13.55 George Wachtel

8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel

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OMV Aktiengesellschaft

Impact of the BP Macondo

Blowout on ME Operations

Gas Arabia 2011


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2 SB Presentation Macondo

Disclaimer

This Presentation is based on information available to the public from various sources at the time of this

presentation , The OMV Sustainability:HSSE department provides no assurance for the accuracy and correctness of

the information in the Presentation and the consequences being a result of using the information herein.

The information opinions and analysis contained herein are based on sources believed to be reliable but no

representation, expressed or implied, is made as to its accuracy, completeness or correctness.

The opinions contained herein reflect my current judgment and are subject to change without notice and are

therefore probably worth less .


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Setting the Scene

Deepwater Horizon 5th generation semi-submersible deepwater rig -

contract with BP since 2001.

Completed seven years without a Lost-Time-Incident.

Contractor had a proven track record in GoM.

Close finishing the well when the blowout occurred.


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The Deepwater Horizon and its BOP


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The BP Investigation Report

astonishing lapses in safety management

storm of m istakes mechanical failures and design faults led to the accident

eight critical factors went wrong simultaneously; if just one of them had been eliminated the outcome of the

Deepwater Horizon tragedy would have been either prevented or reduced in severity

Financial Times, 9.9.2010)


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The BP Investigation ReportKey Findings Annulus Cement

Mechanical Barriers inside Casing

Pressure Integrity Testing

Well Monitoring

Well Control Responses

BOP Emergency Operation

Source: BP Report May 24 2010


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1. The annulus cement barrier did not isolate the hydrocarbons.

2. The shoe track barriers did not isolate the hydrocarbons.

3. The negative-pressure test was accepted although well integrity had not been established.

4. Influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in the riser.

5. Well control response actions failed to regain control of the well.

6. Diversion to the mud gas separator resulted in gas venting onto the rig.

7. The fire and gas system did not prevent hydrocarbon ignition.

8. The BOP emergency mode did not seal the well.

8 Key Findings.


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The first minutes after


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The first minutes later


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Several hours later


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The Well Kill Operation


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Largest Offshore Effort in History


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The Barrier Philosophy

Most operators define a dual mechanical barrier principle for their operations i.e. requiring a minimum of two

physical means of separation between the reservoir pressure and the surface.

In the Macondo case, those would have been (1) the blowout preventer and (2) the casing cemented into the well

bore.

While the cemented casing had been pressure tested, the results were incorrectly interpreted by the rig crew,

subsequently allowing hydrocarbons to enter the well.


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Accidents and incident investigation:

the Swiss Cheese Model (1)

From: James Reason, Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents, 1997, p9


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The Swiss Cheese Model (2)


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Deep Water Horizon


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The Bow Tie: Defenses in depth

Barriers to

prevent

threat release

Recovery

preparedness

measures

Control of

Escalation

factors

Control of

Escalation

factors

Pre-event Post event

How it failed?

Why it failed?


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Analogies in the ME 2

The Nowruz oil field, in Iran, was the site of several 1983 oil spills.One spill was initially caused by a tanker hitting a platform.

The platform was attacked by Iraqi helicopters and the spill caught fire. The Iran-Iraq war prevented capping of the well until

September 1983. Eleven people were killed during the capping

A separate spill occurred when Iraqi helicopters attacked a nearby platform in March 1983. The well was capped in May, 1985.

Nine men were killed during the capping. Approximately 733,000 bblof oil were spil led because of this incident


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Analogies in the ME 1A firefighter tries to extinguish an oil well fire on Aug. 9, 1991, at the Greater Burgan oil field in Kuwait.


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Key Issues

Water Depth

The Macondo incident was in itself not a function of water depth, deep water only made the subsequent recovery from the disas ter

more difficult.

Staff Competency / People

There have been several early warning signs (especially during the last hour before the explosion) that if properly detected and

reacted to could have controlled the incident.

Company Standards / Doing it Wrong

The Macondo incident did not occur because BP or Transocean had insufficient standards but because the rig crew did not fully

comprehend what was happening in the well and did not follow existing Standards.

Regulatory Environment

US regulatory framework is less stringent than UK/Norway/AUS/NZ.


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Lessons from the Gulf Spill

The biggest immediate lesson is the need for a step change in safety and environment performance, which is

practical and economically feasible.

This can be achieved by:

Combining regulatory regimes with prescriptive and performance-based regulations

Addressing technical, human and organizational factors,

Applying an integrated risk model,

Allowing for full communication between operator, contractor and regulator, as well as determining clear roles and

responsibilities and having a shared performance monitoring and decision making


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Impact on ME OperationsAbu Dhabi

Abu Dhabis economic development will significantly

increase natural gas demand over the next decade

UAEs proven natural gas reserves of 214Tcf (AD ~ 198

Tcf) is the sixth largest natural gas reserves in the world

AD gas demand will increase to 12 Bcf/day by 2015 from

the current level of 7 Bcf/day

However most of Abu Dhabis gas is sour and some

located in most sensitive and ecological important area

under UNESCO Biosphere reserve.

Reducing the impact on the sensitive environment is a

major concern for ADNOC.

Need to deal with hydrogen sulfide complicates gas field

developments


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Impact on ME OperationsWay Forward

Ensuring the continuing safety of oil & gas operations is a collaborative process that involves our industry with national and

regional legislators, executive bodies, regulators and other stakeholders

In order to restore confidence in hazardous drilling (deepwater, sour gas environment) companies must

Develop a new containment response system

Commit to financing the initial investments in specially-designed equipment.

To help ensure that the results of the Macondo enquiries are incorporated into industry practice and government

regulations, the ME operating companies should establish an Industry Response Group (IRG) similarly established by

International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP), which is closely liaising with United States industry groups and

other industry associations around the world


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Operators Initiative to reduce Operational Risk

The Mitigation of Major Accidental Events (MAE), Objectives:

To identify operating assets with the potential to cause a major accident event that could jeopardize the longevity of a comp any.

To review the effectiveness of the management systems in place that prevent and control a major accident event occurring.

To review the effectiveness of emergency response management systems to minimise the residual risks if a major accident event

occurs.

To identify areas for improvement in the management of major accident hazards and emergency response at our high risk

operational sites.

To share best practice in high performing sites with all operational sites.


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Thank you for your attention

13.55 George Wachtel

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