TheEﬀectofCreditConstraintsonHousing Choices ......Literature...

TheEffectofCreditConstraintsonHousing

Choices:TheCaseofLTVLimit

NitzanTzur-Ilan

BankofIsrael,HebrewUniversity

ResearchDepartmentConference,December2016

1/25

Motivation

◮ThegeneralobjectiveofLoan-To-Value(LTV)limits,a

commonmacroprudentialpolicy(MPP)tool,istoreducethe

systemicriskinfinancialsystems.

◮TheLTVlimitwasdesignedbytheBOItoprotectthe

bankingsystem

andtheborrowersfromrisksassociatedwith

excessiveleveraging.

◮LTVlimitationsmayalsoinfluencethehousingchoicesof

affectedindividuals.

◮Thereisverylimitedexistingresearchonsucheffects.

◮Thispaperusesrichdatatoexamineatopicthatisimportant

topolicymakersandthatsupportspolicydesign.

EffectofLTVLimitonHousing

NitzanTzur-Ilan

2/25

Literature

◮MainlyfocusesontheeffectofMPPsonbanks’stability.

◮LTVlimitsreducebanklossesindownturns(KrznarandMorsink2014,Limetal2011)

◮But,thetransmissionmechanismsofcreditconstraintsatthe

borrowerlevelarenotwellexplored.

◮Previousstudiesmainlyfocussedonthedelinquencyratio.(Eluletal,2010)

◮Mixedevidenceoftheeffectofcreditconstraintsonthe

housingmarket.

◮Mainlyonhomeprices:Cross-sectionalstudies-KuttnerandShim(2013),Country-Specific

"Case"Studies-IganandKang(2011),Hanetal.(2015)


NitzanTzur-Ilan

3/25

Literature:MainChallenges

◮AmajorobstacleinthisliteratureisthattheMPPsareused

incombinationwithotherpoliciesandmacroeconomicevents,

leadingtoachallengeinattributingoutcomestospecific

MPPtools.

◮Mostrelyonmacrodata/cross-countryanalyses,andare

unabletoassessthedistributionaleffect.

◮(Claessensetal,2015,IMF,2011,Limetal,2011)—Problemofidentification,controllingfor

countrycharacteristics.

◮LittleevidenceregardingtheeffectofMPPsonconsumer

behaviorinthecreditandhousingmarkets.


NitzanTzur-Ilan

4/25

Background:TheHousingMarketinIsrael

TheRateofChangeofHomePricesinIsrael,01/2007-12/2015:


NitzanTzur-Ilan

5/25

TheRegulatoryChange

◮InOctober2010,theBankofIsraelrequiredbankstoincrease

thecapitalprovisionformortgageswithLTVgreaterthan

60%.

◮Thisguidelinedidnotapplytohousingloansoriginally

amountingtolessthanNIS800,000.


NitzanTzur-Ilan

6/25

Data 1.Loan-leveldatafromtheBankofIsrael-mortgagecontracts

andborrowercharacteristics(90Kobs.fromJan2010toMay

2011).

2.HousingunitcharacteristicsfromtheIsraelTaxAuthority-

(Merged:27Kobs.)

⇓ Detailedinformationonthemortgage(interestrate,LTV,

etc.),ontheborrower(age,income)andonthehousing

unit(size,locationetc.)


NitzanTzur-Ilan

7/25

Data-SampleStatistics

Data

set

Vari

able

Mean

S.D

.M

ean

S.D

.C

oef

S.E

.

Mort

gage

co

ntra

cts

LT

V (

%)

56.7

19.7

55.9

18.9

-0.8***

0.2

Ave

rage

inte

rest

rat

e (%

)2.4

10.6

72.7

10.9

70.3***

0.0

1

Hom

e P

urch

ase

Rea

l hom

e p

rice

s (N

IS t

hous

and)

1,0

26

572

968

537

-58***

6.8

Tra

nsa

ctions

Room

s3.9

81.0

93.9

71.1

0.0

0.0

Are

a (s

qua

re m

eter

s)97.3

48.7

96.9

79.3

-0.4

0.8

Dis

tanc

e fr

om

Tel

Avi

v (K

M)

45.2

45.7

47.8

45.8

2.6***

0.5

Nei

ghbo

rhoo

d R

ankin

g11.9

3.6

110.4

3.5

-1.5***

0.0

**

* p

<0

.01

, *

* p

<0

.05

, *

p<

0.1

Sourc

es:

Dat

a on m

ort

gage

s fr

om

the

Ban

k o

f Is

rael

, D

ata

on p

urc

has

e tr

ansa

ctio

ns

(Kar

men

Dat

abas

e) a

re f

rom

The

Isra

el T

ax A

uth

ori

ty.

Num

ber

of

obse

rvat

ions:

27,3

24

(16,1

00

bef

ore

the

LT

V lim

it, 11,2

24

aft

er t

he

LT

V lim

it).

Note

: R

eal

hom

e p

rice

s w

ere

def

late

d b

y t

he

month

ly c

han

ge i

n t

he

Index

of

Hom

e P

rice

s.

Sum

mar

y S

tatis

tics

Befo

re t

he L

TV

Lim

itA

fter

the L

TV

Lim

itD

iffe

ren

ce


NitzanTzur-Ilan

8/25

IdentifyingAffectedBorrowers

◮LTVlimitrequiredbankstosetasidemorecapitalagainst

riskyloans.

◮Hence,theLTVlimitchangedthetermsoftheloancontract.

◮Ifocusontheeffectofthepolicyonthesubsetofborrowers

constrainedbythepolicy-AverageTreatmentEffectonthe

treated(ATT).

But:

◮Thetreatmentstatusisobservedonlybeforethepolicy.

◮TheborrowercouldhavetakenLTV>60%andpaidahigher

interestrate.

◮Also,theborrowercouldhavechosenLTV<60%andbought

adifferentasset.

◮2mainmethodsofidentification


NitzanTzur-Ilan

9/25

#1EmpiricalApproach—Cross-PeriodMatching

SimilarHouseholdsBeforeandAftertheRegulatoryChange

◮Matchinghouseholdswithsimilarcharacteristicsbeforeand

aftertheLTVlimitandexaminingthedifferencesintheir

behaviorinthecreditandhousingmarkets.

◮ATT:E(Y1−Y0|T=1,X)

◮Abadie-Imbens(2002):Mahalanobisdistance,withreplacement,bias-correction

◮Matchingisdoneusingtotalincomeandaverageageper

household.

◮Outcomevariables:homeprices,size,numberofrooms,

distancefrom

TelAviv,andqualityofneighborhoods.

◮Weaknesses:timevarying,othermacroeconomiceventscan

haveaneffect(willbeaddressedlaterinthesecondmatching

approach).


NitzanTzur-Ilan

10/25

LTVLimitwasEffective:MortgagesBecameMore

Expensive

◮TheLTVlimitrequiredbankstosetasidemorecapital

againstriskyloans.

◮Increasedtheaverageinterestratefortheriskyborrowers

(LTV>60%).

0.2.4.6.8Density

02

46

8A

vera

ge

In

tere

st R

ate

befo

re

afte

r

kern

el =

epa

nechn

ikov, b

an

dw

idth

= 0

.06

06

Dis

trib

utio

n o

f th

e A

ve

rag

e I

nte

rest

Ra

te f

or

Bo

rro

we

rs w

ith

LT

V>

60

%

Kolmogorov-Smirnovtest:statisticallysignificantdifferencebetweenthegroups


NitzanTzur-Ilan

11/25

LTVLimitwasEffective—InterestRateAbovevs.Below

WentUp

◮Comparisonof2identicalborrowersaboveandbelowthe60%

limit.

◮Beforetheregulation-nodifferencebetweenthe2borrowers

(0.01-0.03percentagepoints)

◮Aftertheregulation,theinterestratepaidbytheborrower

withLTV>60%is0.21-0.36percentagepointshigherthan

thesimilarborrowerbelowtheLTVlimit

Avera

ge R

ate

Avera

ge R

ate

Spre

ad

Spre

ad

Avera

ge R

ate

Avera

ge R

ate

Spre

ad

Spre

ad

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

AT

T.3

58**

*.2

51**

*0.2

13*

0.2

58**

.312**

*.2

97**

*0.2

51**

*0.2

59**

*

(.078)

(.081)

(.110)

(.129)

(.065)

(.063)

(.086)

(.079)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No. of obs. used

349

349

349

349

1,9

37

1,9

37

1,9

37

1,9

37

No

te: H

ete

ros

ke

da

sticity-

co

ns

iste

nt s

tan

da

rd e

rro

rs a

re in

pa

ren

the

se

s. **

*, *

*, *

in

dic

ate

sig

nific

an

ce

at th

e 1

, 5

, a

nd

10

pe

rce

nt le

vels

, re

sp

ective

ly.

Sp

rea

d -

th

e in

tere

st ra

te o

ver

the

PR

IME

. A

TT

is

th

e A

ba

die

-Im

be

ns

bia

s c

orr

ecte

d a

vera

ge

tre

ate

d e

ffe

ct m

atc

hin

g e

stim

ato

r.

Tre

ate

d-

wh

o b

orr

ow

ab

ove

60

% L

TV

th

res

ho

ld. B

orr

ow

ers

we

re M

atc

he

d, a

fte

r th

e L

TV

lim

it, b

y in

co

me

, a

ge

, b

an

k a

nd

du

ratio

n o

f th

e lo

an

.

Bank

Dura

tion

61%

VS

59%

61-6

5%

VS

55-5

9%

Tota

l incom

e

Avera

ge a

ge


NitzanTzur-Ilan

12/25

LTVLimitisEffective—LTVGoesDown

◮Incentivizeriskyborrowers(LTV>60%)toreduceleverage:

0.01.02.03Density

02

04

06

080

100

LT

V

Be

fore

th

e L

TV

lim

it

Aft

er

kern

el = e

pa

nechn

ikov, b

an

dw

idth

= 2

.906

1

LT

V D

istr

ibu

tio

n B

efo

re a

nd

Aft

er

the R

estr

ictio

n

◮Lesscreditforthepurchaseofahousingunit.


NitzanTzur-Ilan

13/25

TestforCreditRationing

DidtheLTVLimitChangetheDistributionofBorrowers?

◮Distributionofborrowers’characteristicsbeforeandafterthe

LTVlimit:

◮Nosignificantchangeinthedistributionoftheborrowers’

characteristics.


NitzanTzur-Ilan

14/25

Results-Cross-PeriodMatching

◮MatchingsimilarhouseholdsbeforeandaftertheLTVlimit

◮Examiningthedifferencesintheirchoicesinthehousing

market.

Dep.

Vari

able

:

Nom

inal

Hom

e P

rices

(NIS

)

Real H

om

e

Pri

ces

(NIS

)S

ize (

sq.m

.)R

oom

s

Dis

tance

from

Tel

Aviv

(K

M)

Neig

hborh

ood

Rankin

g

AT

T1,397

-83,401***

-1.52

-0.04***

3.8***

-1.8***

(8,9

47)

(8,1

93)

(1.1

)(0

.01)

(0.7

)(0

.4)

AT

T (

%)

0.1%

-8.1%

-1.6%

-1.0%

8.4%

-9.1%

Note

: H

eter

osk

edas

tici

ty-c

onsi

sten

t st

andar

d e

rrors

are

in p

aren

thes

es. ***, **, * indic

ate

sign

ific

ance

at

the

1, 5, an

d 1

0 p

erce

nt

level

s,

resp

ecti

vel

y. N

um

ber

of

ob

serv

atio

ns:

11,2

24. A

TT

is

the

Ab

adie

-Im

ben

s b

ias

corr

ecte

d a

ver

age

trea

ted e

ffec

t m

atch

ing

esti

mat

or.

Tre

ated

-

housh

old

s w

ho b

orr

ow

aft

er t

he

LT

V lim

it (

Oct

ober

2010).


NitzanTzur-Ilan

15/25

Magnitude

◮55%ofIsrael’spopulationlivesinthecenter(radiusof40KM

fromTLV),Within6monthsthetreatmentgroupmoved4

KMfartherfromTLV.

◮Toasignificantlylowergradedneighborhood.

◮Soborrowersadjustedtheirhousingchoicesinresponsetothe

LTVlimitation.


NitzanTzur-Ilan

16/25

WhereDidTheyMoveto?

◮70%oftheborrowersmovedfartherfromthecenter.


NitzanTzur-Ilan

17/25

WhichKindofNeighborhoodDidTheyMoveTo?

◮Foreachsub-groupofdistancefromTelAviv-significant

decreaseinthesocioeconomicratingofneighborhoods.


NitzanTzur-Ilan

18/25

#2-AlternativeApproach-Difference-in-Differences

Matching(WithinPeriods)

◮DoborrowerschoosedifferentassetsbecauseoftheLTVlimit

orbecauseoftheincreaseinhomeprices?

◮AccordingtotheOctober2010LTVlimit,thebankswere

requiredtoincreasethecapitalprovisionforloanswithLTV

higherthan60%exceedingNIS800K.

◮Examinedtwogroups:

◮Untreatedgroup-borrowedbetweenNIS600Kand700K

◮Treatmentgroup-borrowedbetweenNIS900Kand1,000K

◮Then,matchingbetweenthesetwogroupsbyobservable

characteristics.

◮Whiletheimpactofmacrovariablesappliestobothgroups,

onlyonegroupisaffectedbytheLTVlimit.


NitzanTzur-Ilan

19/25

ChangeintheLTVDistribution

0.01.02.03.04Density

02

04

06

08

01

00

LT

V

Be

fore

Aft

er

kern

el =

epa

nechn

ikov, b

an

dw

idth

= 2

.82

02

Un

tre

ate

d (

60

0-7

00

K lo

an

)

0.01.02.03.04Density

02

04

06

08

01

00

LT

V

Be

fore

Aft

er

kern

el =

epa

nechn

ikov, b

an

dw

idth

= 2

.94

72

Tre

ate

d (

900

-1,0

00

K loa

n)


NitzanTzur-Ilan

20/25

ResultsDifference-in-DifferencesMatching(Within

Periods)

ChangeinRealHomePrices(NIS)

-74,728***

1,3

82,2

96***

1,4

56,8

84***

Tre

ate

d(2

2,2

42)

(15,5

20)

(15,8

96)

Dif

fere

nce

Aft

er

Befo

re

-43,0

22*

203,1

18***

246,0

00***

Dif

fere

nce in M

ean

(23,7

14)

( 24,5

77)

( 22,5

92)

-31,706

1,1

79,1

78***

1,2

10,8

84***

Untr

eate

d(2

4,8

55)

(20,0

44)

(15,2

96)

-67,789*

DID

Mat

chin

g (

by

ob

serv

ab

le c

hara

cte

risti

cs)

(36

,13

5)

Note

: H

eter

osk

edas

tici

ty-c

onsi

sten

t st

andar

d e

rrors

are

in p

aren

thes

es. ***, **, * indic

ate

sign

ific

ance

at

the

1, 5, an

d 1

0

per

cent

level

s, r

esp

ecti

vel

y. t

reat

ed b

orr

ow

ers

are

def

ined

as

those

that

borr

ow

ed f

rom

900,0

00 t

o 1

,000,0

00 N

IS. T

he

untr

eate

d b

orr

ow

ers

are

those

that

borr

ow

ed 6

00,0

00 t

o 7

00,0

00 N

IS. T

her

e ar

e 1,4

98 t

reat

ed b

orr

ow

ers

and 3

,462

untr

eate

d b

orr

ow

ers.

Contr

ol

borr

ow

ers

are

a su

bse

t of

the

untr

eate

d b

orr

ow

ers

sele

cted

as

the

close

st m

atch

to t

he

trea

ted b

orr

ow

ers

bas

ed o

n a

set

of

borr

ow

er c

har

acte

rist

ics:

Age

and i

nco

me.

Ther

e ar

e 1,4

98 b

orr

ow

ers

in t

he

contr

ol

group

. A

TT

is

the

Ab

adie

-Im

ben

s b

ias

corr

ecte

d a

ver

age

trea

ted e

ffec

t m

atch

ing

esti

mat

or.

◮AdeclineofNIS68K(4.7%)inrealhomepricesafterthe

LTVlimitinthetreatmentgroup


NitzanTzur-Ilan

21/25


Periods)

DistancefromTelAviv(KM)

Dif

fere

nce

Aft

er

Befo

re

31.5

***

28.3

***

Tre

ate

d(1

.9)

(1.5

4)

(1.1

5)

3.2**

40.5

***

41.2

***

Unt

reate

d(1

.2)

(1.4

1)

(1.6

3)

-0.7

-9***

-12.9

***

Dif

fere

nce in M

ean

(1.5

)(2

.1)

(1.6

)

3.9

***

DID

Matc

hin

g (

by

ob

serv

ab

le c

hara

cte

risti

cs)

(1.7

)

4.3***

No

te:

Het

ero

sked

asti

city

-co

nsi

sten

t st

anda

rd e

rro

rs a

re i

n p

aren

thes

es.

**

*,

**

, *

in

dica

te s

ign

ific

ance

at

the

1,

5,

and

10

per

cen

t le

vel

s, r

esp

ecti

vel

y.

Tre

ated

bo

rro

wer

s ar

e de

fin

ed a

s th

ose

wh

o b

orr

ow

ed f

rom

NIS

90

0,0

00

to

1,0

00

,00

0.

Th

e

untr

eate

d bo

rro

wer

s ar

e th

ose

wh

o b

orr

ow

ed N

IS 6

00

,00

0 t

o 7

00

,00

0.

Th

ere

are

1,4

98

tre

ated

bo

rro

wer

s an

d 3

,46

2

untr

eate

d bo

rro

wer

s. C

on

tro

l bo

rro

wer

s are

a s

ubse

t o

f th

e un

trea

ted

bo

rro

wer

s se

lect

ed a

s th

e cl

ose

st m

atch

to

th

e tr

eate

d

borr

ow

ers

base

d o

n a

set

of

borr

ow

er c

har

acte

rist

ics:

Age

an

d in

com

e. T

her

e ar

e 1

,49

8 b

orr

ow

ers

in t

he

con

tro

l gr

oup

. A

TT

is t

he

Abad

ie-I

mbe

ns

bia

s co

rrec

ted

aver

age

trea

ted

effe

ct m

atch

ing

esti

mat

or.

◮Thetreatmentgroupmoves4.3KM(15%)fartherfromthe

centeraftertheLTVlimit.


NitzanTzur-Ilan

22/25


Periods)

NeighborhoodRanking(scaleof1-20) (1

.5)

(1.5

1)

-1.9

**

0.2

2.1

**

Dif

fere

nce in M

ean

No

te:

Het

ero

sked

asti

city

-co

nsi

sten

t st

anda

rd e

rro

rs a

re i

n p

aren

thes

es.

**

*,

**

, *

in

dica

te s

ign

ific

ance

at

the

1,

5,

and

10

per

cen

t le

vel

s, r

esp

ecti

vel

y.

Tre

ated

bo

rro

wer

s ar

e de

fin

ed a

s th

ose

wh

o b

orr

ow

ed f

rom

NIS

90

0,0

00

to

1,0

00

,00

0.

Th

e

untr

eate

d bo

rro

wer

s ar

e th

ose

wh

o b

orr

ow

ed N

IS 6

00

,00

0 t

o 7

00

,00

0.

Th

ere

are

1,4

98

tre

ated

bo

rro

wer

s an

d 3

,46

2 u

ntr

eate

d

borr

ow

ers.

Co

ntr

ol

borr

ow

ers

are

a su

bset

of

the

untr

eate

d bo

rro

wer

s se

lect

ed a

s th

e cl

ose

st m

atch

to

th

e tr

eate

d bo

rro

wer

s bas

ed

on

a s

et o

f bo

rro

wer

ch

arac

teri

stic

s: A

ge a

nd

inco

me.

Th

ere

are

1,4

98

bo

rro

wer

s in

th

e co

ntr

ol

gro

up.

AT

T i

s th

e A

badi

e-

Imbe

ns

bia

s co

rrec

ted

aver

age

trea

ted

effe

ct m

atch

ing

esti

mat

or.

(0.8

)(0

.8)

(0.9

)

-2.2***

DID

Matc

hin

g (

by

ob

serv

ab

le c

hara

cte

risti

cs)

(0.8

)

Dif

fere

nce

Aft

er

Befo

re

-2.4***

10.3

***

12.7

***

Tre

ate

d(0

.7)

(1.8

)(1

.1)

-0.5

10.1

***

10.6

***

Unt

reate

d(0

.5)

◮Thetreatmentgroupmovestolowerrankedneighborhoods


NitzanTzur-Ilan

23/25

Isthereasub-groupthatismoreaffectedbytheLTVlimit?

Matching-bytypeofbuyer

No

min

al

Ho

me

Pri

ce

s (N

IS)

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al H

om

e

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ce

s (N

IS)

Siz

e (s

q.m

.)R

oo

ms

Dis

tan

ce

fro

m T

el

Aviv

(k

m)

Qu

ality

of

Ne

igh

bo

rho

od

s

Co

ntr

ol

13,3

37

-60,1

79**

*-2

.28*

-0.0

4*

1.8

5**

*-0

.6**

Tre

ate

d[1

0,9

28]

[9,9

84]

[1.2

3]

[0.0

2]

[1.1

][0

.3]

Ch

an

ge

(%

)1

%-8

%**

*-3

%*

-1%

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%**

*-6

%**

Co

ntr

ol

5,3

44

-93,0

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23.9

***

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***

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ate

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reate

d[2

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14]

[22,9

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[0.0

4]

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][0

.41]

Ch

an

ge

(%

)-5

%**

-12

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***

-15

%**

*

No

te: H

ete

ros

ke

da

sticity-

co

ns

iste

nt s

tan

da

rd e

rro

rs a

re in

pa

ren

the

se

s. **

*, *

*, *

in

dic

ate

sig

nific

an

ce

at th

e 1

, 5

, a

nd

10

pe

rce

nt le

vels

, re

sp

ective

ly. T

rea

ted

bo

rro

we

rs a

re d

efin

ed

as

th

os

e th

at b

orr

ow

ed

afte

r th

e L

TV

lim

it (

Octo

be

r 2

01

0).

Th

e u

ntr

ea

ted

bo

rro

we

rs a

re th

os

e w

ho

bo

rro

we

d b

efo

re th

e L

TV

lim

it. C

on

tro

l

bo

rro

we

rs a

re a

su

bs

et o

f th

e u

ntr

ea

ted

bo

rro

we

rs s

ele

cte

d a

s th

e c

los

es

t m

atc

h to

th

e tre

ate

d g

rou

p o

f b

orr

ow

ers

ba

se

d o

n a

se

t o

f b

orr

ow

er

ch

ara

cte

ris

tics

: A

ge

an

d in

co

me

. A

TT

is

th

e A

ba

die

-Im

be

ns

bia

s c

orr

ecte

d a

vera

ge

tre

ate

d e

ffe

ct m

atc

hin

g e

stim

ato

r. N

um

be

r o

f o

bs

erv

atio

ns

: F

irs

t-tim

e h

om

e b

uye

r, c

on

tro

l 3

,08

1

Avera

ge

Inv

es

tors

Up

gra

ders

Fir

st-

tim

e

ho

me b

uy

ers

◮InvestorswereaffectedmorebytheLTVlimit-moreflexible.


NitzanTzur-Ilan

24/25

Conclusions

◮ProvidesacredibleestimationoftheimpactofthefirstMPP

implementedinIsrael.

◮Keyfinding:

1.LTVlimitaffectsthemortgagecontractterms(interestrate,

loanamount).

2.Borrowersadjustedtheirhousingchoicesinresponsetothe

LTVlimitation:boughtcheaperhomes,fartherfromthe

center,inlowergradedneighborhoods.

3.InvestorsareinfluencedmorebytheLTVlimit.

◮Policyimplication:Understandinghowthemarket

participantsrespondtotheMPPiscrucialfordevelopingan

appropriatepolicyresponseframework.


NitzanTzur-Ilan

25/25

TheEﬀectofCreditConstraintsonHousing Choices ......Literature...

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