Kauffman ISA 2011

8/2/2019 Kauffman ISA 2011

1/48

Global Governors and Local Governance:

The Transnational Campaign for Integrated Watershed Management in

Ecuadorian Municipalities1

Craig M. Kauffman, Ph.D. Candidate, The George Washington [email protected]

Paper Presented at the 52nd Convention of the International Studies Association, Montreal,

Canada, March 16-19, 2011

Abstract

This paper examines how a transnational network advocating norms and policies associated withIntegrated Watershed Management (IWM) altered subnational governance structures within

Ecuador, resulting in de facto decentralization. The paper traces the network connections behind

campaigns to establish IWM reforms in six Ecuadorian local governments. The pathways ofinfluence involve direct interaction between transnational and local actors, with relatively littleinvolvement by the state, and thus differ from most studies of transnational campaigns. I argue

that characteristics of the campaigns three subnational targets (local politicians private


2/48

that characteristics of the campaigns three subnational targets (local politicians private

Introduction: Transnational Actors and De Facto Decentralization

Since 2000 a number of Ecuadorian local governments have implemented Integrated

Watershed Management (IWM) reforms to manage natural resources in an environmentally

sustainable yet socially and economically beneficial way. This paper analyzes how a

transnational network of actors advocating IWM norms and policies altered subnational

governance structures within Ecuador. Coalitions of these global governorsenvironmental

activists, technical experts, and members of donor agencies and inter-governmental organizations

(IGOs)developed alliances directly with local governments and civil society to construct new

policies and institutions for managing water-related natural resources in a more integrated and

sustainable way. When successfully implemented these new policies and institutions

significantly altered subnational governance models. They changed local production practices,

altered local socio-political relations, and constituted new powers for local governments

consistent with political and fiscal decentralization.

This paper analyzes transnational campaigns to establish IWM reforms in five

2


3/48

(local politicians, private landowners, and water user groups) were not vulnerable to the kind of

coercion by external actors described in most models of how TANs affect policy change. As a

result, resistance to IWM reform was not overcome through pressure from above and below,

but rather from beside as IWM advocates persuaded the three targeted groups to exert coercive

pressure on each other.

Ecuadors IWM reforms provide an interesting lens for analyzing changes in local

governance because they constitute a form of de facto decentralization. The specific reforms

analyzed in this paper include the creation of two institutions: (1) a stable, local financing

mechanism to fund watershed management activities, and (2) a participatory decision-making

structure to design and manage these activities at the local level. I argue that these reforms

constitute fiscal and political decentralization, respectively. There are many definitions of

decentralization, but most stress the process by which local governments gain the autonomy to

make policy decisions (political decentralization) and control revenue and expenditures (fiscal

decentralization) in at least one policy area.3 The institutions and responsibilities for local

watershed management approximate those that were to be transferred under Ecuadors 1997


4/48

Transnational Advocacy Coalitions Going Local

The process by which transnational advocacy coalitions take norms and policy agendas

developed at the international level and attempt to implement them at the subnational level

remains relatively under-analyzed. Subnational actors are more often analyzed in terms of their

role in bringing local issues to a global discourse through a process Tarrow (2005) calls

externalization (della Porta et al. 2006; Martin 2010; Andonova et al. 2009). To the extent the

causal arrow is reversed, studies typically analyze transnational campaigns seeking policy

change at the national rather than subnational level. Here, the targets are national politicians

who set state policy regarding human rights (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Lutz and Sikkink 2001;

Hawkins 2002), intellectual property (Deere 2009; Drahos 2007), the environment (Khagram

2002; Conca 2006; Andonova 2008), democratization (Riker 2002; Carothers 2004; Buxton

2006), and various other issues.

There are three common models for describing the pathways by which transnational

advocacy networks pressure national leaders, and thus influence normative and policy change

within a state. The cascade model comes from regime theory and argues that policies reflected


5/48

states to adopt policy reform. States are still the main targets and source of coercive pressure.

Local governments are largely ignored.

There are relatively few studies on transnational campaigns seeking policy change at the

subnational level. Notable exceptions include those that study the Agenda 21 campaign related

to sustainable development that emerged from the 1992 Rio Earth Summit (Bulkeley and Betsill

2003; Barrett and Usui 2002; Evans and Theobald 2003; Bulkeley and Kern 2006). The

sustainable cities literature in particular examines local governments and their role as both

campaign targets and activists in networks of local governments advocating environmentally

sustainable policies (Bulkeley 2010; Bulkeley and Betsill 2003; Toly 2008; Haughton and

Hunter 1994). These and other recent studies ascribing a greater role to subnational actors have

called for a multilevel approach to analyzing global governance, one that recognizes the complex

interactions among actors at the subnational, national, and transnational levels (Betsill and

Bulkeley 2006; Martin 2010).

This paper differs from existing studies in two ways. First, studies of campaigns

targeting local governments focus overwhelmingly on large urban areas in highly industrialized


6/48

relative lack of state involvement, either as target or activist. Instead, these cases suggest a

model characterized by direct interaction among transnational and subnational actors.

Integrated Watershed Management & Ecosystem Services

The consolidation of sustainable development as a dominant international norm during

the 1990s brought to prominence a particular approach to watershed management called

Integrated Watershed Management (IWM), also known as Integrated Water Resources

Management (IWRM) when the focus is more directly on a watersheds water resources.5

IWM

is defined as the process of coordinating conservation, management and development of water,

land and related natural resources across sectors within a given watershed in order to maximize

the resultant economic and social benefits in an equitable manner while ensuring the

sustainability of related ecosystems.6

The IWM approach is integrated in that water is seen as integrated within the larger

ecosystem, and thus requires a holistic approach that recognizes the interaction between water

resources and other components of the ecosystem, including vegetation, soil, and biodiversity

(ECE 2004; Gregersen et al. 2007). Water is typically framed in terms of ecosystem services,


7/48

(Clleri 2009). These ecosystem services link the conservation and sustainable use of forests and

pramos with the quantity and quality of water available to communities down stream. Given

this ecosystem approach, watershed management activities are framed in terms of protecting and

recuperating the ecosystem services within watersheds (Garzn 2009; Cordero 2008; Ravnborg

et al. 2007). To achieve an equitable balance among the competing uses of watershed resources,

IWM calls for all stakeholders to be included in decision making through a participatory process

(Jaspers 2003; Gleick 1998).

Local IWM Reforms in Ecuador: Measuring Success

The IWM reforms analyzed here involve the creation of new policies and institutions to

implement the IWM approach. In particular, I analyze two institutional reforms. The first

involves the creation of a local financing mechanism designed to provide stable funding for the

protection and recuperation of ecosystem services provided within a watershed. While these

mechanisms are often referred to as payment for ecosystem services (PES), most are not

strictly PES systems.8 Rather, they cover a broad array of instruments for protecting and

regulating watershed ecosystem services. These financing mechanisms vary in terms of the


8/48

IWM activities, which are therefore not dependent on the vagaries of outside donors. Third, the

financing mechanisms are controlled and managed by local actors.

The second institutional reform is the creation of a local, participatory mechanism that

includes multiple stakeholders in the watershed management decision-making process. Examples

include watershed councils and management committees (Lpez et al. 2007; Lloret 2007;

Dourojeanni et al. 2002). The particular design and structure of the participatory mechanism

varies from case to case, but at a minimum each provides a forum for multiple stakeholders to

jointly identify problems, set priorities, and oversee watershed management activities.

To measure the success of IWM reforms I developed an index of 15 indicators

representing four qualities associated with good governance: consensus, inclusiveness,

effectiveness, and sustainability (see Appendix 1). These measurements are consistent not only

with those found in other studies of watershed management (Sabatier 2005; Pea and Solanes

2003; Ostrom 1999), but also with indicators used by scholars studying local governance in

general. Effectiveness is at the core of most definitions of good governance (Grindle 2007;

World Bank 2007; Crook and Manor 1998). Consensus and inclusiveness capture the elements


9/48

successful, two cases (Ibarra and Pastaza) were relatively unsuccessful, and the results in Zamora

were mixed.

The Transnational IWM Network: Forming Coalitions in Ecuador

Ecuador is a good place to study IWM reforms because it is the site of two pioneering

reform models in Latin America. While Costa Rica pioneered a national level PES program in

1997 (Pagiola 2006), two of the first voluntary, decentralized mechanisms for protecting

watershed ecosystem services emerged in Ecuador (Albn and Wunder 2005). In 2000, the

municipality of Pimampiro launched its PES program to protect the watershed where its drinking

water originates.9

The same year, the Fund for the Conservation of Watersheds (FONAG) was

established in Quito to finance and manage conservation and ecologically sustainable


10/48

directly, FONAG invests donations from water consumers in a trust fund used to finance a

variety of projects to protect and restore watershed resources.

The six cases analyzed in this paper constitute attempts to replicate the Pimampiro and

FONAG models throughout Ecuador. A separate transnational advocacy coalition was

established around each model with the goal of replicating that model through a series of

campaigns. The two coalitions emerged from separate strands of the transnational IWM network,

one linked to the Global Water Partnership and the other linked to the UN Food and Agriculture

Organization (FAO). I argue that the pattern of network coalitions explains the variation in

which IWM reform model was pursued in a given area.

The emergence of the transnational IWM network as part of the larger sustainable

development movement has been well documented elsewhere (Conca 2006, 2007; Rahaman and

Varis 2005; Tern 2005). Efforts to craft an international consensus on the IWM approach

occurred through a series of international conferences, most notably the 1992 International

Conference on Water and Environment in Dublin, the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and

Development in Rio de Janeiro, the 2000 and 2003 World Water Forums, and the 2002


11/48

transnational network emerged and reached into Ecuador, where it promoted its IWM agenda

with significant effect. Three major IGOsthe World Bank, UNDP, and FAOserved as nodes

for the transnational IWM network. Out of these, two distinct advocacy networks emerged in

Ecuador, each promoting an alternative IWM model.

The GWP Network

The Global Water Partnership (GWP) was created in 1996 as a joint initiative of the

World Bank, the UNDP, and the Swedish International Development Agency to institutionalize a

global water governance regime based on the principles and action plans developed in Dublin

and Rio de Janeiro. GWPs activities initially focused on establishing regional Technical

Advisory Committees as start engines for raising awareness of water resources management in

each region (GWP 2010). The GWPs South American Technical Advisory Committee

(SAMTAC) was initially a project of the UNs Economic Commission for Latin America and the

Caribbean (CEPAL, for the Spanish acronym). A number of water experts based in CEPALs

Division of Natural Resources and Infrastructure served as SAMTAC members. These CEPAL

expertsmost notably, Axel Dourojeanni, Miguel Solanes, and Humberto Peawere


12/48

a strategic alliance with CEPAL to promote its development policies, including integrated

watershed management, throughout Latin America.13

During the 1990s, Ecuadorian development activists were influenced by the ideas

emerging from CEPAL due to their membership in the epistemic community of water experts

(Haas 1992). For example, writings by Dourojeanni framing IWM as a way to minimize water

conflicts attracted the attention of experts in rural development organizations like CESA and

IEDECA, whose work was complicated by severe water conflicts in Ecuadors mountain region

(Cabezas 2010).14

As a result, local development organizations shifted their focus from technical

improvements of water delivery systems toward a holistic approach that incorporated the social

component of resource management and linked the conservation of watershed resources to

improved irrigation and production (Chontasi 2009; Cruz 2009). This shift in worldview and

strategy led local development NGOs to advocate IWM reforms throughout the Andean region.

Two key brokers illustrate the various connections between the GWP network and

Ecuadorian institutions involved in IWM reform. One is Pablo Lloret, an Ecuadorian water

expert who became FONAGs Technical Secretary and a president of GWP-SAMTAC (GWP


13/48

of the Technical University of Loja (UTPL), the institution in charge of coordinating GWPs

Ecuadorian network. Lpez is also a founder of Arcoiris, a local environmental NGO that, along

with UTPL, has been promoting FONAG-style water funds throughout southern Ecuador. As

both an environmental activist and technical expert Lpez is emblematic of GWPs influence

with both Ecuadors environmental advocacy network and its network of development experts.

Coalition to Create FONAG and Replicate the Model

The coalition to develop FONAG and similar trust funds for protecting watershed

ecosystems in Ecuador emerged from the merging of three trends: (1) the rise of ecosystem

services as part of the IWM agenda described above; (2) the international environmental agenda

to promote national parks and protected areas; and (3) the rise of Ecuadors environmental

movement around the conservation of national parks.17

The environmental movement in Ecuador developed around a conservationist agenda

closely linked to the creation of national parks, an agenda that was strongly pushed by

transnational environmental actors. During the 1970s a number of IGOs (e.g., World Bank,

FAO, and the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources - IUCN)


14/48

environmental NGO, Fundacin Natura (Nature Foundation), founded in 1978. Fundacin

Natura grew rapidly due to large grants from USAID and money from debt-for-nature swaps

engineered by WWF (Meyer 1993; Echavarria 2010). During the 1990s the growing interest in

conservation throughout Ecuador and a desire to access resources from external NGOs and donor

agencies led to an explosion of local environmental NGOs (Ortiz Crespo 1998).

The idea to create FONAG can be traced to Juan Black, a long-time Ecuadorian

conservationist. Black was the first conservation officer in the Galapagos Islands and later

directed Fundacin Antisana (FUNAN), a local NGO created to protect the Cayambe-Coca and

Antisana ecological reserves (Morton 2004). In 1992 Black became director of TNCs Latin

American regional office, based in Quito, working on the USAID-funded Sustainable Use of

Biological Resources (SUBIR) program. At the time, Ecuadorian conservationists and their

transnational allies were concerned with how to fund the parks system in Ecuador. Like many

developing countries, Ecuadors government devoted few resources to conserving protected

areas. It was Black who first developed the idea that the Cayambe-Coca and Antisana ecological

reserves should be compensated for the water they funnel to Quito (Echavarria 2010).


15/48

watersheds had been established (Echavarria 2010). In this way concepts related to IWM and

ecosystem services coalesced with Ecuadors movement to fund the national parks system.

Troya, Jervis and Echavarra designed the proposal for FONAG drawing on ideas from

national-level programs in other countries as well as publications by ecosystem services scholars

like Robert Costanza.18

In 1998 TNC, Fundacin Antisana, and USAID presented the proposal,

which received strong political support in Quito, largely because the transnational environmental

network reached far into the municipal government (Troya and Curtis 1998; Arias 2009). Then-

mayor Roque Sevilla was an environmental activist who had served as Director of WWF and

President of Fundacin Natura. With Sevilla providing the political will, FONAG was created in

2000, with the municipal water company, EMAAP-Q, taking a strong leadership role.

The intention to replicate the FONAG model throughout Ecuador was present from the

beginning, and TNC began organizing campaigns almost immediately (Troya and Curtis 1998;

Echavarria 2010). They first promoted FONAG through a series of publications and

conferences, including through CAMAREN and the Water Resources Forum. TNC enlisted the

support of USAID, which began funding experts from TNC, FONAG and universities like UTPL


16/48

A second transnational advocacy coalition promoting IWM reforms in Ecuador

developed out of FAOs Community Forestry Development program (DFC, for its Spanish

acronym). Beginning in the 1970s the focus on sustainable and human development led

FAO to adopt new goals, such as poverty reduction and environmental sustainability (Prez-

Foguet et al. 2005). Community level forestry management became a basic component of

FAOs poverty reduction strategy and seen as essential to an integrated approach to natural

resource management (Tllez 2008). This sparked a rapid diffusion of projects based on

community forestry development with the goal of satisfying the material and non-material

needs of men and women farmers through improved management of water, soils, animals, and

vegetation (Kenny-Jordon et al. 1999).

The statement of principles regarding forests at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit recognized

the importance of forests for socio-economic development and called for international

cooperation to promote sustainable forestry in developing countries (UNCED 1992b).

Community forestry development programs were prioritized as the best way to implement

Agenda 21s action plan for sustainable agriculture and rural development (Espinoza et al. 1999).


17/48

Since FAO was one of the major nodes around which the transnational IWM network

formed (Conca 2006), it is not surprising that Ecuadors pioneering PES scheme grew out of

FAOs DFC program.21

The PES program was originally proposed as part of the forest

management plan developed through DFC for the watershed providing water to the city of

Pimampiro (Albn and Wunder 2005). In 1997 several Ecuadorian DFC technicians founded the

local NGO CEDERENA (the Ecological Corporation for the Development of Renewable Natural

Resources) to facilitate community management of natural resources and ecosystem services

(Echavarria et al. 2004). In 1999, while working with Pimampiro landowners on a forest

management plan, CEDERENA experts identified a number of alternatives for the sustainable

use of forests, including PES. They included this innovative element after reading about Costa

Ricas PES system (CEDERENA 2002; Aazco 2011). After gaining the support of rural

landowners and city-dwellers, the Municipality of Pimampiro launched its PES program in 2000.

With support from FAO, the Inter-American Foundation, and CEDERENA, the municipality set

up a watershed management fund financed by a drinking water tax. Since then, money from the

fund has been paid to the watersheds landowners to compensate them for protecting the


18/48

Local IWM Campaigns: Targets, Power, and Pathways of Influence

During the 2000s coalitions organized around TNC and CEDERENA each launched

campaigns to replicate their respective IWM models in different Ecuadorian cantons. The IWM

campaigns were like all transnational advocacy campaigns in that IWM advocates constituted

social entrepreneurs promoting new norms, in this case regarding natural resource management.

They targeted individuals engaging in bad behaviors (e.g., deforestation, burning pramos to

expand agriculture, and contamination of streams) and pressured them to change. However, there

were important differences between the sources of pressure and pathways of influence available

to IWM advocates and those described by the models commonly cited in the TAN literature.

Each local IWM campaign targeted three groups of subnational actors: local politicians

(the mayor and council members), landowners (individuals and communities living in the

watersheds catchment area), and users (water consumers, such as households, irrigation

councils, hydro-electric companies, and other businesses). These targets were not vulnerable to

the same sorts of external pressure described in models where campaign targets are leaders of

states, megacities, or international companies. Local governments in Ecuador are not well


19/48

consequences since the goal of IWM reforms was to develop local sources of financing rather

than rely on external donations. As a result, IWM campaigns relied much more on persuasion

through the use of ideational power rather than coercion.

According to Deere (2009), ideational power is exercised when actors seek to influence,

alter, or build: (a) expertise, knowhow, and institutional capabilities, and (b) beliefs,

understandings, and discourse. IWM advocates exercised ideational power through three

mechanisms: network construction, strategic framing, and capacity building.22

Network

construction occurred through the creation of knowledge communitiesthe training of

watershed management experts and community promoters within local government and

community organizations. These local promoters served as important brokers between the

transnational IWM network and targeted groups.

Strategic framing was used to influence the discourse surrounding the issue of watershed

management and produce the motivation among targeted actors to support the reform process.

This involved identifying a problem and assigning blame (diagnostic framing), offering IWM

reforms as the most credible solution (prognostic framing), and creating a sense of urgency and a


20/48

Through these mechanisms IWM advocates influenced how local governments

understood their environmental management obligations and options; altered perceptions of the

political climate and actors room to maneuver within it; shaped local perceptions regarding the

state of ecosystem services and the value of these services for production and socio-economic

development; and persuaded local actors of the importance of establishing IWM reforms. In

short, they created the motivation and capacity to reform.

Pressure from Beside: the Clockmaker Model.

In the cascade, boomerang, and spiral models, coercive pressure is placed on resistant

targets from above, through IGOs and more powerful states. Once a political space is opened

up, pressure is also exerted from below, since the targets are national-level leaders. But in

Ecuadors local IWM reforms the transnational coalition did not appeal to outside actors to

pressure recalcitrant targets since there was little vulnerability to such pressure. Rather, when

faced with resistance they attempted to persuade each of the targeted groups to pressure the

others. IWM advocates attempted to persuade local governments to pressure resistant landowners

and water users, for example, through the enforcement of ordinances and threats to expropriate


21/48

exerted pressure, the clock (IWM reform process) ran. If one of the cogs stopped working, the

reform process broke down. In this metaphor the transnational advocacy coalition was like a

clockmaker that synchronized the cogs and wound the clock by creating the motivation and

capacity to participate in reforms through the mechanisms associated with ideational power.

Figure 2: Clockmaker Model of IWM Reform

Winding the Clock: A Process Model of Local IWM Campaigns

Like other examples of global governance, the transnational campaigns to establish local


22/48

Richard Sarango, an IWM advocate in El Chaco, summed up the process quite succinctly

by saying, first you have to have the commitment of the technical experts to address this issue

[watershed management]. Later, you then convince the politicians. And then after this you work

to convince the people (Sarango 2010, my translation). As in the boomerang and spiral models,

transnational IWM advocates need domestic support. The first step, then, is to activate local

coalitions by creating alliances with local technical experts and environmental activists who

become the heart of each local IWM campaign. Once the local coalition is established, the next

step is to lobby local politicians since they serve as gatekeepers. However, the people

(landowners and water users) are the main targets since it is their behavior that IWM advocates

seek to change.

Phase 1: Local Coalition Activation

The first stage involves the decision to promote IWM reforms in a particular watershed

and the activation of a local coalition to pursue that goal. This happens through network

connections between local actors, who identify problems regarding natural resource use in a

particular area, and the transnational IWM network, which offers solutions based on IWM


23/48

In each case, local actors identified problems related

to natural resource management in their respective

watersheds. In Tungurahua, Celica, and Ibarra, which

are located in the drought-plagued Andean highlands,

locals became concerned with access to and conflicts

over water. In the Amazon cantons of El Chaco and

Zamora, where water is plentiful, local concerns

related to the protection of neighboring ecological

reserves. In Pastaza, also in the Amazon region, local

landowners observed with alarm the effects of

deforestation and water contamination, including

reduced access to water in the city.24

In each case it was external IWM advocates who recommended specific IWM reforms as

a solution to these locally identified problems. In Tungurahua it was GTZs Project for


24/48

based on IWM concepts. GTZ also facilitated the transfer of IWM concepts to Ibarra, albeit in

an indirect way. In the 1990s, PROFAFOR began working with the local community of Zuleta

to protect the pramos providing much of the water for the city of Ibarra. The wife of

PROFAFORs president is Doris Cordero, a Costa Rican expert on PES systems who worked for

GTZ on PROMACH in Tungurahua. Based on Corderos experience, PROFAFOR developed a

proposal to establish a PES program in Ibarra.

Efforts to establish a FONAG-style water fund in Zamora began in 2001 when Arturo

Jimenez, then-Director of the local conservation NGO Arcoiris, attended a conference on

FONAG hosted by TNC. It was there that Jimenez learned about financing mechanisms for

watershed management and decided to pursue something similar in Zamora (Jimenez 2010).

Over the following years Arcoiris, with support from TNC and FONAG, organized various local

actors, particularly technical experts within local universities and the municipal government, to

develop a coordinated strategy for pursuing IWM reforms. It was CEDERENA, and specifically

PES expert Robert Yaguache, who introduced the PES model to El Chaco and Celica as a

solution to their water-related problems. CEDERENA was looking for places to replicate its


25/48

issues, organized social groups around these issues, and trained local community promoters who

later became IWM coalition members. The two most successful cases, Tungurahua and Celica,

illustrate this network construction process well. During the 1980s and 1990s programs such as

CAREs Project for the Sustainable Use of Andean Lands (PROMUSTA), IEDECAs

Conservation of Natural Resources and Irrigation in the Ambato Watershed (CORICAM), and

GTZs PROMACH organized landowners and water users and trained community promoters to

advance sustainable natural resource management techniques. A similar process occurred in

Celica during the 1990s through the Dry Forest Project (Proyecto Bosque Seco), which emerged

from FAOs DFC program and was implemented by the Dutch development organization SNV.

This network construction process occurred to a lesser extent in Zamora through the

Podocarpus Program and related programs sponsored by TNC, the Dutch government, and local

NGOs to protect Podocarpus National Park, much of which falls within Zamoras borders. El

Chaco also experienced a flurry of activity by TNC, GTZ, and Ecuadorian NGOs working to

protect the surrounding Condor Bioreserve. The two less-successful campaigns in Pastaza and

Ibarra are notable for their lack of previous community organizing around natural resource


26/48

highly trained technical experts existed in the four more successful cases. In Pastaza, the

municipal government created its Department of Sustainable Development as the IWM coalition

was forming. Efforts to establish an EMU failed, and the department only partially focused on

environmental management. Ibarras municipal government created an EMU in 1999, but for

reasons described below only addressed contamination and not natural resource management.

It is important to emphasize that in each case the transnational IWM coalition included

actors that were both local and external to the watersheds in question. The influence of

transnational IWM coalitions on local governance should not be construed as external actors

imposing outside ideas on local actors in a hierarchical, unidirectional manner. The transnational

networks connecting coalition members constitute political spaces in which differently situated

actors negotiatethe social, cultural, and political meanings of their joint enterprise (Keck and

Sikkink 1998). While power dynamics certainly influence these negotiations, recent studies (and

the cases analyzed here) show that local actors from the global South are not powerless against

their northern counterparts; they appropriate global ideologies in distinct ways and alter the

normative underpinnings of campaigns in ways that shape strategies, goals, and outcomes (Fox


27/48

council members, since they served as gatekeepers. The proposed IWM reforms involved

institutional changes that entailed local government ordinances, resources, and enforcement, all

of which required the support of local authorities. Transnational IWM advocates used their

network connections with environmental experts in municipal government EMUs to approach

local politicians and persuade them to place IWM reforms on their agenda.

In addition to framing IWM reforms as the best solution to a locally defined problem, a

key action by IWM advocates was to persuade local governments they had the power to manage

watershed resources. This was necessary because national environmental and decentralization

legislation was ambiguous and contradictory, creating confusion about the responsibilities of

different levels of government. While municipal governments were clearly responsible for

providing potable water and sanitation services in urban areas, their ability to engage in natural

resource management in rural areas was far from clear. IWM advocates strategically interpreted

passages of national legislation to frame IWM reforms as something that local governments not

only should do, but legally could do.25

The most illustrative example comes from Article 163 of the Municipal Organic Law,


28/48

passages as justification for creating local financing and decision-making mechanisms for

integrated watershed management. By strategically interpreting national legislation as

empowering local governments to manage natural resources, and providing local governments

the motivation and capacity to do so, the IWM coalition facilitated de facto decentralization.

Break Point 1: Local Governments as Gatekeepers (e.g. Ibarra)

The first breaking point comes if the local government does not place the issue of IWM

reform on its agenda. Of the six cases analyzed, Ibarra provides the only example, and illustrates

the importance of strategically framing watershed management as a power of local government.

Ibarras municipal government created an Environmental Control and Management Unit

(ECMU) in 1999, spurred by a desire to manage natural resources in a decentralized fashion

(Trujillo 2010). In the end, however, the ECMU did not address natural resource management,

but rather focused on brown issues related to urban contamination. This is because Ecuadors

Ministry of Environment convinced the municipality that natural resource management was

outside their jurisdiction. Explaining the reason not to develop the capacity for natural resource

management, then-ECMU director Rosario Trujillo said natural resources were not within the


29/48

An opening came in 2003 through the municipal water company, EMAPA-I. The new

director, Alvaro Castillo, was a water expert trained in IWM concepts. He created an

environmental management unit within EMAPA-I, recognizing the need to protect the

watersheds that provide the companys water. It was with EMAPA-I that PROFAFOR

developed its proposal for a PES program. However, Ibarras mayor and municipal council

members chose not to move forward with the proposal, and the campaign to establish IWM

reforms effectively died (Cordero 2009; Villalba 2009, 2010).

Phase 3A: Agenda Setting and Mobilization Within Society

Once IWM advocates got the go-ahead from local authorities, the next step was typically

to approach landowners since changing their behavior was a primary goal of the campaign.

Water user groups were the third target since they (along with landowners) were asked to

collaborate by contributing to the financing mechanism, participating in decision-making bodies,

and changing the way they use natural resources. The targeting of these groups was not a linear

process; IWM advocates worked with both groups simultaneously, but they often began with

landowners. When faced with resistance among landowners, the coalition typically focused on


30/48

politicians fears by mobilizing in support of the reforms. IWM advocates facilitated this process

by conducting surveys to demonstrate landowners and users willingness to participate and pay.

Resistance among landowners came from the fact that IWM norms conflicted with

dominant local norms supporting the exploitation of natural resources to expand agricultural

production in order to reduce poverty. The idea that farmers should not expand the agricultural

frontier through deforestation, should remove their animals from the watershed, and should

change traditional production practices often bred fierce resistance. Overcoming this resistance

involved strategically framing watershed management as an integral part of the economic

production cycle, and therefore directly linked to poverty reduction. This was best illustrated in

Tungurahua, where IWM advocates linked the protection of watersheds to sufficient water for

irrigation, which would expand production, which in turn would reduce poverty through

improved marketing and sales. The results of this framing strategy are reflected in the words of a

local farmer, who said we have to work to improve the pramos because it is gold; it is what

makes the markets function. If there are improvements in my products, I can provide better

education for my children. Ill have money to go to the doctor (my translation). It was no


31/48

advocates were more successful in mobilizing support among social actors when they employed

a frame displacement strategy that redefined the hegemonic production frame to include IWM,

rather than a counterframing strategy, such as one that countered the production frame with an

alternative conservation frame.26

Break Point 2A: Failure of Social Mobilization (e.g. Pastaza)

This phase may be the most vulnerable point in the process. Even if political support is

there, the reforms cannot meaningfully move forward without social support. There is little even

local governments can do if landowners refuse to participate. Municipal governments technically

have the authority to confiscate land for conservation, forcing owners to sell at market value, but

mayors are reluctant to do this for fear of public backlash. Therefore, the main tactic has been to

mobilize social groups to pressure landowners and strengthen political support. But society may

also reject reforms, not wanting to pay an environmental tax to finance management efforts.

Gaining this social support requires an extensive and sustained education campaign that uses

strategic framing to motivate people and that mobilizes them into action by organizing events,

providing information, and building capacity through training and organization. This process is


32/48

regular contact either with landowners or society as a whole. A German intern was the only one

who regularly visited landowners, and the few outreach efforts among water users were carried

out by two U.S. Peace Corps volunteers (Garzn and Mancheno 2008; Bare 2009). The implicit

message was that the campaign was something being pushed by foreigners, without the active

support of local actors (Bare 2009). The combination of political will but a lack of social support

resulted in empty paper reforms. The local government passed an ordinance calling for

regulations on watershed resource use, the creation of a water fund, and a participatory decision-

making body to govern watershed management. But without the mobilization of social pressure

to advance these reforms they were never implemented. The IWM coalition soon disbanded.

Phase 3B: Making Rules

Institutionalizing new norms in the rules and procedures of key organizations is an

important part of the norm diffusion process (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink

1998). Once IWM coalitions succeeded in putting IWM reform on the local governments

agenda it worked with local authorities to institutionalize IWM norms through new rules,

procedures and institutions. This involved drafting ordinances to regulate land use practices as


33/48

often included in the process of gathering information and identifying needs, and less frequently

in the process of designing ordinances, financing mechanisms, and participatory decision-making

bodies. Key activities in this phase include providing information on local ecosystem services,

demographics, economic activity, and experiences with IWM reform in other cantons; providing

legal advice; and supporting particular kinds of expertise, such as valuing ecosystem services and

other elements of reform design and implementation.

Break Point 2B: Rejection of Rules (e.g Tungurahuas 2002 PES Proposal)

Even if an IWM coalition succeeds in placing IWM reform on the agenda of both local

authorities and social groups, the proposed rules may be rejected, particularly when they are

developed without the involvement of local communities and are insensitive to local cultural

conditions. This happened in Tungurahua in 2002. GTZ originally proposed a PES-style

watershed management fund in Tungurahua in 2001 to be financed by a tax on water

consumption (GTZ 2001). Prefect Fernando Naranjo supported the proposal at the provincial

meeting of the Water Resources Forum in December 2001, saying an integrated approach to

watershed management and the promotion of a payment for ecosystem services program was a


34/48

cultural traditions (Moreta 2009). The public outcry spooked the provincial government, which

quickly declared they would never accept a PES system.

Such rejection could easily spell the end of an IWM campaign. However, in

Tungurahuas case IWM advocates persevered and continued to promote an integrated approach

to watershed management sustained through a local financing mechanism. Reverting to phase 2,

they worked for five years to organize the provincial government, community and indigenous

organizations, water councils, and businesses through a more participatory process. This was

facilitated by the creation of a Water Parliament that served as a focal point for mobilizing

resources and activities and a space for stakeholders to debate and develop ideas. This Water

Parliament was part of a broader series of institutional changes within the provincial government

that were inspired by GTZs success in fostering a participatory, integrated model for governing

natural resources in the cantons of Cevallos, Tisaleo, Quero, and Mocha (Cruz 2009; Metais and

Cruz 2003; HGPT 2006).27

A turning point came in 2006 when indigenous organizations representing communities

in the pramos agreed to work with GTZ to develop their own proposal for a water fund. While


35/48

groups produced a series of proposals, GTZ served as an important broker, negotiating the

support of other stakeholders. In the end the financing mechanism was modeled on FONAG due

in part to technical support provided by TNC and FONAG. In 2007, the Fund for the

Management of Pramos and Fight Against Poverty was established as a trust fund with

voluntary contributions from the provincial government, indigenous groups (landowners), the

municipal water company, and two hydroelectric companies (user groups).

The Tungurahua case illustrates the importance of creating institutions through which

multiple stakeholders can collaborate in the rule-making phase. These linking institutions serve

as a focal point for mobilizing resources and social will, a structure for maintaining the

participation of stakeholders, and a space where local actors can tweak reform models to be more

appropriate to local circumstances. One practical implication is that IWM advocates should

worry less about which IWM reform design they propose in a given locality. While proposing

options is an important role for IWM advocates, the more important roles are building local

capacity (training locals to have expertise in these issues) and providing spaces in which

stakeholders can meet and modify a proposed model to better suit local needs and norms.


36/48

animals and human activity from catchment areas, conserving forested land, and recuperating

damaged areas. Often this happened through agreements to compensate landowners for altering

their production practices. Compensation came through the financing mechanism and could

include cash or, more commonly, in-kind benefits such as technical assistance to expand

alternate production activities and community development projects. Key activities in this phase

were providing information, technical and capacity assistance, and financing.

Break Point 3: Breakdown in Trust (e.g. Zamora)

Feedback effects mean that new problems may arise as the implementation process

creates issues that raise new challenges for rules (Avant et al. 2010). Perceptions of favoritism,

the failure to fulfill promises, and other problems with implementation can undermine trust in the

IWM coalition and the reform process in general. The case of Zamora illustrates this all too

well. Like Pastaza, attempts to mobilize support for an environmental tax among water users in

Zamora were relatively weak between 2005 and 2009 when the reforms were being designed and

implemented. The coalition member in charge of the socialization campaign lived in a

neighboring province and only came to Zamora once or twice a month, so there was little


37/48

demonstrating a level of norm internalization, they refused to work with the NGO Arcoiris,

which had led the local IWM campaign. As a result, the implementation process stalled, and by

2010 IWM advocates were trying to reestablish a workable coalition.

The breakdown in Zamora illustrates the inter-dependence of each of the three targeted

groups and demonstrates the delicate balancing act required, as described in the Clockmaker

Model. IWM advocates cannot focus on one targeted group at the expense of others. Successful

implementation requires mutual pressure to be exerted among each of the three targeted groups

simultaneously. The local government must pressure landowners to change natural resource use;

landowners must pressure water users for compensation; and water users must demand improved

services from local authorities. If IWM advocates have not synchronized each of these cogs in

the mechanism by the implementation phase, the reform process will likely break down.

Phase 5: Consolidation

This stage refers to the ability of the institutions created through the reform process to

adapt and address new issues as they arise, to deepen the level of institutionalization, to widen

the level of participation, and to expand watershed management activities. When successful it


38/48

This phase is analogous to the internalization and habituation stages described in the

norm diffusion and democratization literatures (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Rustow 1970).

IWM reforms may still be reversed and face a number of challenges, including participation

fatigue, changes in local government administrations, challenges by rival coalitions advocating

alternative norms and practices, as well as conflicts among stakeholders and governors.

However, over time, as institutions mature and stakeholders become accustomed to new rules,

policies, and practices, IWM reforms come to be accepted as the most appropriate strategy for

natural resource management. The three more successful cases analyzed in this paper

Tungurahua, Celica, and El Chacohave only just begun this consolidation phase.

Conclusion

The cases analyzed here show how global governors advocating a global agenda related

to Integrated Watershed Management significantly altered local governance structures within

Ecuador. The benefits of IWM reforms should not be overstated. Nevertheless, when

successfully implemented the participatory and financing mechanisms changed how local

governments and civil society interact and provided local actors with greater autonomy to control


39/48

The targets of subnational campaigns, particularly in the developing world, often lack the

connections with the global system that make them vulnerable to the pressures exerted by

transnational coalitions against targets operating at higher levels. As a result, transnational

actors must rely more on ideational rather than coercive forms of power. When faced with

resistance, transnational actors must look to local actors who can exploit targeted actors local

vulnerabilities. In the case of local IWM reforms this means persuading local actors to engage in

a mutually enforcing circle of pressure from beside rather than from above or below.

References

Albn, Montserrat, and Sven Wunder. 2005. "Decentralized Payments for EnvironmentalServices: Comparing the Cases of Pimampiro and PROFAFOR in Ecuador." In The ZEF-

CIFOR workshop on Payments for Environmental Services: Methods and Design inDeveloping and Developed Countries. Titisee, Germany.

Aazco, Mario, Coordinator for the Program Sustainable Forestry Management Amidst ClimateChange, UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 2011. Interview by author. Tape

recording. Quito, Ecuador, February 25.Andonova, Liliana B. 2008. "The climate regime and domestic politics: the case of Russia."

Cambridge Review of International Affairs 21 (4).Andonova, Liliana B., Michele M. Betsill, and Harriet Bulkeley. 2009. "Transnational Climate

Governance." Global Environmental Politics 9 (2):52-73.Arvalo, Jos, ed. 2003.Documentos de discussion: Foro de los Recursos Hdricos Segundo

Encuentro Nacional. Quito, Ecuador: Consorcio CAMAREN.


40/48

Barrera, Augusto. 2007. "Agotamiento de la descentralizacin y oportunidades de cambio en elEcuador." InLa descentralizacin en el Ecuador: opciones comparadas, ed. F. Carrin.

Quito: FLACSO Ecuador.Barrett, Brendan, and Mikoto Usui. 2002. "Local Agenda 21 in Japan: Transforming Local

Governance."Local Environment7 (1):49-67.Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow. 2000. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An

Overview and Assessment."Annual Review of Sociology 26:611-39.Betsill, Michele M., and Harriet Bulkeley. 2006. "Cities and the Multilevel Governance of

Global Climate Change." Global Governance 12:141-59.Boelens, Rutgerd, and Margreet Zwarteveen. 2005. "Prices and Politics in Andean Water

Reforms."Development and Change 36 (4):735-58.Bulkeley, Harriet. 2010. "Cities and the Governing of Climate Change."Annual Review ofEnvironment and Resources 35:229-53.

Bulkeley, Harriet, and Michele Merrill Betsill. 2003. Cities and climate change: urbansustainability and global environmental governance. London; New York: Routledge.

Bulkeley, Harriet, and Kristine Kern. 2006. "Local Government and the Governing of Climate

Change in Germany and the UK." Urban Studies 43 (12):2237-59.Burau, Dominique. 2002. "El Manejo del Parque Nacional Cajas: La Experiencia del Ilustre

Municipio de Cuenca." InLas reas protegidas y los pramos, ed. D. Ortiz and P. Mena.Quito: Grupo Trabajo Pramo / Abya Yala.

Buxton, Julia. 2006. "Securing Democracy in Complex Environments."Democratization 13(5):709-23.

Cabezas, Diego, Natural Resource Management Expert, Ecuadorian Center for AgriculturalServices (Central Ecuatoriana de Servicios Agrcolas CESA). 2010. Interview by

author. Tape recording. Ibarra, Ecuador, June 15.Cabrera Haro, Patricio. 2008. Gestin Integrada de los Recursos Hdricos: Buena Gobernanza

para el abastecimiento de la poblacin y la proteccin del recurso. Paper read atInternational Expo "Water and Sustainable Development" at Zaragosa, Spain.

Carothers, Thomas. 2004. Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion. Washington, DC:


41/48

practices, ed. G. S. Cheema and D. A. Rondinelli. Cambridge, MA: Ash Institute forDemocratic Governance and Innovation, John F. Kennedy School of Government.

Chontasi, Rodrigo, Natural Resource Management Expert, Instituto de Ecologa y Desarrollo delas Comunidades Andinas (IEDECA). 2009. Interview by author. Tape recording.

Ambato, Ecuador, November 10.Conca, Ken. 2006. Governing water: contentious transnational politics and global institution

building. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.Conca, Ken. 2007. "Transnational Dimensions of Freshwater Ecosystem Governance." In

Governance as a trialogue, ed. A. Turton, H. J. Hattingh, G. A. Maree, D. J. Roux, M.Claassen and W. F. Strydom. Berlin; New York: Springer.

Cordero, Doris. 2008. "Esquemas de pagos por servicios ambientales para la conservacin decuencas hidrogrficas en el Ecuador."Investigacin Agraria: Sistemas y RecursosForestales 2008 17 (1):54-66.

Cordero, Doris, Forest Program Officer, IUCN. 2009. Interview by author. Tape recording.

Quito, Ecuador, August 19.Costanza, Robert, Ralph dArge, Rudolf de Groot, Stephen Farberk, Monica Grasso, Bruce

Hannon, Karin Limburg, Shahid Naeem, Robert V. ONeill, Jose Paruelo, Robert G.Raskin, Paul Suttonkk, and Marjan van den Belt. 1997. "The value of the worlds

ecosystem services and natural capital."Nature 387:253-60.Costanza, Robert, and Carl Folke. 1997. "Valuing ecosystem services with efficiency, fairness,

and sustainability as goals." InNature's services: societal dependence on naturalecosystems, ed. G. Daily. Washington, DC: Island Press.

Cremers, Leontien, Marjolein Ooijevaar, and Rutgerd Boelens. 2005. "Institutional reform in theAndean irrigation sector: Enabling policies for strengthening local rights and water

management."Natural Resources Forum 29 (1):37-50.Crespo, Patricio. 2003. "Propuesta de gua tcnica y metodolgica para la realizacin de

inventarios de agua." InForo de los Recursos Hdricos: Segundo Encuentro Nacional,ed. J. Arvalo. Quito: CAMAREN.

Crook, Richard, and James Manor. 1998.Democracy and Decentralization in South Asia and


42/48

Dourojeanni, Axel, and Andrei Jouravlev. 1999. "Gestin de cuencas y ros vinculados concentros urbanos." ed. D. d. R. N. y. Energa. Santiago, Chile: Comisin Econmica para

Amrica Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).Dourojeanni, Axel, Andrei Jouravlev, and Guillermo Chvez. 2002. "Gestin del agua a nivel de

cuencas: teora y prctica." In recursos naturales e infraestructura. Santiago, Chile:CEPAL, Divisin de Recursos Naturales e Infraestructura.

Drahos, Peter. 2007. "Four Lessons for Developing Countries From the Trade Negotiations OverAccess to Medicines."Liverpool Law Review 28 (1):1139.

ECE, (Economic Commission for Europe). 2004. "Water-related Ecosystems: Features,Functions and the Need for a Holistic Approach to Ecosystem Protection and

Restoration." In Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercoursesand International Lakes. Seminar on the Role of Ecosystems as Water Suppliers. Geneva:United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Secretariat.

Echavarria, Marta, Director, EcoDecisin. 2010. Interview by author. Tape recording. Quito,

Ecuador, October 15.Echavarria, Marta, Joseph Vogel, Montserrat Albn, and Fernanda Meneses. 2004. The impacts

of payments for watershed services in Ecuador: Emerging lessons from Pimampiro andCuenca. London: International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).

Espinoza, Nelson, Javier Gatica, and James Walter Smyle. 1999.El pago de serviciosambientales y el desarrollo sostenible en el medio rural. San Jose, Costa Rica: UnidadRegional de Asistencia Tcnica (RUTA).

Evans, Bob, and Kate Theobald. 2003. "LASALA: Evaluating Local Agenda 21 in Europe."

Journal of Environmental Planning and Management46 (5):781-94.Falcon, Fander, and Pabel Muoz. 2007. "En busqueda de salidas a la crisis tica, poltica y de

pensamient." InLa descentralizacin en el Ecuador: opciones comparadas, ed. F.Carrin. Quito: FLACSO Ecuador.

Falleti, Tulia Gabriela. 2010.Decentralization and subnational politics in Latin America. NewYork: Cambridge University Press.

Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. "International Norms and Political Change."


43/48

Pambay." Puyo, Ecuador: Fundacin Natura; Municipio de Pastaza; CODEAMA;Servicio Forestal Ambiental.

Gleick, Peter H. 1998. The World's Water 1998-99:The Biennial report on FreshwaterResources. Washington, DC: Island Press.Gregersen, Hans M. , Peter F. Ffolliott, and Kenneth N. Brooks. 2007.Integrated Watershed

Management: Connecting People to their Land and Water. Cambridge, MA: CABIPublishing.

Grindle, Merilee S. 2007. Going Local: Decentralization, Democratization, and the Promise ofGood Governance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

GTZ. 2001. "Fondo Para el Manejo Integral de Cuencas Hidrogrficas de la Provincia del

Tungurahua." Ambato, Ecuador: GTZ-Promach.GWP. 2010.History of GWP. Global Water Partnership 2010 [cited October 30 2010]. Available

from http://www.gwp.org/en/About-GWP/History/.GWP. 2011. GWP en Ecuador. Global Water Partnership, 2008 2011a [cited February 25 2011].

Available from www.gwpsudamerica.org/paises_ecuador.asp.GWP. 2011. Sobre SAMTAC. Global Water Partnership, 2008 2011b [cited February 25 2011].

Available from www.eclac.org/cgi-bin/getprod.asp?xml=/samtac/noticias/paginas/2/23262/P23262.xml&xsl=/samtac/tpl/p18

f-st.xsl&base=/samtac/tpl/top-bottom.xsl.GWP, Global Water Partnership. 2003. "La Gobernabilidad de La Gestin del Agua en el

Ecuador." Quito: GWP-SAMTAC.Haas, Peter J. 1992. "Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy

coordination."International Organization 46 (1):1-35.Haughton, Graham, and Colin Hunter. 1994. Sustainable cities. London: J. Kingsley Publishers.Haunss, Sebastian, and Lars Kohlmorgen. 2008. "Political claims-making in IP conflicts." In

ECPR 2008 Joint Sessions of Workshops, Workshop 14 The Politics of Intellectual

Property. Rennes, France.Hawkins, Darren. 2002. "Human Rights Norms and Networks in Authoritarian Chile." In

Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms, ed. S. Khagram, J. V. Riker and


44/48

Jnch-Clausen, Torkil. 2004. "Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) and WaterEfficiency Plans by 2005: Why, What and How?". Stockholm: Global Water Partnership.

Kareiva, Peter, and John Weins. 2005. "Ecosystem Services and conservation: A scienceperspective." Arlington, VA: The Nature Conservancy.

Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998.Activists beyond borders: advocacy networks ininternational politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Kenny-Jordon, Charles B., Carlos Herz, Mario Aazco, and Miguel Andrade. 1999.PioneeringChange: Community Forestry in the Andean Highlands. Quito, Ecuador: UN Food andAgriculture Organization.

Khagram, Sanjeev. 2002. "Restructuring the Global Politics of Development: The Case of

Indias Narmada Valley Dams." In Transnational Social Movements, Networks, andNorms, ed. S. Khagram, J. V. Riker and K. Sikkink. Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press.

Krchnak, Karin M. 2007. "Watershed Valuation as a Tool for Biodiversity Conservation."

Arlington, VA: The Nature Conservancy.Larson, Anne M., and Fernanda Soto. 2008. "Decentralization of Natural Resource Governance

Regimes."Annual Review of Environment and Resources 33:213-39."Ley de Regimen Municipal." 1971. In Codificacin No. 000. RO/ Sup 331, ed. A. N. d.

Ecuador. Quito, Ecuador: Registro Oficial, Gobierno de Ecuador.Lloret, Pablo. 2007. "Creacin del consejo de Cuenca del Paute, alternativa de gobernabilidad

del agua en el Ecuador."Aquaforum 11 (45):19-25.Lloret, Pablo, Technical Secretary, The Water Conservation Fund (Fondo para la Conservacion

del Agua FONAG). 2009. Interview by author. Tape recording. Quito, Ecuador, August24.

Lpez, Vctor, ed. 2008.Memoria de la Jornada 'Descentralizacin, Gestin Ambiental yConservacin'. Quito: EcoCiencia.

Lpez, Vctor, Janett Ulloa, and Cristina Herdoza. 2007. Gestin Democrtica de los RecursosNaturales. Sistematizacin del proyecto Conservacin a travs del fortalecimiento decapacidades de actores locales en la Bioreserva del Cndor. El Chaco y Gonzalo


45/48

Moreno-Jaimes, Carlos. 2007. "Do Competitive Elections Produce Better-Quality Governments?Evidence from Mexican Municipalities, 1990-2000."Latin American Research Review

42 (2):136-53.Moreta, Carlos, Former President, Indigenous Movement of Tungurahua-Atocha (MITA). 2009.

Interview by author. Tape recording. Ambato, Ecuador, November 18.Morton, Jeff. 2004. "Clarification and Unification: A Rapid Assessment of the Condor

Bioreserve, Ecuador."Journal of Sustainable Forestry 18 (2/3):91-106.O'Neill, Kathleen. 2005.Decentralizing the State: elections, parties, and local power in the

Andes. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.Ortiz Crespo, Fernando. 1998. "Tres lustros menos para salvar la Tierra?" InHoy: 15 Aos

(1982-1997). Quito, Ecuador: Diario Hoy.Ostrom, Elinore. 1999. "Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the InstitutionalAnalysis and Development Framework." In Theories of the Policy Process, ed. P. A.Sabatier. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Pagiola, Stefano. 2006. "Payments for Environmental Services in Costa Rica." Washington, DC:The World Bank.

Pagiola, Stefano, and Gunars Platais. 2007. "Payments for Environmental Services: From Theoryto Practice." Washington, DC: World Bank.

Paulson, Susan. 1998.Desigualdad Social y Degradacin Ambiental en Amrica latina.Programa Bosques, rboles y Comunidades Rurales. Quito, Ecuador: Abya-Yala.Pauta, Elizabeth, Environmental Management Expert, Fondo Procuencas. 2010. Interview by

author. Tape recording. Zamora, Ecuador, February 10.

Pea, Humberto, and Miguel Solanes. 2003. "La Gobernabilidad Efectiva del Agua en lasAmricas, un Tema Crtico." InIII Foro Mundial del Agua. Kyoto, Japan.

Prez De Mora, Susana. 2009. "Modelo de Gestin de la Mancomunidad Frente Sur Occidental(FSO) Provincia de Tungurahua." Ambato, Ecuador: GTZ-Gesoren.

Prez-Foguet, Agust, M. Morales, and A. Saz-Carranza. 2005.Introduccin a la Cooperacin alDesarrollo para las ingenieras. Una propuesta para el estudio. Barcelona: UPC -Ingeniera Sin Fronteras.


46/48

Riker, James V. 2002. "NGOs, Transnational Networks, International Donor Agencies, and theProspects for Democratic Governance in Indonesia." In Transnational Social Movements,

Networks, and Norms, ed. S. Khagram, J. V. Riker and K. Sikkink. Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press.Risse, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. 1999. The Power of Human Rights:

International Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Rustow, Dankwart. 1970. "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model." Comparative

Politics 2 (3):337-63.Sabatier, Paul A. 2005. Swimming upstream: collaborative approaches to watershed

management. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Sarango, Richard, Sustainable Development Expert, Sustainable Development Unit, MunicipalGovernment of El Chaco. 2010. Interview by author. Tape recording. El Chaco, Ecuador,

April 23.Shah, Anwar, and Theresa Thompson. 2004. "Implementing Decentralized Local Governance: A

treacherous road with potholes, detours and road closures." In World Bank PolicyResearch Working Paper 3353. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Snow, David A. 2007. "Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields." In The BlackwellCompanion to Social Movements, ed. D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule and H. Kriesi. Malden,

MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.Snow, David A., and Robert D. Benford. 1988. "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant

Mobilization."International Social Movement Research 1:197217.Solanes, Miguel, and Axel Dourojeanni. 1995. "Mercados de Derechos de Agua." Debate

Agrario 21:15-36.Tarrow, Sidney. 2005. The New Transnational Activism. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge

University Press.Tllez, Jorge. 2008. Aproximacin a los Proyectos de Desarrollo Forestal Desde el Dilogo Entre

Los Sistemas de Conocimiento y los Intereses Involucrados, Escuela Tcnica Superior deIngenieros Agrnomos y de Montes, Universidad de Crdoba, Crdoba, Espaa.

Tern, Juan Fernando. 2005.La sequedad del ajuste: Implicaciones de la gobernanza global del


47/48

UNCED, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. 1992b. "Report of theUnited Nations Conference on Environment and Development Annex III: Non-Legally

Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles For a Global Consensus on theManagement, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests." Rio

de Janeiro, Brazil: UN Conference on Environment and Development.UNECE, (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe). 2007.Recommendations on

Payments for Ecosystem Services in Integrated Water Resources Management. NewYork: United Nations.

UNEP. 2004.Integrated Watershed Management: Ecohydrology & Phytotechnology. Osaka,Japan: United Nations Environment Programme.

Van Cott, Donna Lee. 2008.Radical Democracy in the Andes. New York: Cambridge UniversityPress.Villalba, Diego, Director of the Environmental Management Unit, EMAPA-I. 2009. Interview by

author. Tape recording. Ibarra, Ecuador, September 11.

Villalba, Diego, Director of the Environmental Management Unit, EMAPA-I. 2010. Interview byauthor. Tape recording. Ibarra, Ecuador, June 3.

Warren, Meagan, Peace Corps Volunteer. 2010. Interview by author. Tape recording. Quito,Ecuador, February 18.

World Bank. 2007.A Decade of Measuring the Quality of Governance. Washington, DC: TheWorld Bank.

Wunder, Sven. 2008. "Necessary Conditions for Ecosystem Service Payments." InEconomicsand Conservation in the Tropics: A Strategic Dialogue. San Francisco: ConservationStrategy Fund.

Yaguache, Robert. 2002. La Comunalizacin de la Propuesta Desarrollo Forestal Comunal en los

Andes del Ecuador: Una Accin Bsica para su Sostenibilidad, Centro de DesarrolloSustentable, Universidad Catolica de Temuco, Temuco, Chile.

Yaguache, Robert, Natural Resource Management Expert, CEDERENA. 2010. Interview byauthor. Tape recording. Loja, Ecuador, January 20.

Zoebisch, Michael, Khin Mar Cho, San Hein, and Runia Mowla, eds. 2005.Integrated


48/48

Appendix 1: Index of Indicators Measuring Success of IWM Reforms

Governance

ConceptIndicator Tungurahua Celica El Chaco Zamora Ibarra Pastaza

Consensus

General consensus among local authorities, water users and landowners on broadprinciples and goals for watershed management (reflected in statements by group

representatives and surveys).

1 1 1 1 0 0

ConsensusGeneral consensus among local authorities, water users and landowners on specific

projects and work plans (reflected in work plans developed with broad socialparticipation and endorsed by members of all three groups)

1 1 0.5 0.5 0 0

ConsensusCompensation for conservation agreements between local authorities and landowners

exist for at least 20% of landowners in the prioritized areas of the watershed. Thisincludes sales of land for conservation.

1 1 1 0.5 0.5 0

EffectivenessDevelopment of a relatively comprehensive watershed management plan with specific

projects (reflecting planning capacity)1 1 1 1 0.5 0

EffectivenessA local financing mechanism was established with an initial capital investment (i.e. the

basic structure was established and has funds)1 1 1 1 0 0

EffectivenessImplementation of the watershed management plan has begun, according to timetable

set forth in plan.1 1 1 0.5 0 0

Effectiveness Abatement or prevention of point or non-point sources of pollution (e.g. fencing offstreams, restricting animal presence)

1 1 1 1 1 0.5

Effectiveness Restoration of vegetation, reforestation, and decline in deforestation in critical areas 1 1 1 1 1 0.5

Effectiveness A monitoring system exists with capacity to sanction violators 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0

Inclusiveness

A participatory mechanism was created to link various actors (e.g. local authorities,landowners, user groups) for decision-making on watershed management; an attempt

is made to involve representatives of affected groups (whether or not all choose to

participate).

1 0.5 0.5 0 0 0

InclusivenessMembers of local government, user groups, and landowners collaborate on key

decision-making processes1 0.5 0 0 0 0

InclusivenessMembers of local government, user groups, and landowners share responsibility for

implementing watershed management projects1 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0

SustainabilityLocal actors (e.g. water users) make regular contributions to the local financing

mechanism

1 1 1 0 0 0

SustainabilityLocal government ordinance allows regulation of watersheds (e.g. fencing off streams,

prohibition on deforestation, etc).0 1 1 1 0 1

SustainabilityEnvironmental management is well institutionalized (e.g.institutional mechanisms

exist for planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of watershed

management projects, facilitated by trained technical experts).

1 1 1 0.5 0 0.5

Total Score 13.5 13 12 8.5 4.5 2.5

Scoring rules: 0 = absence of criteria; 1 = presence of criteria; 0.5 = criteria is only weakly present, technically exists but not put into practice, or was present at

one time but not sustained.

Kauffman ISA 2011

Documents

Transcript of Kauffman ISA 2011