8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
1/25
OMV Aktiengesellschaft
Impact of the BP Macondo
Blowout on ME Operations
Gas Arabia 2011
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
2/25
2 SB Presentation Macondo
Disclaimer
This Presentation is based on information available to the public from various sources at the time of this
presentation , The OMV Sustainability:HSSE department provides no assurance for the accuracy and correctness of
the information in the Presentation and the consequences being a result of using the information herein.
The information opinions and analysis contained herein are based on sources believed to be reliable but no
representation, expressed or implied, is made as to its accuracy, completeness or correctness.
The opinions contained herein reflect my current judgment and are subject to change without notice and are
therefore probably worth less .
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
3/25
3 SB Presentation Macondo
Setting the Scene
Deepwater Horizon 5th generation semi-submersible deepwater rig -
contract with BP since 2001.
Completed seven years without a Lost-Time-Incident.
Contractor had a proven track record in GoM.
Close finishing the well when the blowout occurred.
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
4/25
4 SB Presentation Macondo
The Deepwater Horizon and its BOP
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
5/25
5 SB Presentation Macondo
The BP Investigation Report
astonishing lapses in safety management
storm of m istakes mechanical failures and design faults led to the accident
eight critical factors went wrong simultaneously; if just one of them had been eliminated the outcome of the
Deepwater Horizon tragedy would have been either prevented or reduced in severity
Financial Times, 9.9.2010)
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
6/25
6 SB Presentation Macondo
The BP Investigation ReportKey Findings Annulus Cement
Mechanical Barriers inside Casing
Pressure Integrity Testing
Well Monitoring
Well Control Responses
BOP Emergency Operation
Source: BP Report May 24 2010
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
7/25
7 SB Presentation Macondo
1. The annulus cement barrier did not isolate the hydrocarbons.
2. The shoe track barriers did not isolate the hydrocarbons.
3. The negative-pressure test was accepted although well integrity had not been established.
4. Influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in the riser.
5. Well control response actions failed to regain control of the well.
6. Diversion to the mud gas separator resulted in gas venting onto the rig.
7. The fire and gas system did not prevent hydrocarbon ignition.
8. The BOP emergency mode did not seal the well.
8 Key Findings.
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
8/25
8 SB Presentation Macondo
The first minutes after
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
9/25
9 SB Presentation Macondo
The first minutes later
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
10/25
10 SB Presentation Macondo
Several hours later
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
11/25
11 SB Presentation Macondo
The Well Kill Operation
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
12/25
12 SB Presentation Macondo
Largest Offshore Effort in History
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
13/25
13 SB Presentation Macondo
The Barrier Philosophy
Most operators define a dual mechanical barrier principle for their operations i.e. requiring a minimum of two
physical means of separation between the reservoir pressure and the surface.
In the Macondo case, those would have been (1) the blowout preventer and (2) the casing cemented into the well
bore.
While the cemented casing had been pressure tested, the results were incorrectly interpreted by the rig crew,
subsequently allowing hydrocarbons to enter the well.
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
14/25
14 SB Presentation Macondo
Accidents and incident investigation:
the Swiss Cheese Model (1)
From: James Reason, Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents, 1997, p9
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
15/25
15 SB Presentation Macondo
The Swiss Cheese Model (2)
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
16/25
16 SB Presentation Macondo
Deep Water Horizon
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
17/25
17 SB Presentation Macondo
The Bow Tie: Defenses in depth
Barriers to
prevent
threat release
Recovery
preparedness
measures
Control of
Escalation
factors
Control of
Escalation
factors
Pre-event Post event
How it failed?
Why it failed?
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
18/25
18 SB Presentation Macondo
Analogies in the ME 2
The Nowruz oil field, in Iran, was the site of several 1983 oil spills.One spill was initially caused by a tanker hitting a platform.
The platform was attacked by Iraqi helicopters and the spill caught fire. The Iran-Iraq war prevented capping of the well until
September 1983. Eleven people were killed during the capping
A separate spill occurred when Iraqi helicopters attacked a nearby platform in March 1983. The well was capped in May, 1985.
Nine men were killed during the capping. Approximately 733,000 bblof oil were spil led because of this incident
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
19/25
19 SB Presentation Macondo
Analogies in the ME 1A firefighter tries to extinguish an oil well fire on Aug. 9, 1991, at the Greater Burgan oil field in Kuwait.
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
20/25
20 SB Presentation Macondo
Key Issues
Water Depth
The Macondo incident was in itself not a function of water depth, deep water only made the subsequent recovery from the disas ter
more difficult.
Staff Competency / People
There have been several early warning signs (especially during the last hour before the explosion) that if properly detected and
reacted to could have controlled the incident.
Company Standards / Doing it Wrong
The Macondo incident did not occur because BP or Transocean had insufficient standards but because the rig crew did not fully
comprehend what was happening in the well and did not follow existing Standards.
Regulatory Environment
US regulatory framework is less stringent than UK/Norway/AUS/NZ.
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
21/25
21 SB Presentation Macondo
Lessons from the Gulf Spill
The biggest immediate lesson is the need for a step change in safety and environment performance, which is
practical and economically feasible.
This can be achieved by:
Combining regulatory regimes with prescriptive and performance-based regulations
Addressing technical, human and organizational factors,
Applying an integrated risk model,
Allowing for full communication between operator, contractor and regulator, as well as determining clear roles and
responsibilities and having a shared performance monitoring and decision making
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
22/25
22 SB Presentation Macondo
Impact on ME OperationsAbu Dhabi
Abu Dhabis economic development will significantly
increase natural gas demand over the next decade
UAEs proven natural gas reserves of 214Tcf (AD ~ 198
Tcf) is the sixth largest natural gas reserves in the world
AD gas demand will increase to 12 Bcf/day by 2015 from
the current level of 7 Bcf/day
However most of Abu Dhabis gas is sour and some
located in most sensitive and ecological important area
under UNESCO Biosphere reserve.
Reducing the impact on the sensitive environment is a
major concern for ADNOC.
Need to deal with hydrogen sulfide complicates gas field
developments
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
23/25
23 SB Presentation Macondo
Impact on ME OperationsWay Forward
Ensuring the continuing safety of oil & gas operations is a collaborative process that involves our industry with national and
regional legislators, executive bodies, regulators and other stakeholders
In order to restore confidence in hazardous drilling (deepwater, sour gas environment) companies must
Develop a new containment response system
Commit to financing the initial investments in specially-designed equipment.
To help ensure that the results of the Macondo enquiries are incorporated into industry practice and government
regulations, the ME operating companies should establish an Industry Response Group (IRG) similarly established by
International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP), which is closely liaising with United States industry groups and
other industry associations around the world
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
24/25
24 SB Presentation Macondo
Operators Initiative to reduce Operational Risk
The Mitigation of Major Accidental Events (MAE), Objectives:
To identify operating assets with the potential to cause a major accident event that could jeopardize the longevity of a comp any.
To review the effectiveness of the management systems in place that prevent and control a major accident event occurring.
To review the effectiveness of emergency response management systems to minimise the residual risks if a major accident event
occurs.
To identify areas for improvement in the management of major accident hazards and emergency response at our high risk
operational sites.
To share best practice in high performing sites with all operational sites.
8/10/2019 13.55 George Wachtel
25/25
25 SB Presentation Macondo
Thank you for your attention
Top Related