Publieke en private pensioenstelsels: lessen van de crisis

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    Policy implications

    The population o Europe is ageing and, as a result, pension systems are exposed to major

    diculties. This requires measures to increase employment rates, to prolong working lives,

    promote qualifed migration, and to curb, to some extent, income replacement rates. Private

    pension systems are, just like the public ones, dependent on adequate economic growth rates,

    as well as being equally sensitive to demographic change; what is more, unlike public systems,

    they are highly risk-susceptible in relation to fnancial markets. It is ar rom clear that there

    are economically sound reasons or giving them public support or even tax relie, especially

    in countries with a strong and ully developed public system. In those countries where privateschemes are already widespread careul monitoring is required. The social partners must have a substantial say in the design

    o whatever arrangements are used. We are going to have to pay more or the older members o our societies (or to put it more

    correctly, or our own old age) but the much lower-risk approach is to secure old-age pensions via public systems.

    Introduction

    The population o Europe is ageing and, as a result, pensionsystems are exposed to major difculties. For these systems

    to remain sustainable requires real GDP growth rates oabove 2.5% as well as urgent reorms designed to adjust todemographic change. This means, in the main, measures toincrease employment rates, to prolong working lives and tocurb, to some extent, income replacement rates. Because themain ocus o discussion is public systems, large numbers opeople, especially the young, believe that it is much saer toinvest in private pensions: you save your own money and whenyou are old you can reap your investments plus interest.

    This view completely disregards the risks inherent in privatepension systems. These systems are, just like the public

    ones, dependent on adequate growth rates, as well as beingequally sensitive to demographic change; what is more, unlikepublic systems, they are highly risk-susceptible in relation tonancial markets. The nancial crisis has revealed these risksall too clearly but the crisis is easily and quickly orgotten.

    Nevertheless, the risks still exist - they are not an occasionalphenomenon but are inherent in unded systems, and more so

    in private systems which have less saety nets than public ones.Moreover, contrary to popular opinion, private systems arenot cheaper than public ones i they are to provide the samebenets. The prevailing ill-inormed and uncritical opinionssurrounding private pensions need to be challenged. Otherwise,not only are people in or massive disappointments but theyalso run the risk o experiencing poverty in their old age.

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    ETUI Policy Brie

    Issue 6/2009

    European Economic and Employment Policy

    Public and private pensions:Lessons rom the crisis

    Agnes Streissler is anAustrian economistand owner o aneconomic policyconsultancy

    Agnes Streissler

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    Table 1: Percentage contribution o components o the obligatory pension system to weighted average pension wealth

    Public redistributive tierInsurance tier

    Public Private DB Private DC

    Belgium 4.4 95.5

    Denmark 40.1 59.7

    Germany 1.5 98.5

    Finland 2.9 97.1

    France 4.7 95.3

    Greece 100.0

    Ireland 100.0

    Italy 100.0

    Luxembourg 16.0 84.1

    Netherlands 41.2 58.8

    Austria 100.0

    Poland 1.5 48.2 50.3

    Portugal 1.8 98.2

    Sweden 4.5 52.6 42.9

    Slovakia 0.3 44.9 54.8

    Spain 1.2 98.8

    Czech Republic 17.1 82.9

    Hungary 65.9 34.1

    United Kingdom 87.1 12.9

    Source: OECD 2009b, Pensions at a Glance. p 133.

    ETUI Policy Brie European Economic and Employment Policy - Issue 6/2009

    Private pensions and the fnancialcrisis

    Pension systems in Europe are predominantly publiclyorganised. Table 1 (which excludes purely voluntary schemes)shows that there are some countries with obligatory or quasi-obligatory strong private dened-contribution (DC) schemes,while the Netherlands has an obligatory private dened-benet(DB) scheme. In general, however, private pensions in Europeserve essentially to complement public ones. This is clear romTable 2 which shows that public expenditure on pensions by arexceeds private expenditure in this area.1

    Nevertheless, in the OECD taken as a whole, private pensionsystems have reached tremendous proportions in absoluteterms. In 2007 US-$ 28 trillion were accumulated in privatepension systems in the OECD area. The OECD-weighted averageratio o private pension assets to the areas GDP reached 111%in 2007. There are large dierences between OECD countries.While the ratio is 149% o GDP in the Netherlands and 124%in the United States, it is only 7% in France and less than 4%in Italy. This denition comprises a wide scope o dierentsystems: rom both mandatory and voluntary employment-based systems (either dening contributions or deningbenets) to individual retirement arrangements. All have in

    common the principle o asset accumulation or book reservenancing but they entail very dierent risks.

    In the 1990s private pension assets grew mainly in the UnitedStates, a development largely induced by the introduction o

    Table 2: Public and private pension expendituresin selected OECD countries, 2006 as a

    percentage o GDP

    Country Public expenditure Private expenditure

    Austria 12.1 0.2

    Belgium 8.1 1.3

    Czech Republic 7.2 0.3

    Denmark 4.8 4.2

    Finland 1.1 9.2

    Germany 11.7 0.1

    Hungary 8.1 0.1

    Italy 12.0 0.3

    Netherlands 5.4 3.6

    Norway 4.4 1.4

    Poland 10.4 0.0

    Portugal 7.5 1.0

    Spain 7.8 0.6

    Sweden 7.7 1.1

    Switzerland 6.7 5.5

    United Kingdom 7.5 3.1

    Source: OECD 2009a, Private Pension Outlook, p 142.

    1 For each country other values can be ound and the OECD calculations are

    subject to much discussion. Nevertheless, it was decided to use them here as

    they provide the possibility o international comparison.

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    ETUI Policy Brie European Economic and Employment Policy - Issue 6/2009

    publicly supported private pension plans (401(k)). Since 2000Europe has been ollowing a similar trend. Stock prices rocketedand this was correlated with a massive expansion o privatepension plans. At the same time assets were shied rom low-risk bonds to high-risk stocks and shares.

    Financial assets held by investors in the OECD are heavilypension-oriented. As much as 60% o the total volume oassets held by institutional investors worldwide has as its mainpurpose the nancing o retirement benets (OECD 2009a,39).

    This development entailed a huge crash potential and thenancial crisis threw back pension unds by ve years. ByOctober 2008 the total assets o all pension unds in the OECDhad declined by about US-$ 3.3 trillion, or nearly 20%, relativeto December 2007. Including other private pension assets, suchas those held under personal plans in the United States and inother countries, brings the loss to about USD 5 trillion (OECD

    2009, 15 OECD published this Private Pension Outlook inFebruary 2009, thereore there are no more recent numbers onthe aggregate eect o the crisis on pension unds worldwide).Even unds having a well-balanced portolio lost on average17% (Whitehouse 2008, 1).

    Financial crises are sel-reinorcing. When rms have difcultyin meeting their pension obligations there is, on the one hand,a reaction on the nancial markets: reduced prots mean worsedebtor-ratings and, as a consequence, higher credit costs. Onthe other hand, problems also arise in the real economy whereadditional or unplanned payments or pension obligations meanless money available or wages and or important investmentsin equipment and research. This reduces rms chances in theuture, thereby generally enlarging the nancial gap in pensionobligations.

    There are many examples o how rms tried to exit this viciouscircle that is rather reminiscent o compulsive gamblingpractices. For example, the Chicago Transit Authority realizedthat there was too little money in their pension plans - theywere underunded by 62%. They thereore issued $ 1.9 billionin bonds, promising 6.8% percent return, expecting that they

    would be able to invest the sales incomes at 8.75% interest. Inactual act, the proceeds o the bond sale earned a 2% returnand, beore the year ended, the pension und was paying outmore to bondholders than it was earning on its new inux omoney. Instead o closing its unding gap, the CTA was allingurther behind (Evans 2009).

    Nevertheless, lobbying or private pensions continues as thereis so much money in this market. The question that has to beasked is thereore: do private pensions just need a little bit oregulating to prevent another crisis or do private systems havesystematic disadvantages compared to public ones? Below, this

    question is analyzed or dierent variables.

    The sustainability o private and publicschemes

    Growth

    Each pension system, regardless o its concrete implementation,needs economic growth. Growth has slowed down in westernEurope but long-term projections issued by the EuropeanCommission nevertheless show that, i productivity growsmoderately and labour participation increases, public pension

    systems are sustainable. The EU 2009 Ageing Report showsthat, i pension reorms (which have been introduced in mostEuropean countries) produce the intended results, no urtherpolicy change is required to achieve sustainability - providedthat productivity growth remains at least at 1.1% p.a. onaverage and employment rates increase to 70% by 2060.

    Under realistic assumptions concerning growth and productivity,public pension expenditure in the EU as a whole will grow romtodays 10.2% o GDP to 12.6%. Dierent countries havedierent developments, depending on the state o reorms andother parameters, but, generally speaking, in no country is the

    situation running out o control.

    It is not always realized that, ultimately, the retired populationconsumes goods and services which are produced by the workingpopulation, regardless o the actual source o income or retirees.

    Table 3: Total private pension assets, 2007As a percentage o GDP

    Country 2007

    Austria 18.8Belgium 14.4

    Czech Republic 4.7

    Denmark 140.6

    Finland 78.1

    France 6.9

    Germany 17.9

    Greece 0.0

    Hungary 10.9

    Ireland 93.6

    Italy 3.6

    Netherlands 149.1Norway 54.5

    Poland 12.2

    Portugal 26.0

    Slovak Republic 4.2

    Spain 12.1

    Sweden 57.4

    Switzerland 151.9

    United Kingdom 96.4

    United States 124.0

    Total OECD 111.0

    Source: OECD Global Pension Statistics and OECD estimates. OECD

    2009a, 44.

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    This means that real growth is needed or private systems too.In other words, to convert aordable savings into comortableretirements depends on investments delivering strong and stablereturns over the long run, which requires economic growth.

    Public systems are, in general, more growth-supporting than

    private ones, insoar as they act counter-cyclically. In timeso nancial crisis public systems act as saety nets keeping updomestic consumption. In private systems there is both the risko incomes and consumption dropping at the same time as thenancial markets and o rms getting into difculties becauseduring a crisis they cannot aord to pay their contributions. Indened contribution systems these risks are mainly a burdenupon rms, while in dened benet systems these are riskscarried by the individual.

    Demography

    One o the big misunderstandings regarding private systems

    is the assumption that they are demography-resistant. This isincorrect. When looking at a single savings plan, there is theproblem that longer lie-expectancy will automatically lead tolower monthly benets. This problem is multiplied when thewhole population o retirees is considered. At the present timemost private systems are still building up their assets. In otherwords, large volumes o contributions are coming in whilesignicantly ewer benets are being paid out. This situationwill change when the systems mature. For example, in the year2030 many baby-boomers will be retired, while there will beewer working people. Pension plans have to be liquidatedbut, as there are more sellers than buyers, asset prices can be

    expected to go down and thus the value o the outstandingsaved assets will deteriorate.

    There are no reorms or measures really able to assuage thisproblem. The demographic burden will have to be paid or

    and the trick is going to be to distribute this burden evenly.Some countries (Sweden, or example) try to solve the problemby a so-called balance mechanism, according to which thebenets paid out cannot exceed the contributions comingin. Such a mechanism may be scally sustainable, but it doesnot meet the requirement o air distribution as the burden is

    placed solely on retirees. Thus, in long-term projections, publiccontributions to these systems by denition do not increase.The working population will not have to pay more, but retireeswill receive ever less. It is very questionable whether this will bea sustainable development in the long run.

    The solution will consist in nding ways o increasingthe number o working years and raising labour marketparticipation. Qualied migration is also an important elemento sustainability o pension systems.

    The risks o the fnancial markets

    Private pension systems ace more maniold and more complexrisks than public systems. In addition to macroeconomic risks(which are relevant or public systems too), there are also marketrisks, strategic and management risks and implementationalrisks.

    The experience o Enron or o the employees o the Maxwellempire shows the scope o management and implementationrisks. To depend on private pension plans rom a singleemployer means risking mismanagement and even raudulentpractices.

    But even i everything is above board there are huge marketrisks. These appear in dierent orms depending on whetherthe system is dened contribution or dened benet. Collective,dened benet systems in which social partners have their voiceare usually less risk-prone or retirees than individual plans.

    Table 4: Projected public pension expenditure in % o GDP

    2007 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060

    EU27 10.2 10.2 10.5 11.4 12.1 12.4 12.6

    Belgium 10.0 10.3 11.8 13.9 14.6 14.7 14.7

    Czech Republic 7.8 7.1 6.9 7.1 8.4 10.2 11.0

    Denmark 9.1 9.4 10.6 10.6 10.4 9.6 9.2

    Germany 10.4 10.2 10.5 11.5 12.1 12.3 12.8

    France 13.0 13.5 13.6 14.2 14.4 14.2 14.0

    Italy 14.0 14.0 14.1 14.8 15.6 14.7 13.6

    Hungary 10.9 11.3 11.0 11.0 12.2 13.2 13.8

    Netherlands 6.6 6.5 7.8 9.3 10.3 10.3 10.5

    Austria 12.8 12.7 13.0 13.8 13.9 14.0 13.6

    Poland 11.6 10.8 9.7 9.4 9.2 9.1 8.8

    Sweden 9.5 9.6 9.4 9.5 9.4 9.0 9.4

    United Kingdom 6.6 6.7 6.9 7.6 8.0 8.1 9.3

    Source: European Commission: The 2009 Ageing Report, Table 47.

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    Reerences

    Evans, David (2009) Hidden Pension Fiasco May Foment Another $1 Trillion Bailout, Bloomberg.com online 3.3.2009.www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=alwTE0Z5.1EA

    Munnell, Alicia H. et al. (2008) How Much Risk Is Acceptable?Center or Retirement Research at Boston College, No.8-20,November 2008.

    Pearson, Mark and Martin, John P. (2005)Should We Extend theRole o Private Social Expenditure? OECD Social Employmentand Migration Working Papers No 23.

    OECD (2009a) Private Pensions Outlook 2008, OECD: Paris.

    OECD (2009b) Pensions at a Glance 2009. Retirement-IncomeSystems in OECD Countries, OECD: Paris.

    World Bank (2006) Evaluating World Bank Support or PensionReorms: Afordability and Coverage remain Center Stage, TheWorld Bank Independent Evaluation Group, Press Release Feb2nd, 2006. www.worldbank.org/ieg/pensions/documents/press_release_pensions_evaluation.pd.

    Whitehouse, Edward and Yermo, Juan (2008) Pensions in anancial crisis, OECD: Paris.

    The views expressed in ETUI Policy Bries are those o the respective author(s) and do not necessarily reect the views o the ETUI.

    For more inormation about the ETUI Policy Brie European Economic and Employment Policy, please contact the editor, Andrew Watt ([email protected]).

    For previous issues, please visit www.etui.org/publications. You may nd urther inormation on the ETUI at www.etui.org. ETUI aisbl, Brussels 2009

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