Greiner, 1972

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Harvard Business Review: Iiily-August 1972

cedures that are holding back expansion intonew markets. Many younger managers subse-quently leave the bank, competi t ion moves in,and profits are still declining.

The problems of these companies, like those ofmany others, are rooted more in past decisionsthan in present events or outside market dy-namics. Historical forces do indeed shape thefuture growth of organizations. Yet manage-ment, in its haste to grow, often overlooks suchcritical developmental questions as: Where hasour organization been? Where is i t now' Andwhat do the answers to tbese questions meanfor where we are going? Instead, its gaze is fixedoutward toward the environment and the fu-ture—as if more precise market projections willprovide a new organizational identity.

Companies fail to see that many clues to their

future success lie within their own organiza-tions and their evolving states of development.Moreover, the inabil i ty of management to un-derstand i ts organization development problemscan result in a company becoming "frozen" inits present stage of evolution or, ultimately,in failure, regardless of market opportunities.

My position in this article is that the futureof an organization may be less determined byoutside forces than it is by the organization'shistory. In stressing the force of history on an

organization, I have drawn from the legacies ofEuropean psychologists (their thesis being thatindividual behavior is determined primarily byprevious events and experiences, not by whatlies ahead). Extending this analogy of individ-ual development to the problems of organiza-tion development, I shall discuss a series of de-velopmental phases through which growingcompanies tend to pass. But, first, let me providetwo definitions:

1. The term evolution is used to describe pro-

!. See, for exaTiiple, Wiliiam H. Siachuck. "Organizational Metamor-phosis," in Promising Research Directions, ediied by R.W. Millmanand M.P. Hottenstein |Tempe, Arizona, Academy of Maiiafiement.[968), p. 115.

Z. See. for example, the Gfiiiigesfeerg case series, prepared by C. RolandChristcnsen and Bruce R. Scott, Case Clearing Ht)u-,e-, HarvardBusiness Sehiml.

3, Stffllegy and Structure: Chapters in the History of tbe American

Industrial Entcipiise [Cambridge, Massachusetts, The M.l.T. Press, ii)6zl,

4. I have drawn on many sources for evidence: |a) numerous casescollected at the Harvard Business School; (b) Organization Crnwth and

Development, edited by William H. Siarbuck (Middlesex, England,Penguin Books, Ltd., 1971], where several studies are cited; and (c)articles puhlished in journals, sucb as Lawrence E. Foucaker and |(ihnM. Stiipfdid. "Organization Structuie and the Multinational Strategy."Administrative Scicnci; Quurierly. Vol . i ) , N o, i , 1968, p . 47 ; a n d

Makolm S. Salter, "Management Apptaisal and Reward Systems,"journal of Easiness Policy, Vol. 1. No. 4. [971.

longed periods of growth where no major heaval occurs in organization practices.

2. The term revolution is used to descrthose periods of substantial turmoil in orgization life.

As a com pany progresses through developm enphases, each evolutionary period creates its orevolution. For instance, centralized practieventually lead to demands for decentralizatiMoreover, the nature of management 's solutto each revolutionary period determ ines wh eta company will move forward into its next staof evolutionary growth. As I shall show lathere are at least five phases of organizatdevelopment, each characterized by both evolution and a revolution.

Key forces in development

During the past few years a small amount research knowledge about the phases of ganization development has been building. Soof this research is very quantitative, such time-series analyses that reveal patterns of enomic performance over time. ' The majority studies, however, are case-oriented and use copany records and interviews to reconstruct a ripicture of corporate development.- Yet bo

types of research tend to be heavily empiriwithout at tempting more generalized statemeabout the overall process of development.

A notable exception is the historical work Alfred D. Chandler, fr., in his book Strategy aStructure.-^ This study depicts four very broand general phases in the lives of four larU.S. companies. It proposes that outside markopportunit ies determine a company's strategwhich in turn determines the company's orgnization structure. This thesis has a valid ri

for the four companies examined by Chandllargely because they developed in a time of eplosive markets and technological advances. Bmore recent evidence suggests that organizatistructure may be less malleable than Chandassumed; in fact, structure can play a criticrole in influencing corporate strategy. It is threverse emphasis on how organization structuaffects future growth which is highlighted in tmodel presented in this article.

From an analysis of recent studies,^ five k

dimensions emerge as essential for buildingmodel of organization development:1. Age of the organization.

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Growing organizat ions

2. Size of the organization.3. Stages of evolution.4. Stages of revolution.5. Grow th rate of the indus try.

ustrated in Exhibit J. Note especially how each

imension influences the other over t ime; whenall five elements begin to interact, a more com-plete and dynamic picture of organizational

rowth emerges.After describing these dimensions and their

nterconnections, I shall discuss each evohi-tionary revolutio nary phase of develo pm ent andshow (a) how each stage of evolution breeds itsown revolution, and (b) how management solu-

t ions to each revolution determine the nextstage of evolution.

Age of the organization

The most obvious and essential dimension forany model of development is the life span of anorganization (represented as tbe horizontal axis

in Exhibit 1). All historical studies gather datafrom various points in time and then makecomparisons. From these observations, it is evi-dent that the same organization practices arenot maintained throughout a long t ime span.This makes a most basic point: managementproblems and principles are rooted in time. Theconcept of decentralization, for example, canhave meaning for describing corporate practices

Exhibit I. Mod el of organization development

Size oforgani-zation

Large

ompany inmedium-growthindustry

Company in

low-growtbindustxy

Small

Young

Age of organ ization

Mature

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Harvard Business Review: July-August 1972

at one time period but loses its descriptivepower at another.

The passage of time also contributes to theinstitutionalization of managerial att i tudes. Asa result, employee behavior becomes not onlymo re predic table bu t also more difficult tochange when atti tudes are outdated.

Size of the organization

This dimension is depicted as the vertical axisin Exhibit 1. A company's problems and solu-tions tend to change markedly as the numberof employees and sales volume increase. Thus,time is not the only determinant of structure;in fact, organizations that do not grow in sizecan retain many of the same management issuesand practices over lengthy periods. In additionto increased size, however, problems of coor-

dination and communication magnify, newfunctions emerge, levels in the managementhierarchy multiply, and jobs become moreinterrelated.

Stages of evohition

As both age and size increase, another phenom-enon becomes evident: the prolonged growthtbat I have term ed the evolutio nary period. Mostgrowing organizations do not expand for two

years and then retreat for one year; rather, thosethat survive a erisis usually enjoy four to eightyears of continuous growth without a majoreconomic setback or severe internal disruption.The term evolution seems appropriate for de-scribing these quieter periods because only mod-est adjustments appear necessary for maintain-ing growth under the same overall pattern ofmanagement .

Stages of revolution

Smootb evolution is not inevitable; it cannot beassumed that organization growth is linear. For-tune's "so o" list, for exam ple, has had significantturnover during the last 50 years. Thus we findevidence from numerous case histories whichreveals periods of substantial turbulence spacedbetween smoother periods of evolution.

I have termed these turbulent times the peri-ods of revolution because they typically exhibita serious upheaval of management practices.

Traditional management practices, which wereappropriate for a smaller size and earlier time,

managers and disillusioned lower-level maagers. During such periods of crisis, a number companies fail—those unable to abandon papractices and effect major organization changare likely either to fold or to level off in thegrowth rates.

The critical task for management in earevolutionary period is to find a new set organization practices that will become the bafor managing the next period of evolutionagrowth. Interestingly enough, these new pratices eventually sow their own seeds of decand lead to another period of revolution. Companies therefore experience the irony of seeia major solution in one time period becomemajor problem at a latter date.

Grow th rate of the industry

The speed at which an organization experiencphases of evolution and revolution is closerelated to the market enviromnent of its indutry. For example, a company in a rapidly expaning market will have to add employees rapidlhence, the need for new organization structurto accommodate large staff increases is acceerated. While evolutionary periods tend to relatively short in fast-growing industries, mulonger evolutionary periods occur in mature slowly growing industries.

Evolution can also be prolonged, and revoltions delayed, when profits come easily. For istance, companies that make grievous errors a rewarding industry can still look good on theprofit and loss statements; thus they can avoa change in management practices for a longperiod. The aerospace industry in its infancy an example. Yet revolutionary periods still ocur, as one did in aerospace when profit opportnities began to dry up. Revolutions seem to bmuch more severe and difficult to resolve whe

the market environment is poor.

Phases of growth

With the foregoing framework in mind, let unow examine in depth the five specific phasof evolution and revolution. As shown in ExhibU, each evolutionary period is characterized bthe dominant niamigement style used to achievgrowth, while each revolutionary period is cha

acterized by the dominant management problethat must be solved before growth can continu

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Growiny organizations

Exhibit 11. The five phases of growth

PHASE I

Evolut ion s tages

Re volu t ion s t a ge s

4 : Crisis ofRED TAPE

5: Growth throughCOLLABORATION

4: Growth throughCO O RD I N A T I O N

2: Crisis ofA U T O N O M Y

3 : Growth thruuehDELEGATION j

2: Growth throughDIRECTION a

1: Growth throuf;hCREATIVITY

Young

Age of organiz^ition

It is important to note that each phase is bothhe previous phase and a cause for

For example, the evolutionary

is characterized by attempts to regain controlover the diversity created through increased del-egation.

The principal implication of each phase is thatmanagement actions are narrowly prescrihed ifgrowth is to occur. For example, a company ex-periencing an autonomy crisis in Phase 2 cannotreturn to directive management for a solution-it must adopt a new style of delegation in orderto move ahead.

Phase 1: Creativity .. .In the birth stage of an organization, the em-

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Harvard Business Review : July-August 1972

ket. Here are the characteristics of the periodof creative evolution:

O The com pany's founders are usually tech-nically or entrepreneurially oriented, and theydisdain management activit ies; their physicaland mental energies are absorbed entirely inmaking and sell ing a new product.

O Co m mu nicatio n amon g em ployees is fre-quent and informal.

O Long hours of work are rewarded by modestsalaries and the promise of ownership benefits.

O Con trol of activities comes from imm edia temarketplace feedback; the management acts asthe customers react.

. .. e^ the leadership crisis: All of the foregoingindividualistic and creative activities are essen-tial for the company to get off the ground. But

therein lies the problem. As the company grows,larger production runs require knowledge aboutthe efficiencies of manufacturing. Increasednumbers of employees cannot be managed ex-clusively through informal communication; newemployees are not motivated by an intensededication to the product or organization. Addi-t ional capital must be secured, and n ew account-ing procedures are needed for financial control.

Thus the founders find themselves burdenedwith un wa nted ma nage me nt responsibil i ties . So

they long for the "good old days," still tryingto act as they did in the past. And conflicts be-tween the harried leaders grow more intense.

At this point a crisis of leadership occurs,which is the onset of the first revolution. Whois to lead the comp any out of confusion andsolve the managerial problems confronting it?Qu ite obviously, a strong manager is needed whohas the necessary knowledge and skill to in-troduce new business techniques. But this iseasier said than done. The founders often hateto step aside even though they are probably

temperamentally unsuited to be managers. Sohere is the first critical developmental choice—to locate and install a strong business managerwho is acceptable to the founders and who canpull the organization together.

Phase 2: Direction ...

Those companies that survive the first phase byinstalling a capable business manager usuallyembark on a period of sustained growth under

able and directive leadership. Here are the char-acteristics of this evolutionary period:

troduced to separate manufacturing from mketing activit ies, and job assignments becomore specialized.

O Acco unting systems for invento ry and pchasing are introduced.

O Incentives, budgets, and work standards adopted.

O Com mu nicat ion becomes more formal aimpersonal as a hierarchy of titles and positiobuilds.

O Th e new man ager and his key supervistake most of the responsibility for institutdirection, while lower-level supervisors are treed more as functional specialists than as tonomous decis ion-making managers .

. . .&) the autonom y crisis: Although the ndirective techniques channel employee ener

more efficiently into growth, they eventuabecome inappropriate for controlling a largmore diverse and complex organization. Lowlevel employees find themselves restricted bycumbersome and centralized hierarchy. Thhave come to possess more direct knowledabout markets and machinery than do the leaers at the top; consequently, they feel torn btween following procedures and taking inittive on their own.

Thus the second revolution is imminent

a crisis develops from demands for greater atonomy on the part of lower-level manageThe solution adopted by most companies is mo ve tow ard g reater delegation. Yet it is difficfor top managers who were previously successat being directive to give up responsibility. Morover, lower-level managers are not accustomto making decisions for themselves, As a resunumerous companies flounder during this revlutionary period, adhering to centralized metods while lower-level employees grow more denchanted and leave the organization.

Phase 3: Delegation ...

The next era of growth evolves from the succesful application of a decentralized organizatistructure. It exhibits these characteristics:

O M uch greater responsibility is given to tmanagers of plants and market terri tories.

O Profit ce nters an d b onuses are used to stiulate motivation.

O The top executives at headq uarters restrathemselves to managing by exception, based periodic reports from the field.

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Growing organizations

new acquisitions which can be lined up besideother decentralized units.

O Comm unication from the top is infrequent,usually by correspondence, telephone, or briefvisits to field locations.

The delegation stage proves useful for gainingexpansion through heightened motivation at

lower levels. Decentralized managers with great-er authority and incentive are able to penetratelarger markets, respond faster to customers, anddevelop new products.

. . , t5̂ the control crisis: A serious problem even-tually evolves, however, as top executives sensethat they are losing control over a highly diver-sified field operation. Autonomous field manag-ers prefer to run their own shows without coor-dinating plans, money, technology, and man-

power with the rest of the organization. Freedombreeds a parochial attitude.

Hence, the Phase 3 revolution is under waywhen top management seeks to regain controlover the total company. Some top managementsattempt a return to centralized management,which usually fails because of the vast scope ofoperations. Those companies that move aheadfind a new solution in the use of special co-ordination techniques.

Phase 4: Coordination ...

During this phase, the evolutionary period ischaracterized by the use of formal systems forachieving greater coordination and by top ex-ecutives taking responsibility for the initiationand administration of these new systems. Forexample:

O Decentralized units are merged into prod-uct groups.

O Formal planning procedures are establishedand intensively reviewed.

O Num erous staff personnel are hired andlocated at headquarters to initiate company-wide programs of control and review for linemanagers.

O Cap ital expenditures are carefully weighedand parceled out across the organization.

O Each product group is treated as an invest-ment center where return on invested capital isan important criterion used in allocating funds.

O Certain technical functions, such as dataprocessing, are centralized at headquarters, w hile

daily operating decisions remain decentralized.O Stock options and companywide profit shar-

ing are used to encourage identity with the firmas a whole.

All of these new coordination systems proveuseful for achieving growth through more ef-ficient allocation of a company's limited re-sources. They prompt field managers to lookbeyond the needs of their local units. While

these managers still have much decision-makingresponsibility, they learn to justify their actionsmore carefully to a "watchdog" audience atheadquarters.

... a? the red-tape crisis: But a lack of confi-dence gradually builds between line and staff,

and between headquarters and the field. Theproliferation of systems and programs begins toexceed its u tility ; a red-tape crisis is created. Linemanagers, for exam ple, increasingly resent heavy

staff direction from those who are not familiarwith local conditions. Staff people, on the otherhand, complain about uncooperative and unin-formed line managers. Together both groups crit-icize the bureaucratic paper system that hasevolved. Procedures take precedence over prob-lem solving, and innovation is dampened. Inshort, the organization has become too largeand complex to be managed through formalprograms and rigid systems. The Phase 4 revo-lution is under way.

Phase 5: Collaboration ...

The last observable phase in previous studiesemphasizes strong interpersonal collaborationin an attempt to overcome the red-tape crisis.Where Phase 4 was managed more throughformal systems and procedures. Phase 5 em-phasizes greater spontaneity in managementaction through team s and the skillful confronta-tion of interpersonal differences. Social controland self-discipline take over from formal con-

trol. This transition is especially difficult forthose experts who created the old systems aswell as for those line managers who relied onformal methods for answers.

The Phase 5 evolution, then, builds around amore fiexible and behavioral approach to man-agement. Here are its characteristics:

O The focus is on solving problems quicklythrough team action.

O Teams are combined across functions fortask-group activity.

O Headquarters stafi experts are reduced innumber, reassigned, and combined in interdis-

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ciplinary teams to consult with, not to direct,field units.

O A matrix-type stru cture is frequently usedto assemble tbe right teams for the appropriateproblems.

O Previous formal system s are simplified an dcombined into single multipurpose systems.

O Con ferences of key man age rs are beld fre-

quently to focus on major problem issues.O Educ ational p rograms are utilized to train

managers in behavioral skills for acbieving bet-ter teamwork and conflict resolution.

O Real-time inform ation systems are inte-grated into daily decision making.

O Economic rew ards are geared m ore to teamperformance than to individual achievemen t.

O Experim ents in new practices are encour-aged througbout the organization.

. . . a? the ' crisis: What will be the revolutionin response to this stage of evolution? Manylarge U.S. companies are now in the Phase 5evolutionary stage, so the answers are critical.While tbere is little clear evidence, I imaginetbe revolution will center around tbe "psycbo-logical saturation" of employees wbo grow emo-tionally and pbysically exbausted by tbe inten-sity of teamwork and tbe heavy pressure forinnovative solutions.

My bu nc h is that tbe Pbase 5 revolution will

be solved through new structures and programstbat allow employees to periodically rest, refiect,and revitalize tbemselves. We may even seecompanies witb dual organization structures: a"habit" structure for getting tbe daily workdone, and a "reflective" structure for stimulat-ing perspective and personal enrichment. Em-ployees could then move back and fortb betweenthe two stru ctures as their energies are dissipatedand refueled.

One European organization has implementedjust such a structure. Five reflective groupsbave been establisbed outside tbe regular struc-ture for tbe purpose of continuously evaluatingfive task activities basic to tbe organization.Tbey report directly to tbe managing director,al tbougb tbeir reports are made public througb-out tbe organization. Membersbip in eacb groupincludes all levels and functions, and employ-ees are rotated tbrougb tbese groups on a six-montb basis.

Otber concrete examples now in practice in-clude providing sabbaticals for employees, mov-

ing managers in and out of "bot spot" jobs,establishing a four-day workweek, assuring job

security, building pbysical facilities for relaxtion during, the working day, making jobs mointerchangeable, creating an extra team on tbassembly line so tbat one team is always off foreeducation, and switcbing to longer vacationand more flexible working bours.

Tbe Cbinese practice of requiring executivto spend time periodically on lower-level jo

may also be wortb a nonideological evaluatioFor too long U.S. ma nage me nt b as assumed tbcareer progress sbould be equated witb an uward patb toward title, salary, and power. Couit be tbat some vice presidents of marketinmight just long for, and even benefit from, temporary duty in tbe field sales organization?

Implications of history

Let me now summarize some important implictions for practicing managers. First, tbe maifeatures of tbis discussion are depicted in Ehibit IU, whicb shows tbe specific managemeactions tbat cbaracterize eacb growtb pbasTbese actions are also tbe solutions whicb endeeacb preceding revolutionary period.

In one sense, I bope tbat many readers wireact to my model by calling it obvious annatural for depicting tbe growtb of an organization. To me this type of reaction is a useful te

of tbe model's validity.But at a more refiective level I imagine som

of these reactions are more hindsight than forsight. Those experienced managers who bavbeen tbrougb a developmental sequence caempatbize witb it now, but bow did tbey reawben in tbe middle of a stage of evolution orevolution? Tbey can probably recall tbe limits of tbeir own developmental understandinat tbat time. Perbaps tbey resisted desirabchanges or were even swept emotionally into revolution witbout being able to propose con

structive solutions. So let me offer some explicguidelines for managers of growing organizationto keep in mind.

Know where you are in the developmentalsequence.

Every organization and its component parts arat different stages of development. The task otop management is to be aware of tbese stageotberwise, it may not recognize wben the tim

for ebange bas come, or it may act to impostbe wrong solution.

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Exhibit III. Organization practices during evolution in the

five phases of growth

MANAGEMENTFOCUS

PHASE I

Make & sell

PHASE 2

Efficieney ofoperations

PHASE 3

Expansionof market

PHASE 4

^ 1- . -Consolidationot organization

PHASE 5

Problemsolving &innovation

ORGANIZATIONSTRUCTURE

TOPMANAGEMENTSTYLE

Informal

Individualistic &entrepreneurial

D irective Delegative

Cen tralized Dece ntralized Line-staff && function al & geographical produ ct groups

Watchdog

Matrix of teams

Participative

CONTROLSYSTEM

M A N A G E M E N TREWARDEMPHASIS

Marketresults

Ownership

1

Standards &cost centers

Salary &meritincreases

Reports &profit centers

Individualbonus

Plans &investmentcenters

Mutualgoal setting

Profit sharing Team bon us& stock options

Top leaders sbould be ready to work witb tbe

fiow of the tide rather than against it; yet theysbould be cautious, since it is tempting to skipphases out of impatience. Each pbase results incertain strengtbs and learning experiences in theorganization that will be essential for success insubsequent pbases. A child prodigy, for example,may be able to read like a teenager, but be can-not bebave like one until he ages tbrougb asequence of experiences.

I also doubt tbat managers can or sbould actto avoid revolutions. Ratber, tbese periods of

tension provide tbe pressure, ideas, and aware-ness tbat afford a platform for ebange and theintroduction of new practices.

Recognize the limited lange of solutions.

In eaeh revolutionary stage it becomes evidenttbat tbis stage can be ended only by eertainspecific solutions; moreover, tbese solutions aredifferent from tbose wbicb were applied to tbeproblems of the preceding revolution. Too often

it is tempting to cboose solutions tbat were triedbefore, wbich makes it impossible for a new

Management must be prepared to dismantle

current structures before tbe revolutionary stagebecomes too turbulent. Top managers, realizingthat tbeir own managerial styles are no longerappropriate, may even have to take themselvesout of leadership positions. A good Phase 2 man-ager facing Phase 3 might be wise to find anotherPhase 2 organization that better fits bis talents,eitber outside the company or with one of i tsnewer subsidiaries.

Finally, evolution is not an automatic affair,-it is a contest for survival. To move abead,

companies must consciously introduce plannedstructures tbat not only are solutions to a cur-rent crisis but also are fitted to tbe next pbaseof growtb. Tbis requires considerable self-aware-ness on tbe part of top management, as wellas great interpersonal skill in persuading otbermanagers tbat change is needed.

Realize that solutions breed new problems.

Managers often fail to realize tbat organizational

solutions create prob lems for tbe future (i.e., adecision to delegate eventually causes a prob-

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determinants of what happens to the company

at a much later date.

An awareness of this effect should help man-

agers to evaluate company problems with great-

er historical understanding instead of "pinning

the blame" on a current development. Better yet,

managers should be in a position to predict

future problems, and thereby to prepare solutions

and coping strategies before a revolution gets

out of hand.

A management that is aware of the problems

ahead could well deeide nof to grow. Top man-

agers may, for instance, prefer to retain the in-

formal practices of a small company, knowing

that this way of Ufe is inherent in the organiza-

tion's limited size, not in their congenial per-

sonalities. If they choose to grow, they may

do themselves out of a job and a way of Ufe

they enjoy.

And what about the managements of very

large organizations? Can they find new solutions

for continued phases of evolution? Or are they

reaching a stage where the govemment will a

to break them up because they are too large.

Concluding note

Clearly, there is still much to learn about proces

es of development in organizations. The phasoutlined here are only five in number and a

still only approximations. Researchers are ju

beginning to study the specific developme

tal problems of structure, control, rewards, a

management style in different industries and

a variety of cultures.

One should not, however, wait for conclusi

evidenee before educating managers to thi

and act from a developmental perspective. T

critical dimension of time has heen missing f

too long from our management theories a

practices. The intriguing paradox is that

learning more about history we may do a bet

job in the future.

A n end

to growth?

Jay W. Forrester,

World Dynamics,Cambridge, Massachusetts,Wright-Allen Press, inc.,

The battle between the forces of growth and the restraints of nature m

be resolved in a number of ways. Man, if he understands well enough a

acts wisely, can choose a path out of the conflict of world pressures tis more favorable than present actions, attitudes, and policies porteSuch a path must be toward a non-growing and balanced condition

the world system.. ..Population, capital investment, pollution, food consumption, and st

dard of hving have been growing exponentially throughout recorded h

tory. Man has come to expect growth, to see it as the natural conditof human behavior, and to equate growth with "progress." We speakthe annual percentage growth in gross national product (GNP) and

population. Quantities that grow by a fixed percentage per year are

hibiting "exponential" growth. But exponential growth cannot continindefinitely.

Pure exponential growth possesses the characteristic of bebavingcording to a "doubling time." Each fixed time interval shows a doublof the relevant system variable. Exponential growth is treacherous a

misleading. A system variable can continue through many doubling invals without seeming to reach significant size. But then, in one or t

more doubling periods, still following the same law of exponential growit suddenly seems to become overwhelming.

The psychological impact of exponential growth is seldom appreciaSuppose that some ultimate physical limit stands in the way of a quanthat is growing exponentially. In all previous time before the limiapproached, the quantity is mucb smaller than tbe limit. The very etence of the limit may be unrealized. No clash between the growquantity and the limit forces attention to the eventual pressures that marise. Then suddenly, within one doubling interval, tbe quantity grfrom half the limit to the limit. Tbe stresses from overexpansion becohighly visible; they can no longer be ignored. If the pressures created

approach to tbe l imit are not great enough to suppress growth, tben grocontinues until the l imit has heen overstepped far enough to gene

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Greiner, 1972

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