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Case Study 1: IJ sselmeer Basin

Dave Huitema


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Case Study 1: IJsselmeer Basin

Dave Huitema

April 2002

University of Twente (UT)Center for Clean Technology and Environmental Policy (CSTM)

PO Box 2177500 AE Enschede

The Netherlands

Tel: +31.53.489.3203Fax: +31.53.489.4850

Website: www.utwente.nl/cstm Email:[email protected]; [email protected] ; [email protected]

EUWARENESS is a research project on European Water Regimes and the Notion of a Sustainable Status. Researchinstitutes from six European countries (Netherlands, Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, Switzerland) have beencooperating in this two year project (2000-2002). More information is available on www.euwareness.nl. The project is

supported by the European Commission under the 5th

Framework Programme, and co-ordinated by the University ofTwente in the Netherlands.


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Nurturing nature: how to make a lake and maintain it

The IJsselmeer case as an example of some modern dilemma's and tendencies in Dutch water

management.

1 Zuiderzee and IJsselmeer

Introduction

This case study is on one of the larger fresh water lakes of Europe, named the IJsselmeer. The

IJsselmeer is located in the heart of the Netherlands (see map below) and covers about 2,000 square

kilometers, surrounded with about 600 kilometers of shore.

Figure 1: The IJsselmeer-area. The color differences in the map indicate

depth of the lake. At the deepest parts, this is 7 meters below NAP. The

surrounding provinces are Noord-Holland, Friesland and Flevoland.

The history of the IJsselmeer is a colored one. In the Roman age, the lake was much smaller and a

freshwater lake. But rising seal levels, declining land, and a recurring river that feeds the lake (the


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IJssel) caused an enormous change. It became much larger (3,700 square kilometers) and became

saline too. An inland sea, called the Zuiderzee was born. This sea was extremely dangerous for the

hinterland (floods in 1287, 1570, 1573, 1686, 1825, 1875, 1916) but measures to enhance safety were

difficult to devise because of political resistance or lack of technical means to control such a large

water mass. When referring to political resistance, one can think of the importance of the lake for

shipping purposes, which has implied that the city of Amsterdam used to block attempts to shorten the

shore line. Technical capabilities for damming and poldering large water bodies were only developed

in the course of the 19th

century. It is in this century that the first plans were developed for the

poldering (turning into land) of the Zuiderzee. The plans were largely deemed unrealistic and

unnecessary, but this slowly started changing. In 1886, the Zuiderzee Vereniging (Zuiderzee

Association) was founded, with the purpose of gaining government approval for a plan to conquer the

Zuiderzee. This group commissioned a relatively unknown engineer, Mr. Lely, who the thought out

what seemed to be a relatively realistic approach for the creation of a new polder. The plan was

presented in 1891 and apparently impressed many. A state committee of experts was appointed which

had to study the whether separating the Zuiderzee from the North Sea and creating polders would be inthe national interest. In 1894, the Committee advised the government that that was the case indeed. De

Pater (2000) emphasizes how the proponents of the project had to work the public opinion to achieve

this result and drew upon images that proved long living. The Zuiderzeevereniging portrayed the

Zuiderzee as nothing but a 'dead' piece of water that had not been put to beneficial use yet. Besides, the

sea was an 'internal enemy' that should be conquered as it could strike at unexpected times. The

Zuiderzeevereniging sought to connect the project to the certain level of nationalism and the desire for

nation building that was present at the time (a grand project would should foreigners that the

Netherlands was a modern country).

One might wonder why the plans then were not implemented. Opposition from active users of

the lake was not as great as it had been in the past. The Zuiderzee had become far less relevant as a

shipping water as ships from Amsterdam could sail to the North Sea over two new canals. The only

active users of the sea were fishermen, who naturally objected to the polder plans. This opposition was

not formidable and the proponents of poldering effectively portrayed the fishery communities as a

marginal affair. More substantial opposition came from important departments as the Ministries of War

(which saw the Zuiderzee as part of the Dutch defense system) and Finance (which feared the costs of

the project). Consequently, implementation was yet far away. Two events finally pushed Mr. Lely's

faltering project into realization. First, the Netherlands suffered from a flood of the Zuiderzee in 1916

that caused considerable damage, very deep into the country. Secondly, the First World War eliminated

some of the traditional trading relations. Thrust upon itself as a neutral country, the Netherlands found

that food production in the country was not sufficient for self-maintenance and food shortages were

experienced. As poldering the Zuiderzee was presented as a solution to the chronic problem of flood

safety (the project would reduce the shoreline and tide) and a possibility for creating additional

agricultural land, resolve to implement Lely's plans stiffened despite continued resistance from the

fisheries sector.


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A special agency to implement the plan (National Agency for the Zuiderzee Works, in Dutch

'Rijksdienst voor de Zuiderzeewerken' (from here on ZZW)) was founded and this agency set to work,

generally following Lely's approach, but with significant changes at opportune occasions. High points

in the project were the realization of the 30 kilometer long 'Afsluitdijk' (closure dam) between the

provinces of Friesland and Noord-Holland in 1932 and the subsequent creation of the new polders

(about 1,700 square kilometers of new land). The dam sealed of the Zuiderzee from the North Sea and

Wadden Sea, and coupled with the continued influx of river water, the sea turned into a freshwater

lake. After realization of the dam, polder construction started. Figure 2 shows some of the ideas that

have existed on the location of such polders. With our current knowledge, the top left figure seems

rather unrealistic (compare with figure 1), but the others are not far from what was later realized. After

construction, the polders were landscaped by a special branch of the Public Works Agency

(Rijkswaterstaat), called the Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders (from here on RIJP).

Figure 2: Plans for the creation of polders in the IJsselmeer area

The considerable length of the implementation period of the Zuiderzee-project (1918-1985 or so)

allowed ZZW and RIJP to keep learning from previous experiences. Especially the initial omission of

'corner lakes', bodies of water that separated the new from the old land, caused problems in the old

land. It was found that a new polder, lying below sea level, attracted great amounts of ground water

from under the old land, thereby causing subsidization and drying up of land. The damage to existing

uses (agriculture, buildings) was considerable and the newer polders were built with a so-called corner

lake to prevent such damage. These corner lakes are clearly visible on map 1 and are part of the

IJsselmeer basin. Another change that can be observed is the way the new polders were put to use. Not


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only were ever-changing techniques used to make the polder dry and to expulse the salt, the land use

for which the polders were used changed as well. The first polders were about 90% agricultural land,

but the final one that was created (Southern Flevopolder) was only for 50% devoted that purpose. The

later polders were much more tailored for housing (18%) and natural area (25% for said polder).

The current uses of the IJsselmeer

Being such a large area, and being so close to large populations, it should be no surprise that the

IJsselmeer has many functions, both from the perspective of the surrounding land and from a water

system perspective. Drinking water preparation: need for achievement of strict water quality standards

and clean up of polluted water soil. A summary of the functions that the lake fulfils, from the

perspective of the various users, would go something like this:

- Flood control: retention basin for high water levels in the IJssel (and Rhine) basin, control of

influx of North Sea water at high tide, control of risks of flooding by the IJsselmeer itself.

- Agriculture: reserve of fresh water in summer, drainage area for superfluous water in the winter,

flushing out saline water under mainland, potential site of expanded agricultural acreage by

creating polders, receptor of pollution (see industrial and urban development).

- Nature: the IJsselmeer is part of the Ecological Main Structure (Ecologische Hoofdstructuur); large

parts protected by the Habitat and Bird Directive (European Union) and Nature Protection Act

(Netherlands). Main reasons: presence of protected bird and fish types and status as 'open

landscape'. Presence of certain species requires achievement of certain water quality standards and

clean up of polluted water soils.

- Recreation and tourism: sailing, windsurfing, beaches, vacation resorts.

- Military: practice area for the army (gun firing range) and air force (fly zone).

- Industrial: use of cooling water, receptor of pollution discharges. The latter function was used

intensively in the 1950s/1960s. Much pollution from the Rhine systems was absorbed by

particulates that fell on the lake soil. The soil is locally of very poor quality.

- Energy production: two power plants present that use cooling water. Plans for park to generate

wind energy by windmills.

- Fisheries: 60% of all inland-water yields stem from the IJsselmeer.

- Transportation: transport of goods by boat, potential location for second national airport and rail

infrastructure.

- Culture/landscape: certain parts of the coast are protected landscape, various towns are on the

world heritage list or are otherwise (nationally) protected.

- Excavation/mining: supply of sand for the construction industry; drilling for gas and oil.


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- Urban development: the lake is in the proximity of the so-called Randstad, a densely populated and

industrialized area where there is shortage of housing and industrial land. If new polders are

created, the IJsselmeer would fulfil certain roles, including the role of receptor of waste water (see

industrial). Together with agriculture and industry, urban development has caused discharges of

wastewater to the IJsselmeer system, which has increased the concentrations of organics

considerably.

- Waste disposal: parts of the IJsselmeer are used for under water storage of dredging sludges. These

sludges are generated in the course of regular maintenance of waterways, but also when polluted

water soils are cleaned up. In either case, they may even formally classify as hazardous wastes and

are isolated from the environment.

Even though the IJsselmeer has long been (and to some extent still is) seen as an almost endless

resource, many of the uses just described are currently seen as being at odds with each other if not

through the entire lake, the in certain parts of it. Many interesting rivalries can thus be studied. Underthe EUWARENESS-project several criteria have been developed to select particularly interesting

rivalries. I have particularly looked for rivalries where economical and ecological uses are involved,

where redistribution of property rights has taken place, and rivalries where new users emerge. In

addition to these criteria, I have kept an eye towards the saliency of the rivalry in political terms, the

periods in which the rivalry played, and 'representativeness' of the rivalry for more general

developments in the basin. In the section below I will briefly describe the IJsselmeer regime as it

developed since 1918 (with an emphasis on more recent developments) and on the basis of that

description, certain interesting rivalries can be identified for closer study in later sections.

2 Regime history of the water basin

Ownership of the IJsselmeer

The issue of ownership of the IJsselmeer (and Zuiderzee) was irrelevant for a long time, but became

poignant when the Zuiderzee project started being implemented. Until that time, the Zuiderzee has

essentially been a free resource (common pool resource), mainly used by fishing interests. Fishermen

claimed title to the sea because they had been using it for fisheries for so long, often with the seal of

approval from local authorities or the church. The State however did however not recognize these

rights, and if it did, set them aside with the Zuiderzee Act of 1918. The government of that day argued

that the fishermen had acquired a privilege with their consents to use the water, but had never acquired

ownership. Because ownership rested with the State, the State was free to alter the characteristics of the

Zuiderzee, even if this would cause detrimental effects for fisheries. A majority of Parliament agreed to

this explanation, and the Zuiderzee Act was approved and the right of the State to polder the land

according to the plan Lely vested. The act did not contain provisions for compensation for the

fishermen. The Zuiderzee Support Act of 1924 was intended to regulate this issue, but much more than


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an offer of financial compensation for lost investments, the act contained provisions on how to re-

educate the fishermen so that they could find other jobs (Bossaers, 1987). One form of compensation

that was initially deemed worthless was the award of a right to fish at the IJsselmeer. These rights

turned out to be valuable, especially when the eel successfully adapted to the change from seawater to

fresh water.

More generally speaking, the real effect of the Zuiderzee Act was to firmly establishstate

ownership of the fish in the lake and more generally the lake itself. Flood safety and agricultural

production became the predominant concerns for a long time, advocated by the ZZW and RIJP. These

organizations, together with certain other government departments, effectively dominated the decision

process for a long time. Their intention was to change large parts of the IJsselmeer to land (by

poldering) and despite the enormous amount of time and money involved, they managed to achieve this

purpose, granting them incredible popularity and a positive public image. Goverde (1986) writes that

the civil and agricultural engineers within ZZW and RIJP were all mighty until the 1970s, basically

constrained only by financial limits. These financial constraints were sometimes very real, especially in

the 1950s when the Zuiderzee project of the Agency had to compete with other infrastructural works,

such as the construction of a road net. Despite this competition within the budget of the national

government, the basic commitment to the plan remained in tact and adjustments were more

instrumental than paradigmatic.

New uses

This situation remained until the 1970s, when the poldering project started to become the target of

environmentalists who propagated the value of the IJsselmeer as open water (natural interest-

landscape). These environmentalists were effective in questioning the poldering agenda and

introducing the realization that perhaps the Lely project should not be completed. They did so in the

course of a debate on the Markerwaard-polder, the last one to be constructed under the plan Lely. In

essence, the Markerwaard debate was on the question whether the Netherlands should continue to use

water as an extension area for activities that can not find a place on the land. In a sense, one could say

that it was the first time since 1918 that natural interests entered the policy arena. The poldering project

had been intended to enhance flood safety, agricultural production, and to a lesser extent housing. Now

newcomers to the arena started advocating the interest of open water (natural use).

Another relatively new use of the IJsselmeer was recreation. Completely neglected in the first

versions of the polder project, recreation has unexpectedly boomed since the Second World War.

Sailing for instance was originally confined to professional boatsmen and the elite of the country, but

this form of recreation has increasingly become popular. More generally speaking, the recreational

value of the new polders and corner lakes was unexpectedly great, and recreation interests started

claiming certain parts of the area for the use. The right to establish recreational facilities around the

corner lakes was originally free given the lack of planning controls and through this situation,

recreational use quickly increased to sizeable proportions. This development was stimulated by ZZW

and RIJP from the 1950s onwards, but has become more and more regulated since then. Especially the


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land use planning system embedded in the 1965 Law on land use planning ('Wet op de ruimtelijke

ordening') introduced an instrument to control recreational development (regional planning and local

zoning ordinances). Crowding and the rise in importance of natural interests have led to an active use

of the instrument. Certain areas of the lake have been put under protection, which implies that

recreational development in these parts is restricted. Further restrictions may or may not have arrived

with the implementation of the Bird Directive in the IJsselmeer; this is yet unclear. Natural interests lay

an increasing claim to space in the IJsselmeer area (increase of extent). On the other hand however,

recreation is stimulated as well, as government notes indicate that the IJsselmeer must overtake

recreational functions from sensitive water bodies such as the Wadden Sea.

Drinking water preparation in the Netherlands tends to take place from deep groundwater

reserves. Because these reserves are increasingly scarce in various locations however, the idea is that

drinking water must increasingly be prepared from surface water. The province of Noord-Holland for

instance, used to largely rely on water that infiltrated in the dunes along the coast for drinking water.

However, the dune ecosystem is currently deemed too sensitive for further water extractions.

Therefore, use of IJsselmeer water for drinking water preparation needed to be increased. This desire

has made the province sensitive to threats to water quality in the IJsselmeer e.g. by urban, agricultural

and industrial discharges of pollution, and to proposals for waste disposal in the lake. The use of the

IJsselmeer as drinking water has also led to hesitations towards another projected new use: gas drilling.

Under Dutch law, ownership of the lake also determines ownership of the valuable minerals in the soil.

The minerals in the lake soil are thus state property. However, ownership of the minerals does not

imply user rights. There is a general prohibition of test drillings without state approval, and this

prohibition also applies in the IJsselmeer. The right to perform test drillings was to be granted by the

State in the 1980s, but that move was seen as being at odds with both drinking water preparation and

the natural value of the lake and caused political disagreement.

Coordination in the lake?

Ideas for more integrated water management developed within the water policy sector in the 1980s

through the work of the Moons Committee (1982). The ideas also reached the IJsselmeer area and in

1985 the National Agency for the IJsselmeer Polders (RDIJ), an amalgam of RIJP and ZZW, initiated

the development of an integral management plan for what the agency called 'little IJsselmeer', the part

that would remain after poldering the Markerwaard. This plan was called Integral Policy Plan

IJsselmeer ('Integraal Beleidsplan IJsselmeer') and the decision to start an integral planning exercise for

the IJsselmeer coincided with a similar decision for the Markermeer ('Interim Beheersplan

Markermeer'). The Agency established contact with other central government agencies and the

surrounding provinces to create several committees (called COMIJS and REDIJS) that would prepare

the plan. Non-government organizations, municipalities, and the waterboards were not invited to the

table, and therefore the attempt at integral planning should be seen as selective cooperation between

government levels. Elsewhere, the Public Works Agency had experienced positive results with the

development of integral management plans, but it seems that in the IJsselmeer they essentially were a


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failure. On the basis of personal interviews with those involved, Spek (1991) identified several reasons

for this. The first reason why integral planning in the IJsselmeer area did not work is that the status of

the to be developed integral plan was unclear, as it was not prescribed by statute and would therefore

not be binding. However, this problem was not unique to the IJsselmeer and can therefore not in itself

explain why integral planning failed, be it that uncertainty about the Markermeer was greater than

elsewhere because the commitment to poldering was waning. For the Northern part of the IJsselmeer,

different additional problems emerged. Because the national ministries sent bureaucratic

representatives to the committees that prepared the plan, the degree to which their opinions would be

politically supported was uncertain. Other parties had sent senior politicians to the COMIJS meetings

and these soon became frustrated with the impossibility to reach final deals. A third factor mentioned

by Spek is that other parties indicated they felt that the Agency was a poor communicator during their

meetings. The National Agency for the IJsselmeer Polders was said to have behaved in a rather

arrogant way during the talks.

Provincial and municipal incorporation

The perception of arrogance might be related to the then pending change of authorities in the area (an

institutional trigger). These implied that Rijkswaterstaat and the National Government more generally

would not control the lake by themselves anymore, but share authority with the provinces and

municipalities. This development took place in the polders first, and then for the lake itself. Provincial

incorporation of all IJsselmeer polders was completed in 1986, when the newest polders (Noord and

Zuid-Flevoland) were incorporated into a new province, Flevoland. These changes signified the

outcome of a fundamental debate, which had begun in the 1970s. Government within the polders had

essentially been a central government affair. The figure of bailiff ('land-drost') had been instituted in

the newest polders (Noordelijke and Zuidelijke Flevopolder). This bailiff was to govern the polders on

behalf of central government, specifically the Minister of the Interior ('Binnenlandse Zaken') without

representation from the (few) inhabitants of the polders. As more and more new inhabitants arrived in

the polders, and population increased, the need for local government and normal democratic

institutions became poignant. Mainly because it would ensure uniformity of government structure

throughout the Netherlands, public administration in the polders was modeled on the existing

government structure on the main land.

Even before municipal and provincial incorporation of the land had been completed, a

discussion started on the government of the lake itself. Some, especially conservation groups, were

pleading for a functional form of government for the entire lake (see e.g. Wessel, 1988). This plea was

motivated by the idea that the lake and its shores were a valuable and interdependent entity, which

should be governed in an integrated fashion by a special government body. The 'Vereniging tot Behoud

van het IJsselmeer' (Association for the Conservation of the IJsselmeer, from here on VBIJ) suggested

that uncontrolled and uncoordinated development was taking place in the area (especially on the shore).

The VBIJ feared that the division of authority over a great deal of municipalities would bring a certain

level of policy competition and infighting to the area, creating even more uncoordinated development.


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This argument has not been taken very serious it seems. The argument of government unity was

decisive and little further discussion was devoted to the topic: the lake was brought under provincial

and municipal authority. The result was that responsibility for management of the lake became divided

over various tiers of government.

One can not escape the impression that the pending provincial incorporation has had an effect

on the interactions between the RDIJ and the provinces involved. Provincial incorporation would imply

that the provinces (Noord-Holland, Friesland and Flevoland) could start to develop their own regional

plans for the IJsselmeer and control the developments on the lake through the land use planning system

which is highly decentralized in nature. Cooperation with the RDIJ, about to be stripped of its special

role, was thus not stimulated by the pending changes that can be regarded as an institutional trigger.

The actual incorporation of the lake occurred in 1989, and the three provinces quickly withdrew from

the coordination body COMIJS (started by RDIJ) to develop their own inter-provincial policy for the

lake. The move has officially been explained by a provincial frustration with the slow pace of plan

development within COMIJS, but the deeper reason seems to be disagreement over the direction

government policies for the lake should take. COMIJS in the end resulted in two 'study notes'

('Studienota IJsselmeer' and 'Studienota Markermeer', both 1990), which remained inconsequential as

the provinces set out to prepare their own plans.

The withdrawal of the provinces from COMIJS marks the beginning of policy arrangements

that are in existence until today and which reflect the relatively fragmented nature of Dutch

government which has been observed by several foreigners including Wynne (1987). As the

Netherlands is a far less centralized country than for instance the UK, government disputes are difficult

to settle by central government. This is not only a result of the constitutional system but also of

informal norms which stress cooperation and thus provide each level with a possibility to veto

initiatives from other actors. In many cases, such veto rights, be they formal or informal, or not linked

to responsibilities for solving certain problems. The irony of the situation is that every tier of

government recognizes the need for integration and coordination of policy, yet has great difficulty in

giving up authority in exchange for such coordination. The result is a game in which governments but

others too start developing their own plans and visions for the area and present them as the relevant

framework for decision making. Firet (1995: 13) sums up about 20 types of plans for the region alone1.

Many of these plans are labeled or considered to be 'integral' by their makers, yet there are many subtle

differences in their intentions, giving an eerie feeling about their actual coordination. The only

coordination between these various instruments seems to be at the level of specific tiers of government

(national actors each other, provincial actors with each other and municipal actors together).The rise in

importance of European Union legislation, already observable in embryonic form in the 1980s, makes

this fragmentation even greater, as it does give certain interests (especially nature) greater weight than

had happened previously and provides incentives not to engage in coordinated action for some actors. I

will make this point clear later.


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National plans, provincial plans, municipal plans, integral plans?

One consequence of the decision not to create the Markerwaard in 1991was that the Ministry of Traffic

and Water Management no longer had an interest in maintaining a separation of regimes for the 'little

IJsselmeer' and Markermeer. The Ministry acknowledged the failure of the COMIJS saga and a new

attempt at integral planning for the entire lake was initiated from within the central government, that is,

without input from the provinces that would not cooperate anyway. The work of the central

government ministries resulted in an Integral Management Plan IJsselmeer and Markermeer ('Integraal

Beheersplan IJsselmeer en Markermeer') which was made public in 1992. The plan was presented as a

water management plan ('Beheersplan') but seemed to contain many other elements as well, specifically

some in the sphere of land use planning. Some commentators have suggested that Rijkswaterstaat at

that time had trouble in getting used to their more limited role and was pushing the boundaries of its

role as water manager 'Rijkswaterstaat must get used to the new situation. The IJsselmeer was their

playing garden, but now everybody has become involved' (Firet, 1995: 30). The plan caused a

meltdown between the provinces and the national government. The provinces perceived the plan as

competing with the provincial planning work, which by then had a.o. resulted in the so called

Framework Sketch ('Kadernota'), of 1990 and was progressing further. There were clear distinctions

between the central government and provincial plans. The provinces were much more hesitant in

allowing certain uses of the IJsselmeer; specifically the provinces intended to ban gas drilling,

approached sand excavation more conservatively, and would not allow a nuclear power plant around

the lake. Because of the strong disagreement, the perceived impossibility of overcoming provincial

resistance, and legal realities of provincial jurisdiction, the Minister of Transport and Public Works

backed off the Integral Management Plan. Clearly, the central government's plan had touched a nerve

and new rules of engagement were established to avoid open disagreement in the future. Indicative of

the growing important of the land use planning system, the new rules determined that Rijkswaterstaat

would 'only' be the water manager for the area, whereas the provinces would become responsible for

policy planning in the region. Several of the interviewees I spoke for this paper referred to this rule,

which is a way of coordinating the work of various government levels.

Despite an already existing path for coordination within the land use planning system

(national government can publish guidelines and can interfere in provincial plans to some extent), it

was decided that a new institution should be created to coordinate the decision processes of national

government with that of the provinces. Rijkswaterstaat had wanted to establish a separate organization

for this purpose (ibid.: 30) but the provinces were afraid that their influence would be reduced if such

an organization came into existence. The province of Flevoland (and its municipalities) for instance

had now become the only actors to still advocate the Markerwaard-polder and the province was afraid

that this desire would be forfeited by too close cooperation with central government (which no longer

advocated the polder). Therefore, more informal means of coordination between the provinces and

central government were established, this time in the form of (yet another) Steering Group ('Stuurgroep

IJsselmeer-Markermeer') and an associated Working Group ('Werkgroep IJsselmeer/Markermeer'),

1 Because there may be more than one plan of each type (e.g. because each municipality has one), this implies and even greater

absolute number of plans in practice.


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going by the appealing abbreviations of STIJM and CIJM. These two organizations still consist as of

today, but they seem to hinge on a fragile equilibrium as the boundaries between water management

and land use planning are not at all perfectly clear. Rijkswaterstaat (RDIJ) continues to play a large role

in policy development at the central government level, for instance because of its extensive knowledge

of the area and crucial importance of water management. A factor contributing to the importance of the

agency seems to be the limited importance of the IJsselmeer for the National Agency for Land Use

Planning ('Rijksplanologische Dienst', or RPD). The RPD does leave a certain vacuum in the national

land use-planning arena for Rijkswaterstaat and therefore Rijkswaterstaat is able to exercise some

control over the provinces through that capacity. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Nature

Management is another actor that has stepped in this vacuum. This Ministry actually succeeded (with

help of Rijkswaterstaat and RPD) in gaining parliamentary approval for a PKB that also covered the

IJsselmeer area. This PKB, called the Structure Scheme Green Space ('Structuurschema Groene

Ruimte', SGR) dates back to 1995 and is mainly a spatial translation of the Ecological Main Structure

('Ecologische Hoofd Structuur', EHS) that this ministry is seeking to realize. The Structure Scheme

Green Space (SGR) identifies the IJsselmeer as a multifunctionalregion, where nature, recreation andfisheries should co-exist and are more or less equally important. Especially in the northern part

however, recreational development should remain limited.

Planning at the national level has moved forward in a coordinated fashion since 1995. There

were several important considerations why new plans were considered necessary. Some of them came

from within the water sector, others from other sectors. Triggers have been institutionally related, event

related, or problem pressure related. Within the water sector, more and more acknowledgement of

natural interest can be observed (institutional trigger). In addition to that, there is an profound

realization that a climate change that could emerge in the coming century must be countered (problem

pressure and event pressure). Each of these factors has had an effect on water quantity management in

the lake. For years, the purpose of water quantity management in the lake has been to keep the lake at -

0.2 meters NAP in the summer (1 April to 1 October) and -0.4 meters NAP in the winter (rest of the

year)2. This counter-natural approach is a compromise of safety interests (low levels at all times),

agricultural interests (prefer high level in summer, low level in winter), nature (generally prefer high

levels at all times, but also a certain amount of tide), and drinking water preparation (prefer high

levels). Shipping interests are not really affected by this regime in this sense that the IJsselmeer is

generally deep enough to be sailed, irrespective of 'ordinary' variations in water level.

The debate on the proper water level in the lake has continued for some time and the issue

seems under continuous study (see e.g. RLG, 1999). In 1981 for instance, RAND-Corporation

developed a quantitative model for water quantity and safety in the IJsselmeer. In that report much

attention was paid to the risk of waves overtopping the dikes if the level of the lake were to be

increased to +0.1 meter NAP in the summer time. The conclusion was that this could probably be done

without an increase of risk (see RAND, 1981). The explanation for this outcome was that an important

factor in determining risk in the IJsselmeer, the wind, would get fewer grips on the lake if it became

2These figures are for the 'small IJsselmeer'; the Markermeer regime is different.


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deeper. Secondly, it was argued that a higher water level would increase possibilities for quickly

discharging water from the lake through opening the locks; as the water level would be higher, water

would be discharged more quickly. There were some uncertainties involved however, warned RAND.

Especially the effect of higher water levels on dike stability were uncertain and certain inputs that had

been used for the computer model were based on relatively short time series. Sixteen years after

completion of the RAND study, the issue was still under study in the project 'Water management in the

Wet Heart' ('Waterbeheer in het Natte Hart', WIN). The difference with previous between 1981 and

1997 appears to be that the various interests involved with water management might be weighted

somewhat differently; especially the nature, recreation and drinking water interests are weighted more

heavily. In this sense the water management sector is broadening its scope somewhat. I say somewhat

because the WIN report itself is very clear about the priorities of Rijkswaterstaat (safety first) and the

organization places all new claims within the framework of a safe water body. The result is observable

when one compares the RLG study with the WIN study; the RLG study is much more interested in

increasing water levels and serving natural interests than the WIN study. Within the WIN-project the

implications of climate change, a potentially disastrous development for the Netherlands (eventpressure), are assessed for the management of the IJsselmeer. If sea levels rise, the current practice of

discharging onto the Wadden Sea when the lake reaches too high levels could be threatened. One

response could be to raise the level of the lake as well, but this might have serious repercussions for

safety, agriculture, ecosystems, etc. The WIN project was completed in 2000 and suggested that for the

first 50 years, only modest changes were needed in the water management regime for the IJsselmeer,

specifically the increase of water expulsion capacity. The project also resulted in a recommendation to

alter the water level regime in the IJsselmeer somewhat to better accommodate nature (a higher level in

spring and earlier start of the summer level).

Outside the water field, the upcoming Fifth Note on Spatial Planning was an institutional

trigger for the central government departments to come together and start to develop a vision statement

(in Dutch 'Meer Visie', meaning both 'More Vision' and 'Lake Vision') and the 'Integral Vision for the

IJsselmeer area until 2030'. These notes could serve as an input into the Fifth Note. 'Meer Visie' was

intended as a means to test societal reaction to the draft 'Integral Vision' and revolved around a policy

game with real actors playing their own role. The idea was that various possible scenarios for the

IJsselmeer area would be tested and that the actors involved would start to develop understanding for

each other's positions. Interestingly, 'Meer Visie' found a certain level of division between actors

representing central government. The implications for the Draft Integral Vision that was presented in

the year 2000 are quite clear in this sense that hardly any significant changes in policies are observable.

A definitive version would obtain the legal status of a sub Note of the Fifth Note on Spatial Planning.

Provincial plan forming

The provinces were able to agree amongst themselves on a Interprovincial Policy Plan IJsselmeer

(1993) and an Interprovincial Policy Plan Markermeer (1994). The central assumptions of these plans

are that (a) water management will be taken as a starting point for plan making, and (b) that the


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IJsselmeer is a multi-functional area, where the various functions laying a claim need to be weighted

against each other. The provinces agreed that the IJsselmeer should remain open water, whereas they

kept the possibility of a Markerwaard polder open, by stating that the Markermeer should remain a

multi-functionalspace and not a water body. Despite the entire IJsselmeer being a multi-functional

space (to use this neutral term), drinking water preparation, nature, recreation and tourism, and

transport should receive increasing weight according to the provinces. The provinces noted that

national policies had guided their plan, which suggests they had followed the principles of the land use

planning system (indicative, non-binding, planning at the national level only). The provinces had

deviated from national policies in at least two respects, besides the fact that they did not exclude the

possibility of a Markerwaard polder: (1) the provinces found that gas and oil drilling should not be

allowed in the IJsselmeer, (2) the provinces did not want to restrict the increase of tourism to the

Southern part of the lake, but would also allow increase in the Northern part, where already existing

'concentration points' could be further developed. Interestingly, the provinces went so far as to agree

that they would use the interprovincial plan as the basis for their statutory Regional Plans, which would

then be used to influence the only plans which are directly binding to citizens, the municipal zoningordinances. Indeed the various Regional Plans for the area, such as the Regional Plan ('Streekplan')

Flevoland of 1993, the Provinciaal Omgevings Plan Flevoland of 2000, the Regional Plan ('Streekplan')

Noord-Holland Noord of 1994, the Policy Note on Shore Development near the IJsselmeer and

Markermeer of 1996 by the Province of Noord-Holland, and the Regional Plan ('Streekplan') Friesland

of 1994 all literally adopted texts of the Interprovincial Plan. In this sense, the interprovincial plans

were a major success in terms of policy coordination.

The actual meaning of this important step forwards in terms of coordination should however

not be overestimated for various reasons. First of all, the interprovincial documents are (ands must be)

rather abstract documents. This implies for instance that the interprovincial plan confirms the principle

that the increase of boat harboring places ('ligplaatsen') is limited to 18,000 and that this growth should

be concentrated. However, no actual division between the harbors in the various provinces was agreed

upon so that it is not certain 'which harbor gets what'. Secondly, the actual practical meaning of the

provincial regional plan only becomes clear through their effect on municipal zoning ordinances.

Unfortunately, various municipalities (Lelystad, Almere, Wnseradiel, Stede Broec, Edam/Volendam)

have failed to establish an ordinance for the lake which is in accordance with the interprovincial plan,

whereas some other municipalities had just introduced a new ordinance before the interprovincial plan

was adopted and would not change these. There are various possible reasons why municipalities have

not adopted zoning ordinances, and these include a lack of priority of the lake for the municipality,

procedural errors, and (in some cases) conflicts between the municipalities and their provinces over the

restraining effects of the interprovincial plan on recreation. In addition to that, even in municipalities

where zoning ordinances were in fact introduced according to the interprovincial plan, the real effect

may be limited. This is because (1) for the shore there are older zoning ordinances in place which

contain less limitations that could be expected under the interprovincial plan; developments might have


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already started (e.g. Makkum), (2) enforcement of zoning ordinances is notoriously weak anyhow3, (3)

disagreement with the national government can result in deadlock. The issue of gas drilling is an

example of that, but it may very well be that the issue of recreation is one too. Finally, it should be

noted that the phrase that interprovincial planning follows the water management field has important

implications as this field is in transformation and the land use planning system essentially faces a

moving target.

The rest of this paper

With the first two paragraphs, the general picture of regime development in the IJsselmeer has been

sketched. When looking exclusively from a water policy perspective one can say that the regime has

broadened from a simple regime to a complex regime, with some steps towards an integrated regime.

Water management was mainly concerned with safety and agriculture since 1918. Control was in the

hand of central government and the problem definition fixed. With the change of inland sea to

freshwater lake, new and unexpected uses entered the scene and the demand for functions increased(recreation, nature, drinking water preparation). Recreation was a very welcome new guest at the table,

but especially the formulation of natural interests was more problematic in the eyes of the water

managers. Propagators of this interest, and the interest of drinking water preparation, largely bypassed

the water policy sector and used the emerging land use planning arena as their playing field. The

distinction between land use planning (emphasizing de-central planning) and the water policy sector

(emphasizing central planning) has not been resolved yet, but current attempts at integral planning can

be seen as an attempt to coordinate the two policy sectors. Given the relatively passive attitude of land

use planners at the national level, it has been relatively easy to achieve coordination at the national

level. However, especially the provinces and municipalities have different opinions on certain topics,

specifically gas drilling and recreation.

In the rest of this paper I will more closely examine certain specific rivalries, keeping in mind

the criteria developed for case selection by the EUWARENESS coordinators. These criteria include a

preference for rivalries where the economic and ecological uses are at odds, cases where property

rights are redistributed, cases where there is public and private ownership and cases where there is a

movement towards coordination. Obviously, it is impossible to satisfy all these criteria at the same time

for every case. However, I have looked for particularly strong rivalries (the most contentious ones, with

disparate views present in the discussion), with a preference for rivalries that involve new uses and/or

redistribution of property rights, and a desire to find rivalries that were relevant in various periods of

the study period (roughly taken to be 1970-2000 here). I have been less concerned with rivalries where

coordination has been achieved, because I have assumed that coordination is a dependent variable and

stimulating/prohibiting factors for its achievement need to be studied. Given this interpretation I have

chosen to focus on the land/water rivalry, as epitomized in the debate on the final polder of the plan

Lely (Markerwaard). This discussion ran from the 1970s until 1991 (covers much of the case study

3As I will demonstrate in the discussion of the nature/recreation rivalry, these factors can be overcome,

but this requires a very active attitude by the province.


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period), but was especially salient in the 1970s. The Markerwaard debate was the gate through which

natural interests entered the IJsselmeer arena and also the first time that the water magicians (RDIJ)

had to defend their ideas in terms of broader considerations than flood safety and agriculture. The

second rivalry that I will address is the one between recreation and nature, both new uses of the

IJsselmeer and both advocated by government policies. But recreation can not be welcomed

everywhere because it may have negative effects on certain parts of the ecosystem. Separation of the

two activities has been the basis of most policies here (a form of coordination) and we will see how that

is being achieved. The third rivalry of interest here is the one between drinking water preparation and

gas drilling. Especially in the 1980s this was a contentious issue and we will see whether and how

coordination has been achieved here. Finally, we will look at the practice of fishing at the lake. Here,

pressure on the resource has been enormous and significant measures to redistribute fishing rights have

been taken. Here too, we will see how such redistribution was possible.

Let it be clear that I have not been able to study all relevant rivalries that are present in the

IJsselmeer area. However, I do find that the rivalries studied do give a representative sample of the

issues at stake. After the sections on specific rivalries, a more analytical section with observations andanalysis follows. A more theoretical interpretation of the rivalries and their development takes place in

that section, so that the first four sections that follow now mainly contain a chronology and description

of the rivalries, with here and there a reference to the theoretical framework.

3 The Markerwaard debate: the challenge of the existing situation and arrival of a new

one

Goals of the Zuiderzee project

Although the actual purpose of the Zuiderzee-project was somewhat changing with he political tide, the

project served three main purposes throughout its existence: (1) flood safety enhancement, (2) creation

of agricultural land, and (3) creation of new land for housing. In the course of the years other possible

uses for the polders have been 'invented', including natural use and use for a second National Airport,

but the interests advocating these uses seem less well represented in the dominant coalition that was

present in the IJsselmeer area until the early 1970s. Goverde, who was personally actively involved in

the Markerwaard debate that ensued, has studied the development of the 'power balance' within the

IJsselmeer region. He argues that the water management network essentially controlled the decision

process until 1970, but slowly lost control in the period 1970-1985. The main reason seems to be that

the construction of the Markerwaard could not only be defended anymore on the basis of Lely's plans,

but increasingly had to be argued on the basis of broader arguments, which implied a window of

opportunity for new groups to enter the discussion arena.


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Second wave of environmentalism

Goverde (ibid.) describes how the 'first wave' of environmentalism in the Netherlands dated back to the

early 1900s. From the start on, the first wave environmental movement had not questioned the

Zuiderzee project, which was already there when the movement emerged. The environmental

movement therefore long worked from within the polder paradigm and the 'Contact Commissie' (a

government board for nature conservation containing environmentalists) actively cooperated with ZZW

and RIJP in determining the set-up of the new polders. The second-wave of environmentalism came up

near the end of the 1960s. It differed from the first wave in that it defined the environmental

problematique more widely (not just nature conversation) and saw a greater need for protest (rather

than an attempt to influence the government from within). The second wave of environmentalist groups

took issue with the definition of water bodies as 'not yet reclaimed land' and they started propagating

the value of water as valuable open space. The first expression of this development in the IJsselmeer

came in 1964, when a tiny group of water sports fans started questioning the need for the

Markerwaard-polder in the size as it had been proposed.

The influx of new actors

The critical comments by environmentalists resonated within certain government departments,

particularly the Department of Finance, which was not convinced that the investment of government

monies in the Markerwaard would be worthwhile. In 1971 a new Minister of Transport and Public

Works was appointed. He had previously been Minister of Finance and had been critical of the

Markerwaard polder in that capacity. One of his actions was to request a study by ZZW on the

usefulness of the new polder. The ZZW unhappily complied and in 1972 a report was published by the

title of 'Considerations on the Markerwaard'. The report, as a result of pressure from the Minister,

contained a discussion of the option notto construct a polder in the Markermeer (ibid.: 197). This

option was rejected by ZZW, but this was only possible by broadening of the set of considerations that

had been relevant under the Zuiderzee project. Thus, the report argued that not only water, housing,

and agricultural interests pleaded for polder construction, it also argued that other interests did not

workagainstthe plan. Specifically mentioned were water recreation, traffic over land and water, water

supply, and nature creation. All these interests would not be harmed, in fact, even be improved by a

polder. The new Minister was considering a stop work order for the dike between Lelystad and

Enkhuizen (see figure 1), which was intended as the future outside border of the Markerwaard polder,

and which had not been completed at that time. On this issue, ZZW argued that the work should

continue anyhow because the dike was of crucial importance from a safety perspective and water

management in general, not only for the Markerwaard polder. Partly because the Minister feared losing

the money already sunk in parts of the dike since 1968, construction continued indeed and was

completed by 1975. By that time however, the debate on the polder itself was nowhere near

completion, also because the Ministerial Advisory Body ('Raad voor de Waterstaat') had decided to put

the report 'Considerations on the Markerwaard' up for public inspection and consultation.


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The consultation process led to considerable response, partly organized by the 'Vereniging tot

Behoud van het IJsselmeer' (The association for the Conservation of the IJsselmeer, from here on

VBIJ). Members of the VBIJ were particularly drawn to the Markerwaard debate because the new

polder was now being mentioned as a potential site for a second national airport, which they opposed.

The connection between airport and polder presented both opponents and proponents with a mixed bag

of opportunities, but certainly complicated things a lot more. For proponents construction of an airport

could possibly provide an additional ratio for the polder but would at the same time bring uncertainty,

more opposition, and perhaps delay. For opponents, the additional ration was not welcome, but the

uncertainty and delay was. The critical Minister of Transport and Public Works had suggested that the

polder and airport should be seen apart from each other and had thus requested a study of the polder

regardless of whether the airport would be sited there. Despite the report 'Considerations on the

Markerwaard' ignoring the possibility of a possible airport in the polder, the attempt to not let the

discussion on the polder be overwhelmed by a discussion on aviation obviously failed. Many

arguments were raised against the polder and the Ministerial Advisory Body requested so much

additional studies from ZZW, that their report was delayed until 1976. Especially representatives ofother government ministries kept seriously questioning the polder plans and demanding further

motivations. In 1976, the Ministerial Advisory Body finally published its advice to actually construct

the polder, but representatives of the Ministry of Finance and the Directorate for Recreation did not

support this advice. Interestingly, the positive advice to the Minister of Transport and Public Works

may have legitimized the Markerwaard-polder in the old days, that was no longer the case in 1976. The

main reason was that the water management framework was no longer accepted as the relevant

framework for deciding on the polder.

The Land use planning system becomes relevant

The large amount of criticism in the consultation process, especially from certain land use planning

experts, had given the government the idea that a decision to polder should perhaps be better motivated

from a land use planning perspective than had happened until then. This conclusion fitted in a more

general desire at the time to increase the plan led character of governmental decision making,

especially in land use, and a realization that land use planning policies in the Netherlands were

relatively ineffective in actually shaping concrete government decisions. The government of the day

decided to introduce the instrument of Core Planning Decisions ('Planologische Kernbeslissingen',

from here on PKBs). These PKBs would outline national planning policies, assist the Minister of

Spatial Planning in his supervisory role over lower tiers of government, and finally prevent haphazard

and ad hoc decision making. Although the authority to draft a PKB was left to individual government

departments, the Minister of Spatial Planning did deliver a list 23 areas that should become subject to a

PKB. Indicative of the strength of the desire to plan and perhaps of an underestimation of

complications associated with the PKB-instrument, this list was quickly approved without much

resistance from within the Council of Ministers. Much to the despise of the ZZW, this decision implied

that the Markerwaard would become subject to a PBK procedure. However, the Markerwaard polder


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was not considered important enough for a PKB on its own; instead the polder was to be studied in

connection with the second national airport, which was seen as the main topic of the PKB. This

decision implied various things. The first is that the then pending advice of the Ministerial Advisory

Body ('Raad voor de Waterstaat') was degraded from an important step en route to a binding sectoral

decision (the water management sector) to an input into a much more integral land use planning

process. Secondly, the decision implied that the connection between airport and polder that the

previous Minister of Transport and Public Works had attempted to prevent was now formally being

made, introducing uncertainty regarding the outcomes of the process. Officials at ZZW continued to

de-couple the two highly controversial projects and move the polder back in the realm of their own

sector, but they failed and the report of the Ministerial Advisory Body was indeed reduced in

importance. The fear of delay became true, as it was not before the early 1980s that considerable

progress was started being made.

In 1980, the airport discussion was solved by a decision not to construct a new airport but to

expand the existing ones. Although a government decision on the Markerwaard was also pending, it

was expected that the formal PKB procedure for the polder would be lengthy and could therefore

potentially delay the aviation PKB. The two procedures were de-coupled, and again this decision was

somewhat of a mixed bag of opportunities for opponents and proponents. The Markerwaard polder

would no longer be a site of a new airport, but Cabinet still decided to actually construct the polder, be

it in a much smaller version than the one that had originally been planned and with the restriction that

the polder should be financially feasible. This decision was presented in a policy note

('Beleidsvoornemen') that signaled the start of the official PKB procedure. The decision was based

largely on recommendations from ZZW (merged with RIJP and then renamed) and the Ministerial

Advisory Body, which had stressed the usefulness of the polder for housing development. The Cabinet

argumentation for constructing the polder drew upon the image of a full country. Because the old land

was filling up, it should be worthwhile to create reserve space, even if it is uncertain which functions in

the future will start demanding space. Despite the Cabinet decision being a confirmation of its intention

to construct the polder, traces of the concerns from various (more or less opposing) departments were

visible in the government decision. The exact shape of the polder and required infra-structural works

were to be determined by the Minister of Transport and Public Works later after more certainty would

have been achieved about the need for the polder. Also Cabinet outlined its intention not to make more

than 50% of the new polder available for agriculture. Housing, nature and recreation were to gain

considerably more space than they had received in the previous polders.

The PKB procedure and the government's intended decision

As required by the statutory procedures, the Policy Intention was put for public inspection and the

government advisory body on land use planning ('Raad voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening', or RARO) was

requested for its advice. In the consultation period that followed the Cabinet decision, about 20,000

people took the opportunity to express an opinion and more than 650 written reactions were received.

A considerable part of these reactions were negative and many were in fact inspired by a fear of


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subsidization of the old land (particularly in the province of Noord-Holland). Both proponents and

opponents questioned the motivation for construction of the polder. Proponents noted that given the

proposed functions of the new polder, its dimensions were too small. Opponents argued that the

government had inadvertently omitted alternatives for construction of the polder. Especially the VBIJ,

in cooperation with other organizations from the fisheries, recreation and nature conservation sectors,

were active in developing such alternatives. Already in 1974 had the VBIJ developed an alternative

plan 'Waterlely' and in the early 1980s a whole range of organizations developed a 'wet vision' for the

Markerwaard. In either case, opponents challenged the idea that 'lack of space' on the old land was a

given and should automatically result in creation of a new polder.

The RARO clearly had difficulty in achieving agreement on the polder. The semi-dependent

body has representation from many corners and thus it had representation from both proponents and

opponents. The council members could not reach consensus and by 1982, the RARO presented two

different scenarios to Cabinet. One was a 'wet scenario' (no polder) and one a 'dry scenario' (polder).

Different groups within the RARO supported different scenarios. Despite the considerable amount of

disagreement, there was consensus in the RARO that some of the assumptions underlying the Cabinet

intention were feeble. Specifically, the Council pointed at the need for a broader vision on the

development in the IJsselmeer region, the need to further study the issue of subsiding land, and to

better assess the economic effects of the new polder.

Change in budgetary policies: monetarism instead of Keynesianism

By 1982, the political spectrum changed and a Cabinet with a deregulatory and 'no nonsense' agenda

started its job. The events that unfolded from 1982 to 1985 indicate that the relevant framework for

decision making changed radically. The water management perspective and land use planning

perspective now had to seriously compete with a stringent government budget perspective. At the

beginning of the new Cabinet rule, the implications of its agenda for the polder were unclear. On the

one hand, the new Cabinet wanted to avoid lengthy procedures and was out to show strong political

will ('daadkracht') which should be focused more strongly on serving business interests (in favor of the

polder). On the other hand, the economic doctrine of the Cabinet was that the macro-economic

feasibility of projects were less relevant than the effects on the government budget, which should

become balanced again. Thus, even if the Markerwaard-polder would be socially worthwhile,

constraints on the government budget could still work against government involvement. Opponents of

the polder were successful in influencing the Cabinet in this sense that its program at the start

('Regeerakkoord') suggested that both the possibilities of constructing and not constructing the polder

should be fully explored. In this sense the active involvement of opponents in the PKB procedure

seemed to have paid off.

On the other hand, the study of options was referred back to ZZW and RIJP (united in a

regional Directorate of the Public Works Agency, named RDIJ). Goverde, who was actively involved

as an opponent at the time, describes the RDIJ's activities from 1982 to 1985 as 'political massage' to

get approval for the polder (ibid: 292-348). He suggests that the main way in which the RDIJ attempted


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political massage was by their control over the study over the various options available. The Agency

originally specified six alternative courses of action, two of which revolved around not constructing the

polder, and four around constructing the polder. Between 1982 and 1985, these six options were

changed in this sense that the non-polder options were fused into one option, whereas the four original

polder options were constantly refined and expanded. RDIJ followed Cabinet policy, in this sense that

the choice between the remaining options was 'reframed' so that they were compared in terms of costs

and benefits, much less in terms of contribution to wider planning policies (ibid.: 305). The National

Planning Agency ('Rijksplanologische Dienst', RPD) had started to study the issue after the divided

RARO advice in 1982, but the conclusions that this Agency reached (that not poldering would meet

planning policies best) was not made public and it seems that this conclusion played a small role in the

deliberations of Cabinet. It seems legitimate to say that the financial focus implies a less integral

approach to the issue. In addition to that, Goverde (e.g. 1986: 316) gives some examples of how the

Ministry of Transport and Public Works selectively used the outcomes of various studies into the

financial feasibility of the project. The Ministry for example used its opportunity to write an advice to

the Cabinet to give a lower assessment of costs of subsidization than the assessment in formal reports.Also RDIJ suggested in 1982 that the polder would generate 50,000 new jobs (mainly in agriculture).

RIJP had been hesitant in publishing the basis for this assessment but when it did, much critique

followed. Analysis by the Agricultural Economic Institute ('Landbouw Economisch Instituut', LEI) had

suggested that poldering of the Markerwaard would not be interesting both from an agricultural and

national economic perspective (or perhaps even 'irresponsible' according to the LEI).

The government of the day was under much pressure to abandon its monetary based economic

policy. There were many who advocated continuation of anti-cyclical government investments, but

even those who did not still thought it would be useful to order all possible projects in order of

attractiveness. This critique resonated within the government and an intergovernmental committee,

called ICES, was formed to prioritize possible government investments. ICES produced a list of

projects that essentially made clear how many projects were competing with the Markerwaard polder

for government money and how low the polder was on the priority list. Still advocates of cost-benefit

analysis in government decision making expressed fear that certain projects, such as the Markerwaard

polder, would be implemented anyway, mainly because certain groups (RDIJ was specifically

mentioned) would be willing to let their own interest prevail over the general interest (ibid: 229). This

fear appears to have been unwarranted however.

Private initiative and the demise of the polder

In 1984, a group of private companies 'Initiatiefgroep Markerwaard B.V.' came forward. This group of

650 companies, which included a major bank, suggested that if government would not pay for the

polder, the private sector would because the polder would be economically feasible. The group

presented a calculation of cost and benefits and requested that the government would give certain

guarantees in return, including a guarantee that the state would actually do the groundwork for the

group. Although the initiative was intended as a signal to the Cabinet that the project should go ahead,


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use of the sea, but claims by fishermen that they had a title to the sea were simply waved away. The

ownership of the sea by the state was hardly challenged and the factual taking of fishing rights was

hardly compensated. Because ownership of the state was so firmly established,property rights of

others than the State tended to play a marginal role in the later developments regarding the land water

rivalry. Parliament had approved the poldering plan, and in line with the judicial doctrine of the day,

this decision was not testable by the courts (judicial testing of government decisions was long

considered unconstitutional in the Netherlands). The regime that was then initiated in the early 20th

century by the State was thought out by engineer Lely and revolved around two very strong

organizational actors, the ZZW and RIJP. For a remarkably long time, these two organizations could

continue to implement their plans and their say over the area was unchallenged until the end of the

1960s. In a sense this situation implied that water managers were in control over a large part of the

Netherlands, and their rule was almost complete, except that fishing rights were controlled by the

Ministry of Finance (see below). The uses with which this water regime was concerned were

remarkably enough 'anti- water' uses: flood protection, agriculture and housing. Incredibly large human

interventions were undertaken, which changed the Zuiderzee to IJsselmeer. Saline water was replacedby fresh water and entire fish populations destroyed or seriously affected. The idea that the Zuiderzee

or even the IJsselmeer could also be seen as a valuable water resource was largely missing from the

picture. In this sense management of the IJsselmeer was totalitarian, yet not very integrated.

The 'water regime' was challenged since the 1960s, after much of the Zuiderzee project had

been completed. Largely because of one specific minister who questioned the financial feasibility of

the last polder, the Markerwaard, the assumptions behind the project were scrutinized. These

assumptions were to be renewed, and largely because of a coupling with the airport debate that was

unwanted by the water sector, the project had to be defended on entirely different grounds, i.c. land use

planning terms. One can say that in 1974 exclusive control over the IJsselmeer was wrestled away from

the water sector, if not by formally removing it from the water managers, then by changing the

framework within which ZZW and RIJP had to make decisions. The airport debate and the desire to

have open land use planning procedures led to an influx of highly motivated actors, which opposed

construction of the polder. Under land use planning procedures, the right to polder the area became

contested and needed active confirmation in a national land use planning decision, despite the fact that

the Zuiderzee Act of 1924 did contain such a right. The repeal of this right in this case, could be done

without compensation because titles to the new polder had not been established yet and it was a

government decision to use its right to polder the Markermeer or not.

The triggers for the regime change in the 1970s seem to be institutionally related. Especially

the change of leadership of the Ministry of Transport and Public Works to a critic of the Markerwaard

polder was instrumental in opening up the decision arena. Opponents of the polder made good use of

their opportunities under land use planning law, but when a new 'no nonsense' Cabinet arrived in the

1980s, this channel of influence lost much of its relevance to the decision process on the Markerwaard

polder. In the 1970s one can in a sense see two separate policy sectors operating in the IJsselmeer area.

(IJburg). A conflict erupted with central government. Arbitration was called for and the city in the end


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Actors from the water sector kept largely pleading for a polder, although motivated by different

reasons. Despite some division between government actors within this field (e.g. in the Ministerial

Advisory Body), plans to polder continued to be supported. Helpful in achieving this result was the fact

that 'non water' actors were relegated to less important position, e.g. in said Advisory Council, they

only had representation on sub-committees. Among the actors active within the land use planning field,

there was much stronger division over what should happen in the Markermeer. Proponents of poldering

had a significant say here as well but they could not tip the balance against opponents and the division

within government figured very prominently here. It is my impression that the resistance from the land

use planning field must be seen as a worrying sign from the perspective of integration as land use

planning is clearly a more encompassing policy field than the water field. Land use planning clearly

has broader problem definitions than the ones under which the water sector operates.

When, by the early 1980s, proponents of the polder overcame the concerns from opponents in

the land use sphere, yet another change occurred. The land use planning process largely lost its

meaning and the importance of financial considerations increased enormously. It is difficult to judge

whether this should be seen as a broadening of the regime. For certain, the idea of the Cabinets of the

early 1980s was that projects such as the Markerwaard polder should be judged only on the basis of

narrow budgetary terms. There was a rejection of the idea that projects should be socially worthwhile.

On the other hand, viewing poldering in monetary terms implies that the costs and benefits can be

compared to other projects which the Cabinet desired to undertake and it seems that this comparison

was not favorable for the polder project: money as an integrating device? Note that the implication here

is that the rivalry was not 'won' by one of the uses because the other use was 'outplayed'. Rather, the

whole rivalry was sort of neglected and a completely different framework of evaluation introduced.

With hindsight it is remarkable that the argument of nature protection seems to have played

such a minor role in the decision to finally not construct a polder in the Markermeer. The case could

well be made that large parts of the IJsselmeer have long been deserving of the Specially Protected

Area (SPA)-status under the Ramsar convention of 1971 (the 1% per cent norm). Indeed, a report

written on important bird areas in the European Union made in light of the Bird Directive of 1978

indicated that the Markermeer was of great importance. The VBIJ had started to play this international

card in the early 1980s. The organization had requested that the European Parliament advise the

European Commission that the Markermeer should become a Specially Protected Area (SPA). The

European Parliament did so indeed, and when the Dutch government decided to construct the polder in

1985, this decision was brought to the attention of the European Commission through a formal

complaint. Needless to say that the argument became less relevant when the decision was taken not to

construct the polder. Because of this, it is difficult to say what would have happened if the Dutch

policies, which clearly left the value of the Markermeer region from an environmental or natural

perspective remained relatively unrecognized, would have collided with European efforts to maintain

the lake as a special area for birds. I do not want to imply that the Dutch government has not

recognized the importance of the IJsselmeer from a nature perspective per se, but certainly there was

had to pay a considerable amount of money).


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more of such a realization for the Northern part of the lake and the so called corner lakes (the pieces of

water between the old land and the new polders). Specifically the somewhat unexpected natural value

of the corner lakes, which attracted many tourists and recreation, seems to have helped recognize the

importance of the area. The Public Works Agency saw the importance of these developments, and it

attempted to extend its scope of authority as a 'water manager' to integrated plan forming. As the

Agency remained committed to the Markerwaard polder throughout the 1980s, its attempts at such

planning largely centered on the Northern part of the lake ('small IJsselmeer' in their terms) and the

corner lakes.

Despite the increased recognition of the IJsselmeer as a nature reserve (see the next paragraph

for some more detailed information) there is still a tendency to take measures that intrude upon the

open water character of the IJsselmeer. What's more there still is a tendency to take (small) parts of the

lake for lakeside development (be it recreational or urban). The best example of this are provided by

the city of Amsterdam that is building a new urban area (40,000 houses) in one of the corner lakes and

by attempts by the towns in the polders of Flevoland to expand into the lake. So despite the fact that the

Markerwaard did not get constructed, the very typical Dutch attitude towards the lake (it is yet to be

reclaimed land) is quite strong and backed by important economic interests (there is a chronic shortage

of housing). The plans of Amsterdam did not go through without a protracted battle with conservation

groups and the plans were defeated in a referendum, which was however not binding on the city. Under

current Dutch regulations, Amsterdam needs to pay for the parts of the lake it has taken (see footnote 4)

and there is an obligation to compensate the loss of nature elsewhere. The Committee for Water

Management in the 21st

century (WB21) has called the plans of Amsterdam a mistake, at odds with

modern thinking about water management. Indeed, during the summer of 2001 there was much talk

about construction of a new corner lake around one of the older polders of the Lely plan (the Noord-

Oostpolder, see figure 1). This would stop the lowering of land near the polder, create opportunities for

nature development and greater storage capacity in the IJsselmeer.

4 The nature-recreation rivalry5

Introduction

The image of the IJsselmeer as an uninteresting area and not yet reclaimed land, which was invoked in

debates on the poldering plans, seem to have stuck around for long and at the time of the Zuiderzee

project's inception little consideration was given to the natural and recreational values of the future

lake. The new polders had high dikes, and the lake was quite deep behind these dikes so that there is a

steep decline from land to lake. Both for natural and (many but not all) recreational purposes such a

steep decline is not very attractive. The water is too deep for wading birds, and swimmers or wind

surfers prefer less steep shores for their activities. Owners of large sailing boats on the other hand do

appreciate deep water, but are still not greatly attracted to the shores of the new polder as there is very

little to see which is of tourist value even though the shoreline is very characteristic. The implication is

5Helpful comments to this part of the text were provided Mr. H. Bakker, Province of Noord-Holland.


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that parts of the lake that do not have great depth nor steep shores are attractive to both recreation and

nature, certainly when these places are near some of the very characteristic old villages. The areas

where such conditions exist are the Friesian coast, large parts of the Noord-Holland coast, and some

parts of the coasts of the corner lakes (especially the parts near the Veluwe region). It is in the corner

lakes where a certain level of tourism started to develop first, now is most intense and where the

likelihood of conflict with other functions is greatest as the space is relatively limited. As tourists are in

fact attracted to natural areas (because of their relatively quiet character for instance) there is a

possibility that valuable natural areas are 'invaded' by tourists. Especially certain forms of recreation

that are very mobile (speed boats, surf boards) have a tendency to sometimes penetrate natural reserves.

Below I will discuss how this potential rivalry has been perceived and attempts are being made to solve

it, both at the Noord-Holland shore and the corner lakes. Before doing so, I will delve into the

recreational and natural value of the IJsselmeer somewhat deeper.

The natural value of the IJsselmeer

The role of the IJsselmeer in the Dutch water system implies that its presence plays a great role far

beyond the immediate lake itself. Even if we restrict ourselves to the lake and the immediate coastline,

the ecological value of the lake is enormous. The basis for the ecosystem is algae growth, mussels

(driehoeksmosselen), and to e lesser extent certain types of water plants. Water plants are relatively

rare and mainly concentrated along the Friesian coast, where slopes are not as steep. Birth grounds for

fish are to be found exactly in that area and in other places where the water is not very deep. Wading

birds are also concentrated there. The importance of the Friesian coast has long been recognized and

large parts of the coast have been assigned a status as natural reserve. But wading birds are not the only

birds present, as many (trekking) birds use the lake as a breeding, feeding and molting place, whereas

some sorts rest at the lake during the winter time. 'Usage' of the lake by the birds is most intense in late

summer (August and September) and during the winter months, when the IJsselmeer is one of the few

fresh water bodies in Europe not to freeze over. All in all, there are 25 bird species in such

concentrations in the IJsselmeer so as to make their habitat qualify as a Special Area of Protection

(SPA) under the Bird Directive (Waterrecreatie Advies, 2000: 9). The figure below depicts the most

important bird habitats in the area, and as the reader will see, practically the entire lake is important by

some type of bird. A fact which is confirmed by the decision of the Under-Minister responsible for

Nature Management to grant the entire lake SPA status in January 2001. This was not until the

European Court had sentenced the Netherlands for not implementing the Directive (institutional

trigger).


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Figure 3: Important bird habitats in the IJsselmeer-area. The figure to the left

shows areas where the common tern ('visdief'), black tern ('zwarte stern'), grebe

('fuut'), cormorant ('aalscholver') are concentrated. The figure to the right indicates

where fish eating species ('viseters'), and particularly the common golden eye

('duikeend') are located6.

There is extensive fish life in the lake, with the most common species being the smelt ('spiering'),

which is predated by many other fish species, especially perch ('baars'). The sorts of fish present again

differ for deeper and shallower parts. In the deeper part the just described species dominate, but other

species such as white roach ('blankvoorn') and eel ( 'paling') are present as well. In the shallow parts of

the lake, plant-eating fish are present, including rock bass and pikeperch ('snoekbaars'). In accordance

with its importance, the IJsselmeer is part of the so-called Ecological Main Structure, a concept

introduced with the Nature Policy Plan in 1989.

The recreational value of the IJsselmeer

The IJsselmeer holds various attractions for tourists. The lake itself is the largest open space in the

Netherlands, with the greatest undisturbed visibility. Just to

Ned 1 Kaft Markerwaard

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