8/10/2019 PIL Verder Digests

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pil-verder-digests 1/4

!"# %&'()#" '**#&+ ,"-."-

!"#$%& %()*+(,)%-(,$ $,. / 0*&)%-( 1*

2

FISHERIES (UNITED KINGDOM V. NORWAY)Judgment of 18 December 1951 (including the text of the declaration of judge

Hackworth)

FACTS:

The coastal zone concerned in the dispute is of a distinctive configuration. Thecoast does not constitute, as it does in practically all other countries in the world a cleardividing line between land and sea. Along the coastal zone are situated shallow banks,which are very rich in fish. The inhabitants of the mainland and of the islands haveexploited these from time immemorial: they derive their livelihood essentially from suchfishing.

On September 28, 1949 the government of the United Kingdom filed the registry of theinternational court of justice an application instituting proceedings against Norway. Thesubject of the proceeding was the validity, under international law, of the lines of

delimitation of the Norwegian fisheries zone as set forth in a Decree of July 12th 1935.

ISSUE: The United Kingdom asked the Court to state whether this delimitation was orwas not contrary to international law.

HELD:

The judgment was rendered in favor of Norway on the 18th December 1951. By10 votes to 2 the court held that the method employed in the delimitation of the fisherieszone by the Royal Norwegian decree of the 12th July 1935 is not contrary tointernational law. By 8 votes to 4 votes the court also held that the base lines fixed by

this decree in application are not contrary to international law.

The Judgment notes that a Norwegian Decree of 1812, as well as a number ofsubsequent texts (Decrees, Reports, diplomatic correspondence) show that the methodof straight lines, imposed by geography, has been established in the Norwegian systemand consolidated by a constant and sufficiently long practice. The application of thissystem encountered no opposition from other States. Even the United Kingdom did notcontest it for many years: it was only in 1933 that the United Kingdom made a formaland definite protest. And yet, concerned with maritime questions, it could not have beenignorant of the reiterated manifestations of Norwegian practice, which was so wellknown. The general toleration of the international community therefore shows that the

Norwegian system was not regarded as contrary to international law.

Judge Hackworth declared that he concurred with the operative part of the judgment because he considered that the Norwegian government had proved theexistence of historic title of the disputed areas of water.

8/10/2019 PIL Verder Digests

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pil-verder-digests 2/4

8/10/2019 PIL Verder Digests

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pil-verder-digests 3/4

!"# %&'()#" '**#&+ ,"-."-

!"#$%& %()*+(,)%-(,$ $,. / 0*&)%-( 1*

8

CONDITIONS 0F ADMISSION OF A STATE TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITEDNATIONS (ARTICLE 4 OF CHARTER)

Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1948

FACTS:

The General Assembly of the United Nations asked the Court to give an advisoryopinion on the question concerning the conditions of admission of a State tomembership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter).

Requests the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on thefollowing questions: Is a member of the United Nations which is called upon, in virtue of

 Article 4 of the Charter, to pronounce itself by its vote, either in the Security Council or inthe General Assembly, on the admission of a State to membership in the UnitedNations, juridically entitled to make its consent to the admission dependent onconditions not expressly provided by paragraph I of the said Article? In particular, can

such a Member, while it recognizes the conditions set forth in that provision to be fulfilledby the State concerned, subject its affirmative vote to the additional condition that otherStates be admitted to membership in the United Nations together with that State?

ISSUE:

 Are the conditions stated in paragraph 1 of Article 4 exhaustive in character in thesense that an affirmative reply would lead to the conclusion that a Member is not legallyentitled to make admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided for in the

 Article, while a negative reply would, on the contrary, authorize a member to makeadmission dependent also on their conditions.

HELD:

The Court answered this question in the negative by nine votes to six. The sixdissenting judges joined to it a statement of the reasons for their dissent. Two othermembers of the Court who agreed with the Opinion added a further statement of theirviews.

The question involved is considered as a political one; hence, it falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court. It has also been contended that the Court cannot reply to thequestion at bar because it involves the interpretation of the Charter.

 Article 4 of the Charter states that “Membership in the United Nations is open toall other peace-loving States which accept the obligations contained in the presentCharter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out theseobligations.”

The conditions abovementioned are subject to the judgment of the Organization.The English and the French texts are consistent with each other and not conflicting. The

8/10/2019 PIL Verder Digests

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/pil-verder-digests 4/4

!"# %&'()#" '**#&+ ,"-."-

!"#$%& %()*+(,)%-(,$ $,. / 0*&)%-( 1*

7

Court considers that the text is sufficiently clear; consequently, it does not feel that itshould deviate from the consistent practice of the Permanent Court of InternationalJustice, according to which there is no occasion to resort to preparatory work if the textof the convention is sufficiently clear in itself.

The conditions in Article 4 are exhaustive and no argument to the contrary can bedrawn from paragraph 2 of the Article, which is only concerned with the procedure foradmission. Nor can an argument be drawn from the political character of the organs ofthe United Nations dealing with admission. For this character cannot release them fromobservance of the treaty provisions by which they are governed, when these provisionsconstitute limitations on their power; this shows that there is no conflict between thefunctions of the political organs and the exhaustive character of the prescribedconditions.

The Court then passes to the second part of the question, namely, whether aState, while it recognizes that a candidate fulfills the conditions set forth in Article 4, can

subordinate its affirmative vote to the simultaneous admission of other States.

Judged on the basis of the rule, which the Court adopts in its interpretation of Article 4, such a demand constitutes a new condition; for it is entirely unconnected withthose prescribed in Article 4. It is also in an entirely different category, since it makesadmission dependent not on the conditions required of applicants, but on extraneousconsiderations concerning other States. It would, moreover, prevent each application foradmission from being examined and voted on separately and on its own merits. Thiswould be contrary to the letter and spirit of the Charter. For these reasons, the Courtanswered the question put to it in the negative.