303 U.S. 525

58 S.Ct. 651

82 L.Ed. 993

CALMAR S.S. CORPORATIONv.

TAYLOR.*

No. 594.

Argued March 9, 1938.Decided March 28, 1938.

Mr. Frank A. Bull, of New York City, for petitioner.

Mr. Abraham E. Freedman, of Philadelphia, Pa., for respondent.

Mr. Justice STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

1 The question for decision is whether the duty of a shipowner to providemaintenance and cure for a seaman falling ill of an incurable disease while inits employ extends to the payment of a lump sum award sufficient to defray thecost of maintenance and cure for the remainder of his life.

2 Respondent was a member of the crew of petitioner's steamship Losmar.Following an injury to his foot, allegedly caused by stubbing his toe against anobject lying on the floor of the boiler room where he was employed, respondentwas found to be afflicted with thrombo angiitis obliterans, otherwise known asBuerger's disease, an incurable malady of the veins and arteries. It is attendedby interruptions of the blood stream, with consequent malnutrition of theaffected parts, producing lesions, deteriorating changes of the tissues, andgangrene. Medical treatment and amputation of the affected parts may halt theadvance of the disease, but its manifestations are likely to recur in other parts ofthe body, and medical opinion is that the disease tends to be progressive andmay ultimately cause death. Care and treatment at frequent intervals, withperiodic medical observation of the patient, are of aid in arresting its progress.

3 After February 12, 1935, when respondent was first hospitalized, he was giventreatment at various marine hospitals, in the course of which he suffered four

amputations upon the right foot and leg. On October 3, 1935, after his leg hadbeen amputated below the knee, he was discharged to the 'OutpatientDepartment to return at intervals for re-examination, and later to be fitted withan artificial limb.' Petitioner, from time to time, paid respondent small sums formaintenance and cure, continuing to do so until March 10, 1936, when theytotaled $487. At about this time respondent brought the present suit inadmiralty to recover maintenance and cure, and, in another count, forpetitioner's negligence in causing the injury. The trial court found that petitionerwas not negligent, but held that respondent is entitled to recover the cost ofmaintenance and medical treatment so long as such treatment is necessary, andthat as his affliction is incurable, there should be a lump sum award based onhis life expectancy. Its decree awarding a recovery of $7,000 was affirmed bythe Court of Appeals. 3 Cir., 92 F.2d 84. Because of the importance of thisquestion, we granted certiorari, 302 U.S. 681, 58 S.Ct. 408, 82 L.Ed. —-, butdenied a cross-petition to review the Court of Appeals' affirmance of the decreefor the shipowner on the negligence count. 303 U.S. 643, 58 S.Ct. 642, 82L.Ed. —-.

4 The ancient duty of a vessel and her owner to provide maintenance and cure forseamen injured or falling ill while in service was recognized and, to someextent, defined by this Court in The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175, 23 S.Ct. 483,47 L.Ed. 760. See, also, Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 38S.Ct. 501, 62 L.Ed. 1171; Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 49 S.Ct.75, 73 L.Ed. 220. The duty, which arises from the contract of employment,Cortes v.Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 371, 53 S.Ct. 173, 174, 77 L.Ed.368, does not rest upon negligence or culpability on the part of the owner ormaster, Id; The City of Alexandria, D.C., 17 F. 390; The Mars, 3 Cir., 149 F.729, 731; Sorensen v. Alaska S.S. Co., D.C., 243 F. 280, affirmed 9 Cir., 247 F.294; Brown v. The Bradish Johnson, C.C., Fed.Cas.No.1992, 1 Woods 301, noris it restricted to those cases where the seaman's employment is the cause of theinjury or illness,The Wensleydale, D.C., injury or illness, The Wensleydale,D.C., F. 831. It is not an award of compensation for the disability suffered, TheWanderer, C.C., 20 F. 140, 143, although breach of the duty may render theowner liable for the consequential damages suffered by the seaman, Cortes v.Baltimore Insular Line, supra, 287 U.S. 367, at page 371, 53 S.Ct. 173, 174, 77L.Ed. 368. The maintenance exacted is comparable to that to which the seamanis entitled while at sea, The Henry B. Fiske, D.C., 141 F. 188, 192; The Mars,D.C., 145 F. 446, 447, affirmed 3 Cir., 149 F. 729; The Bouker No. 2, supra, 2Cir., 241 F. 831, at page 836, and 'cure' is care, including nursing and medicalattention during such period as the duty continues, Whitney v. Olsen, 9 Cir.,108 F. 292, 297 and cases cited; Dougherty v. Thompson-Lockhart Co., D.C.,211 F. 224, 227.

5 In The Osceola, supra, this Court reserved the point whether the duty ofmaintenance and cure extends beyond the duration of the voyage, and thatquestion, so far as this Court is concerned, remains an open one. The reasonsunderlying the rule, to which reference must be made in defining it, are thoseenumerated in the classic passage by Mr. Justice Story in Harden v. Gordon,C.C., Fed.Cas.No.6047: The protection of seamen, who, as a class, are poor,friendless and improvident from the hazards of illness and abandonment whileill in foreign ports; the inducement to masters and owners to protect the safetyand health of seamen while in service; the maintenance of a merchant marinefor the commercial service and maritime defense of the nation by inducing mento accept employment in an arduous and perilous service.

6 It is plain that in many cases these purposes will not be accomplished if theowner's duty to furnish maintenance and cure ends with the voyage. If theinjury or illness outlasts it, the seaman may still be left helpless and uncared forin a foreign port. Even if he is returned to the home port the inducement to theowner to care for the health and safety of seamen during the voyage and theinducement to seamen to take the necessary risks of a hazardous calling will bematerially lessened. The chances of their prompt restoration to a service whosepreservation is in the public interest, will be diminished if the right tomaintenance and cure ends with the voyage.

7 Tacit recognition is accorded these considerations in the great number of casesin the lower federal courts sustaining the right to maintenance and cure for areasonable time after the voyage—'reasonable time' being appraised withreference to the special circumstances of each case. The Bouker No. 2, supra, 2Cir., 241 F. 831, at page 835, and cases cited at page 834. It is true that in mostof these cases the efficient cause of the injury or illness was some proven act ofthe seaman in the service of the ship, but there are others in which it wasdeemed enough that he was incapacitated when subject to the call of duty as aseaman, and that his incapacity continued after the voyage had ended. TheBouker No. 2, supra, 2 Cir., 241 F. 831, at page 835; The Wensleydale, supra.

8 We accept as supported by evidence, the finding of the District Court thatrespondent's disease and the amputations which he suffered were not caused bythe injury to his foot. But we think that even in such a case, whether the seamanis at home or abroad, his right to maintenance and cure may outlast the voyage.The policy underlying the obligation, so cogently stated by Justice Story inHarden v. Gordon, supra, and the liberality with which admiralty courts havetraditionally interpreted rules devised for the benefit and protection of seamenwho are its wards, Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 287, 17 S.Ct. 326, 41L.Ed. 715; Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, supra, 287 U.S. 367, at page 377,

53 S.Ct. 173, 176, 77 L.Ed. 368; The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 123, 56S.Ct. 707, 711, 80 L.Ed. 1075, call for some extension of the duty beyond theterm of service. The practical inconvenience and the attendant danger toseamen in the application of a rule which would encourage the attempt bymaster or owner to determine in advance of any maintenance and cure, whetherthe illness was caused by the employment, are manifest.

9 There remain the questions whether in the case of a chronic illness the dutycontinues so long as medical attendance and care are beneficial, until death ifthe need lasts so long, and whether a lump sum may be awarded to defray thecost of meeting the anticipated need.

10 In answering the first we lay to one side those cases where the incapacity iscaused by the employment. As to them considerations not present here mayapply, which might be thought to require a more liberal application of the rulethan we think is called for in this case. Cf. Reed v. Canfield, C.C.,Fed.Cas.No.11641, with the comments of Judge, later Justice, Brown in The J.F. Card, D.C., 43 F. 92, and see those of Judge Hough in The Bouker No. 2,supra, 2 Cir., 241 F. 831, at page 834. But we find no support in the policieswhich have generated the doctrine for holding that it imposes on the shipowneran indefinitely continuing obligation to furnish medical care to a seamanafflicted with an incurable disease, which manifests itself during hisemployment, but is not caused by it. So far as we are advised, it is withoutsupport in the authorities. We can find no basis for saying that, if the diseaseproves to be incurable, the duty extends beyond a fair time after the voyage inwhich to effect such improvement in the seaman's condition as reasonably maybe expected to result from nursing, care, and medical treatment. This wouldsatisfy such demands of policy as underlie the imposition of the obligation.Beyond this we think there is no duty, at least where the illness is not caused bythe seaman's service.

11 The award of a lump sum in anticipation of the continuing need of maintenanceand cure for life or an indefinite period is without support in judicial decision.Awards of small amounts to cover future maintenance and cure of a kind andfor a period definitely ascertained or ascertainable have occasionally beenmade. The Mars, 3 Cir., 149 F. 729, 730; Wilson v. Manhattan Canning Co.,D.C., 205 F. 996, 997. But the award here seems to us to be inconsistent withthe measure of the duty and the purposes to be effected by its performance. Theduty does not extend beyond the seaman's need. Raymond v. The Ella S.Thayer, D.C., 40 F. 902, 903; The J. F. Card, supra, D.C., 43 F. 92, at page 95;The Bouker No. 2, supra, 2 Cir., 241 F. 831, at page 835; The Santa Barbara, 2Cir., 263 F. 369, 371; Stewart v. United States, D.C., 25 F.2d 869, 870;

Motion to retax costs denied 59 S.Ct. 56, 83 L.Ed. —-.

Marshall v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 2 Cir., 39 F.2d 551, 553; cf.Holt v. Cummings, 102 Pa. 212, 48 Am.Rep. 199; contra, Reed v. Canfield,supra. The amount and character of medical care which will be required in thecase of an affliction, as well defined even as Buerger's disease, cannot bemeasured by reference to mortality tables. Moreover, courts take cognizance ofthe marine hospital service where seamen may be treated at minimum expense,in some cases without expense, and they limit recovery to the expense of suchmaintenance and cure as is not at the disposal of the seaman through recourseto that service. The Bouker No. 2, supra, 2 Cir., 241 F. 831, at page 835;Marshall v. International Mercantile Marine Co., supra, 2 Cir., 39 F.2d 551, atpage 553, and cases cited. Furthermore, a duty imposed to safeguard theseaman from the danger of illness without succor, and to safeguard him, in caseof illness, against the consequences of his improvidence, would hardly beperformed by the payment of a lump sum to cover the cost of medicalattendance during life.

12 The seaman's recovery must therefore be measured in each case by thereasonable cost of that maintenance and cure to which he is entitled at the timeof trial, including, in the discretion of the court, such amounts as may beneedful in the immediate future for the maintenance and cure of a kind and fora period which can be definitely ascertained.

13 The courts below have made no findings sufficient to enable us to fix theamount which respondent is entitled to recover. The decree is accordinglyreversed, and the cause remanded to the District Court for further proceedingsin conformity with this opinion, and without prejudice to any later suit byrespondent to recover maintenance and cure to which he may then be entitled.

14 Reversed.

15 Mr. Justice BLACK is of opinion that the judgment should be affirmed.

16 Mr. Justice CARDOZO took no part in the consideration or decision of thiscase.

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