Stat Con Cases 2

7/27/2019 Stat Con Cases 2

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G.R. No. L-7927 August 8, 1913

JUAN BARRAMEDA, petitioner,

vs.

PERCY M. MOIR, (Judge of First Instance) ET AL., respondents.

TRENT,J.:

Petitioner was a defendant in a suit brought before a justice of the peace to try title to a

parcel of la nd and the case was decided adversel y to him;

Petitioner ap pealed to the Court of First I nstance; and that the judge of that court dismissed

the ap peal with directions to the justice o f the p eace to proceed with the enforcement of the

jud gme nt.

BARRAMEDA now pra ys that the respondent judge be orde red to proceed with the cas e o n

appeal.

RESPONDENT JUDGE has protested to the compl ain t on the ground that it does not state

facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The basis of the demurrer is that Acts Nos.

2041 and 2131, confe rring original jurisdiction upon justices of the peace to try ti tle to rea l

state, are inconsistent with and repugnant to the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902. By Act No.

2041, section 3, it was provided:

Justices of the peace shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate question of

title to real estate or any interest therein when the value of the property in

litigation does not exceed two hundred pesos, and where such value exceeds two

hundred pesos but is less than six hundred pesos the justice of the peace shall

have jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of First Instance.

By Act No. 2131, se ction 1, the above provision wa s amend ed by subs tituting "exclus ive

original jurisdiction" for "exclusive jurisdiction."

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and Courts of First I nstance, as fixed by s ection 9 o f the

Phil ippine Bil l , may be added but to not diminished by the Philippine Legislature . This

hol ding has never been questioned, and it seems unnecessary now to dis cuss the ground s

upon which it was based. Therefore, there will be sufficient reason for declaring the disputed

provisions ofActs. Nos. 2041 and 2131 repugnant to the Philippine Bill and, consequently

void if they attempt to curtail the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance where the title torealty is involved.

The original jurisdiction of those courts extends to "all civil actions which involve the title to

or possession of real property, or of any interest therein," except in forcible entry and

detai ner cas es . (Act No. 136, sec. 56, par. 2.)

There is no more comprehensi ve word in the English language than the word "all."

*If this word be given its natural and unrestricted meaning, there is no case involving the

title to real estate which Court of First Instance are not authorized to hear and determine

under the Organic Law, an d that b eing supreme, any Act of the Philippine Legislature whi ch

attempts i n any manner to curtail such jurisdiction must be hel d void.

Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131 confer original jurisdiction upon justices of the peace to try title to

real estate and provide that it shall be exclusive in cases where the value of the property in

litigation does not exceed P200.

Is the word "exclusive" susceptible of a construction that would still give Courts of First

Instance original jurisdiction to try title to real estate where the value of the property in

litigation does not exceed P200?By no possible means can exclusi ve jurisdi ction to try a

sp ecific class of cases b e construed so as to permit of another court entertaining jurisdictio n

over su ch cases. To give a grant of unrestricted exclusive jurisdiction over a speci fic cla ss of

li tigation to one court its only proper sense, all other courts must be barred from e xercis ing

juri s di ctio n i n s uch cas es .


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To hold that another court has jurisdiction also such in cases is to destroy the grant of

exclusive jurisdiction given to the first. It is no longer exclusive when shared by another

court, but merely concurrent.

Were the disputed provisions of Acts Nos. 2041 an d 2131 al lo wed to s tand , therefo re, the

necessary result would be to deprive Courts of First Instance of their original jurisdiction to

try cases where the title to realty valued at not more than P200 was involved. This applies,

wheth er the phrase "exclusive jurisdiction" or "exclusive original jurisdiction " b e us ed. The

Philippine Legislature cannot d eprive Courts of First I nstan ce of a ny of the juris diction

conferred upon them by the Organic Law. Upon this ground alone, the n, Acts Nos. 2041 and

2131, i n s o far as they a ttempt to confer exclusive original jurisdiction u pon courts of jus tice

of the p eace to try cases involving the title to realty valued a t no t mo re tha n P200, must be

declared void.

There remains to be considered the concurrent jurisdiction conferred upon justice of the

peace by the disputed provisions of those Acts in cases where the amount in controversy

exceeds P200, but is less than P600.

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law,

while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and

be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the

invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself

if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other.

Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligence, and valid statute , whi ch carri es out

the legislative intent. The void provisions must be eliminated without causing results

effecting the main purpose of the Act in a manner contrary to the intention of the

Legislature. The language used in the invalid part of a statute can have no lega l force or

efficacy for any purpose whatever, and wha t remains must e xpress the le gis la tive wil l

independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legis late.

Courts of justices of the peace are courts of limited an d inferiorjurisdi ction. They are the

mos t inferior courts in our judicial system. Where they ha ve jurisdiction at al l, i t ha s never

bee n limited by the insignificance of the particul ar cas e. On the contra ry, the province of

thos e courts, as is well known, is to handle precisely such cases. If litigation be di vide d i nto

important and unimportant cases, then as suredl y, to jus tices of the pe ace fa ll only the

unimportant.

And when the division of jurisdiction in a particular class is based upon the amount in

controversy, a s i s the case with the provisions of Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131 in q uestion, a la w

providing that because of the i nferior amount in controversy a case s hould go to th e Court of

Firs t Instance, while another case of the same nature, because of its greate r a moun t, coul d

be tri ed before a justice of the peace, would be an anomaly and at war with the onl y l ogi cal

distribution of jurisdiction. In other words, the case of A vs. B is too small and

in consequential to be tried before a justice of the peace, and mus t be tried in the Court of

Firs t Instance; while the case ofC. vs. D, b ei ng of a larger amount, may be tried by a justice of

the peace. Such reasoning has never heretofore been used by the Le gislature in dis tributi ng

juri s diction over litigation between Courts of First Instance and justice of the peace courts . It

seems clear that the concurrent jurisdiction in cases where the amount involved is more

than P200 but less than P600, was meant only as supplemental and ancillary to the

exclusive jurisdiction over cases not exceeding P200. This concurrent jurisdiction must

therefore be considered as inseparable from and a bsolutely dependent upon the exercise of

that e xclusive jurisdiction which has already been decla red void. The concurrent jurisdiction

must therefore be declared void also.

Other ad ditional jurisdiction granted to justices of the peace by Acts Nos . 2041 an d 2131 i s

not before the court. We need only say that s uch othe r addi tiona l juris diction bea rs no

rela tion whatever to those void provisions of the statutes which provide for juri sd icti on in

real -estate actions; and applying the same rules to the rest of the Act whi ch we have applied

to the clause conferring concurrent jurisdictional in real-estate actions between the amounts

of P200 an d P600, we are clearly of the opinion that the validity of the remainder of the Act

is not in any case dependent upon the said void provisions.


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G.R. No. 124360 November 5, 1997

FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,

vs.

THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.

G.R. No. 127867 November 5, 1997

EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOKER P. ARROYO, ENRIQUE GARCIA, WIGBERTO TANADA, FLAG

HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION, INC., FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION (FDC), SANLAKAS,

petitioners,

vs.

HON. RUBEN TORRES in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, HON. FRANCISCO VIRAY, in

his capacity as the Secretary of Energy, CALTEX Philippines, Inc., PETRON Corporation and

PILIPINAS SHELL Corporation, respondents.

PUNO,J.:

FACTS: Prior to 1971, there was no g overnment agency regulating the oil i ndustry other than

those deal ing with ordinary commodities.

Oil companies were free to enter and exit the m arket without any government interference.

There we re four (4) refining companies (Shell, Caltex, Bataan Refini ng Compan y an d Fi lo il

Refi ning) and six (6) petroleum marketing companies (Esso, Filoi l, Ca lte x, Ge tty, Mobil and

Shell), then operating in the country.2

The government, rea lizing that petroleum and its p roducts are vital to n ational se curity a nd

that the ir continued supply at reasonable prices is essential to the general wel fare, enacted

the Oil Industry Commission Act which created the Oil Industry Commission (OIC) to

regulate the business of importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transporting,

processing, refining, storing, distributing, marketing and selling crude oil, gasoline, kerosene,

gas and other refine d petroleum products. The OIC was vested with the power to fixthe

market prices of petroleum products, to regulate the capacities of refineries, to license new

refineries and to regulate the operations and trade practices of the industry. 4

President Ferdinand E. Marcos created the Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) to

break the control by foreigners of our oil industry.5

Philippine National Oil Corporation ( PNOC)

acquired ownership of ESSO Philippines and Filoil to s erve as its marketing arm bough t the controlling shares of Bataan Refining Corp oration, th e largest refinery in

the country.

put up its own marketing subs idiary Petrophil. operated under the business name PETRON Corporation.

President Marcos through Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1956, crea ted the Oil Price

Stabilization Fund(OPSF) to cus hion the effects of frequent changes in the price of oil caused

by exchange rate adjustments or increase i n the world market prices of crude oi l an d

imported petroleum products.

The fund is used:

a) to reimburse the oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and i mportedpetroleum products oil

b) to reimburse oil companies for cost underrecovery incurred a s a res ult of thereduction of domestic prices of petroleum products.

By 1985, o nl y three (3) oil companies were operating in the country Caltex, Shell and the

government-owned PNOC.


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President Corazon C. Aquino signed Executive Order No. 172 creating the Energy Regulatory

Board to regu late the business of importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transp orting ,

processing, refining, marketing and distributing energy resources "when warranted and only

when public neces sity requires."

Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which created the Department of Energy to prepare,

in tegrate, coordinate, s upervise and co ntrol all plans, programs, projects, and activities of the

government in relation to energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution and

conservation.9Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4) years f rom the

effectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the President, institute the

programs and timetable of deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the

energy industry."

Government approved the privatization of Petron Corporation in 1993.

PNOC sol d 40% of its e quity in Petron Corporation to the Aramco Overseas Company.

Congress enacted R.A. No. 8180, entitled the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of

1996." Under the deregula ted en vironment, "any person or entity may import or purchase

any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or

own and operate ref ineries and other downstream oil facilitie s and market such crude oil or

use the same for his own requirement," subject only to monitoring by the Department of

Energy.11

The deregulation process has two phases : the transition phase and the full deregulation

phase.

During the transition phase, controls of the non-pricing aspects of the oil industry were to

be lifted. The following were to be accomplis hed:

(1) liberalization of oil importation, exportation, manufacturing, marketing anddistribution

(2) implementation of an automatic pricing mechanism(3) implementation of an automatic formula to set margins of d eal ers and rates of

haulers, water transport operators and pi peline concess ionai res

(4) res tructuring o f oil taxes. Upon full deregulation, controls on the price of oilan d theforeign exchange cover were to be lifted a nd the OPSF was to be aboli shed.

The petitions at bar assail the constitutionality of various provisions of R.A No. 8180 and

E.O. No. 372.

In G.R. No. 124360, petitioner Francisco S. Tatad se eks the annulment ofsection 5(b) of R.A.

No. 8180. Section 5(b) provides :

b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of

this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the

rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of

seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same

as that for imported crude oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the

tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the

same: Provided, further, That this provision may be amended only by an Act of

Congress.

The petition is anchored on three a rguments:

that the imposition of di fferent tariff rates does not deregulate the downstreamoil industry but instead controls the oil industry, contrary to the avowed policy of

the law. Petitioner avers that the tariff differential between imported crude oil and

imported refined petroleum products bars the entry of other players in the oil

industry because it effectively protects the interest of oil companies with existing

refineries. Thus, it runs counter to the objective of the law "to foster a truly

competitive market."

that the inclusion of the tariff provision in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 violatesSection 26(1) Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one


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subject which shall be expressed in its title. Petitioner contends that the

imposition of tariff rates in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject

of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

In assailing section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392, petitioners offer the following

submissions:

Third, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow the formation of a defacto cartel among the three existing oil companies Petron, Caltex and Shel l

in violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in

restraint of trade and unfair competition.

ISSUE: whether or not section 5 (b) violates the one title one subject requirement of the

Constitution;

HELD: NO. As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title one

subject rule. The title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute

details of a law. A l aw having a single general subject indicated in the title m ay con tai n a ny

number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not

inco nsistent with or fo reign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtheran ce of

su ch subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the gene ral su bject.19

We hold that section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A.

No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The s ection is supposed

to s way prospective investors to put u p refineries in our country an d make them rely less on

imp orted petroleum.20

We shall, however, return to the validity of this provis io n wh en we

examine its blocking effect on new entrants to the oi l market.


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ISSUE: whether or not R.A. No. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against

monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.

HELD:

provisions of R.A. No. 8180 violate section 19 of Article XII of the 1987 Cons tituti on. Th es e

provisi ons a re:

(1) Section 5 (b) which states "Any la w to the contrary notwithstandi ng and

starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on

imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined

petrol eum products at the rate of seven percent (7%) except fuel oi l and LPG, the

rate for which shall be the sa me a s that for i mported crude oi l. Provide d, that

beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on i mported crude oi l and refined

petrol eum products shall be the s ame.Provided, further, that this provision may be

amend ed onl y by an Act of Congress ."

(2) Sectio n 6 which states "To ensure the security and conti nui ty of petrol eum

crude a nd products supply, the DOE shall require the refiners and importers to

mai ntain a minimum inventory equivalent to ten percent (10%) of their res pecti ve

annual sales volume or forty (40) days of supply, whichever is lower," and

(3) Sectio n 9 (b) which states "To ensure fair competitio n and prevent cartels

and monopolies in the downs tream oi l i ndustry, the following acts s hall be

prohibited:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Preda tory pricing which means s elling or offering to s ell an y

product at a price unreasonabl y bel ow the indus try average

cost so as to attract customers to the d etriment of competitors.

On the other hand, section 19 of Article XII of the Cons titution al lege dly viol ated by the

aforestated provisions of R.A. No. 8180 mandates: "The State shall regulate or prohibit

monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or

unfair competition shall be allowed."

The validity of the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 8180 has to be decided in light of the

letter and spirit of our Constitution, especially section 19, Article XII. Thus, while the

Constitution embraced free enterprise as an economic creed, it did not prohibit per se the

operation of monopolies which can, however, be regulated in the public interest.33

This

distinct free enterprise system is dictated by the need to achieve the goals of our national

economy as defined by section 1, Articl e XII of the Constitution whi ch a re: more equ ita bl e

dis tribution of opportunities, income and wealth; a sus taine d increas e in the a mount o f

good s and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expa ndi ng

produ ctivity as the key to raising the quality of l ife for all, especially the un derpri vile ged. It

al so calls for the State to protect Filipino enterprises against unfa ir comp eti tion and trade

practices.

Section 19, Article XII of our Constitution is anti-trust in history and in spirit. It espouses

competition. The desirability of competition is the reason for the prohibition agai nst

res traint of trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair competition, an d the reas on for

regulation of unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus the underlying principle of

section 19, Article XII of our Constitution which cannot be violated by R.A. No. 8180.

Ideally, this kind of competition requires the presence of not one, not just a few but several

players. A market controlled by one player (monopoly) or dominated by a handful of

players (oligopoly) is hardly the market where honest-to-goodness competition will prevail.


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ISSUE: whether the provisions on the imposition of 4% tariff differential on imported crude

oil and refined petroleum products, the requirement of inventory and the prohibition on

predatory pricing can be individually struck down without invalidating the entire R.A. No.

8180.

HELD: The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the

Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid,

may stand and be enforced.

The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the

legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute. To justify this

result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the inval id portion that it is fair to

pres ume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had suppos ed that it coul d

not cons titutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a compl ete, in tel li gib le

and valid statute, which carries out the legis lative inte nt. . . .

The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually

dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations

for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the

nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the pa rts of the s tatute dependent,

cond i tional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended the statute to be carried

out a s a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if s ome pa rts

are un constitutional, all the other provisions th us dependent, conditional, or connected must

fall wi th them.

R.A. No. 8180 contains a separability clause . Se ction 23 provides that "if for any reason, a ny

se ction or p rovision of this Act i s declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts not a ffected

thereb y shall remain in full force and effect." This separability cla us e n otwith sta ndi ng , we

hold that the offending provisions of R.A. No. 8180 so permeate its essence that the entire

law has to be struck down.

The provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing are among the

principal props of R.A. No. 8180.Congress could not have deregulated the downstream oil

industry without these provisions . Unfortunately, contrary to their intent, these provis io ns

on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing inhibit fair competition, encourage

mono polistic power and interfere with the free interaction of m arke t forces . R.A. No. 8180

needs provisi ons to vouchsafe free and fair competition.

Before deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX ha d no real competitors but did not ha ve a

free run of th e market because government controls both the pricing and non-pricing aspects

of the o il industry.After deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX remain unthre aten ed by

real competition yet are no longer subject to control by go vernment wi th res pect to the ir

prici ng and non-pricing decisions. The aftermath of R.A. No. 8180 is a d eregu la ted marke t

where competition can be corrupted and where market forces can be mani pula ted by

oligopolies.


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G.R. Nos. L-38215, 38216 December 22, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

FAUSTINO RIVERA, defendant-appellee.

BUTTE,J.:

A cas e in violation of a rticle 363 of the Revised Penal Code wa s fil ed a gai ns t the appellee

Faustino Rivera.

To the se in formations, the defendant interposed a single demurrer al legi ng tha t the facts

averred in said in formations d o n ot constitute the crime defined and punished by article 363

of the Revised Penal Code.

The court below heard the two cases together and sustained the demurrer.

The appellant makes the following as signments of error:

In no t holding that the facts alleged in the informations file d in these two cas esproperly fall under article 363 of the Revised Penal Code; and

In s ustaining the demurrer interposed to said informations and in dismissi ng bothof these cases .

defendant-appellee Faustino Rivera si gned and swore to a complaint accusing Domingo Vito

and Felisa Moreno of the crime of theft

The justice of the peace dismissed the complaint filed against Domingo Vito and F elisa

Moreno

Domingo Vito and Felisa Moreno fil ed separate complaints agai ns t Faustino Rivera before

the same justice, charging Rivera with the offense of incriminating an innocent person

(article 363 of the Revised Penal Code) by the act of filing the said information charging

them with the crime of theft.

Faustino Rivera alleged that the facts alleged did not fall under the condemnation of article

363 of the Revised Penal Code.

But the Solicitor-General contends that article 363 of the Revised Penal Code should be

construed to embrace the crime of false accusation or complaint as formerly penalized

under article 326 of the Codigo Penal.

ISSUE: Whether or not article 363 of the Revised Penal Code embrace the crime of false

accusation or complaint as formerly penalized under article 326 of the Codigo Penal.

HELD: There is no doubt that the facts alleged in the informations fall within the definition of

the offense of "a cusacion" or "denuncia falsa" which is contained in article 363 of the CodigoPenal

Article 326 of the Codigo Penaldoes not appear in the Revised Penal Code, which contains

no offense denominated "acusacion o denuncia fals a" or its equivalent.

Article 363 in the Spani sh text which is decis ive is as follows, under the heading of

"Asenchanzas Inculpatorias ";

ART. 363. Inculpacion de un inocente. El que, de cualquier manera que no

cons tituyere falso testimonio, ejecutare un acto q ue tienda directamente a inculpar

o impu tar a un inocente la comision de un delito, sera castiga do con l a pena de

arresto mayor.

As article 363 of the R evised Penal Code is new and this is the fi rst case before the court

calling for its interpretation, a comp arison of the article with article 326 of the forme r Pena l

Code seems practical in vie w of the a rgument of the Government that the former "is a


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reprodu ction of both the crime of false accusation or complai nt a nd th e crim e o f cal umny

described under said article 326 and article 452 of the old Penal Code."

In passing it may be s tated that if article 363 of the Revised Penal Code could be construed

to include article 452 of the old Revised Penal Code, it would have no application to the

case that we are considering because article 452 of the old Penal Code which is as follows:

ART. 452. Calu mny is the false imputation of a crime upon which a prosecution

might be instituted by the government of its own motion.

doe s no t refer to false accusations or denuncias made before an admini strative or judi cial

officer whose duty it is to investigate or punish such crime.

Comparing now article 363 of the Revised Penal Code with article 326 of the Revis ed Pena l

Code, it will be observed tha t under article 326 of the former Penal Code, the gravamen ofthe offe nse is the imputation itself when made before an administrati ve or judi cia l offi cer,

whereas in article 363 of the Revised Penal Code, th e gra vamen of the offense is performing

an act which "tends directly" to such an imputation.

Article 326 of the old Penal Code punishes fal se prosecutions whereas article 363 of the

Revised Penal Code pun ishes any act which may tend directly to cause a fals e pros ecuti on.

It is well settled law that where the text of a statute is clear, it is improper to resort to a

caption or title to make it obscure . Su ch secondary so urces may be reso rted to i n orde r to

remove, not to create doubt. In the present case we think it proper to ca ll atten tion to the

title immediately precedi ng article 363 of the Revis ed Penal Code which is as foll ows:

"Asechanzas Inculpatorias", as throwing some light on the classes of acts tend directly to lead

to fa lse p rosecutions. The word asechanza, as defined in standard dictiona ries, means as

follows:

"Intrig a, lazo, red, zancadilla, tranquilla, amao, engao, artificio, trama , treta, es peci e de

ma qu inacion urdida, de celada dispuesta contra alguno, bien sea para perderlo enteramente,

bi en para jugarle (sin hundirlo) alguna mala pasada. Engao o a rtifici o pa ra ha cer da o a

otro. Usase, po r lo comun, en el plural, asechanzas . Accio n y efecto de asechar." It see ms to

us a fo rced extension of the termasechanza to brin g a formal criminal complaint with in the

conception of intriga, engao, artificio, etc. It seems the more reasonable and sensible

interpretation to limit article 363 of the Revised Penal Code to acts of "planting" evidence

and the like, which do not in themselves constitute false prosecutions but tend directly tocause false prosecutions.

It i s a well settled rule that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as wil l give

effe ct to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd con clus io n. (La u

Ow Bew vs. Unite d Sta tes , 144 U. S., 47, 59; 36 Law. ed ., 340, 344.)

It is to be noted that article 326 of the old Penal Code contains the provisi on that the

accus er could be prosecuted only on the order of the court, when the court wa s convin ced

upon the trial of the principal cause that there was sufficie nt ba si s for a charge of fa ls e

accusation. Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code contains no such sa feguard. If we

extended said article by interpretation to a dmini strative an d judi cial proceedings , it i s

apparent that we would open the door to a flood of prosecutions in cases where the

defe ndants were acquitted. There is no reason to believe that the Legislature intended su ch

a result.


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G.R. No. L-11860 May 29, 1959

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner,

vs.

LT. COL. LEOPOLDO RELUNIA, respondent.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL" a unit o f the Philippine Navy was dispatched to Ja pan to transport

conti ngents of the 14th BCT bo und for Pusan, Korea, and carry Christmas gif ts for our soldiers

there.

It seems that thereafter, it was used for transportation purposes in connection with the

needs of our soldiers there and made trips between Korea a nd Japan, so that it did not

return to the Philippine until September 2, 1954. While in Japan, it loaded 180 casescontaining various articles subject to customs duties.

All these articles were declared forfeited by th e Col lector of Customs of Ma nila for violations

of the Customs Law.

One of the cases containin g an electric range "GE" with four burners, brought by the RPS

"MISAMIS ORIENTAL" is consigned to petitioner herein. The said article wa s forfeited

pursuant to Section 1363 (g) of the Administrative Code as a n unmanifested cargo.

Section 1363 (g) of the Administrative Code, upon which the decree of forfeiture is

based, reads as follows:

SEC. 1363. Property subject to forfeiture under customs laws. Vessel s, cargo,

merchandise, and other objects and things shall, under the conditions hereinbelow

specified, be subject to forfeiture:

x x x x x x x x x

"(g) Unmanifested merchandise found on any vessel, a manifest therefor being

required."

The Collector of Customs of Manila says that RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL" is required under

the Customs Law to make and submit to the customs authorities a manifest of its cargo and

he has been sustained by respondent Commissioner of Customs.

ISSUE: Whether or not a manifest is required of the RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL" and, if so,

whether or not the aforesaid electric range is an unmanifested merchandise within the

meaning of Section 1363 (g) of the Administrative Code. Is the RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL"

required under the Customs Law to make and submit to the customs authorities a manifest

of its cargo?

HELD: The l aw provides that an "unmanifested merchandise found on any v essel, a manifest

therefor being required" is su bject to forfeiture. This means that where a vessel i s requi red

by la w, or by regu lations promulgated pursuant to law, to m ake and submit a manifest of its

cargo to the customs authorities and it fails to do so, merchandise not mani fes ted sh al l be

forfeited.

It i s argued thatSection 1221, 1225 and 1228 of the Administrative Code require masters of

Government vessels to submit cargo manifests. Section 1221 provides:

"SEC. 1221. Ports open to vessels engaged in foreign trade Duty of vessel to

make entry. Ves sels engaged in the foreign carrying trade shall touch at p orts o f

entry only, except as otherwise specially allowed; and e very such vess el arrivin g

within a customs collection district of the Philippines from a foreign port shall make

entry at the port of entry for such di strict and shall be subject to the authority of

the collector of customs of the port while within his jurisdiction.

The Ma ster of any war vessel or vessel employed by any foreign governme nt shall

not be required to report and enter on arrival in the Philippines, unless engaged

in the transportation of merchandise in the way of trade."


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The term "report and e nter" appea ring in the la st pa ragraph of Section 1221

means, according to the Collector of Customs, "the e ntrance of a vesse l from a

forei gn port into a Philippine port of entry as contemplated in Section 1125" whi ch

reads in part:

SEC. 1225. Documents to be produced by master upon entry of vessel. For the

purpos e of making entry of a vessel engaged in foreign trade, the mas ter the reof

s ha ll present the following documents, duly certified by him, to the b oarding officer

of customs.

(a) The original manifest of all cargo destined for the port, to be returned with

boarding officer's indorsement.

x x x x x x x x x

And Section 1228 provides:

"SEC. 1228. Manifest required of vessel from foreign port. Every vessel from a

foreign port or place must have on board complete written or typewritten

manifests of all her cargo.

"All of the cargo intended to be landed at a port in the Philippines must be

described in separate manifests for each port of call therein. Each manifest shal l

in clude the port of departure and the port of del ivery with the ma rks, nu mbe rs,

quantity, and description of the packages and the names of the consignees thereof.

Every vessel from a foreign port or place must have on board complete ma ni fes ts

of p assengers, immigrants, and their baggage, in the prescribed form, s etting forth

thei r destination and all particulars required by the immi gratio n l aws ; an d e very

such vessel shall have prepared for presentation to the proper cus toms official

upon arrival in the ports of the Philippines a com plete list of all s hip's s tore then o n

boa rd. If the vessel does not carry cargo, passengers , or imm igra nts , there mu st

sti ll be a manifest showing that no cargo is carried from the p ort of d epa rture to

the port of destination in the Philippi nes.

"A cargo ma nifest shall in no case be changed or altered, except after e ntry of the

vess el, by means of an amendment by the mas ter, consi gnee, or a gent thereof,

under oath, and attached to the original mani fest."

Court of Tax Appeals held that the RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL" was not required to present

any manifest to the customs authorities upon its arriv al in Manila BECAUSE:

Sectio ns 1221, 1225 and 1228 of the Administrative Code aforequote d a re fou ndunder Article VI of the Customs Law, the title of which reads: "Entrance of vessels

in foreign trade"

that the said article lays down rules governing entry of vessels engaged in foreigntrade;

and that inasmuch as the navy vessel in question was not engaged in foreigntrade, it was not required to submit the manifest provide for in section 1225.

only vessels engaged i n foreign trade are required to s ubmit ma nifest uponentering any Phili ppine port

The Tax Court apparently overlooked the reason behind the requirement of presenting a

manifest and allowed itself to be swayed by the title of the law. Resort to the title of a

statute as an aid in interpretation thereof is an unsafe criterion, and is not entitled to much

weight. The title be resorted to as an aid where there is doubt as to the meaning of the law

or the intention of the legislature in enacting it, not otherwise.

The Tax Court also overlooked or failed to give due consideration to the provisions of

Section 1228 which requires that every vessel from a foreign port or place must have on

board complete written or typewritten manifests of all her cargoes .


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In our o pinion all other vessels coming from foreign ports, whether or no t engaged in foreign

trade, arriving or touching upon any port in the Phili ppin es shou ld be provided with a

manifest which must be presented to the customs authorities.

Whether the vessel be engaged in foreign trade (Section 1221 and 1225, Revised

Administrative Code) or not (Section 1228), and even when the vessel belongs to the army

or the navy (Section 1234), the universal requirement from a rea ding of al l the foregoi ng

provisions is that they be provided with a manifest.

A manifest is obviously meant to place beyond doubt the nature of the load or of the cargo

that a vessel carries. The ma nifest is therefore intended to be an indication, if not an open

declaration, that the vessel is not engaged in smuggling or in surreptitious practices and

activities.

Were we to confine the requirement about the preparation and presentation o f a man ife st

to vess els engaged in foreign trade, what about private vessels , yachts, pl ea su re bo ats or

cruis er or steamships on a world cruise for tourists, and ships chartered for a s pecial mission

or pu rpose, a ll of which tough not e ngaged in foreign trade, nevertheless could bring into the

country not only dutiable goods, but also articles of proh ib ite d i mportati on? The customs

laws could not have intended to exempt all these vessels from the requirement to present

a manifest.

But the Court of Tax Appeals equall y held that Section 1234 is not applicable to vess els of

the Philippine Navy for the reason that said section applies only to ships of the United

States Army or Navy, and that if our legislature had really wanted or intended to make its

provisions applicable to our navy ships, it should have made the corresponding change or

amendment of the section.

We a gree that it should have been done. But we believe that there was no ne cess ity wh ere

as i n the present case. The application of sa id s ection to our na vy shi ps i s s o clea r and

manifest, considering that the reasons for requiring a manifest for transport and supply ships

of the a rmy and navy of the United States are and with more reason applicab le to o ur n avy

sh ips to carry out the policy of the government, and because we have complete control over

them.

We therefore believe and hold that the RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL" was required to present

a manifest upon its arrival in Manila on September 2, 1954.

In conclusion, we hold that all vessels whether private or government owned, including

ships of the Philippine navy, coming from a foreign port, with the possible exception of war

vessels or vessels employed by any foreign government, not engaged in the transportation

of merchandise in the way of trade, as provided for in the second paragraph of Section

1221 of the Revised Administrative Code, are required to prepare and present a manifest

to the customs authorities upon arrival at any Philippine port.


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G.R. No. L-26100 February 28, 1969

CITY OF BAGUlO, REF ORESTATION ADMINISTRATION,

FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, SR., FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR., and TERESITA J. BUCHHOLZ

petitioners,

vs.

HON. PIO R. MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio,

BELONG LUTES, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

SANCHEZ,J.:

Petitioners attack the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Baguio to reopen

cada stral proceedings under Republic Act 931. Private p etitioner's specificall y qu es tion the

ruli ng of the Court of Appeals that they have no p ersonality to opp ose reopening. The three -

pronge d contentions of all the petitioners are: (1) the reopening petition was fil ed outs id e

the 40-year period next preceding the approval of Republic Act 931; (2) sa id petition was no t

published; and (3) private petitioners, as lessees of the public lan d i n q ues tion , ha ve court

standing under Republic Act 931. The facts follow:

FACTS: On April 12, 1912, the cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened were instituted

by the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Baguio. Land here involved was

amongst those declared public lands by final decision.

Respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to reopen sa id Civil Re servation

Case No. 1 as to the parcel of land he clai ms.

His prayer was that the land be registered in his name upon the grounds that:

(1) he a nd hi s predecessors have been in actual, open, adverse, peaceful andcontin uous possession and cultivation of the land since Span is h ti mes , or be fore

July 26, 1894, paying the taxes the reon; and

(2) hi s predecessors were illiterate Igorots without personal noti ce of the ca da stra lproceedings aforestated and were not able to file their claim to the la nd in

question within the statutory period.

Private petitioners Francisco G. Joaquin, Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita J.

Buchholz regi stered opposition to the reopening and alleged that: They are treefarm lessees

upon agreements executed by the B ureau of Forestry in their favor.

City of Baguio likewise opposed reopening.

Court denied private petitioners' right to in tervene in the case b ecause of a final declaratory

relief judgment which declared that such tree farm leases were null and void.

City of Baguio lodge da motion to dismiss the petition to reopen mai ntaining that the

declaratory judgment in Civil Case 946 was not binding on those not parties thereto.(DENIED)

all the petitioners went to the Court of Appeals which held thatpetitioners were not bound

by the declaratory judgment. Nevertheless, the appellate court ruled that as lessees, private

petitioners had no right to oppose the reopening of the cadastral case.

ISSUE:Do private petitioners have personality to a ppea r in the reope ning proceedings ?

HELD: the controlli ng statute is Republic Act 931, effective June 20, 1953.

The title of the Act reads AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT,

UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT

HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED

WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.

Section 1 thereof provides


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SECTION 1. All persons claiming title to parcels of l and that ha ve be en the

object of cadastral proceedi ngs, who at the time of the s urvey were in actual

possession of the same, but for some justifiable reaso n had been unabl e to fi le

thei r claim in th e proper court during the time limit established by law, in case such

parcels of land, on account of their failure to f ile such claims, have been, or are

about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedingsinstituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act, are

hereb y granted the right within five years after the date on whi ch this Act shal l

take effect, to petition for a reopeni ng of the judicia l proceedi ngs un der the

provisions o f Act Numbered Twenty-two hundred and fifty-nine, as amended , only

with respect to such of said parcels of land as have notbeen alienated, reserved,

leas ed, granted, or otherwise provisionallyor permanentlydispos ed of by the

Government, and the competent Court of First Ins tance, upon receiving s uch

petition, shall notify the Government through the Solicitor General, and if after

hea ring the parties, s aid court shall find that all conditions herein established h ave

bee n complied with, and that all taxes, interests and penalties thereo f ha ve b een

pa id from the time when land tax should have been collected unti l the day w hen

the mo tion is presented, it shall order said judicial proceedings reope ned as if no

action has been taken on such parcels.3

Although Section 34, Land Registration Act,4

"apparently authorizes any person claiming an y

kin d of interest to file an opposition to an application for registration, ... neverthele ss ... the

opposition must be based on a right of dominion or some other real right independent of,and not at all subordinate to, the rights of the Government."

5The opposition must

necessarily be predicated upon the property in question being part of the public domain.

Lessees cannot present is sues of ownership. The

The case at bar, however, stands on a different footing. It involves a special statute R.A. 931,

which allows a petition for reopening on lands "about to be declared" or already "declared

land of the public domain" by virtue of judicial proceedings. Such ri ght, ho wever, is made to

cover limitedcases, i.e., "onlywith respect to such of said parcels of land a s ha ve not bee n

al ienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionallyor permanentlydisposed of

by the Government."6

The lessee's right is thus impliedly recognized by R.A. 931.

If the land subject of a petition to reopen has already been leased by the government, that

petition can no longer prosper.

But we may well scale the heights of injustice or abet violations of R.A. 931 if we entertain

the view that only the Director of Lands7

can here properly oppose the reopening petition.

Suppose the lands office fails to do so? Will legitimate lessees be left at the mercy of

government officials? Should the cadastral court close its ey es to the fact of lease that may

be proved by the lessees themselves, and which is enough to bar the reopening petition?

R.A. 931 could not have intended that this situation should happen. The point is that, with

the fact of lease, no question of ownership need be inquired into pursuant to R.A. 931.

From this standpoint, lessees have sufficient legal interest in the proceedings.


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ISSUE: Does the cadastral court have power to reopen the cadastral proceedings upon the

application of respondent Lutes?

HELD: The fa cts are: The cadastralproceedings sought to be reope ned were i nsti tuted on

April 12, 1912. Fi nal d ecision was rendered on November 13, 1922. Lutes filed the p etition to

reopen on July 25, 1961.

It wi ll be noted that the title of R.A. 931, heretofore transcribed, authorizes "the filing in the

proper court, under certain conditions, of certain c laims of title to parcels of land that have

been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years

next preceding the approval of this Act."

The body of the statute, ho wever, in its Section 1, speaks of parcels of land that "have been,

or are about to be declared land of the public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings

instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act."

There thus appears to be a seeming inconsistency between title and body.

It cannot be seriousl y disputed that the subject ofR.A. 931 is expressed in its title.

[t]he true object of all interpretation is to ascertain the meaning and will of the law-

making body, to the end that it may be enforced." 12

In varying l anguage, "the, purpose of

all rules or maxims" in interpretation "is to discover the true intention of the law ."13

They

"are only valuable when they subserve th is purpos e."14

In fact, "the spirit or intention of a

statute prevails over the letter thereof." 15 A statute "should be construed according to its

spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the law."16

By this, we do

not "correct the act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry out a nd give due course to" its true

intent.17

It s hould be certain by now that when engaged in the task of construing an obscure

expression in the law18

or where exact or literal rendering of the words would not carry out

the legislative intent,19

the title thereof may be resorted to in the ascertainment of

congressional will. Reason therefor is that the title of the law may properly be regarded as

an index of or clue or guide to legislative intention. 20

For the reason that by specific

constitutional precept, "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than

one subject which shall be expressedin the title of the bill." 21

With the foregoing guideposts on hand, let us go back to the situation that confronts us . We

take another look a t the ti tle o f R.A. 931, viz: "AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE

PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF

LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS

RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT."

Rea dily to be n oted is that the title is not merely composed of catchwords.23

It expresses in

language clear the very substance of the law itself. From thi s, it is easy to see that Congress

intend ed to give s ome effect to the title of R.A. 931.

TITLE recites that i t authorizes court proceedings of claims to parcels of land declared public

land "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the

approval of this Act." That titl e is written "in capital letters" by Congress itself; such kind

of a title then "is not to be class ed with words or titles us ed by compilers of statutes"

because "it is the legisla ture speaki ng."29

TITLE - by virtue of judicial decisions rendered"

Section 1 - "by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted."

Remedial legislation should receive the blessings of liberal construction.31

And, there shoul d

be n o quibbling as to the fact that R.A. 931 is a piece of remedial legis la tion. In ess ence , it

provides a mode of relief to landowners who, before the Act, had no legal means of

perfecting their titles. This is plainly evident from the explanatory note thereof.

There are many meritorious cases wherein claimants to certain parcels of land have not had

the opportunity to answer or appear at the hearing of cases affecting their claims in the


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corresponding cadastral proceedings for lack of sufficient notice or for other reasons and

circumstances which are beyond their control.

This measure seeks to remedy the lack of any existing law within said perso ns or cl ai man ts

with me ritorious claims or interests in parcels of land may seek justice and protectio n. This

lawproposes to give said persons or claimants their day in court.

COURT HELD tha t claims of title that may be filed thereunder embrace those parcels of land

that have been declared public land "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the

forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." The refore, by that statute, the Jul y 25,

1961 petition of respondent Belo ng Lutes to reopen Civil Res ervation Case No. 1, GLRO

Record No. 211 of the cadastral court of Baguio, the decision on which was rendered on

November 13, 1922, comes within the 40-year period.


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G.R. No. L-16197 March 12, 1920

CENTRAL CAPIZ, a corporation, petitioner,

vs.

ANA RAMIREZ, respondent.

JOHNSON,J.:

This is an original action brought in the Supreme Court. Its purpose is to obtain an

interpretation and appl ication of the i ntent, purpose and scope of Act No. 2874 of the

Phil ippine Legislature, known as the "Public Land Act," so far as it affects agricultural la nds ,

privately owned.

The only question presented is, whether or not said Act No. 2874 is applicable to

agricultural lands, in the Philippine Islands which are privately owned.

RESPONDENT RAMIREZ contracted wi th the CENTRAL CAPIZ (petitioner)

UNDER the CONTRACT:

CENTRAL CAPIZ (petitioner) will supply RESPONDENT RAMIREZ all s ugar caneproduced upon he r plantati on a term of thirty years

contract was to be converted later into a right in rem and recorded in the Regi stryof Property as an encumbrance upon the land

contract will be binding upon a ll future owners of the same.

In the interim of th e execution o f said contract and its conversion into a right in rem up on the

respondent's property, said Act No. 2874 became effective.

The respondent refused to execute a deed pursuant to her obl igati on up on the fact that

more than 61 per cent of the capital stock of the petitioner is hel d a nd o wned by pe rson s

who are not citizens of the Phili ppine Is lands or of the United States.

It is conceded by the parties th at the land involved is private agricultural land, that is, land

which is held and owned by the respondent, for which she holds a Torrens title.

ISSUE: whether the said Act (No. 2874) is limited in its application to agricultural lands of

the public domain, or whether its provisions also extend to agricultural lands held in

private ownership.

On behalf of the plaintiff it is argued that,

first, the intent of the Legislature, gathered from a reading of Act No. 2874 in itsentirety, is to provide s imply for the sale, lease and other disposition of lands of

the public domain; that lands held in private ownership are not affected thereby;

second, tha t even had the Legislature intended to include private as well as pub li cla nd within the scope of the Act, this intent fails because under the Act as entitled

such attempt would be in direct violation of section three of the Act of Congress

of August 29, 1916, which provides that: "No bill which may be enacted into law

shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the

title of the bill."

Examining Act No. 2874 in detail, there can be little ques tion but that it wa s intende d to

ap ply to and regulate the sale, lease and other dispos iti on ofpublic lands only. The title of

the Act, a lways indicative of legislative intent, reads: "an Act to amend and compile the laws

relating to lands of the public domain, and for other purposes."

Sectio n one of such act provides : "That short title of this Act shall be 'The public Land Act.' "

Sectio n two, wherein the purpose of the Act i s e xpressly stated, reads: "Theprovisions of this

Act shall apply to lands of the public domain."

Section three provides: While title to lands of the public domain remains in the

Government, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the executive officer


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charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act, through the Director of Lands, who shall

act under his immediate control.

It cannot be contemplated that these officers, charged "with carrying out the provisions of

the Act," were intended to exercise authority and control over the sale or other disposition

of lands hold in private ownership.

To the same effect are sections four, five, and e igh ty-se ven of th e Act, wherei n executive

control is vested in the Director of Lands with respect to the survey, appraisal,

classification, etc., of lands of the public domain.

Section 23: Provided, further, That citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens

of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire public lands as to their own citizens,

may, while such laws are in force, but not thereafter. . . purchase any parcel of agricultural

land . . . available under this Act.

In o ther words, it is only necessary for other countries to grant to citizens of th e Phil ip pi ne

Is lands the right to acquire "public lands," in order that their citizens may h ave the right to

acquire any landavai lable under this Act. This provision would be altogether anomalous ha d

it been the intent to apply Act No. 2874 to lands held in private ownership.

If said Act, by express provisions, does not apply to lands privately owned by the

Government, it could hardly have been the intent of the Legislature to make the Act

applicable to lands held in private ownership by individuals .

The Act nowhere contains any direct or express provision applying its terms to privately

owned lands.

The doubts of respondent in that regard are caused by inferences drawn from the langua ge

used in sections 24 and 121 of the Act. The first paragraph of section 24 provides:

No . . . corporation . . . other than those mentioned in the last preceding section

may acquire or own agricultural public land or land of any other denomination or

classification, not us ed for industrial or residence purposes, that is at the time or

was originally, really or presumptively, of the public domain, or any permanent

improvement thereon, or any real right on such land and improvement.

Said section as worded, and standing alone, presents come question as to the character of

land sought to be included therein. This doubt is dispelled, however, when its provisions are

read in connection with other sections of the same chapter.

Ina smuch as the Legislature cannot vest authority in the Director of Land s to "a ppra is e" o r

"sell" lands held in private ownership, it is no t presu med it wa s the i ntention to i nclude

private lands in the Act or subject them i n the ma nner in dicated to any s uch authority.

Whatever interpretation said sections 24 and 121 might receive if standing alone, it is clearthey cannot prevail against the general intent of the Act, derived not only from the

language used but from the machinery adopted for giving effect to its provisions.

We hol d, therefore, that th e purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No. 2874 was and is

to limit its application to lands of the public domain, and that lands held in private

ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever

thereby.

***Even should the holding of the court upon this question of intent be different, it would

not affect the final outcome of the case. Under the Act as entitled, any attempt by the

Legislature to insert provisions in the body thereof relating to lands of private ownership

would be in violation of the provisions of the Jones Law and therefore, null and void.


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It i s p rovided in section 3 of the Jones Law (Act of Congress of August 29, 1916): "That no bill

which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall

be expressed in the title of the bill."

In the construction and application of this constitutional restriction , the courts have kept

steadily in view the correction of the mischief against which it was aimed. The object is to

prevent the practiceof embracing in the same bill incongruous matters having no relation

to each other or to the subject specif ied in the title.

The failure to indicate in the title of the bill the object intended to be accomplished by the

legislation often resulted in members voting ignorantly for measures which they would not

knowingly have approved; and not only were legislators thus misled, but the public also;

Mr. Cooley thus sums up in his review of the authorities defining the objects of this

provision: "It may therefore be assumed as settled that the purpose of this provision was:

First, to prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions

in bills of which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be

overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted;

and , third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislativeproceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being

considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon by

petition or otherwise if they shall so desire.'

Jus tice Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations (pp. 179-180) states that our courts

have held, without exception, that such constitutional provision is mandatory.

As h ere tofore noted, the title of Act 2874, here u nder con structions, reads: "An Act to amend

and compile la ws relative to lands of the public domain, and for other purposes."

In o ur interpretation of sai d Act, the words "and for other purposes" contained i n its title,

must be treated as non-existent. Unde r all th e authorities wherein the requirement "That

no bi ll shall embrace more than one subject, which subject shall be expressed in the titl e of

the bill" has b een considered, the words "and for o ther purposes" when found in the title,

have been held to be without force or effect whatsoever and have been altogether

discarded in construing the Act.

Justice Cooley in his Constitutional Limitatio ns, 6th ed., pp. 173 - 173, states as foll ows:

One thi ng, however, is very pla in: That the use of the words "other purposes,"

whi ch has heretofore been so common in the title to a cts, with a view to cover any

and everything whether connect with the main purpose indicated by the title or

not, can no longer be of any avail where these provisions exist. As wa s said by the

Supre me Court of New York in a case where these words had been made use of in

the title to a local bi ll: "The words "for other purposes" must be laid out of

consideration. They express nothing and amount to nothing as a compliance with

this constitutional requirement. Nothing which the act could not embrace

without them can be brought in by theiraid."

Equally may it be said of the Act of the Philippine Legislature here involved, the addition of

the words "and for other purposes," contained in its title, can only be explained on the

theory that something differentwas to be included therein from that previously expressed, i.

e ., "lands of the public domain."

Appl ying the doctrine of the ab ove cases to the Act be fore us for interpretation, its title must

be considered and treated as though reading: "An Act to amend and compile the laws

relative to lands of the public domain."

Inasmuch as agricultural lands in the Philippine Islands held in private ownership, under

fee title, constitute no part of "the public domain." they cannot come within the purview of

Act No. 2874 as it is entitled.


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The words "public land" are habitually used in ou r legislation to describe such as are subject

to sale or other disposal under general laws . (su ch as are open to e ntry and settlement, and

not thos e in which the rights of the public have passed and whi ch ha ve be come su bject to

some indi vidual right of a settler.)

Our conclusions, therefore, from all of the foregoing are:

1. Tha t it was the purpose and intent of the legislature to comply with the provisi ons of th e

Jones Law and to limit the application of Act No. 2874 to lands of the public domain;

2. That the phrase "and for other purposes," found i n the title of sa id Act (No. 2874), by

virtue of the provisions of section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (the Jones

Law), cannot be interpreted to include, nor be made applicable to any lands not public;

3. That eliminating the phrase 'and for other purposes" from the title of said Act, the s ame

must be considered and treated as though reading: "An Act to amend and compile the laws

relative to lands of the public domain;"

4. That lands held in freehold or fee title, or private ownership, constitute no part of the

public domain and cannot possibly come within the purview of said Act No. 2874, inasmuch

as the "subject" of such freehold or private land is not e mbraced in nay ma nner in the ti tle of

the Act.

5. That it is the uniform holding of the United States Supreme Court, and of other courts

interpreting the phrase "public lands," that once such lands have been "legally

appropriated" by the Government or by individuals, they become segregated from the

mass of public lands, and no law or proclamation thereafter made or issued relating to

"public lands" operate upon them.


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G.R. No. L-33628 December 29, 1987

BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, S ANTIAGO EISMA, MIRUFO CELERIAN, JOSE SAYSON, CESAR

TABILIRAN, and MAXIMO ADLAWAN, petitioners,

vs.

HON. JUDGE MELQUIADES B. SUCALDITO, RUFINO LABANG, MENELEO MESINA, ARTURO

GUILLERMO, IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST

INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SU R, CITY FISCAL OF PAGADIAN CITY AND STATE

PROSECUTOR, and ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.

No. L-34162 December 29, 1987

BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, petitioner,

vs.

HON. JUDGE ASAALI S. ISNANI, RUFINO LABANG, ALBERTO S. LIM, JR., JESUS ACEBES, INTHEIR RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF

ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, CITY FISCAL OF PAGADIAN CITY AND STATE PROSECUTORS, ANTI-

GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., and ARTEMIO ROMANILLOS, respondents.

SARMIENTO,J.:

FACTS: the private respondent Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc., f i led a complaint

with the respondent City Fiscal against PETITIONER EBARLE for violation of the provisions of

the Anti-Graft Law, Article 171 of the Re vis ed Pena l Code (penalizes Falsification by public

officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic m inister), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and

Corrupt Practices Act), Articles 182, 183 ((penalizes FALSE TESTIMONY), and 318 (penalizes

OTHER DECEITS committed by a person) of the Revised Penal Code

the petitioner came to this Court on certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order

(G.R. No. 33628).

The petitioner thereafter went to the respondent Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del

Sur, the Honorable Asaali Isnani presiding, on a special civil action (Special Civil Case No.

1048) for prohibition and certiorariwith preliminary injunction. The respondent Court issued

a restraining order. The respondent Anti-Graft League moved to have the same lifted and

the case itself dismissed.

On October 6, 1971, the petitioner instituted G.R. No. 34162 of this Court, a special civil

action for certiorariwith preliminary injunction. As earlier noted, we on October 8, 1971,

stayed the implementation of dismiss al order.

PETITIONER EBARLE alleges that:

respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League failed to comply with theprovisions ofExecutive Order No. 264, "OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH

COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITHCOMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED,"10 preliminary to their

criminal recourses.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League failed to comply

with the provisions of Executive Order No. 264, "OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH

COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH

COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED," 10 preliminary to their criminal

recourses.

HELD: The petitioner's reliance upon the provisions of Executive Order No. 264 has no

merit.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 264 - OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH

COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES

WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED.


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It is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has exclusive application to

administrative, not criminal complaints. The Order itself shows why.

The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES."There is no mention, not even

by implication, of criminal "offenses," that is to say, "crimes." While "crimes" amount to

"irregularities," the Executive Order could have very well referred to the more specific

term had it intended to make itself applicable thereto.

The first perambulatory claus e states the necessi ty for informing the public "of the

procedure provided by law and regulations by which complaints against public officials and

employees should be presented and prosecuted. 12 To our mind, the "procedure provided

by law and regulations" referred to pertains to existing procedural rules with respect to the

presentation of administrative charges ag ainst erring government officials.

Paragraph 4, which refers to complaints filed against elective local officials, reiterates, on the

other ha nd, the Decentralizati on Act of 1967, providi ng tha t "charges against any elective

provincial and city officials shall be preferred before the President of the Philippines;

against any e lective municipal official before the provincial governor or the secretary of the

provincial board concerned; and against any elective barrio official before the municipal or

secretary concerned. 15

Paragraph 5, me anwhile, is a re production of the provisions of the Police Act of 1966, ves ting

upon a "Board of I nvestigators"16 the jurisdiction to try and decide complai nts agai nst

members of the Philippine police.

Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these existing rules and streamlines the

administrative apparatus in the matter of complaints against public officials. Furthermore,

the fact is that there is no reference therein to judicial or prejudicial (like a preliminary

investigation conducted by the fiscal) recourse, not because it makes such a resort a

secondary measure, but because it does not intend to serve as a condition precedent to,

much less supplant, such a court resort.

To be sure, there is mention therein of "court action[s] [being] pursued forthwith by the

interested parties, " 17 bu t that does not, so we hold, cover proceedings such as criminal

actions, which do not require a prior administrative course of action. It wi ll indeed be noted

that the te rm is closely shadowed by the qualifi cati on, "after administrative remedies shall

have been exhausted," 18 whi ch suggests civil suits s ubject to previous administrative action.

It is moreover signi ficant that the Executive Order in question makes specific reference to

"erring officials or employees ... removed or otherwise vindicated.19If it were intended to

apply to criminal prosecutions, it would have employed such technical terms as "accused",

"convicted," or "acquitted." Whil e this is not necess arily a controll ing pa rameter for all

cases, it i s here material in construing the intent of the measure.

If we were to consider the Executive Order a law, we would be forced to say that it is an

ame ndment to R epublic Act No. 5180, the law on p reliminary investigations then in effe ct, a

situation that would give rise to a Constitutional anomaly. We cannot accordingly

countenance s uch a view.


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G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUND IO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of Provincial Bohol

VICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., as complainant all private prosecutor, petitioners,

vs.

HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol Branch II,

ANO DACULLO, GERONIMO OROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RU PERTO CAJES and MODESTO S

SUELLO, respondents.

AQUINO,J.:p

Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the l ower court sepa rate informations agains t sixteen

persons charging them with squatting as penal ized by Presidential Decree No. 772.

The in formation againstMario Aparici sa ys that sometime in the year 1974 continuous ly u p

to the present at barangay Magsaysay, Bohol,Mario Aparici, wi th s tealth and strategy, enter

into, occupy and cultivate a portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and

claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as su ccessor to the pasture applicant Celestino de la

Serna which is s imila r to the other fifteen i nformations, reads:

Five of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geroni mo Oroyan , Mario Apari ci, Rup erto

Cajes and Modesto Suello we re the accused, were raffle d to Judge Vicente B. E chaves, Jr

Judge Echaves dismis sed the five informations on the grounds:

(1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through "stealth andstrategy", whereas under the decree the entry should be effected "with the use of

force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of

the landowner", an d

(2) that un der the rule ofejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivationof a grazing land.

the fiscal amended the informations and asked that the dismissal order be reconsidered and

that the amended informations be admitted.

The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the phrase "and for other purposes" in

the decree does not include agricultural purposes because its preamble does not mention

the Secretary of Agriculture and m akes reference to the affluent class.

ISSUE: whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts,

applies to agricultural lands.

HELD: NO.

Lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its

preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more

particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The

squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.

The preamble of the decree i s quoted bel ow:

WHEREAS, it ca me to my knowledge that des pite the issuance of Letter of

Ins truction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, di recting the Secretaries of

Nati onal Defense, Public Work. 9 and communica tion s, So cia l We lfa re

and the Director of Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the

Presi dential Assistant on Housing and R ehabilitation Agen cy, Governors ,

City an d Municipal Mayors, and City and Dis trict Engi nee rs, "to remove

an illegal constructions including buildings on and along esteros and

river banks, those along railroad tracks and those built without permits

on public and private property." squatting is still a major problem in

urban communities all over the country;

On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the

grazing lands involved in this case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947 which makes it


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unlawful for any person , corporation or as socia tion to forcibly enter or occupy public

agricultural la nds. That law provides:

SECTION 1. It s hall be u nlawful for any person corporation or associatio n

to enter or occupy, through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or

stealth, any public agriculture land includ ing such publi c la nds as are

grante d to private individuals under the provision of the Publ ic Land Act

or any other laws providing for the of publ ic agriculture l ands in the

Phil ippines and are duly covered by the corresponding app li cati ons for

the notwithstanding standing the fact that title thereto s til l re mai ns in

the Government or for any person, na tural or judicia l to i nvestiga te

indu ce or force another to commit such acts.

The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does

not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakabl e. It is intended to applyonly to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule ofejusdem generis

is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legisla tive in tent is

uncertain.


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G.R. No. L-14526 March 31, 1965

ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION; CARLOS A. GO THONG & COMPANY; CEBU NAVIGATION

COMPANY, INC.; CEBU-BOHOL FE RRY CO., INC.; COROMINAS, RICHARDS NAVIGATION CO.,

INC.; HIJOS D E F. ESCANO, INC.; PACIFIC LINES, INC.; ROYAL LINES, INC.; SOUTHERN ISLAND

SHIPPING CORPORATION; SWEET LINES SHIPPING; VISAYAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.;

PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO.; COMPAIA MARITIMA; and GENER AL SHIPPING CO.,

INC., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.

THE CITY OF CEBU; F ELIPE PAREJA, as City Treasurer of Cebu; THE H ON. SERGIO OSMEA,

JR., as Mayor of the City of Cebu, defendants-appellees.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Ordinance No. 207 was enacted by the Municipal Board.

Plaintiffs

paid the wharfage charges under protest since September 1, 1956 fil ed this action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to have the said o rdin an ce

decl ared void, its enforcement enjoined in so far as the wharves, docks an d other

la nding places belonging to th e National Government were concerned, and a ll the

amounts thus far collected by defendants refunded to them.

Defendants claim Muni cipal Board's authority to pass the ordinance under section 17 (w) of

the charter of the City of Cebu, which states :

SECTION 17. General powers andduties of the Board.

(w) To fix the charges to be paid by all watercrafts landing at or using public

wharves, docks, levees, or landing places.

Lower court: in using the terms "publi c wharves , docks, levees , or landi ng pla ces," the

legislature made no distinction between those owned by the National Government and

those owned by the City of Cebu and that consequently both fall within the scope of the

power granted.

Appellants ass ail this construction as erroneous

in the light of the generally accepted meaning of "public wharf"as it may have abea ring on the right or authority to charge wharfage

in view of other related provisions of the same city charter.ISSUE:whether or not under its charter, the City of Cebu may provide by ordinance for the

collection of wharfage from shipping concerns whose vessels dock at the public wharves of

piers located in said city but owned by the National Government.

HELD:

The word "public does not refer to its ownership either by the National Government or by

a province or municipality. It denotes rather the nature of its use . Thus public wharves

have been held to be those used generally by the public, free of charge or for

compensation, while a private wharf is one whose owner or lessee has exclusive

enjoyment or use thereof.

So a wharf may be public whether it belongs to the National Government, to a municipa l

corporation or to a private individual or concern.

Assuming the public character of a wharf by reason of its availability for public use , the

right to impose wharfage dues rests on a different basis that of ownership.

Wharfage is a charge against the vessel by wa y of rent or com pensation for its being allowed

to l ie alongside a wharf. That the right to charge wharfage is based on ownership has been

recognized by this Court.


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It is unreasonable to conclude that the legislature, simply because it employed the term

"public wharves" in section 17 (w) of the c harter of the City of Cebu, thereby authorized the

latter to collect wharfage irrespective of the ownership of the wharves involved. The

National Government did not surrender such ownership to the city; an d there is no

justifiable ground to read into the statute an intention to burden shipowners, such as

appellants, with the obligation of paying twice for the same purpose.

Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and

not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory

construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning

quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is

considered with those with which it is associated. Thus an apparently general provision

may have a limited application if viewed together with other provisions.

Sectio n 17 (w) of the charter of the City of Cebu is a case in point. It authorizes the Municipal

Board to fix the charges to be paid by all watercrafts la ndin g at or usi ng public wharves,

docks, levees, or landing places. There is indeed no distinction therein between public

wharves owned by the National Government and those owned by the city itself.

But the subsection immediately preceding (v) impliedl y es tabli she s such a dis tinction. It

empowers the Municipal Board "to provide for the construction and maintenance, and

regulate the use, of public landing places, wharves, piers, docks and lev ees."

It seems fairly evident that when the lawmaking body used the term "public wharves, etc."

in subsection 2, it meant to refer to those mentioned in the preceding subsection, namely,

the "public wharves, etc." constructed and therefore owned by the City of Cebu. Section 30

of the charter has a similar bea ring on the que stion , in granting to the CityEngineer "the

care and custody of all public docks, wharves, piers, levees, and landing places, when

erected" undo ubtedly referring to those constructed and owned by the city. For i n s o fa r

as those belonging to the National Government are concerned they remain under the

exclusive con trol, direction and management of the Bureau of Customs, according to section

1142 of th e Re vised Administrative Code. And app ellants have accordingly been p aying to the

Nati onal Government fees for the use of its wharves in Cebu, pursua nt to la w, pa rticula rly

Rep ublic Act No. 1371 whi ch took effect on July 1, 1955 an d was la ter on emb odi ed in the

new Tariff and Customs Code.

The court a quo rule d that Section 17 (w) of the city charter is "plainly evincive of the powe r

to tax for revenue purposes," and therefore the wharfage cha rges imp os ed by ordin an ce

pu rsu ant thereto are proper even if th e amounts actually col lected are much more than what

may be justified as license fees under the police power of regula tion of "s hi ppi ng o ffices "

granted under s ection 17 (1) of the sa me charter.

But even if the wharfage dues authorized under Section 17(w) be considered as taxes for

revenue, such authority nevertheless is limited to public wharves, docks, levees and other

landing places belonging to the City of Cebu and not to those owned by the National

Government under the exclusive supervision of the Bureau of Customs.


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G.R. No. L-19521 October 30, 1964

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ESTEBAN R. CHAVES, defendant-appellant.

REYES, J.B.L.,J.:

FACTS: The accused, Esteban Chaves, has been found by the Court of First Ins tance and by

the Court of Ap peals guilty of a violation, o fRepublic Act No. 145, in that he had collected a

claim of Marcela Rambuyon for death benefits due her for the death of her son;

the corresp onding check was cashed by Chaves, who later de li vered onl y P3,202.20 to the

clai mant, and retai ned P5,362.20 for himse lf.

Chaves was se

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