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What could the ’longue durée’ mean for the history of

modern sciences?

Mathias Grote

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Working Papers Series

What could the ‘longue durée’ mean for thehistory of modern sciences?

Mathias Grote

N°98 | june 2015

Fernand Braudel’s concept of the longue durée is easyat hands when historians of science take into viewextended periods of time. But what is exactly meant when we speak of a longue durée history of an object,instrument, concept or research field? Here, a revisedmeaning of the concept is proposed, which takes intoaccount the historical observer and the background, which in the case of recent science is provided mostlyby developmental narratives. Tus, a perceived longuedurée could refer to historical episodes marked bycontinuity in the sense of a “contemporary of the non-

contemporary” (Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen,R. Koselleck). In the light of a temporal understandingof the longue durée, the problem is distinguished fromthat of micro- versus macrohistories.

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What could the ‘longue durée’ mean for thehistory of modern sciences?

Mathias Grote

June 2015

The authorMathias Grote studied philosophy and biology, followed by a PhD in the molecular life sciences atHumboldt University of Berlin. He then worked his way into the history of science as a post-doc at theMax Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin, the University of Exeter and the echnischeUniversität Berlin. Currently, he is working on the history and philosophy of the life sciences, with afocus on microbial classification and the role of ‘old knowledge’. He is a lecturer at the chair for the his-tory of science at Humboldt University.

The text Tis text was written thanks to a DAAD/FMSH Fellowship in 2013.

AcknowledgementI am indebted to Michel Morange for the stimulating discussions out of which this paper resulted. Manyof the thoughts have been inspired by him, even if I take full responsibility for the final outcome. Moreo- ver, I would like to thank Michel Morange for the generous hospitality during my stay at the CentreCavaillès of the École Normale Supérieure , Paris, in 2013. I acknowledge an exchange fellowship by theGerman Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and the Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme in 2013, which made this work possible. Finally, thanks to erry Shinn (Paris) for a spirited debate and very

valuable comments on a previous draft.

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AbstractFernand Braudel’s concept of the longue durée is easy at hands when historians of science take into view extended periods of time. But what is exactly meant when we speak of a longue durée history ofan object, instrument, concept or research field? Here, a revised meaning of the concept is proposed, which takes into account the historical observer and the background, which in the case of recent science

is provided mostly by developmental narratives. Tus, a perceived longue durée could refer to historicalepisodes marked by continuity in the sense of a “contemporary of the non-contemporary” (Gleichzeitig-keit des Ungleichzeitigen, R. Koselleck). In the light of a temporal understanding of the longue durée,the problem is distinguished from that of micro- versus macrohistories. Prospective examples of longuedurée histories are presented (e.g. simple techniques, instruments or concepts) as well as some reasons why telling such stories might benefit not only the history of science, but the general perception of thesciences.

Keywords

longue durée, history of science, life sciences, historiography

Que pourrait signifer la ‘longue durée’ dans l’histoire dessciences modernes ?

RésuméLe concept de la longue durée selon Fernand Braudel vient à l’esprit si des historiens de science consi-dèrent des périodes étendues. Mais que signifie exactement une histoire de la longue durée d’un objet,instrument, concept ou d’un champ de recherche?

En prenant en compte l’observateur et l’arrière-plan historiques, ce dernier étant caractérisé notammentpar des narrations ‘développementales’, nous proposons une réevaluation du concept de longue durée. Ainsi, la perception d’une longue durée pourrait se référer à des épisodes historiques marqués d’une

continuité dans le sens du ‘contemporain du non-contemporain’ (Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen,R. Koselleck). De plus, nous différencions le problème de la longue durée de celui des micro- versusmacrohistoires.

Nous présentons des exemples d’histoires en longue durée (p.e. techniques simples, instruments, concepts)et nous esquissons pourquoi ce sujet pourrait bénéficier non seulement à l’histoire des sciences, mais à laperception de la science en général.

Mots-clefs

longue durée, histoire des sciences, sciences de la vie, historiographie


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Sommaire

What is the longue durée, and how has it beenrelated to the history of science? 5

The longue durée as a form of observationand its historiographical implications 6

A proposal for a revised meaning of the longue durée 7

Longue durée versus ‘big picture accounts’ 10

Forms of continuity - examples for the longue durée in the history of the 20th century life sciences 12

Banal but inuential – Robert Koch’s culture platesor the longue durée of simple methods and techniques 12

Vintage science? The relevance of “old” instrumentationand techniques 13

Recurrent explanatory patterns or embracing conceptsin the life sciences 15

Larger scales: Fields, trends and styles and ideals of science 17

And why look at longue durée phenomena? 18

References 20

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W hen studying past science, observers (historians or not) may per-ceive certain developments –suchas uses of instruments, tech-

niques, concepts or topics, straddling extendedperiods of time or even reappearing. In such cases,Fernand Braudel’s concept of the longue durée iseasy at hands. But what is exactly meant when anauthor speaks of a longue durée history of researchfields, or even the longue durée of a certain object,e.g. a manuscript?

Tis working paper pursues these questions. Te-refore, I will first present an analysis of the longuedurée as used for science by Braudel and otherauthors. In a second part, a somewhat revisedmeaning of the concept is proposed, which is

based on reflections on observations of the pastas well as the historiographical work of ReinhartKoselleck. A longue durée in this sense fits well with the specific complex of problems encounte-red when studying recent science. It appears thatperceiving historical developments as extendedin time requires reflecting on historical back-ground against which stories unfold. Moreo- ver, the impression of such developments beingout of joint with time, or in the words of Kosel-leck the “contemporary of the non-contempo-rary” (Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen) seemscentral when applying this concept to modernscience. Te problem of longue durée will also bedisentangled from that of micro- versus macro-histories or ‘big pictures’.

Finally, some prospective fields of where to lookfor longue durée episodes are presented (e.g. simpletechniques, instruments or concepts), as well assome arguments of why telling such stories mightbenefit not only the history of science as an aca-demic activity, but the perception of science more

generally.In the framework of a discussion paper, the objec-tive cannot be more than to hint at possible waysto work on a topic that has repeatedly popped upin different contexts in the history of science (forreferences see below). Moreover, these reflectionsremain bound to how the problem of the longuedurée has appeared in the history of the 20th cen-tury experimental sciences, and the exampleschosen are certainly skewed by the author’s areaof expertise, the life sciences. Yet, these reflec-

tions may hopefully provide a stimulus for fur-ther discussions among historians and historiansof science of all sorts.

What is the longue durée,and how has it beenrelated to the historyof science?

Shortly before he deceased in 2004, historianof science Frederick L. Holmes made a plea forlongue durée approaches in the history of science,referring of course to Fernand Braudel, who hadcoined this concept another half century ago(Holmes F., 2003). Braudel, who belonged to thesecond generation of the Annales school of his-tory, had employed the longue durée to develop ahistorical perspective that focuses on how almostimmobile natural conditions, or more generallystable structures have shaped human action overextended periods of time. Famously, Braudel’s work has shown how the geography of the Medi-terranean region with its interspersed mountainsranges and stretches of sea has influenced theformation of e.g. trade or political relations. Inthe same vein, Braudel underlined the impact ofannual rhythms of climatic changes on the cus-toms and life forms of e.g. farmers, coast dwel-lers or the development of settlements. Braudeldifferentiated this “quasi-immobile history, thatof man in relation to the milieu that surroundshim” from two shorter historical times. Tese are

a “slowly rhythmic” social history, centring on theactions of groups, and lastly the histoire evenemen-tielle – the traditional history of events and theindividual, which he characterized as a “historyof brief, rapid, nervous oscillations” (Braudel F.,1966: 16 [foreword of 1946]; Braudel F., 1977: 56).

In a programmatic text that tried to relate the his-torical and the social sciences in the environmentof the 1960s, Braudel briefly hinted at possibleuses of the longue durée in the history of science.He mentioned the “constructed universes” thathad an impact on human life for centuries despitetheir explanatory insufficiencies – the “Aristote-lian universe” that lasted until Galilei, Descartesand Newton, or the “geometrically representeduniverse”, which itself only collapsed followingthe “Einsteinian revolutions” (Braudel F., 1977:57).

Frederic Holmes, renowned for numerous indepth historical studies of the chemical and thelife sciences (mostly centred on individual scien-

tists such as Lavoisier, Claude Bernard, bio-chemist Hans A. Krebs or molecular biologistsMeselsohn and Stahl), then asked whether it


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would not be possible to adapt the longue durée tothe history of science less by such “thought struc-tures that have prevailed in the past than by orga-nizational assemblages, techniques, deeper men-tal frameworks, spiritual constraints, or economicsystems that have provided the support for andthe limits that science could not transgress forlong periods of time [?]” (Holmes F., 2003: 465) Tat is, his vision of a renewed longue durée aimedat a reconciliation of the insights and methodsthat the history of science had gained followingthe 1980s through often local, practice-centeredcase histories with the “grandeur of the ‘origins ofmodern science’ that the older stories [in the his-tory of science, MG/MM] celebrated”. (HolmesF. 2003: 463)1.

Holmes then sketched a few lines along whichsuch narratives could be imagined. He identi-fied “one succession of enduring structures thatcommanded the flow of biological history” on thelevel of techniques, more specifically methods ofobservation (l.c.: 468). From unaided vision toachromatic and finally electron microscopy, thesemethods each related biological organization on various levels (organs, microscopic structures suchas tubules, cells and their organelles) to function.2 Holmes then outlined similar broad stages inthe history of chemistry since the early modernperiod, the scope and the limit of which were set“by the apparatus, instruments, and the repertoireof substances with which chemists could performtheir operations.” (l.c.).

Holmes’ argument, published posthumously froma manuscript of a presentation is inspiring in thisattempt to reconcile recent methods and topicsof the history of science with a concept usuallyassociated with narratives from another era. Yet, itleaves many questions open. What does it exactly

mean to perceive a development as long? Do wenot inevitably over-generalize when bringing

1. Even if most of Holmes’ books focus on the work of in-dividual scientists, he discussed the problem of a „long-termconstruction of scientific knowledge“ before, when he con-ceived of a history of intermediary metabolism from 19th century physiological chemistry to mid-20th century bio-chemical pathways. He suspected that the „short-term socialprocesses upon which Latour and Woolgar, Shapin, Collins,and others rely to explain scientific judgements and theachievement of consensus do not seem adequate to encom-pass problem situations that require several scientific genera-tions to resolve.“ (Holmes F. 1992: 46 ff., 50)

2. Te question of whether the relationship of form tofunction has remained constant throughout remains openhere and would require deeper scrutiny.

early modern anatomy and molecular biologyinto one perspective, thereby losing the achie- vements of microhistory? What is the relationbetween the longue durée and so-called ‘big pic-ture accounts’?

The longue durée as aform of observation andits historiographicalimplications It may appear relatively straightforward to usethe concept of longue durée in a simple “chrono-logical” or “calendarial” sense to the history ofscience, e.g. to describe the observation that cer-tain conceptual frameworks have remained stableover extended times, or for a long-term historyof a method, an instrument or a model. I assumethat many uses of the longue durée concept havebeen made quite casually in this sense, withoutquestioning too much what an analogy to Brau-del’s concept may exactly refer to, or reflectingon the historiographical framework in which itemerged. A longue durée in this sense may appearunproblematic when referring to periods dis-tant from the present or time spans we usuallyconceive of as “extended” (i.e. several centuries),in particular when the focus of analysis straddles

customary periodizations of historiography, suchas the early modern period and the 20th century.It seems that Staffan Müller-Wille and Hans- Jörg Rheinberger use the longue durée in this wayin the introduction to their history of heredity, which studies the phenomenon broadly from c. 1500 -1870 (Müller-Wille S. and RheinbergerH.-J. 2007: ix, 6-7). Yet, also in this case, onecould ask questions similar to the ones discussedhere for more recent times and shorter periods.First, the question of temporal reference points

is obvious – where is the chronological limit for alongue durée ? Tere can be no doubt that answersto this question depend on the specific case, theperiod we are looking at, and what specific back-ground knowledge we have on that period. In thecase of heredity, the reason to speak of a longuedurée is based on the fact that the work looksback into natural history and legal or adminis-trative discourse long before the heredity rose toprominence in 19th and 20th century biology. In asense, things are brought into connection, which

are usually conceived of as belonging to differenthistorical periods.


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Moreover, and this point becomes especially relevant when we follow Holmes and use the longuedurée not only for broad mental frameworks ortrends, but for e.g. concepts, instruments, prac-tices or objects, one has to ask what the link orthe continuity we assume actually refers to. Is it justified to speak of the longue durée of a conceptif its meaning has significantly changed? Does itmake sense to talk of the longue durée of a textif it has been transferred to another scientificcommunity where it has found a different usage?Hence, the question is to determine what actuallyremains in place over a given time span, and in what way we conceive of continuity with respectto our background understanding of the past.

Te need to circumscribe in more detail the

meaning and the historiographical function ofthe longue durée adapted to science’s history isobvious for recent times, and most of all for the20th century with its acceleration of scientificdevelopment. Clearly, years do not tell us muchhere about continuity or breaks, and the questionof who perceives which time span as lasting longagainst what background cannot be avoided if we want to make a meaningful use of this concept.In order to shed some light on these issues, letus return to some of the examples mentionedby Braudel, Holmes and others for longue durée approaches in the history of science, and thensketch a refined framework that deals better withthese questions.

A proposal for a revised meaningof the longue durée

Continuity - From ‘mental prisons’ tolayers of time (Zeitschichten)

Braudel explains the continuity observed in his-tory by the existence of structures that shape and

constrain human action over extended periodsand that are themselves “little worn off by timeand carried on for very long” (Braudel F., 1977:55).3 Geographical and climatic factors range

3. One of Braudel’s interests in this text was to differenti-ate his usage of the term “structure” from that of the socialsciences - he referenced Claude Lévi-Strauss’ Anthropologiestructurale (1959). Tis debate on ‘structures’ in between his-torians and social scientists of the 1960s is itself already partof the history of the human sciences and cannot be recount-ed here. Michel Foucault’s “L’archeologie du savoir ” (1969: 3ff.) provides a critical position aiming at Braudel and the

Annales historians. Foucault has countered the idea of struc-tures by highlighting the significance of discontinuities inthe history of ideas, science or philosophy. More recently,

among the most prominent in Braudel’s work,epitomized already in the title of “La Méditerra-née et le monde méditerranéan dans l’époque de Phi-lippe II ”. Tus, it is presumably no surprise that anearly attempt to adapt a longue durée approach tothe history of medicine, Mirko Grmek’s “Prélimi-naires d’une etude historique des maladies ” (1969),has proposed an intertwining of the natural his-tory of diseases (referring to e.g. the invasion ofspecies such as rats, the spread of certain germs orthe immunization of populations) with an historyof civilization. Tis approach to transfer the longuedurée into the history of medicine seems to makeimmediate sense, although it becomes problema-tic when we consider the historically changingconceptions of diseases, and our bind to historicalsources (primarily textual) when studying natural

phenomena of this episode. Te reliance of his-tory on constraints provided by other sciencesbecomes even more problematic when we moveinto the realm of economy (here, Braudel men-tions e.g. the “limits of productivity” as constrai-ning development at a given time), let alone when he talks about “thought structures” such asthe Aristotelian or the Newtonian universe. In afrequently quoted expression, these latter repre-senting represented for Braudel “mental prisonsof the longue durée ” (l.c.). We have to take into

account that concepts such as the Aristotelianuniverse are themselves results of historical work,and in many cases, detailed analyses have rende-red them much more nuanced and stratified thanit may appear on the first sight (see the critique ofHolmes by Huisman F., 2005). Some of Holmes’cases for a longue durée in the history of sciencealso display such problems. When he states, forexample, that “[a]mong the structures that sup-ported and constrained biological investigationfor many centuries was that of the human or ani-

mal body itself ”, one may readily object that thehistory of science has revealed to us how differentbodies have been perceived and studied very dif-ferently over the course of centuries (Holmes F.,2003: 466).

For both Braudel and Homes, one needs toask what continuity actually means and what itrefers to. Clearly, there is a tension between the

historians of space and environment have addressed Brau-del’s line of argument from a different angle – by histori-cizing what appears to him as the most evident example ofthe invariable, that is, geographical and climatic conditions(on the historization of physical space see e.g . Koselleck R.,2000: 96).


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supposition of continuity provided by long-termframeworks constraining science and the recentmethodology and results of historical researchthat focus on individual events and situate thesein specific, local contexts. Following the Germanhistorian Reinhart Koselleck, one could say thatthe mode of investigation of our own disciplineturns metahistorical categories, such as that of a‘structure’ stabilizing human action, into histori-cal statements.4

Is Holmes’ plea for a longue durée that takes intoaccount histories of particulars thus aporetic?I do not think so. A first step to illustrate this would be to specify Holmes’ example of the bodyconstraining biological investigation. One mayassume that not a fixed biological reality has pro-

vided continuity but certain forms of human activity, e.g. the fact that human and animal bodieshave been compared in anatomy over a long periodof time. In that case, the issue looks more subtleand cannot be so easily dismissed. Te questionremains, however, on what grounds we perceivethe continued comparison as long. Addressingthis problem obviously requires an analysis of ourunderstanding of historical time.

Te two formulations of the problem of a longuedurée of the body address different modes of conti-

nuity, or more generally of temporality. If we takethe body as a biological reality in analogy to geo-graphical structures in Braudel’s work, we refer toa different type of continuity, or duration, than when stating that a method has been repeatedlyused by scientists over a long time. Te work ofReinhart Koselleck, who has fathomed the longuedurée problem for conceptual history (Begriffsges-chichte ), can help to clarify this distinction.

Koselleck has distinguished different formsof duration that the longue durée could refer to.

First, we may think of geographical and clima-tic preconditions of human action, which (evenif influenced to a degree) humans do not com-pletely control – here the climate, the mountainranges and seascapes that have become synony-mous with Braudel’s work come to mind. “Natu-ral preconditions [of our existence as mammalianorganisms] that allow our specific anthropologi-cal experience of time” fall in the same category– circadian rhythms, sequences of generationsframed by birth, growth, reproduction and death,

4. “ Alle metahistorischen Kategorien schlagen im Zuge der For-schung um in historische Aussagen.” Koselleck R., 2000: 301.

etc. (Koselleck R., 2000: 12).5 From these basicconditions of humankind’s existence in time,Koselleck differentiates “structures of repetition”(Wiederholungsstrukturen), that human beings“consciously adopt, ritualize, culturally enrich andlevel to a degree of consistency that helps to sta-bilize a certain society” (l.c.: 12/13). Death, or sohe illustrates, can be culturally shaped as politicalkilling, and feeding as asceticism or culinary art.

Distinguishing these two “layers of time” (Zeit-schichten), as Koselleck put it, may help to makesense of the concept of longue durée for the historyof science. For although scientific activity can cer-tainly not be disconnected from natural precon-ditions of human existence, repeated actions ofhumans establishing continuity seem a far more

promising way to conceptualize such phenomenain science. Moreover, this way of thinking freesthe longue durée from a naturalistic or structura-list discourse on history that one can see in theexamples of Braudel. Tis latter appears particu-larly inappropriate when assuming that science isafter all a social and cultural activity, and that itshistorical development needs to be described as ahighly individualized process. Tis reformulation,that is, should make the longue durée more pala-table for contemporary historians of science.

Tat is, rather than analogizing e.g. a long-lastingbackground assumption informing science or acontinued use of a method to the effects of geo-graphy or climate, I propose to understand suchphenomena of continuity as repeated human acti-vities . For example, a problem may be addressed bydifferent generations of scientists, an instrumentmay be used year after year, a method taught tostudents over many semesters. Also, different pat-terns of repetition are conceivable. Certain phe-nomena may exist continuously or be intersper-

sed by breaks; repetition may be desired, forced byexternal constraints or simply exist as a result ofinertia. A spectrum of recurrent actions in histo-rical time not only goes beyond static or generali-zing approaches to historiography, but also allowsto reconcile the longue durée of a certain historicalobject reconciled with different motives of actors. Tinking of continuity in science as instances

5. I am aware that current science and technology has anincreasing impact on many of these conditions – from repro-ductive medicine to mundane things such as artificial light-ing or greenhouses. Yet, these gradual changes to still verytight patterns (think of a night without sleep, or life beyondthe confines of Western metropolitan areas) do not justifyabandoning Koselleck’s distinction completely.


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of recurring phenomena (Rekurrenzphänomene ,Koselleck R., 2000: 20) allows us to accommo-date the highly individualized situations encoun-tered in historical research with a differentiatedconcept of continuity. Each historical momentmay comprise different layers of time (Zeitschich-ten) at once, and that moment may be conceivedof as a singular instantiation of a broader trend.6

What is more, a conception of continuity basedon repetitions allows for variation and gradualchange. It is interesting to note that in this res-pect, recurrent phenomena fit well with concep-tions that have been brought forward to explainthe dynamics of scientific change, such as thenotion of “tinkering” advocated by François Jacob, or the differential reproduction of experi-

mental systems in the work of Hans-Jörg Rhein-berger ( Jacob F., 1977; Rheinberger H.-J., 1997;Morange M., 2013a). Repeated, gradually chan-ging phenomena exemplify two sides of the samecoin. Whereas the prevailing interest has been tounderstand gradual scientific change, the samephenomenon also secures stability or permanencein science.7

The longue durée as an historicalexperience - the contemporary of thenon-contemporary (Gleichzeitigkeit des

Ungleichzeitigen)Let us now try to understand to what historicalexperience this modified concept of a longue durée beyond a mere chronological sense might refer to when we observe past science. Even if the his-tory of science has been purged of progressivistunderstandings, it is probably true (at least for the20th century experimental sciences) that most ofits narratives are informed by change as science’sprimary mode of existence. Most histories sim-ply centre on a development – e.g. from classical

to molecular genetics, the introduction of the6. With the so-defined concept of temporal layers (Zeitsch-ichten), Koselleck aimed at overcoming the parallel arrange-ment of longue and courte durée as well as histoire evene-mentielle in Braudel’s work.

7. Heiko Stoff (2009) has proposed to use the concept of„assemblage“ (Gefüge ) to describe ontological aspects per-taining to structures, continuity and change. Stoff has tak-en up this concept from e.g. Paul Rabinow or Hans-JörgRheinberger and Staffan Müller-Wille as a way to conceiveof “constellations of actors, things and institutions” that al-low to represent both change and continuity without hav-ing to employ make use of “totalizing categories” (Stoff H.,2009: 152; Rheinberger H.-J.and Müller-Wille S., 2009:237). Te assemblage, however, does not address the issues oftemporality in science’s historiography that is at stake here.

electron microscope etc. Generally, historicalanalyses are far less interested in what has remai-ned in place, that is, in continuity, longevity orre-appearances, let alone in things falling out offashion and fading out. All of these phenomenamay be expected when we study e.g. instruments,patterns of explanation, research fields or stylesof doing science – or do they? Is it not all tooobvious that science constantly changes, bringsforth the new etc? Can’t we read in the newspaperevery morning that a new theory or model for anatural phenomenon has been found, that a newgeneration of instruments will advance science,don’t we see every year that prizes are awarded fornovel discoveries (or at least those from years agothat are considered for their novelty today)?

Certainly, development in the sense of innovationis what characterizes modern science and it seemsintrinsic to the entire endeavour, but differentforms of continuities as well as disappearances arealmost as certain (for examples below) – it is morethe question of whether we consider them worthlooking at. But let us accept the ‘developmentalnarrative’ of science as prevalent for a moment,as it provides the background against which tounderstand the experience connected to a longuedurée phenomenon in the abovementioned sense.

Imagine that in the course of a studying historicalmaterial, we come across a form of continuity, saythe repeated use of an instrument that appearsoutmoded at the time, or an explanation that hasbeen aired decades ago already. We will probablybe surprised of this happening so late , in fact toolate with respect to an historical backgroundinformed by development. Of course, the respec-tive phenomenon needs to be of relevance for thescientific pursuit at that time to cause that impres-sion – if a scientist strikes a match in 1980 as

others may have done in 1900 that does not count.By contrast, the reappearance of an “old ” questionmay even shock us, as may the continued use ofan outmoded instrument (a ‘dinosaur’) or methodthat we connect with other times. o illustratethe experience of an event going in this sense‘against the tide of time’, imagine seeing a 1920scar driving through the concrete environment ofa post-War European suburb, and then imagineto find out that these sorts of cars were actuallystill relevant for certain purposes.8

8. For real-world examples of such situations regarding tech-nologies, see D. Edgerton (2008), Te Shock of the Old.


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In the course of his conceptual reflection on his-tory and its writing, Reinhart Koselleck has calledan event that appears temporally out of joint withan assumed line of development the “contempo-rary of the non-contemporary” (Gleichzeitigkeitdes Ungleichzeitigen, Koselleck R., 1989: 132). Pre-sumably, the longue durée often refers to this typeof historical experience. Some examples will helpto illustrate what this means. Te continued relevance of simple techniques such as chemical indi-cation reactions or Robert Koch’s microbiologicalculture plates in an age we normally associate withspectroscopy, electron microscopy or genomicsmay be called a longue durée of these practices.Similarly, reappearing motives of explanining bio-logical ageing by intoxication from the early 20th in the early 21st century could be called a longue

durée (see below for details on these examples).

In these cases, we experience a contrast betweenone sequence of events characterized by conti-nuity in the sense of repetition and a receivedbackground of science’s development. We haveencountered what we were not expecting, maybenot even looking for. Obviously, this experienceof perceiving something against the course oftime is connected to our very own horizon ofexpectation ( Erwartungshorizont ) as observers ofthe past. Tat is, such cases will probably appearas somewhat anticlimactic, potentially marginaland certainly “below the surface” against a back-ground characterized by change, be it through theactions of individuals, technological innovationor social factors.

Even if the meaning of the longue durée sketchedhere has departed from Braudel in many respects,there is common ground. In the case of humanhistory shaped by geography, climate or largereconomic trends as in the present conception, the

influence of longue durée factors run counter tothe expectations and the preconceived notion ofhistory as more or less permanent change drivenby the actions of individuals, or histoire evene-mentielle . Braudel conceded that he had begunhis dissertation on the Mediterranean politics ofPhilippe II in the framework of diplomatic his-tory, being indifferent to geographical conquests,economy and social problems, and ignorant of the“big facts of civilization” (Braudel, Préface 1969,3). He became aware of these broader factorsinfluencing history that were not present in prior

historiography on the subject only in the courseof his work. Later, he designated the histoire

evenmentielle (metaphorically the ripples on anocean’s surface) as the most capricious, illusory ofall lapses of time” (Braudel F., 1966: 16 [forewordof 1946]; Braudel F., 1977: 52; see also HolmesF., 2003: 464). Tat is, here as in the cases descri-bed above, a longue durée seems to address a layerof time and a level of impact that is not imme-diately visible to observers, an that may come as asurprise to many.

A thought experiment might help to illustratethe bind of the longue durée experience to theexpectations of an observer, and thus to the back-ground understanding of history exposed here.Imagine we discover the continuous relevance ofan “old” method in scientific practice, which firstof all surprises us. Imagine then that in the course

of further inquiry, we find out that this phenome-non has been more of a rule than an exception. We would probably cease to speak of a longuedurée at a certain point and revise our backgroundunderstanding of the historical development,even though the chronology of events remainsthe same. Such a longue durée , characterized as aform of historical experience, cannot be separatedfrom our horizon of expectation as observers ofthe past, it is informed by the background narra-tives with which we are accustomed, and henceprone to revision in the course of historical work.

Longue durée versus‘big picture accounts’

Before sketching some examples of methods,explanations or scientific fields that appear to runagainst the received narrative of scientific deve-lopment, the problem of the longue durée as fra-med above should be disentangled from that of“big picture accounts”, or micro- versus macro-history. Again, Holmes’ paper will serve as a star-ting point. He introduced his plea for the longuedurée against his impression that a history ofscience dominated by microhistorical case stu-dies had lost a certain “ grandeur ” proper to earliernarratives, such as the “origins of modern science”stories (Holmes, F. 2003: 463). Holmes was notalone with that impression. Reflections on howbig pictures or “generalist approaches” could bebrought back to counter a fractured landscape inthe history of science dominated by microstudiescan be traced back to the early 1990s.9

9. Secord J. A., 1993, de Chadarevian, S., 2005; see also thefocus section “Te Generalist Vision in the History of Sci-ence”, Isis 96 (2), 2005.


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But what exactly is a big picture? In a special issueof the British Journal for the History of Science , John R. R. Christie characterized big pictures byfirst, a general embracing subject (i.e. the Che-mical Revolution, biology), second, an epochalspatio-temporality (i.e. covering either a chrono-logically long period, or a global space) and third,an ultimate significance (Christie, J.R.R., 1993).Even if the latter category is of course highly subjective, Christie describes big pictures from the20th century history of science as usually based on“philosophical emplotments”. Tat is, the narra-tives of these works were inspired and borne byepistemological concerns of certain directions inthe philosophy of science. Christie and Sorayade Chadarevian (2005) seem to agree on the factthat big pictures of this type have waned in paral-

lel with the rise of a more sociologically thanphilosophically inspired history of science thatcentres on practices and local knowledge ratherthan theories and general subjects – with Chris-tie pinpointing the watershed in the developmentaway from big pictures to Tomas Kuhn’s “Struc-ture of scientific revolutions” (1962).10

Tus, on the one side, we have the problem ofgenerality, significance and unity of accounts inthe landscape of recent history of science as amethodically refined and differentiated researchfield.11 On the other side, we have the question ofhow science should be understood as unfoldingin time, and how we accommodate stories high-lighting forms of continuity such as persistenceor repetition in relation to accounts interested inand focusing on change.

Braudel’s mentioning of the Aristotelian or themechanic universes as longue durée structures inthe history of science may have effected a confla-tion of the two problems, as we tend to associate

especially these classical topics with “big picturehistory of science”. We should be aware that thebackground against which these two problemsneed to be differentiated nowadays is the recentdevelopment of our own field, as contrasted toBraudel’s horizon.

10. It could be added that Foucault’s “ Archéologie du savoir ”, which proposes to focus on discontinuities and transforma-tions in history rather than on continuity, dates to the samedecade; see Footnote 3.

11. Tis problem also pertains to problems such as the ex-ternal reception of work done in the history of science, howthe academic education in this field should be structured etc.

Big pictures, however they may be delineated,could provide one favourable terrain to describe longue durée phenomena (e.g. if they straddle deli-mitations of historical epochs, research fields etc.,e.g. by centring general practices such as observation). However, one may easily imagine longuedurée histories that would not qualify as big pic-tures – such as a history of the continued impactof Robert Koch’s plate technique in microbiologysince the 1880s over more than a century, notwit-hstanding all dramatic innovations and changesthis field has undergone since then.12

Highlighting such a form of continuity oftenlooks anachronistic in relation to established nar-ratives of history of science. Tis makes such sto-ries appear marginal on the first glance, and the-

reby diametrically opposed to big pictures.13

Tedemand to look at such historical episodes as well(least of all to gauge their relevance) resonates with some aspects of what David H.E. Edgertonhas outlined for the history of technology in his“Te Shock of the Old ”. Edgerton advocated a shiftof focus away from innovation and high-tech to“technologies in use” and their differing modes ofexistence, such as maintenance, re-uses or adap-tations (Edgerton D., 2008).

It should be stressed again that this is not a call

for a revisionist historiography that denies theobvious, namely change in 20th century science,nor is this a plea for some sort of structuralistor even naturalizing historiography based on amonolithic idea of continuity. However, balancingnarratives of development and change with thosestressing forms of continuity (such as repetition,re-uptake or persistence) would be desirable in

12. Also, one should note that chronologically extended works exist in the history of science that one would probablyclassify as neither a big picture, nor longue durée in the sense

proposed here, such as the German „Geschichte der Biologie “,a multi-author volume edited by Ilse Jahn, covering the lifesciences from Greek natural philosophy to molecular biolo-gy ( Jahn I., (Ed.) 2000). In a similar vein, John R.R. Chris-tie, one of the editors of the “Cambridge Companion to theHistory of Modern Science” (ed. 1990) qualified the work as“not a unitarily conceived work with a chronological struc-ture devoted to a whole civilizational epoch”, but “essentiallya heterogeneous collection of small and middle-sized pic-tures” (Christie J.R.R., 1993, 394).

13. Te notion of what one could call an „observationalanachronism“ that we are referring to here, i.e. an histori-cal experience that does not match with the context, wouldneed to be distinguished from anachronisms as a methodicalproblem in the history of science, that is, the various ways ofretroprojecting today’s state of science to understand earlierstages of its development.


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order to draw a more adequate picture of science. Tis also does not mean that such episodes havenot yet been described, as will become clear below. Yet they remain scarce and scattered, and it looksas if there is little focus and interest to describephenomena of continuity. Even if the backgroundassumption of progress as 20th century science’smode of existence might have vanished today, thatof development seems to inform and frame whatis being studied. After providing some examplesfor a longue durée in this sense, I shall explain whya broader discussion of longue durée phenomenaas things seemingly going against the tide of timemight be worthwile.

Forms of continuity -

examples for the longuedurée in the history of the20th century life sciencesIn the following, some interesting examples forconceiving of longue durée histories are presented. Tese cases pertain to different levels of scienti-fic practice – from methods and instruments toexplanations, research fields or ideals of ratio-nality. Due to the author’s expertise, the focus ismostly on experimental and conceptual aspects ofthe 20th century life sciences. Tis selection does

not imply that the concept of longue durée couldnot prove fruitful regarding social, political orinstitutional issues; Quite to the contrary - underthe heading “[o]n contemporary uses of longuedurée in the history of science”, Heiko Stoff hasanalyzed the question of (dis-) continuities inGerman science that straddle the political rup-tures of 1914, 1918, 1933 and 1945 (l.c., 144).Paraphrasing Stoff, the impression of a longuedurée resulted in these cases from a perceived orsupposed asynchronicity between a potentially

continuous development of science and the back-ground narrative provided by political history.Stoff also reported that in this context, the longuedurée was not employed to address the reintro-duction of big picture narratives, but referredto the problem of continuity and discontinuity(Stoff H., 2009: 146). In line with the suggestionmade here, this suggests to understand the longuedurée essentially as a problem of temporality andthus perceptions and comparisons of historicaldevelopments.

Te suggestions that follow are certainly eclecticand heterogeneous. Presumably, this results not

only from the tentative character of this paper,but from the fact that continuity, as describedabove, is not a monolithic phenomenon, but thatit can be brought about in different ways. Howe- ver, these cases at least display a sort of familyresemblance in the sense that they refer to epi-sodes in science’s history going against a purelydevelopmental narrative.

Banal but inuential – RobertKoch’s culture plates or thelongue durée of simple methodsand techniques

One does not have to be a microbiologist to gaugethe relevance of the plate technique to grow, ins-pect and distribute microbes under standardized,

aseptic conditions over more than a century ofbiological, medical and technological practice.Usually this technique is connected to the nameof German bacteriologist Robert Koch, but thestory is more complicated than that.

Research on microorganisms before the 1880smostly relied on liquid culture media, whichhowever made it difficult to grow clonal colonies,i.e. those stemming from one cell only. Mycolo-gists traditionally used solid organic materials,such as gelatine or the surfaces of potatoes steri-

lized by cooking to cultivate fungi, and it was inthe laboratory of German botanist/bacteriologistFerdinand Cohn that such substrates were adap-ted for bacteria (Schlegel H.-G., 2004; see alsoGradmann C., 2005: 60). Schlegel traces RobertKoch’s 1881 approach to use gelatine plates forcultivation back to his experience in using gela-tine for photographic plates and his acquaintance with mycologists’ methods. Te smooth, transpa-rent surfaces of gelatine rapidly became the goldstandard to cultivate all sorts of microbes, related

to diseases or not. In fact, Koch’s plates provideda veritable “display” for microbes – their culturescould be inspected in a transparent glass or plasticcontainer from all sides, they could be transpor-ted and stored on the plates with out contamina-tion. However, gelatine had the disadvantage ofbeing liquefied by the enzymatic activity of manybacteria (which destroyed the fixed arrangementof the colonies). Te introduction of a substancecalled agar-agar proved a better alternative. Pre-pared from algae and used as a jellying agent infood preparation, agar-agar was reportedly pro-

posed by Fanny Hesse, the wife of Koch’s colla-borator Walther Hesse (Schlegel, H.-G., 2004).


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Moreover, in 1887, R.J. Petri introduced a doubleglass dish as the default container of agar plates. Te “Petri dish” has become an almost proverbialexpression for the site of an experiment ever since.

Te smooth surface of sterilized agar (which had

the further technical advantage of solidifying at alower temperature than gelatine, and thus beingeasier to pour into the plates when liquid) alloweddistributing microbes in a Petri dish, either bypouring in liquid or by streaking a solid sample with a wire-based spatula. As a comparison ofmethodical texts shows, many of the simple, butcrucial tools and manipulations to obtain suchclonal or “pure” colonies of bacteria on platesseem to have been practiced in the early 20th cen-tury in a way very similar to that taught to under-

graduate microbiology or biotechnology studentsaround the globe today (see e.g. Kißkalt K. andHartmann M., 1909; Madigan M., et al. 2012). Apart from the fact that Petri dishes are nowa-days made from plastic, and innumerable varia-tions of standardized media, sizes etc. exist, thegeneral design of culture plates à la Koch, as wellas the techniques and the rationale connected tothem seem to have remained the same– in detail,this hypothesis would of course have to stand thetest of a thorough historical analysis.

Te concept of bacteria or later prokaryotes hasbeen revised fundamentally since the late 19th century (remember, for example, that the pro-blem of microbial heredity remained controver-sial until the post-war time). Moreover, micro-biology has seen innumerable technologicalinnovations and changes in work style over thelast century – from the introduction of bioche-mistry to recombinant DNA or genomics. And yet, Koch’s plate technique has formed a stableand influential framework for microbiological

practice – from simple demonstrative experi-ments taught to students to routine diagnostics inmedicine or sophisticated genetic and biotechno-logical interventions (Madigan M. et al. 2012; theuse of such culture plates is central e.g. to basicroutines of genetic engineering such as molecu-lar cloning). It is presumably no exaggeration tosay that culture plates have continuously shaped what microbes were and what they have beenconceived of in the last century. Without thissimple tool to grow, separate, manipulate, trans-port and stock these organisms, much of today’s

high-tech research and diagnostics would be hardto imagine. Culture plates have also contributed

to the standardization of microbes in the labo-ratory. In fact, microbiologists over the last cen-tury have repeatedly critiqued culture plates forproducing artificial life forms that would not beencountered in environmental samples (Doolittle W.F., 2013).14

Te fact that Koch’s plates remain relativelyunchanged among the most important tools ofmicrobiology in an age mostly linked to genesequencing, synthetic biology etc. justifies topresent them as a prime example to conceiveof a longue durée of a simple scientific tool andtechnique.

Vintage science? The relevanceof “old” instrumentation and

techniques Te form of continuity presented by Koch’sculture plates can be characterized cum grano salis as “timeless” for the simplicity of technique, thefact that the rationale behind has been materiallyrealized in different forms (for example by usingPetri dishes made from plastic instead of glass)and their ongoing significance. However, onecould also look for examples of a longue durée ofmethods and instruments in which what one mycall their ‘systematic age’ is more significant. Te

term systematic age, adopted from the work ofhistorian of art George Kubler, refers here to thetemporal relation of one series of artefacts to ano-ther (Kubler G., 2008: 35). Kubler discussed theongoing presence of an artistic style in a periodusually associated with a later style, but the caseof a vintage car on a contemporary street mightagain be illustrative. Here, systematic age refers toa hiatus in terms of function, design or rationale, which is not necessarily congruent with chrono-logical age.

o provide an example of what this could meanin scientific practice, we shall briefly sketch anepisode from biochemical research in Germany, which is the continued use of the so-called War-burg apparatus after 1970. Tis case is certainlyin many aspects singular, but further examplesof ongoing uses of a technology that had beencutting-edge decades before, thus “instrumentaloldtimers” and their phasing out would be worthanalyzing.

14. Standardizations of scientific or medical routines, prod-ucts and objects provide another broad theme that could beconceived of under the framework of longue durée , see e.g.Clarke/Fujimura (1992), Gaudilliere/Hess, 2008.


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In the course of a historical study of the 1970slife sciences, the author was struck to find that ina time normally connected to the rise of mole-cular biotechnologies and recombinant DNA,developmental or neurobiology, a pre-War instru-ment, the so-called Warburg apparatus, was stillactively used in research. In fact, the apparatussupplied important data on a very new researchproject (Grote M., 2013).

Tis instrument, named after the German cellphysiologist and biochemist Otto H. Warburg(1883-1970), was based on manometry, that is,the measurement of pressure changes resultingfrom the production or consumption of gases ina closed reaction vessel. Tese are taken as para-meters of biochemical reactions. Practically, subs-

trates such as tissue samples or unicellular orga-nisms were incubated in a glass flask connectedto the so-called manometer. During incubationsof several hours, and under varying environmen-tal conditions (such as illumination, the presenceof reactants in the liquid etc.), the pressure inthe vessel was manually read out and the data ongas exchange were used for calculations based onchemical reaction kinetics.

Te apparatus stands for cell physiology, pho-tosynthesis and cancer research as carried out

in Warburg’s institute since the 1920s, or thestudy of intermediary metabolism by his formerstudent Hans A. Krebs.15 After the second world war, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Cell Phy-siology in Berlin was re-integrated into the MaxPlanck Society. Warburg continued to work afterretirement age until his death in 1970 with hisestablished methods, encompassing also e.g. cus-tom-made optical instruments, lenses etc. Tisexperimental continuity was secured by techni-cians specifically trained in instrument-making

and measuring. In 1972, the institute was dis-solved and the Max Planck Society distributed itsinstrumental and human resources. One techni-cian and a number of apparatuses and optical gear were transferred to the newly opened Max PlanckInstitute of Biochemistry close to Munich. War-burg’s technician continued to work there untilhis retirement in 1991, and the Warburg appara-tus was used for research purposes until the early1980s. Since the 1970s, oxygen electrodes, a newdevice to measure gas exchanges were available,and generally research had taken new directions,

15. On the development of manometry, see the article by F.Holmes in Clarke A. and Fujimura J. (Ed.) 1992.

such as bioenergetics, structural biology or recom-binant DNA. Even if the Warburg apparatus wasone technology among many others, it suppliedimportant data, ironically for a research projectthat was considered ‘cutting-edge’ around 1970.

Beyond the local case related to the transfer ofa technician and instruments within the MaxPlanck Society, there are some indications thatthe Warburg apparatus, a “classic” and very ins-tructive biochemical instrument, has played a rolein academic education when it finally becameoutmoded for research purposes – a Germancompany produced the instrument until the1980s (Grote M., 2013).

Different explanations could be tried for thecontinued use of an instrument of 1920-1930s

biochemistry in the age of recombinant DNA, which of course lost its role as a ‘modern’ tech-nique to that of an established and later on aphasing-out model. In the present case, the ins-truments and a skilled technician were simplyavailable, and any economic or pragmatic consi-deration would suggest using them unless there were serious disadvantages. Also, the fact thatthese instruments were custom-made for specificuses could have enhanced their value, and evenif Warburg’s methods were highly disputed in

the post-War time, the young biochemist thenleading the project stressed the accuracy of themethod in the hands of a long-time technician.Moreover, the adoption of an established tech-nique could make it easier to compare data toprevious results and thereby to establish reliabi-lity. For the mentioned case, one could also sus-pect that at least among the German community, where the Warburg tradition still emblematizedan ideal of scientific rank and productivity, theremay have been social reasons for adopting this

old line of research into a new research projectcarried out by a new generation.16

It is interesting to note that the incorportation ofthe Warburg apparatus as an “instrumental dino-saur” in the 1970s did not mean that the new project was entirely relying on established methods orconcepts. o the contrary, publications and labo-ratory notebooks reveal that many contemporarymethods were used (such as protein sequencing,gel electrophoresis etc.) and the actual research

16. However, this latter point does not hold international-ly, as Warburg had a bad reputation following the post-warcontroversy on the quantum requirement of photosynthesis(Nickelsen K. and Govindjee 2011)


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object (a protein called bacteriorhodopsin) rapi-dly advanced to a new, hot topic in the context ofbioenergetics and structural biology. Even if theselatter aspects are mostly highlighted in recollec-tions of bacteriorhodopsin research, the caseillustrates how a project can encompass differentlayers of scientific time at once, and how instru-ments, approaches and objects of differing syste-matic ages can be combined. It is also notable thatthis form of experimental continuity was boundnot only to the instrument itself, but in combina-tion to a laboratory technician, an often neglectedfigure of science much less linked to innovationthan to maintenance and routine (on technicians,see Shapin S., 2008)

Recurrent explanatory patterns

or embracing conceptsin the life sciences

Historians and philosophers of science havefrequently debated whether modern scienceconstantly provides new, refined or differingexplanations of phenomena, whether these expla-nations are necessarily congruent, reducible toone another or not. What is less discussed andmaybe perceived, or so it appears, is that and whycertain motives of explanations remain aroundfor extended times or that they reappear. One

may readily object that if one looks into thedetails of an explanation, let alone its context,an historical analogy will quickly dissolve withrespect to the encountered differences. Tere isno doubt that such differences exist, that theyhave sometimes been neglected by e.g. scientistsin order to construct certain narratives (such asthe infamous precursor), and that it is an impor-tant function of the history of science to revealfalse continuities. Yet, would it not be possible toretain these insights and still to try to examine

different forms of continuities in scientific expla-nations? Or, does it make sense to try to thinkof more generally embracing concepts (“concep-tual brackets”) in order to understand the deve-lopment of science in time, the relationships ofdifferent projects, disciplines etc., as well as theproblems and difficulties that research repeatedlyencounters? Here, I will first provide an exampleof a case in which motives of an explanation inthe life sciences have been repeatedly used tounderstand the biological phenomenon of ageing.

Second, I will refer to an attempt to shape gene-ral categories to understand practice in the life

and chemical sciences beyond the usual divi-sions provided by disciplines, research fields etc.

Te general motive of explaining ageing by anintoxication of the body through a substancenot present in its youth even predates modern

science. Its first expression under the latterregime, however, was put forward by the Russian-French immunologist Ilya Mechnikov (MorangeM., 2011). Metchnikov studied the process ofageing in various animals and tried to correlateboth their anatomies as well as life styles to theirdifferent life spans. He rejected the assumptionthat ageing was a consequence of the decrea-sing proliferative power of cells (ageing by loss offunction) in favour of the intoxication hypothesison several grounds. Among these were the detec-

tion of specific substances in ageing tissues at thetime, visualized as granules, and the observationby French cell biologist Alexis Carrel that cellproliferation in vitro required an exchange of themedium even if the nutrients had not been fullyused up – thus one could suspect the accumula-tion of a toxic substance.

In the contemporary life sciences, a model existsto explain neurodegenerative diseases such asParkinson or Alzheimer through the formationof so-called proteotoxic aggregates (l.c.). Tis

model is supported by experimental data suchas that mutations which prolong the life spanof experimental animals also delay the forma-tion of protein aggregates, or that certain drugs which prevent the formation of aggregates alsodelay ageing. Although protein aggregation hasrecently been termed a “paradigm for ageing”(l.c.: 2), the exact mechanism of how this process works in different cases has not yet been resolved,and neither has the effect of the proteotoxicaggregates been understood.

In spite of all differences in detail, Mechnikov’sand the present model of ageing by intoxicationappear similar, with the important difference thatnow a toxic entity has been physically identified(proteotoxic aggregates), and that for Mechnikov,the toxins partly originated externally to the orga-nism. Interestingly, also the shortcomings of bothexplanations appear similar, namely the problemto reconcile them with an evolutionary understan-ding of ageing (i.e. to explain why natural selec-tion has not countered the intoxication process).

Te longue durée of ageing by intoxication, which comprises more than the two instances


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mentioned above, becomes even more interes-ting if one contrasts the intoxication approach toa counterpart – the explanation of ageing by lossof function, e.g. through decreases of the cellu-lar division, tissue regeneration and generally thecapacity of organisms to react to environmentalinfluences. Whereas ‘negative’ models of ageing,such as through loss, are more easily squared withevolutionary theory, ‘positive’ models of ageingare more likely to conceive of medical interven-tions, e.g. through inhibition of the intoxicatingprocesses. Tus, a longue durée history of explica-tions of ageing (which would straddle a centuryof bio-medical research, the upsurge of gene-tics and molecular biology, drastic instrumen-tal changes etc.) might not only help to unders-tand the debates on current models better, but

potentially also to sketch the larger contexts andramifications of these explanations – within andbeyond science.

In the previous case, the repeated appearanceof explanations of ageing has spanned times ofscience that we usually conceive of as far apart.In line with the longue durée conception sketchedabove, the similarity of the explanatory patterncontrasts with the assumed background narra-tive of scientific development. We imagine thatthis similarity will be surprising to many readers– at least it is to the author – and to a degreeeven conspicuous. How far does the analogyhold, and what is behind it? Te same questionsapply to a deliberate attempt to use embracingconcepts (such as intoxication) to conceive ofhistories beyond the temporal divisions providedby disciplines, research projects, general historyetc. When developing a historical “backgroundpanorama” for a collected volume on the his-tory of biochemistry, Joseph Needham sketchedsuch an approach (see Introduction of Hill R.

and Needham J. (Ed.) 1970). His interest was touse general concepts such as “ferment” or “ele-ment” as a “perspective glass to show that theirsubjects [i.e., modern physiological chemistry orbiochemistry] did not suddenly come into beinglike a set of extraordinary mutations, but ratherthat they grew like plants with roots coming upa very long way from the sub-soil of antiquity”,not only in Europe of course (l.c.: viii). Needhamthen announced a number of concepts “almost asif they were entries in a kind of Voltairean ‘Dic-

tionnaire philosophique ’” (l.c.: ix) – in addition tothose mentioned pneuma , humour,krasis , quintes-sence, elixir and conjunction.

Again, one may throw one’s hands up in hor-ror of over-generalizations and anachronisms -at least most readers of today will be surprised. Tere certainly is a feeling of alienation, or of the“contemporary of the non-contemporary” whenconnecting the ancient concept of pneuma withthe modern biochemical assumption of certaingases serving as evidence for a potential emer-gence of life – up to the point where we perceivethese similarities as so superficial to be ridiculous. Apropos the indelible traces of the “pneumaticheritage” on our thinking and language, Need-ham noted not without irony: “As I sat downto write these words, builder’s tradesmen wereloudly singing ‘in high spirits’ on the other sideof the garden wall, and in the newspaper I hadread of the evidence transmitted back by Mariner

7 that there is methane and ammonia – thereforeperhaps life – on the plant Mars”.

And yet, does Needham’s suggestion not deservea second look when trying to understand modernbiochemistry as part of a larger stream of humanactivity taking organisms apart, describing theircomponents and using them to act upon life’s pro-cesses? ake quintessence or elixir: Te extractionor preparation of active principles from biologicalmaterials and their usage in medicine remain cen-tral to biochemical and biomedical practice andform a bridge to scientific and mundane practicesof earlier times. Te danger of linking episodesthat do not have much more in common than theuse of a similar term is obvious. But there is alsothe possible benefit of learning from the longuedurée “historical baggage” of concepts, the desi-gnated phenomena and the associated practices.Virus or ferment , for example, which sound farless alchemically tainted than Needham’s catego-ries, have remained in the 20th century’s scientific vocabulary - could a longue durée history of such

concepts tell us more about the growth of bio-chemistry beyond its disciplinary consolidation?In how far could such attempts be differentiatedfrom the “thematic prejudices” or “themata” thatGerald Holton (1984) has suggested for a historyof ideas in physics?

A recent history of vitamins, enzymes and hor-mones under the title of “Wirkstoffe. Eine Wis-senschaftsgeschichte der Vitamine, Hormoneund Enzyme” ( Active principles . A history of scienceof vitamins, hormones and enzymes ; Stoff H.,2012) has taken a step in the direction of shapinggeneric terms referring to both biological and


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social phenomena to provide a novel framework within which to understand biochemistry, phar-macy and medicine far beyond a mere history ofits ideas. opoi such as “activation”, “regulation” or“precarization” provide the structure of this his-tory, thereby enabling the narrative to transcendboth received periodizations as well as the nature-nurture divide. Such embracing categories wouldallow thinking of longue durée histories than runcounter the preconceived time spans of disci-plines, scientific frameworks, projects etc. Tesehistories could reveal unexpected continuities andsynchronicities within science, but also betweenscience and the history of other human activities.

Larger scales: Fields, trendsand styles and ideals of science

Te examples provided above have incrementallymoved from the concrete and material towardsmore conceptual aspects of science. Whereasthe longue durée of Koch’s plate technique or the Warburg apparatus would be very particular his-tories, patterns of explication or more embrac-ing categories to describe the activity of certainresearch fields take a more general perspective,illustrating the contingent relationship betweenthe longue durée and big pictures. I will concludeon an even more general level, that of research

fields and finally what one could call ideals orstyles of science. Tis last aspect brings us closeto “big pictures”, or at least generalist approaches, yet the focus is again on the temporal aspects inthese stories.

Biological classification is an intrinsically con-servative branch of science. One aim of classifi-cation has been at each point of time to establishan order of nature perceived as “scientific” by cur-rent methods of observation or experimentation. Yet, another goal, or at least a necessity for mostresearchers, has been the stability of their cate-gories in the light of changes in science. Tat is, what is today conceived of as species A shouldonly if absolutely necessary be conceived of asspecies B tomorrow, and what was yesterday spe-cies C should be congruent with today’s speciesC. Especially in the 20th century, a whole range oftools, conventions and institutions have served thepurpose of regulating classification and negotiat-ing new data and requirements with the receivednomenclature and categories. Even if one would

presumably encounter similar situations regard-ing botany or zoology, I shall limit my sketch

to microbial classification. Here, individual orinstitutionalized culture collections have main-tained and distributed the living “type strains” ofmicrobes (the analogue to botanical type speci-mens) for comparison and later analyses, “codesof nomenclature” have stipulated rules for legiti-mate naming, groups of experts have decided oncontested issues and edited the relevant schemesfor identification and classification.17

Classification seems an especially favourable ter-rain for longue durée phenomena. ype specimen,plant materials collected serving as material ref-erences to species, could be even said to embodythe phenomenon at stake here. Tese dried, brit-tle specimen often from times of science longbygone, still play an important role have in order

to decide on conflicts in classification in spite ofall their material shortcomings.

A recent study reanalyzed type specimen of whatare nowadays known as cyanobacteria (formerlyclassified as blue-green algae among the plantkingdom) by molecular methods in order to clar-ify the relationships of certain species. Practically,small samples of the dry cell powder in herbariacollected a century ago were taken to a labora-tory, DNA was prepared and sequenced (PalinskaK. et al. 2006). I argue not only that the role of

type specimen, and the knowledge and practicesconnected in these, should be understood as alongue durée phenomenon in action, but that clas-sification generally displays a temporal structurefavourable for synchronicities of the “old” and the“new”. o cite just one more example, a manualfor experimental methods used in microbial clas-sification from 1969 lists original protocols of thepre-War time, and one dating back as far as 1819- long before Pasteur and Koch, and the mod-ern concept of microbes (Skerman V., 1969). If

today’s researchers wanted to compare their iso-late with these first descriptions of certain organ-isms, they would have to follow precisely theseold protocols, thereby bringing these latter backinto contemporary scientific practice.

Tere would be many more examples showingthat the historical development of classificatorypractice follows a different pace than the historyof microbiology in the 20th century. Not only isthere a time lag in the adoption of novel methodsand concepts into classification, but there is a

17. See e.g. Daston L., 2004 (on type specimen), Sapp J.,2005, on Bergey’s manual, see Murray R. and Holt J., 2005 –a history of microbial classification is work in progress.


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special relationship to the own field’s past as well. Classification is a privileged field to look forforms of continuity in science. Te field seems todisplay different temporal patterns with respectto assumed narratives in the history of the lifesciences (such as the impact and arrival of mole-cular analyses, or the relevance of phylogenetic,i.e. evolutionary classification). Classificationdisplays an intrinsic longue durée structure as forthe continuous reference to and re-negotiationof historical sources – original descriptions andnomenclature, data, methods or materials belon-ging to different layers of scientific time.

o conclude, I shall briefly note an interestingobservation of the contemporary of the non-contemporary in a recent work dealing with the

development of ideals or styles of rationality inscience. In their book “Objectivity”, LorraineDaston and Peter Galison sketch the historicalunfolding of what they call “epistemic virtues”since the 18th century that “re-write and re-imagethe guides that divide nature into its fundamen-tal objects” (Daston L. and Galison P. 2010). Tefirst of these virtues is “truth to nature”, whichfavours representations of natural objects, e.g. indrawings perceived as characteristic. Trough theexpertise of a specific scientific author or illustra-tor, these were meant to reveal something abouttheir objects’ essence. In the 19th century, “truthto nature” was superseded by “mechanical objectivity”, an often mechanical style of representationin which the subjective influences of the image’screator were to be avoided at all costs. Yet, “truthto nature” did not disappear completely – from adominant virtue it turned to a particular, but retai-ned its influence in specific fields (e.g. in botanicaldrawings) much longer than in other branches ofscience. Tis persistence of “truth to nature” seemsa good case for a longue durée of a scientific style.

Daston and Galison also report that those advo-cating the earlier virtue “too late” were often in adefensive position with respect to the community(l.c.: 43). It is intriguing to observe the place ofthis longue durée phenomenon in a work that, asthe authors state in the introduction, “is about thecreation of a new epistemic virtue”, namely objec-tivity (l.c.: 16). In their words, the rise of objectivity has advanced through innovation and proli-feration rather than a “monarchic succession” ofepistemic virtues – that is, the “new forms did not

abolish the old ones”, but as new stars appearingnext to old ones, they change the geography of theheavens. Clearly, the phenomenon or observation

of a longue durée is present in this beautiful meta-phor and it is not at the same time – as the newstars usually seem to shine brighter than the oldones, and the latter are rarely looked at.

And why look at longuedurée phenomena?It seems inevitable in the history of 20th centuryscience to focus on development and change.Even if the notion of “revolutions” may havecome of age, is it not obvious to study how newfields of science have formed, what impacts novelinstruments, institutional structures or politi-cal frameworks have had etc.? Certainly, it is toa degree and, as stated above, I do not want todeny the obvious. Also, I am aware of the danger

of over-generalizations and anachronisms – thesehave to be carefully scrutinized in every studyagain. So, why look at the contemporary of thenon-contemporary, why study forms of durationsuch as persistences of the “old” and potentiallyresidual, at re-appearances or continuities?

First of all, and here I have to again underlinethe provisional character of this paper, to describesuch as episodes, contour different forms of conti-nuity, thereby estimating their potential impacton science. It seems that e.g. in the history of the

20th century life science, the question of continui-ties on the experimental and conceptual level hasrarely been asked, so there is no danger of oversta-ting it. Tere are of course exceptions, such as theissue of standardizing in experimental and biome-dical practice (see above). Yet, it seems that his-tories of the molecular life sciences, for example,are mostly structured by the new, by innovationsand change accelerating the further one movestowards the present. Tere may be different rea-sons for this – from the simple fact the scien-

tist’s accounts have naturally privileged changesto more sophisticated ones. Possible continuitiesare often harder to detect in sources than innovations, as they may go unmentioned, and theremay be fear of methodical anachronisms whentelling such stories. Finally, there is the basic factthat histories need a narrative, and narratives aremostly based on development and differentiation.

Let me finally provide three connected argu-ments of why longue durée approaches in thetemporal sense of developments seemingly going

against the tide of time, by highlighting repeti-tion, maybe even stasis or decline, should be of


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interest. First, looking into the contemporaryof the non-contemporary may help to establishmore balanced narratives by getting less spectacu-lar, development-centred episodes of science intothe picture. Second, this would allow us to ask why certain patterns of explication or frameworksremain around or come back, and third, to thinkof what one could term “sustainability” in scien-tific practice.

Te call for balanced narratives does not needmuch explanation. Without presuming the extentto which continuity has had an impact on science,it is simply a suggestion to take this phenomenoninto consideration when conceiving of a project or working with sources, to note and to estimate therelevance of aspects such as the impact of an esta-

blished technique or the return of an explanatorypattern. Tere might be several terrains to lookfor other forms of duration. One strategy couldfor example be to move away from the centres ofresearch, from the hotspots to the periphery, orfrom principal investigators to technicians, and togauge the impact of novelty at a given time. Also,the role of academic teaching could be studiedand compared to the development of research.

Many stories thus told would result in rathermundane, but potentially surprising accounts of

science – the role of simple coup de mains , of anomnipresent material or a technician versus theimage of science driven forward by technologi-cal innovation and creative individuals. What hasbecome of the ultra-centrifuge after it turned intoa routine technique? What do today’s models ofultracentrifuges have to do with their predeces-sors, where are they used and for what purposes?Here again, we move close to what David Edger-ton (2008) has demanded for the history of tech-nology, that is, to study technologies in use rather

than focusing on certain moments of innovation. Te second point is related to the persistence orre-appearance of patterns in scientific explana-tions – what does this tell us about science? Inhow far is what looks similar really similar, whereexactly lie the differences? Are continuities notedby scientists, do they refer to a mode of operationof scientific explanation and practice or to factorsbeyond the lab bench? What can one learn fromthe fact that reappearing explanations face simi-lar problems, e.g. about the larger conceptual fra-

mework or functioning of science? For a historyof science that addresses not only historians ofscience, but also philosophers and scientists, and

maybe even broader audiences, such cases mightbe not only be enlightening, but well-needed.One could argue that in order to counter progres-sivist or ‘developmentalist’ narratives, a nuancedanalysis of eventual continuities might be a betterremedy than stating that what looks the same isactually not at all related and can be explained bytotally different factors (on the fear of anachro-nisms and presentism, see Oreskes N., 2013).

Let me finish on a somewhat speculative sug-gestion. Not only the public perception, butalso the historical picture of the 20th century lifesciences is characterized by continuous and evenaccelerated development, by novelty and changeon all levels. As many readers have presumablyexperienced themselves, there i

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