High Council for the Judiciary, Rome, June 4th and 5th,...

Conference organised by the Italian High Council for the Judiciary upon the initiative of the Sixth Commission

““ TThhii rrdd II nntteerrnnaattiioonnaall CCoonnffeerreennccee oonn tthhee eexxcchhaannggee ooff eexxppeerr iieenncceess bbeettwweeeenn EEuurrooppeeaann

UUnniioonn CCoouunnttrr iieess ccoonncceerrnniinngg rreellaattiioonnss iinn tthhee vvaarr iioouuss jjuuddiicciiaall ssyysstteemmss bbeettwweeeenn tthhee

ffuunnccttiioonnss ooff tthhee II nnssppeeccttoorraatteess ooff tthhee MMiinniissttrryy ooff JJuussttiiccee aanndd tthhee CCoouunnccii llss ffoorr tthhee

JJuuddiicciiaarryy aanndd//oorr aauuttoonnoommoouuss GGoovveerrnnmmeenntt BBooddiieess””

HHiigghh CCoouunnccii ll ffoorr tthhee JJuuddiicciiaarryy,, RRoommee,, JJuunnee 44tthh aanndd 55tthh,, 22001122

Conférence organisée par le Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature italien sur initiative de la Sixième Commission

“ TTrrooiissiièèmmee CCoonnfféérreennccee II nntteerrnnaattiioonnaallee ssuurr ll ’’ éécchhaannggee dd’’ eexxppéérr iieenncceess eennttrree lleess EEttaattss

MMeemmbbrreess ddee ll ’’ UUnniioonn EEuurrooppééeennnnee ssuurr llee tthhèèmmee ddeess rraappppoorr ttss eennttrree lleess ddii ff fféérreennttss ssyyssttèèmmeess

jjuuddiicciiaaii rreess,, eennttrree lleess ffoonnccttiioonnss ddeess II nnssppeeccttiioonnss dduu MMiinniissttèèrree ddee llaa JJuussttiiccee eett lleess CCoonnsseeii llss

ddee JJuussttiiccee eett//oouu lleess OOrrggaanneess ddee GGoouuvveerrnneemmeenntt aauuttoonnoommeeˮˮ

CCoonnsseeii ll SSuuppéérr iieeuurr ddee llaa MMaaggiissttrraattuurree,, RRoommee,, 44 eett 55 jjuuiinn 22001122

Rome, June 4-5, 2012

TTHHIIRRDD IINNTTEERRNNAATTIIOONNAALL CCOONNFFEERREENNCCEE OONN TTHHEE EEXXCCHHAANNGGEE OOFF EEXXPPEERRIIEENNCCEESS BBEETTWWEEEENN EEUURROOPPEEAANN UUNNIIOONN CCOOUUNNTTRRIIEESS CCOONNCCEERRNNIINNGG RREELLAATTIIOONNSS IINN TTHHEE

VVAARRIIOOUUSS JJUUDDIICCIIAALL SSYYSSTTEEMMSS BBEETTWWEEEENN TTHHEE FFUUNNCCTTIIOONNSS OOFF TTHHEE IINNSSPPEECCTTOORRAATTEESS OOFF TTHHEE MMIINNIISSTTRRYY OOFF JJUUSSTTIICCEE AANNDD TTHHEE CCOOUUNNCCIILLSS FFOORR TTHHEE

JJUUDDIICCIIAARRYY AANNDD//OORR AAUUTTOONNOOMMOOUUSS GGOOVVEERRNNMMEENNTT BBOODDIIEESS

HHIIGGHH CCOOUUNNCCIILL FFOORR TTHHEE JJUUDDIICCIIAARRYY,, RROOMMEE,, JJUUNNEE 44--55,, 22001122


June 4, 2012 1155..3300 Registration of the participants 1166..0000 Welcome coffee 1166..1155 OPPEENNIINNGG SSEESSSSIIOONN Welcome addresses

- Mr. Ernesto LUPO, First President of the Court of Cassation and member of the Presidential Committee of the High Council for the Judiciary - Mr. Filippo GRISOLIA, Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Justice

Opening of proceedings - Mr. Paolo CORDER, President of the Sixth Commission of the High Council for the Judiciary

Introduction - Mr. Riccardo FUZIO, Member of the Sixth Commission of the High Council for the Judiciary

SSEESSSSIIOONN II –– CCHHAAIIRREEDD AANNDD CCOOOORRDDIINNAATTEEDD BBYY MMRR.. VVIITTTTOORRIIOO BBOORRRRAACCCCEETTTTII,, MMEEMMBBEERR OOFF TTHHEE SSIIXXTTHH CCOOMMMMIISSSSIIOONN OOFF TTHHEE HHIIGGHH CCOOUUNNCCIILL FFOORR TTHHEE JJUUDDIICCIIAARRYY

1166..4455 Address on “The work of the Inspectorate in Italy and its effects on the powers

of the High Council for the Judiciary” Mrs. Stefania DI TOMASSI (Italy), Chief Inspector, Ministry of Justice

1177..1155 Address on “Relations between inspectors’ activities, the body responsible for

bringing disciplinary actions and the related judgment” Mr. François FELTZ (France), Chief Inspector 1177..4455 Address on “Relations between the work of inspectors, the body responsible

for bringing disciplinary actions and the related judgment” Mrs. Ana Maria APARICIO MATEO (Spain), Servicio de Inspeccion, CGPJ

1188..1155 Address on “Relations between the results of inspection work and any ensuing

evaluations of judges’ professionalism” Mr. Michael FULLER (England and Wales), Chief Inspector

1188..3300 Debate 1199..0000 Conclusion of 1st Session proceedings 2211..0000 Gala Dinner June 5, 2012 SSEESSSSIIOONN IIII –– CCHHAAIIRREEDD AANNDD CCOOOORRDDIINNAATTEEDD BBYY MMRR.. GGUUIIDDOO CCAALLVVII,, MMEEMMBBEERR OOFF

TTHHEE SSIIXXTTHH CCOOMMMMIISSSSIIOONN OOFF IITTAALLYY’’SS HHIIGGHH CCOOUUNNCCIILL FFOORR TTHHEE JJUUDDIICCIIAARRYY 99..0000 RROOUUNNDD TTAABBLLEE DDIISSCCUUSSSSIIOONN OONN TTHHEE TTOOPPIICC OOFF ““TTHHEE MMOOSSTT SSIIGGNNIIFFIICCAANNTT

DDIISSCCIIPPLLIINNAARRYY CCAASSEESS IINN EEUURROOPPEEAANN JJUUDDIICCIIAALL SSYYSSTTEEMMSS:: RREELLAATTIIOONN TTOO IINNSSPPEECCTTIIOONN FFUUNNCCTTIIOONNSS””

Mrs. Corina Adriana DUMITRESCU (Romania), Member of the High Council for the Judiciary Mr. Ümit SADE (Turkey) Chief Inspector

Mrs. Marta STEFANCSIK (Hungary), Judge, Court of Kecskemet and member of the Service Tribunal Mr. Vincenzo GERACI (Italy), Deputy Prosecutor General, Supreme Court of Cassation Prof. Annibale MARINI (Italy), President emeritus, Constitutional Court – Member of the High Council for the Judiciary – Member of the Disciplinary Division of the High Council for the Judiciary Mr. Paolo AURIEMMA (Italy) Member of the High Council for the Judiciary – Member of the Disciplinary Division of the High Council for the Judiciary

1111..0000 Coffee break

1111..1155 Debate

1122..0000 Conclusion of proceedings

Rome, 4-5 juin 2012

TTRROOIISSIIÈÈMMEE CCOONNFFÉÉRREENNCCEE IINNTTEERRNNAATTIIOONNAALLEE SSUURR LL’’ÉÉCCHHAANNGGEE DD’’EEXXPPÉÉRRIIEENNCCEESS EENNTTRREE LLEESS ÉÉTTAATTSS MMEEMMBBRREESS DDEE LL’’UUNNIIOONN EEUURROOPPÉÉEENNNNEE SSUURR LLEE TTHHÈÈMMEE DDEESS RRAAPPPPOORRTTSS EENNTTRREE LLEESS DDIIFFFFEERREENNTTSS SSYYSSTTEEMMEESS JJUUDDIICCIIAAIIRREESS,, EENNTTRREE LLEESS FFOONNCCTTIIOONNSS DDEESS IINNSSPPEECCTTIIOONNSS DDUU MMIINNIISSTTÈÈRREE DDEE LLAA JJUUSSTTIICCEE EETT LLEESS CCOONNSSEEIILLSS DDEE JJUUSSTTIICCEE EETT//OOUU LLEESS OORRGGAANNEESS DDEE GGOOUUVVEERRNNEEMMEENNTT AAUUTTOONNOOMMEE

CCOONNSSEEIILL SSUUPPEERRIIEEUURR DDEE LLAA MMAAGGIISSTTRRAATTUURREE,, RROOMMEE,, 44--55 JJUUIINN 22001122


4 juin 2012 1155..3300 Enregistrement des participants 1166..0000 Café de bienvenue 1166..1155 OOUUVVEERRTTUURREE DDEE LLAA CCOONNFFEERREENNCCEE

Salutations - M. Ernesto LUPO, Premier Président de la Cour de Cassation italienne et membre du Comité de Présidence du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature

- M. Filippo GRISOLIA, Chef de Cabinet du Ministère de la Justice

Début des travaux - M. Paolo CORDER, Président de la Sixième Commission du C.S.M.

Introduction - M. Riccardo FUZIO, Membre de la Sixième Commission du C.S.M.

SSEESSSSIIOONN II –– PPRREESSIIDDEEEE EETT CCOOOORRDDOONNNNEEEE PPAARR MM.. VVIITTTTOORRIIOO BBOORRRRAACCCCEETTTTII,, MMEEMMBBRREE DDEE LLAA SSIIXXIIEEMMEE CCOOMMMMIISSSSIIOONN DDUU CC..SS..MM..

1166..4455 Intervention sur le thème “Les activités d’Inspection en Italie et leurs

incidences sur les attributions du C.S.M.” Mme Stefania DI TOMASSI (Italie) Chef du Service d’Inspection auprès du

Ministère de la Justice 1177..1155 Intervention sur le thème des “Rapports entre les activités des inspecteurs,

l’organe chargé d’approuver des sanctions disciplinaires et le jugement relatif” M. François FELTZ (France) Chef du Service d’Inspection 1177..4455 Intervention sur le thème des “Rapports entre les activités des inspecteurs,

l’organe chargé d’intenter les actions disciplinaires et le jugement correspondant”

Mme Ana Maria APARICIO MATEO (Espagne) Servicio de Inspeccion – CGPJ

1188..1155 Intervention sur le thème des “Rapports entre les résultats des activités

d’inspection et les éventuelles évaluations du professionnalisme des magistrats” M. Michael FULLER (Angleterre et Pays de Galles) Chef du Service d’Inspection

1188..3300 Débat 1199..0000 Clôture des travaux de la première session 2211..0000 Dîner de Gala 5 juin 2012 SSEESSSSIIOONN IIII –– PPRREESSIIDDEEEE EETT CCOOOORRDDOONNNNEEEE PPAARR MM.. GGUUIIDDOO CCAALLVVII,, MMEEMMBBRREE DDEE

LLAA SSIIXXIIEEMMEE CCOOMMMMIISSSSIIOONN DDUU CC..SS..MM.. IITTAALLIIEENN 99..0000 TTAABBLLEE RROONNDDEE SSUURR LLEE TTHHEEMMEE:: ““LLEESS CCAATTEEGGOORRIIEESS DDIISSCCIIPPLLIINNAAIIRREESS LLEESS

PPLLUUSS SSIIGGNNIIFFIICCAATTIIVVEESS DDAANNSS LLEESS OORRDDOONNNNAANNCCEEMMEENNTTSS JJUUDDIICCIIAAIIRREESS EEUURROOPPEEEENNSS:: RRAAPPPPOORRTT AAVVEECC LLEESS IINNSSPPEECCTTIIOONNSS””

Mme Corina Adriana DUMITRESCU (Roumanie), Membre du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature

M. Ümit SADE (Turquie) Chef du Service d’Inspection Mme Marta STEFANCSIK (Hongrie) Juge au Tribunal de Kecskemet et membre du Service Tribunal M. Vincenzo GERACI (Italie) Substitut du Procureur général près la Cour de Cassation Prof. Annibale MARINI (Italie) Président émérite de la Cour Constitutionnelle italienne – Membre du C.S.M. – Membre de la Section Disciplinaire du C.S.M. M. Paolo AURIEMMA (Italie) Conseiller du C.S.M. – Membre de la Section Disciplinaire du C.S.M.

1111..0000 Pause-café

1111..1155 Débat

1122..0000 Clôture des travaux







Albanian System of the Judicial Power Inspection

Mrs. Marsida XHAFERLLARI General Director of Justice Issue Ministry of Justice ALBANIA

ALBANIAN SYSTEM OF THE JUDICIAL POWER INSPECTION

Marsida Xhaferllari General Director of

Justice Issue Ministry of Justice

Albania May 2012

Today, the Republic of Albania is at a historic moment of development as it aims integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures and membership in the European family. Our efforts are moving to another level; from the phase of transition towards the consolidation of the new Albanian democracy created after the nineties. In this perspective, the Albanian reforms are in harmony with and based on the adopted strategic documents, the most important of which are the Cross-Cutting Justice Strategy and the Government’s Plan for European Integration. Such documents determine the vision of the government “Albania will be entitled to the status of a country integrated in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures as a country of rule of law, democracy and guarantor of fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, through a conversion of the justice system into a system open to everyone, inspiring everyone’s trust and rendering justice to everyone”. In this background, similarly as in other countries of new democracies, independence is the key word accompanying reform in the judiciary. The principle of independence of the judiciary is provided for in article 7 of the Albanian constitution and it is widely elaborated in the case law of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Albania. Independence of the judiciary is an essential element of the rule of law and it is indispensable for impartiality of judges and better functioning of the judicial system. Above all, independence of the judicial power has been of chief importance for the respect, provision and guaranteeing of fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals in the light of the constitutional obligation to ensure due legal process to everyone and in the light of the obligation deriving from the ECHR in article 6 according to which Albania is committed “to guarantee to everyone the right to have the case heard…by an independent and impartial court established by law….”. The role of the judge is fundamental to ensure the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals. In this regard, the independence of the judicial power should not be considered a privilege of the judges; instead it should be considered a safeguard for the respect for fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals because it makes the individuals confident in the judicial system. Based on the intensive exchange of information and cultures made possible because of the free movement of persons and goods, Albania is aware of the fact and widely recognises that there is no unique approach towards a certain issue. Different countries are different; have different legal

systems; different constitutional positions and approaches towards the principle of separation of powers. This is the reason why very often international documents state in their preambles the desire to promote relationship between authorities and individuals of different states aiming at the boosting of development of a common judicial culture. In this perspective, this Conference is very important for the Albanian context because it allows the progressive dialogue and the learning from the best practices and experiences. Albania provides solutions based on constitutional provisions (especially in articles 135-147), organic law provisions adopted by 3/5 votes of the members of parliament (respective law on organisation of the judicial power, on the high court and even on the Constitutional Court), and also based on the case-law of the constitutional court, which in several cases has interpreted the constitutional rules and respective legislation oriented towards the strengthening and consolidation of the judicial power. The focus is already oriented not only on consolidation of independence of the judicial power, but also on the increase of accountability of the judiciary towards the Constitution and the laws. Independence of the judiciary is not and should not be considered simply and solely independence from the two other branches. The substance of the concept of independence of the judiciary is the principle that the judge in deciding over a case should be pressure and influence-free from external authorities or individuals. The concept of independence elaborated even by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is linked to the power of the court to take a binding decision which may not be changed by an extra-judicial authority; such power is inherent in the concept of the “court” itself. Judicial power according to article 135 of the Constitution is exercised by the High Court and courts of appeal and district courts. The courts have the exclusive right to render justice. According to the constitution, judges are independent and subject only to the Constitution and laws. Moreover, article 145 of the Constitution foresees that interference in the activity of the courts or the judges leads to liability as foreseen in the law. The constitution through such a provision prohibits interference in the activity of the courts and judges. Article 6 and 81/2 of the Constitution foresee that organisation and functioning of the bodies provided for in the Constitution is governed by their respective laws which must be adopted by qualified majority, 3/5 of all the members of parliament. This provision is an indispensable prerogative which enables more security, sustainability and effectiveness of the constitutional bodies and institutions, including judicial power, in the exercise of their duties. Moreover the judicial power in the Republic of Albania is entitled to financial independence. Article 144 of the Constitution foresees that the courts have a separate budget, which is proposed and managed by them.

Self-governance is another important component of the judiciary which is recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution. Article 147 of the Constitution governs the composition and competences of the High Council of Justice. The latter has the duty to “govern” the judiciary and it is the constitutional body located at the top of the organisational pyramid of the judicial power. The presence of 9 judges in the composition of the High Council of Justice makes possible the connection with the judiciary and makes the court independent from interference by any other power. According to the Constitution, the High Council of Justice is the only body to decide on the transfer of judges and their disciplinary responsibility. More specifically about and fully coherent with the principle of lawfulness of the activity of judges, article 31 of the law no. 9877/2008 determines the disciplinary responsibility of judges and the limits within which such responsibility lies. Ministry of Justice is committed to the utmost to accomplish the reforms initiated already in order to reach the highest levels of justice and law enforcement, fight against corruption and crime, guaranteeing of fundamental human rights which are all the requirements for the progress of the country and obtaining of the candidate status in the European Union. In this framework, fundamental importance has been paid to the strengthening of the independent and effective judicial power, capable of rendering impartial, integrity-full and standard-high justice. We are aware that the rendering of justice is based on and oriented towards the main principles, including:

- independence and impartiality of the judicial power; - accountability of judges and other stakeholders towards the Constitution and the law; - increase of citizens’ access to justice; - increase and consolidation of transparency of the entire activity of the justice system. All

these for the purpose of providing a qualitative and European standard-related service against effective costs.

The Constitutional Court of Albania asserts that according to the Constitution, whenever separation of powers is mentioned, balance of powers is implied. The aim of such a constitutional concept is to prevent each branch of government from exercising unlimited power. Control and balance recognized by the Constitution provide to each branch the competences which compensate or reduce those of the other branches. Currently, there are in place means and mechanisms which balance powers, because no power alone is able to fulfil the mission, unless its activity is harmonised with the activity of other powers and unless balance, coordination and mutual control is ensured; of course all these do not intervene to the detriment of their constitutional missions. Two inspectorates of judicial power operate in Albania: one attached to the Ministry of Justice and another to the High Council of Justice. The legal basis of their functioning is the law no. 8678 of 14 may 2001 “On organisation and functioning of the Ministry of Justice” amended; law

no 8811 of 17 May 2001 “On organisation and functioning of the High Council of Justice, amended; and decision of the Constitutional Court no 11 of 27 May 2004. The jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice to exercise the competence of inspection derives from this legal framework which determines that Ministry of Justice “sees to and controls the activity of the judicial administration, conducts inspections and disciplinary proceedings against judges of the courts of first instance and courts of appeal according to the law”. The main procedure for inspection of courts and/or judges is: a) complaints’ verification and b) judicial inspections. The essence of inspection and control mechanisms is protection of public interest and lawful interests of natural and legal persons. This is achieved through: � assessment of compliance with the legal criteria by the subject of inspection; � documentation of the good practices in compliance with the legal requirements and their

dissemination; � consultation of the inspected subject for the most proper application of legal

requirements; � identification and adjustment of the violation of legal requirements and elimination of

consequences deriving from them; � taking of other administrative measures for the avoidance of risks which may be incurred

to the public interest and lawful interests of the natural and legal persons, according to the requirements and procedures foreseen by law.

The inspection procedure relies on the rule that judicial power is independent and it is exercised in an escalated way according to the principle of control of judicial decisions of the lower courts by the higher courts, and no other body may assess the legality and groundedness of judicial decisions as long as they are not changed or dismissed by a higher court. Another important aspect of the inspecting activity of the judicial system refers to the broad involvement of the public in decision-making through the increase of its access by means of verification of requests and complaints against judges. The definition of rules and procedures for the development and conduction of verification of the judicial activity through the increase of performance of inspectors will definitely lead to the consolidation of the system making it more efficient, corruption-free and fair. Accountability of the judicial system is being requested increasingly in parallel with the strengthening of independence and impartiality. The instrument of inspection guarantees not only a more effective process for the protection of rights and freedoms of individuals before the judicial body, but above all, it also makes control of the citizens over the justice system a reality. Social control by the citizens is already seen as the recent and successful trend of the monitoring of the judicial system because it makes possible identification of real practical problems and at the same time it acts as a deterrent of the abusive and corruptive behaviour in the system. In order to achieve accountability of the system there is

an increasing need for the civil society and the judiciary to admit the fact that the judiciary acts within the civil society and it serves the latter. In this regard, the strengthening of the role of the citizen has a decisive role as a means to boost integrity of the judiciary and alertness of society so that integrity can reach the required level. Currently, there is an increasing concern to avoid overlapping of competences of both inspectorates in order to increase their effectiveness. This concern is expressed even in international recommendations and it is reflected in the Albanian government programmes. To this end, both inspectorates signed on the 5th of December 2011 the Memorandum of Understanding “On harmonisation of procedures of judicial inspection and avoidance of overlapping of competences”. This document is of technical nature and it confirms the will and utmost commitment of Albania to ensure and implement all the necessary legal and executive remedies for the conduction of inspections in the judicial system in order to transform them into effective means of supervision of application of legislation. In order to enforce this document, three working groups have been set up to deal intensively with the fulfilment of determined tasks, timely and qualitatively:

- 1st Working Group- on the drafting of a draft manual on inspection which aims at presenting the rules and modus operandi of the inspection structures of the judicial system and also reflecting their professional performance in alignment with European contemporary standards and best practices. The working group has already finalised the first draft of this document and the public consultation of this document is expected;

- 2nd Working Group- on the drafting of the standard inspection acts. It has prepared the outline of reports of inspection and the schemes of the reports based on their typology;

- 3rd Working Group- on the exchange of statistics and sustainable data on the complaints against the judges. Such data make possible the separate tracking of cases of complaints for corruption and violation of ethical rules. Based on the data of January - March 2012, an analysis has been prepared and it has concluded that 25 complainants have filed with the Ministry of Justice and High Council of Justice complaints of the same nature and against the same court (one complainant has submitted complaints up to three times and another up to two times). Statistical data are exchanged at the end of each month and aim at avoiding the overlapping of inspection by both inspectorates.

Moreover, Ministry of Justice in order to increase of accountability and efficiency of the judicial power, has taken several measures, one of which is monitoring of enforcement of the code of judicial ethics. In this context, special importance is paid to the complaints of this nature as a source for inspection. More concretely, during 2012, the inspectorate of the Ministry of Justice has conducted an inspection at the Judicial District Court of Tirana and Court of Appeal of Tirana focusing on the verification of the rules of ethics, towards the procedures for exclusion of judges from the case because of partiality. The results of this inspection will be processed within May

2012 and the respective recommendations will be issued. Concerning inspections conducted during 2012, the issue of violation of the code of judicial ethics is considered in 8 disciplinary proceedings initiated by the HCJ at the request of the Minister of Justice, out of a total of 9 proceedings:

- 6 cases related to the performance and documentation of procedural actions by the judges in the courts while from the verification it results that the judges were outside the territory of Albania. The HCJ concerning two of these requests decided to dismiss the request of the Minister of Justice, even though the results were collected by the HCJ inspectorate.

- 2 other cases related to extradition procedures; and

- 1 recent case concerning declaration of assets. The recent case (of the judge of the judicial district court) has been subjected to disciplinary proceedings for violation of rules of declaration of assets after an administrative proactive investigation of the Ministry of Justice and the High Inspectorate of Inspection and Declaration of Assets. HCJ is expected to express itself over this disciplinary proceeding.

The processing of these data is made in close cooperation with the HCJ inspectorate which recent results conclude in 6 out of 9 submitted proceedings. It must be pointed out that during this year, the main commitment of the HCJ has been and remains the professional assessment of judges – as the main premise for development of solid merit-based career. In the identification of requests for disciplinary proceedings it is considered the principle of proportionality of the sanction with the identified violation, which is expressively foreseen in law no.9877/2008 “On organisation of the judicial power in the Republic of Albania”. The inspectorate of the Ministry of Justice gives weight even to the inspection of the judicial administration as a stakeholder of important responsibility in the rendering of justice. Only during the first 5 months of 2012, 3 disciplinary measures of “reprimand” against three court clerks, one attached to the Court of Appeal and two attached to the Courts of First Instance have been taken. Such disciplinary measures were taken after the conduction of inspection against the administration of these courts. The recent novelty corresponds to the installation of the electronic portal for submission of complaints in the electronic website of MoJ and HCJ, launched on May 10th 2012. This project was made possible in cooperation with the civil society in Albania. It has been accomplished the installation of the electronic portal of online complaints and digital administration of complaints in the inspection structures of both institutions. The next step is the centralisation of the digital database of each court in the portal www.gjykata.gov.al, which will make possible online

inspection and maximum increase of transparency. In addition to this, our efforts are not finished yet; we are determined for independence and accountability of all the pillars of the rule of law and undoubtedly of the judicial power in particular in order to impose European standards and align with the most successful models provided by our collaborative partners. In this context, it is our pleasure to participate in this conference and during the exercise of our management duties we will consider the results of the conference and will apply them to the greatest extent in line with the needs of Albania in this regard. Moreover, I avail myself of the opportunity to express in particular our deepest gratitude not only to the committed staff working in these two inspectorates, but also to our international partners among which allow me to mention EURALIUS which consists of a team of professionals, especially Italian experts who have assisted and supported our initiatives for a positive development of integration processes. All this makes us feel close, both as neighbours in geographical areas and as partners in our legal procedures. Thank you for making possible our participation in this important conference. Once again thank you and success!

Conference organised by the Italian High Council for the Judiciary

upon the initiative of the Sixth Commission






Brief description of the Joint Advisory and Investigation Commission

The High Council of Justice

BELGIUM

3rd Conference on Inspection services for the Judiciary

BELGIUM

Brief description of the Joint Advisory and Investigation Commission

A. Composition

Constitution: art. 151§3; Judicial code: art. 259bis11

The Joint Advisory and Investigation Commission (JAIC) is part of the Belgian High Council of Justice.

The Council is an independent (sui generis) constitutional body of 44 members.

The JAIC combines the French and Dutch speaking Advisory and Investigation Commissions which

consist of 8 members each (4 magistrates and 4 non-magistrates). The JAIC is thus composed of 16

members (8 magistrates – judges and/or prosecutors - and 8 non magistrates – lawyers, university

professors and/or civil society “representatives”).

The Belgian Council has no disciplinary competence.

B. Competencies

Judicial code: art. 259bis12 - 16

The JAIC prepares advices and proposals for approval by the council’s general assembly concerning (

bills regarding) the functioning of the judiciary and prosecutor offices and their use of resources.

These opinions are meant for the leading judges, the chief prosecutors, the minister of Justice and

the parliament.

The JAIC is also competent for auditing and investigating the functioning of the judiciary and the

prosecutor offices. The JAIC is supported by a small pluridisciplinary team of auditors.

The French and Dutch speaking Advisory and Investigation commissions handle complaints. Citizens

can address complaints about the functioning of the judiciary directly to the High council. These

commissions can formulate opinions on the basis of received complaints.

Auditing

Different audit types (and type combinations) are possible:

1) Compliance audit (evaluation of conformity with the law, regulations etc.)

2) Operational audit (evaluation of the internal control system)

3) Efficiency audit (evaluation of performance and resources)

4) Management audit (evaluation of the executive management body of a court/prosecutor

office)

5) Transversal audit (evaluation of specific focus areas in different courts/prosecutor offices)

An audit is executed by the audit team in collaboration with an accompanying group composed of

council members. The audit reports (audit findings and recommendations) are approved by the JAIC.

Through audits the JAIC evaluates the impact of the weaknesses detected and estimates the risks

they may pose and their effects.

On the basis of the audit findings the JAIC formulates recommendations for improving the

functioning of courts and prosecutor offices to the court’s/prosecutor’s management, minister of

Justice and parliament.

Investigating

1) individual dysfunctions

2) systemic dysfunctions

The investigation starts from the presumption of a dysfunction. The investigation team (some

members of the JAIC and the audit team) must be chaired by a judge or prosecutor.

An investigation report must be approved by the JAIC and afterwards by the council’s general

assembly. Such a report can also contain recommendations.

Verifying the use of internal control instruments by the judiciary (courts and prosecutor offices)

Different internal control systems exist (e.g. prosecutor offices are responsible for the inspection of

the court services).

The JAIC has to monitor these systems on the basis of yearly reports drafted by the authorities

responsible for these internal control mechanisms. The JAIC must also promote the use of these

control instruments.


““ TThhii rrdd II nntteerrnnaattiioonnaall CCoonnffeerreennccee oonn tthhee eexxcchhaannggee ooff eexxppeerr iieenncceess bbeettwweeeenn

EEuurrooppeeaann UUnniioonn CCoouunnttrr iieess ccoonncceerrnniinngg rreellaattiioonnss iinn tthhee vvaarr iioouuss jjuuddiicciiaall ssyysstteemmss

bbeettwweeeenn tthhee ffuunnccttiioonnss ooff tthhee II nnssppeeccttoorraatteess ooff tthhee MMiinniissttrryy ooff JJuussttiiccee aanndd tthhee

CCoouunnccii llss ffoorr tthhee JJuuddiicciiaarryy aanndd//oorr aauuttoonnoommoouuss GGoovveerrnnmmeenntt BBooddiieess””


Report on the relations between Inspection activities, Ministry of Justice

and the Supreme Judicial Council of the Republic of Bulgaria

Supreme Judicial Council

BULGARIA

2

Report on the relations between Inspection activities, Ministry of Justice

and the Supreme Judicial Council of the Republic of Bulgaria

Since 1910 till 2008 the Inspectorate for the Bulgarian judicial system

was under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Justice. During the process of

accession of Bulgaria to the European Union as legislative guarantees of the

principle for independence of judicial system have been ensured by the last

4th amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, adopted on 6

January 2007. In this way the Inspectorate to the Supreme Judicial Council

(ISJC) was established as an autonomous body, responsible for inspection of

the judicial system.

The Inspectorate to the Supreme Judicial Council consists of ten

inspectors with at least 12 years of judicial experience, mainly magistrates

and a Chief inspector with at least 15 years of judicial experience. Every

inspector is supported in fulfilling his duties by two experts and by his

administration. The Chief inspector and the other ten inspectors are elected

individually by the Parliament with a majority of 2/3 of the deputies (Art.

132 a of the Constitution of 6 January 2007).

Functions

The functions of the ISJC have been stipulated in details in the

Judiciary System Act (Art. 54). In general they are as follows:

- Inspection of the organization of the administrative activities of

courts and prosecutor’s offices;

3

- Inspection of the activities related to the institution and progress of

cases and other closure within the prescribed terms;

- Analysis and summary of cases closed with enforced judicial and

prosecutor’s acts. In case of a contradictory case law practice has been

found, the Inspectorate initiates interpretative activities of the Supreme

courts on the relevant issue;

- Inspections referring to signals, complains of citizens, legal entities

as well as state bodies, including judges, prosecutors and investigators; the

ISJC is also initiating inspections referring to publications in media.

- In cases of disciplinary breaches done by judges, prosecutors and

Heads of Offices, the Inspectorate is entitled to make proposals for

disciplinary sanctions;

- Sending signals, proposals and reports to all judicial bodies as well

as to other public authorities.

Relation between the Inspectorate to the Supreme Judicial Council and

the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC)

The Inspectorate to the Supreme Judicial Council prepares and adopts an

Annual program and sending it to the SJC.

The Inspectorate to the Supreme Judicial Council regularly prepares an

Annual report for the SJC which is to be presented at the Parliament.

The Chief Inspector participates at the Supreme Judicial Council hearings

without participating in voting.

4

The Chief Inspector and the other inspectors may participate in Supreme

Judicial Council Commissions.

The role of the ISJC in the assessment of magistrates and of their

professional capacity is important as far as it concerns their appraisal too.

The appraisal is of great significance for the career development of the

judges and prosecutors. The Judiciary System Act, art. 198 prescribes

explicitly that when an appraisal is made the results from inspections made

by the Inspectorate to Supreme Judicial Council shall be taken into

consideration. The Supreme Judicial Council under the Chief Inspector’s

proposal had reduced appraisals of magistrates in case of weaknesses found

in their work.

The Supreme Judicial Council may ask the ISJC to do a concrete check of a

magistrate.

Another significant aspect of Inspectorate’s activity that influenced

substantially the quality of justice refers to the analysis and summary of

contradictory case law. The interpretative activity of the Supreme Courts has

been initiated by the Inspectorate with 16 proposals for interpretative rulings

to the competent authorities - the Supreme Court of Cassation and the

Supreme Administrative Court, which resulted in 7 interpretative rulings.

The ISJC may send a proposal for interpretative ruling to the Minister of

Justice who also has the power to initiate interpretative rulings. Once the

contradictions in case law have been overcome the quality of justice

definitely improves.

The analysis and the summary of contradictory case law will continue to be

one of the main priorities in the performance of the Inspectorate. Further

5

approaches shall be applied to improve the interaction between all the

judicial system bodies and mostly the one with the Supreme Judicial

Council. This will improve the effect of the Inspectorate activity upon the

functioning of the judicial system as a whole.

The disciplinary powers of the SJC

In cases of violations, discovered during ordinary inspections, or during

extraordinary inspections made upon signals in case of a breach, proposals

are made for disciplinary sanctions: for smaller penalties a proposal is made

before the administrative head of the Judiciary Office, and in case of heavier

disciplinary sanctions - before the SJC.

Decisions to impose disciplinary sanctions are made by the SJC. The

magistrate getting a penalty as well as the ISJC when the penalty is not

accepted, can appeal the decision at the Supreme Administrative Court. The

decision of it is irrevocable.

Under art. 310 of the Judiciary System Act the disciplinary proceedings shall

be opened by an order or respectively a resolution by the sanctioning body

within six months of discovery, but not later than three years of notice of the

fact of the offence.


“ TTrrooiissiièèmmee CCoonnfféérreennccee II nntteerrnnaattiioonnaallee ssuurr ll ’’ éécchhaannggee dd’’ eexxppéérr iieenncceess eennttrree lleess

EEttaattss MMeemmbbrreess ddee ll ’’ UUnniioonn EEuurrooppééeennnnee ssuurr llee tthhèèmmee ddeess rraappppoorr ttss eennttrree lleess

ddii ff fféérreennttss ssyyssttèèmmeess jjuuddiicciiaaii rreess,, eennttrree lleess ffoonnccttiioonnss ddeess II nnssppeeccttiioonnss dduu MMiinniissttèèrree

ddee llaa JJuussttiiccee eett lleess CCoonnsseeii llss ddee JJuussttiiccee eett//oouu lleess OOrrggaanneess ddee GGoouuvveerrnneemmeenntt

aauuttoonnoommeeˮˮ


Rapport sur les relations entre les activités d'Inspection, le Ministère de la

Justice et le Conseil Judiciaire Suprême de la République de Bulgarie

Conseil Supérieur de la Justice

BULGARIE

2

Rapport sur les relations entre les activités d'Inspection, le Ministère de

la Justice et le Conseil Judiciaire Suprême de la République de Bulgarie

De 1910 jusqu'à 2008, l'Inspectorat pour le système judiciaire bulgare

relevait de la juridiction du Ministre de la Justice. Durant le processus

d'accession de la Bulgarie à l'Union Européenne, des garanties législatives

du principe de l'indépendance du système judiciaire ont été apportées par le

4ème et dernier amendement à la Constitution de la République de Bulgarie,

adopté le 06 janvier 2007. De cette manière, l'Inspectorat du Conseil

Judiciaire Suprême (ISJC) fut établi en tant qu'organe autonome,

responsable de l'inspection du système judiciaire.

L'Inspectorat du Conseil Judiciaire Suprême est composé de dix

inspecteurs, ayant au moins 12 ans d'expérience judiciaire chacun,

principalement des magistrats, et d’un inspecteur en Chef ayant au moins 15

ans d'expérience judiciaire. Chaque inspecteur est soutenu dans l'exercice de

ses fonctions par deux experts et par son administration. L'inspecteur en Chef

et les dix autres inspecteurs sont élus individuellement par le Parlement avec

une majorité des 2/3 des députés (Art. 132 a de la Constitution du 06 janvier

2007).

Fonctions

Les fonctions de l'ISJC ont été indiquées en détail dans la Loi sur le

Système Judiciaire (Art. 54). En général, ce sont les suivantes:

- Inspection de l'organisation des activités administratives des

tribunaux et des parquets;

3

- Inspection des activités liées à l'institution et à l’avancement des

dossiers et autre, clôture dans les délais prescrits;

- Analyse et résumé des affaires terminées avec exécution des actes

juridictionnels et des actes du procureur. Au cas où un exemple

contradictoire de jurisprudence a été trouvé, l'Inspectorat initie des activités

interprétatives de la part des Cours Suprêmes sur la question correspondante;

- Inspections se rapportant à des signalements, des plaintes de

citoyens, de personnes morales ainsi que d'organismes nationaux, y compris

des juges, procureurs et enquêteurs; l'ISJC déclenche aussi des inspections

se rapportant à des publications dans les médias.

- Dans les cas de manquements disciplinaires de la part de juges,

procureurs et Chefs de Bureaux, l'Inspectorat est autorisé à faire des

propositions de sanctions disciplinaires;

- Envoi de signalements, propositions et rapports à tous les

organismes judiciaires ainsi qu'à d'autres autorités publiques.

Relation entre l'Inspectorat du Conseil Judiciaire Suprême et le Conseil

Judiciaire Suprême (SJC)

L'Inspectorat du Conseil Judiciaire Suprême prépare et adopte un

programme annuel et l'envoie au SJC.

L'Inspectorat du Conseil Judiciaire Suprême prépare régulièrement un

rapport Annuel pour le SJC qui doit être présenté au Parlement.

L'Inspecteur en Chef participe aux audiences du Conseil Judiciaire Suprême

sans participer au vote.

4

L'Inspecteur en Chef et les autres inspecteurs peuvent participer aux

Commissions du Conseil Judiciaire Suprême.

Le rôle de l'ISJC dans l'évaluation des magistrats et de leur capacité

professionnelle est important dans la mesure où il concerne aussi leur

appréciation. L'appréciation a une grande incidence sur le développement de

la carrière des juges et des procureurs. La Loi sur le Système Judiciaire, art.

198 prescrit explicitement que lors de l'établissement d'une appréciation, les

résultats des inspections effectuées par l'Inspectorat du Conseil Judiciaire

Suprême sont pris en considération. Le Conseil Judiciaire Suprême sur

proposition de l'Inspecteur en Chef peut diminuer les appréciations des

magistrats dans le cas de criticités relevées dans leur travail.

Le Conseil Judiciaire Suprême peut demander à l'ISJC d'effectuer un

contrôle concret par rapport à un magistrat.

Un autre aspect important de l'activité de l'Inspectorat qui a influencé

de manière substantielle la qualité de la justice a trait à l'analyse et à la

synthèse de précédents contradictoires. L'activité interprétative des Cours

Suprêmes a été initiée par l'Inspectorat avec 16 propositions de jugements

interprétatifs pour les autorités compétentes - la Cour Suprême de Cassation

et la Cour Administrative Suprême, qui ont abouti à 7 jugements

interprétatifs. L'ISJC peut envoyer une proposition de jugement interprétatif

au Ministre de la Justice qui a également le pouvoir d'initier des jugements

interprétatifs. Une fois que les contradictions dans la jurisprudence ont été

dépassées, la qualité de la justice en est véritablement améliorée.

L'analyse et la synthèse des précédents contradictoires continueront à être

l'une des priorités essentielles dans les tâches de l'Inspectorat. D'autres

5

approches seront appliquées pour améliorer l'interaction entre tous les

organes du système judiciaire et principalement avec le Conseil Judiciaire

Suprême. Ceci améliorera l'effet de l'activité de l'Inspectorat sur le

fonctionnement du système judiciaire dans son ensemble.

Les pouvoirs disciplinaires du Conseil Judiciaire Suprême

En cas de violations, découvertes lors d'inspections ordinaires, ou lors

d'inspections extraordinaires effectuées suite à des signalements en cas de

manquement, des propositions de sanctions disciplinaires sont faites: pour

les sanctions les plus légères, une proposition est faite devant la direction

administrative du Bureau Judiciaire, et dans le cas de sanctions disciplinaires

plus lourdes - devant le Conseil Judiciaire Suprême.

C'est le Conseil Judiciaire Suprême qui prend les décisions d'imposer des

sanctions disciplinaires. Le magistrat qui est frappé d’une sanction ainsi que

l'ISJC quand la sanction n'est pas acceptée, peuvent faire appel de la

décision devant la Cour Administrative Suprême. La décision de cette

dernière est irrévocable.

En vertu de l'art. 310 de la Loi sur le Système Judiciaire, les procédures

disciplinaires sont ouvertes par une ordonnance ou respectivement une

résolution émanant de l'organe qui sanctionne dans un délai de six mois

suivant la découverte, mais pas au-delà de trois ans à la suite de la

notification du fait constituant l'infraction.







The Public Prosecution in Egypt

Counselor Mr. Mohamed MOSAD EL TALIIT Vice-Director of the Inspection Department EGYPT



MMeemmbbrreess ddee ll ’’ UUnniioonn EEuurrooppééeennnnee ssuurr llee tthhèèmmee ddeess rraappppoorr ttss eennttrree lleess ddii ff fféérreennttss

ssyyssttèèmmeess jjuuddiicciiaaii rreess,, eennttrree lleess ffoonnccttiioonnss ddeess II nnssppeeccttiioonnss dduu MMiinniissttèèrree ddee llaa JJuussttiiccee eett

lleess CCoonnsseeii llss ddee JJuussttiiccee eett//oouu lleess OOrrggaanneess ddee GGoouuvveerrnneemmeenntt aauuttoonnoommeeˮˮ


Le Ministère Public en Egypte

Conseiller M. Mohamed MOSAD EL TALIIT Vice-directeur du Service d’Inspection

EGYPTE

La République arabe d'Egypte

Le Procureur

Le parquet du vice-procureur

La direction du service d'inspection judiciaire

Le Ministère Public en Egypte

- Le Ministère Public est une branche essentielle de l'autorité judiciaire; c'est le représentant

de la société, il représente les intérêts du public et cherche à faire appliquer la règle

législative.

- La haute cour en Egypte - la cour qui a précédé l'établissement de la cour suprême

constitutionnelle - a assuré l'affiliation du ministère public au milieu judiciaire; et elle a

déclaré que "le ministère public est une branche de l'autorité judiciaire, il fait des actions

judiciaires, dont la plus importante est l'investigation héritée du juge d'instruction, ensuite la

mise en examen devant les tribunaux correctionnels, car il est nécessaire que le ministère

public soit présenté dans la formulation du panel des tribunaux, autrement le jugement sera

nul".

- La cour de cassation a assuré, eu égard au statut légal du ministère public, que "le ministère

public fait partie de l'autorité judiciaire; la législation a conféré à ses membres - entre autres:

Le pouvoir d'investigation, la supervision des actions criminelles, en confirmant la nature

judiciaire des investigations effectuées par les membres du ministère public."

Indépendance du ministère public par rapport aux autorités législatives et exécutives:

Selon le principe d'autonomie des pouvoirs qui est considéré comme l'un des éléments

importants de l'état de droit, comme l'article 165 de la constitution l'a précisé "le pouvoir

judiciaire est indépendant, il était constitué par les tribunaux de différents types et degrés, et

les jugements émis par ceux-ci conformément à la loi".

-1-

Le ministère public jouit (comme il est considéré comme faisant partie de l'autorité judiciaire)

de la même indépendance dont bénéficie le pouvoir judiciaire, ce qui signifie la liberté par

rapport à toute supervision ou à tout contrôle par toutes les autres autorités nationales, et de

la même façon ses membres ne sont soumis à rien d'autre qu'à la loi et à leurs consciences, ce

qui est précisé à l'article 166 de la constitution qui dit "les juges sont indépendants, il n'y a pas

d'autorité sur eux autre que celle de la loi, et aucun pouvoir n'intervient dans les dossiers ou

dans les affaires de la justice."

Indépendance du ministère public par rapport à l'autorité législative:

Le ministère public est indépendant de l'autorité législative, soit quand ses membres

accomplissent leurs missions ou dans son organisation, ainsi le pouvoir législatif n'a pas le

droit de prendre les compétences des membres du Ministère public, d'intervenir dans leur

travail, ou même d'intervenir à titre minimal, par exemple en critiquant leur travail, ou de

revoir un cas montré au ministère public, et n'a pas le droit de rendre des comptes à ses

membres.

Relation entre le ministère public et le ministre de la justice:

L'article 26 de la loi sur l'autorité judiciaire a prévu la subordination des procureurs (les

membres du ministère public) à leurs supérieurs.

De plus, l'Article 125 de cette loi a indiqué que les procureurs suivent leurs supérieurs, le

ministre de la justice a le droit de superviser et de contrôler le ministère public et ses

membres, et le procureur de la république a le droit de superviser et contrôler tous les

procureurs.

En tenant compte du fait que l'autorité du Ministre de la Justice sur le Ministère Public est une

autorité purement administrative dont le but est de s'assurer que ses membres accomplissent

entièrement leur rôle juridique et de faire la coordination entre eux et d'autres autorités qui y

sont liés, il n'a pas de présidence légale ou technique sur eux. Il n'a pas non plus le droit

d'exécuter leurs fonctions ou de prendre leurs compétences en remettant des affaires

-2-

criminelles aux tribunaux ou en suivant l'action criminelle devant eux. Et si le procureur violait

les ordres du ministre en accomplissant sa tâche, cette violation ne serait pas frappée

d'invalidité, mais sa responsabilité administrative ou disciplinaire peut être mise en cause

pour répondre aux exigences de sa responsabilité.

Le Procureur de la République a le droit de donner un avertissement à tout procureur qui

manque simplement à ses devoirs, après avoir entendu ses déclarations.

"Article 126 de la Loi sur l'Autorité judiciaire"

Le Ministre de la Justice a le droit de demander au procureur général de lancer une action

disciplinaire à l'encontre du procureur concerné. De plus, le ministre de la justice et le

procureur de la république peuvent suspendre le procureur de ses fonctions jusqu'à ce qu'une

décision soit prise sur l'action disciplinaire.


La structure du ministère public:

- La structure du ministère public en Egypte:


La fonction du ministère public devant les tribunaux - sauf la cour de cassation - est assurée

par:

1 - Le Procureur de la République

2 - L'un des substituts du procureur de la république

3 - Des Avocats généraux Senior

4 - Des Avocats généraux

5 - Les Principaux représentants du Ministère Public (Chefs des parquets)

6 - Les représentants du Ministère Public

7 - Les Assistants des représentants du Ministère Public

8 - Les Aides des représentants du Ministère Public

-3-

Le procureur de la république est nommé en vertu d'une décision du président de la

république.

Les membres du parquet sont nommés en vertu d'une décision du président de la république

après consultation (en demandant l'avis) du Conseil Judiciaire Suprême.

Bureaux et services du Ministère Public:

Le procureur de la république assure ses fonctions à travers de nombreux bureaux et services

annexés à son bureau, qui sont soumis à sa supervision, grâce à un nombre suffisant de

membres du parquet (procureurs), choisis sur la base de l'efficacité technique et

comportementale, qui effectuent leurs tâches comme suit:

A) Les bureaux:

1 - Le bureau technique.

2 - Le bureau de la coopération internationale, de l'exécution des jugements et de la gestion

des prisons

B) Les services:

1 - Le Service de l'Inspection Judiciaire (Examen et contrôle)

2 - Le Service de gestion des Parquets

3 - Le Service de la gestion du fonds de réserve.

Le service de l'Inspection judiciaire (Examen):

- Ses compétences:

Assurer l'inspection (examen) du travail des membres du ministère public (des aides des

représentants du ministère public aux principaux représentants du ministère public (chefs des

parquets)), dans le but de:

1) Recueillir des données qui mènent à la connaissance de l'efficacité des procureurs dans

l'accomplissement de leur tâche et de l'étendue du dynamisme mis à accomplir leurs

missions.

-4-

2) Enquêter sur les plaintes reçues à leur encontre

3) Etudier les requêtes qui leur sont faites

4) Identifier l'étendue de leur supervision sur le travail du personnel du parquet travaillant

sous leur direction

5) Pratiquer des inspections surprise des Parquets (soit les districts soit leur présidence) pour

identifier la régularité du travail et l'étendue du dynamisme des procureurs dans

l'accomplissement de leurs tâches

6) Investigations et recueil d'informations et de données nécessaires pour les candidats aux

postes vacants du Ministère Public

7) Soumettre des propositions au Procureur de la République eu égard à la gestion des

bureaux du ministère public

8) Préparer le projet annuel de mouvement judiciaire (mutations) qui comprend la promotion

et la mutation des membres du ministère public (procureurs) et l'échange avec les juges des

tribunaux de première instance (tribunaux primaires) et pour préparer un projet de leurs

congés réguliers et d'été.

- Sa formation:

Le service d'Inspection (Examen) Judiciaire au ministère public est formé en vertu d'une

décision par le Procureur de la République, il comprend un nombre suffisant de juges

travaillant dans les bureaux des tribunaux et du parquet y compris des membres pris parmi les

avocats généraux senior, les avocats généraux et les principaux représentants du ministère

public, ils occupaient leurs postes soit par nomination ou affectation des tribunaux, et étaient

présidés par un Directeur, à savoir, le substitut du Procureur de la République.

- Ses sections:

1) Section d'Inspection technique (contrôle)

2) Section des plaintes.

-5-

Section de première inspection technique (contrôle):

- Ses fonctions:

Recueillir des données sur les membres du parquet (procureurs) pour évaluer leur efficacité

dans l'accomplissement de leur travail et l'étendue de leur connaissance de la législation en

général, et surtout de la législation criminelle, ainsi que leur aptitude et intérêt à appliquer

correctement cette législation sur les faits reçus régulièrement (les faits qui sont exposés

devant eux).

- Inspection (Contrôle): comment cela est mené et ses procédures:

L'examen du travail des membres du parquet est effectué par l'un des membres du service

d'inspection (l'inspecteur) qui doit avoir plus d'ancienneté que le procureur inspecté

(examiné).

L'inspection (examen) est effectuée soit au bureau du procureur de la république soit en se

déplaçant dans le bureau du membre concerné dont le travail est examiné.

L'inspection (examen) est effectuée pour les tâches accomplies par le membre concerné du

parquet durant une certaine période déterminée par le directeur du service (le substitut du

procureur de la république).

L'inspecteur doit rédiger un rapport contenant le résultat de l'inspection et constitué de deux

parties:

La première partie comprend:

1) L'investigation effectuée par le membre concerné durant la période d'inspection.

2) Le nombre de cas que le membre concerné a eu le droit d'étudier, le type de cas, les

décisions auxquelles ils ont abouti.

-6-

3) La validité des décisions prises par le membre concerné sur les investigations (durant les

investigations ou à la fin de celles-ci).

4) Des observations pertinentes sur le travail du membre concerné.

Alors que la seconde partie comprend:

- L'évaluation (classement) du membre concerné

Le rapport doit être montré à un comité formé par le procureur de la république pour l'examen

et l'évaluation du membre concerné; ensuite il sera archivé dans le dossier confidentiel du

membre concerné (dossier top secret) après le lui avoir notifié en lui joignant une copie du

rapport, et il a le droit d'émettre des objections dans un délai restreint (15 jours suivant la date

de la notification).

Ces objections seront revues par un comité formé du procureur de la république, du directeur

du service d'inspection (substitut du procureur de la république), et du directeur adjoint du

service concerné pour les étudier et prendre une décision à leur sujet (soit archivée dans le

dossier du membre concerné avec l'ajout de ce que le comité a décidé sur le rapport original,

en plus de la notification du membre concerné).

Section des plaintes:

Ses fonctions:

Examiner et étudier les plaintes envoyées au procureur de la république ou au service

d'inspection judiciaire concernant des questions et des faits liés aux membres du parquet qui

méritent d'être examinées et étudiées.

Si l'examen de la plainte demande une investigation, l'avocat général ou les principaux

représentants du ministère public sont désignés par le procureur de la république ou par le

directeur du service d'inspection.

L'examen de la plainte ou ses investigations se termine avec l'un des ordres suivants:

-7-

1) Lancer l'action disciplinaire à l'encontre du membre concerné (devant le Conseil Disciplinaire,

en le renvoyant devant ce conseil pour examiner sa capacité à travailler),

Le conseil disciplinaire est constitué par:

Article 98 de la Loi sur l'Autorité judiciaire

- Le premier président de la cour d'appel autre que les membres du conseil judiciaire

suprême.

Président

- Les deux juges les plus anciens de la cour de cassation

Membres

- Les deux vice-présidents les plus anciens de la cour d'appel

Membres

2) Adresser un avertissement écrit au membre concerné

3) Adresser un avis judiciaire oral au membre concerné

4) Emettre un avis écrit au membre concerné

5) Demander à l'avocat général de s'adresser au membre concerné verbalement (oralement)

6) Garder la plainte dans le dossier confidentiel (dossier top secret) du membre concerné

7) Garder la plainte hors du dossier confidentiel du membre concerné

8) Eliminer le numéro de compte de l'investigation et garder la plainte dans le courrier entrant

(Boîte des courriers arrivés).

Le Conseiller

Mohamed Mosad El Taliit

Vice-directeur du Service d'inspection

-8-







A brief report of the relations among inspection activities

as regards the Ministry of Justice, Judiciary and Prosecutor’s Office

in the Republic of Estonia

Ministry of Justice

ESTONIA

A brief report of the relations among inspection ac tivities as regards the Ministry of Justice, Judiciary and Prosecutor’s Office in the Republic o f Estonia

1. Relations between the Ministry of Justice and the J udiciary

(Courts Act

http://www.legaltext.ee/et/andmebaas/tekst.asp?loc=text&dok=X30065K6&keel=en&pg=1&ptyyp=RT&tyyp=X&query=kohtute+seadus)

1.1. Supervisory control

Supervisory control over the administration of justice pursuant to the requirements, over the performance of duties by judges and over the forwarding of the data of the courts information system pursuant to the established procedure shall be exercised by the chairman of the court. The chairman of a court has the right to demand explanations from judges, inspect compliance with the operations procedure and collect other necessary information. The manager of courthouse may, on the order of the chairman of a court of first instance or on his or her own initiative, demand explanations from judges of a courthouse and collect other necessary information to ensure the administration of justice in the court pursuant to the requirements. Chairmen of circuit courts shall also exercise supervisory control over judges of the courts of the first instance.

The Minister of Justice shall exercise supervisory control over the performance of the duties by the chairmen of courts of first instance and chairmen of courts of appeal. The Minister of Justice may demand explanations from the chairman of a court concerning the administration of justice in a court pursuant to the requirements.

Supervisory control over the area of activity of land registry departments and registration departments shall be exercised by the directors of court and the Minister of Justice. The Minister of Justice shall exercise supervisory control over directors of court. The Minister of Justice has the right to demand explanations from the employees of the departments mentioned above and from the directors of court, to inspect compliance with the operations procedure and the budget and to collect other necessary information. The Minister of Justice shall establish the procedure for supervisory control.

Courts of the first instance and courts of appeal shall submit a statistical report on cases to the Ministry of Justice. The Minister of Justice shall approve the standard format for reporting and the term for submission thereof.

1.2. Disciplinary authority

The Minister of Justice has no right of command or disciplinary authority over the judges.

Disciplinary proceedings shall be commenced if elements of a disciplinary offence become evident. Disciplinary proceedings are commenced by preparation of disciplinary charges. The following have the right to commence disciplinary proceedings: 1) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, against all judges;

2) the Chancellor of Justice, against all judges;

3) the chairman of a circuit court, against judges of courts of first instance in his territorial jurisdiction;

4) the chairman of a court, against the judges of the same court; 5) the Supreme Court en banc against the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

For the adjudication of disciplinary matters of judges, the Supreme Court shall comprise the Disciplinary Chamber which is comprised of five justices of the Supreme Court, five circuit court judges and five judges of courts of the first instance. The Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court shall hear matters of disciplinary offences of judges and impose disciplinary punishments to judges. A five-member panel of the Disciplinary Chamber shall hear a disciplinary matter at a court session.

1.3. Inspection activities and ensuing evaluations

If a judge without a good reason fails to perform a necessary procedural act, inter alia fails to appoint a session in due time to ensure the conducting of court proceedings within a reasonable period of time, or if it is evident that the time planned by the judge for performing the procedural act or other organisation of proceedings does not ensure the conducting of proceedings within a reasonable period of time, a chairman of a court shall decide on the implementation of such measure organising the administration of justice, which presumably provides the opportunity to finalise the proceedings within a reasonable period of time.

The chairman of the court may, inter alia:

1) establish a reasonable term for the judge to perform the procedural act or finalise the proceedings depending on the circumstances;

2) provide the judge with other organisational guidelines for conducting the proceedings and organising the work and working time;

3) redistribute the court cases among the judges taking account of the division of tasks plan;

4) in exceptional case, also deviate from the division of tasks plan in the distribution of work, primarily taking into account the peculiarities of the court case, the specialisation of the judge and different workload of the judges.

If the culpability of a judge is proved, the Disciplinary Chamber shall make a decision by which the judge is convicted of the commission of a disciplinary offence and a disciplinary

punishment is imposed on the judge. The following are disciplinary punishments: 1) a reprimand;

2) a fine in an amount of up to one month’s salary;

3) a reduction in salary;

4) removal from office.

2. Relations between the Ministry of Justice and the P rosecutor’s Office

(Prosecutor’s Office Act

http://www.legaltext.ee/et/andmebaas/tekst.asp?loc=text&dok=X2050K11&keel=en&pg=1&ptyyp=RT&tyyp=X&query=prokuratuuriseadus)

2.1. Supervisory control

The Ministry of Justice shall exercise supervisory control over the Prosecutor’s Office. The supervisory control over the Prosecutor’s Office exercised by the Ministry of Justice does not extend to the activities of the Prosecutor’s Office in planning of surveillance, pre-trial criminal proceedings and representing of public prosecution in court.

The Chief Public Prosecutor shall exercise supervisory control in the Prosecutor’s Office, and leading prosecutors shall exercise supervisory control in the district prosecutor’s offices. Persons exercising supervisory control have the right to demand explanations and information from prosecutors under their supervisory control.

2.2. Disciplinary authority

Disciplinary proceedings shall be initiated if elements of a disciplinary offence become evident. An interested person may submit an application for the initiation of disciplinary proceedings. An application for the initiation of disciplinary proceedings shall be submitted within six months after the date on which the person submitting the application became or should have become aware of the circumstances on which the application was based.

Disciplinary proceedings shall be initiated at the request of an interested person or on their own initiative by:

1) the Minister of Justice against the Chief Public Prosecutor, leading public prosecutor or leading prosecutor;

2) the Chief Public Prosecutor against all prosecutors;

3) a leading prosecutor against the prosecutors of a district prosecutor’s office subordinate to him or her.

In the case specified in subsection (2) 1) of this section, the Minister of Justice may determine upon initiation of the disciplinary proceedings that the Minister of Justice shall hear the disciplinary offence.

A person who initiates disciplinary proceedings shall conduct the preliminary processing of the disciplinary offence. The Minister of Justice may assign the task of conducting the preliminary processing of disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Minister of Justice against a leading public prosecutor or a leading prosecutor to the Chief Public Prosecutor.

A person who conducts the preliminary processing of a disciplinary offence may gather evidence and demand explanations which are necessary to adjudicate the disciplinary matter. It is compulsory to demand explanations from the prosecutor against whom disciplinary proceedings are initiated. The person conducting the preliminary processing of a disciplinary offence may assign the task of gathering evidence and demanding explanations to a prosecutor designated by such person. The task cannot be assigned to a prosecutor who is a member of the prosecutors’ disciplinary committee, a prosecutor against whom the disciplinary proceeding is initiated or prosecutors subordinate to him or her.

The prosecutors' disciplinary committee or in the cases specified in subsection 32 (3) of this Act the Minister of Justice shall hear a prosecutor's disciplinary offence.

If it is necessary to gather supplementary evidence, the person hearing the disciplinary offence shall defer the hearing of the disciplinary offence, determine the time and place of the next session and assign the task of gathering supplementary evidence to the person conducting the preliminary processing of the disciplinary offence or the person who prepared the charge.

The disciplinary committee shall comprise two prosecutors of the Public Prosecutor's Office, two prosecutors from the district prosecutor’s offices and one judge elected by the Court en banc. The disciplinary committee shall be elected for three years. The disciplinary committee shall elect the chairman of the disciplinary committee from among its members who are prosecutors.

(4) The Minister of Justice shall establish the procedures of the disciplinary committee by a regulation.

2.3. Inspection activities and ensuing evaluations

A disciplinary penalty may be imposed on a prosecutor for a disciplinary offence.

Disciplinary offences are:

1) the wrongful non-performance or unsatisfactory performance of duties;

2) an indecent act – a wrongful act which is in conflict with the generally recognised moral standards or which discredits the prosecutor or the Prosecutor's Office, regardless of whether such act is committed in the performance of duties or not.

Disciplinary penalties are:

1) reprimand;

2) fine of up to one month’s salary;

3) reduction of salary by up to 25% for up to one year;

4) release from service.







Bref rapport sur les relations concernant les activités d'inspection entre le

Ministère de la Justice, les Cabinets Judiciaires et les Parquets

en République d'Estonie

Ministère de la Justice

ESTONIE

Bref rapport sur les relations concernant les activ ités d'inspection entre le Ministère de la Justice, les Cabinets Judiciaires et les Parquets e n République d'Estonie

1. Relations entre le Ministère de la Justice et le mo nde judiciaire

(Loi sur les Tribunaux

http://www.legaltext.ee/et/andmebaas/tekst.asp?loc=text&dok=X30065K6&keel=en&pg=1&ptyyp=RT&tyyp=X&query=kohtute+seadus)

1.1. Supervision et contrôle

C'est le président du tribunal qui supervise et contrôle l'administration de la justice en fonction des exigences, l'accomplissement de leurs missions par les juges et la transmission des données du système d'information des tribunaux conformément à la procédure établie. Le président d'un tribunal a le droit de demander des explications aux juges, d'enquêter sur le respect des procédures opérationnelles et de recueillir tout autre renseignement nécessaire. Le directeur du palais de justice peut, sur ordre d'un président de tribunal de première instance ou de sa propre initiative, demander des explications aux juges d'un palais de justice et recueillir toutes les autres informations nécessaires pour assurer l'administration de la justice dans le tribunal conformément aux exigences. Les présidents de tribunaux correctionnels supervisent et contrôlent aussi les juges des tribunaux de première instance.

Le Ministre de la Justice supervise et contrôle l'accomplissement des missions par les présidents des tribunaux de première instance et les présidents des cours d'appel. Le Ministre de la Justice peut demander des explications au président du tribunal concernant l'administration de la justice dans un tribunal en vertu des exigences.

Ce sont les administrateurs des tribunaux et le Ministre de la Justice qui supervisent et contrôlent le secteur d'activité des services du cadastre et du service de l'état civil. Le Ministre de la Justice supervise et contrôle les administrateurs des tribunaux. Le Ministre de la Justice a le droit de demander des explications aux employés des services mentionnés ci-dessus et aux administrateurs des tribunaux, pour enquêter sur le respect des procédures opérationnelles et du budget et pour recueillir d'autres informations nécessaires. Le Ministre de la Justice établit la procédure pour la supervision et le contrôle.

Les tribunaux de première instance et les cours d'appel soumettent un rapport statistique sur les causes au Ministère de la Justice. Le Ministre de la Justice approuve le format standard de rapport et la date pour remettre celui-ci.

1.2. Autorité disciplinaire

Le Ministre de la Justice n'a pas de droit de commandement ou d'autorité disciplinaire sur les juges.

Des procédures disciplinaires sont entamées si des éléments d'infraction disciplinaire apparaissent de façon évidente. Les procédures disciplinaires commencent par la préparation des charges disciplinaires retenues. Les personnes suivantes ont le droit d'entamer une procédure disciplinaire: 1) Le Premier Président de la Cour Suprême, contre tous les juges;

2) le Chancelier de la Justice, contre tous les juges;

3) le président d'une cour correctionnelle contre les juges des tribunaux de première instance de sa juridiction;

4) le président d'un tribunal, contre les juges du même tribunal;

5) la Cour Suprême dans son ensemble (en banc) contre le Premier Président de la Cour Suprême.

Pour le jugement des questions disciplinaires des juges, la Cour Suprême comprend la Chambre Disciplinaire qui est composée de cinq juges de la Cour Suprême, cinq juges correctionnels et cinq juges des tribunaux de première instance. La Chambre Disciplinaire de la Cour Suprême statue sur les infractions disciplinaires des juges et impose des peines disciplinaires aux juges. Un jury de cinq membres de la Chambre Disciplinaire statue sur une question disciplinaire lors d'une séance de la cour.

1.3. Activités d'inspection et évaluations conséquentes

Si un juge, sans motif valable, omet d'effectuer un acte de procédure nécessaire, entre autres, s’il omet d'organiser une séance en temps voulu pour assurer que la procédure du tribunal soit menée dans un délai raisonnable, ou s'il est évident que le moment choisi par le juge pour accomplir l'acte de procédure ou une autre organisation de la procédure n'assure pas que la procédure puisse être menée dans un délai raisonnable, un président de tribunal décide de la mise en place de la mesure d'organisation de l'administration de la justice, qui fournit vraisemblablement l'occasion de terminer la procédure dans un délai raisonnable.

Le président du tribunal peut, entre autres:

1) fixer un délai raisonnable pour que le juge accomplisse l'acte de procédure ou termine la procédure selon les circonstances;

2) imposer au juge d'autres principes organisationnels pour mener la procédure et organiser le travail et le calendrier;

3) redistribuer les dossiers du tribunal entre les juges, en tenant compte du programme de répartition des tâches;

4) exceptionnellement, s'éloigner également du programme de répartition des tâches dans la distribution du travail, en tenant compte de manière prioritaire des particularités du dossier du tribunal, de la spécialisation du juge et des différente charges de travail des juges.

Si la culpabilité d'un juge est prouvée, la Chambre Disciplinaire prend une décision par laquelle le juge est condamné pour avoir commis une infraction disciplinaire et une peine disciplinaire est imposée au juge. Les peines disciplinaires sont les suivantes: 1) une réprimande;

2) une amende pouvant aller jusqu'à un mois de salaire;

3) une réduction de salaire;

4) la destitution de sa fonction.

2. Relations entre le Ministère de la Justice et le Pa rquet

(Loi relative au Parquet

http://www.legaltext.ee/et/andmebaas/tekst.asp?loc=text&dok=X2050K11&keel=en&pg=1&ptyyp=RT&tyyp=X&query=prokuratuuriseadus)

2.1. Supervision et contrôle

Le Ministère de la Justice supervise et contrôle le Parquet. La supervision et le contrôle exercés par le Ministère de la Justice ne s'étendent pas aux activités du Parquet relatives à la planification de la surveillance, aux procédures pénales préalables au procès et à la représentation du ministère public au tribunal.

Le Procureur Général supervise et contrôle le Parquet, et les principaux procureurs supervisent et contrôlent les parquets de district. Les personnes qui supervisent et contrôlent ont le droit de demander des explications et des informations aux procureurs qui sont soumis à leur contrôle et supervision.

2.2. Autorité disciplinaire

Les procédures disciplinaires sont initiées si des éléments d'une infraction disciplinaire deviennent manifestes. Une personne intéressée peut présenter une demande de lancement de procédure disciplinaire. Une demande de lancement de procédure disciplinaire doit être examinée dans un délai de six mois après la date à laquelle la personne formulant la demande a eu ou aurait dû avoir connaissance des circonstances sur lesquelles la demande était fondée.

Une procédure disciplinaire est lancée à la demande d'une personne intéressée ou de leur propre initiative par:

1) le Ministre de la Justice contre le Procureur Général, le Procureur de la République principal ou le procureur principal;

2) le Procureur Général contre tous les procureurs;

3) un procureur principal contre les procureurs d'un parquet de district qui lui sont subordonnés.

Dans le cas mentionné dans le paragraphe (2) 1) de la présente section, le Ministre de la Justice peut décider, en lançant la procédure disciplinaire, que le Ministre de la Justice connaîtra de l'infraction disciplinaire.

Une personne qui lance une procédure disciplinaire doit effectuer l’instruction préliminaire de l'infraction disciplinaire. Le Ministre de la Justice peut attribuer au Procureur Général la tâche de traitement préliminaire de la procédure disciplinaire lancée par le Ministre de la Justice contre un Procureur de la République principal ou un procureur principal.

Une personne qui mène l’instruction préliminaire d'une infraction disciplinaire peut recueillir des preuves et demander les explications qui sont nécessaires pour juger la question disciplinaire. Il est obligatoire de demander des explications au procureur contre lequel une procédure disciplinaire est lancée. La personne menant l’instruction préliminaire d'une infraction disciplinaire peut attribuer la tâche de recueillir des preuves et de demander des explications à un procureur désigné par cette personne. La tâche ne peut pas être attribuée à un procureur qui est membre du comité disciplinaire du parquet, à un procureur contre lequel la procédure disciplinaire est lancée ou à des procureurs qui sont ses subordonnés.

Le comité disciplinaire du parquet ou dans les cas précisés au paragraphe 32 (3) de cette Loi, le Ministre de la Justice, statuera sur une infraction disciplinaire d’un procureur.

S'il est nécessaire de recueillir davantage de preuves, la personne statuant sur l'infraction disciplinaire reportera l'audience sur l'infraction disciplinaire, déterminera le lieu et la date de la prochaine séance et attribuera la tâche de recueillir davantage de preuves à la personne assurant l’instruction préliminaire de l'infraction disciplinaire ou à la personne qui a préparé les charges retenues.

Le comité disciplinaire comprend deux procureurs du Parquet, deux procureurs des parquets de district, et un juge élu par la Cour dans son ensemble (en banc). Le comité disciplinaire est élu pour trois ans. Le comité disciplinaire élit le président du comité disciplinaire parmi ses membres qui sont procureurs.

(4) Le Ministre de la Justice établit les procédures du comité disciplinaire par un règlement.

2.3. Activités d'inspection et évaluations conséquentes

Une sanction disciplinaire peut être imposée à un procureur pour une infraction disciplinaire.

Les infractions disciplinaires sont:

1) l’inexécution dommageable ou l'accomplissement insatisfaisant des missions;

2) un acte indécent – un acte dommageable qui est en conflit avec les normes morales généralement reconnues ou qui porte atteinte à la fonction du procureur ou au Parquet, que cet acte soit commis dans l'accomplissement des missions ou non.

Les peines disciplinaires sont:

1) une réprimande;

2) une amende pouvant aller jusqu'à un mois de salaire;

3) une réduction de salaire pouvant s’élever à 25% par an;

4) la destitution de sa fonction.







Relationships among the activities of the Inspectorates,

the Body responsible for the endorsement of disciplinary measures and the

related judgments

Mr. François FELTZ Inspector-general for judicial inspectorates FRANCE

2

«RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INSPECTORATES, THE BODY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ENDORSEMENT OF DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AND THE RELATED JUDGMENTS»

by

François FELTZ

Inspector-general for judicial inspectorates (France)

(Greetings)

The relationships between the activities of the inspectorates and the body responsible for the approval of disciplinary measures inevitably raise the issue of the institutional place and status of the inspectorate as it relates to the department responsible for examining the evidential grounds for a disciplinary offence attributed to a magistrate and, as the need arises, pronouncing or proposing sanctions against him/her.

The relations between the investigative authority and this body will be more or less close depending on whether or not the inspectorate is linked to the body responsible for pronouncing the existence of a disciplinary offence and deciding on the sanction.

As a consequence, it is worth examining this issue to study the organization and missions of these institutions taken separately, on the one hand, and the unfolding of the disciplinary proceedings, on the other, by distinguishing, if necessary, the proceedings that apply to judges from those that apply to members of the public prosecution.

In this respect, institutional organization in France presents some interesting characteristics insofar as there exist no a priori ties between the Higher Council of the Judiciary, which is responsible for ruling on disciplinary proceedings and pronouncing or proposing sanctions, and the Inspectorate-General for the Judiciary, which is only in some cases responsible for undertaking a preliminary administrative inquiry, and which in statutory terms is linked only to the keeper of the seals - the Ministry of Justice.

And yet, we will see that in spite of this lack of any institutional links, the work of the Inspectorate-General does in fact have consequences for disciplinary proceedings.

I propose, therefore, to present a succinct overview of the roles of these two bodies - the CSM and the Inspectorate-General - before turning to discuss the actual links that connect them indirectly. In closing, I will describe some of the current ideas about how to cultivate and develop the connection between these two institutions.

I. The institutional place and role of the Higher Council of the Judiciary of France in disciplinary proceedings

This discussion addresses the institutional place of the CSM and the manner in which the disciplinary proceedings unfold.

I.1. Statutory approach

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It is likely that some of the participants in this conference do not yet know that the Higher Council of the Judiciary of France is a constitutional body whose composition and powers have recently evolved with the help of the organic law of 22nd July 2010, which is a reform of the law of 05th February 1994. The independence of this fully independent body had already been reinforced by the law of 23rd July 2008, which entrusted the presidency of the CSM departments - under the executive branch until then - to the First President and Attorney General of the Court of Cassation.

To simplify matters, in addition to a plenary body whose powers are irrelevant to this afternoon's topic, two departments are distinguished under the CSM: one responsible for the appointment and discipline of judges, and the other responsible for the judgments on the appointments and the disciplining of public prosecutors.

Accounting for the statutory differences between these two categories of magistrates, disciplinary power in regard to judges is exercised by the Higher Council of the Judiciary itself, and for public prosecutors by the keeper of the seals - the Ministry of Justice - which rules after receiving the opinion of the CSM.

I.2. Aspects of disciplinary proceedings

There are three different procedures for referring to the Higher Council of the Judiciary on disciplinary matters. It can be referred to:

- either by the keeper of the seals - the Ministry of Justice - following a possible inquiry by the Inspectorate-General of the Judiciary,

- or by the First Presidents and the Attorneys General of the Courts of Appeal. In this case, a copy of the referral documents is addressed to the keeper of the seals - the Ministry of Justice - who may order an inquiry by the Inspectorate-General of the Judiciary. The idea here is to permit the keeper of the seals to join in the proceedings initiated by the Chief Justice, subsequent to the inquiry confirming the disciplinary nature of the wrongful conduct,

- or in any case justiciable for which the judicial proceeding in regard to the conduct of a judge or public prosecutor during the performance of their duties is likely to receive a disciplinary qualification. By innovation of the law of 22nd July 2010, these direct complaints are first conveyed to an admission commission for petitions that examines its admissibility.

This commission may query the Chief Justice about any useful information and his/her observations. It may hear the implicated magistrate and, if the need arises, the person subject to trial who introduced the petition. When it determines that the evidence is likely to receive a disciplinary qualification, it refers the examination of the complaint to the disciplinary council. The hearing may not however be held sooner than three months after the keeper of the seals - Ministry of Justice - has been advised of referral, allowing it the possibility to join in the proceedings, as mentioned above.

Should the complaint be rejected, the keeper of the seals - Ministry of Justice - and the Chief Justices, who are notified of the judgment, reserve the right to refer the allegations to the Higher Council of the Judiciary.

At this stage, we notice that the admission commission for petitions has no opportunity to make a referral to the Inspectorate-General of the Judiciary, and that it is unable to solicit the Chief Justices to attain supplemental information.

4

Once the disciplinary council has assumed the responsibility, the procedure is as follows. The president of the competent department designates one of its members as a rapporteur and makes him/her responsible for proceeding, if necessary, with an inquiry that may not be entrusted to the Inspectorate-General of the Judiciary

Upon the referral to the disciplinary council, it should be noted that the rights of the defendant come into effect for the magistrate subject to the proceeding: the right to the disclosure of his/her administrative dossier and the documents of the preliminary inquiry on which the proceeding is founded, the right to an attorney.

The hearing is public except in the case of special circumstances that might be contrary to the interests of justice; the council deliberates in a closed session; the judgment and its motives are issued publicly.

In conclusion, it should be noted that during the course of the inquiry proceedings and the judgment, there is no direct link between the Higher Council of the Judiciary presiding over the disciplinary department and the Inspectorate-General of the Judiciary, whose statute and role is under a separate regulatory framework that is administrative in nature.

II. The institutional place and role of the Inspectorate-General of the Judiciary

Established by decree on 22nd December 1958 in relation to judiciary regulations, the Inspectorate-General of the Judiciary did not take on its current form until 1964. After a large number of regulatory modifications, most notably from the decrees of 08th November 2005 and 09th July 2008, in present times it is mainly governed by the provisions of decree no. 2010-1668 of 29th December 2010. In other words, its current form is the result of a recent reform that confirms its institutional positioning and endorses the methodological practices that it has elaborated for itself over the years

II.1. The regulations of the Inspectorate-General of the Judiciary

The Inspectorate-General of the Judiciary of France is directly linked to the keeper of the seals - Ministry of Justice. In essence it is composed of veteran judges and public prosecutors as well as (since 2010) Chief Clerk Inspectors, it exerts a permanent inspection mission over the group of departments and directorates of the Ministry of Justice and the courts of the first and second degree judicial order, as well as the related clerks and practitioners of public and private law in various capacities for the Ministry of Justice. It is presided over by a High Magistrate placed under the keeper of the seals, which choses and appoints him/her by decree of the President of the Republic.

One recent and Praetorian innovation was recently introduced by the previous keeper of the seals, the Inspector General, Chief of the Inspectorate, was appointed after receiving a favorable opinion from the Higher Council of the Judiciary, a formality that had not been provided for in any previous text.

In my opinion, the willingness of the Ministry of Justice to reinforce the legitimacy of its Inspector General as the only magistrate in France whose appointment is not subject to receiving the opinion of the CSM, in contrast to the magistrates appointed by transferal to the central administration of the Ministry of Justice, remains to be seen.

5

In any matters whatsoever (function control tasks, subject-specific missions...) and most notably in matters of pre-disciplinary inquiries, the Inspectorate-General can only be referred by the keeper of the seals to the exclusion of all other authorities and specifically the CSM.

11.2. The role of the General-Inspectorate for the Judiciary in disciplinary matters

Independently of the other functions it is assigned in the context of controlling the operations of the judiciary institution and public policy assessment, the domains that sum up the essence of its activity, the task of the Inspectorate-General shall proceed with administrative inquiries when deemed necessary by the keeper of the seals - Ministry of Justice.

The aim of these inquiries is to gather the informational elements of relevance to the individual conduct of a magistrate or civil servant or a departmental malfunctioning that could implicate one or more individuals and that is likely to be characterized as a disciplinary offence.

The objective of the inquiry is to enable the keeper of the seals - Ministry of Justice - to assess the possibility of referring the detected breaches to the competent disciplinary authority. Its analysis and qualification of the breaches is founded on the codes of practice and disciplinary rules that apply to magistrates and civil servants.

The linkage between the inspectorate and the Ministry has many consequences.

Only the keeper of the seals enjoys the competence to refer an inquiry of this nature that the keeper need not take care of itself. The Ministry is the only recipient of its inquiry reports, which are not disclosed, at this stage, to the magistrate nor the civil servant in question nor his/her hierarchical superior nor any other individual. The interested parties are only notified of the fact that the report was transmitted to the Ministry.

It is important to note that there is no text that establishes any concrete procedures for executing pre-disciplinary inquiries conducted by the Inspectorate-General like the ones that the Chief Justices can undertake within the context of the exercise of their hierarchical power. There is only one article of the decree on the Inspector General's tasks that specifies the position of the individuals who may conduct inquiries into the individual conduct of magistrates.

The methodology followed by the department, in fact, is the result of a lengthy development over the years that reflects the evolution of national and European procedural law that has made it possible to prepare a set of rules inspired by the ruling on disciplinary proceedings of statutory order of 22nd December 1958 and various principles of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, notably with concern to the respect to the rights of the defendant: official notification of the individual for which an inquiry is being opened, fairness in the collection of evidence, sufficiency in the investigations, preparation of a case for conviction or acquittal, respect for the adversarial principle, strict control of the conditions for the examination of the individuals in question, access to the dossier prior to the hearing, etc.

6

In the current state of affairs, only the right to counsel during the course of the inquiry is not recognized. This restriction is in reality associated to the administrative and pre-decision character of the proceedings of the preliminary inquiry and the fact that the right to counsel is activated upon referral to the disciplinary body. While we can observe, all the same, that the magistrate remains free to consult with an attorney at any time, no constraining measures can naturally be taken on his/her account.

At this stage of our account, we notice the absence of any direct connection between the inspectorate and the disciplinary body responsible for ascertaining the existence of a disciplinary offence and pronouncing a sanction (judges), or to issue a recommendation on these two points (public prosecutors): the decision to order an inquiry is the Ministry’s alone; the inquiry report is designed for it alone; it determines whether to refer it to the disciplinary authority.

Therefore, even though no direct, institutionally-ordained relationship exists between the inspectorate and the CSM, the inspectorate's work in disciplinary matters has consequences for the subsequent disciplinary proceedings before this constitutional authority when it is referred a proceeding.

III. The direct and indirect relationships between the inspectorate and the disciplinary decision-making body

An initial remark is called for.

At a more general level and with the exception of the sphere of discipline for magistrates, we note that the Higher Council of the Judiciary in France is not only a disciplinary authority, but it is also an authority that takes part in the appointment of the magistrates. In this capacity, it is expected to issue an opinion on the proposals to appoint general inspectors and inspectors of the inspectorate. This first direct link is hardly insignificant, particularly if one considers the ministerial practice that consists in abiding by the opinion issued by the CSM and not appointing any magistrate against a legal contradictory opinion, and the Ministry may override a negative opinion.

A second remark is also called for.

It is important in effect to emphasize that in spite of the direct statutory link to the Ministry, article 6 of the decree on its functions and the organization of its tasks provides that during the execution of its tasks, the Inspectorate-General of the Judiciary remains free to determine its own methodology as well as the official reports, analyses and suggestions that are reported to the keeper of the seals.

This means, as clearly confirmed in practice, that in the framing of its mission, the Inspectorate-General is fully independent in its determination of whether the evidence that led the inquiry to be entrusted to it is of a disciplinary nature or not. It is not responsible, however, for pronouncing on the possibility of referring it to the disciplinary body for a preliminary opinion (which is mandatory for any sanctions) or on its nature.

This is how we can affirm that the regulations on the linkage between the inspectorate and the Ministry have as little influence on the methodologies employed by the inspectorate (within the context of its inquiry) as on the assessment of its grounds.

In French law, the authority with the power to assess the disciplinary offence and to pronounce a sanction depends on whether it concerns a judge or a public prosecutor. This distinction results in different types of links between the inspectorate and the authority for disciplinary decision-making.

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III.1. The relationship between the inspectorate and the keeper of the seals, authority for disciplinary decision-making for public prosecutors

For public prosecutors, the statutory ordinance provides that both decision to proceed and the decision to sanction are determined by the keeper of the seals - the Ministry of Justice.

Concerning the decision to proceed, and except in the case of a public prosecutor referred directly to the CSM, the keeper of the seals makes the decision based on the informational elements provided in the reports submitted by the general prosecutors and/or by the inquiry report that the Inspectorate-General establishes when it decides to refer the proceedings.

Concerning the sanction, its pronouncement is determined by the keeper of the seals, which rules after receiving the opinion of the CSM department with competence for public prosecutors. This opinion applies to both the analysis of the offence and the pronouncement of the sanction.

The Ministry, for its part, remains free in terms of its intention to proceed following the inspection report. It remains similarly free in terms of the sanction it intends to inflict, having observed that it may not pronounce a sanction more severe than the one proposed in the opinion of the CSM unless a new deliberation is solicited on its part.

III.2. The relationship between the inspectorate and the CSM body with competence for judges, the disciplinary decision-making authority for them

The appropriate department of the Higher Council of the Judiciary has sole competence for determining the disciplinary or non-disciplinary nature of the conduct of a judge and pronouncing a sanction on his/her account.

It does so after the referral, as already suggested, either to a First President of the Court of Appeals or to the keeper of the seals, who may have first ordered the Inspectorate-General to proceed with an inquiry to clarify the alleged offences of the judge.

There is no direct link, therefore, between the inspectorate and the body responsible for determining the wrongful conduct of the judge and pronouncing the sanction.

One cannot fail to notice, however, and this point is particularly important, that when the proceeding is executed on the basis of an administrative inquiry conducted by the inspectorate, this inquiry has a considerable impact on the evaluation of the dossier by the disciplinary authority.

In effect, the thorough nature of the investigations conducted by the Inspectorate-General, its rigorous methodology - notably the particular care with which it prepares for conviction or acquittal and does its best to respect the adversarial principle - along with the professionalism of its members endows its ascertainments and analyses with a very high level of credibility and legitimacy that, quite often, is difficult to contest during the procedural phase following on the decision to proceed.

The procedural quality of the inspectorate's inquiry is all the more important since the Council of State - the court of appeal against the disciplinary decisions of the Higher Council of the Judiciary - recently (26th July 2011) extended its control over the correctness of the subsequent disciplinary proceedings before the CSM during the administrative inquiry phase of the Inspectorate-General, which also validates the methods on this occasion.

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This is about a particularly strong form of indirect judicial linkage between the disciplinary decision-making body and the inspectorate that compels it to even stronger vigilance over its methodology and analyses. The link to be considered, in effect, is that a failure by the Inspectorate-General in its duties of rigor, fairness and respect for the rights of the individual subject to inquiry would put the correctness of the disciplinary proceeding itself at risk.

Practice and jurisprudence being what they are, then, what institutional perspectives might result? This is the point I will conclude on.

Possible institutional perspectives

In France there is little doubt that a pure and simple form of linkage is being advocated between the Inspectorate-General and the Higher Council of the Judiciary.

The advantages would be:

- a strengthening in the independence of the judiciary: the initiation of administrative inquiries would no longer depend on the Ministerial authority (a member of the executive branch) and inquiries would be under the control of an independent authority;

- the possibility for the CSM to be automatically apprised of allegedly wrongful conduct and to initiate, under its control, the investigations needed to prove or refute the facts.

The opponents to this system note the following drawbacks:

- there will be concurrency of powers between the authority for the proceedings and authority for the judgment, which contradicts the principle of the separation of the two authorities;

- as with every ministry, the Ministry of Justice must be able to have an inspectorate at its disposal for evaluating the institutions and agents under its authority, unless one imagines the existence of two inspectorates: one under the Ministry and the other under the CSM, which, lacking any clear partition of competences, would create a source of concurrency and duplication;

- lastly, there is the issue of the procedures to use for appointing the inspectors of an inspectorate that is under the authority of the department responsible itself for their appointment.

An alternative solution could be the development of a right of referral to the inspectorate. This would involve attributing the CSM (and - why not - other Chief Justices) the possibility of direct referral to the Inspectorate-General of an inquiry, the execution of which may or may not be placed under its control.

It would, of course, be up to the political authorities to determine in which of these directions the current system should be developed. My only wish is that whichever solution is pursued, the Inspectorate-General of the Judiciary should have a permanent inspectorate whose objectivity, legitimacy, competence, experience, pertinence and professionalism are all acknowledged, in sum, which seems to me to be the current case and I welcome this.

Thank you for your attention.

Conférence organisée par le Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature italien

sur initiative de la Sixième Commission






Rapports entre les activités des Inspections, l’Organe chargé

d’approuver les sanctions disciplinaires et le jugement relatif

M. François FELTZ

Inspecteur général des services judiciaires FRANCE

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« RAPPORTS ENTRE LES ACTIVITES DES INSPECTIONS, L’ORGANE CHARGE D’APPROUVER LES SANCTIONS DISCIPLINAIRES ET LE JUGEMENT RELATIF »

par

François FELTZ

Inspecteur général des services judiciaires (France)

(Mot de bienvenue)

Evoquer les rapports entre les activités des inspections et l’organe chargé d’approuver les sanctions disciplinaires renvoie inévitablement à la question de la place et du statut institutionnels du service d’inspection par rapport à l’instance chargée d’examiner les faits qualifiés de faute disciplinaire imputée à un magistrat et, le cas échéant, de prononcer ou de proposer une sanction à son encontre.

En effet, selon que le service est rattaché ou non à l’organe chargé de se prononcer sur l’existence ou non d’une faute disciplinaire et de décider d’une sanction, les rapports entre le service d’enquête et cet organe seront plus ou moins étroits.

Il convient, en conséquence, pour examiner cette question, d’étudier, d’une part, l’organisation et les missions de ces institutions, prises séparément, d’autre part, l’articulation entre elles dans le cheminement de la procédure disciplinaire en distinguant, s’il y a lieu, la procédure applicable aux juges de celle applicable aux membres du ministère public.

L’organisation institutionnelle française présente à cet égard des caractéristiques intéressantes dans la mesure où, a priori, aucun lien ne peut exister entre le Conseil supérieur de la magistrature, chargé de statuer sur la procédure disciplinaire et de prononcer ou de proposer une sanction, et l’inspection générale des services judiciaires chargée, dans certains cas seulement, de procéder à une enquête administrative préalable, ce dernier service étant statutairement rattaché au seul garde des sceaux, ministre de la justice.

Pourtant, on verra que s’il n’existe pas de lien institutionnel, dans les faits, le travail de l’inspection générale n’est pas sans conséquence sur la procédure disciplinaire.

Je me propose, en conséquence, de vous exposer succinctement le rôle de ces deux organes, CSM et inspection générale, avant d’évoquer les liens qui peuvent, dans la réalité, les unir indirectement. Je vous ferai part, in fine, des réflexions existantes susceptibles de faire évoluer l’articulation entre ces deux institutions.

I. La place institutionnelle et le rôle du Conseil supérieur de la magistrature français dans la procédure disciplinaire

Seront ici successivement évoqués la place institutionnelle du CSM et le déroulement de la procédure disciplinaire.

I.1. Approche statutaire

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Comme ne l’ignore sans doute pas un certain nombre de participants à cette conférence, le Conseil supérieur de la magistrature français est un organe constitutionnel dont la composition et les attributions ont récemment évolué au bénéfice d’une loi organique du 22 juillet 2010 qui a réformé celle du 5 février 1994. C’est un organe totalement indépendant dont l’indépendance a encore été renforcée depuis la loi du 23 juillet 2008 qui a confié la présidence des formations du CSM, relevant précédemment de membres du pouvoir exécutif, au premier président et au procureur général de la Cour de cassation.

Pour faire simple, outre la formation plénière dont les attributions ne relèvent pas de notre sujet de cet après-midi, on distingue, au sein du CSM, deux formations : l’une compétente pour la nomination et la discipline des magistrats du siège, l’autre compétente pour les avis sur les nominations et sur la discipline des magistrats du parquet.

Compte tenu des différences statutaires entre ces ceux catégories de magistrats, le pouvoir disciplinaire est exercé, à l’égard des magistrats du siège, par le Conseil supérieur de la magistrature lui-même, et, à l’égard des magistrats du parquet, par le garde des sceaux, ministre de la justice, qui statue après avis du CSM.

I.2. Aspects de la procédure disciplinaire

Les modalités de saisine du Conseil supérieur de la magistrature en matière disciplinaire sont de trois ordres. Il peut être saisi :

- soit par le garde des sceaux, ministre de la justice, après enquête éventuelle de l’inspection générale des services judiciaires,

- soit par les premiers présidents et les procureurs généraux des cours d’appel ; dans cette hypothèse, copie des pièces de saisine est adressée au garde des sceaux, ministre de la justice, qui peut demander une enquête à l’inspection générale des services judiciaires. L’idée ici est de permettre au garde des sceaux de se joindre aux poursuites initiées par le chef de cour, après une enquête confirmant le caractère disciplinaire du comportement fautif,

- soit par tout justiciable qui estime qu’à l’occasion d’une procédure judiciaire le concernant, le comportement adopté par un magistrat du siège ou du parquet dans l’exercice de ses fonctions est susceptible de recevoir une qualification disciplinaire. Innovation de la loi du 22 juillet 2010, ces plaintes directes sont préalablement soumises à une commission d’admission des requêtes qui en examine la recevabilité.

Cette commission peut demander au chef de cour concerné toutes informations utiles et ses observations. Elle peut entendre le magistrat mis en cause et, le cas échéant, le justiciable qui a introduit la demande. Lorsqu’elle estime que les faits sont susceptibles de recevoir une qualification disciplinaire, elle renvoie l’examen de la plainte au conseil de discipline. L’audience ne peut toutefois se tenir avant un délai de trois mois après que le garde des sceaux, ministre de la justice a été avisé de la saisine, ceci pour lui permettre, comme précédemment, de se joindre éventuellement à la poursuite.

En cas de rejet de la plainte, le garde des sceaux, ministre de la justice, et les chefs de cour, qui sont avisés de cette décision, conservent la faculté de saisir le Conseil supérieur de la magistrature des faits dénoncés.

On observera, à ce stade, que la commission d’admission des requêtes n’a pas la possibilité de saisir l’inspection générale des services judiciaires et qu’elle ne peut que solliciter les chefs de cour pour obtenir éventuellement des renseignements complémentaires.

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Une fois le conseil de discipline saisi, la procédure est la suivante. Le président de la formation compétente désigne un rapporteur parmi ses membres et le charge, s’il y a lieu, de procéder à une enquête laquelle ne peut être confiée à l’inspection générale des services judiciaires

Il convient d’observer qu’à compter de la saisine du conseil de discipline, s’ouvrent, pour le magistrat visé par la poursuite, les droits de la défense : communication de son dossier administratif et des pièces de l’enquête préliminaire servant de fondement à la poursuite, possibilité d’être assisté d’un conseil.

L’audience est publique sauf circonstances spéciales de nature à porter atteinte aux intérêts de la justice ; le conseil délibère à huis clos ; la décision qui doit être motivée, est rendue publiquement.

En conclusion, il est à noter qu’au cours de cette procédure d’instruction et de jugement, aucun lien direct n’existe entre le Conseil supérieur de la magistrat statuant en formation disciplinaire et l’inspection générale des services judiciaires dont le statut et le rôle relèvent d’un cadre réglementaire séparé, à caractère administratif.

II. La place institutionnelle et le rôle de l’inspection générale des services judiciaires

Créée par l’ordonnance du 22 décembre 1958 relative au statut de la magistrature, l’inspection générale des services judiciaire n’a connu sa forme actuelle qu’à partir de 1964. Après plusieurs modifications réglementaires, résultant notamment des décrets du 8 novembre 2005 et du 9 juillet 2008, elle est régie aujourd’hui principalement par les dispositions du décret n° 2010-1668 du 29 décembre 2010. C’est dire que sa configuration actuelle est le résultat d’une réforme récente qui a confirmé son positionnement institutionnel et avalisé les pratiques méthodologiques qu’elle a elle-même élaborées au fil des années

II.1. Le statut de l’inspection générale des services judiciaires

L’inspection générale des services judicaires française est un service rattaché directement au garde des sceaux, ministre de la justice. Composé pour l’essentiel de magistrats expérimentés du siège et du parquet, mais aussi, depuis fin 2010, d’inspecteurs greffiers en chef, elle exerce une mission permanente d’inspection sur l’ensemble des directions et services du ministère de la justice et des juridictions de l’ordre judiciaire du premier et du second degré, ainsi que sur les greffes et les personnes de droit public et de droit privé relevant, à un titre ou à un autre, du ministère de la justice. Son responsable est un haut magistrat placé auprès du garde des sceaux, choisi par lui et nommé par décret du président de la République.

Innovation récente et prétorienne récemment introduite par le précédent garde des sceaux, l’inspecteur général, chef du service, a été nommé après avis favorable préalable du Conseil supérieur de la magistrature, alors qu’aucun texte ne prévoyait cette formalité.

Il faut y voir, à mon sens, la volonté du ministre de la justice de renforcer la légitimité de son inspecteur général, seul magistrat en France dont la nomination n’était soumise à aucun avis du CSM, à la différence même des magistrats nommés en détachement à l’administration centrale du ministère de la justice.

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En quelque matière que ce soit (missions de contrôle de fonctionnement, mission thématiques…) et notamment en matière d’enquête pré-disciplinaire, l’inspection générale ne peut être saisie que par le garde des sceaux à l’exclusion de toute autre autorité et spécifiquement du CSM.

11.2. Le rôle de l’inspection générale des services judiciaires en matière disciplinaire

Indépendamment des autres attributions qui lui sont confiées dans le cadre du contrôle du fonctionnement de l’institution judiciaire et de l’évaluation des politiques publiques, domaines qui regroupent l’essentiel de son activité, l’inspection générale a pour mission, lorsque le garde des sceaux, ministre de la justice, l’estime nécessaire, de procéder à des enquêtes administratives.

Ces enquêtes ont pour objet de recueillir les éléments d’information relatifs au comportement individuel d’un magistrat ou d’un fonctionnaire ou à un dysfonctionnement de service pouvant impliquer une ou plusieurs personnes, susceptibles de caractériser des fautes disciplinaires.

L’objectif de cette enquête est de permettre au garde des sceaux, ministre de la justice, d’apprécier l’opportunité de saisir l’instance disciplinaire compétente des manquements relevés. Son analyse des manquements et de leur qualification est fondée sur les règles déontologiques et disciplinaires applicables aux magistrats et fonctionnaires.

Du rattachement de l’inspection au ministre, découle plusieurs conséquences.

Seul, le garde des sceaux a compétence pour la saisir d’une telle enquête dont elle ne doit rendre compte qu’à lui seul. Le ministre est seul destinataire de ses rapports d’enquête dont ni le magistrat, à ce stade, ou le fonctionnaire concerné, ni son supérieur hiérarchique, ni toute autre personne ne reçoivent communication. Les intéressés sont seulement informés de la transmission du rapport au ministre.

Il est important de noter qu’aucun texte ne fixe les modalités concrètes d’exécution de ces enquêtes pré-disciplinaires accomplies par l’inspection générale comme de celles auxquelles les chefs de cour peuvent eux-mêmes procéder dans le cadre de l’exercice de leur pouvoir hiérarchique. Un seul article du décret sur les missions de l’inspecteur général précise la qualité des personnes pouvant effectuer les enquêtes sur le comportement individuel des magistrats.

En fait, la méthodologie suivie par le service est le résultat d’une longue maturation qui a permis d’élaborer, au fil des années et à la lumière de l’évolution du droit processuel national et européen, des règles s’inspirant de la procédure disciplinaire régie par l’ordonnance statutaire du 22 décembre 1958 et des principes fondamentaux de la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés individuelles, notamment en ce qui concerne le respect de droits reconnus à la défense : notification officielle à la personne visée de l’ouverture d’une enquête à son encontre, loyauté dans l’administration de la preuve, exhaustivité dans les investigations, instruction à charge et à décharge, respect du principe du contradictoire, encadrement strict des conditions d’audition de la personne concernée, accès au dossier avant l’audition etc.

En l’état actuel des choses, seul, le droit d’être assisté par un conseil au cours de l’enquête n’est pas reconnu. Cette restriction est en réalité liée au caractère administratif et préalable à la décision de poursuite de l’enquête préliminaire et au fait que ce droit d’assistance s’ouvre avec la saisine de l’organe disciplinaire.

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A ce stade de l’exposé, on peut observer l’absence de tout lien direct entre le service de l’inspection et l’organe disciplinaire chargé de statuer sur l’existence d’une faute disciplinaire et de prononcer une sanction (magistrats du siège), ou d’émettre un avis sur ces deux points (magistrats du parquet) : la décision d’ordonner une enquête appartient au seul ministre ; le rapport d’enquête n’est destiné qu’à lui seul ; c’est lui qui apprécie l’opportunité de saisir ou non l’instance disciplinaire.

Pourtant, si aucun rapport direct entre l’inspection et le CSM n’est institutionnellement consacré, le travail accompli par le service en matière disciplinaire n’est pas sans conséquence sur la procédure disciplinaire suivie devant cette instance constitutionnelle lorsqu’elle est saisie d’une poursuite.

III. Les rapports directs et indirects de l’inspection avec l’organe de décision disciplinaire

Une première remarque s’impose.

Sur un plan plus général et hors la seule sphère de la discipline des magistrats, on observera qu’en France le Conseil supérieur de la magistrature est non seulement une instance disciplinaire, mais aussi une instance intervenant dans la nomination des magistrats. A ce titre, il est amené à émettre un avis sur les projets de nomination des inspecteurs généraux et des inspecteurs au service de l’inspection. C’est un premier lien direct qui est loin d’être négligeable surtout si l’on considère la pratique ministérielle qui consiste à se conformer aux avis émis par le CSM et à ne pas nommer un magistrat contre l’avis contraire de celui-ci alors que légalement, le ministre pourrait passer outre cet avis négatif.

Une seconde remarque doit aussi être formulée.

Il est important en effet de souligner qu’en dépit de son rattachement statutaire direct au ministre, l’article 6 du décret relatif à ses attributions et à l’organisation de ses missions, prévoit que, dans le l’exécution de ses missions, l’inspecteur général des services judiciaires arrête librement sa méthodologie ainsi que ses constats, analyses et préconisations dont il fait rapport au garde des sceaux.

Ce qui veut dire, et la pratique le confirme clairement, que dans le cadre de sa mission, l’inspection générale est totalement indépendante dans l’appréciation qu’elle fait du caractère disciplinaire ou non des faits sur lesquels porte l’enquête qui lui a été confiée. Mais il ne lui appartient de se prononcer ni sur l’opportunité de saisir l’organe disciplinaire pour avis préalable, lequel est obligatoire avant toute sanction, ni sur la nature de celle-ci.

On peut ainsi affirmer que le statut de rattachement de l’inspection au ministre est sans influence tant sur la méthodologie mise en œuvre par l’inspection dans le cadre de son enquête que sur son appréciation au fond.

En droit français, l’autorité qui détient le pouvoir d’apprécier la faute disciplinaire et de prononcer une sanction est différente selon qu’il s’agit d’un magistrat du siège ou d’un magistrat du parquet. De cette distinction résulte la nature différente des liens qui peuvent exister entre le service de l’inspection et l’autorité de décision disciplinaire.

III.1. Les rapports entre l’inspection et le garde des sceaux, autorité de décision disciplinaire des magistrats du parquet

Pour les magistrats du parquet, l’ordonnance statutaire prévoit que tant la décision de poursuite que la décision de sanction appartient au garde des sceaux, ministre de la justice.

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S’agissant de la décision de poursuite, et hormis le cas où c’est un procureur général qui saisit directement le CSM, le garde des sceaux la prend au vu des éléments d’information qui lui sont fournis par les rapports transmis par les procureurs généraux et/ou par le rapport d’enquête établi par l’inspection générale lorsqu’il a décidé de la saisir pour y procéder.

S’agissant de la sanction, son prononcé appartient au garde des sceaux qui statue après l’avis rendu par la formation du CSM compétente pour les magistrats du parquet. Cet avis porte à la fois sur l’analyse de la faute et sur la sanction à prononcer.

Le ministre, pour sa part, reste libre de la suite qu’il entend donner au rapport de l’inspection. Il est également libre de la sanction qu’il entend infliger, étant observé qu’il ne peut prononcer une sanction plus sévère que celle proposée par le CSM dans son avis sauf à solliciter de sa part une nouvelle délibération.

III.2. Les rapports entre l’inspection et la formation du CSM compétente pour les magistrats du siège, autorité de décision disciplinaire pour ceux-ci

Le Conseil supérieur de la magistrature, dans la formation adéquate, est seul compétent pour apprécier le caractère disciplinaire ou non du comportement d’un magistrat du siège et prononcer à son encontre une sanction.

Il le fait après avoir été saisi, comme il a déjà été indiqué, soit par un premier président de cour d’appel, soit par le garde des sceaux qui peut avoir préalablement demandé à l’inspection générale de procéder à une enquête pour l’éclairer sur les faits reprochés au magistrat.

Aucun lien direct n’existe donc entre le service de l’inspection et l’organe chargé d’apprécier le comportement fautif du magistrat et de prononcer la sanction.

Mais force est de constater, et ce point est particulièrement important, que lorsque la poursuite est exercée sur le fondement d’une enquête administrative effectuée par l’inspection, cette enquête a un poids considérable dans l’appréciation du dossier par l’instance disciplinaire.

En effet, le caractère exhaustif des investigations opérées par l’inspection générale, sa méthodologie rigoureuse, notamment le soin particulier qu’elle porte à instruire à charge et à décharge et à respecter au mieux le principe du contradictoire, ainsi que le professionnalisme de ses membres donnent à ses constatations et analyses une crédibilité et une légitimité très fortes qui, bien souvent, sont difficilement contestables dans la phase procédurale qui suit la décision de poursuite.

La qualité procédurale de l’enquête de l’inspection est d’autant plus importante que le Conseil d’Etat, juridiction de recours contre les décisions disciplinaires du Conseil supérieur de la magistrature, a récemment (26 juillet 2011) étendu son contrôle de la régularité de la procédure disciplinaire suivie devant le CSM à la phase d’enquête administrative de l’inspection générale dont il a d’ailleurs, à cette occasion, validé les modalités.

Il s’agit là d’un lien juridique indirect particulièrement fort qui unit l’organe de décision disciplinaire à l’inspection et qui contraint celle-ci à une vigilance encore plus forte dans sa méthodologie et dans ses analyses. Il y a lieu en effet de considérer que si l’inspection générale manquait à ses devoirs de rigueur, de loyauté et de respect des droits de la personne concernée par l’enquête, elle mettrait en péril la régularité de la procédure disciplinaire elle-même.

Alors, la pratique et la jurisprudence étant désormais ce qu’elles sont, quelles pourraient être les perspectives institutionnelles à en tirer ? Et je terminerai sur ce point.

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Les perspectives institutionnelles

Certains en France préconisent un rattachement pur et simple de l’inspection générale au Conseil supérieur de la magistrature.

Ils y voient pour avantages :

- un renforcement de l’indépendance de la magistrature : le déclenchement d’une enquête administrative ne dépendrait plus de l’autorité ministérielle, membre du pouvoir exécutif, et cette enquête serait placée sous le contrôle d’une autorité indépendante ;

- la possibilité pour le CSM de se saisir d’office des comportements supposés fautifs et de faire procéder, sous son contrôle, aux investigations nécessaires pour en prouver ou en démentir la réalité.

Les opposants à un tel système y voient les inconvénients suivants :

- il y aurait confusion entre l’autorité de poursuite et l’autorité de jugement, ce qui va à l’encontre du principe de séparation entre ces deux autorités ;

- comme tous les ministres, un ministre ne peut être privé d’une inspection à sa disposition pour évaluer les institutions et leurs agents placés sous son autorité, sauf à imaginer l’existence de deux services d’inspection, l’un placé auprès du ministre, l’autre placé auprès du CSM, ce qui peut être source de confusion et de doublon ;

- enfin, la question se poserait des modalités de nomination des inspecteurs dans un service placé sous l’autorité de l’instance chargée elle-même de leur nomination.

Une autre solution pourrait résider dans l’aménagement du droit de saisine de l’inspection. Elle consisterait à reconnaître au CSM, et pourquoi pas aux chefs de cour, la possibilité de saisir directement l’inspection générale d’une enquête dont la conduite serait alors placée ou non sous son contrôle.

Il appartient naturellement à l’autorité politique de faire ou non évoluer le système actuel dans un sens ou dans un autre. Mon seul souhait est que, quelle que soit la solution retenue, l’inspection générale des services judiciaires demeure un service dont l’objectivité, la légitimité, la compétence, l’expérience, la pertinence, le professionnalisme en somme, sont reconnus, ce qui me paraît être le cas actuellement et je m’en félicite.

Merci de votre attention.







Rapport entre les inspections et les juridictions des juges et des

procureurs des états membres de l’Union européenne

Mme Márta STEFANCSIK Juge au Tribunal de Kecskemet et membre du Service Tribunal HONGRIE

RAPPORT ENTRE LES INSPECTIONS ET LES JURIDICTIONS D ES JUGES ET DES PROCUREURS DES ETETS MEMBRES DE L'UNIO N

EUROPÉENNE

ROME LES 4-5 JUIN 2012.

H O N G R I E

LES CATEGORIES DISCIPLINAIRES PLUS SIGNIFICATIVES D ANS LES ORDONNANCEMENTS JUDICIAIRES EUROPÉENNES:

RAPPORT EVEC LES INSPECTIONS

Le systeme judiciaire et l'inspection des magistrat, le statut des magistrats et leurs rémunération sont regis – selon le Constitution (art.25) - par les lois constitutionnelles.

L'administration et l'inspection général est le devoir du Directeur du Bureau National de la Magistrature (DBNM). Le DBNM est élu par 2/3 de vote de l'Assemblé Nationale pour 9 ans des juges qui possedents plus que 5 ans d'experiance du magistrat.Le DBNM -entre les cadres définis par les lois – possede le droit de former de reglementation comme dispositions normatives obligatoires aux tribunaux, et faire de recommendation et prononcer de décisions. Il a droit exclusif de publier des appels de concours (en cas d'enrée aux magistrature et l'avancement aussi), faire sa proposition pour la nomination et le relevement de magistrats devant le Président de la République, possede de droit de la nomination et du relevement de fonctionnaires - mentionnés par la lois - de directions.

C'est le Bureau National de la Magistrature qui prépare les reglementation et qui est responsable de leurs application.

L'administration et l'inspection générales sont soumises a la surveillance du Conceil National de la Magistrature (CNM) qui regroupe le président de la Cour Supreme (Kúria) et de 14 membres élus á vote secret , a la majorité des voix par les électeurs des magistrats (délégués par les assembles plénieres des tribunaux). CNM est l'organe de l'autonomie de magistrat. Il tient ses séances au moins 4 fois par ans, mais sur l'initiation de 2/3 de membres il est obligatoire de sieger. Le quorum est de 1/3 de membres. Il prend ses décision a la majorité simple. Le membre est irrévocable, et il est indispensable avoir l'avis de CNM a l'instruire un procédure disciplinaires contre le membre magistrat.

Les lois de 2/3 ne regles les devoirs de l'administration et de l'inpection qu'en grands lignes, ces taches sont accomplies par de reglementation, recommandetion et décisios de DBNM. Lors'que le systeme actuel est entré en vigeur cette anné, le DBNM est obligé de révisé tous les reglementation

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antérieur jusqu'au 1er octobre 2012. Le travail est en cours.L'organe de l'autodétermination de magistrat possede le pouvoir de la nomination de présidents et membres du Tribunaux Disciplinaires, décide a la donation de titres et aux affaires d'incompabilité. Hors des cettes questions, le CNM ne possede que droit d'expression et de proposition concernant - le reglementation, - l'activité de BNM et du President de la Cour Supreme dans le domain de concours d'entrée et de l'avancement,• la personne proposée comme DBNM ou President de la Cour Supreme.• Initiative legistlative concernant des tribunaux.

L'administration et l'inspection de tribunaux déroulent -par les présidents et vice-président et autres fonctionnaires administratifs- sous la surveillance du DBNM, Il controle le respect de regles (échéances etc.) effectue des enquets, analyse la professionalité des dirigeants nominés par lui-meme et propose de procedures disciplinaires.

RESPONSABILITÉ DISCIPLINAIRESTRIBUNAUX DISCIPLINAIRES

Les organesTribunal Disciplinaire de Premiere Instance (TDPI)Tribunal Disciplinaire de Recours (TDR)

Les membresLes membres sont élus pour 6 ans par le Conseil National de la Magistrature sur l'avis de l'assemlé pléniaire des tribunaux des juges de tribunaux de grande instance, de la cours d'appel et de la Cour Supreme (Kúria). Le président est nommé par le CNM, le vice-président est nommé par le président. Les magistrats accomplient leurs devoirs a coté du travail de juge.

Categories disciplinairesLa loi mentionne deux categories souples: a./ commettre une faute délictuelle concernant de l'activité de magistrat b./violer ou mettre en danger la réputation de magistrat par son coportement ou son mode de vie.

Ces categories sont en pratique apprécier par le tribunal disciplinaires.

La procédureLe président de tribunal possede le pouvoire d'initiative contre les juges. (mais contre les dirigeants celui qui possede le pouvoire de nomination. )Il est obligatoire de la demender si le juge est supconné de commettre une crime.

Le président du TDPI assigne le chambre de 3 juges disciplinaires et l'enqueteur, sauf dans le cas si le fait contesté est sans importance et

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conséquance, mais le juge a droit de demender de continuer la procédure disciplinaire.Ile président de TDPI fait au courant le juge et le DBNM du commencement de la procédure.L'action n'est pas etre intenter apres 3 mois a comter de l'annonce du fait dont le président /TDPI est venu a connaissance ou passant 3 ans de l'action de la fait commise. (En cas d'une crime, l'action n'est pas etre intenter apres 1 ans a comter du jugement.)

L'enqueteur fait l'analyse pendant 15 jours et met au courant de son avis la chambre qui décide d'instruire la procédure, l'abandonner ou suspendre. La chambre fixe la date de débat et prononce sa décision. La décision doit etre notifier au DBNM.

La décision est susceptible d'appel. Le délais de recours est 15 jours.

Rapports entre le resultat de la procédure et l'avancement La terme de validité de décision est dite par la loi. Pendant cette terme le juge ne peut pas attribuer de classement plus élevé. Le Tribunal Disciplinaire a le droit d'en le déchaeger.

Ces regles assure que la responsabilité des magistrats ne dépende pas de l'administration des tribunaux et assurent l'indépendance des juges.

Le Minister de la Justice n'a aucun role d'inspection.

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dell’Ispettorato e Magistrato Ispettore debba essere inquadrato in senso

organizzativo e funzionale: le connotazioni proprie del rapporto gerarchico

potendo essere riferite esclusivamente al primo aspetto, mentre sotto l’aspetto

funzionale la sovraordinazione non potendo implicare alcun potere d'ordine

generale. In relazione alle modalità di espletamento dell’attività ispettiva in

genere e d’inchiesta in particolare spetta perciò al Capo dell’Ispettorato

(solamente) un potere di direzione e di indirizzo, cui consegue l’attribuzione di

responsabilità ai delegati in base a direttive limitate a metodi, scopi concreti e

compiti.

Le direttive, proprio perché tali, non possono rivestire carattere tassativo ed

elidere gli ambiti di discrezionalità riservati ai delegati, ferma la regola che il

delegato che intenda non attenersi ad esse dovrà motivatamente giustificare la

sua scelta

Le modalità concrete di realizzazione dell’attività delegata restano per

l’effetto affidate all'autonomia del soggetto titolare dell'incarico e del

responsabile della procedura: autonomia avvalorata, nel caso dell’Ispettorato

Generale, dalla previsione legislativa che le funzioni di Ispettore Generale sono

assegnate esclusivamente a componenti della magistratura.

La salvaguardia dell'indipendenza e dell'autonomia della funzione giudiziaria

deve intendersi affidata anche e direttamente, perciò, alla responsabilità

individuale dei Magistrati Ispettori, proprio perché magistrati.

I Magistrati Ispettori delegati per l’esercizio di attività istruttorie, ispettive o

d’inchiesta assumono in conclusione la veste di responsabili dei relativi

procedimenti e vanno riconosciute loro indipendenza d’azione, autonomia di

valutazione e facoltà di sindacato certamente più incisive rispetto a quelle che

normalmente assistono l'esercizio di qualsivoglia altra attività amministrativa.

Può trarsene, io credo, un codice “procedurale” formulabile, in tema

d’inchiesta, nei seguenti termini.

1) Il presupposto dell’attività di accertamento non può essere indeterminato

o generico, e non può fondarsi su anonimo.

2) L’oggetto dell’inchiesta deve presentare caratteri di specificità e riferibilità

ad una o più ipotesi specifiche di illecito disciplinare.

3) L’oggetto dell’incarico d’inchiesta (comunemente e d’ora in avanti

chiamato “lettera d’incarico”) deve essere riportato nel provvedimento

d’attuazione con il quale il Capo dell’Ispettorato individua i Magistrati Ispettori

delegati allo svolgimento dell’attività d’inchiesta e dà loro mandato e istruzioni.

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Il provvedimento attuativo del Capo dell’Ispettorato, in particolare,

(a) dovrà riportare:

- l'oggetto dell'incarico conferito al Magistrato Ispettore in base al mandato

del Ministro, riferibile ad ipotesi suscettibili di rilievo disciplinare;

- una sintetica enunciazione delle fonti dell’ipotetico addebito;

- i soggetti destinatari dell’inchiesta, se già individuati o chiaramente

individuabili in base agli atti che hanno costituito la notizia da accertare;

(b) dovrà individuare:

- i Magistrati Ispettori delegati e, tra questi, se più, il responsabile del

procedimento accertativo;

- i Dirigenti o Direttori Ispettori e gli ausiliari che dovranno assisterli,

rispettivamente, nelle attività di acquisizione dei dati e nelle attività di

verbalizzazione;

(c) potrà dettare direttive:

- in ordine alle modalità di conduzione dell’inchiesta;

- nonché finalizzate al particolare rispetto, avuto riguardo alle connotazioni

del caso concreto, di regole procedimentali, delle garanzie dell’incolpato,

dell’indipendenza della funzione esercitata e del principio di non ingerenza

nell’attività giurisdizionale.

4) La leale collaborazione dei magistrati e dei capi degli uffici giudiziari

presso cui si svolge l’inchiesta, nei confronti dei Magistrati Ispettori incaricati di

svolgere l’attività ispettiva, può essere richiesta nei limiti imposti loro dalla

esigenza di salvaguardare l’autonomia e l’indipendenza della funzione giudiziaria.

5) I capi degli uffici presso cui è svolta l’inchiesta e i magistrati sottoposti

all’indagine amministrativa hanno il diritto di esigere che lettera d’incarico e

mandato attuativo siano loro esibiti onde poter verificare se l’attività di

accertamento è svolta in concreto nell’ambito del mandato.

6) Nel caso in cui non siano rispettate le garanzie di specificazione, di

comunicazione, trasparenza, congruità e proprorzionalità prima enunciate, cessa

il dovere collaborativo dei capi degli uffici e dei magistrati assoggettati ad

inchiesta.

7) Deve essere consentito ai magistrati nei cui confronti si ipotizzano fatti di

rilievo disciplinare di avvalersi delle garanzie difensive. Si applicano per quanto

compatibili le disposizioni dell’art. 220 disp. att. cod. proc. pen.1

1 Prevedendo il d.lgs. n. 109 del 2006 che nel giudizio disciplinare si applicano le norme del

codice di procedura penale, pare evidente che tali norme in tanto possono trovare applicazione in quanto alla nozione di indagato o “imputato”, “reato” e “penale” di si sostituiscano quelle di “incolpato”, “fatto disciplinarmente rilevante”, “disciplinare”: nello stesso senso, d’altronde S.U. n.

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8) La relazione conclusiva deve essere redatta in autonomia dai Magistrati

Ispettori delegati allo svolgimento dell’attività d’inchiesta, senza interferenze del

Capo dell’Ispettorato sulle valutazioni da loro espresse in ordine all’esistenza, o

non, di fatti o di comportamenti suscettibili di valutazione in sede disciplinare.

9) La formulazione di proposte rivolte al Ministro è riservata al Capo

dell’Ispettorato, al quale spetta evidenziare l’eventuale difformità della sua

valutazione rispetto a quella dei Magistrati Ispettori e darne giustificazione al

Ministro.

10) Nel caso di attività d’inchiesta demandata dal Consiglio Superiore della

Magistratura, spetta invece al Magistrato Ispettore responsabile della procedura

trasmettere direttamente al Consiglio la relazione e gli atti allegati, inviandone

contemporaneamente copia al Ministro (art. 40 d.P.R. n. 916 del 1958).

11) Compete agli ispettori unitamente al responsabile della procedura

d’inchiesta la denuncia di fatti ulteriori ritenuti forieri di responsabilità penale o

erariale; nessuna ingerenza può essere esercitata in tali ambiti dal Capo

dell’Ispettorato.

5.2. Con riguardo all’attività istruttoria, “preispettiva” (su esposti,

segnalazioni e informative) e ispettiva, regole sufficienti possono trarsi, a mio

avviso, dal d.m. del 1995 citato e, soprattutto, dalla legge n. 241 del 1990, per

quanto applicabile. Le stesse possono sintetizzarsi secondo quanto segue.

1. Il magistrato Ispettore Generale Capo designato nell’ambito del gruppo

cui è assegnato lo svolgimento di attività ispettive presso un ufficio giudiziario,

ovvero, in mancanza di tale figura, il magistrato Ispettore Generale designato,

assume il ruolo di “Capo del gruppo ispettivo” ed é responsabile della sub-unità

organizzativa costituita dalle unità di personale con lui delegate alla verifica.

E’ per conseguenza responsabile del procedimento di verifica ai sensi degli

artt. 5 e 6 della legge n. 241 del 1990; è responsabile delle eventuali

raccomandazioni e prescrizioni impartite in corso di ispezione; è responsabile

della trasmissione al Capo dell’Ispettorato della relazione finale e delle eventuali

segnalazioni a fini disciplinari o comunque destinate ai dipartimenti e agli uffici

di diretta collaborazione del Ministero.

2. Spetta al Capo dell’Ispettorato la formulazione di eventuali proposte

disciplinari e l’interlocuzione in genere con l’ufficio del Gabinetto del Ministro,

con i dipartimenti e gli uffici dell’Amministrazione centrale, con gli organi aventi

15976 del 2009, non massimata sul punto.

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attribuzioni in materia disciplinare e con i capi degli uffici giudiziari per le

questioni esulanti l’ambito delle attività ispettive delegate.

3. L’attività ispettiva ha come scopo soltanto l’accertamento della regolarità

e della funzionalità dei servizi di giustizia erogati dagli uffici giudiziari; non deve

essere condotta con metodi inquisitori; non consente l’esternazione di propositi

punitivi né apprezzamenti di merito estranei allo scopo e alla funzione per la

quale è esercitata; deve essere condotta nella logica della minore invasione e nel

rispetto delle regole istituzionali d’interlocuzione con i capi degli uffici interessati.

4. Gli ispettori devono ricercare sin dove è possibile la collaborazione degli

uffici ispezionati e sono essi stessi chiamati ad agire anzitutto in funzione di

collaborazione al miglioramento del servizio giustizia.

Il Capo dell’Ispettorato è tenuto a vigilare sul corretto espletamento

dell’attività ispettiva.

6.3. Quanto a rapporti e protocolli del dialogo tra gli organi cui compete il

potere di vigilanza e di esercizio dell’azione disciplinare, ovviamente non

compete a me individuare modi e contenuti.

Rilevo tuttavia che sarebbe opportuno colmare alcuni deficit di definizione in

tema:

- di criteri di dialogo e di interlocuzione interna all’Amministrazione centrale,

ovverosia tra Dipartimenti, Direzioni generali, Gabinetto e Ispettorato (penso agli

artt. 3 e 17 del d.m. 18 ottobre 2010, n. 180, come modificati dall’art. 1 del d.m.

6 luglio 2011, n. 145; all’art. 4 del d.m. 23 ottobre 2001, come modificato dal

d.m. 22 febbraio 2008, n. 31307, da un lato; agli artt. 2 e 8 d.P.R. n. 315 del

2001 e all’art. 12, sesto e settimo comma, l. n. 1311 del 1962, dall’altro);

- di protocolli d’interlocuzione esterna, diretta, tra Gabinetto del Ministro,

Consiglio Superiore e Procuratore Generale, in tema di mandati all’Ispettorato;

- di limiti di informazione e intromissione dei diversi organi titolari dei poteri

di controllo, aventi voce in materia disciplinare, in relazione alle attività

demandate o compiute dall’Ispettorato.

- di regole di comunicazione dei risultati dell’attività strettamente ispettiva,

di interesse per gli altri organi (bonifica dei dati statistici effettuata

dall’Ispettorato, rilevazione di criticità e buone prassi negli uffici ispezionati).

Considero difatti acquisizione consolidata (maturata in ambito

internazionale, sviluppata nel sistema della Carta dell’U.E., ampiamente recepita

dalla Corte Costituzionale allorché è costretta ad occuparsi di conflitti tra poteri o

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enti) che, allorché più soggetti muniti di poteri autoritativi debbano spartirsi una

sfera (grande o piccola) di competenze o di attribuzioni, principi generali quali

quelli di responsabilità, precauzione e sostituzione richiedono anzitutto una

proceduralizzazione dei meccanismi di interlocuzione oltre che, se del caso, di

cooperazione, ovverosia una procedimentalizzazione del dialogo mediante il

quale attuare il dovere di leale collaborazione.

Vista dall’ottica dell’Ipettorato (apparato che come detto svolge attività

amministrativa nell’ambito di un rapporto di “diretta collaborazione“ con il

Ministro, che la legge vuole composto da soggetti aventi status di magistrato e

che è a servizio altresì dell’organo di autogoverno della magistratura), la leale

collaborazione consiste nel dovere di assicurare non soltanto nei confronti del

Ministro, ma agli organi in genere titolari dell’azione disciplinare e al Consiglio

Superiore quale organo di autogoverno, l’ordinato perseguimento di finalità

condivise di vigilanza, rispettando l’autonomia dell’ordine giudiziario e

garantendo il valore dell’indipendenza dei giudici.

Sicché una procedimentalizzazione dei rapporti conferirebbe certamente

trasparenza all’operato dello stesso Ispettorato.

Credo fermamente, d’altro canto, che la corretta realizzazione del dovere

dell’Ispettorato di assicurare una funzionalità credibile, e neppure

apparentemente invasiva, al proprio operato, non possa dipendere

esclusivamente dalla opinione, o dalla esperienza, del Capo occasionalmente

nominato; richiede invece, anch’essa, la possibilità di un controllo esterno, che

resterebbe estremamente incerto in assenza di una definizione dei protocolli,

anche relazionali, cui parametrare il vaglio di correttezza istituzionale.

Vi ringrazio nuovamente.

Roma 4 giugno 2012

M.Stefania Di Tomassi

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compiti.




sua scelta
























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verbalizzazione;


















inchiesta.






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Ministro.








dell’Ispettorato.




















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tema:


















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Roma 4 giugno 2012


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compiti.




sua scelta
























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verbalizzazione;


















inchiesta.






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Ministro.








dell’Ispettorato.




















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tema:


















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Roma 4 giugno 2012


Conferenza organizzata dal Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura su iniziativa della Sesta Commissione:

““TTeerrzzaa CCoonnffeerreennzzaa IInntteerrnnaazziioonnaallee ssuulllloo ssccaammbbiioo ddii eessppeerriieennzzee ttrraa ii PPaaeessii ddeellll’’UUnniioonnee

EEuurrooppeeaa ssuuii tteemmii ddeeii rraappppoorrttii,, nneeii vvaarrii ssiisstteemmii ggiiuuddiizziiaarrii,, ttrraa llee ffuunnzziioonnii ddeeggllii IIssppeettttoorraattii

ddeell MMiinniisstteerroo ddeellllaa GGiiuussttiizziiaa eedd ii CCoonnssiiggllii ddii ggiiuussttiizziiaa ee//oo ggllii oorrggaannii ddii ggoovveerrnnoo aauuttoonnoommoo””

Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura, Roma, 4-5 giugno 2012

L’attività dell’Ispettorato in Italia ed i suoi riflessi sulle attribuzioni

del C.S.M.

Dott.ssa Mariastefania DI TOMASSI

Capo dell’Ispettorato Generale del Ministero della Giustizia

ITALIA

Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura

Funzioni e rapporti degli ispettorati nell’Unione europea

<>

Tema affidato: «L’attività dell’Ispettorato in Italia ed i suoi riflessi

sulle attribuzioni del C.S.M. »

(Italia - Mariastefania Di Tomassi – Capo dell’Ispettorato Generale del Ministero della Giustizia - Relazione)

Signor Primo Presidente, signor Capo di Gabinetto, gentili ospiti, signori e

signore, porgo loro i saluti dell’Ispettorato Generale del Ministero della Giustizia

italiano e ringrazio per l’invito e per l’attenzione.

Premessa

La mia esperienza quale Capo dell’Ispettorato è recente.

Come giudice ho vissuto l’epoca in cui si temeva che l’Ispettorato potesse

essere usato dalla politica per intromettersi nella giurisdizione e ridurne

l’autonomia. Ho aderito al cortese invito del Ministro Paola Severino a ricoprire

questo incarico credendo e auspicando che l’era della tensione fra poteri politici e

giudici, e dei sospetti di interferenza arbitraria, si avviasse a superamento.

La resistenza all’abbandono di schemi rigidamente gerarchici e una certa

tendenza alla deresponsabilizzazione, che ho colto nella stessa organizzazione

interna dell’Ispettorato, mi fanno pensare che è necessario risolvere ancora

alcune incertezze in tema di regole procedurali e protocolli di dialogo.

Tenterò di spiegarmi.

1. L'Ispettorato Generale, in breve.

L’ispettorato è composto da 21 magistrati (affiancati da un corpo ispettivo

composto da funzionari e dirigenti di cancelleria, appartenenti

all'amministrazione giudiziaria) ed è, formalmente, uno degli uffici di “diretta

collaborazione” del Ministro della Giustizia.

Compongono l’organico, secondo la legge n. 1311 del 1962: un magistrato

di Corte di Cassazione con ufficio direttivo, con le funzioni di Capo

dell’Ispettorato Generale; un magistrato di Corte di Cassazione con le funzioni di

Vice Capo dell’Ispettorato Generale; altri diciannove magistrati, sette di Corte di

Cassazione con funzioni di Ispettore Generale Capo; dodici di Corte di appello

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con funzioni di Ispettore Generale.

Il Capo dell’ufficio può destinare all’esercizio di funzioni denominate

“amministrative” (più che altro per distinguerle da quelle squisitamente ispettive,

da svolgere mediante accessi negli Uffici) presso l’Ispettorato Generale tre

magistrati con funzioni di Ispettori Generali. Ad essi sono di regola “delegate” le

attività di studio, di valutazione e di formulazione di proposte per parte delle

procedure (nell’ordine oramai di alcune migliaia l’anno) scaturenti da esposti,

informative, interrogazioni, prescrizioni e segnalazioni (quest’ultime redatte dagli

ispettori all’esito della loro attività).

A magistrati dirigenti e direttori le funzioni ispettive vengono conferite dal

Ministro con apposito decreto. L’organico del personale è in teoria composto da

145 unità (oggi 95).

Dell’ispettorato il Ministro si avvale, secondo la legge n. 1311 del 1962, per

l’esercizio dell’azione disciplinare e dei suoi poteri di sorveglianza sui servizi di

giustizia.

Dell’Ispettorato può avvalersi anche il Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura

e l’Ispettorato risponde per legge direttamente al C.S.M., se questo direttamente

lo investe.

A differenza di tutti gli altri Uffici di diretta collaborazione e a differenza, in

genere, da tutte le altre “articolazioni” ministeriali, l’Ispettorato è dunque:

- regolato, nell’organizzazione e nel funzionamento, da autonoma legge

istitutiva (la legge n. 1311 del 1962, appunto), ovverosia da fonte di rango

primario non soggetta a delegificazione;

- a diretto servizio anche del Consiglio Superiore;

- composto, per legge, da magistrati.

2. Inquadramento sistematico

Per comprendere tale assetto, e la reale natura delle attribuzioni

dell’Ispettorato, occorre partire dal dato che nel nostro sistema costituzionale la

magistratura costituisce un ordine autonomo e indipendente da ogni altro potere

dello Stato. E’ la stessa Costituzione a prevedere, per conseguenza, che la

magistratura sia dotata di un organo di autogoverno, il Consiglio Superiore

appunto, al quale "spettano”, «secondo le norme dell'ordinamento giudiziario, le

assunzioni, le assegnazioni ed i trasferimenti, le promozioni e i provvedimenti

disciplinari nei riguardi dei magistrati» (art. 105 Cost.).

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La Carta costituzionale delinea peraltro, in coerenza con il sistema accolto di

separazione bilanciata, in senso funzionale, dei “poteri”, una griglia di

“interferenze” (meglio, contrappesi) nei rapporti fra ordine giudiziario e altri

poteri, che per gli aspetti che qui interessano, consistono essenzialmente:

- nella prefissazione di una composizione, per così dire “mista”, del Consiglio

Superiore della Magistratura (il Consiglio è presieduto dal Capo dello Stato, ne

sono membri di diritto il Primo Presidente e il Procuratore Generale della Corte di

Cassazione; é composto per un terzo da personalità elette dal Parlamento in

seduta comune; per i restanti due terzi da magistrati eletti: art.104);

- nella previsione che anche il Ministro della Giustizia (art.107 Cost.) «ha

facoltà di promuovere l'azione disciplinare», e che «Ferme le competenze del

Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura, spettano al Ministro della Giustizia

l'organizzazione e il funzionamento dei servizi relativi alla giustizia» (art. 110).

Al Ministro sono insomma attribuite potestà “concorrenti” in punto di

esercizio – discrezionale però – dell’azione disciplinare e di vigilanza sul corretto

“funzionamento” degli uffici giudiziari.

I limiti fisiologici di tali “incroci” di competenze non possono tuttavia ancora

cogliersi se non si considera che la seconda parte del testo costituzionale, in cui

s’inseriscono le norme ordinamentali appena ricordate, è, nell’architettura del

sistema, funzionale (servente) alla prima, che, enunciando i diritti fondamentali,

fissa i principi su cui l’ordinamento stesso si basa.

Il rapporto tra principi e diritti, da una parte; istituzioni che esercitano i

poteri loro attribuiti (in funzione della attuazione di principi e diritti) dall’altra,

non ammette deroghe che non siano coerenti con i presupposti che regolano tale

rapporto: il primato dei diritti, soggettivi e di libertà; il diritto alla tutela dei

diritti, quale conseguenza obbligata di tale primato; il diritto ad un giudice

indipendente, a garanzia dell’effettività della tutela e quale diritto anch’esso

fondamentale.

L’esercizio dei poteri attribuiti in vista del controllo del modo in cui il servizio

giustizia è erogato, deve pertanto mantenere una funzionalità credibile (deve

essere svolto in senso funzionale, nella sostanza e nelle manifestazioni esteriori,

al primato di tali diritti).

D’altronde, se è vero che un diniego (o un eccesso di limitazione) della

responsabilità del giudice per suoi errori o inefficienze pone in dubbio l’efficacia

delle norme che attribuiscono il diritto e ne garantiscono la tutela, il diritto del

cittadino ad una giustizia rapida e “giusta” non può prescindere dal rischio che il

sindacato sull’operato del giudice apra la via a "ritorsioni": non solo da parte dei

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soggetti nei confronti dei quali è stata somministrata la giurisdizione e all’interno

del plesso giurisdizionale, quanto e soprattutto nell’ambito dei rapporti del

magistrato con l’amministrazione e con altri poteri.

Il problema sta, come sempre, nei limiti e nelle garanzie del controllo.

Non basta, perciò, stabilire i confini tassativi (come ha voluto il legislatore

del 2006) entro i quali l’errore o il comportamento assume i connotati obiettivi

della patologia idonea a generare responsabilità disciplinare (l’unica che

interessa in questa sede). L'affidabilità del sistema non può non essere

avvalorata da un discorso chiaro sul metodo con cui vengono attuate le verifiche,

prima; da un sistema adeguato in astratto e credibile in concreto di valutazione

disciplinare e professionale, poi.

3. I compiti di collaborazione attribuiti all’ispettorato.

Seguendo l’assetto delineato dalla Costituzione, le leggi ordinarie prevedono

che il Ministro eserciti le sue attribuzioni concernenti l’organizzazione e il

funzionamento dei servizi relativi alla giustizia e la sorveglianza sugli uffici

giudiziari mediante poteri di interlocuzione e richiesta nei confronti del C.S.M.

(artt. 10 e 11 legge n. 195 del 1958, in tema di costituzione e funzionamento del

C.S.M.), chiedendo informazioni ai capi delle corti circa il funzionamento della

giustizia, facendo al riguardo le “comunicazioni” che ritiene opportune (art. 14

legge); chiedendo ai capi di corte informazioni sul conto di singoli magistrati (art.

56 d.P.R. n. 916 del 1958); avvalendosi inoltre, anche in funzione di controllo

diretto, dell'Ispettorato Generale costituito presso il Ministero.

In base alla legge costitutiva (n. 1311 del 1962) l'Ispettorato Generale

contribuisce alla realizzazione di dette finalità mediante:

- Ispezioni ordinarie, consistenti in controlli, mediante interrogazioni dei dati

informatizzati ed esame a campione degli incartamenti, in tutti gli uffici giudiziari

(corti di appello, tribunali, uffici del giudice di pace e di conciliazione) per

verificare se i servizi procedono secondo le leggi, i regolamenti e le istruzioni

vigenti, disposte d’iniziativa, secondo turnazione periodica (per legge ogni tre

anni, di fatto oramai molto più distanziate), direttamente dal Capo

dell'Ispettorato;

- Ispezioni occasionali o parziali (comunemente dette mirate), che devono

essere disposte segnatamente dal Ministro della Giustizia, ogni qual volta questi

ne ravvisi la necessità o opportunità, anche al fine di accertare la produttività

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degli uffici, nonché «l'entità e la tempestività del lavoro di singoli magistrati»;

- Inchieste, disposte dal Ministro, sul personale appartenente all'ordine

giudiziario e su qualsiasi altra categoria di personale dipendente dal Ministero

della Giustizia, al fine di verificare la ricorrenza di fatti integranti ipotesi di illecito

disciplinare. All’esito dell’attività d’inchiesta il Magistrato Ispettore redige una

dettagliata relazione alla quale allega gli atti e i documenti acquisiti per

l'accertamento della responsabilità disciplinare dell'inquisito. Il Capo

dell'Ispettorato Generale trasmette al Ministro la relazione d'inchiesta,

«formulando, se del caso, proposte circa i provvedimenti da adottare». Copia

della relazione viene trasmessa anche «al Direttore Generale competente».

Scopo delle Ispezioni è, in breve, accertare «se i servizi procedono secondo

le leggi, i regolamenti e le istruzioni vigenti»; al termine dell’ispezione vengono

segnalate «le irregolarità e le lacune riscontrate nei servizi» e formulate «le

proposte atte ad eliminarle». Quelle da fare sono dunque rilevazioni “oggettive”,

di funzionalità. Ai soli Magistrati Ispettori è attribuito il compito di riferire anche

«sulla entità e tempestività del lavoro eseguito dai magistrati».

Non sono ammessi (neppure da parte dei Magistrati Ispettori)

apprezzamenti (di merito) sulla capacità, operosità e condotta dei magistrati

(consentite invece da parte dei soli Magistrati Ispettori nei confronti dei

funzionari addetti all'ufficio ispezionato), i Dirigenti o Direttori Ispettori per

quanto concerne l'attività dei magistrati debbono limitarsi invece «al rilevamento

dei dati statistici».

Mediante l’attività d’inchiesta vengono invece effettuati “accertamenti

preliminari” finalizzati a verificare la notizia relativa ad un fatto disciplinarmente

valutabile, già acquisita (in esito ad ispezioni ordinarie o anche sulla scorta di

esposti o interrogazioni).

Nell’ipotesi in cui dall’inchiesta disposta dal Ministro emergano

effettivamente comportamenti disciplinarmente rilevanti, spetta al Ministro di

valutare, nell’ambito della sua discrezionalità politica, se esercitare l’azione

disciplinare.

Lo stesso accade nell’ipotesi in cui fatti o comportamenti di rilevanza

disciplinare emergano dalle ispezioni, ordinarie o mirate (nell’esperienza

maturata, ciò accade normalmente giacché è purtroppo usuale che nel corso

dell’attività ispettiva vengano segnalati perlomeno un certo numero di reiterati

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ritardi nel deposito dei provvedimenti, nella trattazione dei procedimenti, a volte

anche nelle scarcerazioni).

L’azione disciplinare che consegue all’attività normale d’istituto o a quella

straordinaria specificamente delegata dal Ministro è, quindi, in ogni caso

eventuale (discrezionale) ed é esercitata dal Ministro, secondo quanto dispone il

d.lgs. n. 109 del 2006, mediante richiesta di indagini rivolta al Procuratore

Generale della Corte di Cassazione, che accogliendo la richiesta darà avvio alla

fase giurisdizionale del procedimento disciplinare e formulerà quindi le proprie

richieste alla Sezione Disciplinare del Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura:

giudice disciplinare. Avverso le decisioni della Sezione Disciplinare è prevista la

facoltà, anche per il Ministro che ha esercitato l’azione disciplinare, di ricorrere

alle Sezioni Unite Civili della Corte di Cassazione.

Coerentemente con l’assetto costituzionale di divisione in senso funzionale

dei poteri, l’Ispettorato Generale è tuttavia posto per legge (quella che regola il

funzionamento del C.S.M.), autonomamente, anche al servizio del Consiglio

Superiore della Magistratura.

Ai sensi dell’art. 8 della già ricordata l. 195 del 1958, difatti, il C.S.M., per

esigenze relative all'esercizio delle funzioni ad esso attribuite, si avvale

dell'Ispettorato Generale istituito presso il Ministero della giustizia.

Il Consiglio Superiore, nel fare le sue richieste all'Ispettorato Generale

presso il Ministero della giustizia, ne informerà il Ministro (al quale potrà

richiedere che autorizzi l'esame dei fascicoli personali dei singoli magistrati).

L'Ispettore Generale (si noti, il riferimento testuale non è al “Capo”

dell’Ispettorato) trasmetterà direttamente al Consiglio la relazione e gli atti delle

inchieste promosse dal Consiglio stesso, e contemporaneamente ne invierà copia

al Ministro (art. 40 d.P.R. n. 916 del 1958).

Il Consiglio Superiore ha quindi l’obbligo (così come i consigli giudiziari e i

dirigenti degli uffici) di comunicare al Ministro della giustizia e al Procuratore

Generale presso la Corte di Cassazione ogni fatto rilevante sotto il profilo

disciplinare (art. 14, comma 4, d.lgs. n. 109 del 2006).

Per conseguenza, poiché per il Procuratore Generale l’esercizio dell’azione

disciplinare è obbligatorio, a fronte di accertamenti realizzati in identico modo e

dal medesimo organo, nel caso in cui l’Ispettorato sia investito dal Consiglio

Superiore della Magistratura, il promovimento dell’azione disciplinare non

dipende più solamente dal vaglio discrezionale del Ministro, ma segue la via

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ordinamentale dell’obbligatorietà.

4. L’attività ispettiva e l’azione disciplinare

A parte tale particolarità, quanto alle relazioni tra attività ispettiva e azione

disciplinare, va anzitutto ricordato che la prima suole essere definita come un

complesso di atti giuridici e di operazioni, ordinati secondo una serie

procedimentale (non sempre rigida e inderogabile), compiuti da una pubblica

autorità allo scopo di acquisire la conoscenza di fatti e di comportamenti che la

interessano e quale presupposto per ulteriori attività.

Nessun dubbio che l’attività ispettiva costituisca, in sé, una attività

amministrativa.

Il procedimento disciplinare nei confronti dei magistrati è invece

tradizionalmente, e in armonia con la Costituzione, configurato secondo

paradigmi di carattere giurisdizionale.

Per dirla con le parole della Corte Costituzionale, le ragioni della necessaria

giurisdizionalità di tale tipo di procedimento disciplinare consistono: da un lato

nell'opportunità che l'interesse pubblico al regolare e corretto svolgimento delle

funzioni giudiziarie e lo stesso prestigio dell'ordine giudiziario siano tutelati nelle

forme più confacenti alla posizione costituzionale della magistratura e al suo

statuto di indipendenza; dall'altro nell'esigenza che alla persona del magistrato

raggiunto da incolpazione disciplinare sia riconosciuto quell'insieme di garanzie

che solo la giurisdizione può assicurare (C. cost. sentenza n. 497 del 2000 e ivi

richiamate nn. 71 del 1995, 289 del 1992 e 145 del 1976).

Conformandosi a tali principi, il d.lgs. n. 109 del 2006 dispone che

nell'attività di indagine (art. 16, comma 2) e nel giudizio (art. 18, comma 4) si

osservano, in quanto compatibili, le norme del codice di procedura penale:

eccezione fatta per quelle che comportano l'esercizio di poteri coercitivi e per

quelle riferibili alla assunzione e formazione della prova in dibattimento.

In relazione a tale ultimo aspetto, particolare rilievo assume quindi, per

l’Ispettorato, la previsione che nel corso del giudizio la Sezione Disciplinare può

«disporre o consentire la lettura di rapporti dell'Ispettorato Generale del

Ministero della giustizia, dei consigli giudiziari e dei dirigenti degli uffici, la lettura

di atti dei fascicoli personali nonché delle prove acquisite nel corso delle

indagini» (art. 18, comma 3, lett. b, decreto citato).

La peculiarità dell’attività amministrativa dell’Ispettorato è, dunque, che può

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fungere da presupposto, non soltanto per ulteriori atti che parimenti restano

manifestazione di amministrazione attiva, ma anche per atti d’impulso di

un’azione e di un’attività a carattere, invece, giurisdizionale. I risultati della

attività amministrativa dell’Ispettorato, riversati nel rapporto conclusivo possono

essere, in altri termini, utilizzati appieno nel giudizio disciplinare.

5. Rapporti

Pare per conseguenza evidente che il problema dei rapporti tra Ispettorato e

Consiglio Superiore, quali organi che a diverso livello intervengono nel controllo

dell’attività dei magistrati, non sta nell’individuazione delle – ovviamente

“subordinate” – attribuzioni del primo, di per sé chiare.

Discende, invece, dalla possibilità che il modo di esercizio, o della

utilizzazione, delle, diciamo così, competenze dell’Ispettorato, si risolva in

travalicamento dei limiti della potestà attribuita in funzione, come detto,

servente l’assetto equilibrato dei rapporti tra poteri delineato dalla Costituzione.

E nei fatti, questo è stato sempre il nodo critico: che all’interno dell’area

d’interferenza relativa alla vigilanza sul corretto funzionamento del servizio

giustizia, voluta dal Costituente, potessero in concreto realizzarsi modi

d’esercizio invasivi delle attribuzioni e dell’indipendenza della magistratura.

Ora, a mio avviso, l’eliminazione di questo rischio non può restare affidato

alle sensibilità individuali, ma richiede l’avvio di dialoghi sereni sulla necessità di

una procedimentalizzazione dei rapporti e dell’azione.

Non per astratto amore della procedura.

La codificazione mediante la legge n. 241 del 1990, specie a seguito degli

interventi del 2005 e 2009, della teoria del procedimento come “forma della

funzione” amministrativa (da Sandulli a Giannini, Benvenuti, Cassese), luogo in

cui meglio possono comporsi autorità, interesse pubblico e legalità, segna una

svolta netta nel senso della rivalutazione del profilo formale del procedimento in

funzione di garanzia. Ai fini che qui interessano basterà al proposito di tale

codificazione brevemente ricordare che il sistema così positivamente accolto si

pone in una posizione intermedia tra due modelli di regolazione dell’azione

amministrativa: dal modello statunitense mutua la “struttura snella e

l’impostazione per principi”; da quello austriaco e tedesco l’attenzione alla

regolazione del procedimento e all’interazione tra organizzazione e attività.

Quello che anche a costo di ripetizioni mi preme sottolineare è, invece, che è

proprio la materia e l’oggetto dell’attività ispettiva o d’inchiesta sui servizi della

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giustizia in genere a sui magistrati in particolare, a reclamare la massima

attenzione alle garanzie.

Se, infatti, la tutela dell'indipendenza del magistrato rileva anche in materia

di responsabilità disciplinare, perché la prospettiva dell'irrogazione di una

sanzione può condizionare il magistrato nello svolgimento delle funzioni che

l'ordinamento gli affida, ed é necessario, dunque, che siano adottate, in ambito

disciplinare, tutte le misure volte a evitare ogni indebito condizionamento (C.

cost. n. 87 del 2009), analoga ratio di tutela, identica esigenza che sia evitato

ogni indebito condizionamento e siano garantite indipendenza e autonomia di

giudizio, non può non ispirare la regolazione degli accertamenti preliminari,

seppure di per sé a carattere amministrativo, posti in essere dall’Ispettorato.

In linea generale, occorre dunque convenire che l’attività ispettiva consiste

in un procedimento d’accertamento al quale si applicano i principi di legalità,

imparzialità, comunicazione, trasparenza, congruità e proprorzionalità che

debbono ispirare ogni azione dell’Amministrazione, congruità e proporzionalità

costituendo in particolare, per l’attività dell’Ispettorato e quali proiezioni del

bilanciamento tra indipendenza e controllo, indicatori necessari dell’esercizio

dell’autorità secondo il canone di funzionalità credibile.

5.1. In quest’ottica, e in tema d’inchiesta, il Consiglio Superiore ha da tempo

tracciato, seppure indirettamente, occupandosi delle possibilità di reazione dei

soggetti ispezionati e degli stessi Magistrati Ispettori, linee guida chiare, già

d’altro canto recepite, quanto a contenuto essenziale dell'avviso di avvio del

procedimento e a conformazione a regole e principi dettati dalla legge n. 241 del

1990, dal d.m. 20 novembre 1995, n. 540 (art. 4), in tema di procedimenti di

competenza del Ministro della Giustizia.

E’ sufficiente perciò che in questa sede io sottolinei poche cose di codeste

linee guida.

La specificazione dell’oggetto dell’incarico risponde a criteri minimi di

legalità.

La dizione "senza particolari formalità" utilizzata per le inchieste

amministrative (art. 12, comma 3, l. n. 1311 del 1962) non può stare a

significare uso disinvolto delle modalità operative, né eccezione alle garanzie

dovute all'incolpabile come persona e come appartenente all’ordine giudiziario.

In linea ancora più generale, natura, funzioni e criteri di composizione

dell’Ispettorato comportano che il rapporto di sovraordinazione tra Capo

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compiti.




sua scelta
























11













verbalizzazione;


















inchiesta.






12








Ministro.








dell’Ispettorato.




















13


















tema:


















14


























Roma 4 giugno 2012








The activity of Italy's Inspectorate

and its effects on the powers of the C.S.M.

Mrs. Mariastefania DI TOMASSI Head of the Inspectorate General of the Ministry of Justice ITALY

High Council of the Judiciary

Functions and relationships of the inspectorates in the European Union

<>

Assigned topic: "The activity of Italy's Inspectorate and its effects on

the powers of the C.S.M. »

(Italy - Mariastefania Di Tomassi - Head of the Inspectorate General of the

Ministry of Justice - Report)

Mr. First President, Mr. Head of Cabinet, dear guests, ladies and gentlemen:

I would like welcome you on behalf of the Inspectorate General of the Italian

Ministry of Justice, and I thank you for the invitation and your attention.

Premise

My experience as Head of the Inspectorate is recent.

As a judge, I have experienced an era characterized by the concern that

political forces could use the Inspectorate, meddle in its jurisdiction and diminish

its autonomy. I welcomed Minister Paola Severino's courteous invitation to fulfill

this task in the belief and hope that we can start to overcome this era of tension

between political and judicial powers and suspicions of arbitrary interference.

A resistance to the abandonment of rigidly-hierarchical schemes and a

certain tendency towards the shirking of responsibilities, which I witnessed

within the Inspectorate itself, lead me to believe that a variety of uncertainties

remain to be resolved in terms of procedural rules and protocols for dialogue.

Allow me to elaborate.

1. The Inspectorate General, a brief overview.

The inspectorate is made up of 21 magistrates (joined by an inspection body

consisting of civil servants and clerk managers belonging to the judicial

administration) and is formally one of the "direct collaboration" offices of the

Minister of Justice.

In accordance with Law no. 1311 of 1962, the personnel is composed of: one

Court of Cassation magistrate with a management unit, functioning as the Head of

the Inspectorate General; one Court of Cassation magistrate, functioning as

Deputy Head of the Inspectorate General; nineteen other magistrates - seven

from the Court of Cassation functioning as Head Inspectors General, and twelve

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from the Court of Appeals functioning as Inspectors General.

The Head of office may assign the "administrative" functions (mainly for

purposes of distinguishing them from actions purely related to inspections, to be

carried out through access in the Offices) of the Inspectorate General to three

magistrates functioning as Inspectors General. As a general rule, they are

"delegated" to examine, assess and formulate recommendations for the

proceedings (on the order of a few thousand each year) originating in

statements, disclosures, questioning, prescriptions and recommendations (the

latter published by the inspectors upon completion of their activities).

The Minister confers the inspection functions to the magistrate managers

and directors by special decree. In theory, the staff is composed of 145 units (in

practice, 95 at present).

The Minister, in accordance with Law no. 1311 of 1962, utilizes the

inspectorate to implement disciplinary actions and its oversight powers of the

judicial services.

The High Council of the Judiciary may also avail itself of the Inspectorate,

and by law the Inspectorate answers directly to the C.S.M. if vested by it

directly.

Differently from any other direct collaboration offices and differently, in

nature, from all other ministerial "articulations," the Inspectorate is thus:

- regulated, in terms of organization and function, by an autonomous

organic statute (law no. 1311 of 1962, to be precise) - in other words, a highest-

degree source that is not subject to ‘delegislation’;

- at the direct service of the Higher Council, as well;

- composed, by law, of magistrates.

2. Systematic placement

To explain this structure and the true nature of the Inspectorate's powers,

we should begin with the fact that the judiciary, under our constitutional system,

constitutes an autonomous order that is independent from any other State

authority or power. The Constitution itself provides, as a consequence, for the

judiciary to be equipped as a self-governing body (the High Council, to be

precise) that is responsible for, «in full accordance with the judicial order's

regulations, the hiring, assignments and transfers, promotions and disciplinary

measures for the magistrates» (art. 105 Const.).

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Consistently with the accepted system of the balanced separation of powers, in

functional terms, the constitutional Charter also delineates a grid of "interferences"

(or even better, counterbalances) in the interrelationship of the judicial order with

the other “powers”. The ones of interest to us at the moment consist in:

- the pre-establishment of the "mixed" composition of the High Council of

the Judiciary (the Council is presided over by the Head of State, then there are

the First President and the Attorney General of the Court of Cassation as

members-by-law; one third of the body is composed of figures elected by a joint

session of Parliament, and the remaining two thirds consists of elected

magistrates: art. 104);

- the provision that the Minister of Justice (art. 107 Cost.) also «has the

authority to initiate disciplinary actions,» and that «Without prejudice to the

powers of the High Council of the Judiciary, the Minister of Justice is responsible

for the organization and function of justice-related services» (art. 110).

The Minister, in short, is empowered with "concurrent" authority on the

point of the implementation (albeit discretionary) of disciplinary actions and

oversight of the correct "functioning" of the judicial offices.

The physiological limits of these "overlapping" responsibilities cannot be fully

appreciated, however, until one acknowledges how the second part of the

constitutional text (which incorporates the structural laws just mentioned) is, within

the system's architecture, functional (subservient) to the first part, which pronounces

the basic rights and establishes the principles on which the order itself is founded.

The relationship between principles and laws, on the one hand, and the

institutions that exercise the powers attributed to them (as a function of the

implementation of principles and laws), on the other - does not allow for exceptions

that are inconsistent with the assumptions governing this relationship: the primacy

of subjective rights and freedoms; the right to the protection of rights, as a

mandatory consequence of this primacy; the right to an independent judge to

guarantee the effectiveness of this protection as another fundamental right.

The exercise of the powers attributed to provide for controls over the

manner in which judicial services are provided must therefore maintain a

credible functionality (must be performed in a sense that is functional to the

primacy of those rights in its substance as well as its external manifestations).

While it may be true, on the other hand, that a denial (or an excessive

limitation) of the judge's responsibility for his/her errors or inefficiencies may raise

doubts about the effectiveness of the laws that establish the right and guarantee

its protection, the right of a citizen to rapid and "just" justice cannot disregard the

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risk that the checks on the judge's activities could open the way to "retaliations":

not only for the subjects on behalf of whom the jurisdiction is being administered

and within the judicial plexus, but also and especially within the context of the

magistrate's relationships with the administration and other powers.

The problem, as always, lies in the limits and guarantees governing the controls.

It is not enough, therefore, to establish inflexible boundaries (as attempted

by the legislature of 2006) within which an error or behavior takes on objective

connotations of pathology suited to generate a disciplinary liability (the only

liability of interest in this session). The system's reliability cannot help but be

strengthened, first of all, by a clear discourse about the implementation method

for the checks and inspections, and second of all by a system of professional and

disciplinary evaluation that is adequate in the abstract and credible in practice.

3. The collaborative duties attributed to the inspectorate.

Following the structure outlined in the Constitution, ordinary law provides

for the Minister to apply his/her powers to the organization and function of

justice-related services and the oversight of the judicial offices by means of

interlocutory powers and by making requests of the C.S.M (arts. 10 and 11, Law

no. 195 of 1958, on the constitution and functioning of the C.S.M.), asking the

heads of the courts for information on the functioning of justice, issuing any

related "communications" they deem appropriate (art. 14 law); asking the heads

of the courts for information about individual magistrates (art. 56 of Presidential

Decree no. 916 of 1958); availing themselves, as part of the direct control

function, of the Inspectorate General constituted at the Ministry.

Based on the organic statute (no. 1311 of 1962), the Inspectorate General

contributes to the realization of said goals by means of:

- Ordinary inspections consisting in controls, queries on digitized data and

sample-based surveys of the files in all of the judicial offices (courts of appeal,

tribunals, offices of the justice of the peace and conciliation) to confirm that the

services are proceeding in accordance with the law and the regulations and

guidelines in force, and at the periodic and direct initiative (every three years by

law, de facto much less frequently) of the Head of the Inspectorate;

- Occasional or partial (targeted) inspections that need to be initiated

notably by the Minister of Justice when deemed necessary or appropriate, and

also in order to ascertain the productivity of the offices and the «volume and

5

timeliness of the work of individual magistrates»;

- Inquiries, initiated by the Minister, concerning the personnel of the judicial

order and any other category of personnel employed by the Ministry of Justice,

for purposes of verifying the recurrence of actions constituting possible

disciplinary offences. The Magistrate Inspector drafts a detailed report based on

the outcome of the inquiry, attaching the papers and documentation that were

acquired to ascertain the disciplinary liability of the person under investigation.

The Head of the Inspectorate General presents the inquiry report to the Minister,

«formulating, if necessary, recommendations about the measures to be

adopted.» A copy of the report is also submitted «to the competent Director

General.»

The scope of the Inspections, in short, is to determine «whether the services

are proceeding in accordance with current laws, regulations and guidelines.»

Upon the conclusion of the inspection, «the irregularities and gaps in the

services» are signaled and «recommendations designed to eliminate them» are

formulated. These entail, in other words, "objective" findings concerning

functionality. The Magistrate Inspectors are the only ones assigned the additional

task of reporting «on the volume and timeliness of the work carried out by the

magistrates.»

Not even the Magistrate Inspectors, however, are allowed to express an

opinion of the capacity, industriousness and conduct of the magistrates

(Magistrate Inspectors are only allowed to do so in regard to the staff of the

inspected office), and the Managers and Director Inspectors must limit themselves

instead «to the gathering of statistical data» about the activity of the magistrates.

Inquiries, alternatively, are used to conduct "preliminary ascertainments" in

order to verify information related to a disciplinarily assessable action that has

already been acquired (via ordinary inspections or even on the basis of

statements or questioning).

Should an inquiry initiated by the Minister reveal disciplinarily-significant

behaviors, it is the Minister's responsibility to evaluate, within the context of

his/her political discretion, whether or not to initiate a disciplinary action.

The same thing happens whenever disciplinarily-significant actions or behaviors

are discovered during inspections, whether ordinary or targeted (experience has

shown, unfortunately, that it is normal during the course of inspections for a

6

number of repeated latenesses to be discovered in the filing of measures and the

treatment of proceedings, at times even in releases from prison).

Disciplinary actions ensuing normal activities or extraordinary ones that are

specifically delegated by the Minister are possible, therefore, (discretionary) and

are implemented by the Minister, in accordance with the provisions of Leg.

Decree no. 109 of 2006, by submitting a request for investigation to the

Attorney General of the Court of Cassation, who receives the request and

initiates the jurisdictional phase of the disciplinary proceedings, and then

submits his/her own request to the Disciplinary Division of the High Council of

the Judiciary: disciplinary judge. Objections to the decisions of the Disciplinary

Division can be posed through United Civil Divisions of the Court of Cassation.

Consistently with the constitutional structure of the functional division of

powers, the Inspectorate General is also placed, by law (the one regulating

functions of the C.S.M.) and autonomously, at the service of the High Council of

the Judiciary.

Pursuant to art. 8 of L. 195 of 1958 (cited above), de facto, for any needs

related to the exercise of its assigned functions, the C.S.M. avails itself of the

Inspectorate General instituted at the Ministry of Justice.

The High Council also informs the Minister (who may be asked for

authorization to examine the personal files of individual magistrates) of any

requests the Council submits to the Inspectorate General at the Ministry of

Justice. The Inspector General (note that the textual reference is not to the

"Head" of the Inspectorate) transmits the report and the documentation for any

inquiries ordered by the Council itself directly to the Council and sends a copy to

the Minister (art. 40 Presidential Decree no. 916 of 1958).

The High Council therefore has an obligation (just like the judicial councils

and office directors) to communicate every fact of relevance under the

disciplinary profile to the Minister of Justice and the Attorney General at the

Court of Cassation (art. 14, sub-paragraph 4, Leg. Decree no. 109 of 2006).

As a consequence, since the Attorney General has the obligation to initiate a

disciplinary action when presented with ascertainments made in the same way

by the same body, the promotion of a disciplinary action follows the structured

path of obligation when the Inspectorate has the authorization of the High

Council of the Judiciary, and it does not depend exclusively on the discretionary

7

order of the Minister.

4. Inspection activities and disciplinary actions

Aside from this peculiarity in the relationship between inspection activities

and disciplinary actions, it should first of all be recalled that the former should be

defined as a collection of judicial acts and operations, ordered in accordance with

a set of proceedings (not always rigid and binding), carried out by a public

authority for purposes of acquiring knowledge of the facts and behaviors in

question and the prerequisites for further actions.

There is no doubt that the inspection activity itself constitutes an

administrative activity.

The disciplinary proceeding for magistrates is instead configured,

traditionally and in harmony with the Constitution, in accordance with paradigms

that are jurisdictional in nature.

In the words of the Constitutional Court, the reasons for the necessary

jurisdictionality of this type of disciplinary proceeding consist of: the possibility,

on the one hand, for the public interest in the regular and correct performance of

judicial functions and the prestige of the judicial order itself to be safeguarded in

the forms that are most consistent with the constitutional stature of the judiciary

and its organic independence and, on the other hand, in the need to be

acknowledged the set of guarantees that only the jurisdiction can ensure for the

individual magistrate subject to disciplinary accusations (C. Cost. ruling no. 497

of 2000 and ivi cited in nos. 71 of 1995, 289 of 1992 and 145 of 1976).

In conformity with these principles, Leg. Decree no. 109 of 2006 provides

that the investigatory activity (art. 16, sub-paragraph 2) and the judgment (art.

18, sub-paragraph 4) both observe, to the extent they are compatible, the laws

of the penal code of proceedings, with exception made for those entailing the

exercise of coercive powers and for those related to the taking and hearing of

evidence during the proceedings.

In relation to this last aspect, the Inspectorate finds a particular degree of

significance in the provision that the Disciplinary Division, during the course of

judgment, may «prepare or allow the reading of the reports of the Inspectorate

General of the Ministry of Justice, the judicial councils and the office directors, the

reading of acts from personal files as well as the evidence acquired during the

course of the investigations (art. 18, sub-paragraph 3, lett. b, cited decree).»

The peculiarity of the Inspectorate's administrative activity, therefore, is not

8

only that it may serve as a prerequisite for additional acts that are likewise still

manifestations of active administration, but also for acts that stimulate

jurisdictional actions and activity. The results of the Inspectorate's administrative

activity as reflected in the concluding report may, in other words, be used in

their entirety in the disciplinary judgment.

5. Relations

As a consequence, it seems clear that the problem with the relationship

between the Inspectorate and the High Council, as bodies that intervene at different

levels to control the activities of magistrates, does not lie in the identification of the

former’s (obviously "subordinate") powers, which in themselves are clear.

It derives, instead, from the possibility that the method of implementation

(or utilization) of the, shall we say, powers of the Inspectorate are resolved by

transcending the limits of the power attributed as a function, as mentioned, that

serves to balance the structural relations between the different powers defined in

the Constitution.

This was always the critical nexus in terms of the facts: that within the zone

of interference related to the oversight of the correct functioning of the judicial

service, at the will of the Constituent, operational methods could materialize that

were invasive of the judiciary's powers and independence.

In my opinion, the elimination of this risk cannot be entrusted to individual

sensibilities, and instead requires the initiation of a sober dialogue focused on

the need to proceduralize the relations and the action.

This would not be for the sake of an abstract love of procedure.

Law no. 241 of 1990, subsequent to the interventions of 2005 and 2009,

codified the theory of proceedings as "the form of the administrative function"

(from Sandulli to Giannini, Benvenuti, Cassese), a domain of improved

performance for authority, public interest and legality, marks a clear turning point

in terms of the reevaluation of the formal profile of the proceedings in their

function as a guarantee. For our present purposes, it suffices for this codification

to briefly recall that the system, which was welcomed so positively, is placed in an

intermediate position between two regulatory models for administrative action:

from the United States model it borrows the "lean structure and principle-based

setup," and from the Austrian and German model it borrows the focus on the

regulation of proceedings and the interaction between organization and activity.

At the risk of seeming repetitive, I would also like to underline, alternatively,

9

that it is the very material and object of the investigation or inquiry into the

judicial services in general, and its magistrates in specific, that attracts

maximum attention to the guarantees.

If the protection of the magistrate's independence applies to matters of

disciplinary responsibility as well, in fact, due to the influence that the imposition

of sanctions could have on the magistrate's performance of the functions as

entrusted by the order, thus requiring the adoption of all of the measures in the

disciplinary context that are designed to prevent undue conditioning (C. cost. no.

87 of 2009), analogous protection ratio, identical needs to avoid any undue

conditioning and to guarantee the independence and autonomy of judgment, this

cannot help but motivate the regulation of the preliminary ascertainments by the

Inspectorate, even if they are only administrative in nature.

Generally speaking, therefore, we need to acknowledge how the ascertainment

proceedings involved in the inspection activities that are subject to the principles of

legality, impartiality, communication, transparency, congruity and proportionality -

principles that should characterize all of the Administration's activities, with

congruity and proportionality of the Inspectorate's activities and the projected

balancing of independence and control providing the necessary indicators of how the

powers are being exercised in accordance with the canons of credible functionality.

5.1. On the topic of inquiries, from this point of view, the High Council has

for some time been marking out clear guidelines, albeit indirectly by considering

the potential reactions of the subjects being inspected as well as the Magistrate

Inspectors themselves, that have already been incorporated as essential

elements of the notices of the initiation of proceedings, in conformity with the

rules and principles dictated by Law no. 241 of 1990, by M.D. no. 540 of 20th

November 1990 (art. 4) on the proceedings of the Ministry of Justice.

In this session, therefore, it is sufficient for me to highlight a few aspects of

these guidelines.

The specification of the purpose of the proceedings meets the minimum

criteria of legality.

The phrase "without particular formalities," as employed by administrative

inquiries (art. 12, sub-paragraph 3, L. no. 1311 of 1962), cannot signify the

casual use of the operating procedures or any exception to the guarantees for

the person charged as an individual and as a member of the judicial order.

In even more general terms, the nature, functions and criteria of

10

composition of the Inspectorate imply that the superordinate relationship

between the Head of the Inspectorate and the Magistrate Inspector needs to be

framed in organizational and functional terms. The hierarchical connotations of

the relationship itself could refer exclusively to the first aspect, while

superordination in terms of functionality cannot imply any general form of

power. In terms of the methods used to execute inspections and inquiries in

particular, the Head of the Inspectorate (alone) enjoys the power of

management and guidance, in accordance with the attribution of responsibility to

the delegates on the basis of directives that are limited to methods and concrete

scopes and tasks.

The directives, as such, cannot be obligatory in nature or nullify the discretionary

contexts that are reserved for the delegates, except for the rule that the delegate who

does not intend to comply with it is required to justify his/her decision.

The concrete procedures for executing the delegated activity, in effect, are

still entrusted to the autonomy of the subject who is charged with the task and

the head of the procedure: autonomy, in the case of the Inspectorate General,

that is corroborated by the legislative provision that assigns the Inspector

General's functions exclusively to components of the judiciary.

Protecting the independence and autonomy of the judicial function also needs

to be understood as having been entrusted directly, that is, to the individual

responsibility of the Magistrate Inspectors precisely because they are magistrates.

The Magistrate Inspectors who are delegated to exercise investigations,

inspections and inquiries, in the end, take on the responsibility for the related

proceedings and their independence of action, autonomy of assessment and

authority as inspectors is recognized as more incisive relative to those that

normally accompany the exercise of any other administrative activity.

This is about a "procedural" code for inquiries that I believe could be

formulated in the following terms.

1) The prerequisite that the ascertainment activity cannot be indeterminate

or generic, and cannot be founded on anonymity.

2) The subject matter of the inquiry must be specific and refer to one or

more specific hypotheses of disciplinary offence.

3) The subject in charge of the inquiry (typically and henceforth through the

"letter of appointment") should be reported in the implementation measure used by

the Head of the Inspectorate to identify which Magistrate Inspectors are delegated

to conduct the inquiry and provide them with the mandate and the instructions.

11

The implementation measure of the Head of the Inspectorate, in particular,

(a) must include:

- the subject matter of the case conferred to the Magistrate Inspector by mandate

of the Minister, reporting a hypothesis that is likely to be of disciplinary relevance;

- a summary statement of the sources of the alleged hypothesis;

- the subjects targeted by the inquiry, when already identified or clearly

identifiable on the basis of the acts constituting the information to be ascertained;

(b) must identify:

- the delegated Magistrate Inspectors, and which one of these is in charge of

the ascertainment proceedings;

- the Managers or Director Inspectors and the auxiliaries needed to assist

them, respectively, with the data gathering and recordation;

(c) may dictate directives:

- regarding to the procedures used to conduct the inquiry;

- intended specifically to respect (as related to the connotations of the

concrete case) the procedural rules, the guarantees for the person being

charged, the independence of the function being exercised and the principle of

non-interference in the jurisdictional activity.

4) The loyal collaboration of the magistrates and the heads of the judicial

offices where the inquiry is taking place with the Magistrate Inspectors assigned

to perform the inspection may be requested as constrained by the need to

protect the autonomy and independence of the judicial function.

5) The heads of the offices where the inquiry is taking place and the

magistrates subjected to administrative investigation are entitled to demand that

the letter of appointment and the implementation mandate be shown to them so

that they can verify whether the ascertainment is actually being performed

within the context of the mandate.

6) For cases in which the already mentioned guarantees of specificity,

communication, transparency, congruity and proportionality, the duty to collaborate

is nullified for the heads of the offices and the magistrates subject to the inquiry.

7) Magistrates under investigation for actions of potential disciplinary relevance

must be allowed to avail themselves of defensive guarantees. The provisions of art.

220 enact. prov. Code of C.P. apply, to the extent they are compatible.1

1 Leg. Decree no. 109 of 2006 provides that the procedural regulations of the penal code be

applied to the disciplinary judgment, and it seems clear, in any case, that such regulations can be applied by replacing the concepts of investigated or "accused," "offence" and "penal" with the concepts of "charged," "disciplinarily-relevant action" and "disciplinary": in the same sense, on the other hand S.U. no. 15976 of 2009, not ruled on the point.

12

8) The conclusive report needs to be published autonomously by the

Magistrate Inspectors delegated to conduct the inquiry, without the Head of the

Inspectorate interfering in their assessments with regard to the existence (or

absence) of actions or behaviors susceptible to disciplinary evaluation.

9) The formulation of recommendations for the Minister is reserved for the

Head of the Inspectorate, whose responsibility is to reveal any differences

between his evaluation and that of the Magistrate Inspectors and explain them

to the Minister.

10) For inquiries referred by the High Council of the Judiciary, it is instead

the Magistrate Inspector in charge of the procedure who is responsible for

transmitting the report and the attached documentation directly to the Council

and sending a copy to the Minister at the same time (art. 40 Presidential Decree

no. 916 of 1958).

11) The inspectors along with the head of the inquiry proceedings are

responsible for reporting any additional actions heralding penal or fiscal liability;

the Head of the Inspectorate may not interfere in these contexts in any way.

5.2. In regard to investigations, whether "pre-inspection" (of statements,

reports and disclosures) or inspection, sufficient rules can be drawn from the

cited M.D. of 1995, in my opinion, and mostly from Law no. 241 of 1990 (to the

extent it applies). These rules can be summed up as follows.

1. The designated Head Inspector General magistrate within the context of

the unit assigned to inspect a judicial office or, in the absence of this figure, the

designated Inspector General magistrate, assumes the "Head of the inspection

unit" role and is responsible for the organizational sub-unit consisting of the

personnel units that are delegated to conduct the inspection with him.

This figure, as a consequence, is responsible for the inspection proceedings

pursuant to arts. 5 and 6 of Law no. 241 of 1990, and is also responsible for any

recommendations or prescriptions conveyed during the inspection and

transmitting the final report to the Head of the Inspectorate, as well as any

discipline-related or other recommendations addressed to the offices and

departments of direct collaboration with the Ministry.

2. The Head of the Inspectorate is responsible for the formulation of any

disciplinary recommendations and communication with the office of the Cabinet

Office, the departments and offices of the central Administration, the bodies with

13

disciplinary functions and the heads of judicial offices for issues concerning the

context of the delegated inspection activities.

3. The sole scope of the inspection is to ascertain the regularity and

functionality of the judicial services being supplied by the judicial offices, and

should not be conducted using investigative methods. Neither the externalization

of punitive recommendations nor opinions in this regard are allowed that are

external to the scope and function for which it is being conducted. It should be

carried out in the spirit of minimal invasiveness and with respect for the

institutional rules of interlocution with the heads of the offices in question.

4. Wherever possible, the inspectors should seek out the collaboration of

inspection offices, which are in turn called on first and foremost to collaborate in

order to improve the judicial service.

The Head of the Inspectorate is responsible for overseeing the proper

fulfillment of the inspection activity.

6.3. As for the reports and protocols for the dialogue between the bodies with

oversight powers and the bodies implementing disciplinary actions, the

identification of the methods and contents is obviously beyond my present scope.

Overall, it would seem opportune to rectify various deficits in the definitions:

- of the criteria for internal dialogue and interlocution within the central

Administration, i.e., between Departments, Directorates-General, the Cabinet and

the Inspectorate (having in mind arts. 3 and 17 of M.D. no. 180 of 18th October

2010, as modified by art. 1 of M.D. no. 145 of 06th July 2011, art. 4 of M.D. of 23rd

October 2001, as modified by M.D. no. 31307 of 22nd February 2008, on the one

hand, and by arts. 2 and 8 of Presidential Decree no. 315 of 2001 and art. 12,

sixth and seventh sub-paragraph of L. no. 1311 of 1962, on the other);

- of the protocols for direct external interlocution between the Cabinet Office,

the High Council and the Attorney General on the mandates of the Inspectorate;

- of the limits on the disclosures and interference of the various authorized

control bodies with an interest in disciplinary affairs, in regard to the activities

referred to or performed by the Inspectorate.

- of the rules for communicating the results of exclusively inspection-related

activities of interest to other bodies (sharing of the Inspectorate's statistical

data, detection of critical issues and best practices in the inspected offices).

I consider the consolidated acquisition (matured in the international context,

developed in the EU Charter system, broadly incorporated by the Constitutional

14

Court when forced to address conflicts between powers or bodies) that, when

multiple subjects endowed with powers of authority need to divide up a sphere

(large or small) of powers and responsibilities, what the general principles like

responsibility, precaution and replacement require most of all is a

proceduralization of the mechanisms of interlocution and, when necessary, of

cooperation, i.e., a proceduralization of the dialogue used to implement the duty

of loyal collaboration.

Viewed from the perspective of the Inspectorate (an apparatus which, as

suggested, performs administrative activities within the context of "direct

collaboration" with the Minister, composed by law of subjects with magistrate

status and embodying both a service and a self-governing judiciary body), loyal

collaboration consists in the duty to ensure - with respect to the Minister, the

bodies in charge of disciplinary actions and the High Council as a self-governing

body - the orderly pursuit of the common goals of oversight while respecting the

autonomy of the judicial order and guaranteeing the independence of the judges.

So that the proceduralization of these relations would be sure to confer

transparency to the work of the Inspectorate itself.

I am a firm believer, on the other hand, that the Inspectorate's duty to

ensure the credible functionality of its own workings cannot be fully realized

when it depends exclusively on the opinion or experience of its own periodically-

appointed Head, but instead requires the possibility for external controls, a

possibility that will remain extremely tenuous until we define the protocols (even

relational) for parameterizing the assessment of institutional correctness.

Thank you once again.

Rome - June 04th, 2012








The General Inspectorate

- Ministry of Justice

Mrs. Mariastefania DI TOMASSI Head of the Inspectorate General at the Ministry of Justice ITALY

GENERAL INSPECTORATE

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

- ITALY -

Some background

According to the Constitution of the Italian Republic, judicial function

is exerted by magistrates (judges and public prosecutors) who are

independent from the executive power.

The Judges (and public prosecutors) are appointed, promoted and

transferred from an office to another by the Superior Council of

Magistrature (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura). This organism,

composed of twenty magistrates elected among all judges (and public

prosecutors) and ten other members elected by Parliament, is also a

disciplinary Court in the matter of disciplinary charges relating to

magistrates.

Shortly

The fundamental law of the Italian legal system is the Constitution, of 1948.

The Constitution is divided into four sections and contains 139 articles (plus

18 final and transitional provisions):

1st Section - Fundamental Principles (articles 1 to 12)

2nd Section - Citizens’ Rights and Duties (articles 13 to 54) (Part One of

the Constitution)

3rd Section - The Republic’s Legal Structure (article 55 to 139) (Part Two of

the Constitution)

4th Section - Final and Transitional Provisions (19 provisions on transition

to the new republican system).

The first twelve articles and some others of the Part One of the Constitution

contain the foundations of our legal system.

Part one completes the recognition of the rights giving every citizen the

right to a defence before a court (article 24). The right to a defence is an

inviolable right at any stage and grade of judicial proceedings and is guaranteed

by appropriate institutions also to the poor.

Part two, on the organization of the Italian Republic, describes the structure

and functions of the public institutions.

It is within these institutions that the Judiciary operates, administering

justice through the enforcement of laws, the composition of disputes and the

carrying out of trials. The Judiciary is a power endowed with guarantees that

make it subjected solely to the Constitution and the law and thus independent

2

from any other power. As a further declaration of the Judiciary’s independence

and impartiality, article 25 (1) of the Constitution states that "no one may be

withheld from the jurisdiction of the judge previously ascertained by law".

An entire title of the Constitution is dedicated to the Judiciary, wherein its

main characters are outlined:

1. Judges are subjected only to the law (article 101); the Judiciary

constitutes an autonomous order which is independent from any other power

(article 104);

2. Judges may not be moved from their office and are distinguished only by

their different functions (article 107);

3. Judges must be impartial and in a third party position (article 111);

4. The Supreme Council of the Judiciary is its self-governing body. It is

chaired by the President of the Republic, who is its President, the First President

(Primo Presidente) and the General Prosecutor (Procuratore Generale) of the

Supreme Court of Cassation (Corte Suprema di Cassazione); while all its other

members are elected (2/3 by Judiciary; 1/3 by Parlament). It has a number of

tasks including employments, assignments, transfers, promotions and

disciplinary measures of judges (article 104 and 105);

5. The Ministry of Justice, being the lead organism of the Government's

justice policy, is competent for the judicial organization and its functionality

(“services”: article 110). According with article 107 of Constitution, the Minister

of Justice may open disciplinary proceedings against any magistrate (every time

he thinks it is suitable).

The Inspectorate

To achieve his duty, the Minister of Justice may use the Inspectorate,

an office instituted in close cooperation with the Minister himself.

The Superior Council of the Judiciary may ask the Inspectorate to

inquiry on judicial offices or judges.

The organization and functioning of the General Inspectorate is ruled by Law

n. 1311 of August 12th 1962.

Its task is to perform, in coordination with the Ministry's Departments, a

supervision function in the fields indicated by the above law and in compliance

with it, either reporting directly to the Minister, or to the Superior Council of the

Judiciary (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura) when it operates on the latter's

request.

The General Inspectorate is composed of the following staff:

3

A magistrate with the grade of Justice of the Court of Cassation with

managerial functions, who is the Head of the General Inspectorate;

A magistrate with the grade of Justice of the Court of Cassation, who is the

Deputy Head of the General Inspectorate;

Seven magistrates with the grade of Justice of the Court of Cassation, who

are the Chief General Inspectors;

Twelve magistrates with the grade of Justice of the Court of Appeal, who are

the General Inspectors.

The Head of the General Inspectorate can appoint no more than three

Magistrates General Inspectors to perform, even temporarily, administrative

functions at the Inspectorate General. This staff helps the Chief in preliminary

checks of complaints or protests against judges and other judiciary’s personnel

(in the last time ever increasing: now about 1500 - 2000 by year).

Inspectorate General is also staffed with personnel of the Ministry of Justice

that can be assigned for not more than five years to the same district of a Court

of Appeal.

The staff of the Inspectorate is placed under the authority of the Head of the

General Inspectorate or his substitute and is conferred its inspection functions by

a Minister's Decree (Decreto del Ministro).

Inspectorate carries out its inspection activity essentially through four types

of interventions:

ORDINARY INSPECTIONS: these are checks ordered by the Head of the

Inspectorate in order to verify whether the different types of services are

performed in compliance with the laws, regulations and directives in force; they

are usually performed once every three years.

SPECIAL INSPECTIONS: these are ordered before the end of the standard

three-year period in regards to offices where shortcomings or irregularities have

been reported or found.

TARGETED INSPECTIONS: the Minister, at any moment might order partial

inspections in a judicial office in order to verify its productivity, output and

timeliness of the work performed individually by the judges.

ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY: Inspectorate carries out inquiries ordered by

the Minister or the Superior Council of Magistrature about judges every time

supposes they have failed to their duties (of correctness, care, activity, reserve,

fairness). The Minister also utilize the General Inspectorate for carrying out

inquiries on other personnel of the Judiciary and staff employed by the Ministry

of Justice.

4

Once an inspection is concluded, the Inspector makes a report on the

irregularities and shortcomings found in the services and the proposals for

overcoming them.


““ TTeerrzzaa CCoonnffeerreennzzaa II nntteerrnnaazziioonnaallee ssuull lloo ssccaammbbiioo ddii eessppeerr iieennzzee ttrraa ii PPaaeessii ddeell ll ’’ UUnniioonnee

EEuurrooppeeaa ssuuii tteemmii ddeeii rraappppoorr ttii ,, nneeii vvaarr ii ssiisstteemmii ggiiuuddiizziiaarr ii ,, ttrraa llee ffuunnzziioonnii ddeeggll ii II ssppeettttoorraattii

ddeell MMiinniisstteerroo ddeell llaa GGiiuussttiizziiaa eedd ii CCoonnssiiggll ii ddii ggiiuussttiizziiaa ee//oo ggll ii oorrggaannii ddii ggoovveerrnnoo aauuttoonnoommoo””


Breve relazione sui rapporti tra l’attività ispettiva, il Ministero della

Giustizia ed il Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura

Cons. Riccardo FUZIO Componente del Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura ITALIA

Breve relazione sui rapporti tra l’attività ispettiva, il Ministero della Giustizia ed il Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura

* * *

1. L'Ispettorato generale è uno degli uffici di diretta collaborazione del Ministro della Giustizia. Esso è disciplinato, nell’organizzazione e nel funzionamento, dalla legge del 12 agosto 1962, n. 1311. L’Ispettorato generale svolge compiti di controllo informando direttamente il Ministro (art. 9 legge 12 agosto 1962, n. 1311) e coordinandosi nella sua attività con il Dipartimento per gli affari di giustizia (Dag) e con il Dipartimento dell'organizzazione giudiziaria, del personale e dei servizi (Dog).

Il Consiglio superiore della magistratura, altresì, può avvalersi dell’Ispettorato nell’espletamento dei propri compiti (art. 8 legge 24 marzo 1958, n. 195).

Sono sottoposti al controllo dell’Ispettorato generale: tutti gli uffici giudiziari.

L’Ispettorato generale svolge la propria azione di controllo effettuando degli interventi ispettivi, riconducibili essenzialmente a quattro tipologie (art. 7 legge 12 agosto 1962, n. 1311).

Ispezione ordinaria: costituisce una verifica disposta dal Capo dell’Ispettorato, allo scopo di accertare se i servizi giudiziari e di cancelleria procedano secondo le leggi, i regolamenti e le istruzioni vigenti. Le ispezioni di norma hanno luogo ogni triennio.

Ispezione straordinaria: è ordinata dal Capo dell’Ispettorato, prima dello scadere del termine triennale, negli uffici in cui sono state riscontrate, o vengono segnalate, deficienze o irregolarità.

Ispezione mirata: il Ministro in ogni tempo, quando lo ritenga opportuno, può disporre ispezioni parziali negli uffici giudiziari, al fine di accertare la produttività degli stessi, nonché l’entità e la tempestività del lavoro svolto dai singoli magistrati.

Inchiesta amministrativa: il Ministro si avvale dell’Ispettorato generale per l’esecuzione di inchieste sul personale appartenente all’ordine giudiziario e su qualsiasi altra categoria di personale dipendente dal Ministero della Giustizia. In tale ambito può essere inquadrata anche l’attività che l’Ispettorato generale svolge su delega del Consiglio superiore della magistratura (art. 8 legge 24 marzo 1958, n. 195)

L’organico dell’Ispettorato generale (art. 1 legge 12 agosto 1962, n. 1311) è composto da: un magistrato con le funzioni di Capo dell’Ispettorato generale; un magistrato con le funzioni di Vice Capo dell’Ispettorato generale; sette magistrati di corte di cassazione, con le funzioni di Ispettori generali capi ; dodici magistrati di corte d’appello, con le funzioni di Ispettori generali.

All’Ispettorato generale sono destinati anche dirigenti e funzionari amministrativi provenienti dal ruolo del personale del Ministero della giustizia.

2. L’attività dell’Ispettorato è funzionale alle attribuzioni che la Costituzione assegna al Ministro della Giustizia facendone il responsabile dell'organizzazione e del funzionamento dei servizi relativi alla giustizia e di titolarità del potere disciplinare ( art.107 Cost)

Al Ministro sono , in particolare, attribuiti il potere di promuovere l’azione disciplinare, di richiedere la estensione ad altri fatti dell’azione disciplinare promossa dal Procuratore generale, di formulare un’integrazione della contestazione disciplinare in caso di azione promossa dal Procuratore Generale e di chiedere la modificazione della contestazione disciplinare in caso di azione promossa da lui medesimo, oltre che di formulare l’imputazione e di chiedere autonomamente la fissazione del giudizio disciplinare in tutti i casi in cui dissenta dalla richiesta di proscioglimento avanzata dal Procuratore Generale (art. 14 , 16 e 17 D. lgs. 109/2006).

L’azione deve essere promossa entro un anno dalla notizia del fatto, della quale il Procuratore Generale presso la Corte di Cassazione ha conoscenza a seguito dell’espletamento di sommarie indagini preliminari o di denuncia circostanziata o di segnalazione del Ministro della Giustizia ( art. 15 D. lgs. 1092006). Il Ministro nell’esercizio della iniziativa disciplinare è soggetto al medesimo termine. Entro due anni dall’inizio del procedimento il Procuratore generale deve formulare le richieste conclusive, la Sezione disciplinare del Consiglio Superiore della magistratura è tenuta a pronunciarsi entro due anni dalla richiesta. La legge ha inoltre stabilito che non può essere promossa azione disciplinare quando siano decorsi dieci anni dal fatto ( art. 15 comma 1 bis D. Lgs. 109/2006).

Il Procuratore generale, se non ritiene di dovere chiedere la declaratoria di non luogo a procedere, formula l’incolpazione e chiede la fissazione dell’udienza di discussione orale (art. 15 cit.). La discussione nel giudizio disciplinare avviene in udienza pubblica. La sezione disciplinare delibera sentite le parti e la decisione può essere impugnata dinanzi alle Sezioni unite civili della Corte di cassazione, mentre la sentenza divenuta irrevocabile può essere soggetta comunque a revisione.

Al Procuratore Generale presso la Corte di Cassazione compete anche un potere di archiviazione pre - disciplinare, ove ritenga che il fatto disciplinare sia di scarsa rilevanza ovvero non costituisca illecito disciplinare . Tale provvedimento di archiviazione è comunicato al Ministro della Giustizia il quale, entro dieci giorni dal ricevimento della comunicazione può chiedere copia degli atti e, nei successivi sessanta giorni, può chiedere la fissazione della udienza innanzi alla sezione disciplinare del Consiglio, formulando l’imputazione ( art. 16 , comma 5 bis D. Lgs. 109/2006).

3. L’attività ispettiva può interferire sulla progressione di carriera dei magistrati, la cui valutazione è riservata – previe osservazioni del Ministro della Giustizia - al Consiglio Superiore della magistratura. Le verifiche dell’Ispettorato rilevano sia nella procedura di nomina dei capi degli Uffici giudiziari sia nella periodica (quadriennale) valutazione di professionalità. Sotto il primo profilo si deve osservare che la legge prevede che, per il conferimento degli incarichi direttivi e semidirettivi tra le “ Fonti di conoscenza e di valutazione”, il merito e le attitudini sono desunti dai dati ricavabili dagli “ esiti delle ispezioni ministeriali realizzate

presso gli uffici di appartenenza del magistrato”. Inoltre la legge stabilisce che la nomina dei Capi degli Uffici è fatta dal Consiglio ma con un parere, obbligatorio se pur non vincolante, espresso dal Ministro della Giustizia sulla base delle conoscenze acquisite tramite l’Ispettorato. Sotto il secondo profilo, le disposizioni della legge e della normativa del Consiglio superiore stabiliscono che la periodica valutazione di professionalità dei magistrati è effettuata anche sulla scorta delle risultanze dalle “ ispezioni ordinarie”.







Bref rapport sur les relations entre l’Inspection, le Ministère de la

Justice et le Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature

M. Riccardo FUZIO Membre du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature (C.S.M.) ITALIE

Bref rapport sur les relations entre l’Inspection, le Ministère de la Justice et le Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature

* * *

1. Rapports entre l’Inspection Général du Ministère de la Justice et le Conseil Supérieur de la magistrature.

L'Inspection Générale est l’un des services collaborant directement avec le Ministère de la Justice. Son organisation et son fonctionnement sont disciplinés par la loi n. 1311 du 12 août 1962. Le rôle de l’Inspection Générale est de contrôler et d’informer directement le Ministre (article 9 de la loi n. 1311 du 12 août 1962) en coordonnant son activité avec le Dipartimento per gli affari di giustizia (Dag – Département pour les Affaires de Justice) et avec le Dipartimento dell'organizzazione giudiziaria, del personale e dei servizi (Dog- Département de l’organisation Judiciaire, du personnel et des services).

Le Conseil Supérieur de la magistrature peut également s’appuyer sur l’Inspection pour la réalisation de ses tâches (art. 8 loi n. 195 du 24 mars 1958).

Tous les services judiciaires sont soumis au contrôle de l’Inspection générale.

L’Inspection générale effectue ses contrôles par le biais d’inspections essentiellement de quatre sortes (art. 7 loi n. 1311 du 12 août 1962).

Inspection ordinaire: vérification ordonnée par le Directeur de l’Inspection Générale, dans le but de s’assurer que les services judiciaires et les greffes opèrent conformément aux lois, aux règlements et aux dispositions en vigueur. Ces inspections se font en règle générale tous les trois ans.

Inspection extraordinaire: ordonnée par le Directeur de l’Inspection Générale, avant la fin de l’échéance triennale, dans les services dans lesquels des déficiences ou des irrégularités ont été signalées ou constatées.

Inspection ciblée: le Ministre peut à tout moment et s’il le juge opportun, demander que soient effectuées des inspections partielles dans les services judiciaires, afin de vérifier leur efficacité, ainsi que l’importance et la régularité du travail de chaque magistrat.

Enquête administrative: le Ministre s’adresse à l’Inspection générale pour la réalisation d’enquêtes sur le personnel des services judiciaires et sur toute autre catégorie de personnel dépendant du Ministère de la Justice. Ceci peut également concerner l’activité de l’Inspection générale réalisée sur délégation du Conseil Supérieur de la magistrature (article 8 de la loi n. 195 du 24 mars 1958).

L’Inspection générale regroupe (article 1 de la loi n. 1311 du 12 août 1962): un magistrat Directeur de l’Inspection générale; un magistrat sous-directeur de l’Inspection générale ;

sept magistrats de la Cour de Cassation qui exercent les fonctions d’inspecteurs généraux; douze magistrats de la Cour d’Appel, qui exercent les fonctions d’inspecteurs généraux.

Des dirigeants et des fonctionnaires administratifs provenant du personnel du Ministère de la Justice sont également désignés pour faire partie de l’Inspection générale.

2. Le Ministre de la Justice est titulaire du pouvoir disciplinaire contre les magistrats.

L’activité de l’Inspection générale dépend des attributions que la Constitution confère au Ministre de la Justice qui en fait le responsable de l’organisation et du fonctionnement des services judiciaires et le titulaire du pouvoir disciplinaire (art.107 de la Constitution).

Le Ministre se voit notamment confier la faculté d’instruire les procédures disciplinaires, de demander que les sanctions disciplinaires requises par le Procureur général s’étendent à d’autres faits, de formuler une intégration de la contestation disciplinaire en cas d’une action intentée par le Procureur Général, de demander que soient modifiée la contestation disciplinaire en cas d’une action intentée par lui-même ainsi que de formuler l’imputation et de demander en toute autonomie que le jugement disciplinaire soit appliqué à tous les actes pour lesquels il conteste la demande d’acquittement présentée par le Procureur général (articles 14, 16 et 17 du décret législatif 109/2006).

3. Le Parquet Général auprès de la Cour de Cassation est l’organisme responsable des enquêtes.

L’action doit être intentée dans un délai de un an à compter de l’annonce du fait, dont le Procureur Général auprès de la Cour de Cassation est venu à connaissance suite à la réalisation d’enquêtes préliminaires, au dépôt d’une plainte circonstanciée ou à une indication du Ministre de la Justice (art. 15 du Décret législatif 1092006). Le Ministre est tenu de respecter la même échéance pour la décision de sanctions disciplinaires. Le Procureur général doit, dans un délai de deux ans à compter du début de la procédure, formuler ses demandes finales et la Section disciplinaire du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature est tenue de se prononcer dans un délai de deux ans à compter de la date de présentation de la demande. La loi précise également qu’une sanction disciplinaire ne peut être adoptée dix ans après que le fait ait été commis (article 15, al. bis Décret législatif 109/2006).

4) Les rapports entre les résultats de l’inspection et les éventuelles analyses de la professionnalité des magistrats.

Le Procureur général, s’il estime ne pas avoir à demander une ordonnance de non-lieu, formule l’accusation et demande que soit fixée la date de l’audience pour les débats (article 15 cité). Les débats dans le cadre d’une procédure disciplinaire sont publics. La section disciplinaire après avoir entendu les parties, procède à une délibération et la décision peut faire l’objet d’un recours devant les Chambres civiles de la Cour de Cassation, tandis que la sentence jugée comme irrévocable peut toutefois faire l’objet d’une révision.

Le Procureur Général auprès de la Cour de Cassation a également la faculté de décider l’abandon de la procédure pré-disciplinaire, s’il estime que le fait contesté est sans

importance ou ne constitue pas une faute disciplinaire. Cette décision est communiquée au Ministre de la Justice qui, dans un délai de dix jours à compter de la date de réception de la communication, peut demander une copie des actes et, dans les soixante jours suivants, peut demander que soit fixée l’audience devant la section disciplinaire du Conseil en formulant l’accusation ( article 16, al. 5 bis, Décret législatif 109/2006).

3. L’inspection peut interférer avec l’avancement de carrière des magistrats, dont l’évaluation est réservée – après observations faites par le Ministre de la Justice – au Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature. Les contrôles de l’Inspection se font aussi bien du point de vue de la procédure de désignation des responsables des Services Judiciaires que du point de vue de l’évaluation régulière (quadriennale) de la professionnalité. Pour ce qui concerne le premier point de vue, il est à souligner que la loi prévoit que, pour l’attribution des postes de direction et de sous-direction entre “Sources de connaissance et d’évaluation”, le mérite et les compétences sont définis sur la base des “conclusions des inspections ministérielles réalisées auprès des services d’appartenance du magistrat”. En outre, la loi stipule que la désignation des Directeurs des Services incombe au Conseil mais après avoir reçu l’avis, obligatoire mais non contraignant, du Ministre de la Justice sur la base des connaissances acquises par le biais de l’Inspection générale. Pour ce qui concerne le deuxième point de vue, les dispositions légales et de la réglementation du Conseil supérieur définissent que l’analyse périodique de la professionnalité des magistrats se fait également sur la base des résultats des “ inspections ordinaires”.







Brief report of the relations among inspection activities,

the Ministry of Justice and the High Council for the Judiciary

Mr. Riccardo FUZIO Member of the High Council for the Judiciary (C.S.M.) ITALY

Brief report of the relations among inspection activities, the Ministry of Justice and the High Council for the Judiciary

* * *

1. Relations between the Inspectorate General of the Ministry of Justice and the High Council for the Judiciary

The Inspectorate General is one of the offices in direct collaboration with the Minister of Justice. It is governed, in its organization and operation, by Law 1311 of 12 August 1962. The Inspectorate General undertakes auditing tasks, directly reporting to the Minister (Art. 9, Law 1311 of 12 August 1962), and coordinating its work with the Department of Judicial Affairs (Dag) and the Department of Judicial Organisation, Personnel and Services (Dog).

The High Council for the Judiciary may likewise make use of the Inspectorate General in the performance of its own duties (Art. 8, Law 195 of 24 March 1958).

Subject to the control of the Inspectorate General: all judicial offices.

The Inspectorate General carries out its control function by undertaking inspection audits, mainly belonging to four types (Art. 7 Law 1311 of 12 August 1962).

Ordinary inspection: an audit ordered by the Chief of the Inspectorate General, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the judicial and administrative services are proceeding according to the laws, regulations and instructions in force. Inspections normally take place every three years.

Extraordinary inspection: ordered by the Chief of the Inspectorate General before the expiry of the three-year term, for offices where deficiencies or irregularities were found or reported.

Targeted inspection: the Minister may at any time deemed appropriate carry out partial inspections in judicial offices to ascertain the productivity thereof as well as the extent and timeliness of the work carried out by individual magistrates.

Administrative inquiry : the Minister may utilise the Inspectorate General to perform investigations on personnel in the judiciary and any other category of employees in the Ministry of Justice. The activity that the Inspectorate General carries out on behalf of the High Council for the Judiciary (Art. 8, Law 195 of 24 March 1958) also can be seen within this scope.

The organisation of the Inspectorate General (Art. 1, Law 1311 of 12 August 1962) is composed of a magistrate with the function of Chief Inspectorate General; a magistrate with the function of Deputy Chief of the Inspectorate General; seven magistrates of Court of Cassation, with the functions of General Chief inspectors; twelve magistrates of Court of Appeals, with the functions of chief inspectors. The Inspectorate General also includes managers and administrative officers from the roll of the personnel of the Ministry of Justice.

2. The Minister of Justice is responsible for disciplinary matters against magistrates.

The activity of the Inspectorate General is a function within the responsibilities that the Constitution assigns to the Minister of Justice, making it responsible for the organisation and operation of services relating to justice and holding disciplinary powers (Art. 107, Constitution)

The Minister, in particular, is conferred the powers to bring disciplinary action, to request the extension of a disciplinary action brought by the Attorney General to other actions, to formulate a supplement in a disciplinary dispute in an action initiated by the Minister and to seek a modification in a disciplinary dispute for an action promoted by the same Attorney General, as well as to formulate the charges and independently seek the establishment of disciplinary judgment in all cases where the Minister dissents from the request for acquittal advanced by the Attorney General (Arts. 14, 16 and 17, Leg. Decree 109/2006).

3) The Attorney General’s Office at the Court of Cassation is the investigating body.

The action must be brought within one year of the notice of the fact, of which the Attorney General at the Court of Cassation becomes aware as a result of the completion of the summary preliminary investigations or the detailed complaint or the report of the Minister of Justice (Art. 15 Leg. Decree 109/2006). The Minister, in exercising the disciplinary initiative, is subject to the same term. Within two years from the beginning of the proceedings the Attorney General must formulate the conclusive requests; the disciplinary Section of the High Council for the Judiciary is obliged to rule within two years of the request. The law has also determined that no disciplinary action may be brought if ten years have passed after the fact (Art. 15, paragraph 1-bis, Leg. Decree 109/2006).

4) Relations between the results of inspection activities and any ensuing evaluations of judges and prosecutors’ professionalism.

The Attorney General, if it is not deemed necessary to seek a declaration of null process, formulates the charges and calls for setting a hearing for oral argument (Art. 15). The discussion in the disciplinary proceedings takes place in a public hearing. The Disciplinary Section shall rule after hearing the parties and the decision may be appealed before the United Civil Sections of the Court of Cassation, while the ruling becoming irrevocable may be howsoever subject to revision.

The Attorney General at the Court of Cassation also has the power to set aside judgment previous to the proceedings, if it is deemed that the act of discipline has little relevance or does not constitute an offence to be disciplined. The motion to set aside is communicated to the Minister of Justice who, within ten days after receipt of the notice, may request copies of records and, over the next 60 days, may request a hearing be set before the disciplinary section of the Council, formulating the charges (Art. 16, paragraph 5-bis, Leg. Decree 109/2006).

3. The inspection activity can interfere in the career progression of magistrates, whose evaluation is confidential – through comments made by the Minister of Justice – to the High Council for the Judiciary. The Inspectorate General audits are revealed both in the nomination procedure for the heads of Judiciary Offices and in the periodic evaluation (every four years) of professionalism. Under the first heading, it must be observed that the law provides for the conferral of executive and semi-managerial duties that, among the “Sources of knowledge and evaluation”, the merits and aptitudes are deduced from data contained in the “ results of ministry inspection carried out at the offices to which the magistrate belongs”. Moreover, the law stipulates that the appointment of the Office Chief is made by the Council, but with an opinion, required though not binding, expressed by the Minister of Justice on the basis of the knowledge gained through the Inspectorate General. Under the second heading, the provisions of law and of the regulations of the High Council establish that the periodic evaluation of the professionalism of magistrates is conducted on the basis of findings from “ordinary inspections.”


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ddeell MMiinniisstteerroo ddeell llaa GGiiuussttiizziiaa eedd ii CCoonnssiiggll ii ddii ggiiuussttiizziiaa ee//oo ggll ii oorrggaannii ddii ggoovveerrnnoo aauuttoonnoommoo””


Brevi osservazioni sul sistema disciplinare italiano

Prof. Annibale MARINI Componente del Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura ITALIA

1

Ringrazio, anzitutto, il Presidente Guido Calvi dei generosi apprezzamenti che

ha voluto indirizzare alla mia attività di giurista, di docente universitario e di

giudice costituzionale e tengo ad assicurarlo che non supererò i limiti di tempo

che mi sono stati assegnati.

E ciò sia perchè ho l’abitudine, non so se buona o cattiva, di guardare

costantemente l’orologio sia perchè non dimentico una rilevazione americana

secondo la quale dopo venti minuti l’attenzione di chi ascolta diminuisce

progressivamente fino a trasformarsi in istinto aggressivo nei confronti di chi

parla.

Come ha ricordato l’amico Calvi, io faccio parte della Sezione disciplinare che

spesso presiedo.

Ho, quindi, il dovere di dedicare qualche cenno al sistema disciplinare italiano

che, dico subito, considero in assoluto uno dei migliori di quelli esistenti.

E si tratta di una valutazione che passo subito a motivare anche perchè si pone

in contrasto con il costume nazionale di criticare tutto ciò che ci appartiene

dimenticando le tante cose buone che nei vari campi dell’arte e del sapere il

nostro Paese ha fatto e continua a fare.

Il nostro sistema disciplinare è un sistema tipizzato che recepisce il

fondamentale principio di civiltà giuridica “nullum crimen sine lege”. Principio

che deve essere applicato in tutto il campo punitivo per evitare che la sanzione

sia demandata all’arbitrio di chi deve giudicare e possa quindi comportare una

violazione dei diritti fondamentali della persona.

E ciò vale particolarmente per il sistema disciplinare dei magistrati che, non si

dimentichi, deve conciliare due esigenze fondamentali di ogni ordinamento

costituzionale.

Da un lato v’è l’esigenza punitiva che si pone come il riflesso del potere stesso

dei magistrati e che serve in certo senso a legalizzare tale potere.

2

Dall’altro, c’è l’esigenza, egualmente fondamentale, di garantire uno dei valori

fondamentali dell’ordinamento democratico: e cioè l’indipendenza dei

magistrati.

Valore che, va detto, sarebbe in fatto se non in diritto compromesso da un

sistema punitivo fondato non già sulla volontà sovrana della legge, ma su quella

mutevole dei giudizi disciplinari.

Ecco perchè la tipizzazione degli illeciti disciplinari può considerarsi, anche se

non lo si dice, una delle più importanti conquiste di democrazia e di civiltà

giuridica del nostro Paese. Ed ecco perchè occorre rifuggire dalla ricorrente

tentazione di introdurre una clausola generale di punibilità che si colloca

all’antitesi del vigente sistema tipizzato e che di tale sistema segnerebbe la fine.

Se un fatto non è previsto quale illecito disciplinare la risposta dell’ordinamento

deve essere quella dell’assoluzione del magistrato. Ferma restando ove si tratti

di un fatto condannato dalla coscienza sociale l’introduzione, ad opera sempre

del legislatore, di una nuova figura (o tipo) di lecito destinata ad operare per il

futuro.

Vorrei concludere queste brevi notazioni con un ammonimento che riguarda

questa volta l’attività applicativa del giudice disciplinare.

Occorre cioè escludere proprio perchè siamo nel campo punitivo

quell’interpretazione analogica dei singoli tipi di illecito che è vietata

espressamente per le norme penali.

Il giudice disciplinare deve cioè applicare rigorosamente le specifiche

previsioni di legge senza estenderne la portata sotto il mantello ipocrita

dell’interpretazione estensiva che deve essere consentita solo se ed in quanto

non si trasformi in analogia.

Quanto, infine alle fattispecie di illeciti disciplinari più ricorrenti nel nostro

ordinamento, che è poi l’interrogativo che ci viene posto, non avrei alcun

3

dubbio ad indicarle nei ritardi nel deposito dei provvedimenti giudiziali in

genere e particolarmente stando all’id quod plerumque accidit, delle sentenze.

Ciò potrebbe dare l’impressione di una scarsa diligenza dei magistrati italiani

nell’osservanza dei propri doveri. Ma si tratterebbe di una impressione fallace

per diversi e concorrenti motivi.

In primo luogo, infatti, il numero dei magistrati italiani sanzionati per i ritardi è

sempre un numero esiguo se rapportato al totale dei magistrati in servizio. Ma

ciò che più importa sottolineare è, poi, il fatto che la durata ragionevole dei

processi che il legislatore intende perseguire con la sanzione dei ritardi richiede

anche, e soprattutto, una coraggiosa riforma legislativa senza la quale il nostro

Paese continuerà a detenere la maglia nera dei Paesi sanzionati dalla Corte di

Strasburgo per la violazione del principio della ragionevole durata del processo.

In un Paese, come è l’Italia, che ha un alto, anzi altissimo grado di litigiosità

occorre, quale misura indilazionabile, differenziare le varie specie di

controversie sulla base del loro differente rilievo economico e sociale,

riservando i 3 gradi di giudizio, che oggi è la regola per tutte le controversie,

solo alle vicende più importanti, mentre quelle meno importanti potrebbero

essere decise in unico grado o, comunque, in due gradi di giudizio.







Brief remarks on the Italian disciplinary system

Prof. Annibale MARINI Member of the High Council for the Judiciary (C.S.M.) ITALY

1

I would first like to thank President Guido Calvi for his generous words

regarding my work as jurist, university lecturer and constitutional judge, and to

reassure him that I will not exceed the time limit that has been assigned to me.

Of this I am certain because I have the tendency - for better or worse - to check

the clock constantly, because I can never forget an American finding about the

attention span of an audience and how it declines gradually until, at last, it

transforms into an aggressive instinct against the speaker.

As my friend Calvi has reminded us, I work in the Disciplinary Division, over

which I often preside.

My task, therefore, is to offer a few comments on Italy's disciplinary system,

starting with how I consider it to be better than any other of its kind in existence

today.

This is a judgment that I will justify at the outset because of how it contrasts

with the national custom of criticizing everything that we belong to and

forgetting the many good things our Country has done and continues to do in

various fields of art and knowledge.

Our disciplinary system is a typed system that incorporates the basic principle

of juridical culture: "nullum crimen sine lege." This is a principle that should be

applied to every punitive field in order to prevent the punishment from

relegated to the judge's own discretion, leading to a fundamental violation of

basic human rights.

This holds especially true for the disciplinary system of magistrates that is

called on, let us not forget, to reconcile the two fundamental needs of any

constitutional order.

On the one hand, there is the punitive need, which reflects the power of the

magistrates themselves and serves, in a certain sense, to legalize this power.

2

On the other hand, there is the equally fundamental need to guarantee one of the

most basic values of democratic order: the independence of the magistrates.

A value that, it must be said, would (in fact, if not in law) be compromised if

the punitive system were founded on the changeable will of the disciplinary

judgments as opposed to the sovereign authority of the law.

This is why we can consider the typing of disciplinary offences to be (although

usually left unsaid) one of the most important conquests of democracy and the

judicial culture of our Country. And this is why we need to resist the repeated

temptations to introduce a general punishability clause, which would represent

the anti-thesis of the typed system that exists now and signal the end of such a

system. If an action has not been defined as a disciplinary offence, then the

response of the order must be the acquittal of the magistrate. Notwithstanding

an action condemned by social conscience the introduction, as always by the

legislature, of a new lawful figure (or type) designated to work for the future.

I would like to conclude these brief remarks with some advice concerning, this

time, the applied activities of the disciplinary judge.

Analogous interpretations of single types of offences that are expressly

prohibited by penal law need to be excluded precisely because we are in the

punitive field.

Disciplinary judges, in other words, must apply the specific provisions of law

with great rigor and without extending its importance under the hypocritical

guise of extended interpretation, which should only be allowed if and to the

extent that it is not transformed into an analogy.

As for the case of the most recurrent disciplinary offences in our order, last of

all, which is the question we are asked, I can point without a doubt to the late

3

filing of judicial measures and especially the id quod plerumque accidit of the

sentences.

This might give an impression of scant diligence by the Italian magistrates in

the observance of their duties. Such an impression, however, would be

fallacious for a variety of concurrent reasons.

First of all, in fact, the number of Italian magistrates sanctioned for lateness is

always quite meager in proportion to the total number of magistrates in service.

What is even more important to emphasize, then, is the fact that the reasonable

length of proceedings that the legislature hopes to achieve through the sanction

for lateness also requires courageous legislative reform, most importantly,

without which our Country will continue to boast the black jersey of Countries

being sanctioned by the Court of Strasbourg for violating the principle on the

reasonable length of proceedings.

In Countries like Italy, which has a high (extremely high, in fact) degree of

contentiousness and litigation, it is necessary, without any further delay, to

differentiate among different types of disputes on the basis on their relative

social and economic importance and to reserve the 3 levels of court

proceedings, which is currently the rule for all litigation, for the more important

issues, with less important cases being decided at one or at most two levels of

proceedings.







Short Review on the Supervision of Courts, Disciplinary Liability of

Judges and Judicial Assessment

The Judicial Council

LITHUANIA

Short Review on the Supervision of Courts, Disciplinary Liability of Judges and Judicial Assessment

Relations of the Ministry of Justice with courts In the Republic of Lithuania due to the principle of the separation of powers, the judiciary is separated from the executive power; therefore, the Ministry of Justice does not participate in the inspection activities (administration of the judicial activities). The Ministry of Justice participates in the process of preparing and managing the qualification development and training programmes intended for the court officers, also organising their qualification development and training. Administration of judicial activities With reference to the Law on Courts, the administration in courts shall consist of organisational activities of judicial officers (internal administration of the court) and the supervision of the above activities performed by the officers provided under this Law (external courts’ administration). Internal administration of the court The Chairman, the Deputy Chairman of the court and the Chairman of a division of the court are officers of the court who shall, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Law on Couts and other laws or other legal acts, direct the organisational work of the court. The Chairman of the court shall organise and supervise administration at the court, control compliance with the requirements of the Code of Judicial Ethics. The Chairman of the court shall review complaints of the persons in respect of the non-procedural actions unrelated to the administration of justice, also in respect of the acts of the court staff and shall report to the interested parties the results of the review, shall eliminate the identified shortcomings of the court, and perform other functions of court administration assigned to him. External administration of the court Supervision of the administrative activities (external court administration) in accordance with the Regulations of Administration in Courts shall be exercised of: 1) district courts - by the Chairman of the relevant regional court; 2) regional administrative courts - by the Chairman of the Supreme Administrative Court; 3) regional courts - by the Chairman of the Court of Appeals; 4) the Court of Appeals – by the Chairman of the Supreme Court of Lithuania; 5) all courts - the Judicial Council. The Judicial Council shall be an executive body of the self-governance of courts ensuring the independence of courts and judges. Types of supervision (in the spheres of internal and external administration) are the following: � Objective inspection – for a concrete case or for the investigation of a particular sphere of activity; � Integrated inspection – overall inspection of court’s judicial activities. Objective and integrated inspections may be planned and unplanned (operative). According to the procedure established in the Regulations of Administration in Courts, the planned

integrated supervisory inspection of administrative activities in every court must be performed at least once every five years. Administrative subjects, implementing the administrative functions assigned to them may form commissions, which may include judges of several courts or other officials, as well as the specialists, academics of other institutions, agencies, society representatives. These persons are involved in the implementation process of judicial administration functions based on the principles of transparency, impartiality and voluntary. Composition of the Judicial Council The Judicial Council shall be composed of 21 members: 1) by virtue of their office - the Chairman of the Supreme Court, the Chairman of the Court of Appeals, the Chairman of the Supreme Administrative Court; 2) Judges elected by the General Meeting of Judges: three from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Administrative Court each, three from all regional courts, three from all regional administrative courts and three from all district courts. The candidates shall be nominated and elected during the General Meeting of Judges by the representatives of the relevant courts. Disciplinary liability of judges According to the Law on Courts of the Republic of Lithuania, the right to make a motion for instituting a disciplinary action shall be given to the Judicial Council, the Judicial Ethics and Discipline Commission and the Chairman of the court, where a judge is employed or the Chairman of any court of a higher level or any person knowledgeable of the judge’s action demeaning the judicial office, of violation of other requirements of the Code of Ethics of Judges or of non-compliance with the limitations on the work and political activities of judges provided by law. The party having the right to make a motion for instituting a disciplinary action shall submit a reasoned petition for bringing a disciplinary action against the judge to the Judicial Ethics and Discipline Commission. The instituted disciplinary action shall be transferred to the Judicial Court of Honour. The law states that a disciplinary action may not be instituted after a lapse of more than three years from the moment of the commission of the violation. There is no specific right provided to the Minister of Justice, General Prosecutor and members of the Parliament to make a motion for instituting a disciplinary action against the judge settled in laws of the Lithuania. They can act on regular bases. Assessment of the judges’ activities The activities of judges shall be assessed seeking to reveal the level of professional activities and skills possessed by the judges, also Chairman of courts, Deputy-chairman of courts, Chairman of the divisions (hereinafter in this Section together referred to as judges), the capacities to use their theoretical knowledge and skills in practice, to participate in the administrative work of the court and to organise it, to establish the strengths and weaknesses of the activities of judges and to promote them, to improve professional skills. The assessment of the activities of judges shall be performed by the permanent commission for the assessment of activities of judges under the Judicial Council. Types of the assessment of judges’ activities shall be as follows: � Periodical assessment of the activities of judges; � Extraordinary assessment of the activities of judges.

The first assessment of the judge’s activities shall be after a lapse of three years following his appointment to judge’s office. Thereafter, the activities of the judge shall be assessed periodically every five years. The extraordinary assessment of the judge’s activities shall be carried out on the request of the judge himself or when the judge’s operational weaknesses have been recurring. The extraordinary assessment of the judge’s activities shall also be carried out when deciding on the promotion of the judge or Chairman of the court or Deputy-chairman of the court, Chairman of the division of the court or of his appointment for a new term of office, except occasions when the last ordinary assessment of the judge’s activities or the extraordinary assessment of the judge’s activities has been carried out less than three years ago.







Bref compte-rendu sur la Supervision des Tribunaux,

la Responsabilité Disciplinaire des Juges et l'Evaluation Judiciaire

Conseil de la Justice

LITUANIE

Bref compte-rendu sur la Supervision des Tribunaux, la Responsabilité

Disciplinaire des Juges et l'Evaluation Judiciaire

Relations du Ministère de la Justice avec les tribunaux Dans la République de Lituanie, en raison du principe de la séparation des pouvoirs,

le pouvoir judiciaire est séparé du pouvoir exécutif ; en conséquence, le Ministère de la Justice ne participe pas aux activités d'inspection (administration des activités judiciaires). Le Ministère de la Justice participe au processus de préparation et de gestion des programmes de formation, de développement et de qualification à l'attention des officiers de justice, en organisant également leurs qualifications, développement et formation.

Administration des activités judiciaires En référence à la Loi relative aux Tribunaux, l'administration dans les tribunaux

consiste en activités organisationnelles des officiers de justice (administration interne du tribunal) et en la supervision des activités ci-dessus, effectuées par les officiers prévus aux termes de cette Loi (administration externe des tribunaux).

Administration interne du tribunal Le Président, le Vice-président du tribunal et le Président d'une chambre du tribunal

sont des officiers de justice, conformément à la procédure prescrite par la Loi relative aux Tribunaux et à d'autres lois ou à d'autres actes juridiques, dirigent le travail organisationnel du tribunal. Le Président du tribunal doit organiser et superviser l'administration du tribunal, contrôler le respect des exigences du Code d'Éthique Judiciaire. Le Président du tribunal examine les plaintes des personnes en ce qui concerne des actions non-procédurales non liées à l'administration de la justice, ainsi qu’en ce qui concerne les actes du personnel du tribunal et soumet aux parties intéressées un rapport présentant les résultats de son étude, il élimine les dysfonctionnements identifiés du tribunal et accomplit d'autres fonctions d'administration du tribunal qui lui sont attribuées.

Administration externe du tribunal La supervision des activités administratives (administration externe du tribunal)

conformément aux Règlements d'Administration dans les Tribunaux est exercée dans : 1) les tribunaux de district - par le Président de la cour régionale correspondante ; 2) les tribunaux administratifs régionaux - par le Président de la Cour Suprême

Administrative ; 3) les cours régionales - par le Président des Cours d'Appel ; 4) les Cours d'Appel – par le Président de la Cour Suprême de Lituanie ; 5) tous les tribunaux - le Conseil Judiciaire. Le Conseil Judiciaire est un organe exécutif de l'autonomie des tribunaux assurant

l'indépendance des tribunaux et des juges. Les types de supervision (dans les secteurs de l'administration interne et externe)

sont les suivants : � Inspection objective – pour un cas concret ou pour l'investigation d'un domaine d'activité

particulier ;

� Inspection intégrée – inspection globale des activités judiciaires du tribunal. Les inspections objectives et intégrées peuvent être programmées et non

programmées (opérationnelles). Selon la procédure établie dans les Règlements de l'Administration des Tribunaux, l'inspection de supervision intégrée programmée des activités administratives dans chaque tribunal doit être effectuée au moins une fois tous les cinq ans.

Les sujets administratifs, dans le contexte des fonctions administratives qui leur sont attribuées peuvent former des commissions, qui peuvent comprendre des juges de plusieurs tribunaux ou d'autres fonctionnaires, ainsi des que des spécialistes, des experts provenant d'autres institutions, des agences, des représentants de la société. Ces personnes sont impliquées dans le processus de mise en œuvre des fonctions administratives judiciaires basées sur les principes de transparence, d'impartialité et de bénévolat.

Composition du Conseil Judiciaire Le Conseil Judiciaire est composé de 21 membres : 1) en vertu de leur mandat - le

Président de la Cour Suprême, le Président des Cours d'Appel, le Président de la Cour Administrative Suprême ; 2) des juges élus par l'Assemblée Générale des Juges: trois provenant de la Cour Suprême, des Cours d'Appel, de la Cour Administrative Suprême, trois provenant de toutes les cours régionales, trois provenant de tous les tribunaux administratifs régionaux et trois provenant de tous les tribunaux de district. Les candidats sont nommés et élus durant l'Assemblée Générale des Juges par les représentants des tribunaux correspondants.

Responsabilité disciplinaire des juges En vertu de la Loi relative aux Tribunaux de la République de Lituanie, le droit de

présenter une motion pour entamer une action disciplinaire appartient au Conseil Judiciaire, à la Commission d'Ethique Judiciaire et de Discipline et au Président du tribunal, où un juge est employé ou au Président de tout tribunal de niveau supérieur ou à toute personne informée de quelque action du juge dégradant la fonction judiciaire, de la violation d'autres dispositions du Code d'Ethique des Juges ou du non-respect des limites de la fonction et des activités politiques des juges prévues par la loi. La partie ayant le droit de présenter une motion pour entamer une action disciplinaire soumettra une demande motivée d'engagement d'une action disciplinaire contre le juge à la Commission d'Éthique Judiciaire et de Discipline. L'action disciplinaire engagée est transférée à la Cour Judiciaire d'Honneur.

La loi établit qu'une action disciplinaire ne peut être intentée après un délai supérieur à trois ans à partir du moment où l’infraction a été commise.

Il n'y a pas de droit spécifique accordé au Ministre de la Justice, au Procureur Général et aux membres du Parlement pour présenter une motion pour engager une action disciplinaire contre le juge établi par les lois de Lituanie. Ils peuvent agir sur des bases régulières.

Évaluation des activités du juge Les activités des juges sont évaluées en cherchant à mettre en évidence le niveau

d'activités et de compétences professionnelles possédé par les juges, ainsi que par le Président des Cours, le Vice-président des Cours, le Président des chambres (ci-après dénommés dans cette Section ensemble « les juges »), leurs capacités à utiliser leur connaissances et compétences théoriques dans la pratique, à participer au travail administratif du tribunal et à l'organiser, à établir les points forts et les points faibles des activités des juges et à les promouvoir, à améliorer les compétences professionnelles.

L'évaluation des activités des juges est effectuée par la commission permanente pour l'évaluation des activités des juges sous l'autorité du Conseil Judiciaire.

Les types d'évaluation des activités des juges seront les suivants : � Évaluation périodique des activités des juges ; � Évaluation extraordinaire des activités des juges.

La première évaluation des activités du juge a lieu après un délai de trois ans suivant sa nomination au poste de juge. Ensuite, les activités du juge sont évaluées périodiquement tous les cinq ans.

L'évaluation extraordinaire des activités du juge a lieu à la demande du juge lui-même ou quand les faiblesses opérationnelles du juge ont été récurrentes. L'évaluation extraordinaire des activités du juge est aussi effectuée quand on décide de la promotion du juge ou du Président du tribunal ou du Vice-président du tribunal, du Président de la chambre du tribunal ou de sa nomination pour un nouveau mandat, sauf dans les occasions où la dernière évaluation ordinaire des activités du juge ou l'évaluation extraordinaire des activités du juge a été effectuée moins de trois ans auparavant.







Brief report of the main guide lines of Portuguese system for

judges' evaluation

High Council for the Judiciary PORTUGAL

Brief report of the main guide lines of Portuguese system for judges' evaluation.

1. The Portuguese system for judges' evaluation is under total and exclusive control of the High Council for the Judiciary (from now called “High Council”), although its decisions can be appealed to the Supreme Court of Justice. There are other two similar “High Councils”, one for the Public Prosecutors and the other for the Administrative Courts. The High Council is the constitutional1 self-governing body of the Portuguese Judges. It is not part of the Public Administration, not being under control of any other authority, though it performs essentially administrative functions: it is responsible for the appointment, assignment, transfer, promotion, evaluation and any disciplinary matters against judges.

The High Council has 17 members: the President of the Supreme Court of Justice, who chairs and is elected directly by all the judges of the Supreme Court; 7 members elected by the Parliament; 2 members appointed by the President of the Republic; and 7 judges elected by all the judges in direct elections with secret vote (1 judge from the Supreme Court of Justice who will become the Vice President of the High Council; 2 judges from the Courts of Appeal; and 4 judges from the Courts of First Instance).

2. There is a body of 20 judicial inspectors (including one Inspector Coordinator, who seeks to harmonize and standardize inspection procedures), distributed in 20 geographic areas, charged to carry out the procedures on evaluation and disciplinary matters. The inspectors are appointed for a 3 year term, with one possible renewal for the same period. They are chosen among judges from the Courts of Appeal, with the higher classification (Very Good) or, exceptionally, among judges from the first instance, with the classification of "Very Good" and no less than 15 years of seniority. The choice of the candidates is done by secret vote in the Plenary of the High Council. 3. Judges can have the following classifications: "Very Good", "Good with Distinction", "Good", "Sufficient" and "Mediocre". The two first classifications are required to be appointed to the Courts of Appeal. On the other hand, the quota of Judges in the Supreme Court of Justice (3/5) is fulfilled only by judges coming from the Courts of Appeal. With regard to the first instance courts, those two classifications are required to be a judge in some specialized courts, such as family, labour and criminal ones, besides having 10 years of seniority. The classification of "Mediocre" implies the suspension from the exercise of functions and the opening of an inquiry to check the (in)capacity of the judge. 4. Concerning the evaluation criteria, the Law (Statute of Judges2

) and the Regulation of Inspections (enacted by the High Council) lay down that classifications must consider the way the judges fulfill their duties; the amount and difficulty of the work assigned; the conditions how the work is done; their capacity to simplify the procedures; their technical preparation; intellectual category; published legal works and civic capacity.

1 Arts. 215 to 218, Constitution of the Portuguese Republic. 2 Law 21 of 30 July 1985.

It is Important to point out that the service of inspection ought by no means to interfere with the independence of the Judges, concerning the substantive merits of their judgments and decisions. Regarding the human ability to exercise the function, the inspection takes into consideration the following factors, among others:

a) Independence, impartiality and dignity of conduct; b) Relationship with procedural intervenients, other judges, lawyers, other court

professionals, court officials and the public in general; c) Personal and professional prestige; d) Reserve and serenity while exercising the function; e) Sense of justice and ability to understand the specific situations under analysis,

considering the socio-cultural environment where the function is exercised. The adjustment to the service is analysed, among others, by the following factors:

a) Assiduity, zeal and devotion; b) Productivity; c) Method; d) Celerity in deciding; e) Ability to simplify procedures; f) Management of the courts, chairing of hearings, punctuality and timing of schedule.

In the analysis of the technical preparation, are taken into consideration the following factors, namely:

a) Intellectual category; b) Ability to apply the law considering all the relevant elements; c) Capacity to convince, based on the quality of the arguments used in the decisions,

with particular emphasis on the original ones; d) Juridical level of work, assessed, essentially, by the capacity for synthesis in the

enunciation of the issues and their resolution, the clarity and simplicity of exposition, as well as knowledge revealed in the decisions. Inspectors must also consider:

a) Data held by the High Council about the courts or services in which the judge has exercised functions;

b) Record of biographical and disciplinary of the judge, as well as contents of previous decisions conferring classification;

c) Analysis of cases, books and papers, either completed or pending, as long as necessary in order to get the correct opinion on the merits of the inspected;

d) Statistics of procedures; e) Works submitted by the judge, 10 to the maximum; f) Interviews with the judge in the beginning and in the end of inspection.

5. The classifications of the judges are allocated according to the following criteria:

a) The attribution of "Very Good" is the recognition that the Judge has had a highly meritorious performance throughout his career;

b) The attribution of "Good with Distinction" is the recognition of a meritorious performance throughout his career;

c) The attribution of "Good" is the recognition that the judge has revealed qualities worth being emphasized;

d) The attribution of "Sufficient" means that the judge has only the minimum conditions for the exercise of the office;

e) The attribution of "Mediocre" means that the judge has less than those minimum conditions.

Apart from exceptional circumstances, the initial classification must not be over "Good".

Except for some especial cases, but in no circumstances only based on the judge's seniority, the improvement of the classification must be gradual, not rising more than one step at a time.

Only exceptionally should the mark of "Very Good" be given to the judge who has not exercised for 10 years, only occurring if the high merit is clearly evident by his personal and professional qualities.

"Mediocre" implies the suspension of the judge and the establishment of inquiry to confirm the inability for the exercise of his office. To give a general perspective, last 2011, 303 judges were submitted to inspections for evaluation. From those, 100 got "Very Good", 123 "Good with Distinction", 57 "Good", 11 "Sufficient" and 2 "Mediocre". 10 are still under decision. 6. Judges of the first instance courts must be evaluated after the first year of exercise3 and afterwards, normally, every four years.4 Any judge classified with less than "Good" must be inspected and evaluated two years after the beginning of the last inspection. If a judge hasn’t yet been classified, he is presumed to have "Good" as classification.

There is no regular inspection for the judges of the Courts of Appeal, but the High Council can determine it, in case of a bad performance of any judge.

The judges from the Courts of Appeal can also ask for a special evaluation if they are in conditions to be appointed to the Supreme Court of Justice. In these situations, a judge from the Supreme Court (ad hoc Inspector) is assigned for that purpose. 7. The evaluation procedure is carried out by the inspector belonging to the geographic area correspondent to the court where the judge has remained for a longer time. The beginning of an inspection must be communicated to the judge 30 days in advance. 3 In the Portuguese system, judges come from the school of judges (CEJ – “Center for Judicial

Studies”) belonging to the Ministry of Justice (those who are considered to be capable are ranked in

order to be appointed to the Courts by the High Council). So, the first evaluation, after one year in

office, is of extreme relevance for the Judicial High Council, so that any possible problems with the

new judges can be detected in time and eventually corrected. 4 Every year in November, an Annual Plan of regular evaluating inspections is approved by the High

Council for the next year, in order to have every judge evaluated every four years, with the aim of

providing equal number of inspections during the career of every judge. It also allows judges to know

if they are included in the following year’s plan and eventually protest if their inspection is not

scheduled. Every year, about 400 - 500 judges are on the annual plan of evaluating inspections.

At the end of the procedure, the inspector makes his report on his assessment and proposes a specific classification to the High Council (instead, if a deeper analysis on the judge’s performance is advised, the inspector can propose that the procedure of evaluation should wait for no longer than one year). The judge can answer the inspector’s report, as well as join elements and require any convenient steps, within 15 days maximum. In this case, the inspector produces a final information and sends the whole Inspection Procedure to the High Council. If the High Council (operating, firstly, with a smaller composition of their members) approve the proposal of the inspector, the procedure comes to an end.

Otherwise, the High Council can disagree with the proposed classification. But only after hearing the Judge about that eventuality, can a lower classification be attributed.

Disagreeing with the deliberation, the judge can claim to the Plenary of the High Council. And from this one, he can appeal directly to the Supreme Court of Justice. Lisboa, Maio de 2012




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Bref rapport sur les principales lignes directrices du système

portugais d’évaluation des juges.

Conseil Supérieur de la Justice PORTUGAL

Bref rapport sur les principales lignes directrices du système portugais d’évaluation des juges. 1. Le système portugais d’évaluation des juges est sous le contrôle total et exclusif du Haut Conseil Judiciaire (ci-après appelé “Haut Conseil”), toutefois ses décisions peuvent faire l’objet d’un appel devant la Cour Suprême de Justice. Il existe deux autres “Hauts Conseils” équivalents, l'un pour les Procureurs de la République, l'autre pour les Cours Administratives. Le Haut Conseil est le corps autonome, constitutionnel1, des juges portugais. Il ne fait pas partie de l’Administration Publique, n’est pas sous le contrôle d’une quelconque autre autorité, bien qu’il remplisse des fonctions essentiellement administratives: il est responsable de la nomination, de l’affectation, de la mutation, de la promotion, de l’évaluation et de toutes les affaires disciplinaires à l’égard des juges.

Le Haut Conseil se compose de 17 membres: le Président de la Cour Suprême de Justice, qui préside et est élu directement par tous les juges de la Cour Suprême; 7 membres élus par le Parlement; 2 membres nommés par le Président de la République; et 7 juges élus par tous les juges lors d'élections directes à bulletin secret (1 juge de la Cour Suprême de Justice qui devient le Vice-président du Haut Conseil; 2 juges des Cours d’Appel; et 4 juges des Tribunaux de Première Instance).

2. Il y a un corps de 20 inspecteurs judiciaires (dont un inspecteur coordinateur, qui vise à harmoniser et à standardiser les procédures d’inspection), répartis dans 20 zones géographiques, chargés de mener à bonne fin les procédures relatives à des questions d’évaluation et disciplinaires. Les inspecteurs sont nommés pour une période de 3 ans, renouvelable une fois. Ils sont choisis parmi les juges des Cours d’Appel, avec la plus haute appréciation (Très Bien) ou, exceptionnellement, parmi les juges de première instance, avec l’appréciation “Très bien” et un minimum de 15 ans d’ancienneté. Le choix des candidats se fait à bulletin secret lors de l’assemblée Plénière du Haut Conseil. 3. Les juges peuvent obtenir les appréciations suivantes: “Très bien”, “Bien avec Félicitations”, “Bien”, “Suffisant” et “Médiocre”. Les deux premières appréciations sont nécessaires pour la nomination dans une Cour d’Appel. D’autre part, le quota de Juges à la Cour Suprême de Justice (3/5) est atteint par des juges venant uniquement des Cours d’Appel. Du point de vue des tribunaux de première instance, ces deux appréciations sont requises pour certains postes de juge dans des cours spécialisées, tels que juge aux affaires familiales, juge en matière de droit du travail, juge correctionnel, en plus de 10 ans d’ancienneté. L’appréciation “Médiocre” entraîne la suspension de l’exercice des fonctions et l’ouverture d’une enquête pour vérifier la (l’) (in)capacité du juge. 4. Au sujet des critères d’évaluation, la loi (Statuts des Juges2

) et la Réglementation des Inspections (décrétée par le Haut Conseil) établit que les appréciations doivent prendre en compte la manière dont les juges remplissent leurs devoirs; l’importance et la difficulté du travail confié; les conditions dans lesquelles le travail est effectué; leur capacité à simplifier les procédures; leur préparation technique; leur catégorie intellectuelle; les ouvrages juridiques publiés; et leur capacité civique.

1 Arts. 215 à 218, Constitution de la République Portugaise. 2 Loi 21 du 30 juillet 1985.

Il est important de signaler que le service d’inspection ne doit en aucun cas interférer avec l’indépendance des juges, en ce qui concerne le bien-fondé de leurs jugements et décisions. En ce qui concerne les qualités humaines pour exercer la fonction, l’inspection prend en considération les facteurs suivants, entre autres:

a) L’indépendance, l’impartialité et la dignité du comportement; b) Les relations avec les acteurs intervenant durant la procédure, les autres juges,

les avocats, les autres professionnels judicaires, les fonctionnaires judiciaires et le public en général;

c) Le prestige personnel et professionnel; d) La réserve et la sérénité durant l’exercice des fonctions; e) Le sens de la justice et la capacité à comprendre les situations spécifiques

analysées, en prenant en compte l’environnement socioculturel où la fonction est exercée.

L’adaptation au service est analysée, entre autres, par les facteurs suivants: a) L’assiduité, le zèle et le dévouement; b) La productivité; c) La méthode; d) La promptitude dans les décisions; e) L’aptitude à simplifier les procédures; f) La gestion des tribunaux, la présidence des audiences, la ponctualité et la

programmation du calendrier.

Dans l’analyse de la préparation technique, sont pris en considération les facteurs suivants, à savoir:

a) La catégorie intellectuelle; b) La capacité d’appliquer la loi selon les éléments pertinents; c) La capacité de convaincre, basée sur la qualité des arguments utilisés pour rendre

les décisions, avec un accent particulier mis sur l'originalité; d) Le niveau juridique du travail, évalué, pour l'essentiel, par la capacité de synthèse

dans l'énonciation des problèmes et leur résolution, la clarté et la simplicité de l'exposé, ainsi que le niveau des connaissances révélé par les décisions.

Les inspecteurs doivent aussi tenir compte de:

a) Les données détenues par le Haut Conseil sur les tribunaux ou les services dans lesquels le juge a exercé des fonctions;

b) Les archives biographiques et disciplinaires du juge, tout comme le contenu des décisions précédentes attribuant un classement;

c) L’analyse des affaires, livres et documents, qu’ils soient conclus ou pendants, dans la mesure où c’est nécessaire afin d’obtenir une évaluation correcte de la valeur du juge inspecté;

d) Les statistiques des procédures; e) Les travaux présentés par le juge, 10 au maximum; f) Les entretiens avec le juge au début et à la fin de l’inspection;

5. L’évaluation des juges se fait selon les critères suivants:

a) L’appréciation “Très Bien” est la reconnaissance que le juge a eu un comportement vraiment méritoire tout au long de sa carrière;

b) L’appréciation “Bien avec Félicitations” est la reconnaissance d’un comportement méritoire tout au long de sa carrière;

c) L’appréciation “Bien” est la reconnaissance que le juge a révélé des qualités qui méritent d’être soulignées;

d) L’appréciation “Suffisante” signifie que le juge ne possède que les conditions minimales pour l'exercice de la fonction;

e) L’appréciation “Médiocre” signifie que le juge possède moins que les conditions minimales.

Exception faite de circonstances exceptionnelles, l’appréciation initiale ne peut pas être mieux que “Bien”.

Sauf pour certains cas particuliers, mais en aucun cas fondés uniquement sur l'ancienneté du juge, l'amélioration de l’appréciation doit être progressive, n’augmentant pas de plus d'un échelon à la fois. Seulement exceptionnellement, l’évaluation “Très Bien” peut être donnée à un juge qui n’exerce pas depuis au moins 10 ans, et dans le seul cas où son mérite apparaît évident, de par ses qualités professionnelles et humaines.

“Médiocre” entraîne la suspension de l’exercice des fonctions et l’ouverture d’une enquête pour vérifier la (l’) (in)capacité du juge. Pour fournir un aperçu général, en 2011, 303 juges ont été inspectés et évalués. Parmi eux, 100 ont obtenu “Très bien”, 123 “Bien avec Félicitations”, 57 “Bien”, 11 “Suffisant” et 2 “Médiocre”. 10 sont encore en attente d’une décision. 6. Les juges des tribunaux de première instance doivent être évalués après leur première année d'exercice3 et ensuite, normalement, tous les 4 ans4. Si un juge n’a pas encore été évalué, il est présumé avoir l’appréciation “Bien”.

Il n’y a pas d’inspection régulière pour les Juges d’Appel, mais le Haut Conseil peut en décider une, si un juge ne s'est pas montré compétent.

Les Juges d’Appel peuvent aussi demander une évaluation spéciale s’ils remplissent les conditions pour être nommés à la Cour Suprême. Dans ce cas, un juge de la Cour Suprême (inspecteur ad hoc) est affecté à cette fin. 7. La procédure d’évaluation est dirigée par les inspecteurs appartenant à la zone géographique du tribunal où le juge a exercé le plus longtemps. Le début d’une inspection doit être indiqué au juge 30 jours auparavant.

3 Dans le système portugais, les juges viennent d’une école (CEJ – “Centre pour Etudes Judiciaires”)

dépendant du Ministère de la Justice (ceux qui sont considérés compétents sont classés dans le but

d’être nommés dans un Tribunal par le Haut Conseil). Ainsi, la première évaluation, après un an

d’exercice, est d’une extrême importance pour le Haut Conseil Judiciaire, de cette manière tout

problème éventuel avec les nouveaux juges peut être détécté à temps et éventuellement corrigé. 4 Chaque année en novembre, un plan annuel d’évaluation et d’inspection est décidé par le Haut

Conseil pour l’année suivante, le but étant que les juges soient évalués tous les quatre ans, tout en

s’assurant que chaque juge soit évalué le même nombre de fois tout au long de sa carrière. Cela

permet aussi aux juges de savoir s’ils sont dans le plan pour l’année suivante et éventuellement de

contester si leur inspection n’est pas programmée. Tous les ans, environ 400 à 500 juges figurent

dans le plan annuel d’évaluation et d’inspection.

A la fin de la procédure, l’inspecteur fait un rapport sur son évaluation et propose une appréciation spécifique au Haut Conseil (cependant, si une analyse plus poussée sur les compétences du juge est conseillée, l’inspecteur peut proposer que la procédure d’évaluation ne dépasse pas un an). Le juge peut répondre au rapport de l’inspecteur, fournir des éléments et demander des mesures convenables, dans un délai de 15 jours maximum. Dans un tel cas, l’inspecteur produit un rapport final et envoie toute la Procédure au Haut Conseil. Si le Haut Conseil (agissant, en premier lieu, avec une composition réduite) approuve la proposition de l’inspecteur, la procédure est terminée.

Sinon, le Haut Conseil peut désapprouver l’évaluation proposée. Il peut, mais seulement après avoir entendu le Juge sur la question, donner une appréciation inférieure.

S'il est en désaccord avec la délibération, le juge peut présenter une requête à l’Assemblée Plénière du Haut Conseil. Et il peut interjeter appel directement devant la Cour Suprême de Justice selon la décision de l’Assemblée Plénière. Lisbonne, mai 2012







Brief report of the relations among the Judicial Inspection,

the Superior Council of Magistracy and the Ministry of Justice

The Superior Council of Magistracy ROMANIA

Brief report of the relations among the Judicial Inspection, the Superior Council of Magistracy and the Ministry of Justice

* * *

At 25 May 2012, new legal provisions entered into force in Romania1 aiming at strengthening the role of the Judicial Inspection. The main changes of the law bring modifications to the actors of disciplinary proceedings and offer the Judicial Inspection legal personality and a separate budget in order to strengthen its independence.

1. The Superior Council of Magistracy (SCM) and the disciplinary liability of judges and prosecutors

The SCM is the representative of the judicial authority and has the role of guarantor of the independence of justice (Arts. 133, Constitution and 1, Law 317/2004). The SCM is independent and obeys only to the law in its activity. The SCM functions as a permanent body, issuing decisions in plenum or in sections, according to the duties incumbent on them.

The SCM protects the professional reputation of magistrates from any act liable to affect their independence or impartiality in administering justice. A magistrate who believes that his professional independence, impartiality or reputation are being affected may address the SCM which may order a check by the Judicial Inspection of the notified aspects. (art. 30, Law 317/2004).

The SCM prepares and keeps and updates the professional records of magistrates, having a database concerning their activity (art. 33, Law 317/2004).

The SCM, by its sections, accomplishes the role of a court dealing with matters of disciplinary liability of judges and prosecutors (art. 44 § 2, Law 317/2004).

The disciplinary action for the breeches committed by a judge is taken by the Judicial Inspection (through a judicial inspector), by the Minister of Justice or by the Chief Justice, while the disciplinary action against a prosecutor is taken by the Judicial Inspection (through a judicial inspector), by the Minister of Justice or by the General Prosecutor of the High Court (see below). (art. 44 § 3, Law 317/2004)

2. Relations between the Judicial Inspection and the Superior Council of Magistracy

Starting with 25 May 2012, the Judicial Inspection is functioning as a body with legal personality within the SCM. Annual current expenses and capital budges of the Inspection are assured from the State budget, separately highlighted in the SCM’s budget. (art. 642 § 7, Law 317/2004)

1 These new legal provisions have modified the Law no 317/2004.

The Judicial Inspection functions under the principal of operational independence, fulfilling, by its judicial inspectors appointed under the conditions of the law, its powers of analyses, verification and control. (art. 641, Law 317/2004)

The Judicial Inspection is run by a chief-inspector, helped by a deputy chief-inspector, appointed for 3 years through a contest organized by the SCM. (art. 643 § 1 -3, Law 317/2004)

The chief-inspector and his deputy may be revoked only by the SCM’s plenum in case of not fulfilling or wrongfully fulfilling their managerial attributions. The decision is taken by the Plenum on the grounds of the annual independent audit report and the decision may be challenged at the administrative section of the High Court of Cassation and Justice. (art. 643 and 644, Law 317/2004)

On the proposal of chief-inspector, the rules for performing the works of the inspection are endorsed, by a Regulation adopted by the SCM’s plenum, published in the Official Journal. (art. 641 § 4, Law 317/2004)

In order to fulfil its task, the Judicial Inspection has its on body organised in directorates, divisions and offices. The organisation and the functioning of the Judicial Inspection, the organizational structure and the responsibilities of the compartments are established by a regulation which is endorsed by an order of the chief-inspector, published in the Official Journal (art. 642 § 3, Law 317/2004).

The SCM, as any other person, may file a complaint with the Judicial Inspection (in writing and reasoned) about the disciplinary breeches committed by judges and prosecutors. (art. 45 § 2, Law 317/2004)

A preliminary check (verificare prealabilă) made by the Judicial Inspection is mandatory in order to take the disciplinary action (art. 44, Law 317/2004). Being notified by the SCM, other persons or ex officio, the judicial inspectors perform a preliminary check in order to establish whether there are clues of a disciplinary breech. If there are no clues, the judicial inspector closes the case himself.

Preliminary disciplinary investigation. If there are clues on a disciplinary breech, the judicial inspector decides himself to start preliminary investigations. The preliminary investigation establishes the facts and their consequences, circumstances under which they were committed and any other data for establishing the guilt. (art. 45, Law 317/2004)

The judicial inspector may decide by a reasoned decision to allow the request by taking the disciplinary action and notify the correspondent section of the SCM, to close the case or to reject the request when the conditions for the disciplinary action aren’t fulfilled. The decision of the judicial inspector is endorsed by the chief-inspector, who may decide to take the disciplinary action himself and notify the section of the SCM or to reject the request himself. The decision to reject the request may be challenged by the applicant at the

Court of Appeal of Bucharest, which may decide whether to reject the appeal or to continue the disciplinary proceedings. (art. 46, Law 317/2004)

The disciplinary action is upheld by the judicial inspector who has taken it in front of the SCM’s section, or by other inspector in case of impossibility. (art. 47 § 2 , Law 317/2004)

If the section of SCM, having the role of a court, finds that the notification is well founded, issues a decision applying one of the disciplinary sanctions stipulated by the law, in relation to the seriousness of the disciplinary offence committed by the magistrate and to his/her personal circumstances. Against the decision may be lodged an appeal within 15 days of notification at the High Court of Cassation and Justice. (art. 47, 49, Law 317/2004)

During the disciplinary proceedings, the section of the SCM, ex officio or at the proposal of the judicial inspector, may decide to suspend the magistrate from office. During the disciplinary investigation the request for a special pension is suspended (art. 491, Law 317/2004).

3. Relations between the Judicial Inspection and the Minister of Justice, Chief Justice and General Prosecutor. Disciplinary proceedings

In the cases where the Minister of Justice, the Chief Justice or the General Prosecutor of the High Court takes disciplinary action, they can notify the disciplinary breeches committed by judges or prosecutors to the Judicial Inspection. (art. 45 § 1, Law 317/2004)

Preliminary check. Being notified by the above-mentioned persons, the judicial inspectors perform a preliminary check. If there are no clues on a disciplinary breech, the judicial inspector sends to the above-mentioned persons a proposal to close the case. On the inspector’s proposal, the Minister of Justice, the Chief Justice or the General Prosecutor may decide whether to close the case (informing the applicant and the investigated person), to request the continuation of preliminary check or to start the preliminary disciplinary investigation (cercetare preliminară prealabilă). (art. 45 § 4-5, Law 317/2004)

Preliminary disciplinary investigation. If there are clues on a disciplinary breech, the judicial inspector sends to the Minister of Justice, the Chief Justice or the General Prosecutor a proposal to start the preliminary disciplinary investigation. On this proposal, they may decide to start the preliminary investigation. (art. 45 § 6-7, Law 317/2004) The results of preliminary investigation are sent by the Judicial Inspection to the holder of the disciplinary action, who may decide to request their completion or to take the disciplinary action in front of one of the sections of the SCM.

The disciplinary action is upheld in front of the SCM’s section by its initiator (the Minister of Justice, the Chief Justice or the General Prosecutor) or by a designated representative. The SCM’s decision may be challenged at the High Court of Cassation and Justice.

1



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Inspectorate of Prosecution in Scotland

Inspectorate of Prosecution in Scotland SCOTLAND

2

INSPECTORATE OF PROSECUTION IN SCOTLAND

The Inspectorate of Prosecution in Scotland (IPS) is the independent inspectorate for the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, the sole prosecuting authority in Scotland which is also responsible for investigating sudden deaths and complaints against the police which are of a criminal nature.

The principal aim of the IPS is to make recommendations that will contribute to improvements in the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) service delivery, making COPFS more accountable and enhancing public confidence.

The principal functions of the IPS are:

• To inspect or arrange for the inspection of the operation of COPFS

• To report to the Lord Advocate on any matter connected with the operation of COPFS

The ministerial head of the prosecution service in Scotland is the Lord Advocate assisted by the Solicitor General. Both are government ministers but the Lord Advocate acts independently of any other person in relation to prosecution decisions.

The IPS now operates on a statutory basis under sections 78 and 79 of the Criminal Proceedings etc (Reform) (Scotland) Act 2007.

The 2007 Act provides for the appointment by the Lord Advocate of an officer known as Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Prosecution in Scotland.

The 2007 Act provides that the Chief Inspector in carrying out his functions shall act independently of any other person.

This therefore ensures the independence of the inspectorate body.

All of the reports of the IPS are published.

The inspectorate carries out its functions by:

• Office and Area inspections

These consist of inspections of the operational offices of the Procurator Fiscal Service

• Thematic reports

3

Thematic reports are risk based looking at areas of perceived weakness or concern

Increasingly the thematic reports are undertaken in conjunction with criminal justice partners and other inspectorates particularly Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (Scotland) to give a whole system holistic view.

The inspectorate does not deal with individual complaints although comments from individuals are welcome.

Powers of the inspectorate

The inspectorate has statutory powers to access any documents or material held by the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service in whatever form.

It is not, however, a regulatory body and the main sanction it has is the weapon of publicity.

There is in Scotland no inspectorate of the court service and the function of prosecutor and judge is quite separate. The criminal justice system is an adversarial system and not an inquisitorial system.

The Chief Inspector reports directly to the Lord Advocate bypassing the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service management structure.

Reports normally contain a number of recommendations and (if accepted) compliance with the recommendations is periodically examined.

1




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Inspectorat du Parquet en Ecosse

Inspectorat du Parquet en Écosse ECOSSE

2

INSPECTORAT DU PARQUET EN ÉCOSSE

The Inspectorate of Prosecution in Scotland (L'Inspectorat du Parquet en Ecosse - IPS) est l'inspectorat indépendant pour le Crown Office (Bureau de la Couronne) et le Procurator Fiscal Service (Service du Ministère Public), seule autorité en charge des poursuites en Écosse, qui est aussi chargée d'enquêter sur les morts subites et les plaintes contre la police qui sont de nature criminelle.

Le principal objectif de l'IPS consiste à faire des recommandations qui contribueront à apporter des améliorations aux services rendus par le Crown Office et le Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS), ce qui aboutit à ce que le COPFS soit plus responsable, en renforçant la confiance du public.

Les principales fonctions de l'IPS consistent à:

• Inspecter ou organiser l'inspection du fonctionnement du COPFS

• Faire un rapport au Lord Advocate (Procureur Général) sur toute question liée au fonctionnement du COPFS

La direction ministérielle du service du parquet en Écosse est confiée au Lord Advocate, assisté du Solicitor General (Avocat Général). Les deux sont des ministres du gouvernement, mais le Lord Advocate agit indépendamment de toute autre personne en ce qui concerne les décisions de poursuite.

L'IPS fonctionne actuellement sur une base réglementaire en vertu des sections 78 et 79 de la Loi (Écossaise) de 2007 (de Réforme) sur les Procédures Criminelles.

La Loi de 2007 prévoit la nomination par le Lord Advocate d'un officier connu sous le nom de Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Prosecution (L'Inspecteur en Chef du Parquet de Sa Majesté) en Écosse.

La Loi de 2007 prévoit que l'Inspecteur en Chef agira dans l'exercice de ses fonctions, indépendamment de toute autre personne.

Ceci assure donc l'indépendance du corps de l'inspectorat.

Tous les rapports de l'IPS sont publiés.

L'inspectorat remplit ses fonctions par l’intermédiaire:

• Des inspections de Bureau et de Régions

Celles-ci consistent en des inspections des bureaux opérationnels du Procurator Fiscal Service

As a general rule, the Disciplinary Committee convenes every 15 days in ordinary

sessions attended by its own five members, the head of the inspection service and, in a

secretarial capacity, the chief legal officer of the disciplinary measures division.

Bodies responsible for the imposition of sanctions (art. 421 LOPJ)

For sanctions consisting of fines or warnings for minor offences, the judge or senior

judge in question answers to the respective offices he/she is responsible to: the

presidency of the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court), the National Court or the high

courts of justice.

For sanctions regarding serious violations: the Disciplinary Committee of the General

Council of the Judiciary.

For very serious violations: the Plenary Session of the General Council of the Judiciary,

on the proposal of the Disciplinary Committee.

V.- RELATIONS BETWEEN INSPECTION RESULTS AND POSSIBLE

PROFESSIONAL EVALUATIONS OF THE SENIOR JUDGES

The General Council of the Judiciary is in charge of the selection, training and

improvement of skills, provision of appointments, promotions, administrative status and

disciplinary measures for judges and senior judges.

Judges are appointed by an Order, by the General Council of the Judiciary. Senior

Judges and Presidents are appointed by Royal Decree, at the proposal of the Council.

The presentation to Royal Decree is made by the Minister of Justice, who endorses the

appointment (art. 316 LOPJ).

Having been subject to disciplinary sanctions for committing a serious or very serious

offence which has not been cancelled from their record constitutes grounds for

ineligibility for such Presidencies (art. 333.2 LOPJ). Another ground for relinquishment

of the post is cancellation as ruled in a disciplinary procedure (art. 338.3 LOPJ).

Accordingly, on the advice of the Inspection Service based on the results of ordinary

inspections, the Inspection may interrupt the career advancement of a senior judge

who the Council has appointed as president.

VI.- THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

The Ministry of Justice, when he/she considers it necessary, may solicit the Council to

order the inspection of any Tribunal. In this case, the Council shall inform the Ministry

of Justice of the resolution and the measures adopted (article 171.4 LOPJ).

The Ministry has no other competence in inspection matters for the courts and

tribunals. It enjoys this competence instead with Public prosecutors (procurators or the

prosecution) who do not belong to the magistracy.

The subsequent reforms enacted by organic laws 19/2003 and 1/2009, however, have

outlined a new system in the Spanish judiciary organization (with common procedural

services and more attributions for the registrars), which has been partially applied to

certain territories with quite a few problems.

This system enthrones the Ministry of Justice as the enabling body for carrying out

inspection functions in its own field of the Administration of Justice. It does so through

the Secretary of State and the public ministers of the high courts of justice, but only as

concerns the fields of services assumed by the head registrars (under the Ministry) and

without any limitation on the powers that fall to the Council.

This was dictated by Instruction 3/2011 of the General Secretariat of the Administration

of Justice on the «Inspection System for the Public Ministers and Services under the

Judicial Minister.»

Madrid - May 09th, 2012.

Signed. Ana María Aparicio Mateo

Inspector of the Spanish Inspection Service

3

• Des rapports thématiques

Les rapports thématiques sont basés sur les risques, en étudiant des domaines où des manquements ou des motifs d'inquiétude ont été perçus

Les rapports thématiques sont le plus souvent réalisés en collaboration avec des partenaires appartenant au monde de la justice criminelle et d'autres inspectorats, en particulier Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (L'Inspectorat de la Police de Sa Majesté) (Écosse) pour fournir un compte-rendu de type holistique du système dans son ensemble.

L'inspectorat ne traite pas de plaintes individuelles bien que les remarques de particuliers soient les bienvenues.

Pouvoirs de l'inspectorat

L'inspectorat a des pouvoirs réglementaires pour accéder à tous les documents ou matériels détenus par le Crown Office et le Procurator Fiscal Service sous toute forme, quelle qu'elle soit.

Ce n'est pas, toutefois, un organisme de réglementation et la principale sanction dont il dispose est l'arme de la publicité.

En Écosse, il n'y a pas d'inspectorat du service de la cour et la fonction de procureur et celle de juge sont bien séparées. Le système de justice criminelle est le système du contradictoire et non un système inquisitoire.

L'Inspecteur en Chef fait directement rapport au Lord Advocate, en évitant la structure de gestion du Crown Office et du Procurator Fiscal Service.

Les rapports contiennent normalement un certain nombre de recommandations et (si elles sont acceptées) le respect de ces recommandations est examiné à intervalles périodiques.

En règle générale, la Commission de discipline se réunit tous les 15 jours en session

ordinaire, en présence des cinq membres qui la composent, de la responsable du

service d'inspection et, à titre de secrétaire, du juriste chef de la section du régime

disciplinaire.

Organes compétents pour imposer les sanctions (art. 421 LOPJ)

Pour la sanction consistant en une amende ou un avertissement correspondant aux

fautes légères, les bureaux de la présidence du Tribunal Supremo (Cour suprême), de

la Cour Nationale et des tribunaux supérieurs de justice, concernant les juges et les

magistrats qui dépendent de chacun de ces organes.

Pour les sanctions correspondant à des fautes graves, la Commission disciplinaire du

Conseil général du pouvoir judiciaire.

Pour les fautes très graves, l'Assemblée plénière du Conseil général du pouvoir

judiciaire, sur proposition de la Commission disciplinaire.

V.- RAPPORTS ENTRE LES RÉSULTATS DE L’INSPECTION ET LES

ÉVENTUELLES ANALYSES DE LA PROFESSIONNALITÉ DES MAG ISTRATS

Le Conseil Général du pouvoir Judiciaire est compètent pour la sélection, la formation

et le perfectionnement, le recrutement du personnel, les avancements, les situations

administratives, le régime disciplinaire des juges et des magistrats.

Les Juges seront nommés, au moyen d’une Ordre, par le Conseil général du pouvoir

judiciaire. Les Magistrats et les Présidents seront nommés par Décret royal, sur

proposition du dit Conseil. La présentation au Décret royal sera faite par le Ministre de

la Justice, qui visera la nomination (art. 316 LOPJ).

On ne peut pas accéder à telles Présidences quand il existe une sanction disciplinaire

par la commission de faute grave ou très grave (art. 333.2 LOPJ). Aussi un motif de

cessation est l’accord dans un dossier disciplinaire (art. 338.3 LOPJ).

Par conséquent, l’Inspection peut interférer avec l’avancement de carrière des

magistrats, dont le Conseil désigne les présidents mais après avoir reçu l’avis du

Service d’inspection sur la base des résultats des inspections ordinaires.

VI.- LE MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE

Le Ministère de la Justice, quand il le considérera nécessaire, pourra solliciter au

Conseil qu’il ordonne l'inspection de n'importe quel Tribunal. Dans ce cas, le Conseil

notifiera le Ministère de la Justice la résolution et les mesures adoptées (article 171.4

LOPJ).

Le Ministère n'a pas d'autre compétence en matière d'inspection des juges et des

tribunaux. Par contre, il a cette compétence avec le Ministère public (procureurs ou

parquet), qui n'appartiennent pas à la magistrature.

Mais, les réformes successives opérées par les lois organiques 19/2003 et 1/2009 ont

dessiné un nouveau système dans l’organisation judiciaire espagnole (avec des

services communs procéduraux et plus d’attributions pour les greffiers), qui est en

phase d'implantation timide dans certains territoires, avec non peu de difficultés.

Ce système intronise le Ministère de la Justice comme organe habilité pour réaliser

des fonctions d'inspection dans le propre domaine de l'Administration de Justice, au

travers du Secrétaire d'État et des secrétaires de gouvernement des tribunaux

supérieurs de justice, mais uniquement en ce qui concerne le domaine des services

assumés par les greffiers en chef (qui dépendent du Ministère), et sans aucune

limitation dans les facultés qui incombent au Conseil.

À tels effets, il a été dicté l'Instruction 3/2011, du Secrétariat Général de

l'Administration de Justice, relative au « Système d'Inspection des Secrétaires de

Gouvernement et des Services responsabilité du Secrétaire Judiciaire ».

Madrid, le 9 mai 2012.

Signé. Ana María Aparicio Mateo

Inspectrice du Service d’Inspection Espagnol

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Relations between the Inspection activities of the General Council

of the Judiciary and the Ministry of Justice

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Mrs. Ana María APARICIO MATEO Inspector of the Spanish Inspection Service SPAIN

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RELATIONS BETWEEN THE INSPECTION ACTIVITIES OF THE GENERAL

COUNCIL OF THE JUDICIARY AND THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

I.- THE SPANISH GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE JUDICIARY (CGPJ)

This is the governing body of the judiciary. By constitutional mandate it has, among

other things, the highest powers of court inspection (art. 122.2 Constitution).

Article 107 of the Organic Law for the Judiciary (LOPJ) provides that: The General

Council of the Judiciary shall have competence in the following matters:

3. Inspection of courts and tribunals

4. Selection, training and improvement of skills, provision of appointments,

promotions, administrative status and disciplinary measures for judges and

senior judges.

The subject of the CGPJ's inspection activities is the control and prevention of

dysfunctions and improper procedures

This entails activities that are designed to detect situations of risk and apply measures

to avoid them and, when necessary, to examine the potential disciplinary accountability

of the judges or senior judges in question.

The bodies authorized to intervene in inspection matters are as follows, with

different levels of responsibility and competence:

� The inspection service and the service directorate for each of the

inspection units.

� Management bodies of the courts: Chairmen of the Courts of Appeal

(Audiencias Provinciales), of the High Courts of Justice, the National

Court (Audiencia Nacional) and of the Court of Cassation (Tribunal

Supremo).

II.- THE INSPECTION SERVICE

This is a technical body responsible to the General Council of the Judiciary, and its

main function is to check and control the operation of the judicial administration

services by carrying out visits and actions as ordered by the General Council (article

171.3 LOPJ).

Composition of the Inspection Service

Directed by the Department Head and his/her Deputy, it consists of 14 Inspection units:

9 territorial, 4 specialized and 1 central (18 inspectors). There is a coordinator inside

these for each autonomous community

The Inspection Service carries out four types of controls:

Ordinary inspections: control the fulfillment of qualitative and quantitative standards

related to management, organization and functioning.

Extraordinary visits: verify exceptional facts and prepare submissions for reporting on

them.

Fact-finding visits: obtain information on concrete aspects (liability to disciplinary

action, data protection, mediation, becoming acquainted with new judges, etc.)

Virtual visits: Twice a year, the inspection units evaluate statistical data and all other

information to verify the smooth operation of the judicial bodies and, when deemed

necessary, any dysfunctions.

The Inspection Service also issues reports on the contents of the Inspection

Department itself as required by the competent bodies of the Council.

III.- DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE

The Disciplinary Committee is integrated within the CGPJ itself and consists of five

members who are chosen each year during a plenary session of the Council from

among its own members (article 132 LOPJ).

The Disciplinary Committee is authorized to prepare the cases for judgment and

impose sanctions on judges and senior judges (article 133).

As a general rule, the Disciplinary Committee convenes every 15 days in ordinary

sessions attended by its own five members, the head of the inspection service and, in a

secretarial capacity, the chief legal officer of the disciplinary measures division.

Bodies responsible for the imposition of sanctions (art. 421 LOPJ)

For sanctions consisting of fines or warnings for minor offences, the judge or senior

judge in question answers to the respective offices he/she is responsible to: the

presidency of the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court), the National Court or the high

courts of justice.

For sanctions regarding serious violations: the Disciplinary Committee of the General

Council of the Judiciary.

For very serious violations: the Plenary Session of the General Council of the Judiciary,

on the proposal of the Disciplinary Committee.

V.- RELATIONS BETWEEN INSPECTION RESULTS AND POSSIBLE

PROFESSIONAL EVALUATIONS OF THE SENIOR JUDGES

The General Council of the Judiciary is in charge of the selection, training and

improvement of skills, provision of appointments, promotions, administrative status and

disciplinary measures for judges and senior judges.

Judges are appointed by an Order, by the General Council of the Judiciary. Senior

Judges and Presidents are appointed by Royal Decree, at the proposal of the Council.

The presentation to Royal Decree is made by the Minister of Justice, who endorses the

appointment (art. 316 LOPJ).

Having been subject to disciplinary sanctions for committing a serious or very serious

offence which has not been cancelled from their record constitutes grounds for

ineligibility for such Presidencies (art. 333.2 LOPJ). Another ground for relinquishment

of the post is cancellation as ruled in a disciplinary procedure (art. 338.3 LOPJ).

Accordingly, on the advice of the Inspection Service based on the results of ordinary

inspections, the Inspection may interrupt the career advancement of a senior judge

who the Council has appointed as president.

VI.- THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

The Ministry of Justice, when he/she considers it necessary, may solicit the Council to

order the inspection of any Tribunal. In this case, the Council shall inform the Ministry

of Justice of the resolution and the measures adopted (article 171.4 LOPJ).

The Ministry has no other competence in inspection matters for the courts and

tribunals. It enjoys this competence instead with Public prosecutors (procurators or the

prosecution) who do not belong to the magistracy.

The subsequent reforms enacted by organic laws 19/2003 and 1/2009, however, have

outlined a new system in the Spanish judiciary organization (with common procedural

services and more attributions for the registrars), which has been partially applied to

certain territories with quite a few problems.

This system enthrones the Ministry of Justice as the enabling body for carrying out

inspection functions in its own field of the Administration of Justice. It does so through

the Secretary of State and the public ministers of the high courts of justice, but only as

concerns the fields of services assumed by the head registrars (under the Ministry) and

without any limitation on the powers that fall to the Council.

This was dictated by Instruction 3/2011 of the General Secretariat of the Administration

of Justice on the «Inspection System for the Public Ministers and Services under the

Judicial Minister.»

Madrid - May 09th, 2012.

Signed. Ana María Aparicio Mateo

Inspector of the Spanish Inspection Service

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Les rapports entre les activités des Inspections du Conseil

Général du Pouvoir Judiciaire et le Ministère de la Justice

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Mme Ana María APARICIO MATEO Inspectrice du Service d’Inspection Espagnol ESPAGNE

LES RAPPORTS ENTRE LES ACTIVITÉS DES INSPECTIONS DU CONSEIL

GÉNÉRAL DU POUVOIR JUDICIAIRE ET LE MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE

I.- LE CONSEIL GÉNÉRAL DU POUVOIR JUDICIAIRE ESPAGNOL (CGPJ)

C’est l’organe de gouvernement du pouvoir judiciaire. Il a, entre d’autres, la plus haute

faculté d’inspecter les tribunaux, par un mandat constitutionnel (art. 122.2

Constitution).

L’article 107 de la Loi Organique du Pouvoir Judiciaire (LOPJ) dispose : Le

Conseil Général du pouvoir Judiciaire est compètent dans les matières suivantes :

3. Inspections des juges et tribunaux

4. Sélection, formation et perfectionnement, recrutement du personnel,

avancements, situations administratives, régime disciplinaire des juges et des

magistrats.

Les activités d'inspection du CGPJ ont pour objet le contrôle et la prévention des

dysfonctionnements et des procédures irrégulières

Il s'agit d'activités destinées à constater les situations de risque, en proposant des

mesures en vue de les éviter et d'examiner l'éventuelle responsabilité disciplinaire du

juge ou du magistrat, le cas échéant.

Les organes intervenants en matière d’inspection, avec différents niveaux de

responsabilité et de compétence, sont les suivants :

� Le service d'inspection, aussi bien la direction du service que chacune

des unités d'inspection.

� Organes de direction des tribunaux : Présidents des Cours d’Appel

(Audiencias Provinciales), des Tribunaux Supérieurs de Justice, Cour

Nationale (Audiencia Nacional) et Cour de Cassation (Tribunal

Supremo).

II.- LE SERVICE D’INSPECTION

C’est un organe technique qui dépend du Conseil général du pouvoir judiciaire, dont la

fonction principale c'est la vérification et le contrôle du fonctionnement des services de

l'administration de justice, au moyen de la réalisation de visites et d’actions qui sont

convenues par le Conseil général (article 171.3 LOPJ).

Composition du Service d'Inspection

Il est dirigé par une Chef de Service, avec une Adjointe, et composé par 14 Unités

inspectrices: 9 territoriales, 4 spécialisées et 1 centrale (18 inspecteurs). D'entre ceux-

ci, il y a un coordinateur pour chaque communauté autonome

Le Service d’Inspection effectue quatre sortes de contrôles :

Inspection ordinaire : contrôle de l'accomplissement des standards qualitatifs et

quantitatifs de gestion, organisation et fonctionnement.

Visites extraordinaires : vérification des faits exceptionnels et élaboration de

propositions par rapport aux mêmes.

Visites de connaissance : obtenir l'information sur des aspects concrets

(responsabilité disciplinaire, protection de données, médiation, connaître les nouveaux

juges, etc.)

Visites virtuelles : Deux fois par an, les unités inspectrices évaluent les données

statistiques et toute autre information pour vérifier la bonne marche des organes

judiciaires ou, le cas échéant, les dysfonctionnements possibles.

Le Service d’inspection émet aussi les rapports qui lui sont demandés par les organes

compétents du Conseil relatifs au propre contenu du Service d’Inspection.

III.- COMMISSION DISCIPLINAIRE

La Commission disciplinaire est intégrée dans le CGPJ même et se compose de cinq

membres, choisis chaque année par l'assemblée plénière du Conseil, parmi ses

membres (article 132 LOPJ).

La Commission disciplinaire est compétente pour instruire les dossiers et imposer des

sanctions aux juges et magistrats (article 133).

En règle générale, la Commission de discipline se réunit tous les 15 jours en session

ordinaire, en présence des cinq membres qui la composent, de la responsable du

service d'inspection et, à titre de secrétaire, du juriste chef de la section du régime

disciplinaire.

Organes compétents pour imposer les sanctions (art. 421 LOPJ)

Pour la sanction consistant en une amende ou un avertissement correspondant aux

fautes légères, les bureaux de la présidence du Tribunal Supremo (Cour suprême), de

la Cour Nationale et des tribunaux supérieurs de justice, concernant les juges et les

magistrats qui dépendent de chacun de ces organes.

Pour les sanctions correspondant à des fautes graves, la Commission disciplinaire du

Conseil général du pouvoir judiciaire.

Pour les fautes très graves, l'Assemblée plénière du Conseil général du pouvoir

judiciaire, sur proposition de la Commission disciplinaire.

V.- RAPPORTS ENTRE LES RÉSULTATS DE L’INSPECTION ET LES

ÉVENTUELLES ANALYSES DE LA PROFESSIONNALITÉ DES MAGISTRATS

Le Conseil Général du pouvoir Judiciaire est compètent pour la sélection, la formation

et le perfectionnement, le recrutement du personnel, les avancements, les situations

administratives, le régime disciplinaire des juges et des magistrats.

Les Juges seront nommés, au moyen d’une Ordre, par le Conseil général du pouvoir

judiciaire. Les Magistrats et les Présidents seront nommés par Décret royal, sur

proposition du dit Conseil. La présentation au Décret royal sera faite par le Ministre de

la Justice, qui visera la nomination (art. 316 LOPJ).

On ne peut pas accéder à telles Présidences quand il existe une sanction disciplinaire

par la commission de faute grave ou très grave (art. 333.2 LOPJ). Aussi un motif de

cessation est l’accord dans un dossier disciplinaire (art. 338.3 LOPJ).

Par conséquent, l’Inspection peut interférer avec l’avancement de carrière des

magistrats, dont le Conseil désigne les présidents mais après avoir reçu l’avis du

Service d’inspection sur la base des résultats des inspections ordinaires.

VI.- LE MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE

Le Ministère de la Justice, quand il le considérera nécessaire, pourra solliciter au

Conseil qu’il ordonne l'inspection de n'importe quel Tribunal. Dans ce cas, le Conseil

notifiera le Ministère de la Justice la résolution et les mesures adoptées (article 171.4

LOPJ).

Le Ministère n'a pas d'autre compétence en matière d'inspection des juges et des

tribunaux. Par contre, il a cette compétence avec le Ministère public (procureurs ou

parquet), qui n'appartiennent pas à la magistrature.

Mais, les réformes successives opérées par les lois organiques 19/2003 et 1/2009 ont

dessiné un nouveau système dans l’organisation judiciaire espagnole (avec des

services communs procéduraux et plus d’attributions pour les greffiers), qui est en

phase d'implantation timide dans certains territoires, avec non peu de difficultés.

Ce système intronise le Ministère de la Justice comme organe habilité pour réaliser

des fonctions d'inspection dans le propre domaine de l'Administration de Justice, au

travers du Secrétaire d'État et des secrétaires de gouvernement des tribunaux

supérieurs de justice, mais uniquement en ce qui concerne le domaine des services

assumés par les greffiers en chef (qui dépendent du Ministère), et sans aucune

limitation dans les facultés qui incombent au Conseil.

À tels effets, il a été dicté l'Instruction 3/2011, du Secrétariat Général de

l'Administration de Justice, relative au « Système d'Inspection des Secrétaires de

Gouvernement et des Services responsabilité du Secrétaire Judiciaire ».

Madrid, le 9 mai 2012.

Signé. Ana María Aparicio Mateo

Inspectrice du Service d’Inspection Espagnol







Inspection and disciplinary measures in the Netherlands

Mrs. Monique van der GOES Senior advisor international cooperation Council for the Judiciary (de Rechtspraak) THE NETHERLANDS

1. Inspection services

There is neither an agency or department within the Government nor within the Judiciary which deals with Inspection. Complaints against judges/court staff on how the party was treated (if the party does not agree with the outcome of the case they can appeal the decision) can be submitted at the Court where the case was handled. Every Board of the Court has set up a procedure for complaints and the Board of the Court will handle the complaint according to the law. The Council has no role.

2. Evaluation of judges

According to the law the Board of the court should regularly hold interviews with the judges in which the way the duties are carried out are evaluated. Either the President of the court of the Presiding Judge of the sector will discuss the further career advancement and issues pertaining to the conduct. The evaluation may not relate to the judgement in individual cases. The evaluation and the comments of the judge are laid down in a written report.

3. Disciplinary measures in the Netherlands

The Judicial Officers (Legal Status) Act (Wet rechtspositie rechterlijke ambtenaren (Wrra)) contains the following provisions on disciplinary proceedings: A legal official can be sanctioned with the disciplinary measure of a written warning if he: a. neglects the dignity of his office or his official duties; b. violates the provisions prohibiting him the exercise of certain professions, to discuss cases with lawyers or legal representatives, to accept (written) information in writing from lawyers or legal representatives or the obligation to keep a secret. The written warning is issued by the President of the court in which the judicial officer is appointed.

A judicial officer can be sanctioned with the disciplinary measure of dismissal if: a. he, by act or omission, has brought serious harm to the judiciary or to public trust in the judiciary. b. he has previously received a written warning and he has violated the provisions set in this written warning.

about Inspection and disciplinary measures in the Netherlands from M. van der Goes

doorkiesnummer +31 70 - 361 9840 datum 25 May 2012

datum 2 mei 2012 onderwerp -

pagina 2 van 2 Dismissal is imposed by the Supreme Court, upon recommendation of the Procurator-General. In the past decade the Supreme Courts has decided in one case to dismiss a judge. If proceedings are started against a judge, they often resign before the procedure can lead to dismissal. In 2008, a working group established by the Council for the Judiciary issued recommendations on the extension of disciplinary measures for judges. The former government (the Dutch government fell in April 2012) was planning to broaden the number of disciplinary measures for judges to be able to better react to unfit or undesirable behaviour of judges. The proposed measures would include

• a written reprimand by the President of the court • suspension by the Supreme Court

In addition the possibility of withholding (part of) the remuneration for a certain period of the transfer of judges to another court ( for instance in case of disturbed working relations) are being considered. Written warning In the period 2001-2011 eight written warnings have been issued against judges in the Netherlands. Reasons for issueing the written warning were

• Unprofessional behaviour (three times , two for the same Judge) • Sexual intimidation and unprofessional behaviour (once). • Misconduct (also outside office hours)/ unwanted sexual avances (once). • Poor quality of the work (once ). • Alcohol abuse and public drunkenness (once). • Breach of official secrecy (once ).

Disciplinary dismissal In the period 2001-2010 no disciplinary dismissals have occurred. ) - vaak kiest de rechter voor ontslagname ipv ontslag via de HR.







Inspection et mesures disciplinaires aux Pays-Bas

Mme Monique van der GOES Senior Advisor international cooperation Conseil de la Justice (de Rechtspraak) PAYS-BAS

1. Services d’inspection

Il n’y a ni agence ni service au sein du Gouvernement ou au sein du milieu Judiciaire qui s’occupe de l’Inspection. Les plaintes contre les juges/le personnel du tribunal sur la façon dont la partie a été traitée (si la partie n’est pas d’accord avec le résultat de l’affaire elle peut faire appel de la décision) peuvent être déposées au Tribunal où l’affaire a été jugée. Chaque Comité du Tribunal a mis en place une procédure pour les plaintes et le Comité du Tribunal traite la plainte selon la loi. Le Conseil ne joue aucun rôle.

2. Evaluation des juges

Selon la loi, le Comité du tribunal doit régulièrement avoir des entrevues avec les juges lors desquelles la façon dont les missions sont effectuées est évaluée. Le Président du tribunal ou le Juge Présidant le secteur discuteront de l’avancement de carrière et d’autres questions relatives à la conduite. L’évaluation peut ne pas être liée au jugement dans des cas particuliers. L’évaluation et les commentaires du juge sont consignés dans un rapport écrit.

3. Mesures disciplinaires aux Pays-Bas

La Loi sur les Officiers Judiciaires (Statut Juridique) (Wet rechtspositie rechterlijke ambtenaren (Wrra)) contient les dispositions suivantes sur les procédures disciplinaires: Un officier de justice peut être sanctionné par une mesure disciplinaire consistant en un avertissement écrit s’il: a. néglige la dignité de sa fonction ou ses missions officielles; b. viole les dispositions lui interdisant l‘exercice de certaines professions, discute des affaires avec des avocats ou représentants légaux, accepte des informations (écrites) par écrit d‘avocats ou de représentants légaux ou viole l‘obligation de garder un secret. L’avertissement écrit est émis par le Président du tribunal où l’officier de justice est nommé.

Un officier de justice peut être sanctionné par la mesure disciplinaire consistant en un renvoi si: a. par un acte ou une omission, il a causé un préjudice grave au milieu judiciaire ou à la confiance du public dans le milieu judiciaire. b. il a précédemment reçu un avertissement écrit et a violé les dispositions précisées dans cet avertissement écrit.

sujet Inspection et mesures disciplinaires aux Pays-Bas de M. van der Goes

doorkiesnummer +31 70 - 361 9840 date 25 mai 2012

datum 2 mei 2012 onderwerp -

pagina 2 van 2 Le renvoi est imposé par la Cour Suprême, sur la recommandation du Procureur-Général. Au cours de la dernière décennie, la Cour Suprême a décidé dans un seul cas de renvoyer un juge. Si la procédure est lancée contre un juge, celui-ci démissionne souvent avant que la procédure n’aboutisse à un renvoi. En 2008, un groupe de travail établi par le Conseil Judiciaire a émis des recommandations sur l’extension des mesures disciplinaires pour les juges. Le précédent gouvernement (le gouvernement néerlandais est tombé en avril 2012) programmait d’élargir le nombre de mesures disciplinaires afin que les juges puissent mieux réagir face au comportement indésirable ou inadéquat de certains juges. Les mesures proposées comprendraient

• une réprimande écrite par le Président du tribunal • la suspension par la Cour Suprême

De plus, sont à l’étude la possibilité de retirer (une partie de) la rémunération pendant une certaine période ou la mutation des juges dans un autre tribunal (par exemple en cas de relations de travail perturbées). Avertissement écrit Dans la période 2001-2011 huit avertissements écrits ont été émis à l'encontre de juges aux Pays-Bas. Les motifs d’émission de cet avertissement écrit étaient

• Comportement non professionnel (trois fois, deux pour le même Juge) • Intimidation sexuelle et comportement non professionnel (une fois). • Conduite répréhensible (également en dehors des heures de travail)/ avances sexuelles non

désirées (une fois). • Qualité médiocre du travail (une fois). • Abus d’alcool et ivresse publique (une fois). • Violation du secret professionnel (une fois).

Renvoi disciplinaire Dans la période 2001-2010 aucun renvoi disciplinaire n’a été prononcé. ) - vaak kiest de rechter voor ontslagname ipv ontslag via de HR.







Brief information about the Inspection Board of the High Council of

Judges and Prosecutors in Turkey

Mr. Umit SADE Chief Inspector High Council of Judges and Prosecutors TURKEY

BRIEF INFORMATION ABOUT THE INSPECTION BOARD OF THE HIGH COUNCIL

OF JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS IN TURKEY

The 1982 Turkish Constitution (No:2709), the Law on The High Council of Judges

and Prosecutors (No:6087) and the Law on Judges and Prosecutors (No:2802) regulates the

Inspection Board.

A) Structure and Appointment System

The Inspection Board of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors consists of the

President of the Inspection Board, two deputy presidents, chief inspectors and inspectors.

The High Council of Judges and Prosecutors is responsible for all appointments. The

President and Deputy Presidents of the Inspection Board are appointed from among the first

class judges or prosecutors; The chief inspectors are appointed from inspectors who have

completed five years of service in the Inspection Board; the inspectors are appointed from

among those who have worked as judges and prosecutors for a minimum of five years.

B) Duties

The Inspection Board has the following duties;

• to inspect whether administrative and civil judiciary judges and prosecutors perform

their duties in compliance with laws and secondary legislation; including preparing

performance evaluation and improvement forms for the attention of the High Council,

• to examine whether offences are committed during the exercise of duties, or whether

judges and prosecutors’ manners and acts are in compliance with the requirements of

their capacities and duties, and if necessary, to launch examination or investigation

proceedings about them;

• to perform necessary inquiries and examinations on matters which fall within their

remit concerning the gaps and defects in the relevant legislation and to bring

recommendations to the Council about judicial and administrative measures to be

taken.

C) Relationship With The High Council and the Ministry of Judges

All inspections and investigations are carried out upon proposal by the Third Chamber

of the High Council and with the approval of the President of the Council. The Inspection

Board performs its duties on behalf of the Council and under the supervision of the Head of

the Third Chamber.

All inspectors are responsible to the President of the Inspection Board when exercising

their duties. The President of the Inspection Board is responsible to the Council.

After the 2010 Constitutional Amendments, the Inspection Board came under the High

Council. The High Council is independent of the Ministry of Justice.

D) Disciplinary Matters

All complaints are received by the Third Chamber, this Chamber examines whether

they are valid or not. If so, it requests approval from the President of the High Council. On

approval, the matter is referred to the Inspection Board or a senior judge or prosecutor for

investigation. After such investigation the matter may either be referred to the Second

Chamber for a disciplinary punishment, or referred back to the Third Chamber in the event of

recommendations for closing the case. Alongside disciplinary procedures, cases involving a

criminal act will be referred by the Chamber to the Prosecution Service for a criminal

investigation.

The President and concerned parties may request a re-examination of a decision within

ten days. The relevant Chamber will be responsible for the re-examination. Objections may be

made to the Plenary Session after re-examination within ten days. The Plenary Session’s

decision is final and no appeal can be made other than those for dismissal. The Council of

State reviews such cases as matter of urgency.

UMIT SADE

CHIEF INSPECTOR







Overview of the Legal Framework for Judicial Discipline in Ukraine:

Roles and Responsibilities of Disciplinary Inspectors

Mr. Ashot AGAIAN Legal Specialist USAID FAIR Justice Project UKRAINE

Overview of the Legal Framework for Judicial Discipline in Ukraine:

Roles and Responsibilities of Disciplinary Inspectors

By Ashot Agaian, Legal Specialist

Disciplinary proceeding against judges in Ukraine is the subject of two laws. In July 2010, the Parliament of Ukraine adopted the new law on the Judiciary and Status of Judges, as part of a process of judicial reform. The Law sets out totally new judicial discipline procedures regarding judges of local and appellate courts and establishes the position of disciplinary inspectors within the newly-created national High Qualifications Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQC), which was previously a regional-based, part-time body that selected and disciplined judges.

Disciplinary cases against judges of high specialized courts and justices of the Supreme Court are resolved by the High Council of Justice, according to the Law on the High Council of Justice.

I. The High Qualifications Commission of Judges of Ukraine The HQC is a permanent standing body that is responsible both for judicial selection and for disciplining judges of local and appellate courts. (Art. 90 of the Law) The HQC is composed of eleven members, who are citizens of Ukraine, have higher legal education and a record of service in the legal profession of at least twenty years. The Commission shall consist of: (a) six members - judges appointed by the Congress of Judges of Ukraine – the highest judicial self-government body; (b) two members appointed by congress of representatives of higher law schools and scientific institutions; (c) three members appointed by the Minister of Justice of Ukraine, Ombudsman of the Parliament of Ukraine, and Head of State Judicial Administration respectively. (Art. 92 of the Law) The Service of Disciplinary Inspectors is established within the HQC in order to assist HQC members in conducting proper verification of the grounds for disciplinary action against judges of local courts and courts of appeal. This Service consists of thirty three disciplinary inspectors. Three disciplinary inspectors are assigned to each HQC member. (Art. 98 of the Law) Verification Procedure After a complaint of judicial misconduct is registered with the HQC intake office, the Secretariat conducts a preliminary screening of the content of the complaint and via an automated system assigns the file to a member of the HQC to deal with the admissibility of the case (Art. 13.2.2. of the HQC Rules of Procedure)

2

The judge against whom the complaint was filed is notified by delivery of a copy of the complaint and is invited to provide a written memo on the indicated facts and documents (other proof) to substantiate his/her position.

Upon guidance from the HQC member assigned to the matter, the disciplinary inspector develops a plan of investigation of the facts which may be grounds for disciplining the judge. During the investigation process Inspector is authorised to:

• review materials of relevant court cases; • make copies of court files; • ask the judge to provide explanations and interview other people who may know

about the circumstances of the action containing the signs of a disciplinary misconduct, offer judge to provide written explanations on the essence of the complaint;

• receive relevant information on the case upon a written inquiry from state authorities and local governments, their officials, heads of companies, institutions, organizations, regardless of their form of ownership and subordination, from citizens and their unions;

• prepare draft opinions on existence or absence of grounds for disciplining judges of local and appellate courts;

• perform other commissions of the HQC member in the course of disciplinary proceedings. (Art. 86 of the Law)

The judge in question while providing the explanations is entitled to get familiar with the materials of the disciplinary case against him/her, to provide extra arguments and facts for his/her defense.

After the investigation process is over, the disciplinary inspector shall prepare a draft opinion on the sufficiency of the grounds to initiate the disciplinary case or to dismiss the complaint, and that opinion is handed over together with the materials of the disciplinary case to the HQC member. The opinion shall be signed by the HQC member and sent over to the HQC members for their collegial consideration. (Art. 86 of the Law)

Commencing a Disciplinary Case

The issue of disciplinary case initiation or complaint dismissal is considered at the meeting of the Commission without notifying the complainant and the judge in question. Consideration of the issue of disciplinary case initiation starts with the report of the member of the Commission who was responsible to conduct the verification. The other members of the Commission can ask the reporter for the clarification. (Art. 13.3.1. of the HQC Rules of Procedure)

A copy of decision on commencing a disciplinary case by the HQC shall be sent to the judge against whom the case was initiated and to the complainant. The judge is provided also with a copy of the HQC member opinion on the result of investigation. (Art. 86 of the Law)

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Consideration of a Disciplinary Case

The HQC considers a disciplinary case at its meeting, to which the complainant and judge in question are invited. (Art. 86 of the Law)

Presence of the judge or his legal representative during the hearing is a must. If such judge/representative fails to appear at the meeting, the issue of such judge’s disciplinary liability may be reviewed in his/her absence. If the judge has valid reasons for being absent in the Commission meeting, such judge, whose case is under review, may deliver written statements on the merits of the relevant issues. Such statements shall be formally submitted to the Commission Secretariat and shall be attached to the case file. (Art. 86 of the Law)

The judge’s written statements are announced at the Commission meeting by judge’s representative and in case there is no such representative, by the HQC member, who was entitled to conduct the investigation.

The disciplinary case is considered on the adversarial principle. The judge, whose disciplinary case is under review, and/or his/her representative may testify, ask the participants of the proceedings questions, express objections, file motions and rejections. (Art. 86 of the Law)

The Law envisages the only sanction – reprimand, which may be imposed on a judge. Disciplinary sanction is applied to a judge not later than six months from the day of opening of disciplinary proceedings by the Commission, but not later than one year after the misconduct took place. If within a year since the day the disciplinary sanction was applied, the judge is not subjected to a new disciplinary sanction he/she shall be regarded as the one that has no disciplinary sanction. (Art. 87 of the Law) Appeal Procedure A judge of a local or appellate court may appeal a decision of the HQC on disciplining him/her to the High Council of Justice or to the High Administrative Court of Ukraine within one month since the day a copy of the decision was handed out to him/her or received by him/her by mail. However, the complaint to the High Council of Justice shall be filed through the HQC. Upon receiving the complaint, the HQC shall send it, along with the case file materials to the High Council of Justice. Filing an appeal against the HQC decision regarding disciplining a judge to the High Council of Justice or filing administrative case before the High Administrative Court of Ukraine prevents the imposed sanction to be immediately implemented (Art. 89 of the Law) The High Council of Justice shall consider the appeal within one month after its receipt and in case of additional evidence of circumstances and materials of the case - within three months. (Art. 45 of the Law of Ukraine on the High Council of Justice)

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When deciding on a judge's disciplinary liability, the High Council of Justice shall obtain judges explanation. In case of impossibility to attend the hearing of the High Council of Justice due to reasonable excuses, the judge may forward written arguments concerning the raised issues, which shall be attached to the case files. Written arguments of the judge must be announced during the hearing of the High Council of Justice. Upon consideration of a judge’s or complainant’s appeal, the High Council of Justice on sufficient grounds may:

• satisfy an appeal, annul the decision on disciplining a judge, and terminate disciplinary proceeding;

• satisfy the appeal completely or partially, and change the HQC decision in a disciplinary case;

• leave the HQC decision in a disciplinary case as it was.

II. The High Council of Justice The High Council of Justice is a constitutional body responsible for (1) forming of highly professional corps of judges, judicial dismissal, (2) for adoption of decisions regarding violations by judges and prosecutors of requirements regarding incompatibility and (3) cases on discipline liability against judges of high specialized courts and justices of the Supreme Court (Art.131 of Constitution of Ukraine and art. 1 of the Law of Ukraine on the High Council of Justice) The High Council of Justice consists of twenty members. The Parliament of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine, the Congress of Judges of Ukraine, the Congress of Advocates of Ukraine, the Congress of Representatives of Higher Legal Educational Establishments and Scientific Institutions shall appoint three members to the High Council of Justice, and the All-Ukrainian Conference of Employees of the General Prosecutor's Office - two members of the High Council of Justice. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ukraine, the Minister of Justice of Ukraine and the General Prosecutor of Ukraine are ex officio members of the High Council of Justice. (Art. 5 of the Law of Ukraine on the High Council of Justice) The High Council of Justice shall form two sections: (i) preparation of recommendations for the first five-year appointment of judges and their dismissal; (ii) disciplinary section to conduct disciplinary proceedings, consider complaints about decisions on holding judges and public prosecutors disciplinarily liable and about decisions on violation of incompatibility requirements. Each section shall take preliminary decisions on the cases within its competence and submit them for collegial approval by the High Council of Justice. (Art. 19 of the Law of Ukraine on the High Council of Justice) The only basis for commencing a disciplinary case by the High Council of Justice is a High Council of Justice member’s submission made upon the results of investigation procedure. (Art. 38 of the Law of Ukraine on the High Council of Justice) Verification Procedure

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Information about judicial misconduct shall be verified by a High Council of Justice member acting on the basis of assignment issued by the High Council of Justice, its Chairman or Deputy Chairman, by means of obtaining relevant written explanations from the judge in question and other individuals, requesting and familiarizing with materials of court proceedings, obtaining other relevant information from state authorities or local self-government bodies, their officials, leaders of organizations, institutions, individuals or public associations of all forms of ownership. (Art. 40 of the Law of Ukraine on the High Council of Justice) Upon the results of investigation, a report shall be drafted, specifying actual circumstances found out in the course of investigation along with conclusions and proposals. The judge subject to investigation has a right to become familiar with the report and the materials. The report and all materials shall be forwarded to the High Council of Justice, to decide whether the disciplinary proceeding should take place. (Art. 40 of the Law of Ukraine on the High Council of Justice) Commencing a Disciplinary Case

Based on disciplinary proceeding requirements with regard to the Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice or a judge of the Supreme Court of Ukraine, Chief Judge, deputy Chief Judge or a judge of a high specialized court, disciplinary proceeding shall be commenced upon a resolution of the High Council of Justice within ten days since the day of obtaining information about judicial misconduct, and in case, where such information requires verification - within no more than ten days since the completion of verification. (Art. 41 of the Law of Ukraine on the High Council of Justice) Consideration of a Disciplinary Case The High Council of Justice shall consider a disciplinary case at the nearest session of the High Council of Justice after receipt of the conclusion and investigation materials. A decision on a disciplinary case is made in absence of the judge in question. The High Council of Justice decision should consist of information about the name, position of the judge, circumstances of his misconduct, the essence of judge's explanations and information characterizing his personal achievement, motives for the decision taken, with reference to the evidence, disciplinary sanction applied to the judge, or grounds for termination of the proceeding, as well as the procedure and the term of appeal against the decision. In case of imposing a disciplinary sanction, the HCJ shall take into consideration the nature of the disciplinary misconduct, its consequences, the judge's personality, and other circumstances which may influence the level of liability. (Art. 42 of the Law of Ukraine on the High Council of Justice) When deciding on a judge's disciplinary liability, the High Council of Justice shall hear his explanation. In case of impossibility to participate in the session of the High Council of Justice because of reasonable excuses, the judge may forward written arguments concerning the raised issues, which are attached to the case materials. Written arguments of the judge must be announced at the session of the High Council of Justice (Art. 42 of the Law of Ukraine on the High Council of Justice)

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Appeal Procedure Acts and decisions of the High Council of Justice according to the standard procedure may be challenged before the High Administrative Court of Ukraine with no right to appeal its decision. (Art. 18 of the Administrative Procedure Code of Ukraine)

III. Ministry of Justice of Ukraine The Ministry of Justice of Ukraine has a rather limited role in the judicial discipline process. As it was already mentioned, the Minister of Justice is an ex officio member of the High Council of Justice and takes part in forming the composition of the HQC by nominating one of its members. Unlike in most European Countries, the Service of Disciplinary Inspectors is established within the HQC and is not related to the Ministry of Justice. The authority to deal with judicial discipline issues is given exclusively to the HQС and the High Council of Justice.







Aperçu du Cadre Juridique pour la Discipline Judiciaire en Ukraine:

Rôles et Responsabilités des Inspecteurs Disciplinaires

M. Ashot AGAIAN Spécialiste du Droit UKRAINE

Aperçu du Cadre Juridique pour la Discipline Judiciaire en Ukraine:

Rôles et Responsabilités des Inspecteurs Disciplinaires

Par Ashot Agaian, Spécialiste du Droit

La procédure disciplinaire à l’encontre des juges en Ukraine fait l’objet de deux lois. En juillet 2010, le Parlement d’Ukraine a adopté la nouvelle loi sur le Monde Judiciaire et le Statut des Juges, dans le cadre d’un processus de réforme judicaire. La Loi établit des procédures de discipline judiciaire totalement nouvelles eu égard aux juges des tribunaux de première instance et des cours d’appel et fixe la position des inspecteurs disciplinaires au sein de la toute nouvelle Haute Commission de Qualification des Juges d’Ukraine (HQC), laquelle était précédemment un organisme régional, fonctionnant sur la base du temps partiel, qui sélectionnait les juges et réglait leur discipline.

C’est le Haut Conseil de la Justice qui tranche les cas disciplinaires à l’encontre des juges des hautes cours spécialisées et des juges de la Cour Suprême, conformément à la Loi relative au Haut Conseil de la Justice.

I. La Haute Commission de Qualification des Juges d’Ukraine La HQC est un organisme permanent qui est chargé de la sélection judiciaire ainsi que de la discipline par rapport aux juges des tribunaux de première instance et des cours d’appel. (Art. 90 de la Loi) La HQC est composée de onze membres, qui sont citoyens d’Ukraine, ont fait des études supérieures juridiques et ont des états de service dans les professions juridiques depuis au moins vingt ans. La Commission est constituée de: (a) six membres - juges nommés par le Congrès des Juges d’Ukraine – le plus haut corps judiciaire autonome; (b) deux membres nommés par le congrès des représentants des facultés de droit et institutions scientifiques; (c) trois membres nommés par le Ministre de la Justice d’Ukraine, le Médiateur du Parlement d’Ukraine, et le Directeur de l’Administration Nationale Judiciaire respectivement. (Art. 92 de la Loi) Le Service des Inspecteurs Disciplinaires est établi au sein de la HQC afin d’aider les membres de la HQC à mener des vérifications en bonne et due forme sur les motifs d’action disciplinaire à l’encontre des juges des tribunaux de première instance et des cours d’appel. Ce Service est composé de trente-trois inspecteurs disciplinaires. Trois inspecteurs disciplinaires sont attribués à chaque membre de la HQC. (Art. 98 de la Loi) Procédure de Vérification Après le dépôt d’une plainte pour conduite judiciaire répréhensible auprès du bureau d’accueil de la HQC, le Secrétariat effectue un repérage préliminaire du contenu de la plainte et, par un système automatisé, attribue le dossier à un membre de la HQC pour examiner la recevabilité de l’affaire (Art. 13.2.2. des Règles de Procédure de la HQC)

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Le juge à l’encontre duquel la plainte a été déposée reçoit une notification par remise d’une copie de la plainte et est invité à soumettre une note écrite sur les faits indiqués ainsi que des documents (autres preuves) pour justifier sa position.

Sur les conseils du membre de la HQC auquel l’affaire a été attribuée, l’inspecteur disciplinaire met au point un programme d’investigation sur les faits qui pourront devenir des motifs d’action disciplinaire à l’encontre du juge. Au cours du processus d’investigation, l’Inspecteur est autorisé à:

• examiner les éléments des dossiers du tribunal correspondants; • faire des copies des dossiers du tribunal; • demander au juge de fournir des explications et interroger d’autres personnes

susceptibles de connaître les circonstances de l’action contenant les signes d’une conduite judiciaire répréhensible, proposer au juge de fournir des explications écrites sur l’essence de la plainte;

• recevoir des informations pertinentes sur l’affaire suite à une demande écrite adressée aux autorités nationales et aux collectivités territoriales, à leurs fonctionnaires, à des dirigeants d’entreprise, d’institutions, d’organismes, quelle que soit la nature de leur propriété et subordination, à des citoyens et à leurs associations;

• préparer des avis préparatoires sur l’existence ou l’absence de motifs pour une action disciplinaire à l’encontre des juges des tribunaux de première instance et des cours d’appel;

• exécuter d’autres missions de la part du membre de la HQC dans le cadre des procédures disciplinaires. (Art. 86 de la Loi)

Le juge en question, tout en fournissant les explications, a le droit d’être informé des éléments du dossier disciplinaire contre lui, de fournir de plus amples arguments et faits pour sa défense.

Une fois que le processus d’investigation est terminé, l’inspecteur disciplinaire rédige un avis préparatoire indiquant s’il y a suffisamment de motifs pour lancer une action disciplinaire ou s’il convient de rejeter la plainte, et cet avis est remis avec les éléments du dossier disciplinaire au membre de la HQC. L’avis est signé par le membre de la HQC et adressé aux autres membres de la HQC pour être examiné en formation collégiale. (Art. 86 de la Loi)

Lancement d’une Action Disciplinaire

La question portant sur le lancement de l’action disciplinaire ou sur le rejet de la plainte est étudiée lors de la réunion de la Commission sans que le plaignant et le juge en question n’en soient avertis. L’examen de la question du lancement de l’action disciplinaire commence par le rapport du membre de la Commission qui était chargé de mener la vérification. Les autres membres de la Commission peuvent demander au rapporteur des clarifications. (Art. 13.3.1. des Règles de Procédure de la HQC) Une copie de la décision d’intenter une action disciplinaire par la HQC est envoyée au juge contre lequel le dossier a été ouvert ainsi qu’au plaignant. Le juge reçoit aussi une copie de l’avis du membre de la HQC sur le résultat de l’investigation. (Art. 86 de la Loi)

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Examen d’une Action Disciplinaire

La HQC se réunit pour examiner une action disciplinaire, le plaignant et le juge en question sont conviés à cette réunion. (Art. 86 de la Loi)

La présence du juge ou de son représentant légal à l’audience est obligatoire. Si un tel juge/représentant omet de se présenter à la réunion, la question de la responsabilité disciplinaire de ce juge peut être examinée en son absence. Si le juge a des motifs valables pour être absent de la réunion de la Commission, ce juge, dont le cas est examiné, peut produire des déclarations écrites sur le fond des questions correspondantes. Ces déclarations sont soumises de manière formelle au Secrétariat de la Commission et sont annexées au dossier. (Art. 86 de la Loi)

Les déclarations écrites du juge sont annoncées à la Commission par le représentant du juge et au cas où il n’y a pas un tel représentant, par le membre de la HQC, qui a été autorisé à mener l’investigation.

L’action disciplinaire est examinée sur le principe du contradictoire. Le juge, dont le dossier disciplinaire est examiné, et/ou son représentant peut témoigner, poser des questions aux participants à la procédure, émettre des objections, déposer des motions et des refus. (Art. 86 de la Loi)

La Loi envisage la seule sanction – la réprimande, qui peut être imposée à un juge. La sanction disciplinaire est appliquée à un juge dans un délai de six mois au plus suivant le jour d’ouverture de la procédure disciplinaire par la Commission, mais au plus tard dans un délai d’un an après que la conduite répréhensible a eu lieu. Si dans un délai d’un an suivant la date à laquelle la sanction disciplinaire a été appliquée, le juge n’est pas soumis à une nouvelle sanction disciplinaire, il/elle sera considéré(e) comme n’ayant pas eu de sanction disciplinaire. (Art. 87 de la Loi) Procédure d’Appel Un juge d’un tribunal de première instance ou d’une cour d’appel peut faire appel d’une décision de la HQC lui imposant une sanction disciplinaire auprès du Haut Conseil de la Justice ou auprès de la Haute Cour Administrative d’Ukraine dans un délai d’un mois suivant le jour où une copie de la décision lui a été remise en mains propres ou par courrier. Toutefois, la plainte auprès du Haut Conseil de la Justice est déposée par l’intermédiaire de la HQC. Lorsqu’elle reçoit la plainte, la HQC l’envoie, avec les éléments du dossier au Haut Conseil de la Justice. Faire appel de la décision de la HQC par rapport à une affaire disciplinaire concernant un juge auprès du Haut Conseil de la Justice ou déposer un dossier administratif devant la Haute Cour Administrative d’Ukraine sont deux façons d’empêcher que la sanction imposée ne soit immédiatement appliquée. (Art. 89 de la Loi) Le Haut Conseil de la Justice examine l’appel dans un délai d’un mois après l’avoir reçu et en cas de preuves supplémentaires sur les circonstances et éléments de l’affaire – dans un délai de trois mois. (Art. 45 de la Loi d’Ukraine sur le Haut Conseil de la Justice)

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Lors de sa prise de décision sur la responsabilité disciplinaire d’un juge, le Haut Conseil de la Justice obtient les explications du juge. Si le juge ne peut pas assister à l’audience du Haut Conseil de la Justice pour des motifs raisonnables, il peut transmettre des arguments écrits concernant les questions soulevées, lesquels seront annexés au dossier. Les arguments écrits du juge doivent être annoncés lors de l’audience du Haut Conseil de la Justice. Lorsqu’il examine l’appel d’un juge ou d’un plaignant, le Haut Conseil de la Justice peut, avec des motifs suffisants:

• donner droit à l’appel, annuler la décision d’imposer une sanction disciplinaire à un juge, et mettre fin à la procédure disciplinaire;

• donner droit à l’appel en totalité ou en partie, et modifier la décision de la HQC concernant une action disciplinaire;

• laisser la décision de la HQC par rapport à l’action disciplinaire telle qu’elle était.

II. Le Haut Conseil de la Justice Le Haut Conseil de la Justice est un corps constitutionnel chargé (1) de former des corps de juges de grande qualité professionnelle, du renvoi judiciaire, (2) de l’adoption de décisions concernant des violations par des juges et procureurs d’exigences eu égard à l’incompatibilité et (3) des dossiers de responsabilité en matière de discipline à l’encontre des juges des hautes cours spécialisées et des juges de la Cour Suprême (Art. 131 de la Constitution d’Ukraine et art. 1 de la Loi d’Ukraine sur le Haut Conseil de la Justice) Le Haut Conseil de la Justice est composé de vingt membres. Le Parlement d’Ukraine, le Président d’Ukraine, le Congrès des Juges d’Ukraine, le Congrès des Avocats d’Ukraine, le Congrès des Représentants des Etablissements Educatifs Supérieurs Juridiques et des Institutions Scientifiques nomment trois membres au Haut Conseil de la Justice, et la Conférence de Tout l’Ukraine des Employés du Parquet – deux membres du Haut Conseil de la Justice. Le Juge Principal de la Cour Suprême d’Ukraine, le Ministre de la Justice d’Ukraine et le Procureur Général d’Ukraine sont membres d’office du Haut Conseil de la Justice. (Art. 5 de la Loi d’Ukraine sur le Haut Conseil de la Justice) Le Haut Conseil de la Justice forme deux sections: (i) préparation des recommandations pour la première nomination pour cinq ans des juges et leur renvoi; (ii) section disciplinaire pour mener les procédures disciplinaires, étudier les plaintes relatives à des décisions sur la responsabilité disciplinaire des juges et des procureurs et à des décisions dur la violation des exigences d’incompatibilité. Chaque section prend des décisions préliminaires sur les dossiers relevant de sa compétence et les soumet à l’approbation collégiale du Haut Conseil de la Justice. (Art. 19 de la Loi d’Ukraine sur le Haut Conseil de la Justice) On ne peut intenter une action disciplinaire devant le Haut Conseil de la Justice que sur présentation par un membre du Haut Conseil de la Justice des résultats de la procédure d’investigation. (Art. 38 de la Loi d’Ukraine sur le Haut Conseil de la Justice) Procédure de Vérification

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Les informations relatives à une conduite judiciaire répréhensible sont vérifiées par un membre du Haut Conseil de la Justice agissant sur la base d’une mission confiée par le Haut Conseil de la Justice, son Président ou Vice-Président, en obtenant des explications écrites pertinentes de la part du juge en question et d’autres individus, en demandant et se familiarisant avec les éléments des procédures du tribunal, en obtenant d’autres informations pertinentes auprès des autorités nationales ou des organismes autonomes locaux, de leurs employés, des dirigeants d’organismes, des institutions, des particuliers ou des associations publiques de toutes formes de propriété. (Art. 40 de la Loi d’Ukraine sur le Haut Conseil de la Justice) Sur les résultats de l’investigation, un rapport est préparé, spécifiant les circonstances effectives découvertes au cours de l’investigation ainsi que les conclusions et propositions. Le juge faisant l’objet de l’investigation a le droit de connaître le rapport et les éléments du dossier. Le rapport et tous les éléments sont transmis au Haut Conseil de la Justice pour que celui-ci décide si la procédure disciplinaire doit avoir lieu. (Art. 40 de la Loi d’Ukraine sur le Haut Conseil de la Justice) Lancement d’une Action Disciplinaire Sur la base des exigences concernant les procédures disciplinaires relatives au Juge Principal, au Juge Principal Adjoint ou à un juge de la Cour Suprême d’Ukraine, un Juge en Chef, un Juge en Chef adjoint ou un juge d’une haute cour spécialisée, les procédures disciplinaires sont lancées sur résolution du Haut Conseil de la Justice dans un délai de dix jours suivant la date d’obtention d’informations sur la conduite judiciaire répréhensible, et au cas où de telles informations nécessitent d’être vérifiées – dans un délai n’excédant pas dix jours suivant la fin de la vérification. (Art. 41 of the Law of Ukraine on the High Council of Justice) Examen d’une Affaire Disciplinaire Le Haut Conseil de la Justice examine une affaire disciplinaire à la séance suivante du Haut Conseil de la Justice après réception de la conclusion et des éléments de l’investigation. Une décision sur une affaire disciplinaire est prise en l’absence du juge en question. La décision du Haut Conseil de la Justice doit consister en informations sur le nom, le poste du juge, les circonstances de sa faute, l’essence des explications du juge et des informations quant à son accomplissement personnel, les motifs pour la décision prise, en référence aux preuves, la sanction disciplinaire appliquée au juge, ou les motifs pour mettre fin à la procédure, ainsi que la procédure et les modalités d’appel de la décision. Au cas où il impose une sanction disciplinaire, le Haut Conseil de la Justice prend en compte la nature de la conduite répréhensible disciplinaire, ses conséquences, la personnalité du juge, et d’autres circonstances qui peuvent influer sur le niveau de responsabilité. (Art. 42 de la Loi d’Ukraine sur le Haut Conseil de la Justice) Lorsqu’il prend une décision sur la responsabilité disciplinaire d’un juge, le Haut Conseil de la Justice entend son explication. Au cas il ne peut pas participer à la séance du Haut Conseil de la Justice pour des motifs raisonnables, le juge peut transmettre des arguments écrits concernant les questions soulevées, qui sont annexés aux éléments du dossier. Les arguments écrits du juge doivent être énoncés lors de la séance du Haut Conseil de la Justice (Art. 42 de la Loi d’Ukraine sur le Haut Conseil de la Justice)

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Procédure d’Appel Les actes et les décisions du Haut Conseil de la Justice selon la procédure habituelle peuvent être contestés devant la Haute Cour Administrative d’Ukraine sans droit de faire appel de sa décision. (Art. 18 du Code de Procédure Administrative d’Ukraine)

III. Ministère de la Justice d’Ukraine Le Ministère de la Justice d’Ukraine a un rôle plutôt limité dans le processus de discipline judiciaire. Comme il a déjà été indiqué, le Ministre de la Justice est membre d’office du Haut Conseil de la Justice et participe à la formation de la composition de la HQC en nommant l’un de ses membres. Contrairement à la situation dans la plupart des pays européens, le Service d’Inspecteurs Disciplinaires est établi au sein de la HQC et n’est pas lié au Ministère de la Justice. L’autorité pour traiter de questions de discipline judiciaire est donnée exclusivement à la HQС et au Haut Conseil de la Justice.

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