatoons. On receipt of the division warning order,the chemical company commander coordinateswith the division chemical officer to effect task organization and obtain appropriate augmentationfrom corps.

Chemical reconnaissance units locate areas free

of persistent contamination. They are positionedbased on the IPB process. When collocated with thedivision’s security forces, they are attached. Theymay conduct some independent operations.

Mobility and Survivability The division chemical officer recommends gen-

Engineers eral decontamination sites to the chemical companycommander. The commander refines these loca-

The division engineer receives guidance and pri- tions based on a physical reconnaissance andorities for the engineer effort from the commander. METT-T and requests they be approved and

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that is, they develop detailed plans to support fast-moving division operations. They must rapidly dis-place to keep up with the division’s communicationneeds. The signal battalion ensures uninterruptedfrequency-modulated (FM) voice and digital datacommunications during offensive operations.

PREPARING FOROPERATIONS

Transition To The Offense

If the division’s defense (discussed in Chapter 5)is successful, the enemy reaches a culminating pointwithin the main battle area (MBA). The combatpower of the attacking enemy at the point of hisattack no longer exceeds that of the friendlydefender. The enemy attack flounders and he at-tempts to withdraw or transitions to a defense.

Time becomes critical. The division commandermust already have a plan to attack quickly. Herapidly reorganizes and refits selected units, movesto attack positions, and attacks. His units are inpositions known to the enemy and, unless moved,

will be subject to the enemy’s supporting fires. Timeis also critical to the enemy. He uses this time toreorganize, establish a security zone, and dig in hisdefensive positions.

Unless the division has a large, uncommittedreserve prepared to quickly exploit the situation, thecommander must reset its defense as well as main-tain contact with the enemy. At the same time, thecommander must move forces to prepare for hisattack, or conduct a frontal attack with units incontact (normally the least favorable course of ac-tion). Successful friendly force commanders must

think through this transition period and have a planto execute.

The division’s higher headquarters normally dic-tates the time of the attack. If the division com-mander is free to choose the time, he must considerthe time required to reconnoiter the terrain andgather additional information about the enemy, if needed. He must also consider the time required bysubordinate units to prepare. Time is critical. Timeused to prepare the division to attack is time pro-vided the enemy to prepare to defend or even toattack the division.

Offensive Formations

Divisions attack the enemy at the location offer-ing the greatest likelihood of success. Attacks areaimed at weak points in the enemy defense. If noweak point can be found, the division must createone with fire, maneuver, or deception.

Divisions normally deploy in a standard forma-tion for an attack. Traditional formations are a col-umn of brigades, a box of brigades, a line of

brigades, a “V” formation, a wedge formation, orbrigades in echelon. Division commanders pre-scribe initial formations and designate the divisionunit’s march order. Initial dispositions usuallychange in the course of an attack, however, as forcesare committed and plans modified.

The column of brigades is used in narrow orrestrictive zones and against deep objectives. Thecolumn of brigades provides great depth, flexibility,

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vague. It is the preferred formation for a movementto contact as it initiates contact with the smallestelement. When enemy contact is not expected, thewedge may be used to rapidly cross open terrain.Within the wedge, subordinate units employ theformation best suited to the terrain, visibility, andlikelihood of contact, or directed by the seniorcommander. (See Figure 4-9.)

Brigades are in echelon when advancing in a widezone, when a flank threat exists, or when the

division commander plans to envelop a knownenemy force in the objective area. The echelonformation provides good flank security anddepth but limits flexibility. Brigades in eche-lon are slow in developing combat power tothe front. (See Figure 4-10.)

Enemy resistance, maneuver space and avenuesof approach in the zone, road net, weather, and timeavailable all affect the choice of attack formations.Figure 4-11, page 4-17, summarizes these factors.

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CHAPTER 5

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

This chapter discusses how Army divisions de-feat an attacking enemy through defense. Without acompelling reason to defend, however, Army divi-sions continue the attack. The defense is a tempo-rary state that permits the division to survive anenemy attack, halt the enemy, and create conditionsfor offensive operations.

As part of a corps or joint force, divisions performmultiple operations. They could be required to si-multaneously attack, defend, or delay as part of thehigher organization’s security, main battle force, orreserve force. Defensive operations are normally

conducted with the immediate purpose of causingan enemy attack to fail. A force may also defendbecause it is unable, to continue the attack. Divisiondefensive operations may also achieve one or moreof the following: gain time, concentrate forces else-where, wear down enemy forces before offensiveoperations, or retain tactical, strategic, or politicalobjectives.

SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONSIN DEPTH

The division conducts simultaneous operations inthe defense to eliminate the enemy’s will to fight, todefeat his capability to fight, and to protect friendlyforces. Defensive operations prevent the enemyfrom gaining momentum in his attacks and elimi-nate his freedom of maneuver. Simultaneity andprecision fires set the conditions for decisive defen-sive battles.

Through modern technologies, the division com-mander can compress and control the battlefield.

Target acquisition improvements help him to pre-dict enemy intentions and apply the division’s com-bat power to quickly defeat an enemy at the timeand place he chooses. Enhanced acquisition andinformation, combined with technological advance-ments such as longer-range delivery and Army and

joint precision fires, allow the commander to massthe effects of his combat power throughout thebattlefield.

The division commander’s concept for simulta-neous operations may include—

•

•

•

•

•

Electronic warfare and cannon fires to blind ordestroy the enemy’s forward reconnaissance andsurveillance capabilities.

Rocket and missile fires to destroy enemy com-mand, control, communications, and intelligence(C

3

I) facilities, which are located and continu-ously tracked with intelligence assets.

Electronic warfare and indirect fire systems(Army and joint) to fire on enemy C

3I facilities

and deny the enemy commander the means toeffectively recover, synchronize, and concentratehis combat power.

Attack helicopter battalions to destroy selectedenemy units throughout the enemy’s depth.

Planned exploitation to strike at the enemy’sweaknesses:

FORMS OF THE DEFENSE

There are two general forms of defensive opera-tions— mobile defense and area defense. The com-mander articulates terms for the form of defense

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within his concept of operation. Staffs must be inconsonance with the commander as they developthe scheme of maneuver, specifically paragraphthree, execution. They must also ensure that subor-dinate unit missions and tasks support the com-

mander’s intent and the scheme of maneuver.

Mobile Defense

The mobile defense orients on the destruction of the enemy force. Generally, the division com-mander resorts to a mobile defense when—

• Friendly forces are insufficient to adequately de-fend the AO.

• He possesses sufficient mobile forces to create astriking force.

• The defense orients on the destruction of theenemy force versus the retention of terrain.

The mobile defense combines fire and maneuver,offense, defense, and delay to defeat the enemyattack and destroy the enemy force. The commandermay “shape” the battlefield through a fixing forceusing strongpoints, delays, or defenses in sector.Such actions deny terrain to the enemy in one areawhile creating an illusion of success in another area.This may entice the enemy to attack in a directionof the commander’s choosing.

In a mobile defense, the mobility of the strikingforce is equal to or greater than that of the attacker.Minimum force is committed to the fixing force;maximum combat power is given to the strikingforce making the decisive attack. The commander’s

visualization of the battlefield includes a decisivepoint—the place he sees as the most advantageousto allow the enemy to proceed in order for thestriking force to destroy the force. The enemy’sinitiative must create a vulnerability, such as expos-ing a flank to the striking force. The striking forceengages and destroys the enemy as he is trying toovercome that part of the force with minimumdefenses.

The main effort in the mobile defense is thestriking force. Other considerations might includethe forward displacement of fire support assetswhen the striking force attacks, the ability of thedefending force to provide fire support to thestriking force to mass tires, and the fact that thetargets of the striking force may be beyond artil-lery range.

Although the mobile defense normally orients ondestroying the enemy force, it may also keep theenemy from achieving his objectives. Further, it maybe used as a “shield of protection” to strengthen theentire defense or to buy time for the defending forces.

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Since the striking force is key to the commander’sscheme of maneuver, the mobile defense may failwithout its commitment. It is not a reserve since itis deployed on a specific mission and is not availablefor commitment elsewhere. The mobile defensenormally has a reserve independent from the strik-ing force.

The echelon that executes the mobile defenseretains command of the striking force. A divisionmay be used as a corps striking force or it maytask-organize its own striking force within its AO.The division staff must synchronize the activities intime and space to ensure the striking force arrivesat the right time and place with the right force.

The commander conducting a mobile defensemay commit his reserve to assist the defending unitsin shaping the battlefield. When committed, thereserve normally becomes the main effort until thestriking force is committed. At this time, the main

effort reverts to the striking force, its only missionbeing to deliver the decisive blow to the enemyforce.

Accepting risk is inherent in a mobile defensebecause the division retains the bulk of its combatpower in the striking force. Risks to the division aretwofold. First, the forces defending possess onlysufficient combat power to shape the penetration,

not defeat the enemy. The commander determineswhat unfavorable force ratio he will accept in thedefending or delaying sector (prior to commitmentof the striking force). Second, the enemy may notsee the battlefield as planned. He may not be luredor maneuvered into the defending commander’sintended area, which may preclude use of the strik-

ing force. Both situations require contingency plans.Figure 5-1 shows mobile defense.

Area Defense

The area defense focuses on denying the enemyaccess to designated terrain or facilities for a speci-fied time, rather than on destroying the enemy. Thedivision normally conducts an area defense in depth.(See Figure 5-2.) However, where ground cannot beeasily surrendered or when enemy forces are weakand disorganized, the commander may use a

forward defense, in which there is little depth. Aperimeter defense is another type of area defense.In a perimeter defense, a commander defends in alldirections and maintains the integrity of his area.

The area defense is normally organized aroundstatic defensive positions in depth, seeking to de-stroy the enemy forces with interlocking fires. Thedivision commander normally positions his forces

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in sectors or battalion battle positions on suitableterrain with a specific orientation of fires. He useslocal counterattacks against enemy units penetrat-ing between defensive positions.

Occasionally, the commander may direct the con-

struction of a strongpoint (company, battalion, orbrigade in size). A strongpoint is a key point in adefensive position that is usually heavily armed andstrongly fortified, around which other positions aregrouped for protection.

Subordinate commanders usually exercise moreautonomy in the area defense than in the mobiledefense. They fight engagements within their sec-tors while the division commander retains a reserveto commit where needed.

ORGANIZATION OF BATTLESAND ENGAGEMENTS

All defenses use terrain, depth, and mutual sup-porting fires as force multipliers. Proper use of terrain helps mass combat power at decisive points,influences the tempo of enemy attacks, and providescover and concealment to the defender. Depth pro-vides operational flexibility and dispersion. It alsoreduces the defender’s risk. Mutual support inte-grates the fires and maneuver of the total force andfocuses combat power at decisive points to defeatenemy forces.

Division defensive battles are generally organ-ized into three interrelated but equally importantoperations. These are—

•

•

•

Deep operations.

Close operations, consisting of reconnaissanceand security actions, main effort, and reserveactions.

Rear operations.

Their simultaneous execution, as well as actions tosecure our forces, defeats attacking enemy forces.

Deep Operations

Deep operations in the division defense destroy,delay, disrupt, or divert critical enemy elements.Deep attacks strike at the enemy’s critical fictionalnodes, such as command posts, artillery positions,logistics sites, troop concentrations, and air

defenses. They create windows of opportunity forfriendly commanders. Deep operations comple-ment close and rear operations. All divisions exe-cute deep attacks as part of their defensive battle.

To ensure unity of effort, the division’s deepoperations complement the corps’ or joint force’sdeep attacks. The division commander and hishigher commander agree on targeting responsibili-ties during the deep fight. Normally, the corps com-mander assigns the division specific deep targets. Aforward boundary or phase line delineates the areaof responsibility between the corps or joint force andthe division.

Deep operations begin well before the enemycloses into engagement areas. Division areas of interest and operations extend far enough forward

of the FLOT to give the commander time to identifyapproaching enemy forces, assess his options, andtarget and execute deep attacks accordingly.

Destruction and defeat of enemy forces deep,though preferable, are difficult to achieve becausedestruction normally requires massive resources of forces and fires. Disruption of enemy movementsand timings through the destruction of key assetsmay be the only element achievable. Disruptionnormally reduces the enemy’s correlation of forcesand can be accomplished through a combination of AI, deception, PSYOP, EW, artillery fires, aviation

attacks, and ground maneuver.In preparing for and conducting deep operations,

the division commander makes specific demands onorganic and supporting intelligence systems to fo-cus the intelligence collection effort. As enemyformations approach, the commander monitors theirmovement within his area of interest and identifiesthe enemy’s main effort. As the enemy enters hisAO, the division commander attacks high-payoff targets, disrupting and delaying the enemy, as hemodifies his defensive plan.

The DOCC plans and synchronizes the division’sdeep operations. Through the division’s internaltargeting process, high-payoff targets that divisionassets cannot hit are passed on to the corps or jointtargeting board. The means available for conductingdeep operations may be limited. The DOCC ensuresthat deep fires and deep aerial maneuver are usedefficiently to obtain effects that contribute directlyto the overall defense.

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Air-delivered weapons, air maneuver units, elec-tronic warfare, and field artillery are the division’sweapons for deep operations. Their effective em-ployment depends on careful planning, coordina-tion, and IPB before the battle begins. Additionally,

they require a responsive, survivable targeting pro-cess once operations are underway. Further discus-sions of division deep operations are in Chapter 2 of this manual and in FM 71-100-1 and FM 71-100-2.

Close Operations

Division close operations include reconnais-sance, security, main battle area actions, and em-ployment of the reserve force.

Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance is a vital and continuous divisionoperation. Initially, through reconnaissance, divi-sions acquire knowlege about the terrain and gainand maintain contact with the enemy. Divisions usevarious units and technical assets to conduct recon-naissance throughout the division’s AO.

The division tracks and assesses the situation asthe enemy approaches through the deep, and into theclose, operations area. The division’s technical andaerial reconnaissance assets maintain contact withand provide continuous reports on the enemy’s situ-ation. Reconnaissance missions include area, zone,and route. Reconnaissance should not be confusedwith security operations. Reconnaissance orientsprimarily on the enemy to provide intelligence forcurrent and future operations. Reconnaissance isdetailed in Appendix A.

Security

Security operations protect friendly forces. Secu-rity operations include screen, guard, cover, andarea security missions. The division conducts secu-rity operations to provide maneuver space and reac-

tion time to protect the main body. Securityoperations orient on the forces (or facilities) theysecure. Security actions are detailed in Appendix A.

Main Battle Area Actions

Covering Force. The commander may use a cov-ering force for all-weather security of MBA forces.He establishes a covering force depth allowing for

sufficient room to maneuver and to force the enemyto reposition his artillery and air defense forces priorto his attack into the MBA. Enemy repositioning of artillery and air defense artillery indicates his maineffort, makes them vulnerable to deep attacks, and

limits the effectiveness of his massed artillery fires.

The covering force fight in the security force areais not a preliminary operation before the main battlefight. It is directly tied to the future fight in the MBAas part of one battle, one scheme of maneuver. Thedivision must understand how the covering forcecan affect the MBA fight. For example, the coveringforce might inflict too much enemy attrition, caus-ing the enemy to stop and defend well forward of the MBA. This action could derail a corps plan thatcalled for luring the major enemy force into thecorps MBA and destroying it in accordance with the

corps commander’s intent.

In the absence of corps covering force units, thedivision normally assigns a maneuver brigade toconduct the covering force battle. A division-controlled covering force allows the division toseize the initiative from an attacking enemy force.The size and composition of the covering forcedepend on its mission, the enemy, the terrain, andavailable forces. These factors take on added sig-nificance and complexity, depending on the en-emy’s chosen course of action, the depth and width

of the sector available for the covering force fight,and the time required for MBA defenders to preparefor action. A covering force is normally a combinedarms force that one commander commands andcontrols.

The division’s initial plan includes contingenciesfor unexpected covering force battle results that willdirectly impact on the MBA fight. A situation maydevelop that requires the division commander toestablish a strong covering force to form the firstpart of his defense in depth. The commander decides

that his covering force mission is to destroy anddisrupt leading enemy formations, causing the com-mitment of follow-on units, and forcing the reposi-tioning of enemy artillery and air defense systems.This will cause the enemy to disclose his maineffort. While the covering force fights the enemy’slead elements, the division conducts deep opera-tions against follow-on forces and critical enemynodes.

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Brigade commanders operating as covering forcecommanders may use the same tactics and controlmeasures that the MBA brigade commanders use.Brigades tasked as the division’s reserve should notbe used in covering force operations and then revert

to the reserve force on completion of the coveringforce operations. The covering force may be unableto reorganize fast enough to assume critical reservemissions. Having the MBA brigade control battal-ion- or task force-sized covering forces is not apreferred technique because MBA commandersmust divide their attention between the security areaand MBA preparation. This diffuses the picture of the covering force battle, limits lateral maneuver inthe security area, and makes it harder for the divisionto locate the enemy main effort.

Generally, in division covering force operations,one DS artillery battalion supports one maneuverbattalion. If artillery is insufficient, one or morecorps or division GS or general support reinforcingartillery battalions may also provide fires to thecovering force.

Air defense artillery is positioned in support of the covering force. While HIMAD units do notnormally support the covering force, they may beable to range far enough forward from the MBA toprovide some general support. Generally, forwardarea air defense (FAAD) units are initially posi-

tioned to support critical CP, aviation, and CSSassembly areas in the security area and to assist incovering the passage of lines as covering forcesbegin to pass into the MBA. FAAD units in thesecurity force area engage enemy attack helicopters,high-performance aircraft, and enemy remotely pi-loted vehicles (RPVs). Man-portable AD teams aretask-organized and should habitually associate withsupported units.

Depending on the priority of effort, division en-gineers locate well forward in the security area toemplace obstacles, prepare vehicle fighting posi-

tions, and provide for the mobility of the coveringforce. Obstacles are more important to the coveringforce operations when the enemy has numericaladvantage in artillery and maneuver strength. Thedivision commander must make a key decision in-volving priority of engineer effort-security forcearea versus main battle area. Engineer unitsmounted in armored vehicles are required for cov-ering force operations; other less-protected engineer

units can complete the terrain reinforcement of thesecurity area.

The MI battalion GSRs and remote sensor teamsalso operate in the covering force, as do collection

and jamming assets from the division MI battalionand corps MI brigade’s tactical exploitation battal-ion. The division G3 and the security area com-mander coordinate their locations and inclusion intothe covering force scheme of maneuver.

Electronic warfare operations are conducted tolocate the enemy’s main effort and to locate anddestroy enemy jammers. Jamming operationsagainst the enemy’s electronic command andweapon control systems are in accordance withdivision commanders’ established priorities. CorpsEW assets augment the division EW capability in

the security area to provide continuous EW opera-tions while delaying rearward.

Because the covering force fight is short, onlyessential classes III and V and medical elementslocate in the security force area (normally towardthe rear). All CSS assets must be 100 percent mobileto function in the fluid arena. DISCOM mainte-nance collection points and BDA and repair teamsare of limited value. Damaged equipment must bedestroyed in place if it is not capable of quicklybeing recovered to the MBA. A covering forceforward support battalion (FSB) normally locatestemporarily in the MBA near passage points, lanes,and road networks that support the forward coveringforce. The CSS elements require extensive coordi-nation with MBA ground commanders for multipleforward and rearward passage of lines necessary forsecurity area sustainment and terrain management.

The G4 controls and coordinates the division’sreorganization of the covering force based on pri-orities the G3 and the covering force commanderestablish. Planning for the covering force’s reor-ganization precedes the battle. The division hasneither the time nor the resources to conduct regen-eration. The corps must assume this responsibility.Based on the covering force’s follow-on missionand the division’s or corps’ ability to effect timelyreconstitution, the division commander normallystates to the covering force commander the lossesacceptable in both personnel and weapon systems.

All nondivisional and divisional units not as-signed to, but in support of, the covering force battleand located within the security area coordinate with

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the covering force commander. Coordination in-cludes terrain management, security, movement,and synchronization of covering force operations.

Battle Handover. Main battle area brigades nor-

mally assume responsibility for the battle as enemyforces reach the FEBA. The headquarters estab-lishing the covering force prescribes where cover-ing force units will pass through and designatesroutes, the battle handover line (BHL), and contactpoints. The MBA commanders and the coveringforce commanders normally coordinate adjust-ments to the location of the line and other designatedcontrol measures and recommend changes to thehigher commander. They also coordinate specificpassage lanes and other details not contained inhigher headquarters’ overlay graphics. Generally,the boundaries of the covering force units coincide

with those of the main battle area brigades, whichsimplifies battle handover coordination. The risk is,however, that the enemy will find the “seams” in thesecurity area and exploit them through to the MBA.

Covering forces retain freedom of maneuver priorto passage of lines. The covering force passesthrough or around the MBA forces quickly to mini-mize the vulnerability of both to nuclear strikes orconventional tires. Moving around a friendly forcerather than through it minimizes tactical vulnerabil-ity and confusion. The CS and CSS elements in thesecurity area pass rearward early to preclude ham-

pering combat element passage. The MBA unitsnormally provide direct and indirect fire assets inthe vicinity of the BHL, which is normally posi-tioned forward of the FEBA. This allows direct firesystems to provide overmatching fires to cover thewithdrawal of covering force units and to closelanes.

The division commander must consider the sub-sequent employment of division covering forceunits. Only in emergency situations are they at-tached to the forward committed brigades. They aremost effectively employed after reorganization as

the division reserve on commitment of the initialreserve force. Passing covering forces to the reservemay allow for reorganization but, at the same time,add considerable time before they are ready forcommitment.

Combat Outposts. Combat outposts providecommanders at various levels of command a tech-nique to secure their forces in the defense. They are

well suited for use in mountainous areas. Com-manders can use combat outposts to provide sub-stantial security for their forces when breaking upmomentum of enemy attacks, or when disengagingfrom the enemy and a covering force is not avail-

able. The use of combat outposts differs somewhatfrom the traditional security missions of screen,guard, and cover. Combat outposts normally fightfrom well-prepared, well-dug-in, nonmobile posi-tions, If directed, they accept a large amount of ground combat. They engage and destroy initialenemy forces with direct and indirect fires. Basedon their need for extended early warning or time,commanders augment combat outposts with sub-stantial fire support and CS forces to achieve desiredresults.

Commanders can establish a series or line of

combat outposts which, in addition to securing theirforces, may deceive the enemy on the location of the divisions’ defensive positions. These outpostsobserve the FEBA and may cause the enemy todeploy early and reveal his main effort.

If a requirement exists for a combat outpost line,coordination and control are necessary else the en-emy can easily bypass or flank individual outposts.Usually the division directs the trace of the line andbrigades control teams within sectors. A brigadecommander may pass control of outposts to the taskforces, permitting teams to fight or withdraw as

required to achieve the intended mission of theseoutposts. Further, if divisions do not require anoutposts line, a brigade or battalion may establishone if the situation requires.

Main Effort. The overall defensive battle maturesin the MBA. Division main battle and reserve forcesnormally fight the decisive fight. If the enemy is notdefeated deep, the simultaneity of the deep battleand the MBA engagement ultimately defeats theforce. The division allocates combat, CS, and CSSassets to its brigades and reserve for the MBA fight.Brigades fight engagements as part of the overall

division battle. In the defense, the division normallydesignates one brigade as its main effort. That bri-gade fights the most critical engagement and isresourced accordingly. The division shifts and syn-chronizes combat power where necessary to rein-force its brigades. Units subordinate to the divisionorganize their MBA defenses similar to the division;that is, they include reconnaissance, security, a maineffort, and reserve forces.

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Forces positioned in the MBA conduct area ormobile defenses. They control or repel enemy pene-trations. Combat, CS, and CSS options for friendlyand enemy forces become less numerous duringMBA engagements. The division and brigades ad-

just their initial plans to the developed situation andcommit themselves to decisive combat. Decisionsin defense may be reached through a single, massivecounterattack or in a series of local actions, depend-ing on the capabilities of the opposing commanders.The destruction of the attacker is always sought, butunder some economy of force circumstances, sim-ply stopping the enemy or limiting his advance canbe success in the defense.

The MBA brigades direct and control close op-erations using direct and indirect fires and maneuveragainst the assaulting enemy forces. The divisiondirects operations involving forward brigades andthe commitment of reserves. Concurrently, the di-vision conducts deep operations and counterfireoperations against enemy follow-on forces and criti-cal functional nodes.

A brigade structures its defense around static,mutually supporting positions deployed in depththroughout the MBA. Holding out a large mobilereserve and committing fewer elements to the initialMBA defense enhance defense effectiveness. Theprimary function of committed elements in such adefense is to slow the attack and fight it throughoutthe area. Ground and or air units then strike exposed

enemy forces and engage those that have penetratedthe defended area. Additionally, these mobile re-serves may be directed to conduct a spoiling attack.

Light forces can perform a variety of missions inthe MBA. Their use may free up mechanized andarmored forces for use elsewhere. Light infantryforces could conduct night infiltration attacksagainst key enemy targets; attack to secure rugged,restricted terrain that would deny the enemy the useof indirect approaches into friendly flanks and rear;and provide a rapidly deployable force to respondto opportunities on the battlefield. Light forces need

an area large enough to conduct offensively orienteddefensive operations. They exploit such techniquesas air assaults, ambushes, armored hunter-killerteam missions, and raids.

The defender cannot be strong everywhere andshould not attempt to be; he takes risks. For exam-ple, he may have to accept risk when moving forces

from ground positions to reinforce the reserve in adecisive blow against the enemy rear or flank. Airand ground cavalry, attack helicopter units, airmo-bile infantry, and battalion task forces operating aseconomy of force over wider areas could coverless-threatened areas. Ground surveillance radars,remote sensors, and obstacles can also help coversuch areas. Contingency plans are developed tocounter enemy efforts in these risk areas.

Employment of Reserves

The reserve provides the division a means toregain the initiative through offensive actions. Earlyin his planning, the division commander decides onthe size, composition, and mission of the reservebased on METT-T. Its primary purpose is to pre-serve the commander’s flexibility of action. Sec-

ondary purposes are to—•

•

•

•

•

Reinforce the defense of committed forces.

Block enemy forces that have penetrated theFEBA.

React to rear area threats.

Relieve depleted units and to provide for continu-ous operations.

Counterattack into the flanks of vulnerable en-emy forces.

The division commander must balance capabilitiesagainst requirements, assign priorities, and takerisks based on METT-T.

The division must develop force protection plansthat mask the probable location of the reserve’scommitment. Its commitment must be consistentwith and integrated into the corps commander’sscheme of maneuver and intent. The division con-siders time and distance factors associated with thereserve’s initial positioning to trigger the decisionto begin moving it toward specific objectives orenemy forces. The commander may not be able towait until favorable conditions are created to com-

mit the reserve. To accomplish its mission, he mayhave to take risks. Movement times or unexpectedenemy actions could possibly affect the reserveforce.

In difficult terrain lacking routes for movement,smaller reserve units may be positioned in the bri-gade areas to react quickly to the local battle. Lateral

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and forward high-speed deployment routes shouldbe available. In more open terrain, the armoreddivision positions a brigade in reserve at consider-able depth. Prior to the reserve’s commitment, en-gineers are assigned mobility and countermobilitytasks to support the reserve commander’s multipleroutes of movement. Control of engineers task-organized to support the reserve must pass to thereserve force in sufficient time to link up, resupply,reorganize, and rehearse to support the reservemission.

With substantial reserves, the division com-mander can permit or direct subordinate command-ers to commit all their forces. If he does not havesufficient reserves of his own, he may require hissubordinates to obtain his permission prior to theemployment of their reserves and he may specifytheir location.

Once the designated reserve force is committed,division and brigade commanders must reorganizeor redesignate a reserve. Forces most easily desig-nated are the TCF and the reserves of subordinateunits, depending on their level of commitment.

Artillery units earmarked to support reserves arepositioned for short-notice support throughout thescheme of maneuver. Until the reserve is commit-ted, the designated artillery supports the main battle,usually in a GS or general support reinforcement

role.Attack helicopters may be held initially in divi-

sion reserve or temporarily designated as the reserveduring the battle when other reserves have beencommitted. Because of their mobility and fire-power, attack helicopters are the quickest and mosteffective means of stopping enemy tank penetra-tions. They can be given missions with or withoutother maneuver elements.

The division commander uses decision pointsthroughout the sector to trigger early decisions oncommitment of the reserve and other actions. En-emy arrival at decision points is tied to the time andspace considerations needed for employment of thereserve. This information is graphically portrayedon the decision support template. The commanderthen determines which of his units will attack, wherethey will be positioned after the attack, and whatinterdiction or deep attack is needed to isolate theenemy. Success of the reserve depends on its timelycommitment, mass, surprise, speed, and boldness.

Attacking units seek to avoid enemy strength. Themost effective attacks seize strong positions thatpermit the attacking force to deliver fire on theexposed enemy’s flanks and rear. If the reserveforce is to stay and defend against another enemyforce, it must complete its tasks, reorganize, andgain good defensive positions before overmatchingor before the following enemy forces can interfere.

A counterattack is normally done with a reserveor lightly committed forward element. The divi-sion’s reserve counterattack plan normally includesthe mission, a brief statement of the higher head-quarters’ assigned mission, and the intent of thehigher headquarters; assumptions—the size andshape of an assumed penetration or enemy forma-tion; the strength and composition of the enemyforce; and the status of friendly forces in the MBA.Other factors include the capability to contain theenemy, deep battle assets available to support theattack, strength and responsiveness of the reserve atthe time of the attack execution, and availability andcapabilities of all munitions.

In some situations, the division or brigade com-mander may determine he cannot counterattack with a reasonable chance of success. He then useshis reserve to contain or delay the enemy to gaintime for the use of the higher echelon’s reserve. Thereserve must have fire support available or be able

to fire and maneuver to counterattack when anunexpected penetration occurs earlier than plannedor at a different location.

Such local counterattacks must be launched dur-ing the temporary confusion and disorganizationthat occur when the attacking forces have enteredthe position. The attackers have not had time toreorganize and establish themselves and cannotmaintain the operational tempo that allowed themto penetrate. Since this period is relatively short,counterattacks must be delivered judiciously and onthe initiative of the local commander. With avail-

able assets, he must eject the enemy and restoreconditions necessary to support the commander’sconcept and intent.

The reserve counterattack, when committed, be-comes the division’s main effort. The commanderavoids piecemeal commitment of the reserve. Hedoes not counterattack as an automatic reaction toan enemy penetration nor does he commit the re-serve solely because an enemy force has reached a

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Rear operations focus on maintaining the capabil-ity to sustain the division’s forces. Movement, se-curity, and terrain management, as well as areadamage control, are integrated with sustainment toprovide the division synchronized rear area support.

Three levels of enemy activity guide the planningfor rear operations. These levels focus on thefriendly response’ required to defeat the enemyrather than on the size or type of enemy. Level Ithreats can be defeated by base or base clusterself-defense measures. Level II threats are beyondbase or base cluster self-defense capabilities and canbe defeated by response forces, normally consistingof MPs with supporting fires. Level III threats re-quire the command decision to commit the TCF ora reserve force. Chapter 2 and Appendix E provideadditional information on rear operations.

TRANSITION TOTHE DEFENSE

When attacking units cease their attack and mustdefend, they generally have two options. One is tocommit forces and push forward to claim enoughground for a security and or covering force area (thatis beyond the majority of enemy artillery). Thesecond is to fall back to defensible terrain to estab-lish a security area, establishing the FLOT generallyalong the attacking force’s line of advance of finalobjectives. In both options, the FLOT is the forwardedge of the security area. The FEBA is the forwardedge of the main defensive area.

In the first option, the security area often lacksdepth. Additionally, the enemy force will probablyaccurately template the friendly FEBA trace andengage with artillery. Unfortunately, these actionsoften result in the loss of additional personnel andequipment and the expenditure of more resources.

In many cases, the second option is better. Com-manders pull back the bulk of their forces to defen-

sible terrain and establish the MBA on ground theattacking force already owns rather than under thethreat of enemy artillery. The forward edge of thesecurity area (the FLOT) remains along the line of contact.

Commanders must remain mentally agile andanticipate a transition to the defense. They must notfixate on phase lines and other control measures.

Deliberate planning is a must in any transition.Deliberate planning allows commanders to set con-ditions for a transition which include maintainingcontact, keeping the enemy off balance, and control-ling tempo. Deliberate planning using METT-T and

the operational plan will determine the depth of thesecurity area and the defense.

PLANNINGOPERATIONS

The corps or JTF commander sets the stage fordivision and brigade planning. One of these com-manders provides the division commander a mis-sion, his intent, and a concept of operation.Likewise, the division commander provides his sub-ordinate commanders a clear mission, intent, and the

division’s concept of operation. Coupled with de-centralized command and control, these elementsprovide brigade and battalion commanders flexibil-ity and agility to respond to rapid change to exploitopportunities on defensive battlefields.

Division, brigade, and battalion commanders or-ganize their defensive plan based on the mission, thenature of the enemy force, the terrain and weather,the troops available, the time available for troop-leading procedures, and orders from their highercommander. They identify and war-game possibleenemy reactions for inclusion in the plan. Contin-

gency plans to the basic defensive plan enable thecommanders and staff to remain proactive and readyfor possible forthcoming situations.

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engagement to provide the time and space requiredby the division commander. When the corps’ cav-alry regiment is used as a corps covering force, thedivision’s squadron may conduct a flank guard orperform an advance guard role. Following security

area operations, the squadron may become part of the division reserve or perform rear operations.(Security and reconnaissance missions are detailed inAppendix A.)

Fire Support

Field Artillery

The division commander allocates available firesupport to defending brigades. He places at least onefield artillery battalion in direct support of eachcommitted maneuver brigade. In exceptional cir-

cumstances, field artillery battalions may also pro-vide direct support to battalion task forces oreconomy of force units operating over wide front-ages. The division commander weights the maineffort with other organic, nonorganic, or joint fires.In both the area defense and mobile defense, firesupport weights the main effort. Under certain cir-cumstances, a field artillery brigade (from corpsartillery) can be given a mission of direct support,or general support, to a maneuver brigade, or rein-forcing or general support reinforcing to the brigadeDS artillery battalion.

The division fire support plan and task organiza-tion must also provide for lethal and nonlethal deepfires, counterfire, and SEAD and support rear anddeep operations. These fires are synchronized withother division assets, such as aviation, intelligence,and maneuver forces. The division artillery com-mander, the FSCOORD, plans and controls coun-terfire and SEAD operations. He is best positionedwhere he can see, sense, and anticipate the battle.The FSCOORD recommends to the division com-mander the artillery organization for combat of sup-porting FA brigades and battalions that gives theFSCOORD the flexibility to meet the division com-mander’s guidance.

To use fire support effectively, division com-manders must be able to fight not only with theirorganic fires, but also with joint fires. Joint firesincrease the division commander’s destructiveforce. Planners must be aware, however, of sisterservice capabilities and time requirements in re-questing strikes. This is imperative when integrating

multiservice delivery systems in simultaneous at-tacks across the depth of the battlefield. (See appli-cable joint publications listed in references.)

Combat AirThe G3 air and the senior ALO ensure that joint

air support is integrated and synchronized with theoverall division defensive plan. The TACP mustanticipate future air requirements to support thedivision’s transition from the defense to the offense.(See Chapter 4.) While priorities may shift, airsupport of division defensive operations is identicalto that required to support offensive operations.Combat aircraft are also effective counterfireweapon systems. The FSE and ALO coordinate andintegrate these assets into all fire support operationsat the division main CP. (Air support discussions arealso in Chapters 1 and 3.)


Engineers

The division engineer controls and establishes thepriorities for both division and corps engineer unitsin response to the commander’s defensive plan.(This is the engineer brigade commander in armoredand mechanized divisions; the battalion commanderin light infantry divisions.) The division engineerconstantly monitors the tactical situation and antici-pates future engineer support requirements to en-sure that sufficient personnel, equipment, andmaterials are at the right place, at the right time. Hepositions himself where he can best see and influ-ence engineer support to the division.

In the defense, major engineer efforts are directedtoward preparing routes for the mobility of friendlyforces (mobility), establishing obstacle zones andemplacing obstacles (countemobility), and prepar-ing strongpoints and fighting positions (survivabil-ity). The priority of engineer effort may change asthe division shifts its main effort from support to the

MBA brigades to the mobility of the reserve.

In a mobile defense, engineer assets must re-source both the striking force and the more staticdefending forces. Priority of effort for the strikingforce is to mobility and then countermobility opera-tions. The priority of effort for the static forces issurvivability and then countermobility. The seniorcommander establishes obstacle zones to turn and

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fix the penetrating enemy force and still permit rapidattack by the striking force. Aerial-delivered minesare critical to completing the obstacle plan in shap-ing the battlefield in front of the attacking enemyforce. The striking force may even conduct a hasty

breach and attack through a short-duration mine-field after the mines have disarmed.

Engineers should be task-organized with the re-connaissance elements in front of the striking force.Highly mobile engineer forces should be well for-ward and integrated into the leading maneuver for-mations of the striking force. Follow-on engineersconduct route improvement, replace AVLBs withbridges, and expand obstacle breaches. Engineerswith flank units focus on countermobility to impedepotential enemy counterattacks.

In all defenses, synchronization of mobility and

countermobility requires specified obstacle zonesand obstacle-restricted areas. This ensures em-placed obstacles do not interfere with, and are syn-chronized with, the division’s overall defensiveplan. At all echelons, maneuver commanders, firesupporters, and engineers work together to combinethe combat multiplier effects of obstacles (friendly,enemy, and terrain) and to enhance friendly directand indirect fires.

Air-delivered artillery and engineer-emplacedFASCAMs disrupt and fix enemy movement orsudden enemy penetrations so that counterattacking

forces can engage them. Engineer actions must becoordinated among maneuver, CS, and CSS units toensure a synchronized effort. The assistant divisionengineer (ADE) is a special staff officer within thedivision headquarters. The ADE is normally locatedat the division main CP where he coordinates andmonitors engineer operations. For example, divi-sion and corps transportation assets must be syn-chronized with the division’s countemobility andsurvivability effort to ensure the timely and uninter-rupted flow of adequate obstacle and class Vmaterial.

Chemical

Throughout the defensive planning process, thedivision commander plans for enemy use of NBCweapons and his division’s employment of NBCdefense units. The G3 and the division chemicalofficer analyze all plans, tactical units, and CSSunits to determine their vulnerability to these

weapons. The division commander specifies thedegree of risk he is willing to accept. The divisionchemical officer recommends changes to the defen-sive concept of operation if the concept involvesunacceptable risks from enemy NBC weapons. Di-

vision NBC defensive operations are geared towardidentifying contaminated areas that will directlyimpact on the division plan. The division chemicalofficer employs the NBC reconnaissance and smokewhere it can best support the division’s main effort.

Air Defense

Division air defense artillery is employed in massand mix to support the defensive scheme of maneu-ver. The ADA battalion commander advises thedivision commander on air defense systems em-

ployment, support relationships, and air threatstatus. His headquarters is responsible for the divi-sion’s early warning systems.

In the defense, ADA priorities often include cov-ering forces, logistics, tire support, and C

2facilities.

ADA units must be as mobile and protected as themaneuver unit they are supporting and must beintegrated into the combined arms plan. Air defenseunits from the covering force transition into theMBA air defense scheme when the covering forcereturns to the main battle area. Normally, a divisionADA battery directly supports each ground maneu-

ver brigade. All units use passive and internal airdefense measures to protect their operations fromenemy air activities. Air defense must be continu-ally synchronized with aviation operations to pre-clude fratricide of friendly aviation assets.

Combat Service Support

Sustainment

The G4 and the DISCOM commander must un-derstand the intent of the division, corps, and or JTFcommanders to develop a support plan to sustain thedefense. Knowing the intent and concept of opera-tion allows them to anticipate CSS requirements.The G4, in conjunction with the ADC-S, developsa concept of support and recommends support pri-orities to the division commander. With the G3 andthe DISCOM commander, the G4 recommends aCSS task organization to support the division defen-sive plan.

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The DISCOM commander tailors the task organi-zation of the brigade’s direct support FSB to meetspecific needs of units operating within the maneu-ver brigade’s area of operations. The DISCOMmust look beyond the defense to anticipate support

requirements as the division transitions to the of-fense. Additional sustainment considerations arediscussed in Appendix E.

Military Police

The employment of MP units in the defense dif-fers somewhat by division type. Support relation-ships depend on the commander’s concept for theoperation, a METT-T analysis, and risk assessment.(Often in lighter divisions (light, airborne, and airassault), the MP company will be in general sup-port.) Optimally, each forward brigade receives anMP platoon to support its defense. Remaining MPplatoons of the divisional MP company are in gen-eral support to the division with the priority tobattlefield circulation control, area security, andEPW operations. During the defense, the com-mander may place the division band OPCON toorganizations responsible for rear area security op-erations. The band should be employed intact forthese operations, facilitating the commander’s abil-ity to quickly return them to their primary mission.

Command and ControlBattle Command

In the defense, the division commander employsa command group and or a TAC CP forward in abrigade AO to directly influence and maintain con-trol of the close fight. Most critical is that thedivision commander locate where he can see thetotal battle and make timely decisions. The divi-sion’s deep operations are normally controlled at themain CP through the DOCC. The ADC-S controlsthe division’s rear operations from the rear CP in thedivision rear area.

Command and control facilities in forward areasmust be lean enough to rapidly and constantly relo-cate to survive. Emphasis is on locating them inhardened areas or protective terrain and reducingelectronic signature. All personnel and equipmentnot required for the express purpose of commandingand controlling the division are left elsewhere.

Deception

Division planners must develop a deception storythat supports the corps’ deception plan. The decep-tion story must portray a logical, situational, anddoctrinally correct scheme of maneuver that is notonly believable to enemy commanders, but supportsthe true friendly scheme of maneuver. It shouldcause the enemy to perform some action or nonac-tion that is favorable to friendly courses of action.The division must then develop the means to iden-tify enemy reconnaissance patrols (both ground andair) entering the division’s security area. These en-emy patrols must be engaged and destroyed fromlocations with the type weapons that support the

deception story.

Signal

In the defense, the division’s signal battalion con-nects all major command elements and establishesentry procedures into the communications systemsfor covering forces, units in the MBA, the rear, andthe reserve. Communication centers displace lessoften in the defense. However, they must have plansto rapidly displace personnel and equipment (par-ticularly MSE) on short notice. Messengers andsecure digital data reduce the requirement for voiceradio transmissions and provide a high degree of signal security. Radio communications are nor-mally not used if other communications means areavailable. Radio nets remain open, but on listeningsilence. Digital data and wire communications arethe primary means used during the preparation of the defense.

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CHAPTER 6

RETROGRADE OPERATIONS

Retrograde operations are organized and orderlymovements to the rear or away from the enemy.They may occur on the orders of a higher headquar-ters or be forced by enemy actions, They are classi-fied as delay, withdrawal, or retirement. Retrogradeoperations allow the division to inflict damage onenemy troops and equipment while maintaining itsfighting integrity.

PURPOSE

Retrograde operations are conducted to improvethe overall tactical situation or to prevent a worsesituation from occurring. Commanders may call fordivisional retrograde operations to accomplish oneor more of the following:

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Inflict casualties on an enemy while avoidingdecisive combat.

Gain time and avoid fighting a decisive engage-ment.

Reshape the battlefield to maintain contact on theleft and right.

Take advantage of more defensible terrain.Permit the employment of the division elsewhere.

Fight against a numerically superior force.

Minimize the effects of poor terrain and capitalizeon good terrain.

Mass division forces for a penetration.

Deceive the enemy into committing his forces.

Create a salient in the division sector to shape thebattlefield.

When moving a force from its present disposi-tions rearward for use against the enemy in morefavorable circumstances, commanders—

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Disengage and move less mobile units and non-essential elements prior to withdrawing the mainbody.

Use more mobile units to cover the movement of less mobile units.

• Use minimum essential forces to cover the move-ment of the main body.

• Provide adequate fire support means to units leftin contact.

PLANNING FACTORS

Commanders consider several factors when plan-ning retrograde operations. They include leadershipand morale, reconnaissance, mobility, and battle-field deception.

Leadership and Morale

Maintaining theN offensive spirit is essentialamong subordinate leaders and troops during retro-grade operations. Movement to the rear may be seenas a defeat or a threat of isolation unless command-ers are well forward and ensure that soldiers knowthe purpose of the operation and their role in theconcept of operation.

Reconnaissance

Often the commander near the scene of action hasthe only accurate information during a retrogradeoperation. Intelligence requirements for the com-mander increase as forces are echeloned to the rearand as forward combat capabilities are reduced.Intelligence collectors remain well forward to locateenemy attempts to pursue, outflank, and isolate allor a portion of the retrograde force.

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Mobility

The greater the retrograding force’s mobility overan enemy, the greater the chance of a successfuloperation. Commanders must enhance friendly mo-bility and degrade enemy mobility. The division’smobility is improved through—

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Conducting key leader reconnaissance of theroutes and battle positions.

Improving existing road networks and controllingtraffic flow.

Executing well-rehearsed unit movement SOPSand battle drills.

Positioning air defense artillery and securityforces at critical choke points.

Evacuating civilian refugees or restricting theirmovements to nondivision-used routes.

Evacuating casualties, recoverable supplies, andunnecessary stocks early.

Displacing nonessential command and controland CSS activities early.

The enemy’s mobility is degraded through—

Occupying and controlling terrain or choke pointsthat dominate high-speed avenues of approach.

Improving natural obstacles with reinforcing ob-

stacles and covering them by fire.Employing indirect fire and smoke to degrade theenemy’s vision and to slow his rate of advance.

Conducting spoiling attacks to keep the enemy

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off balance and to force him to react to anotherattack.

Deception

Deception operations are routinely planned toproduce surprise from resulting unit moves anddispositions. Deception can cause indecision anddelay in the enemy’s actions. Units must use toadvantage darkness and other limited-visibility con-ditions as well as exfiltration techniques to coverrelocation and evacuation during deception opera-tions. Employing phony minefield and decoy po-sitions, and maintaining normal radio trafficpatterns and artillery improve security. Other decep-tion measures are radio listening silence for

disengaging units, feints and demonstrations, anddeceptive EW and PSYOP.

DELAY

The delay is an operation in which the division,under enemy pressure, trades space for time whileinflicting maximum damage on the enemy. Com-manders normally conduct delays without becom-ing decisively engaged. This preserves the force aswell as freedom of movement.

The division conducts a delay when the corps orJPC needs time to concentrate or withdraw forcesto establish defenses in greater depth, or to econo-mize forces in an area. The division may execute thedelay—

As a covering force for a main body that is de-fending or withdrawing.

As an advance guard when encountering superiorforces.

As an economy of force to fix, contain, or slowan enemy attack on a less critical avenue of approach.

As a deception measure to set up a counterattack.

To gain time for units to proceed away from theenemy to prepare a subsequent defensiveposition.

In the delay, destroying the enemy force is secon-dary to slowing his advance to gain time. The divi-sion delays in sector to slow and defeat as much of the enemy as possible without sacrificing the divi-sion’s tactical integrity. The division may delayforward of a specified line for a specified time orevent. This task requires a unit to prevent enemyforces from reaching a given area earlier than adirected time or event, regardless of the cost. Sub-ordinate friendly elements attack, defend, and con-duct ambushes, raids, feints, and other actions todestroy as much of the enemy as possible.

The delay is fought much in the same way as theinitial defensive covering force battle. Task forcesengage the enemy from previously selected posi-tions in depth. This causes the enemy to deploy hisforces. Meanwhile, friendly forces move to the nextbattle position before the enemy can concentratesufficient combat power. Also, air and ground am-bushes are executed to keep the enemy off balance.

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The key to any delay plan is a simple task organi-zation. Task organizations that can be maintainedthroughout the battle are most effective. Because of the decentralized control during the battle, changesin task organizations during the delay are difficult.When ordering a delay, the commander specifies—

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The intent of the operation—what must be done.Task organization.

Conduct of the operation—when, where, andhow.

Measures to be used to cover gaps and flanks.

Control measures.

The main effort-who.

The division assigns sectors to its maneuver ele-ments along with phase lines or delay positions forcontrol. During the execution of the delay, all or part

of the delaying force elements maintains constantcontact and pressure with the enemy. The contactand pressure could alternate between several unitsas the division continues its delaying tactics awayfrom the enemy. (See Figure 6-1.)

In a delay, the division normally retains a small,mobile reserve. The reserve conducts standard re-serve missions as well as provides overwatch firefor a withdrawing unit. Reserves counterattack to

limited objectives. In this type of action, the coun-terattack force normally strikes the enemy’s flankto disrupt and delay him. This counterattack is force-oriented and normally does not attempt to secureand hold terrain.

Committed brigades also retain small reserves ina delay. These reserves are used on the same typesof missions as the division reserve. The divisioncommander may require subordinate commandersto obtain his permission before committing theirreserves.

A delay is more difficult to execute if the initiativeis left entirely to the enemy. The division com-mander seizes the initiative through counterattacksand limited spoiling attacks. When the retention of specified areas is required or when space is limited

or time requirements are long, the division mayactually defend in parts of the sector.

If the division commander cannot successfullydelay the enemy and still preserve his force, he mustinform the corps or joint force commander. Thishigher commander then decides to accept less timeand preserve the division or to gain the time he needsand risk losing all or part of the division.

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WITHDRAWAL

Withdrawals are planned operations in which adivision in contact completely disengages from anenemy force, either to preserve the force or releaseit for a new mission. Withdrawals are normally freefrom enemy pressure; however, commanders planthem both with pressure, and without. Commandersshould plan deception to deceive the enemy. Decep-tion for the covering force and main body couldinclude multiple routes, additional transportation,route improvement, and movement planning.

Withdrawals under enemy pressure normally aresubject to enemy observation and take place at night.Commanders must avoid premature actions thatlead the enemy to believe a withdrawal is beingcontemplated. Elements withdrawing use delayingtactics to fight their way to the rear. The greater thedivision’s mobility, the better it can successfullywithdraw. Commanders must anticipate enemymeans of interference and effectively employ secu-rity forces, attack helicopters, CAS, and airsuperiority.

A withdrawal under enemy pressure requiresclose coordination between withdrawing units andthe security force. The security force should consistof armored and mechanized infantry augmented byattack helicopters, field artillery, engineers, and airdefense artillery.

Under enemy pressure, the less heavily engagedelements of the forward brigades withdraw first.The more heavily engaged units generally withdrawunder cover of the division or corps security forceand with support provided through available firesupport, EW assets, and obstacles. Night moves andobscuration smoke are used to screen movementand to reduce enemy observation and the accuracyof enemy fire. The division’s movement and opera-tions are similar to those of a delay on alternatepositions. The security forces and disengaged bri-gades continue to use alternate and successive

positions until the entire division breaks contactwith the enemy.

When conducting withdrawals not under enemypressure, the division specifies the planned time of withdrawal. For utmost secrecy and deception, thecommander takes advantage of darkness and re-duced visibility, commencing the withdrawal assoon as the enemy cannot effectively deliver

observed fires. The division controls the movementof subordinate units through—

• Designating primary and alternate routes.

• Designating priority of movement.

• Enforcing traffic control measures.

In daylight, commanders limit activities thatmight disclose the intentions to withdraw, such asabnormal or excessive movement of vehicles to therear. Necessary daylight movements to the rear,including reconnaissance, should be by infiltration.

Units withdrawing without enemy pressure maydirect that their covering force stay in contact toprolong the deception by simulating normal activi-ties. Covering forces and rear guards normally re-main between the enemy and the main body. After

the main body is a safe distance to the rear, thecovering force withdraws to intermediate or finalpositions. These forces should have mobility equalto or greater than that of the enemy. The withdraw-ing force moves to the rear in the followingsequence:

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Elements to reconnoiter and prepare the nextposition.

CSS units.

Artillery not essential to the support of detach-ments left in contact.

Division security force.

Main body.

Detachments left in contact and direct supportartillery for the detachments left in contact.

Units in the forward area execute the withdrawalon a broad front. Units move directly to the rear,form march columns, and proceed to designatedtactical assembly areas. These areas are widely dis-persed and are occupied for minimum periods.

The detachments left in contact have a limited

capability for resistance. They must depend ondeception and long-range supporting fires to accom-plish their mission. Although the division coordi-nates their employment, the brigade specifies theirtime of withdrawal, coordinating the action withadjacent units. The withdrawal of detachments leftin contact is initiated in time to permit completionduring limited visibility. The success of a with-drawal not under enemy pressure depends on

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control, security, and deception. Detailed plans, de-ception, and simulation of normal radio traffic, fires,and other activities aid control and security. Oncein the defended area, the withdrawing force either

joins the defense or continues to the rear in a

retirement.

RETIREMENT

A retirement is conducted when units are not incontact with the enemy. Although normally over-matched by other units’ security forces, retiringunits must use force protection measures againstenemy air, ground, and long-range fires while mov-ing rearward.

The division assigns definite objectives or rear

positions to each of the major subordinate com-mands moving with the main body. Movement dur-ing darkness or reduced visibility, while preferred,is more difficult. During the initial stage of theretirement, control is decentralized to subordinatecommanders. However, as the main body increasesthe distance between itself and the enemy and as theunits rejoin, the division commander resumes cen-tralized control.

Security for the main body is similar to that for amovement to contact. Advance, flank, and rearguards provide security. The rear guard is normally

stronger when a withdrawal action precedes a retire-ment. If enemy contact occurs, the rear guard usesdelaying actions to hold the advancing enemy andto prevent interference with the movement of themain body. The commander must plan for enemyinterference while retiring. Reconnaissance obtainsearly information on enemy interference attempts.The retiring force should be positioned to supportthe higher command’s future operational plans.

BOS CONSIDERATIONS

IntelligenceWhen the division delays, major information col-

lection capabilities, such as GSRs, SIGINT sensors,and countermortar and counterbattery radars, locatewell forward. Corps collection systems augment thedivision’s intelligence collection as they displace.

Aggressive electronic warfare (EW) minimizesthe effects of enemy EW operations and slows the

enemy’s attack coordination or pursuit. In particu-lar, it interrupts enemy fire support coordination.Commanders rely on personal reconnaissance andspot reports from the tactical units for timelyinformation.

Maneuver

The division cavalry squadron may perform routeand area reconnaissance to the rear of the divisionin preparation for the retrograde operation. In with-drawals without enemy pressure, brigades and otherunits in contact designate units to be left in contact.This protects the main body’s initial movement tothe rear and simulates the normal combat posture.Where there is enemy pressure, security forces at alllevels cover forward elements that withdraw intactwithout leaving detachments in contact. This delay-ing force is task-organized with armor and antiar-mor capabilities to delay and inflict casualties on theenemy.

The aviation brigade provides a mobile and lethalguard force to interdict enemy units attempting toattack the division’s flanks. The aviation brigadealso assists ground maneuver forces to disengageand continue in their retrograde mission.

Fire Support

During the delay, artillery is located well forwardand echeloned in depth. This allows artillery—

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To fire deep into enemy formations and forceearly deployment.

To slow and degrade the effectiveness of enemyarmored vehicles.

To suppress and destroy overmatching enemy airdefense, weapon systems, and artillery commandobservation posts.

To deliver antipersonnel or antiarmor mines tocomplement and reinforce the effects of obstacles.

To deliver smoke to cover the movement of dis-placing maneuver units.

To mass fires to support the extrication of threat-ened or isolated units.

Close air support provides the division com-mander highly responsive fires. CAS aids the

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subordinate units in disengaging from the enemyand supports limited objective counterattacks. Aer-ial interdiction against enemy targets prevents en-emy forces from establishing a parallel pursuingforce.


Engineers use obstacles (friendly, enemy, andterrain) and other resources to reduce enemy mobil-ity. Ideally, a battalion-sized force of engineerssupports each committed brigade in the delay.Based on time available, engineers—

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Prepare point obstacle targets (road craters, aba-tis), destroy bridges, and block tunnels. Executionis normally delegated to the maneuver unit having

responsibility for the AO.

Emplace hasty minefield, cut antitank ditches,and emplace other antiarmor obstacles to blockenemy high-speed avenues of approach andcanalize them into choke points.

Conduct denial operations against any resourcesthat the enemy can use to sustain his attack.

Improve routes between battle positions.

Prepare hasty fighting positions for maneuverunits.

Prepare landing zones and airfields to facilitaterapid retrograde operations.

As units displace to the rear, chemical units mayconduct NBC reconnaissance or provide a cover of smoke to conceal troop movement.

Air Defense

The air defense artillery battalion is employedbased on the division commander’s ADA priorities.

Normally, one battery is in direct support to eachcommitted brigade to protect critical divisionaviation, logistics, or command and control. ADAassets may also be used in a point defense of criticalassets throughout the delay sector.


DISCOM elements must provide responsive sup-port without interfering with the movement of tac-tical units. Their planning must reflect the critical

nature of retrograde operations. This mandates pushresupply with a priority towards fuel and ammuni-tion—using fuel from local resources when possibleand pre-positioning ammunition packages nearfighting positions. Committed units’ forward main-tenance support teams (MSTs) repair equipmenton-site or collect disabled vehicles for repair orevacuation. DISCOM elements move medical sup-plies to the rear to prevent capture or abandonmentand destroy items of military hardware potentiallyuseful to the enemy. They use battle damage assess-ment and repair (BDAR) techniques to return dis-abled equipment to combat.

Supplies moving into the forward areas should bekept to a minimum. This prevents their unnecessaryhauling, destruction, or loss. Other DISCOM re-sponsibilities include—

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Evacuating excess supplies and logistics facilitiesas early as possible.

Providing the postal system specific mail routing,stop, and start instructions to prevent mail stock-piles and redirection requirements for redeployedunits.

Pre-positioning supplies along withdrawal routesto reduce enemy interference with supply opera-tions, simplify resupply, reduce vehicular clutter,and permit the early withdrawal of supply units.

Maintaining strength accountability, safety, andcasualty reporting of units and individuals.

Command and Control

During the delay, division commanders positionthemselves where they can best control the opera-tion. Their primary means of communication issecure voice radio. Because radio is vulnerable to

EW, commanders may use visual signals, messen-gers, and wire line communications. The use of communications assets during the delay requiresdetailed planning because command posts and sig-nal support nodes frequently displace.

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CHAPTER 7

OTHER OPERATIONS

The division conducts other operations to supportoffensive and defensive operations. These opera-tions may require augmentation of specializedequipment and personnel with special skills. Thetype of augmentation will depend on the charac-teristics of the area of operations, conditions underwhich they are conducted, the nature of the opera-tions, or a combination of these factors.

banks, the force does not have to clear all enemyforces from the river but exploits the enemy’s con-fusion and inability to effectively oppose the cross-ing. The skillful use of night, smoke, fog, and badweather is effective.

The force crosses the river at multiple pointsacross a broad front as soon as its elements reachthe river. Minimum forces remain behind to securethe crossing sites.

RIVER CROSSINGOPERATIONS

Deliberate CrossingDivision river crossing operations project combatpower across a waterway while ensuring the integ-rity and momentum of the force. Divisions gener-ally have no bridging for large-scale river crossingoperations. These are conducted as part of a corpsoperation with additional bridging assets from corpsengineer units. The best method of securing a rivercrossing, METT-T dependent, is through (or sup-ported by) air assaults. Division headquarters antici-pate and plan in detail for river crossings. Theplanning requirements and technical support aresimilar whether the crossing is hasty, deliberate, or

retrograde. (See Field Manual 90-13 for a detaileddiscussion.)

Hasty Crossing

A hasty crossing of a waterway is normally doneas soon as the unit reaches the waterway, usingequipment at hand or readily available. It is plannedand conducted as a continuation of the operationunderway. Although the crossing is termed hasty,planning, SOPs, and battle drills ensure that firesupport and crossing means are available to the

force on arrival at the waterway. Loss of momentumis minimal.

Preferable to a deliberate crossing, the hastycrossing features decentralized control. A conciseorder articulating the commander’s intent allowsexploitation wherever subordinate units success-fully force a crossing. When possible, advance ele-ments seize crossing sites intact and ahead of themain body. When enemy resistance is light on both

A deliberate crossing of a waterway is used whenextensive enemy defenses are present, a division ismoving from a defensive posture to an offensiveposture, a hasty crossing is not feasible, or a hastycrossing is unsuccessful. Deliberate crossings re-quire detailed planning and preparation.

In both the hasty and deliberate crossings, a cross-ing force commander plans and controls the opera-tion. In a division crossing, it is normally theassistant division commander for maneuver

(ADC-M).

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The crossing force commander has a temporaryheadquarters with minimum staff representation.Additional manning may come from the higherheadquarters. Staff representation is as follows:

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G3: operations and area security.Division engineer brigade commander: crossingforce engineer.

Provost marshal: movement control.

Division signal battalion commander: communi-cations.

DISCOM: logistics.

Division air defense artillery battalion com-mander: ADA coverage.

Division artillery: indirect fire support.

Division chemical officer: smoke, NBC recon-naissance and decontamination.

Division transportation officer: movement ordersand control.

Planning for a river crossing is divided into dis-tinct phases: advance to the river, assault crossingof the river, advance from the exit bank, and secur-ing of the bridgehead line. During execution there

are no planned pauses between the phases; theoperation proceeds as the attack continues. (SeeFigure 7-1.)

Securing the division bridgehead line requires

controlling the exit bank area. It must be largeenough to accommodate the assault force and thesupport elements of the crossing force. It must denythe enemy the ability to observe and engage thebridgehead area. Terrain and space within thebridgehead must be defensible against a possibleenemy counterattack. Objectives within this area areassigned to assault forces. Once the bridgehead issecured, the river crossing operation is completed.

With the division commander’s guidance, thedivision crossing force commander and his staff plan a river crossing operation using the following

tactical concepts:• Assault forces lead the initial assault of the river

and continue the advance from the exit bank tothe bridgehead objective or to the air assaultterrain objectives along the bridgehead line.

Follow-up forces provide overmatching directand indirect fire support, crossing site security,and follow and support assistance to the assaultforce.

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contact or out of contact with the enemy. A passageof lines is a difficult and dangerous operation.

Forward Passage of Lines

In a forward passage of lines, a unit passesthrough another unit that may be in contact with theenemy. This is done to continue the attack. Thestationary unit supports the passing unit until itsfires are masked. A forward passage of lines isnormally not done while in direct contact with en-emy combat units. (Attacks to envelop or flank theenemy are normally conducted when friendly forcesare in direct contact with enemy combat forces.)Planning for a forward passage of lines is similar toplanning for a relief in place. On receipt of a warningorder that directs a passage of lines, the passingcommander and his staff establish liaison with the

stationary unit. The passing unit normally collocatesits TAC or main CP with the TAC or main CP of the stationary unit.

Close coordination is essential for a passage of lines. Commanders and staffs of the units involvedcoordinate—

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Exchange of information and intelligence on en-emy forces.

Exchange of tactical plans, to include obstacleplans.

Exchange of standing operating instructions, es-pecially common signals, such as flares.

Arrangements for elements of the passing units toperform reconnaissance.

Security measures during the passage.

Selection of areas of passage and provisions forguides.

Priorities for use of routes and facilities and pro-visions for movement control. The passing unitmust have priority.

Time or circumstances when responsibility forcontrol of the area affected by the passage will betransferred.

Provisions to provide continuous fire support andother combat support during operations.

Unit CSS responsibilities.

Exchange of liaison personnel at all levels.

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Collection and exchange of information onfriendly minefield and other obstacles.

Command relationship between passing CS andCSS units and facilities, and the stationary unit inwhose area they may plan to locate.

Measures to minimize vulnerability to enemyNBC munitions.

Tactical cover and deception plans to retain se-crecy and to aid in gaining surprise.

When possible, passage areas are along bounda-ries between stationary units. This reduces the riskthat results when one unit passes directly throughthe occupied positions of another unit.

The passing unit has priority for routes to andwithin the area affected by the passage. The station-

ary unit is responsible for traffic control. During thepassage, the passing unit augments the traffic con-trol capability of the stationary unit.

Close coordination and understanding betweencommanders and staffs of the units involved areessential for a smooth transfer of control. Whencommands determine a time or identifiable event fortransfer of control and responsibility to the com-mander of the passing unit, the information is dis-seminated to the lowest levels of both commands.Prior to the transfer of responsibility, the passingunit is TACON to the stationary unit in the area

affected by the passage. Transfer of control mayoccur when the lead battalions pass the start pointsof their passage lanes. At that point, the commanderof the passing division is committed and exercisestactical control over the stationary unit until thebrigade (or brigades) is out of direct fire range of the stationary unit (or other agreed-upon phase line).Phase lines delineate areas of responsibility andcontrol of units.

Direct and indirect fire from in-place units nor-mally support passing units. After responsibility istransferred, the commander of the passing unit co-

ordinates all fires. One technique is to use the indi-rect fires of the unit in place until passage iscomplete. The indirect fire means of the passing unitmove to support the continuation of the attack.

The stationary unit furnishes the following CSSassistance to the passing unit:

• Evacuation of casualties and prisoners of war.

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Civilian and straggler control.

Use of areas and facilities; for example, waterpoints, medical treatment.

Route priority and traffic control.

Evacuation of disabled vehicles.

Movement schedules ensure that units do not stop(at least until the division’s combat and combatsupport have completed the passage). This alongwith multiple passage points minimizes the time thattwo friendly forces are concentrated in a forwardarea.

Division commanders agree on support and ter-mination arrangements. Normally, this occurs whenall of the maneuver brigades (including reserve) of

the passing unit have moved out of the direct firesupport range of the passed unit. However, artilleryfires, ADA, and other area and long-range weaponsmay remain in support until directed by higherheadquarters or coordinated with the passing unit.

Rearward Passage of Lines

In a rearward passage of lines, a unit effecting aretrograde movement passes through the sector of aunit occupying a rearward defensive position. With-drawal through a rearward position is executed to

relieve an overcommitted or a depleted unit, as partof a retrograde operation, or to allow the pulled-back unit to accomplish another mission. The rear-ward moving unit may move to a rest area to refitand retrain, cover the withdrawal of another unit, ormove to another area to be committed to otheractions.

Division planning for executing a rearward pas-sage of lines is similar to that for a forward passageof lines. On receipt of a warning order for an opera-tion that entails a retrograde through a rearwardposition, the divisions collocate their main com-

mand posts to coordinate the operation while theTAC CP continues the close fight. All levels ex-change liaison personnel.

The commanders and staffs of the units involvedin the movement coordinate the same details as fora forward passage of lines. The unit passing throughthe rearward position coordinates its plan for recog-nition with the unit in position.

Selecting areas or points of passage that permitthe rearward moving unit to pass around the flanksof the units in position reduces vulnerability toenemy attacks. Designating release points well tothe rear of those positions also reduces the units’

vulnerability to enemy attacks. The rearward mov-ing unit has priority on roads and facilities to moverapidly through the defended area.

Coordination between commanders is critical tothe successful execution of operations and the trans-fer of control and responsibility between stationaryand passing commanders. The area affected by thepassage, either in the zone of attack or the sector of defense, becomes the responsibility of the stationaryforce commander. Coordination is even more criti-cal when the rearward passage is staggered or incre-mental across the sector or area of operations. Thistransfer of responsibility requires that the com-mander conducting the retrograde relinquish controlof those elements of his unit that may remain incontact at the time of transfer.

The stationary unit furnishes the rearward mov-ing unit with all possible assistance, to include com-bat, CS, and CSS assistance. Fire support of the unitin position is critical to the moving unit, especiallyin covering the withdrawal of detachments left incontact during a delay. The commander of the ret-rograde unit identifies the last element of his com-mand as it passes through the stationary unit. He alsoreports clearance of his last element from the de-fended sector.

LINKUP OPERATIONS

Linkup operations are conducted to join twofriendly forces. Both forces may be moving towardone another, or one may be stationary or encircled.Linkup operations are most often conducted—

• To complete the encirclement of an enemy force.

• To assist the breakout of an encircled friendlyforce.

• To join an attacking force with a force inserted inthe enemy rear area (for example, an airborne, airassault, or infiltration force).

For a corps or joint force linkup operation, thedivision’s higher headquarters establishes the com-mand relationship between forces and the responsi-bilities of each. It also establishes control measures

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mass-destruction munitions. Intermingling of forces increases the burdens on command and con-trol systems. Movement control, fire support coor-dination, communications nets and facilities, andsecurity and obstacle plans require close coordina-

tion and liaison between all headquarters involved.

Planning Factors

The relief unit order includes the time for relief,relieved units and sequence, restrictions for advanceparties, security, time and place for issuing theorder, routine route priorities, and discussion of future missions. Coordination and synchronizationare achieved primarily through overlay graphics,event sequences, and march tables. A current intel-ligence update is provided with the order.

Advance Party

On receipt of the relief warning order, the divisionorganizes an advance party. The advance party in-filtrates forward to avoid detection and maintains alow profile. For a deliberate relief operation, theTAC CP, reinforced with selected coordinating andspecial staff officers, collocates with the TAC CPof the unit being relieved. When time is short, as inthe hasty relief, a small advance party consisting of TAC CP personnel moves quickly to the main CP

of the relieved unit, conducts liaison functions forother staff agencies, coordinates the relief, and is-sues FRAGOs while subordinate units are movingto the area of operations.

Communications

To maintain security, the outgoing unit’s radionets, command frequencies, and operators are used.Increased radio traffic on the in-place unit net sendsa message that something is about to happen. Theoutgoing division signal officer remains in chargeof communications throughout the entire relief.

Fire Support

The preferred technique in a relief in place is torelieve artillery last. If possible, the outgoing unitartillery remains in position until all units are re-lieved. If the purpose of the relief is to continue theattack, all artillery remains in support.

Artillery is not required to relieve weapon forweapon unless firing positions are limited. Decep-tion is enhanced and detection is minimized whenrelieving batteries locate near, and integrate theirfires with those of, the outgoing unit. Until the

change of control is designated, all field artillery,like all ground units, remains under the control of the outgoing commander. This requires close coor-dination with the supported units.

Air Defense

ADA units have two responsibilities. The first isto support the relief of forward committed forces.The second is to increase the ADA coverage overall primary relief routes. These tasks are accom-plished jointly after the division relief plan is

developed.

Passage of Control

Normally, the relieving division’s TAC or mainCP collocates with the outgoing unit’s TAC or mainCP, and both commanders or their designated rep-resentatives remain together during the relief. RearCPs use liaison elements to plan support and meetrequirements. Usually rear CPs do not collocatebecause of their size and subsequent vulnerabilityto enemy engagements. Initially, the unit being re-lieved has TACON over the relieving unit. Com-manders, normally with corps guidance, determinea time or an event to effect the transfer of responsi-bility. For example, the agreed time for transfercould be when two-thirds of the ground maneuverforces of the relieving division are in place andprepared to conduct tactical operations. Control of all units within the division area of operations thenpasses to the relieving commander. All units inplace, regardless of their parent organization, comeunder the TACON of the designated commander.When possible, a clear, short, and simple messageis sent to all units in the sector acknowledging the

transfer of responsibility.

Exchange of Equipment

Units may need to exchange certain weapons,supplies, equipment and, occasionally, vehicles.The corps identifies the division’s common supplyexchange items and any other specific equipmentthat warrants exchange. The division provides

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guidance but leaves the details to brigade and bat-talion commanders.

Interoperability

Reliefs in future conflicts may involve, at somepoint, replacing a force from another nation. Plan-ning considerations must include the following:

•

•

•

•

•

Dissimilar unit organizations may require specialadjustments in assigned sectors.

Control of fire support may require specialliaison.

Language difficulties may require the increaseduse of liaison.

Use of outgoing unit radios will require special

arrangements.Ammunition incompatibility needs to be exam-ined in detail.

ENCIRCLEMENTOPERATIONS

Conducting Encirclements

Encirclements are force-oriented operations to

enclose and capture or defeat large groups of enemyforces. Although terrain objectives may be desig-nated, isolation or defeat of enemy forces is theprimary goal. Encirclements can be deliberate orunforeseen opportunities created by offensiveaction.

Factors of METT-T have a significant impact onwhether, and how, to conduct an encirclement. Plan-ning considerations include-

•

•

•

•

Will the encirclement involve an envelopment,double envelopment, or other form of maneuver?

What fire control measures will be needed duringthe envelopment?

How will encircling units be organized and posi-tioned to secure the LOC and prevent encircledforces’ breakout attempts or outside enemyforces’ linkup attempts?

When, where, and how will linkup operationsoccur during the encirclement?

Encirclements make efficient use of attackingforces when it may be impractical or too costly toattack everywhere along an enemy’s front. The idealresult is the surrender of the encircled force. Thisminimizes the loss of both friendly and enemy lives

and equipment. Generally, encirclements consist of five actions:

•

•

•

•

•

Exploitation and attack on converging axis.

Extension of a pursuit or envelopment.

Linkup operations and the establishment of theinner circle.

Establishment of the outer ring to counter enemyreserves and to continue exploitation.

Destruction, or forced surrender of, the encircledforces.

The complete encirclement of the enemy pocketis often not necessary nor efficient. It is more im-portant to quickly cut all avenues of egress or resup-ply for the encircled force and to control air and seaLOC. (An encircled force that is resupplied and notreduced will remain a serious concern for the com-mander throughout future operations, and requirededicated forces to maintain the inner rings.)

Reduction of the pocket is extremely important asencircled forces (if left alone) can jeopardize offen-sive operations. Commanders should conduct op-,

erations to reduce the pocket day and night, withoutinterruption, concentrating forces and fires until theencircled force is captured, or surrenders. Rotationof reduction forces ensures fresh units are continu-ally attacking.

The pocket may be reduced by fire or fire andmaneuver. The use of fires alone to reduce a pocket,though low in casualties, requires extensive resup-ply. The encircling force may be unable to sustainreduction activities or find itself unable to conductother operations while attempting the reduction.This was apparent during the German-failed attemptto reduce Leningrad in World War II.

The mostN effective method of reduction is todivide the pocket, attacking from several directionssimultaneously. This concentrates much largerforces against a much smaller enemy. Even with thistechnique of divide and conquer, pressure must bemaintained on other forces in the pocket, concen-trating on nodes, ADA systems, artillery systems,airstrips, command and control systems, and CSS.

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Another reduction technique is to allow an at-tempted breakout and destroy the enemy forcethrough planned attacks.

•

•

•Defending EncircledThe mobility and noncontiguous nature of the

future battlefield may create situations in whichforces become encircled or bypassed. Through de-sign or because of rapidly changing situations, unitsmay be cut off from other friendly forces. Encircle-ment occurs when the enemy cuts off all groundroutes for evacuation and reinforcement of divisionground forces. Divisional forces face encirclementmost often when enemy forces bypass defendingunits or an enemy counterattack cuts off advancingunits.

Encircled force operations have occurredthroughout history. Encircled US forces at the Battleof the Bulge conducted a successful breakout opera-tion. US elements encircled at the Kasserine Passwere destroyed when their supporting forces couldnot reach them.

Encircled forces must continue the mission. Theencircled force commander must attempt to estab-lish communications with his higher commander. Inthe absence of communications, however, he mustact on his own initiative within the higher com-mander’s intent to maintain the integrity of hisfighting force. Encircled forces have several op-tions. They can—

Conduct a breakout toward friendly forces.

Attack and conduct small-unit harassment opera-tions to bleed off enemy units from the mainattack.

Attack rear-echelon enemy forces and installa-tions to disrupt their operations.

Exfiltrate from the encircled positions towardfriendly forces.

Defend until relieved.

Friendly encircled forces that elect to stay inposition and defend encircled must consider thefollowing:

• Mission and commander’s intent.

• Good, defensible terrain.

• Available reinforcement or relief.

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Availability of the necessary logistics and othercombat support to sustain the operation.

Mobility of the enemy.

Motivation and discipline of troops.The senior maneuver commander within the en-

circlement assumes control of all forces. He informshis superior of the situation and establishes a chainof command (if necessary) to ensure unity of com-mand. He reorganizes fragmented units and attachestroops separated from their units to other units. Aclear chain of command must be established quicklythroughout the forces.

The commander immediately establishes an all-around viable defense. He attacks to seize favorable

ground, if necessary. He improves fighting posi-tions within the capability of available resources andidentifies and closes seams and gaps in the defensiveperimeter.

The commander establishes a reserve from avail-able armored or mechanized units to react to perime-ter penetrations. He positions them centrally to takeadvantage of interior lines. Quick reaction to pe-rimeter penetrations maintains the encircled forces’defensive integrity.

All field artillery in the encirclement is reorga-nized and brought under centralized control of thesenior field artillery commander. Fire nets and co-ordination measures are established. Although bat-talion mortars remain under the control of theirparent headquarters, breakout or force survival mayrequire the collective fires of all fire support assets.Artillery and mortars are dispersed throughout theencirclement to protect them from counterfire.Available fire support from outside the encircle-ment is coordinated through the senior field artillerycommander’s headquarters. This usually includesair support and may include other indirect firemeans.

The senior logistician present assesses early thelogistics posture of the encircled command. Alllogistics operations come under his centralized con-trol. Airdrop or helicopter lift, if possible, resuppliesthe encircled force from the outside. A centrallylocated medical facility is established and casualtiesevacuated if an air supply line is open. If the forcemust break out, every effort is made to evacuatecasualties with the breakout force.

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The commander positions security elements asfar forward as possible to provide early warning andinitiates vigorous patrolling. He establishes localsecurity throughout the force and strictly enforcespassive security measures.

The commander immediately establishes com-munications with higher headquarters and remainsinformed about the battle outside the encirclement.Encircled units can furnish information on the en-emy’s rear area and assist in spoiling attacks andcounterattacks.

The encircled force must continue to defend. En-emy forces may attempt to penetrate the perimetersize and split an encircled force. If friendly forcesare weakened in the defensive battle, the perimetersize may need to be reduced. The encircled force

must maintain its defensive integrity.Soldiers in the encirclement must not be allowed

to regard their situation as desperate or hopeless.Commanders and leaders at all levels displaying afirm resolve and positive attitude help maintain theirsoldiers’ confidence. Keeping their soldiers in-formed suppresses rumors. Encircled defendingforces must prepare for the linkup with relief forcesusing the considerations discussed earlier in LinkupOperations.

Breakout From AnEncirclement

Breakout operations are planned, organized, andexecuted before the enemy has time to react. Com-manders considering the breakout option face thecritical demand of time. Encircled forces must actbefore the enemy decides on a course of action andbegins to contain or destroy the friendly force. Anearly breakout is easiest, but it can be achieved atany time.

An attack to break out of an encirclement is ademanding effort. In most cases, the commander

conducts a simultaneous defense in other areas of the perimeter. Tasks in a breakout include:

• Deceive the enemy on the time and place of theattack. If immediate breakout is not possible, thecommander conceals his preparations and repo-sitions to deceive the enemy. The direction for thebreakout should not be the obvious route towardfriendly lines unless there is no other alternative.

• Identify and exploit gaps or weaknesses. Early inthe encirclement, reconnaissance should locategaps or weaknesses in the encircling enemy force.Although the breakout attack through a gap orweakness may be less director over less favorableterrain, this course of action avoids enemystrength and increases the chance for surprise.

• Exploit limited visibility. The cover of darkness,

fog, or severe weather conditions favors thebreakout because the target acquisition capabilityof weapons of the encircling enemy force is nor-mally less effective in these conditions. However,waiting for darkness or limited visibility mayprovide the enemy time to consolidate hisdefense.

• Task organize for the attack.

Forces for the breakout are organized into fivetactical groups. They are shown in Figure 7-3 anddescribed in the following paragraphs.

Rupture Force. The encircled force attacks assoon as possible by employing one or more ruptureforces to penetrate the enemy defensive positions.The commander must produce overwhelming com-bat power at the breakout point. The rupture forcemay vary in size from one-third to two-thirds of thetotal encircled force. Its mission is to penetrate theenemy encircling position, widen the gap, and holdthe shoulder of the gap until all other encircled

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forces can move through. It must be of sufficientstrength to penetrate the enemy line. A favorablecombat power ratio must be achieved at the point of attack by means of surprise, troop strength, mobil-ity, and firepower.

Initially, the rupture force will be the main effort.The rupture force commander will probably haveadditional assets attached to his unit. These assetsmight include air defense or additional engineerpersonnel from any encircled engineer unit. Thecommander should integrate these assets for maxi-mum combat power to achieve the rupture.

Reserve Force. The reserve follows the ruptureattack to maintain the attack’s momentum and se-cure objectives past the rupture. After the ruptureforce secures the gap, the reserve normally becomes

the lead element. When a unit is given the reserveforce mission, the commander must coordinateclosely with the rupture force commander on thegap’s location, the enemy situation at the rupture,and the enemy situation (if known) along the direc-tion of attack past the rupture point.

Initially, the reserve passes through the gap cre-ated by the rupture force and continues rapid move-ment from the encircled area toward the finalobjective (probably a linkup). It must not becomebogged down if it is to make secondary attacks.Artillery preparation may assist the reserve force in

maintaining momentum out of the encircled area. Main Body. The main body, which contains the

CP elements, casualties, and CS and CSS elements,moves as a single group. It usually follows thereserve force through the gap created by the ruptureforce. One individual should command this elementto ensure orderly movement. Security elements pro-tect the flanks of the main body during movement.

Rear Guard. The rear guard consists of the per-sonnel and equipment left on the perimeter to pro-vide protection for the rupture and diversionaryattacks (if a diversionary attack force exists). Forces

left in contact must fight a delaying action on theperimeter so that no portion of the force is cut off.Under a single commander; the rear guard acts as acovering force to protect the main body from attackwhile it is moving from the area. In addition toproviding security, it deceives the enemy about theencircled force’s intentions. It simulates the activi-ties of the encircled force until the force has clearedthe gap. Once the breakout commences, the rear

guard and any diversionary forces disengage ordelay toward the rupture. Perimeter forces integratesmoothly into the rear of the breakout column. Oncethe breakout is achieved, priority of fires may shiftto the rear guard action. Above all else, the attack’s

momentum must be maintained or the force will bemore vulnerable to destruction than it was prior tothe breakout.

As other units support or follow the breakout, therear guard commander must spread his forces overan extended area. This will require flexibility andmobility of the rear guard. The perimeter mustwithstand enemy pressure.

Diversionary or Supporting Force. Enemy at-tention must be diverted from the location of therupture. The breakout attack is assisted when a

supporting attack (executed by a nearby friendlyforce) or a designated diversionary force divertsenemy attention and assets from the breakout effort.The breakout attempt should be timed to occur justafter the enemy reacts to such a supporting attack.The diversionary force may be from either inside oroutside the encirclement area. Forces participatingin a diversionary attack should be as mobile asavailable vehicles and trafficability allow. Mobileweapons systems are ideally suited for this require-ment. Any diversionary or supporting attack shouldbe directed at a point where the enemy might expecta breakout or where a relief effort might occur.

Success of the diversionary force is important tothe success of any breakout operations. If the forcefails to deceive the enemy on the encircled force’sintentions, the full combat power of the enemy couldbe directed at the rupture point. On the other hand,the diversionary force may rupture the enemy’slines. If a rupture occurs, the diversionary forcecommander must know the commander’s intent. Hemay exploit this success, or he may have to disen-gage and follow and support the reserve force.

Exfiltration of Encircled ForcesIf success of a breakout attack appears question-

able and a relief operation is not planned, the leastpreferred option to preserve a portion of the force isthrough organized exfiltration. Exfiltration is pref-erable to capture and can distract the enemy fromhis main effort and produce intelligence for the mainforce. The encircled forces organize into smallgroups under small-unit leaders and exfiltrate

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deep attack. Timely and accurate intelligence drawsthe picture of the battlefield; Precision fires precedeand support ground and aviation maneuver. Auto-mated command and control systems coupled withthe effective use of high-frequency (HF) and FM

radio and satellite communications provide mobilecommunications and extend critical communica-tions links that are used to maintain the tempo of theattack. A tailored logistics package backed by asolid logistics plan sustains the operation.

As the US Army refines the organization andoperations concept for Force XXI, deep opera-tions will become easier to plan and execute.Intelligence gathering and dissemination will im-prove through automation and broadcast dissemi-nation systems that provide a multiple-echelon

common intelligence picture of the battlefield. Ad-vanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems willallow commanders to mass precision fires at depthfrom dispersed locations. This, coupled with theenhanced range and lethality of the weapons sys-

tems, significantly improves the division’s capabil-ity to set the conditions for deep maneuver.

Digitization and other advances in informationtechnology will result in smaller, more mobilestaffs with a common view of the battlefield andassured communications. Logistics will be modu-lar, tailorable, and flexible to sustain Army forcesduring deep operations. These innovations willproduce divisions much more readily able to con-duct deep operations than their counterparts of today.

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CHAPTER 8

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

US Army divisions focus on warfighting. Whendirected, however, divisions tailor, train, and deployforces for operations other than war that supportUS national interests. Chapter 13, FM 100-5;FM 100-19; FM 100-20; and FM 100-23 are theArmy’s primary doctrinal references for operationsother than war (OOTW). This chapter applies thisdoctrine to division commanders, their staffs, anddivision operations.

THE ENVIRONMENT

To understand the division’s role in OOTW, re-view of the political-military environments of peaceand conflict described in FM 100-5 is necessary.Peace is the state which countries presumably seek.Peace is not totally free of violence, but the violencethat exists is generally not politically directed andorganized. In time of peace, divisions dedicatethemselves to preparing for war. Their mere exist-ence and their activities are deterrents to war.

Conflict, on the other hand, is distinguished frompeace by the introduction of political violence. Con-

flict is neither peace nor war, at least not as theUnited States defines war. Conflict is a politicalstruggle in which organized violence serves politi-cal and psychological purposes.

All divisions have capabilities that apply to peaceand conflict as well as war. Among these capabili-ties are leadership, organization, various skills,manpower, communications, mobility, and equip-ment. Additionally, US Army divisions can operatein all environments, have experience in multina-tional operations, can work under austere condi-tions, and can protect themselves from a wide range

of threats. Army divisions may be called on tosupport national interests (and assist in preventingconflict and war) by applying these capabilities inOOTW. Our government may deem it necessary toemploy the military element of power in OOTW forthe promotion of our national interests.

The Army classifies its activities during peace-time and conflict as operations other than war.Peacetime activities can occur both at home and

abroad. Peacetime activities include disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, counterdrug opera-tions, support to law enforcement, military trainingexchanges, and multinational exercises. Divisionactivities in conflict could include limited attacks,raids, base defense, support to insurgencies andcounterinsurgencies, peacekeeping, and peaceenforcement.

ROLE OF THE DIVISION

An OOTW mission often requires only part of thedivision. Typically, the division deploys with lessthan its full complement and should expect to com-mand and control a variety of nondivisional forces.A command and control headquarters is normallyselected based on the size of the deploying forcesand the complexity of their mission. Commandersshould preserve unit integrity and maintain the ha-bitual relationships established in training, if possi-ble. Occasionally, divisional units will be attachedto another headquarters, such as special operationsor Marines, for these operations.

Figure 8-1, page 8-2, depicts some of the morecommon OOTW activities in which divisional unitsparticipate. These are detailed in FMs 100-5,100-20, and 100-23. Because of their versatility,division soldiers and units may be called on toperform tasks and missions for which they are not

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specifically trained. Commanders assess their cur-rent capabilities and apply these capabilities inOOTW. Divisions may provide forces for hurricanerelief, mountain search and rescue, and fighting of forest fires. Division versatility was evident duringthe Los Angeles riots when DIVARTY personnelof the 7th Infantry Division performed LNO func-tions as part of JTF LA. The artillery personnel were

well suited for the operation in terms of on-handcommunication equipment and individual and col-lective training for the LNO functions based on theirwar-time METL requirements. However, com-manders need to make every effort to train their

forces for specific OOTW missions and tasks priorto or immediately on completion of deployment.

In OOTW, as in war, the division conducts simul-taneous operations. For example, the division couldconduct peacekeeping operations at the same timeit is deploying additional forces and securing facili-ties. Operations other than war are usually complex.Rarely will deployed forces be given a single taskto accomplish.

BATTLE COMMAND

Within the Division

When the division headquarters is deployed forOOTW, it is often assigned as the ARFOR andworks for a joint task force commander. ARFORand JTF duties, responsibilities, requirements, andorganizations are discussed in Chapters 1 and 3.

Typically, operations other than war focus onmissions that require the efforts of CS and CSSunits. These units work with US and foreign civilianagencies of government and with international andprivate organizations. The DISCOM, augmentedwith corps support, often has a major role providingCSS. This support includes such services as trans-portation, religious support, food service, water dis-tribution, medical assistance, maintenance, andshelter. Combat support and combat service supportunits are frequently the main effort while combatunits become the supporting effort.

Although often only part of the division deploys,as a controlling headquarters, it may receive at-tached or OPCON units from many externalsources. These sources include Army organizations,other US military services, and multinational forces.

The division often coordinates for the resources andinvolvement of other agencies of the US or foreigngovernments.

Divisional operations in OOTW are likely to besplit-based as well as in depth. For example, adivision forward C² element may direct forces con-ducting several critical tasks in an OOTW missionwhile the rest of the division supports from its home

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station. Split-based operations are discussed inChapter 3. The concept of operations in depth isdiscussed in Chapter 2 and can be applied to OOTW.

In Multinational and InteragencyOperations

Overseas, operations other than war require thefully integrated efforts of US and multinational(military and civilian) organizations. When di-rected, the division headquarters provides C² andintegrates these resources and their actions.

In interagency operations, the division com-mander usually does not have directive authorityover other agencies. Interagency operations includeboth US and non-US governmental and nongovern-mental activities. In these operations, the division(or elements of the division) will participate in aconsensus decision-making process. Military com-manders present the military position in a calm,persuasive manner and influence decisions with theforce of their logic and the strength of their leader-ship skills. They focus on achieving unity of effort.

provide equipment, operators, communications,and other assets to civilian participants. BecauseTOEs authorize only enough material for the divi-sion’s own needs, providing these resources to ci-vilian agencies may require assets from a

subordinate element or from outside the division.In conventional operations, a headquarters ex-

changes liaison parties with adjacent and higherorganizations. Liaison requirements for OOTW aremuch larger. The division may exchange liaisonparties with other service components, US govern-ment agencies (such as embassy, US Agency forInternational Development (USAID), US Informa-tion Service (USIS)), foreign and international gov-ernment agencies, multinational military forces, aswell as private organizations. Because units mayoperate in widely separated locations, subordinate

commands also exchange liaison parties with a va-riety of organizations.

The division and its subordinate units exchangeliaison parties (and equipment) with many organi-zations at several echelons. Civilian organizations,in particular, do not have the communications, dataprocessing, and other equipment for controlling op-

erations that is equivalent to, or compatible with, themilitary’s. Therefore, the division may have to

PRINCIPLES

Many of the time-tested principles that apply towarfare also apply to OOTW. Other considera-tions are equally important. Collectively, theseare referred to as the principles of operations otherthan war. The principles, shown in Figure 8-2,page 8-4, are detailed in FM 100-5. To be success-ful in OOTW, division commanders must under-stand these principles and apply them to theiroperations.

Communication systems are of special concern.They require special emphasis to ensure theiravailability.

Liaison in OOTW involves complex and politi-cally sensitive issues requiring LNOs with maturityand experience. They may also have to be language-qualified or able to work effectively through aninterpreter. Foreign area officers and special opera-tions forces (Special Forces, PSYOP, and civil af-fairs) personnel, specialized in area studies andlanguage-qualified, are well suited to liaison mis-sions. The US Army’s use of SOF liaison teamswith multinational forces during Operation DesertStorm was extremely successful.

The military objective may be a limited one. Forexample, in Bosnia-Herzegovina during 1994, themission of the United Nations Protection Force(UNPROFOR) was limited. It was simply to protect

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the humanitarian relief convoys. UNPROFOR wasnot charged with ending the conflict and solving thepolitical problems. In Somalia, US forces had asimilar mission during 1993-94. Success of attain-ing military objectives is measured against thestated military mission. Division commandersshould not, themselves, expand the mission; theymust keep the political goals and objectives in mind.Commanders understand that goals and objectives(and their missions) may be expanded by a higherheadquarters with perceived successes or setbacks.

Most operations other than war do not involveclear lines of command and control for all agencies(foreign and domestic) participating in the opera-tion. Often military commanders and their unitscontribute towards the final objective instead of leading the way. In this regard, the concept of unityof command gives way to the concept of unity of effort. All actions by all agencies should support

success of the overall mission. The overall goal isfor all actions to contribute to unity of the effort.

Legitimacy is relative. Some people will alwayssupport a US political-military operation; otherswill always oppose it. The balance, however, islikely to shift with changing perceptions.

The way the division conducts its operations willshape both domestic and foreign public opinion.Use of force must be seen as necessary only afterpeaceful means have been exhausted. The violenceemployed must be proportional to the threat; it mustnever be seen as excessive. Military public affairsand PSYOP, through their communications and in-

formation channels, can support legitimacy of thedivision’s operation by explaining Army actions.

Equally important is the legitimacy of the hostnation government—the willingness of the popula-tion to accept the right of the government or othergroup or agency to make and enforce decisions.Popular vote does not always confer or reflect le-gitimacy. It derives from the perception that author-ity is genuine and effective and uses proper agenciesfor reasonable purposes. Legitimacy is the centralconcern of all parties directly involved in a conflict.It is also important to parties involved indirectly.

Rules of engagement (ROE), when properly pre-pared and applied, clarify the proper restraint ne-cessary to aid in accomplishing the mission. ROEmay be prepared by the division commander orpromulgated by higher authority. They are designedto protect the force, to prevent escalation of hostili-ties, and to avoid casualties. Although ROE aredetermined by the factors of METT-T, they may or

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may not be very restrictive. The issuing commandermust determine just how much force is enough toaccomplish his mission. He must understand thethreat and provide a force package that includesappropriate protection. (See the discussion of ROEon page 8-8.)

Operations other than war are normally executedin response to a political directive, such as a resolu-tion of the United Nations Security Council. Thedirective provides the authority for and limits of military action. The staff judge advocate assists thedivision commander and G3 in preparation of ROE.His recommendations are based on the authoritativepolitical and appropriate legal directives.

The rules of engagement should provide first forthe protection of the force. Then, they shouldauthorize such coercive options as may be requiredand appropriate while avoiding casualties and un-

necessary property damage. Generally the purposeof OOTW is not to destroy an opponent’s capability,but to change his behavior, stabilize the situation,and return life to “normalcy.”

Regardless of their mission, commanders secure their forces. The presence of division forcesin any operation around the world evokes a widerange of actions and reactions. US Army com-manders act to ensure hostile factions do not ac-

quire an unexpected advantage. Commandersand staff should never be lulled into believingthat nonhostile missions or environments do notcontain risk. Commanders protect their soldiersand soldiers have the right to protect themselves.

Conflict resolution is a time-consuming processand military support may require a long-term com-mitment. A conflict may continue for months, years,or decades. Division elements employed in OOTWmust exercise patience and perseverance to con-tinue the mission for as long as it takes.

Operations in an environment of conflict may notlead to a conclusive victory. Instead, such opera-tions may be reduced gradually in scope and even-tually ended without significant measurable result.However, even limited success in OOTW is prefer-able to war. The division must be patient, adaptable,

and determined to support national policy for aslong as may be necessary. Success of operations inconflict comes from avoiding the pitfalls depictedin Figure 8-3. Success also comes from an under-standing of the cause of the conflict, a consistentconcern for legitimacy, the determination to perse-vere for the long haul, the patient use of restraint,and a continuing explanation of Army actions to allinterested publics.

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BOS CONSIDERATIONS

Division forces may deploy to support OOTWactivities as individual units, or as task forces. Thedivision may deploy as a whole unit during large-

scale disaster relief efforts or deploy as a single unitin a peacekeeping operation. Whatever the mission,commanders task-organize their forces for opera-tions, normally as a component of an interagency, a

joint, or a multinational operation. The followingparagraphs discuss specific considerations withineach battlefield operating system.

Intelligence

Tailored Intelligence

In OOTW, as in war, the intelligence cycle con-

tinues to be to plan and direct, collect, process,produce, and disseminate information and intelli-gence products. The division’s intelligence staff tailors traditional products to meet specific needs of commanders conducting OOTW missions. Care istaken to ensure intelligence activities do not violateUS law pertaining to both military intelligence ac-tions in CONUS and to US citizens overseas.

Greater Human Intelligence

OOTW will often cause a greater reliance on andaccess to HUMINT. Contacts with host nation, gov-

ernmental agency, and multinational personnel willresult in overtly collected HUMINT intelligenceand other information which is of value tocommanders.

Sharing of Intelligence

Downgrading and sharing US intelligence withnon-DOD US agencies as well as military and non-military multinational organizations challengescommanders and their intelligence staffs at all lev-els. Special arrangements and specific guidelinesmust be established to meet this need.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Missions in operations other than war, as in war,require intelligence preparation. The IPB processapplies in OOTW; however, its focus is on terrain,weather, and socio-political issues as well as on thethreat. In some cases, the threat may not be “enemy

personnel,” but factors such as underlying causes of instability or extant conditions in the host nation. InOOTW, terrain and weather considerations or ac-tivities such as disaster relief and humanitarian as-sistance are of major importance. Considerations

include—• A detailed analysis of key terrain, transportation

networks (trafficability and location), built-up ar-eas, water, serviceable airfields, and possiblelanding and drop zones.

• Climatic and environmental weather conditionsfor a region that may affect the mission. Forexample, hot, humid areas may require the accli-matization of soldiers.

• Political, social, and economic factors that mayaffect the end state of the division’s operations.

These factors include the receptiveness of thehost nation population to US forces, sources of political instability, ongoing insurgencies, cul-tural sensitivities, and standard of living. (Thistype of information is often available in civilaffairs area studies.)

Planners throughout the division anticipate spe-cific OOTW mission requirements. They developcreative, useful IBP products to display thisinformation.

Maneuver

Analysis of Plans

Once tasked to support outside continental UnitedStates (OCONUS) OOTW activities, the divisionstaff analyzes appropriate theater strategy, cam-paign plans, and concept plans (CONPLANs) of thegaining combatant command. The theater strategyarticulates the CINC’s vision for his theater. In mostcases, it provides guidance, direction, and opportu-nities for peacetime activities in general terms of ends, ways, and means. The campaign plans andCONPLANs identify theater objectives, sustain-ment concepts, needed resources, and specified and

implied tasks. Supporting plans developed by theArmy service component command provide moredefinitive guidance on essential tasks.

Interoperability

The division considers potential interoperabilitywith other US and non-US organizations. Planning

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for interoperability includes appropriate liaison,supplies, equipment, guidance, instructions, andprocedures that are useful to the intended user.

TrainingThe division considers training with both US and

non-US agencies who will be involved in the opera-tion. This training may occur prior to deploymentor in the area of operations after deployment. Suchtraining may include (but is not limited to) tactics,techniques, and procedures; nation assistance; cul-tural and environmental issues; liaison; and vehicleand equipment maintenance.

Fire Support

Lethal FiresWhen considering the use of lethal fires and the

deployment of fire support systems, commanderscarefully weigh protecting their force withMETT-T. OOTW missions rarely lead to the de-ployment of large amounts of heavy weapon sys-tems. The political nature of OOTW makesprecision fires critical and ROE often restrict the useof lethal fires. Planning and delivery of fires mustpreclude fires on protected targets, unwanted collat-eral damage, and political ramifications of per-ceived excessive fire. Mortars, due to their smaller

bursting radius, may reduce collateral damage.Mortars may provide illumination rounds to dem-onstrate deterrent capability, observe contested ar-eas, support friendly base security, or assistpatrolling maneuver forces. Division commandersrely heavily on joint fire support and precision mu-nitions, using systems such as AC 130 aircraft,attack helicopters, and tactical air when increasedcombat power is required to respond to a significantchange in the situation.

Nonlethal Fires

Because division activities in OOTW supportpolitical objectives, commanders pay close atten-tion to the use of information. Information affectsboth political and military objectives. MilitaryPSYOP, civil affairs, and public affairs are thedivision commander’s primary means of communi-cating to foreign and internal audiences, respec-tively, his actions and intents. PSYOP and civilaffairs are well suited for both short- and long-term

OOTW missions. The division commander’s coop-eration with the media is important to strengthenlegitimacy and promote both foreign and domesticpopular support for his effort. Finally, in someOOTW situations, the division commander may

employ electronic attack as part of his nonlethalfires.


The division considers requirements and aug-mentation for general engineering. These may in-clude planning for reconstruction and newconstruction of transportation and public utilities,such as public hygiene facilities, waterworks, sew-age treatment, telephone, and power plants and fa-cilities. In some operations, division engineers may

be asked to clear mines and provide limited verticaland horizontal engineering construction.

Air Defense

The division’s air defense officer coordinates andrecommends to the commander appropriate integra-tion of joint and multinational air defense systems.He should consider the availability, coverage, capa-bility, and interoperability of joint, host nation, andmultinational air defense assets. If reliable air de-fense is available from other sources in country, the

commander may choose to rely on them as opposedto deploying additional divisional and nondivisionalassets. This is especially useful if an in-countrytroop ceiling exists. Additionally, the commanderensures that detailed air defense ROE are estab-lished and deploying forces undergo specific hostileaircraft identification training.


Environmental Conditions

Logistics plays an important role in OOTW.

Often OOTW missions occur with short notice andin austere environments. These conditions stressand stretch the division’s CSS capabilities.

Transportation Services

Division planners consider requirements and aug-mentation for transportation services. These serv-ices may include terminal operations, warehousing,

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loading, and distributing of food, water, equipment,and fuel.

Health Support

Traditionally, OOTW missions require extensivehealth support. The division plans for increasedpreventive medicine and veterinarian services. Atailored medical support unit will be configuredconsidering the stated mission and objective withinthe framework of local as well as US legal require-ments. (See Appendix E and FM 8-18.)

Law and Order

OOTW may require additional military police(MP) for the division. When required, the corps MPbrigade augments division MPs for law and ordersupport. MPs conduct joint patrols with host nationor multinational forces to maintain order, evaluatehost law enforcement operations, as well as conductsecurity operations. (Note, however, that the For-eign Assistance Act of 1961 forbids the militaryfrom training host nation police.) Division MPs willestablish liaison with local host nation police.

Funding and Contracting

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Funding and contracting for host nation (or an-other nation’s) support require special planning and

attention by resource managers, S5 and G5, divisionstaff judge advocate, and the supporting financebattalion commander. Additionally, these officersdetermine contracting procedures to be used in theassigned AO.

The division contracting officer works closelywith the G4, G5, division engineer, and DISCOMcommander to determine contracting requirementsprior to, during, and after the operation.

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Staff Judge Advocate

The division SJA advises commanders and G3and S3 on legal limitations and Title X restrictionsconcerning the use of forces. The SJA receives theJTF or corps ROE from the division G3. He recom-mends changes to the division commander and G3.The SJA works with the division staff and subordi-nate commanders to ensure that ROE support theoperation.

Rules of Engagement

Generally, ROE explain the circumstances andlimitations under which US forces initiate andcontinue engagements with hostile forces. In alloperations, commanders are legally responsible

for the care and treatment of civilians and prop-erty within their areas of operations until they aretransferred to a proper authority. ROE assist thecommander in fulfilling these responsibilities aswell as completing his mission. Often ROE mustbe accompanied with commander’s guidance forclarity. While ROE are tailored to each situation,nothing negates the commander’s obligation totake all necessary and appropriate action in unitself-defense.

Detailed ROE and self-protection often appear as anappendix to the division’s OPORD. (Additionally,

commanders often publish and distribute a pocket-sizedROE card for soldiers to carry.) ROE prevent indis-criminate use of force or other violations of law orregulations. ROE and self-protection issues include:

Proper conduct and regard for the local areapopulation.

Proper respect and actions regarding private andpublic property.

Use of deadly force, appropriate actions prior tousing deadly force, and situations where deadlyforce is not appropriate.

Use of unattended means of force (such as minesand booby traps).

Restrictions on employing certain weapons in thearea of operation.

Confiscation and use of non-US weapons andproperty.

Use of riot control agents.

Detention and handling of various categories of people.

A good unclassified example ROE is found in

FM 100-23.

Personnel

The G1 continues to provide routine personnelsupport to the division. For OOTW missions, the G1initially focuses on unit strengths and low densitymilitary occupational specialties (MOSS) that

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may be critical to the particular mission. Languageor specific skills (such as medical, legal, religious,or cultural) may require augmentation.

Logistics

The G4 monitors the division’s logistics status.The G4 compiles detailed estimates for all classesof supply and equipment. He determines what pre-scribed load lists (PLLs) are critical and recom-mends increases in quantities to the divisioncommander. The G4 also estimates the type andamount of support needed and available from theArmy service component command or otheragency within the AO.

For disaster relief or humanitarian assistancemissions, the G4 may assume a leading role in

division. These operations revolve around the dis-tribution of food and supplies, shelter, and medi-cal evacuation and support. The division’slogistics system may be required to coordinatewith many agencies and distribute large quantitiesof government and nongovernment supplies.

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Civil Affairs Staff

The G5 reviews regional studies of AOs and,through the G3, coordinates for, and recommendsto the commander appropriate use of, civil affairs.

The G5 also examines needs assessments con-ducted for the AO to see what units must actuallydo and requests PSYOP in support of CA-relatedactivities. The G5 identifies the HN agency respon-sible for the operation, the level of HN participa-tion, and points of contact within the HNgovernment.

Command and Control

Decision Making

Divisions use the military decision-making pro-cess described in FM 101-5 as a framework forcollecting information, analyzing possible coursesof action, and making good decisions. Althoughoperations other than war may differ in orientationfrom traditional, combat missions, the militarydecision-making process is still used (and may beexpanded or modified) to make decisions in anOOTW environment.

Assumptions

The division staff develops assumptions neededto replace necessary, but missing, facts and to facili-tate planning. Assumptions developed during theinitial planning may include some of the following:

Limits on deployed personnel.Availability and type of transportation assets.

Force protection requirements.

Training requirements.

SOF participation.

Security assistance organization (SAO) role.

Use of reserve component forces.

Other US government agencies’ roles.

Lodgment sites and responsibilities.

Host nation requirements and expectations(OCONUS).

Political and social implications of the division’sactions.

Funding and special equipment requirements.

Public Affairs

The role of public affairs and coordination withnews agencies will be important to how the division

is viewed and to the perceived success of eachoperation. In OOTW, the PAO may be the center-piece of the commander’s special staff officers be-cause of the nature of OOTW and the principle of legitimacy, which can be greatly influenced in anOOTW environment.

Agency Coordination

Support to US civil authorities, other than coun-terdrug operations, is usually a crisis response, butin either case, US government agencies may havethe lead in planning and employing division assets.Once committed, the divisions normally initiatedirect coordination with local government agencies(such as Federal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA), US Forestry Service, US Coast Guard, orForeign Relief Agency) to analyze their plans,receive their guidance, and make recommendations.This coordination is always performed through thedivision CMOC.

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CHAPTER 9

FIGHTING ON THE DIGITIZED BATTLEFIELD

The division commander moved with 1st Bri-gade as his division, equipped with moderntechnological enhancements, continued itsattack in zone. The 1st and 2d Brigadeswere attacking side by side. The main effort,1st Brigade, was on the north; 2d Brigade,making a supporting attack, was on thesouth. Although some images appeared a bit grainy, the commander could easily followthe movements of his forces on his command and control vehicle’s display unit. He could see Task Force Dragon, 1st Brigade’s lead task force, closing quickly on its electronicline of deployment.

“Dragon 6 to all Dragon units... Move...Over!”

In perfect ripple, subordinate commandersresponded: “Dragon 20.. .Move... Out.”

“Dragon 30.. .Move... Out.”

“Dragon 40... Move... Out.”

LTC Smith, the task force (TF) commander,entered the launch command into his on-board computer with one key stroke. Theword ‘MOVE’ flashed red in the bottom left corner of all task force vehicles’ command displays. Dragon task force deployed.

LTC Smith patched his scouts’ opticalscanner and the UAV video into his cen-tral processing unit. His advanced land combat task force of MIA3s and M2A5srolled across the desert toward the en-emy positions 25 kilometers away. The dis-

persed task force effectively evaded theenemy’s artillery concentrations.

Attacking at 50 kilometers per hour, the task force converged only momentarily to slipthrough pinpointed passages in obstacles,then dispersed again. The enemy’s obstacleswere placed to hold an attacker, but theybarely slowed the task force as it moved be-hind engineer assault vehicles using liquid explosion in-stride breaching techniques.

The defender was alert, well armed, and ready. His forces were much better than the

Iraqi army destroyed in Operation Desert Storm. His new training technologies, long-range antitank (AT) weapons, and improved T-80 tanks had given him confidence. How-ever, this confidence now began to wane.

LTC Smith’s vehicle and his rear command post synchronized their common view displays of the zone of action. They could seethat most targets had already been acquired by UAVs, processed and correlated at

ground centers, and attacked by Comancheswith blinding speed and violence. The bulbof dug-in enemy vehicles were smolderingas the task force rolled past. (Obviously theenemy had not been ready for the Co-manches’ stand-off range and “smart” mu-nitions.) Dragon TF vehicles scanned for signs of live enemy. With their second gen-eration forward-looking infrared sights, TF gunners could easily identify the images of TF vehicles as “friendlies.”

Ten kilometers from the “hot” enemysensings forward of the airfield, the TF vehi-cles swerved hard right in unison. The bat-talion commander had directed the

preventive movement simultaneously to the force through his vehicle’s onboard computer-decision-support processor. Themaneuver worked. Enemy artillery fire fellalong the task force’s previous axis.

The task force’s information exchange wasautomatic—all command vehicles and therear command post knew precisely whereeverything was and where it was supposed to be. There was no guessing, no lack of in-

formation or intelligence. And there was nomistaken identity.

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its sources. When the Army achieves this goal, ourcommanders will have friendly and enemy opera-tional and service support information that is muchmore accurate and processed faster than at anytimein the past. The digitization effort will affect everybattlefield operating system.

In intelligence, digitization will allow the com-mander to cue intelligence collection resourcesbased on information received from a variety of sensors and systems. This process will optimizeresources by using intelligence assets and activitiesmore efficiently. Digital imagery and other intelli-gence products will be directly downlinked fromsatellite systems simultaneously into commandposts and combat vehicles (even while they move).

Digitization in maneuver will allow for a smaller

friendly force, supported by precise, responsivefires, to defeat or destroy an enemy. Commandersmay employ a smaller number of maneuver forcesduring the decisive phase of the battle with less risk.Digitization will also result in pinpoint navigationthrough a global positioning system (GPS). Forceswill move faster and more safely over familiar andunfamiliar terrain.

In fire support, digitization will provide auto-matic entry into fire control nets from any unit onthe battlefield. Fire support requests, together withcomputer-generated fire mission reports, will up-

date intelligence data bases, displays, and staff esti-mates with information such as enemy locations,units, kills, and BDA. The result will be faster andmore precise fire support, less rounds fired, and amore accurate intelligence picture of the enemy.Further, digitization in fire support will—

• Automate tire planning and fire control. Fireplanning that is computer-assisted will optimizetires and distribute accurate and up-to-date firecontrol measures throughout the friendly force.The end product will be faster, and more effec-tive, fires with much less risk of fratricide and

accidental damage to protected areas and targets.Allow staff officers to more precisely target andtrack an exponentially greater number of targetsthan we have ever targeted or tracked in the past.

Provide direct, automated sensor-to-shooter links

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•resulting in significantly faster fire support.

Digitization in mobility and survivability willenhance mobility and survivability planning,

execution, and resupply. Obstacles—enemy,friendly, and terrain (with their passage lanes)—willbe cataloged, numbered, described in detail, anddisplayed throughout our force and be available tofollow-on forces. Digitization of these functionswill result in less fratricide and better informationon obstacles. Digitization will improve the accu-racy, timeliness, and efficiency of engineer esti-mates; use of engineer resources; and obstacle plandevelopment with computer-generated planningtools and data bases.

In air defense, computer-generated airspace con-trol graphics and planning templates will enhanceairspace command and control. A²C² informationwill be provided to all appropriate command posts,command vehicles, and directly into aircraft. Digi-tization will also allow better and faster IFF identi-

fication and minimize fratricide. Faster and moreprecise tracking and engagements will significantlylimit the effect of enemy air attacks on divisionoperations.

Digitization in combat service support will resultin computer-generated CSS reports sent from on-board vehicle computers to central data bases. Ac-cess to these data bases will result in preciseresupply requirements compiled for each soldier,vehicle, and unit.

Digitization will also reform health support.

Computer-generated medical evacuation requestswill incorporate GPS locations, and automaticallyupdate personnel, CSS, operational, and medicaldata files. Use of these files will raise the quality of medical support and result in better personnel esti-mates and actions.

Requests for repair parts and other supply itemswill be automatically generated. These will enter acentral data base that can be accessed from any-where in the world. Responses to these requests canbe packaged and sent to appropriate supporting unitsand identified for specific systems. All units con-

cerned will be notified simultaneously as requestsare sent and requisitions are filled. Digitization willresult in more accurate and more efficient combatservice support.

In command and control, digitization will allowautomated unit reports and graphic overlay reports.These will be sent to central databases that providecommanders with an accurate picture of the situ-ation. The automation and burst data transmission

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of reports will eliminate late, inaccurate, or incom-plete reports. The requirements for radio conversa-tion will be less.

Doctrinally correct operational graphics will becreated and distributed rapidly to the force. (This is

a great improvement over our current manuallydrawn graphics reproduced on copying machinesand distributed by a messenger.) This change willresult in precise, accurate, and up-to-date controlmeasures throughout the friendly force. Digitizedfriendly and enemy unit locations will result in acommon view and understanding of the battlefield.

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Communications, planning, and decision makingwithin the force will also be improved. Burst-transmitted digital data files will be added to ourmore traditional means of communications (for ex-ample, FM, AM, FAX, teletype, telephone, and

messenger). More precise and up-to-date informa-tion together with computer-generated decisiontools will result in faster planning and decisionmaking.

Digitization will better focus limited assets andresources. Commanders can cue resources based oninformation received from a variety of sensors andsystems. This process will optimize assets and ac-tivities to accomplish the assigned mission.

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Through digitization, redundant communicationmeans will limit loss of communication betweenunits. These means include digital message equip-

ment, computer nets, traditional radio nets, facsim-ile, conventional telephone systems, cellulartelephones, and satellite communications.

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AUTOMATIONARCHITECTURE

The backbone of the division’s digitization effortswill be the Army Battle Command System (ABCS),discussed in Chapter 3. ABCS will be composedof—

• Maneuver Control System (MCS).

Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System(AFATDS).

All Source Analysis System (ASAS).

Air Defense Command and Control System

(ADCCS).Combat Service Support Control System(CSSCS).

When fully implemented ABCS will—

Link installation sustainment information sys-tems that include intelligence, weather, and com-bat service support to deployed forces.

Link the warfighters to any command post (bothhigher and lower) through satellite-based war-fighter nets. This allows commanders to com-

mand and control from anywhere on thebattlefield.

Link sensors to shooters for quick, precision fireswith no fratricide or collateral damage to pro-tected targets.

Provide warriors a digital information system thatlinks all weapon systems to each other as well ascommand posts.

Provide commanders with automated decisiontools that access real-time friendly and enemyinformation and can be used while moving orstationary.

Provide central processing and distribution of information. Units can access this central proces-sor from home station and staging bases, as wellas within the theater of operation. Access to theprocessor will be worldwide.

New technologies will continue to change theway we control forces. However, no matter howsophisticated technology becomes, commanderswill make decisions and provide the leadership toaccomplish missions.

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APPENDIX A

RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY

Reconnaissance and security are two differentmissions; however, they are closely related at thetactical level. Units conducting reconnaissance pro-vide some security. Units conducting security mis-sions use reconnaissance techniques. This appendixdiscusses each.

RECONNAISSANCE

Reconnaissance provides information concern-ing the disposition of an enemy force, the enemy’sintent, terrain conditions, and indications of nuclear,

biological, or chemical contamination. Reconnais-sance is undertaken by visual observation or otherdetection methods. It provides information aboutthe activities and resources of an enemy or a poten-tial enemy, or about the meteorologic, hydro-graphic, or geographic characteristics of a particulararea. Reconnaissance is the precursor to all opera-tions. It may be accomplished through passivemeans such as observation, or more aggressivemethods such as probes, reconnaissance by fire, andother means to fight for information.

Forms of ReconnaissanceThe traditional forms of reconnaissance are route,

zone, and area. A route reconnaissance is a recon-naissance along a specific line of communications,such as a road, railway, or waterway. Its purpose isto provide new or updated information on routeconditions and activities along the route. A zone

reconnaissance obtains detailed information con-cerning all routes, obstacles (to include chemical orradiological contamination), terrain, and enemyforces within a zone defined by boundaries. A zonereconnaissance normally is assigned when the en-

emy situation is vague or when information con-cerning cross-country trafficability is desired.

An area reconnaisance obtains detailed infor-mation about the terrain or enemy activity within a

You can never have too much reconnaissance.George S. Patton, Jr.

prescribed area, such as a town, a ridgeline, woods,or other feature critical to operation. At its mostbasic level, an area reconnaissance could be madeof a single point, such as a bridge or an installation.

In addition to the traditional forms of reconnais-sance, the Army also uses reconnaissance in force.A reconnaissance in force (RIF) is conducted by aconsiderable force to obtain information and testenemy dispositions, strengths, and reactions. Re-connaissance and general purpose forces conductthis form of reconnaissance to aggressively developinformation. The size and strength of the force must

be sufficient to cause the enemy to respond in somemanner as well as to protect the friendly forcesinvolved in the effort. A RIF usually is conductedwhen the enemy is known to be operating in strengthwithin a given area and sufficient intelligence can-not be developed by other means.

Reconnaissance can be passive or active. Activemethods include mounted and dismounted recon-naissance, aerial platforms, or reconnaissance byfire. Passive methods include map and photographicreconnaissance and systematic observation. Sys-tematic observation is use of human assets or tech-

nical means to watch a particular location, place, orthing. Technical means might be unmanned aerialvehicles or remotely emplaced sensors.

Divisions use highly trained cavalry and scoutunits to conduct successful reconnaissance mis-sions. Leaders and soldiers in these units are theArmy’s experts in the art and techniques of recon-naissance. However, other units also accomplishreconnaissance missions. All maneuver forces canconduct reconnaissance missions. All tactical unitsconduct some sort of reconnaissance prior to com-mencing their operations. These actions include

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local combat patrols, use of air defense and artilleryradars, chemical detection, map and photo recon-naissance, interrogation of other technical intelli-gence sources, and MP patrols. The importance of reconnaissance operations to successful tactical op-

erations means commanders normally use theirmost-suited units to perform these missions.METT-T drives this decision.

Not all intelligence collection assets are adequatefor every situation. Commanders and staffs encoun-ter problems, such as too few collectors for theamount of area they must observe, assets that cannotrelocate as quickly as needed, or assets that are notfully effective for a specific environment, such asOOTW. These problems can degrade reconnais-sance efforts, directly impacting the success of en-gagements and battles.

Commanders must conduct reconnaissance op-erations prior to all maneuver and fires. Successfulreconnaissance precedes successful operations.Poor reconnaissance often results in unsuccessfuloperations and unnecessary friendly casualties.

Reconnaissance is not under the control of anyone particular branch or unit. The division’s recon-naissance system is based on complementaryground, aerial, and technical assets and is importantin all the battlefield operating systems. All BOS

provide information to meet the commander’s re-quirements. Engineer and NBC reconnaissance arekey to the IPB process. Engineers are responsiblefor obstacle intelligence, route and bridge recon-naissance, and general engineering reconnaissance.NBC reconnaissance informs commanders on NBC

hazards in the area of operations as a component of battlefield management. Reconnaissance informa-tion provided from the BOS add detail to the com-mander’s vision of the battlefield. (See Figure A-1.)

Ground reconnaissance elements gain and main-tain contact with the enemy. They work throughgaps and around the flanks and rear of the enemy,learning the strength, movements, composition, anddispositions of the enemy’s main force. They also

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learn the location of enemy reinforcements. Groundreconnaissance units can maintain continuouscontact, fit or guide units into the fight (reconnais-sance pull) at the preferred point of attack, andoperate under weather conditions that preclude air

reconnaissance. However, they are generally lim-ited in the depth to which they can conduct recon-naissance. Ground reconnaissance is employedwhen and where air and technical reconnaissanceassets are ineffective.

Air reconnaissance complements and extends thezone covered by ground reconnaissance. Successfulaerial reconnaissance obtains information useful ineffectively directing ground reconnaissance units.Under favorable conditions, aviation furnishes earlyinformation concerning the enemy’s general dispo-sition and movements to a considerable depth be-

yond the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).

Technical reconnaissance is accomplishedlargely by systems. It includes all the electronic-gathering methods available at all echelons. Addi-tionally, theater and national technicalreconnaissance and surveillance systems downlinkto the tactical commanders, providing near-real-time battlefield information.

Proper reconnaissance requires a coordinated andfocused team effort and is accomplished through an

integration of units and technical assets. Spot re-ports from maneuver and reconnaissance units, andtechnical reports and analysis from CS and CSSunits, all combine to form information needed bythe commander. The combination of all assets al-lows the commander to see the enemy with preci-sion without having to use large formations todetermine the enemy’s location, disposition, orcapabilities.

A key element of intelligence collection is cueing.Cueing involves the use of one or more forms of reconnaissance (air, ground, or technical) to provide

information that directs collection by other systems.For example, Guardrail common sensor may inter-cept transmissions of a suspected enemy air defensesite. This, in turn, may cue an unmanned aerialvehicle launch to confirm or deny this location. If detailed or first-hand reconnaissance is required, thecommander may choose to dispatch a groundreconnaissance element. Cueing maximizes the ef-ficient use of limited collection assets in support of

multiple, often competing, intelligence collectionpriorities.

The Reconnaissance Objective

One of the reconnaissance fundamentals is toorient on the objective. The commander orients hisreconnaissance assets by identifying a reconnais-sance objective (such as an enemy force or terrain)within his zone of operation and providing anyadditional instruction in his guidance or tasks to hissubordinate units in paragraph 3b of the OPORD.He commits reconnaissance assets based on theircapabilities. He commits ground reconnaissance togain vital information and in a way which minimizesthe risk to his soldiers’ lives.

The IPB process helps focus reconnaissance by

identifying terrain locations that will confirm ordeny an enemy course of action and dispositions.These areas are called named areas of interest(NAIs). For example, a battalion scout platoonwould not normally attempt to conduct a detailedzone reconnaissance of an entire TF zone. It wouldrecon in detail those assigned NAIs developed bythe IPB process. The scout platoon would normallyconduct an area reconnaissance of each NAI.

When the enemy situation is extremely vague orthe requirement for terrain information (includingobstacles) is significant, the reconnaissance objec-

tive also would be terrain-oriented. The reconnais-sance unit would then conduct a detailed andtime-consuming zone reconnaissance.

The G2 or S2 uses cueing to help focus limitedreconnaissance assets, especially limited ground re-connaissance assets. The G2 or S2 builds the col-lection plan against each NAI. He targets theappropriate collection means or unit based on fac-tors of METT-T. For example, JSTARS and Guard-rail can cover large areas to alert or cue other assetsonce an enemy force or target is identified. ThenUAVs or ground reconnaissance may be dispatched

to verify the information and track the enemy fortargeting purposes. Additionally, if a commanderneeds a reconnaissance conducted to achieve only acertain task he says so in guidance to his reconnais-sance unit. For example, if based on all technicaland HUMINT sources, a G2 can reliably say thatthe enemy is not in an area and the terrain appearsto be “go” terrain without indications of obstacles,the commander may decide he doesn’t need a

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detailed reconnaissance effort forward of the divi-sion. He may direct a zone reconnaissance missionwith guidance to move rapidly and report by excep-tion terrain obstacles which will significantly slowthe brigade’s movement.

When the reconnaissance objective is a specificenemy force which is of vital importance, the com-mander may choose to use reconnaissance troops tofind and maintain contact with it. In this case hisguidance may include “ ...the enemy’s reserve tankbattalion is uncommitted. Tracking its activities iskey to my plan. I want you to conduct an areareconnaissance in our sector between phase linesSUE and JANE. Our intelligence indicates that thebattalion was last located near the village of Hamp-ton. Your mission is to locate that battalion, main-tain contact with it, and keep me informed of itsmovements.”

When the objective is to locate an enemy force,the friendly reconnaissance unit will conduct onlythat terrain reconnaissance necessary to find theenemy and develop the situation in accordance withthe commander’s guidance and mission constraints.

When the G2 or G3 puts the entire intelligencepicture together, the commander will see his intel-ligence gaps and collection efforts. He can thentailor reconnaissance missions and objective basedon METT-T to fill these gaps.

In summary, the commander must focus his re-

connaissance efforts. He does this by assigningmissions and amplifying those with additional guid-ance. Specifically, the reconnaissance objectiveclarifies his intent.

Reconnaissance Responsibility

FM 100-5 states that “commanders get directlyinvolved in deciding priorities of reconnaissanceand intelligence operations. Commanders aggres-sively seek gaps or weaknesses in the enemy’sdefenses; study enemy defensive preparations and

attempt to obstruct and frustrate those preparations;and plan to penetrate enemy security areas, over-come obstacles, avoid the strengths of establisheddefenses, and destroy the coherence of the defense.All of this requires an active, predictive intelligenceeffort oriented on critical units and areas.”

purpose is to deny the enemy knowledge of what thefriendly force is doing. Security may be achieved byestablishing protective measures or by conductingdeception operations that confuse and dissipate

The commander must determine what informa-tion he already has and what he needs to know.

Reconnaissance is then used to satisfy these infor-mation requirements. This information allows thecommander to make sound decisions, conduct ma-neuver, and avoid being surprised by an enemyforce. Information requirements are the basis for

orders and missions governing the preparation of reconnaissance and surveillance plans. Command-ers rely on their G2s for the majority of this analysis;however, the G2 receives assistance from other staff officers in their respective fields of expertise.

Staff responsibilities for reconnaissance are clear(although different staff sections have oversightover different reconnaissance means). While thedivision’s chief of staff coordinates the efforts of thecoordinating and special staff, the G3 has primaryresponsibility for the reconnaissance supporting anoperation. The G3 normally has staff responsibilityfor ground units. The G2 normally has responsibil-ity for the technical assets. They share staff respon-sibility for air assets.

The G2 normally has staff responsibility for spe-cial electronics mission aircraft (SEMA); the G3,normally for scout, attack, cargo, and utility aircraft.For example, if the G2 needs the divisional cavalrysquadron to report certain PIR, he can request,through the G3, that the cavalry squadron performthese tasks. The G3 can go through the G2 to haveaerial assets search for key targets.

Although coordinating and special staff officers

have reconnaissance responsibilities, the G2 and theG3 must synchronize all of the planning efforts toconduct reconnaissance operations. The chief of staff remains aware of the reconnaissance activitiesand ensures that the G2 and G3 synchronize theirefforts. The chief of staff intervenes when neces-sary, but the commander is the final authority.

SECURITY

FM 101-5-1 defines security as measures takenby a military unit, an activity, or an installation toprotect itself against all acts designed to, or that may,impair its effectiveness. Security operations are in-herent in every military operation. Security is essen-tial to protect and conserve combat power. The

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enemy attempts to interfere with the force beingsecured. Effective security prevents the enemy fromgaining an unexpected advantage over friendlyforces.

Each commander is responsible for the securityof his force. In the conduct of operations, the higherheadquarters commander prescribes security meas-ures for the force as a whole and coordinates thoseadopted by subordinate commanders. Subordinatecommanders provide additional security as requiredfor their own local protection.

At the tactical level, security forces protect thecommand against surprise attack and observation byhostile air and ground forces. They maintain free-dom of maneuver by providing reaction time andmaneuver space. Forces conducting security mis-

sions orient their movements on the force or facilitythey are assigned to secure. However, to be effec-tive, all security systems must have an adequatewarning system consisting of observers and themeans to promptly communicate warning of hostileactions.

Traditional security operations are screen, guard,cover, and area security. Screen describes a forcewhose primary task is to observe, identify, andreport information, and which fights only in self-protection. Further, the force maintains surveil-lance, provides early warning to the main body,impedes and harasses the enemy with supportingindirect fires, and destroys enemy reconnaissanceelements within its capability.

Guard describes a force whose primary task is toprotect the main force by fighting to gain time, whilealso observing and reporting information, and toprevent enemy ground observation of and direct fireagainst the main body by reconnoitering, attacking,defending, and delaying. A guard force normally

operates within the range of the main body’s indirectfire weapons.

Cover describes a force operating apart from themain force to intercept, engage, delay, disorganize,

and deceive the enemy before he can attack thecovered force. Cover is also the security mission of any body or detachment of troops that providessecurity for a larger force. It may be by observation,reconnaissance, attack, defense, or any combinationof these methods. Cover forces may accept decisiveengagement if action fits within the seniorcommander’s intent.

Area security results when a force’s mission is tosecure a specific area. Area security actions couldinclude area reconnaissance; rear operations; andsecurity of designated personnel, equipment, facili-

ties, and critical points. Applications of area securitymissions are convoy and route security.

All forces have a security responsibility and arecapable of conducting security operations. Com-manders may consider giving a cover force missionto a maneuver brigade or battalion when weighingthe METT-T factors in the planning process. How-ever, cavalry, scouts, and aviation are generallyconsidered as the maneuver units organized andequipped for conducting security missions. As inreconnaissance operations, all units-combat, com-bat support, and combat service support-contrib-

ute to the unit’s overall security.Counter-reconnaissance is not a distinct mission;

rather, it is a result of security operations. Unitsconduct traditional security actions (screen, guard,cover, and area security) as well as many otheractivities (such as OPSEC, deception, and physicalsecurity). The purpose is to counter the enemy’sreconnaissance and, in doing so, defeat or destroyhostile reconnaissance forces.

RECONNAISSANCE AND

SECURITY ASSETSAlthough reconnaissance and security assets vary

in specific units, tactical systems normally found incorps, division, brigade, and battalion are outlinedin this section.

The corps conducts reconnaissance and securityoperations using many systems and organizations,both organic and external. Primary organic assets

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for focused collection include the military intelli-gence (MI) brigade and the armored cavalryregiment (ACR).

The corps MI brigade directly supports the corps

by providing multidisciplined IEW support to theentire corps. Collectors organic to the corps MIbrigade include—

•

•

•

•

•

The Guardrail common sensor.

The unmanned aerial vehicle-short range(UAV-SR).

Long-range surveillance units.

Counterintelligence and interrogator personnel.

The Guardrail common sensor provides signalsintelligence (communications and electronics intel-ligence) direction-finding (DF) capability with tar-getable accuracy. The analysis and control element(ACE) collects reported information from theGuardrail common sensor, analyzes this informat-ion, then disseminates it through the All SourceAnalysis System (ASAS). Information meeting theneed for urgent dissemination is redundantly passeddown to division and brigades in near real time viaa commander’s tactical terminal (CTT).

Depending on the configuration, the UAV-SR,when fielded in FY 96, will provide—

• •

•

•

Near-real-time live video imaging.

Forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) imagery.

Moving target indicator.

Electro-optical freeze-frame photo and retrans-mission capability.

Through automated processors, the corps alsoprocesses and disseminates intelligence from thea-ter and national sensors. The JSTARS ground sta-tion module (GSM) receives and analyzes movingtarget indicators and synthetic aperture radar data.

The Imagery Processing and Dissemination System(IPDS) and the Tactical Radar Correlation (TRAC)system receive and exploit imagery from national-and theater-level sensors in near real time. Theythen disseminate secondary imagery to customersvia such systems as Trojan SPIRIT and the mobileintegrated tactical terminal (MITT). The ElectronicProcessing and Dissemination System (EPDS) re-ceives and processes signals intelligence data from

national and theater systems and disseminates thatdata to customers via other systems.

The ACE is the synergistic focus of intelligenceand reconnaissance at the corps level. Under the

G2’s supervision, this element fuses all intelligenceand reconnaissance data to provide the commandera coherent picture of enemy operations. The ASASis the primary processing system at both corps anddivision. It is a “one-stop shopping store” forcomputer-assisted all-source IEW processing,analysis, reporting, technical control, target identi-fication and nomination, and collection manage-ment. The primary MI long-haul communicationspathway is provided by the Trojan SPIRIT (current)satellite communications terminal. The TrojanSPIRIT has capabilities for secure voice and datatransmission, including graphic products, facsimile,

and secondary imagery transmission.

The ACR is the primary maneuver force perform-ing reconnaissance and security operations for thecorps. The regiment with its ground and aviationassets is uniquely suited to perform reconnaissance(route, zone, area, and reconnaissance in force), andsecurity (screen, guard, cover, and area) operations.The ACR’S subordinate armored cavalry squadronsconduct screen and guard security and all forms of reconnaissance. The air cavalry squadron can par-ticipate in security missions as well as all forms of reconnaissance.

Other reconnaissance and security resourcesavailable to the corps include aviation, military po-lice, fire support, air defense, and chemical assets.The aviation brigade can augment or performmissions alone. MP assets from the MP brigadeconduct reconnaissance and area security missionsto ensure uninterrupted use of main supply routes,and other key areas in the corps rear. Corps artillerypossesses target acquisition systems; corps air de-fense units provide early warning from and targetacquisition of enemy air activity. Finally, corpschemical units perform NBC reconnaissance.

The division conducts reconnaissance and secu-rity similar to the corps. Its primary organic assetsfor focused collection include the MI battalion andthe cavalry squadron.

The division MI battalion directly supports thecommander, G3, and G2 by providing dedicatedmultidisciplined battlefield IEW support to the

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•

•

•

• •

•

•

•

•

•

division and its subordinate maneuver brigades.Collectors organic to the division include—

Quickfix.

Unmanned aerial vehicle-short range (UAV-SR).

Ground surveillance radar (GSR). Long-range surveillance detachments (LRSDs) (insome divisions).

Counterintelligence and interrogator personnel.

The ground-based common sensor (GBCS),which consists of communications and electronicintelligence, direction finding, and jamming, re-places the following four current systems:

AN/TRQ-32, (Teammate), very high frequency(VHF) collection and direction finding.

AN/TSQ- 17, (Traffic Jam), high frequency(HF)/VHF collection and jamming.

AN/TSQ-38, (Trailblazer), VHF collection andDF.

The MITT, CTT, and GSM provide the divisionthe ability to receive and exploit imagery andSIGINT national, theater, and corps systems. Thecavalry squadron is the division’s primary recon-naissance and security organization. The squadroncan conduct route, zone, and area reconnaissance,and reconnaissance in force. It can conduct screenand guard (if augmented) security operations. Thedivision also receives information from other or-ganic units (aviation, field artillery, military police,engineer, chemical, and air defense) to complete theintelligence picture.

The division brigade does not have an organicreconnaissance or security organization (separatebrigades have their own cavalry troop). Army doc-trine states that a brigade normally does not actindependently, but serves as part of a division orcorps. Brigades may task their subordinate

battalions with reconnaissance and security opera-tions, but brigades normally rely on the division G2,the direct support MI company, the cavalry squad-ron, subordinate maneuver battalions, and other at-tached and adjacent units for reconnaissance and

security.The DS MI company provides the brigade the

following assets:

GSR.

Remotely monitored battlefield sensor system(REMBASS).

HF and VHF collection and jamming (TLQ-17,TRQ-32).

UAV-SR.

JSTARS ground station module.Commander’s tactical terminal.

Analysis and control element.

•

•

•

•

Brigades may conduct security operations (ad-vance, flank, or rear guard) for a larger force. Theymay also participate as part of a division in a corpscovering force, or be the divisional covering force.Brigades also execute internal reconnaissance andsecurity actions by tasking subordinate elements orDS intelligence assets.

The battalion is the lowest tactical echelon with

its own organic reconnaissance assets. The battalionscout platoon can conduct route, zone, and areareconnaissance, and surveillance and screen mis-sions. The platoon along with other battalion ma-neuver elements and technical reconnaissanceassets from other attached or supporting organiza-tions provide reconnaissance for the battalion taskforce. The MI battalion assets are normally task-organized to the brigade level. The brigade mayelect to push GSRs and REMBASS down to battal-ion level.

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APPENDIX B

ARMORED-LIGHT OPERATIONS

Armored and mechanized and lighter infantryforces operate effectively together provided the di-vision commander tailors his force to the factors of METT-T. The combined use of armored-lightforces permits the commander to maximize hiscombat power and increases the forces’ lethality andendurance. The strengths of one type unit offset theinherent weaknesses of another. Armored-light op-erations merely extend the combined arms concept.

Not all situations are suitable for armored-lightoperations. Armored and light forces are best em-ployed when they take advantage of their respective

strengths. These are discussed in Chapter 1 andhighlighted in following paragraphs.

ARMORED-LIGHT FORCES

Ground mobility, armored protection, and lethal-ity describe the capabilities of armored forces. Ar-mored forces include mechanized infantry,armored, and ground cavalry units. Because of theirmobility and protection, they are best employedwhere battles are fought over wide areas of rela-tively unrestricted terrain. Their capabilities andlimitations are discussed in Chapter 1.

Light forces include infantry, light infantry, air-borne, and air assault units. Ranger and other specialoperations forces are often classified as light; how-ever, they are normally employed differently thantraditional infantry. The use of Ranger and specialoperations forces as light infantry is addressed inFM 7-30, FM 7-85, and the 31-series field manualson special forces operations.

Light forces provide the Army versatility andstrategic flexibility through their capability for rapid

deployment. Airborne units are capable of opposedentry into enemy-held areas anywhere strategictransportation assets can reach. Airborne forceshelp the rapid buildup of combat power in an objec-tive area. Air assault forces, although not as strate-gically deployable as airborne units, maintain asignificant tactical self-deployment capability. Theair assault division maximizes the effectiveness of integrated attack and assault helicopter operations

as well as the capability to rapidly reposition infan-try forces on the battlefield. Force limitations arealso discussed in Chapter 1.

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT

The goal of armored-light operations is to opti-mize both forces to defeat the enemy by providingcommanders many flexible options. Through theestimate process (FM 101-5), commanders deter-mine the appropriate force level at which task or-ganization should occur, tasks to accomplish,

command and support relationships, additional aug-mentation and support required, and concept of logistics support.

No set formula exists for task-organizing armoredand infantry forces. Commanders apply METT-Tand other basic considerations to the decision. Theseinclude the ever-increasing lethality of modemweapons, the speed with which an enemy can strikefriendly units, the tactics friendly forces will use todefeat the enemy forces, the ability of friendlyforces to move across the terrain, and the CS andCSS requirements. All of these factors influence the

commander when he selects the final combinationof armored and light forces.

Under certain circumstances, task-organizing anarmored division with a brigade from an infantrydivision or vice versa may be necessary to accom-plish a specific mission. However, task-organizingelements below brigade level in a division mayresult in a piecemeal effort and undue logisticsburdens on both the gaining and losing units.

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relatively large area and conducts synchronized butdecentralized operations. An infantry division isnormally attached to a corps or joint force. Aninfantry brigade can be attached or OPCON to anarmored division. An infantry battalion can be at-

tached or OPCON to an armored brigade.Note that the infantry brigade deploys with an

austere CS and CSS allocation. The armored divi-sion will require transportation support from corpsto provide mobility for the infantry unit in supportof its tactical operations. Increased equipment den-sities may exceed the maintenance capabilities of the gaining division and require additional assetsfrom corps. Infantry divisions do not have aDISCOM large enough to support the division’soperations and easily support a detached brigade orbattalion supporting an armored force.

In addition to differences in combat service sup-port, major differences between an infantry divisionand an armored or a mechanized division exist inthe areas of antitank, chemical, and transportationcapabilities. Augmentation of forces is based on

METT-T. Figure B-1 is an example of a robustaugmentation package for an infantry division.

The infantry brigade will habitually deploy to thesupported unit with the units shown in Figure B-2,page B-4. Figure B-2 also provides an example of augmentation that the brigade could require.

Figure B-3, page B-4, shows what an armoredbrigade operating as part of an infantry divisionoften brings as part of its normal allocation. It alsodepicts what the infantry division usually provides.

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Infantry brigades position forces to fight in depthfrom reverse slope positions along restrictive mo-bility corridors on carefully selected and preparedterrain to destroy the enemy at choke points, obsta-cles, and road blocks. After engaging the enemy

with direct and indirect fires, infantry forces maneu-ver through the restricted terrain to alternate posi-tions, progressively slowing and weakening theenemy.

Combat Support

As in all combat operations, CS units in anarmored-light force are essential to applying supe-rior combat power at the decisive time and place.Light forces have fewer combat support assets

available than do armored forces. A light infantrydivision has an extremely austere CS structure andis designed to accept augmentation when the mis-sion requires additional assets. Therefore, plannersof operations involving an armored-light force atany level must be familiar with the organization,capabilities, and limitation of all forces involved.They must also understand the concept for provid-ing augmentation to the infantry forces.

Augmentation

Augmentation is the single most important con-sideration during planning of armored-light opera-tions. Augmentation provides light forces withsufficient CS to accomplish the mission. However,planners should not assume arbitrarily that the in-fantry force always requires major augmentation. Alight force, given an appropriate mission and terrainconsistent with its normal combined arms task or-ganization and capabilities, can accomplish somemissions without additional assets.

Combat Aviation

Generally, the organic aviation units in the infan-try division can lift one light infantry battalion usingthe combined assets of the two assault companies(the armored division has one assault company).However, without additional CSS support, the lightinfantry division aviation maintenance organizationdoes not easily support decentralized operations.

Field Artillery

All organic fire support in the light division istowed (105 and 155 millimeter) artillery and 60- or8l-millimeter mortars. Armored and mechanized

infantry divisions’ artillery is self-propelled. Theirmortars are vehicle-mounted 120 millimeter. Thus,when mixing the forces, commanders and staff mustconsider the availability of ammunition type, mo-bility, maintenance, and communications. The ca-pability of air-lifting the infantry division’s DS105-millimeter battalion provides the force com-mander responsive, mobile artillery.

Personnel and equipment also differ between ar-mored and infantry division artillery. The infantrydivision artillery’s command and control elementshave fewer personnel but the same responsibilities.

Additionally, the infantry division artillery has lim-ited ground resupply capability. It lacks target ac-quisition radar except for the countermortar radar.The light division artillery is not equipped with anarmored fire support control system. This limits itsability to use or to interface with corps and armoreddivision artillery without augmentation. This is es-pecially true for counterfire.

Air Defense

The infantry division’s air defense battalion isorganized and equipped for a low air threat. There-fore, based on the air threat, the light force mayrequire additional ADA support. Also, the ADAresupply capability is limited.

Chemical

The lighter divisions do not have an organicchemical company. These divisions routinely re-ceive support from EAD assets for decontamina-tion, smoke, and NBC reconnaissance.

EngineeringThe engineer battalion in the infantry divisions

(armored and mechanized divisions have a brigade)has limited terrain reinforcement capability. How-ever, it can perform traditional mobility, counter-mobility, and survivability missions. By the natureof their organization, light engineers require addi-tional assets to operate for extended periods of timeagainst a robust threat.

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The engineer battalion can support the infantryforce in constructing fighting positions, commandposts, and FA firing positions, and in improvingsmall roads and trails. The battalion’s equipment iscapable of limited earth moving, scraping, and dig-

ging. In an armored-light force organization, thelight engineer unit will require additional armoredengineer elements, such as armored earth-movingequipment, haul assets, and mechanical mine-layingelements.

Communications

The infantry division’s area communications sys-tem can support the division deployed over ex-tended distances. Additionally, infantry forces uselaptop computer networks for many tasks. The

armored-light force may require additional commu-nications support based on METT-T. The light forcedoes not have the redundancy in communicationssystem compared to the armored force. AlthoughMSE contingency packages, forced entry switches(FESs), and tactical satellite systems have enhancedand expanded area signal capabilities and versatil-ity, force communications remain a critical planningconsideration. All means of augmentation to com-munications support should be exploited to includehost nation fixed plant facilities when available.

Intelligence and Electronic WarfareThe light force’s organic IEW assets are austere.

These assets include limited jamming, collection,interrogation, and counterintelligence capability.

An armored-light force may require additionalIEW assets. (For example, a light division has noelectronic intelligence or ground-based jammingcapability.) Additional assets should come fromcorps and EAC.

Military Police

Division MP companies fall into two catego-ries-those that support armored or mechanizeddivisions and those that support the lighter infantrydivisions. Both types of companies execute areasecurity, battlefield circulation control, EPW con-trol, and law and order. These functions are per-formed as prioritized in the division commander’sconcept of operations.

The division’s provost marshal will initially haveOPCON of the division MP company and any MPassets provided from corps. In armored and mecha-nized divisions, MP companies provide generalsupport to the division’s rear area and normally

direct support to maneuver brigades. However, inthe lighter infantry divisions, MP companies are notresourced to habitually provide direct support tomaneuver brigades. In these lighter divisions, theMP company normally provides general support tothe division as a whole. Corps MP assets will nor-mally provide additional support for an armored-light mix of forces.


Generally, light forces cannot logistically support

armored forces. The armored force’s tremendouscombat power comes with correspondingly highsupply, maintenance, and transportation require-ments. Consequently, the armored unit must sustainitself or be sustained by its parent division or thecorps or joint force.

The armored division’s method of support is simi-lar to that of the light division. There are differences,however, which the armored division plannersshould consider. The infantry DISCOM is an aus-tere support organization that emphasizes aerial re-supply and push resupply to the lowest level

possible, and a maintenance system which reliesheavily on exchange versus repair. The infantrydivision normally depends on external transporta-tion assets for mobility and movement of supplies.Water resupply for light forces is a critical concern.Soldiers in light divisions rely on canteens and5-gallon water cans. DISCOMs are discussed inChapter 1. Division sustainment is detailed inAppendix E.

The level of support directly affects the type of support and the force. To determine the appropriatelevel, planners consider—

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•

•

•

Structure of the supported force.

Supported unit and its organic support organiza-tion-carried level of stock. (Special emphasis isgiven to classes I through V, VIII, and IX.)

Levels of maintenance to be performed.

Degree of mobility and transportation required.

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•

•

•

Duration and distances of the support to be The combat capability of both armored and infantryprovided. units are directly related to their logistics

Capability to conduct replacement operations.capabilities.

Recovery operations.

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deployment time lines. Units following the DRB1(in the precrisis plan) are in a lesser deploymentposture. This allows greater flexibility for unit train-ing and related support activities.

The division ready brigades’ ground maneuverbattalions form the nucleus of the division readyforce (DRF). These battalions also maintain variousstages of readiness, depending on where they fall inthe planned deployment sequence. One battaliontask-organized with combat, CS, and CSS forms theDRF1 battalion. It is the first unit in the DRB1 todeploy. The DRF1 designates one of its companiesas the initial ready company (IRC). The IRC is thefirst unit to respond to division crisis requirements.

Combat, CS, and CSS elements not task-organized with a DRB or DRF are organized into

separate support packages (SUPPACs) according tothe division plan. These elements are also task-organized to initially provide an advance party andoperational elements. This advance party preparesfor the reception of follow-on forces. Initial opera-tional elements provide the necessary support tosustain operations of the DRB1. These advanceparties also establish a support base for the arrivalof the remainder of the division. With this organi-zation, the division can rapidly tailor and deploySUPPACs for a separate brigade operation if theentire division does not deploy.

A core force-package structure helps to modifyand deploy forces quickly when a crisis occurs. Thedivision commander tailors his forces and echelonsthem for movement based on current contingencyplans (which may be modified through JOPES), hismission, the enemy situation, available lift, andaccess to host nation or pre-positioned resources.

The division relies on organic, installation, andcontracted transportation for the movement of per-sonnel and equipment to the division’s POE. TheUSTRANSCOM provides the division transporta-tion for strategic movement. Divisions, responding

to short-notice contingencies for which noCONPLANs or OPLANs exist, quickly assess theirstrategic transport requirements. They assistUSTRANSCOM (or their corps headquarters) incomputing requirements and time of embarkation.Headquarters higher than division may dictate theamount of available transportation.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•Divisions establish internal movement proce-

dures and responsibilities for moving personnel,

equipment, and logistics from installations to stra-tegic embarkation points. Since divisional equip-ment will eventually be deployed, divisions use asfew organic assets to outload their units as possible.Installations maximize all installation and higherheadquarters resources to support the division’soutload. Divisions also develop procedures to con-duct a self-outload.

The complexity of deployment requires a dedi-cated C² system with fixed communications. Thedivision establishes an emergency operations center(EOC) with at least minimal staffing at aIl times.When the division is alerted, the EOC is fully staffedto execute operations, intelligence, logistics, andadministration functions. The EOC is the control-ling agency as the division’s various commandposts and command groups are moved in accord-

ance with the division’s plan. If the entire divisionis alerted to deploy, the installation or garrison staff performs duties in the EOC.

READINESS PROCEDURES

The division establishes a formal division deploy-ment system to synchronize resources and eventsfor an effective and efficient deployment. This sys-tem is documented in the division’s readiness stand-ing operating procedures (RSOP). The RSOPprescribe unit procedures for preparation and over-all conduct of deployment activities.

Divisions develop their RSOP on planning guid-ance established by their parent headquarters andthe 55-series field manuals. (CALL NewsletterNo. 90-11, December 1990, Getting To The Desert,also provides excellent, specific lessons learned onreadiness and deployment.) The RSOP address—

An overall concept.

Force-package training requirements.

The division’s notification system.

Logistics support.

Personnel readiness (to include family supportplans).

Equipment readiness.

Outload support.

Command and control at all critical points.

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JOPES is the national system for joint militaryplanning and execution of operations. It provides allservices a formal system to develop, coordinate,approve, and publish OPLANs and CONPLANs.Divisions are involved with two types of JOPES

planning-deliberate and crisis action. Their majordifference is the availability of time. The Army Mo-bilization and Operations Planning and ExecutionSystem (AMOPES) is the Army supplement toJOPES. Army components plan Army forces andresources to meet combatant commanders’ needsusing the AMOPES. It provides the interface be-tween unified plans for deployment and Army plansfor mobilizing forces and resources. Division plan-ners must be familiar with the JOPES and AMOPESprocesses. (See FM 100-11 and FM 100-1 7-1.) De-ployments normally begin with the receipt of an

alert message, which is a product of JOPES andAMOPES.

Division crisis-action planning (CAP) takes placeon receipt of an alert or a warning order. On receiptof a warning order from the higher headquarters,crisis-action team (CAT) members (normally se-lected division staff members) are alerted and as-semble in the EOC. There the team modifies anexisting OPLAN or develops a new OPLAN andprepares to issue it to the division.

The following paragraphs describe critical pieces

of the division’s readiness procedures.

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•Alert Notification

At the appropriate time, the EOC initiates thedivision’s alert notification and begins the CAPsequence. Critical, events are set into motion. Onalert, notification units initiate personnel-assemblyprocedures, strength accounting, and mission plan-ning and commence deployment activities outlinedin the division’s RSOP.

Notification from the EOC follows an establishedchain. It uses dedicated communications to majorsubordinate commands, separate battalions, andcompanies. The EOC should have the ability tosimultaneously communicate emergency actionmessages to all designated units and activities. (Forexample, some civilian support may deploy.) Thisnotification provides subordinate units with essen-tial information needed to begin actions fordeployment.

Outloading

Outload procedures are established to quicklymove the division. Outload procedures lay outevents and activities by hour, from the time of

notification through the deployment of the divi-sion’s trail unit. The outload sequence is based onthe division’s standard precrisis task organizationinto DRBs. METT-T requirements may require tai-loring the standard task organization. The outloadsequence is flexible enough to accommodate suchchanges.

Agencies and organic units (if required) assistpushing the deploying units. If possible, the divisionshould minimize using organic assets for outloadsupport. The installation or garrison is responsiblefor outloading the division. If, however, the garrison

or associated nondivisional elements are unable toperform all outloading tasks, the divisional unitsperform outload support. The division identifies if special assets are needed, and the installation ob-tains them from other installations or commercialresources.

Division outload-support procedures must fix re-sponsibilities for support activities. Examples of outload activities include—

Formation of POE control groups.

Transportation of personnel.

Conduct of Soldier Readiness Program (SRP).

Establishment of personnel and vehicle process-

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ing centers and holding areas.

Personnel Readiness

Integral to deployment proficiency is personnelreadiness. Units, soldiers, and deployable civiliansregularly perform personnel readiness actions.These actions include—

Maintenance of personnel readiness folders.

Updates to individual SRP requirements.

Maintenance of individual special equipment.

Personnel actions that must be accomplished re-gardless of mission.

Most personnel actions are completed prior to anactual alert. There will always be last-minute re-quirements however.

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Final requirements may include—

Prepare for overseas movement of 100 percent of deploying soldiers and finalize deployment ros-ters.

Conduct final immunization based on expectedarea of deployment.

Request POM, postal, and Red Cross support.

Create manifests.

Conduct final weapons qualification.

Create shortage lists.

Conduct minimum mission-essential equipment

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Logistics Readiness

Combat service support is a component part of the division’s task organization. The DRBs are task-organized with appropriate CSS assets that enablethe force to sustain itself for a designated timeperiod. Assigned missions may require logisticssupport beyond the DISCOM’s responsibilities.Therefore, the division quickly assesses logisticsrequirements, taking into account host nation capa-bilities. The division then requests and sequencesaugmentation by corps CSS units into the division’sdeployment.

Logistics requirements of deploying forces are of two categories: unit-related supplies and equip-ment, and nonunit-related supplies and equipment.The first includes the unit’s organic equipment,basic load, and accompanied supplies. The latterincludes all sustainment support requirements notassigned to a specific unit. Nonunit-related suppliesand equipment support the division’s forces untillines of communication (LOC) are open.

Procedures for the storage, accountability, anddeployment of supplies are essential to the divi-sion’s deployment readiness. Logistics require-ments at every divisional level must be clearly statedand documented. Procedures that cover logisticssupport, ranging from uploading equipment to issu-ing ammunition, must be thoroughly documentedand synchronized with other parts of the deploy-ment plan. The desired end state of these logisticsactions is to deploy and sustain an effective forcecapable of conducting assigned missions on arrivingin the area of operations.

Transportation Considerations

A key issue is transporting the division. The Armydepends on the Air Force and the Navy for strategiclift. The division identifies its transportation re-

quirements and constraints through the Transporta-tion Coordinator Automated Command and ControlInformation System (TC-ACCIS). This is an infor-mation management and data communications sys-tem used to plan and control movement fordeployments. The TC-ACCIS ties together (througha computer network) the installation transportationoffice, unit movement coordinators, intermediateunit movement officers (such as the division trans-portation officer, brigade movement officers), andunit movement officer (FM 55-65). By establishinga detailed precrisis movement data base, the divi-sion can tailor its unit loads according to METT-Tand available transportation.

Security

Security measures are vital to protecting the divi-sion’s forces. The division establishes proceduresand ROE to prevent hostile or unwanted monitoringof division activities. Laxness in division securityprocedures jeopardizes soldiers and the mission.

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Security measures include—

Establishing procedures and safeguards to limit

military and commercial communications.Designating unit security areas.

Developing unit OPSEC measures.

Conducting counterintelligence evaluations priorto the deployment and executing countermea-sures during the deployment sequence.

Public Affairs

Media impact on deployment operations is sub-stantially greater today than in any previous time inhistory. The news media’s capability to gain andtransmit ongoing deployment activities globallycannot be discounted. News technology requires thedivision to establish a single point of contact forreleasing information regarding ongoing opera-tions. The division’s public affairs office (PAO)coordinates all media actions. Additionally, PAOresponds to public requests for information as ap-propriate. The division develops procedures and

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guidelines for releasing information within security,propriety, and safety considerations of the ongoingoperation.

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Family SupportProcedures for family support while soldiers are

gone are critical in deployment planning. Theseprocedures are established and documented. Theymay include forming family support groups thatassist in resolving problems and formally interact-ing with Army Community Services, the Installa-tion Ministry Team, and Family Life Center to meetfamily needs. Soldiers need assurance that theirfamilies will be cared for after they deploy. Singlesoldiers must be considered and assured that theirfamilies are kept abreast on their situation. Familysupport is the responsibility of both the deployingcommander and the garrison or installation com-mander. The garrison, installation, or rear detach-ment commander supervises family support actionswhen the division deploys.

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Rear Detachment

Rear detachment requirements always exist whenunits deploy. Nondeployable personnel and equip-ment (organizational and personal) will requirepositive control. Rear detachments must be estab-lished and trained to perform their critical tasks in

the areas of—

Installation or facility control.

Administrative responsibility of nondeployedpersonnel.

Storage of privately owned vehicles (POVs) and

weapons.Disposition of personal property.

Family assistance.

Unit property management.

Provision of Class A agent.

Security management.

Training

Since force-projection missions are accom-

plished rapidly with little or no warning, divisionsmust train as they intend to operate. Once alerted,the division may have little time to correct trainingdeficiencies.

When not deployed, divisions normally establishthree DRB TF operating cycles—mission, training,and support. These rotational cycles ensure that oneDRB is fully prepared to deploy while the secondDRB is postured to support or augment the divi-sion’s outload. The third DRB concentrates on train-ing. Such cycles facilitate the division’s readinessand support METL and battle task training. FM 25-5

addresses unit training for deployments.

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APPENDIX D

MOBILIZATION ANDDEMOBILIZATION PLANNING

Worldwide missions demand an appropriate mixof forces. This mix includes active, National Guard(NG), and US Army Reserve (USAR) forces incombat, combat support (CS), and combat servicesupport (CSS) units to meet the various missionrequirements around the globe. In some cases, divi-sion commanders may execute plans for the recep-tion and training of mobilized reserve component(RC) units.

In Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, theUnited States demonstrated its capability to assem-

ble, deploy, and rapidly project military forces. The1st Battalion 158th Field Artillery (Multiple-Launch Rocket System) of the Oklahoma ArmyNational Guard, for example, was alerted for mobi-lization on 15 November 1990, and federalized on21 November 1990. The l-158th FA (MLRS)arrived at its mobilization station, Fort Sill, on24 November 1990. The battalion’s equipment wasprocessed at the mobilization station and shipped toa seaport of embarkation (SPOE) within 24 days of federalization. The battalion, minus equipment, de-ployed to Southwest Asia on 31 January 1991. Oncein country, the battalion awaited the arrival of itsequipment. At the seaport of debarkation (SPOD),the battalion off-loaded its own equipment, movedto its VII corps assembly area, and fired in the initialpreparation fires for the ground offensive on 22February 1991. The 1-158th FA mobilized, de-ployed, and participated in combat fire missionswithin 82 days from call-up. In other examples, RCunits were alerted, mobilized, and deployed into thearea of operations in as little as two days.

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•authorizes the mobilization of 1,000,000 readyreserve (all services) members for up to 24months using a Presidential executive order uponproclamation of a national emergency. Congressmay declare a state of national emergency andsubsequent reserve mobilization under Title 10,USC 672(d). The congressional declaration does

AUTHORITY FOR

MOBILIZATION

The end of the cold war has resulted in changesin the national security strategy and the nationalmilitary strategy. The Army has gone from aforward-deployed to a forward-presence, primarilyCONUS-based, force-projection Army. The resultis a dramatic increase in reserve forces’

participation in all areas of operation. Under-standing the impact of RC mobilization is critical tomission success.

Authority for RC mobilization resides in the Na-tional Command Authorities (NCA) and the USCongress. The NCA must authorize both the move-ment of troops and the execution of military actions.By law, no one else in the chain of command hasthe authority to take such action.

The graduated mobilization response (GMR) is

key in the mobilization process. The GMR providesfor five levels or options which can be adjusted forthe degree of severity and ambiguity of the situation.These levels are—

Presidential selected reserve call-up (PSRC). Ti-tle 10, United States Code (USC) 673(b), autho-rizes the President to involuntarily call up200,000 members (all services) of the selectedreserve as individuals or units for 180 days, withan extension of up to 180 days. This PSRCauthority does not require the President to declarea national emergency; it does require a report to

the US Congress within 24 hours.

Partial mobilization. Title 10, USC 673(a),

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not limit the number of reservists mobilized or thelength of tour unless specified in the resolution.

Full mobilization. Title 10, USC 671 (a), 672,674,and 675 authorize the call-up of all forces in thecurrent force structure, including NG and USAR

units, individual ready reserve, standby reserve,and members of the retired reserve. In addition,Congress must declare that a state of nationalemergency or war exists. The length of service isfor the duration of the national emergency or warplus six months.

Total mobilization. This is an extension of fullmobilization. It activates and organizes additionalunits beyond the current approved force structure.Total mobilization brings the industrial mobiliza-tion base up to full capacity to provide the addi-tional resources, equipment, and production

facilities needed to support the armed forces of the nation.

Selective mobilization. This is used primarily for

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•domestic emergencies or natural disasters. It isauthorized under Title 10, USC 3500,8500,331,332, and 333. The President or Congress, throughproclamation or special action, authorizes an ex-pansion of the active duty force with NG orUSAR units to protect life, federal property, andfunctions, or to prevent the disruption of federalactivities.

AVAILABLE FORCES

Division commanders consider augmenting theirforces for operations under the authorities just men-tioned. Specifically, division commanders may re-quest, through their chains of command, call-up andattachment of an Army National Guard separatebrigade, activation of their division’s rear opera-tions cell (ROC), or individual Army reserve aug-mentations to fill special skill requirements. Planscall for medium divisions to also be available to theArmy.

Army National GuardSeparate Brigades

Some Army National Guard brigade-sized unitsare currently designated as separate brigades. Thesebrigades provide the Army with an additional go-to-war capability when mobilized. The structure of

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these brigades can best be defined as a modifiedseparate brigade. Some have an assigned trainingaffiliation with active Army units. Others do not.None, however, are assigned to divisions for warplanning purposes.

Reserve component separate brigades are ar-mored, mechanized, or light infantry (and one ar-mored cavalry regiment). Armored and mechanizedseparate brigades comprise a brigade headquarters,three maneuver battalions, an artillery battalion, asupport battalion, an engineer battalion, a militaryintelligence company, and an armored cavalrytroop. Infantry brigades comprise a brigade head-quarters, three maneuver battalions, an artillery bat-talion, a support battalion, an engineer company, acavalry troop, and a military intelligence company.

Rear Operations CellIntrinsic to the division rear CP is the ROC. The

ROC is a 19-person RC unit that augments thedivision’s rear operations staff. This augmentationresults in a fully capable 24-hour division rear com-mand post. The ROC assists with rear area planning,coordinating and controlling of rear security opera-tions, movement control, terrain management, anddamage control.

Individual MobilizationAugmentation

Individual mobilization augmenters (IMAs) are re-serve personnel generally assigned to an approvedTOE or table of distribution and allowances (TDA)but may be available to augment the division com-mander’s staff in times of crisis. These soldiers maybe able to provide specific skills to the division as wellas fill unmanned positions in units. If special reserveaugmentation is required, the division submits a re-quest through the appropriate chain of command tothe US Army Reserve Personnel Center.

Medium Divisions

Finally, the Army National Guard is developingdivisions patterned after the 2d Infantry Division inKorea. This design consists of one armored, onemechanized, and one light infantry brigade withtraditional division CS and CSS units. This divisionis designed to provide commanders with a greatdegree of operational flexibility. When fielded and

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trained, the medium divisions’ strengths and limita-tions should be similar to that of armored divisions.

PLANNING FOR

MOBILIZATIONAlthough Active Army divisions have very little

impact on the reserve mobilization process, com-manders and their staffs must know how RC unitsmobilize. They also must know their role in theprocess.

The division commander may identify and rec-ommend or request specific types of reserve forcesrequired to support a specific OPLAN through theappropriate chain of command. (Normally reserveunits are identified in CINC-developed OPLANs

and time-phased force and deployment data(TPFDD).) Early identification of any needed RCsupport allows for the mobilization planning of these units. Divisions routinely express their re-quirements to their corps headquarters.

The division commander and his staff also con-sider individual manpower requirements. Thesegenerally fall into four categories:

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Manpower required to bring units up to approvedauthorized levels of organization.

Manpower required for unit filler or casualty

replacements.Civilian manpower required to meet expandedmissions within the sustaining base and to supportrequirements of the supported combatantcommanders.

Military and civilian requirements in the sustain-ing base.

Some IMAs are already assigned to TOE posi-tions. These individuals are assigned againstMTOEs in AC divisions. IMAs may be activated fora specific training period or a crisis.

The division or his installation commander mayalso be a mobilization station commander. As RCunits enter active duty (or report to duty), the mobi-lization station commander plans for their adminis-trative services and support. The primary concern isensuring soldiers meet requirements and standardsfor active duty and processing for overseas move-ment (POM) deployment. These include, but are not

limited to, specific legal, medical, dental, and ad-ministrative standards. Mobilization installationswill meet many of these requirements. Installationcommanders may or may not request division sup-port. The installation’s planning process will cer-

tainly affect the division. (See Army MobilizationOperations Planning and Execution System.)

Initially, mobilized RC unit facility needs may notimpact on the division. Under a selected or PSRCmobilization, existing structures can fill facilitiesrequirements. However, as a GMR increases, thedivision or installation will have to deal with theincreased demand for facilities on its installation.Commanders must also anticipate increased re-quirements for medical, dental, and other support.Note that during Operation Desert Storm, facilitiesand property accountability at some installationsbecame a problem because deployed AC units didnot completely clear their buildings.

Installation mobilization plans may require Na-tional Environmental Policy Act analysis beforetheir final approval. (For example, increased soldierpopulations in older garrison areas may overburdenpresent sewage capacities and require environ-mental waivers.) “Dual-hatted” commandersshould be aware that environmental restrictions im-pact mobilization plans. They should have specificcontingency plans or prenegotiated waivers to meetthese requirements.

Deliberate planning must also include the impacta full or total mobilization would have on the divi-sion’s facilities. Both financial management andservices and contracting should be considered. Fi-nancial management and services planning shouldinclude currency support for procurement and or-ganizational support in the area of operations (AO);field services (commissary and exchange services);military pay and travel; and central funding opera-tions. Contracting support should be considered tofill gaps in the existing facilities and services, in-cluding billeting, food service, transportation, andmedical and dental services and supplies.

Mobilization of the RC occurs in five phases:planning, alert, home station, mobilization station,and movement to port of embarkation.

Planning is the first and probably most importantphase of mobilization. This phase must include boththe AC and the RC during peacetime to properlyplan, train, and prepare to accomplish their assigned

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mobilization missions. Critical to this phase is theidentification of combat, CS, and CSS units to sup-port the various combatant commanders’CONPLANs and OPLANs. Reserve componentunits remain under control of their state or US Army

Reserve Command (USARC) during this phase.However, AC WARTRACE and dedicated trainingassociation (DTA) units continue planning and co-ordination with their RC units for mobilization andemployment. Thus, RC DTA unit METLs mustreflect the divisions’ training guidance.

The alert phase begins when an RC unit receivesnotice of a pending order to active duty; it ends whenthe unit enters active federal service (effective dateof entry on federal active duty). Actions initiated inthe planning phase help the unit transition to anactive status. Some key unit members are broughton active status early to begin these actions. Com-mand and control (C²) of RC units remain un-changed during this phase.

The third phase, home station mobilization, be-gins when RC units enter on federal active duty attheir local armories or centers. It concludes upon theRC units’ departure for the mobilization station(MS) or port of embarkation (POE). During thisphase, the unit finalizes necessary actions to bringit to an active status and to prepare for movement toits MS or POE. Under a partial or full mobilization,command and control of RC units fall under the

CONUSA.Arrival at the mobilization station begins the next

phase of mobilization. It ends as the unit arrives atthe POE. All efforts focus on bringing RC units toa mission-capable status in the shortest amount of time. Processing for overseas movement and vali-dation or certification for deployment are the majorconcerns of RC units during this phase. Unit valida-tion and certification for deployment are responsi-bilities of the installation or garrison commanderand his representatives. Command and control of mobilized RC units remain the responsibility of the

mobilized units’ MS installation commander. How-ever, the division coordinates and provides liaisonwith the supporting RC unit.

Port of embarkation is the fifth phase of themobilization process. It concerns those actions thatoccur at the POE. This phase corresponds to thesecond phase of deployment and begins with theunits’ arrival at the POE and ends on their departure

from the POE. At the APOE and SPOE, units pre-pare and load equipment and manifest and loadpersonnel.

PLANNING FORDEMOBILIZATION

Planning for demobilization is critical. The divi-sion cannot wait for crisis termination to beginplanning for redeployment and demobilization of mobilized RC units. It must begin early in the pro-cess. The division’s role in demobilization may bemuch greater than in mobilization. It begins in thedivision’s AO with reconstitution of attached RCforces and preparation for redeployment to CONUSor OCONUS demobilization stations. There are fivephases of demobilization: demobilization planning;area of operations demobilization; POE-to-demobi-lization station or CONUS demobilization center(CDC); demobilization station (DMS) or CDC ac-tions; and home station/home of record actions.

Demobilization planning begins concurrentlywith mobilization. Demobilization planning mayimpact on division planners in theater as RC unitsbegin the tasks of reconstitution and demobilizationwhile under division or corps control. This planningconsiders critical decisions and priorities betweenpersonnel and logistics support along with theDOD’s desire to return RC soldiers to CONUS asquickly as possible. Plans must address many issuesincluding basic equipment maintenance, dispositionactions, decorations and awards, and evaluation re-ports. The division may also coordinate for installa-tion support activities at both the division’s homestation installation and the RC unit’s demobilizationstation. The division will be an active player incommunicating demobilization plans and actionsdown to attached RC units.

Area of operations demobilization begins withthe reconstitution of RC units. It ends when theseunits arrive at the POE for onward movement.Again, the division’s actions in theater play a greatpart in the successful demobilization of RC units.Initiation of administrative and logistic actions toensure soldiers are cared for, critical equipment ismaintained, and supplies are properly accounted foris of primary importance. During this phase, thedivision programs RC units for movement to DMSs.These stations are usually at the same place the units

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were mobilized. The division ensures units andindividuals are programmed to move to POE. Otherservice and support actions, such as medical anddental care, are initiated (if available in theater) tofurther speed the demobilization process.

The POE-to-demobilization station or CONUS demobilization center phase overlaps with the re-deployment phase discussed in FM 100-17. Thisphase ends on arrival at the DMS or CDC. Pastredeployment experiences and exercises have indi-cated the corps or division should provide a C²organization chartered to assist logistics organiza-tions such as Theater Army Area Commands(TAACOMs) or the COSCOM in theater POE op-erations. Command of redeploying units passesfrom the supported CINC to the supporting CINCupon “wheels up” from the APOE or when passingthe outer marker from SPOE. While in transit, the

USTRANSCOM temporarily exercises control un-til arrival at the APOD or SPOD.

The RC units’ arrival at the DMS, or individualRC soldiers’ arrival at CDC, begins the fourthphase of the demobilization effort. Installation com-manders ensure all necessary medical and dentalactions, finance records, legal and entitlement brief-ings, personnel records updates, and logistics filesare current before releasing units or individuals formovement to their home stations. Installation plans

for increased soldier and family support activitiesshould be prepared for execution on arrival of re-turning individuals and units. Welcome-home cere-monies, which include both soldiers and families,should be planned and executed for returning units.

Home station/home of record actions is the finalphase of the demobilization process. It ends withrelease from federal service at the RC units’ homestations or the individuals’ homes of record. Actionsare taken at home stations to complete the demobi-lization process and return the units to a pure RCstatus. Some of these actions include turning inindividual equipment, ensuring the maintenanceand storage of equipment, and updating inventoriesand hand receipts. CONUSA issues orders (lessArmy special operations force (ARSOF)) estab-lishing active duty RC units’ date and time of releasefrom active duty and subsequent reversion to RC

status. The US Army Special Operations Commandreleases the special operations forces.

The timely and expedient demobilization and re-constitution of the reserve component are critical tosuccess of the US force-projection Army. How wellthe Army redeploys, demobilizes, and reconstitutesfrom its last contingency operation may well deter-mine its ability to rapidly mobilize and deploy forthe next crisis or emergency situation.

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APPENDIX E

SUSTAINING THE DIVISION

The primary mission of combat service support(CSS) units is to sustain our forces in battle. CSSplanners analyze force requirements for all phasesof the division’s operation. Combat and combatsupport (CS) planners help to determine the besttactical course of, action. Once the division com-mander determines his concept of operation, CSSplanners focus on supporting and anticipating forceneeds. CSS operations, like combat operations, usethe basic Army tenets:

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Initiative. The division aggressively denies theenemy continuous logistics support.

Depth. The division ensures distribution of sup-port so that close and deep operations do notdepend on one facility only to continue the fight.The division plans for alternate support and isprepared to shift the support without interruptingthe main effort.

Agility. The division anticipates, plans, and reactsto any rear threat and moves the necessary forcesto meet and defeat the threat throughout the widthand depth of the rear area.

Synchronization. The division sustains CS andCSS forward and coordinates combat assets si-multaneously to neutralize the rear threat withoutdegrading support forward.

Versatility. The division employs versatile sol-diers and units to sustain deep, close, and rearoperations.

Within the division, sustainment is detailed in the

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concept of support, developed by the G1 and G4 incoordination with the G3. To develop the concept,the G4 uses the CSS estimate, the commander’sintent and guidance, unit priorities, the higher head-

quarters’ concept of support, lessons-learned data,unit battle books, and the concept of operation. Thedivision’s concept of support addresses manning,arming, fueling, fixing, moving, and sustaining thesoldier and his equipment. The DISCOM com-mander is the division commander’s and ADC-S’sprincipal player in executing combat service sup-port plans.

Planners consider the impact of both joint andmultinational support. In today’s environment, di-visions are often part of joint or multinational forces.CSS planners must understand and integrate jointand multinational assets and requirements into thedivision’s sustainment operations. They—

Understand the commander’s intent and thepriorities.

Track and monitor the battle.

Anticipate requirements and use initiative to meetthem.

Pre-position supplies and equipment.

Actively push support forward.

Seek windows of logistics opportunity.

Consider the impact of rear area threats.

Division logistics depends on an effective distri-bution system. Distribution is the heart of logisticsat all levels of command. The distribution systemrelies on movement control to make it trulyeffective.

Chapter 1 discusses the missions and functions of the DISCOM. Chapters 2 and 3 highlight sustain-ment along with other aspects of division rear op-erations. Additionally, FMs 100-10, 63-2, and63-2-1 detail sustainment of division operations.The following paragraphs address CSS to divisionoperations only.

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CONCEPT OF SUPPORT FOCUS

Manning and Sustaining Soldiers

Manning the force includes all the provisions tomaintain healthy, fit soldiers. The division G1 sec-

tion coordinates this personnel service support forthe division. This support includes—

Personnel operations (including replacement op-erations, strength accounting, and casualty report-ing, as well as other personnel services).

Religious support.

Legal services.

Finance services.

Morale support activities.

Postal services.

Coordination of public affairs.

The combat health support (CHS) system of thedivision sustains and protects the health of the sol-dier in war and operations other than war. Consis-tent with tactical operations, CHS operates at bothunit and division levels. It provides continuousmedical management, patient care, and evacuation.CHS functions are performed by unit-level medicalplatoons and sections (treatment echelon I) andDISCOM medical companies (treatment echelonII). CHS functions include—

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Advanced trauma management.Patient evacuation.

Surgical resuscitation.

Emergency dental care.

Limited laboratory and x-ray services.

Mental health services.

Preventive medicine services.

Medical logistics and blood management andclass VIII distribution.

Patient evacuation from unit-level medical treat-ment facilities (MTFs) and provisions for “seam-less” medical care and treatment and health servicelogistics characterize division CHS. DISCOMmedical companies operate in all brigade supportareas (BSAs) and the division support area (DSA).Each medical company operates a division clearingstation in its respective support area and uses its

ambulance platoon, augmented with corps ambu-lances, to evacuate patients from MTFs. Clearingstations focus on—

Triaging, treating, and immediately returningthose soldiers who are fit for duty.

Treating and holding those patients expected toreturn to duty within 72 hours.

Performing urgent surgery (when properly aug-mented), and stabilizing and evacuating criticalpatients out of the division.

The CHS system optimizes the return-to-duty(RTD) status of the maximum number of skilled andcombat-experienced soldiers at the lowest possibletreatment echelon. RTD and non-RTD patients areidentified early in the evacuation chain. Patientsrequiring evacuation out of the division are trans-

ported to a corps-level hospital (treatment echelonIII) for definitive treatment. In split-based opera-tions and in OOTW, patients may be evacuateddirectly from a corps-level hospital to CONUS.

The division CSS structure does not provide formortuary affairs (MA) and laundry field services.Augmentation normally comes from platoons orsections of a COSCOM field service companyplaced in support of a division below division level.The quantity and variety of services that can bemade available will depend on the augmentationavailable to the division.

The COSCOM normally operates a MA collec-tion company in the rear corps support group (CSG)and employs MA platoons in BSAs and the DSA onan area support basis. Collection platoons collect,assist with identification, and evacuate remains tothe rear. Collection points are isolated from otheractivities, but are located near a main supply route(MSR). Deceased personnel are identified as earlyand as completely as possible and evacuated withtheir personal effects from forward areas. The inten-sity of combat, coupled with a lack of MA capabil-ity, will result in requirements that far exceed

capabilities. Division personnel must be trained inpeacetime to handle MA tasks during the initial daysof hostilities.

The field service company (FSC) providesshower, laundry, limited clothing repair, and de-lousing support to the DISCOM. The FSC is nor-mally assigned to a corps support battalion andlocated in the division rear area. The FSC is a

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modular unit that may provide support as far for-ward as METT-T allows.

Water supply points are established as close to theusing unit as possible considering the location of awater source and the commander’s tactical plan.The most forward water points are normally locatedin the BSA, even if it requires establishing a drypoint and transporting water from a suitable source.Using units draw water from the supply point usingorganic transportation. Preventive medicine person-nel are responsible for approving water sources.

The division stocks limited supplies and equip-ment, ranging from clothing to tools. Supportingunits normally stock items such as MOPP gear andenvironmental protection items (boots, overshoes,parkas, helmets). Distribution plans for this typeprotective clothing and equipment must considerservice life of the overgarments and filters, as wellas the threat. Unit priorities for equipment issuemust be established.

Arming

Arming is the provision of munitions to weaponsystems. It encompasses all types of ammunition toinclude mines and demolition munitions. Class V isa scheduled supply that the COSCOM ammunitiondistribution system provides the division based onknown requirements and forecasted needs. The di-

vision ammunition officer (DAO) manages class V.Ammunition is managed in combat loads (theamount of class V a unit can carry on its weaponsystems) and basic loads (the amount of ammuni-tion a unit can carry which is designed to sustainthem in combat until they can be resupplied). Unitsdesignate a required supply rate (RSR) of ammuni-tion items indicating their needs to sustain tacticaloperations for a specific period. Within the corps-established constraints, the division establishes itsown internally controlled supply rate (CSR) whichis passed down to each subordinate commander.

The ammunition transfer point (ATP) is normallylocated in the brigade support area. It is staffed bythe FSB and aviation support battalion (ASB) sup-ply company’s class V section. A DAO repre-sentative supervises its operations.

Forward CSGs distribute approximately 25 per-cent of the division’s ammunition from ammunitionsupply points located in the division’s rear area. The

bulk of the division’s ammunition (approximately75 percent) is throughput from the corps storagearea (CSA) to ATPs. Recently approved munitionsconcepts for support are found in FM 100-10.

Fueling

Fueling provides required fuels to weapon sys-tems and other equipment. In modem battle, fuel isas important as ammunition. Fuels are furnished tothe division based on long-range forecasts and dailyusage factors. Functional petroleum units assignedor attached to the CSG provide the distributionsystem that brings fuels to the division area. Divi-sion units report their fuel status through brigadesto the division materiel management center

(DMMC). The DMMC passes on the consolidatedreport to the corps materiel management center(MMC) and the division G4.

Fuel may have to be allocated to meet tacticalrequirements. The G4, with input from the G3,recommends allocation of fuels. Allocation instruc-tions are then passed to the fuel issuers in the divi-sion main support battalion (MSB), ASB, and FSBs.

Fuel is brought forward to the division and bri-gade support areas in large-capacity corps and divi-

sion tankers. (Division 5,000-gallon tankers areroutinely exchanged between the MSB and FSBs.)Railway tank car, barge, and pipeline or flexiblehoseline are also used to deliver to the brigade area,bypassing the division main class III supply pointand eliminating double handling of the fuel. Fuel iseither pumped into the tanks of the fuel systemsupply point or transferred into division tankers fordistribution within the division. In some cases, fullsemitrailers may be exchanged for empty ones.

The aviation brigade uses large quantities of JP8

(aviation turbine fuel). It provides fuel supply to alldivision aircraft through fueling points at the divi-sion airfield and FARPs throughout the divisionarea. The COSCOM resupplies the aviation bri-gades’s ASB in heavy divisions or the support pla-toon in light divisions, although the division mainfuel supply point maintains some aviation fuelstockage. The aviation brigade reports fuel status tothe DMMC.

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Fixing

Fixing is more than simple maintenance. Fixingincludes repair parts provided at the right time andplace and all the action taken before, during, andafter battle to keep equipment operational. Mainte-

nance, battle damage repair procedures, and theother fixing tasks are combat multipliers.

The maintenance system in the division area re-pairs damaged weapon systems and other equip-ment as far forward as possible. This increases theircombat time and reduces or eliminates recovery andevacuation time. Maintenance support teams(MSTs) implement this fix forward support mainte-nance concept and repair major weapon systems inthe MBA. The exposure of the MSTs is a risk factorthe commander must consider when applying the“support forward” concept.

Weapon systems or items of equipment that can-not be repaired on site must be recovered, or evacu-ated to the lowest level at which they can berepaired. The using unit is responsible for recover-ing damaged equipment. Once an item is in mainte-nance channels, evacuation to a higher maintenancelevel becomes a maintenance responsibility.

Decisions concerning the disposition of damagedweapon systems and equipment must be made onsite, if possible. Items that cannot be repaired on sitemust be recovered to the maintenance collection

point in the battalion trains area or the BSA to awaitrepair. Repair time limits are outlined in FM 43-11and usually disseminated in the appropriate SOP ateach successive level.

Damaged and unrepairable equipment is evacu-ated to salvage collection points. They are normallycollocated with maintenance collection points. TheDISCOM has the organic ability to operate salvagecollection points in the BSAs and the DSA.

DISCOM maintenance units provide DS mainte-nance, reinforcing maintenance, and repair partssupply for all equipment, except crypto material,

ADP, medical, textile, airdrop, and individual andorganizational. Because of its many organic aircraftand their high-maintenance requirements, the airassault division is authorized an aircraft mainte-nance and supply battalion. It provides repair partssupply and DS maintenance of aircraft, aircraft ar-mament, avionics, and ground control approachequipment. The aviation intermediate maintenance

(AVIM) battalion provides organic aviation main-tenance to the division.

Moving

The moving function transports equipment andpersonnel via the most efficient means from theirorigin to final destination. Transportation activitiesinclude mode operations, movement control, andterminal operations. Transportation is the vital linkin moving all classes of supply and services todivision units.

Divisions have limited motor transport capabili-ties and rely on corps assets to deliver most suppliesand equipment. Corps truck companies are nor-mally employed in general support roles. They arecommitted by the movement control center (MCC)and movement control teams (MCTs) directlythrough their battalion headquarters. Corps trans-portation assets deliver to both division and brigadesupport areas.

Movement control is performed at corps to sup-port the division. The corps MCC provides manage-ment services and highway traffic regulation to thedivision in the form of movement control teams andair terminal MCTs.

The move function also includes terminal opera-tions. A terminal is any facility in which cargo orpersonnel are loaded, unloaded, and handled in tran-

sit. Terminals are usually established at origin, des-tination, and in-transit transfer points. The goal of terminal operations is to transfer cargo only whenabsolutely necessary in order to expedite delivery tothe user.

SUSTAINING THE OFFENSE

The concept of support for offensive operationsnormally results in CSS units positioned well for-ward. They sustain the attacking units with priorityof support to the main effort. Forward support bat-

talions or forward logistics elements normally fol-low closely the attacking brigades where they cansupport without interfering with maneuver units.The remainder of the DISCOM is positioned to bestsupport the FSB and weight the main effort.

The DISCOM displaces forward as required toshorten the supply lines as the tactical situationdictates. In the event of rapidly advancing division

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attacks, rear DISCOM elements support on themove or by bounds. In the latter case, the DISCOMunits must take only mission-essential items.

The division must plan and coordinate for dispo-

sition of disabled equipment, casualties, and trans-portation of excess supplies. DISCOM elementsestablish refuel points in forward assembly areas tofacilitate and maintain the momentum of the attack.The support plan must ensure that ground and airmaneuver units arrive on their objectives withenough supplies to continue the attack without lossof momentum, should the need arise. Differenttypes of offensive operations require different logis-tics tailoring.

During offensive operations, primary manningconcerns are monitoring unit personnel status and

conducting replacement operations.

Arming is always critical. Extended supply linescreate problems ensuring that ammunition (class V)is available when needed. The division positions

ATPs as far forward as possible, moving them for-ward as the attack advances. Artillery ammunitionis stockpiled at predesignated firing points. Otherarming considerations include monitoring unit basicloads and required and controlled supply rates, and

preparing for emergency resupply procedures.

Offensive operations use much more fuel (classIII) than defensive operations, although terrain maysignificantly affect the fuel consumption. Estimatedconsumption versus basic load refuel capability isassessed. Shortfalls are fixed with prestocked facili-ties, increased fuel-carrying capacity, or refuel onthe move or forward arming and refueling pointoperations. Additional fueling considerations in-clude distribution plans, reallocation of fuels, anddisplacement of fuel and refueling assets.

Extensive vehicular movement in the offense in-creases maintenance needs, especially in rough orslow-going terrain. All PLL stockage levels will beat required levels, with increases in items such astires, gauges, and shock absorbers. Recovery,

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evacuation, and roadside repairs have priority.Other maintenance considerations include:

•

•

• •

Establish and secure maintenance collectionpoints.

Institute battle damage assessment and repair.Allow controlled substitution or cannibalizationof equipment.

Attach MSTs to combat units.

Provide security of LOC for recovery operations.

•

•

Offensive operations also increase resupply timelines and turnaround times. Longer supply linesincrease vehicle maintenance and decrease avail-able transportation assets. Available convoy secu-rity forces and the consolidation of convoys for

security increase turnaround times. CSS command-ers and staff also consider using alternate MSTs,requesting additional throughput from the highersupporting headquarters, and using capturedvehicles.

Requirements for medical and MA support in-crease in offensive operations. The division’s mainattack normally receives the highest number of casualties and is weighted appropriately. Com-manders and staff also consider medical evacuationprocedures, EPW evacuation procedures, refugeemovement, casualty collection points, and ambu-

lance exchange points. Following are other CSSplanning considerations:

•

•

•

•

Position forward at night essential support (suchas ammunition, fuels, and maintenance).

Use preplanned and preconfigured push packagesof supplies.

Maximize throughput distribution when feasible.

Echelon support forward and initiate operationsat the new sites before ceasing operations at theold sites.

Make CSS mobile and upload as much aspossible.

Use captured enemy supplies.

Plan adequate communications between CSS andassets and units.

Coordinate for use or future use of terrain.

Plan for transition to an exploitation or to thedefense.

SUSTAINING THE DEFENSE

The aims of CSS in the defense are to supportdefensive battles and facilitate rapid transition to theoffense. These operations require tactical logisticstailoring. In the defense, logistics support mustadapt to changing situations.

CSS units are tailored similarly for mobile andarea defenses. Support to the striking force in amobile defense, however, may resemble support tothe offensive, as described earlier. (The strikingforce in a mobile defense is discussed in Chapter 5.)CSS support is normally stockpiled and cached tosupport the division’s forces. The following para-graphs highlight personnel and logistics considera-tions during defensive operations.

Unit personnel readiness (strength accounting),replacements, and casualty management continue tobe critical functions. Overall casualty rates usuallydecrease in the defense as opposed to the offense;however, the casualties from NBC and artilleryattacks may increase.

Ammunition expenditures are higher in the de-fense with expenditures two or three times the basicload amount. Forward stockpiling and caching help

meet projected needs. Preconfigured ammunitionloads such as push packages are sent forward regu-larly during the engagement. Commanders makespecific plans for the emergency resupply of theirunits.

The need for class III supplies decreases signifi-cantly for a relatively static defense. In a mobiledefense, however, consumption may equal that of offensive operations. Following are other defensiveconsiderations:

•

• •

•

Send forward push packages of critical suppliesregularly. Continue resupply until the receiving

unit issues instructions to the contrary.

Move logistics support during limited visibility toreduce enemy interference.

Secure collection points and pre-position stocksof critical supplies.

Air deliver supplies where feasible.

• •

• •

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•

•

Plan for increased demand for barrier materials.

Coordinate with civil affairs concerning refugeecontrol and host nation support.

•

•

SUSTAINING RETROGRADEOPERATIONS

Providing CSS for retrograde operations is com-plex because various maneuver units may be attack-ing, defending, or retrograding at the same time andoften near the enemy. CSS units support all theseactivities. Retrograde considerations are as follows:

•

•

•

•

•

Echelon support in depth and to the rear.

Limit the flow of supplies forward to only the

most essential.Evacuate supplies and equipment early, prefer-ably during limited visibility.

Keep supply and evacuation routes open.

Repair forward under hostile conditions and usecombat systems to evacuate inoperable combatsystems rather than risk loss to the enemy.

Implement the division commander’s policy of controlled exchange.

Most important, maintain full knowledge of the

•

•current tactical plan and contingency plans.

RECONSTITUTION

Reconstitution is extraordinary action that com-manders plan and implement to restore units to adesired level of combat readiness. It transcendsnormal daily force sustainment actions. No re-sources exist solely to perform reconstitution, ratherit is done by existing systems and units.

Reconstitution decisions belong to commanders.They control assets and decide whether to reorga-nize or regenerate a unit. Normally, the decision toreconstitute is made two echelons above the unitwhich must be rebuilt. The commander two eche-lons above, with his staff’s assistance, is in the bestposition to assess a subordinate unit’s effectiveness.His assessment includes—

•

• • His knowledge of the soldiers and units involved.

The condition and effectiveness of subordinatecommanders and leaders.

Previous, current, and anticipated situations andmissions.

These factors form the foundation for reconstitutiondecisions. FM 100-9 is the doctrinal reference forreconstitution. It discusses the commander’s assess-ments in detail.

Reorganization shifts resources within a de-graded unit to increase its combat effectiveness.Commanders reorganize before considering regen-eration. Reorganization may be immediate or delib-erate. Immediate reorganization quickly, andusually temporarily, restores degraded units to mini-mum levels of effectiveness. Normally a com-

mander implements it in the combat position or asclose to that position as possible to meet near-termneeds. Deliberate reorganization is conductedwhen more time and resources are available. Itusually occurs in brigade rear areas. Procedures aresimilar to those of immediate reorganization; how-ever, some replacement resources may be available.Also, equipment repair is more intensive, and moreextensive cross-leveling is possible.

Regeneration involves the rebuilding of a unitthrough the large-scale replacement of personnel,equipment, and supplies; reestablishment of com-

mand and control; and mission-essential training forthe rebuilt unit. Because regeneration is so inten-sive, it occurs at specific planned sites after the unitto be regenerated disengages from the enemy. Adivision can regenerate combat units through reor-ganization. Regeneration requires help from higherechelons. The commander directing the regenera-tion normally forms a regeneration task force.

Responsibilities

The following paragraphs highlight general re-sponsibilities in the conduct of reconstitution.

The commander includes reconstitution consid-erations in all operational planning. Further, he—

Ensures regeneration SOPs and plans exist.

Ensures the unit’s training program includes re-generation training.

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•

•

•

Sets priorities that align with operational andtactical objectives when more than one unit re-quires regeneration.

Activates regeneration assessment teams toevaluate attrited units when required.

Determines the follow-on missions for reconsti-tuted forces.

Decides whether or not to regenerate an attritedunit. If he decides to regenerate, he sets the uniteffectiveness goals while keeping in mind thetime available.

Determines the specific actions required for the

•

•

•

•

•regeneration.

The G1 and S1 manage strength accountabilityand determine replacement availability for current

and upcoming operations. They identify soldierswith required qualifications and develop personnelreplacement plans in the OPLAN process. In addi-tion, the G1 and S1—

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Determine the expected unit losses for specificmissions.

Coordinate casualty reporting with the medicalsystem.

Coordinate support for increased battlefield stresscasualties.

Anticipate increased needs for battlefield promo-tions and impact awards.

Coordinate the RTD program with supportingmedical elements.

Coordinate personnel actions for contingencymanning standards.

Advise the commander and operations staff on

•

•

the personnel services for support.

The G2 and S2 advise commanders on the threatsituation facing candidates for regeneration. Fur-ther, they—

•

•

•

Assess the threat for prospective regenerationsites.

Obtain medical intelligence on the site for thecommand surgeon to evaluate.

Advise the commander and operations staff on

•

•

•

the intelligence elements for the regeneration task

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force, coordinating intelligence with these ele-ments during the process as required.

The G3 and S3 include regeneration in OPLANson the basis of expected losses and future missions.The G3 and S3—

Recommend to the commander the assessment of an attrited unit.

Recommend, based on the formal assessment,whether or not to regenerate a unit and, if so, theextent of regeneration. They recommend priori-ties to the commander, advising him on availabil-ity of personnel and equipment.

Identify critical shortfalls and plan for employ-ment options to meet contingency needs.

Advise the commander on the need for, compo-sition of, and functions of the regeneration taskforce, and coordinate these with all other staff sections.

Recommend regeneration sites after coordinatingwith the logistics staff, CSS commanders, andothers with relevant information.

Advise commander on security measures for thesite. These include the recommended role of theattrited unit.

Coordinate with the rear operations commander

to integrate a unit undergoing regeneration intothe rear operations security plan.

Advise commander on training needs in unitsundergoing regeneration, identifying required re-sources, and help execute the training.

The G4 and S4 provide logistics input for theregeneration part of the OPLAN. Further, they—

Identify logistics resources needed to carry outregeneration if required.

Recommend, based on command priorities, theallocation of critical items of supply. (This ex-cludes medical and cryptographic items. They arehandled by the medical and signal officersrespectively.)

Coordinate transportation plans and policies, andidentfy movement control needs and the elementto provide support.

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Determine, as appropriate, host nation support•

•

•

requirements and help secure available host-na-tion support.

Recommend to the operations staff, in coordina-

tion with CSS commanders, the general locationof the regeneration site.

Plan for prestocking of supplies and equipmentfor support of the commander’s priorities.

Plan for services essential to the regenerationprocess and ensure the expeditious handling of remains and personal effects. They also plan forclothing exchange and bath and laundryoperations.

Recommend logistics elements for support of

reconstitution actions.Recommend the extent to which the attrited unit’s

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

CSS activities can support reconstitution.

The G5 and S5 coordinate and collate host nationfacility and resource requirements identified by thestaff. The G5 and S5 also—

•

•

•

•

•

Plan and recommend procedures to minimizecivilian interference with division combatoperations.

Plan and recommend procedures to minimize ef-

fect of division combat operations on civilianpopulation.

Plan, recommend, establish, and supervise theoperation of the division CMOC.

Coordinate host nation support. They advise thecommander and staff and the regeneration taskforce on host nation support availability. (Civilaffairs elements help conduct area surveys.) Theyhelp contracting personnel plan for and obtainsupport from local sources.

Coordinate the temporary augmentation of language-qualified host nation personnel.

Plan and coordinate operations for dislocated

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

civilians.

The engineer staff officer recommends to thecommander and operations staff the allocation andredistribution of engineer units, personnel, andequipment. In addition, he—

Participates in site and terrain reconnaissance andhelps in site selection. He also determines needsto prepare the site.

Coordinates engineer efforts at the regeneration

site. Engineers may support actions concerningarea damage control; mobility, countermobility,and survivability; and sustainment.

The signal staff officer recommends employ-ment of signal units and resources to support regen-eration. This includes all assets involved in the fivedisciplines of the information mission area as de-fined in AR 25-1. In addition, he—

Recommends allocation of critical communica-tions and cryptographic equipment.

Coordinates the communications for liaisonelements.

Advises the operations staff on any signal consid-erations for reconstitution site selection.

The medical staff officer and surgeon recom-mend, in coordination with the medical command,allocation and distribution of medical personnel,materiel, and units. This includes the compositionof medical support elements, treatment and evacu-ation assets, preventive medicine personnel (veteri-nary personnel to inspect class I if required), classVIII, and medical equipment. Further, they—

Advise commanders on preventive medicine as-pects of regeneration. This includes the availabil-ity and use of combat stress or mental healthteams.

Advise commanders on the effects of accumu-lated radiation exposure and possible delayedeffects from exposure to chemical or biologicalagents. They identify resources required for pa-tient decontamination.

Advise commanders on the disposition of person-

nel exposed to lethal, but not immediately life-threatening, doses of radiation or chemical andbiological agents.

Coordinate with personnel staff on evacuationpolicy and return to duty.

Advise the operations staff on any CHS consid-erations for site selection. These may includeproximity to medical facilities.

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The provost marshal coordinates MP area secu-rity needs, reconnaissance, battlefield circulationcontrol, and MP assets required at regeneration siteswith the rear CP or rear area operations center. Hecoordinates host nation military and civil securityimplications with the civil-military operations asrequired. The provost marshal also—

•

•

•

Coordinates to adjust existing, or to establish,battlefield circulation control, concentrating onroute reconnaissance and traffic control points.He coordinates straggler and dislocated civiliancontrol as planned by the G5 or civil-militaryoperations.

Advises commanders and movement managerson route and area security considerations for se-lecting and moving to regeneration sites.

•

•

•

Advises commanders on EPW considerationsunique to the regeneration site. He ensures unitsselected for regeneration are relieved of any EPWresponsibility as soon as possible.

The public affairs (PA) officer recommends thePA policy to the commander. He also—

•

• •

•

•

Provides a PA team to advise and assist in dealingwith public information and press requirements.

Ensures information flows to the team at theregeneration site.

Monitors the flow of information out of the re-generation site through media operations, to in-clude press pools if used.

The chemical officer coordinates decontamina-tion needs and use of chemical support elements.Further, he—

•

•

•

•

•

Plans for and coordinates the establishment of alinkup point and decontamination site on the routeto the regeneration site if required.

Coordinates nuclear or chemical route and regen-eration site reconnaissance.

Coordinates use of battlefield obscurants to assistregeneration effort.

Coordinates with the logistics staff for resupplyof chemical defense equipment.

Maintains radiation exposure data and status.

•

•

•

•The chaplain provides unit ministry support, par-ticularly for cases of battle fatigue. He coordinates

worship and memorial services, sacramental acts,and pastoral counseling.

The rear CP integrates the units being regener-ated into rear area defense plans and provides

appropriate liaison. The rear CP also supervisesregeneration actions.

The DISCOM, COSCOM, and theater Army air defense command—

Coordinate with the logistics staff of the directingheadquarters on the availability and applicabilityof logistics elements for the regeneration task force. They also provide the supply and equip-ment status of these units.

Coordinate the integration of higher-level logis-tics elements into the regeneration task force.

Recommend, with the logistics staff of the direct-ing headquarters, regeneration sites. They alsoadvise on the availability and mobility of supportfacilities.

Coordinate the move to the site for subordinateelements in the regeneration task force. Theysupport their operations at the site as required.

Provide a materiel management capability for theregeneration task force. They also provide ameans for it to link up with the supporting MCC.The MCC ensures materiel is distributed accord-

ing to the priorities set by the commander direct-ing the regeneration. The support command alsoprovides a movement control capability.

Instructions and Guidance

Unit SOPs should address reconstitution. Theyestablish the means to maintain a continuous combatpresence and the methods to shift to more extensiveefforts. A template for a reconstitution SOP is inAppendix B, FM 100-9. The SOP covers—

Information needed to make reconstitution deci-

sions, and reporting procedures.Assessment procedures and responsibilities. Foran organization that may direct a regeneration, theSOP also covers contingency manning standards.

Critical tasks for the unit’s overall missionaccomplishment.

Procedures to reestablish or reinforce commandand control systems.

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REFERENCES

SOURCES USED

Joint and Multiservice Publications

JP 2-01. (D) Intelligence Support to Targeting. 20 May 1994.

JP 3-0. Doctrine for Joint Operations. 9 September 1993.

JP 3-09. (D) Doctrine for Joint Fire Support. 11 December 1995.

JP 3-52. Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone. 3 December 1993.

JP 3-56.1. Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 14 November 1994.

JP 5-00.2. Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures. September 1991.

FM 3-100. NBC Defense, Chemical Warfare, Smoke, and Flame Operations. FMFM 11-2. 23 May 1991.

FM 33-1. Psychological Operations. FMFM 3-53.18 February 1993.

FM 90-13. River Crossing Operations. FMFM 7-26.30 September 1992.

FM 100-19. Domestic Support Operations. FMFM 7-10. 1 July 1993.

FM 100-103-1. Multiservice Procedures for Integrated Combat Airspace Command and Control.FMFRP 5-61; ACCP 50-38; PACAFP 50-38; USAFEP 50-38; NDC TACNOTE 3-52.1 .3 October 1994.

FM 100-103-2. TAGS Multiservice Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System. FMFRP 5-62; ACCP50-54; PACAFP 50-54; USAFEP 50-54; NDC TACNOTE 3-56.2. 31 October 1994.

Army Publications

AR 25-1. The Army Information Resources Management Program. 8 November 1988.AR 200-1. Environmental Protection and Enhancement. 23 April 1990.

AR 200-2. Environmental Effects of Army Actions. 23 December 1988.

FM 1-111. Aviation Brigades. 27 August 1990.

FM 5-71-100. Division Engineer Combat Operations. 22 April 1993.

FM 6-20-2. Corps Artillery, Division Artillery, and Field Artillery Brigade Headquarters. 7 January1993.

FM 6-20-10. (D) TTP for the Targeting Process. 31 July 1994.

FM 6-20-30. Fire Support for Corps and Division Operations. 18 October 1989.

FM 6-30. Observed Fire Procedures. 16 July 1993.

FM 7-30. (D) The Infantry Brigade. September 1994.

FM 7-85. Ranger Unit Operations. 9 June 1987.

FM 11-50. Combat Communications Within the Division (Heavy and Light). 4 April 1991.

FM 17-95. Cavalry Operations. 19 September 1991.

FM 19-1. Military Police Support for the AirLand Battle. 23 May 1988.

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FM 25-Series. Training.

FM 25-5. Training for Mobilization and War. 25 January 1985.

FM 31-Series. Special Forces.

FM 34-Series. Military Intelligence.FM 34-130. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 8 July 1994.

FM 41-10. Civil Affairs Operations. 11 January 1993.

FM 43-11. Direct Support Maintenance Operations. 5 September 1991.

FM 44-100. US Army Air Defense Operations. 15 June 1995.

FM 55-Series. Transportation.

FM 55-65. Strategic Deployment. 3 October 1995.

FM 63-Series. Combat Service Support.

FM 63-2. Division Support Command, Armored, Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry Divisions. 20 May1991.

FM 63-2-1 Division Support Command, Light Infantry, Airborne, and Air Assault Divisions. 16 Novem-ber 1992. Change 1, 20 September 1994.

FM 63-20. Forward Support Battalion. 26 February 1990.

FM 63-21. Main Support Battalion. 7 August 1990.

FM 71-3. Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade. June 1993.

FM 71-100-1. (D) Armor and Mechanized Division Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.1 May 1991.

FM 71-100-2. Infantry Division Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 31 August 1993.

FM 71-100-3. (D) Air Assault Division Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. June 1996.

FM 71-123. Tactics and Techniques for Combined Army Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battal-ion/Task Force, and Company/Team. 30 September 1992.

FM 90-13-1. Combined Arms Breaching Operations. 20 February 1991 w/change 17 May 1993.

FM 100-6. (D) Information Operations. 6 December 1995.

FM 100-9. Reconstitution. 13 January 1992.

FM 100-10. Logistics. 3 October 1995.

FM 100-11. Force Integration. 15 January 1995.

FM 100-15. Corps Operations. March 1996.

FM 100-17. Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization. 28 October 1992.

FM 100-20. (D) Stability and Support Operations. April 1996.

FM 100-23. Peace Operations. 30 December 1994.

FM 100-25. Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces. 12 December 1991.

FM 100-26. The Air-Ground Operations System. 30 March 1973.

FM 100-103. Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone. 7 October 1987.

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