DOYLE LOWTHER LLP KATHERINE S. DiDONATO (272704) · 2013-12-19 · Case No. 3:11-cv-01576-H-RBB...

__________________________________________________________________________________ PLTFS’ MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES 11-CV-1576-H-RBB

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DOYLE LOWTHER LLP WILLIAM J. DOYLE II (188069) JOHN A. LOWTHER IV (207000) JAMES R. HAIL (202439) SAMANTHA A. SMITH (233331) KATHERINE S. DiDONATO (272704) 10200 Willow Creek Road, Suite 150 San Diego, CA 92131 (858) 935-9960 (858) 939-1939 fax [additional counsel on signature page] Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Class

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRY HORVATH, JEREMY FORSYTHE, RONALD JOHNSON, and FRED MONTGOMERY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated;

Plaintiffs,

v. LG ELECTRONICS MOBILECOMM U.S.A., INC., a California corporation;

Defendant.

Case No. 3:11-cv-01576-H-RBB CLASS ACTION Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses, and Service Awards Date: January 13, 2014 Time: 10:30 a.m. Court: Hon. Marilyn L. Huff

Case 3:11-cv-01576-H-RBB Document 93-2 Filed 12/16/13 of 32

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction ..........................................................................................................1

II. Class Counsel’s Fee And Expense Application Should Be Approved ...............3

A. California law provides fees for successfully prosecuting consumer class

action claims ..........................................................................................................3

1. Plaintiffs are “Prevailing Plaintiffs” entitled to fees and costs under the

CLRA ..................................................................................................................4

2. Plaintiffs are a successful party entitled to fees and costs under California’s

private attorney general statute ...........................................................................5

B. The Court’s equitable basis .............................................................................6

III. An Award Of Attorneys’ Fees Is Appropriately Calculated Using The

Lodestar/Multiplier Method ......................................................................................6

IV. The Requested Fee Award Is Reasonable .........................................................7

A. Class Counsel’s lodestar is presumptively reasonable ....................................7

1. Doyle Lowther LLP total lodestar and billing judgment reduction ..............8

2. Consumer Law Group of California and Glynn Law Group ........................9

3. Class Counsel’s collective lodestar request ..................................................9

4. Class Counsel’s rates are reasonable ............................................................9

5. Class Counsel’s hours expended are reasonable ........................................11


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B. A modest lodestar enhancement is warranted ...............................................12

1. The results achieved for the class ...............................................................13

2. The novelty and difficulty of issues ...........................................................13

3. Risk of non-payment ..................................................................................15

4. Skill and experience class counsel displayed in coordinating a prompt

resolution to this Litigation ...............................................................................17

V. The Percentage-Of-The-Benefit Method Confirms The Requested Award Is

Reasonable And Appropriate ..................................................................................18

VI. The Requested Costs Are Fair And Reasonable ..............................................19

VII. The Requested Service Awards Are Fair And Reasonable ............................20

VIII. Conclusion .....................................................................................................21


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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 115 Cal. App. 4th 715 (2004) ..............................................................................19 Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984) .......................................................................................14, 17 Brazil v. Dell Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47986 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2012) .....................................11 Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans, 21 Cal. 4th 1066 (1999) .........................................................................................4 Bruno v. Quten Research Inst., LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35066 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2013) .....................................7 Buccellato v. AT&T Operations, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85699 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2011) ...................................12 Camancho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2008) ..................................................................................9 Cazares v. Saenz, 208 Cal. App. 3d 279 (1989) ................................................................................15 Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co., 342 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2003) ................................................................................3 Cicero v. DirecTV, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86920 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2010) ....................................21 Cox v. Clarus Mktg. Group, LLC, 291 F.R.D. 472 (S.D. Cal. 2013) ..........................................................................21 Cunningham v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,


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__________________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________________________ PLTFS’ MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES 11-CV-1576-H-RBB

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879 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1988) ..................................................................................7 Fischel v. Equit. Life Assurance Soc., 307 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 2002) ................................................................................15 Flannery v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 61 Cal. App. 4th 629 (1998) ..................................................................................6 Fulford v. Logitech, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144437 (N.D. Cal. March 5, 2010) ................................21 Gallucci v. Boiron, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157039 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2012) ..................................11 Garner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49477 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2010) ...................................21 Glendale City Emps.’ Ass’n, 15 Cal. 3d 328 (1975) ..........................................................................................19 Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 140 (2006) ............................................................................4, 5 Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998) ..............................................................................18 Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16 (9th Cir. 1994) ................................................................................7, 19 Hartless v. Clorox Co., 273 F.R.D. 630 (S.D. Cal. 2011) ..........................................................7, 10, 12, 18 Hemphill v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, Inc., 225 F.R.D. 616 (S.D. Cal. 2004) ..........................................................................12 Heston v. Taser Int’l., Inc., 431 Fed. Appx. 586 (9th Cir. 2011) .......................................................................6 Hogar Dulce Hogar v. Cmty. Dev. Com. of City of Escondido,


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157 Cal. App. 4th 1358 (2007) ............................................................................13 Horvath v. LG Elecs. Comms. U.S.A., Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19215 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2012) ......................................4 In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2011) ......................................................................7, 12, 18 In re Businessland Sec. Litig., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8962 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 1991) .....................................19 In re Equity Funding Corp. Sec. Litig, 438 F. Supp. 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1977) ................................................................7, 17 In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 2000) ..........................................................................20, 21 In re Omnivision Techs., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ...............................................................19 In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291 (9th Cir. 1994) ................................................................................15 Iorio v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21824 (S.D. Cal. March 3, 2011) ...................................10 Keating v. Sup. Ct., 31 Cal. 3d 584 (1982) ............................................................................................6 Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122 (2001) .............................................................................8, 10, 16 Kim v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, 149 Cal. App. 4th 170 (2007) ............................................................................4, 5 Kohler Co. v. Domainjet, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50452 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2013) ......................................10 Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc.,


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82 Cal. App. 4th 19 (2000) ......................................................................12, 16, 19 Lobatz v. U.S. W. Cellular of Cal., Inc., 222 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2000) ..............................................................................12 Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 45 Cal. 4th 634 (2009) ...........................................................................................4 Parkinson v. Hyundai Motor Am., 796 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (C.D. Cal. 2010) .............................................................6, 7 Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1989) ................................................................................19 Reveles v. Toyota by the Bay, 57 Cal. App. 4th 1139 (1997) ................................................................................4 Rodriguez v. Disner, 688 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2012) ..........................................................................18, 20 San Bernardino Valley Audubon Soc v. San Bernardino, 155 Cal. App. 3d 738 (1984) ..................................................................................7 Sanders v. City of L.A., 3 Cal. 3d 252 (1970) ............................................................................................19 Schwarz v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 73 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 1995) ....................................................................................9 Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25 (1977) .................................................................................... passim Shames v. Hertz Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158577 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2012) ...............................7, 10 State of Cal. v. Meyer, 174 Cal. App. 3d 1061 (1985) ..............................................................................12 Staton v. Boeing Co.,


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327 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2003) ................................................................................19 Steiner v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 248 Fed. Appx. 780 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2007) ......................................................12 Stern v. Gambello, 480 Fed. Appx. 867 (9th Cir. 2012) .....................................................................19 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1990) ................................................................................10 Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 901 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ......................................................................20 Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2002) ..........................................................................3, 12 Williams v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67731 (S.D. Cal. July 7, 2010) .......................................21 Williams v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 129 F. 3d 1026 (9th Cir. 1997) .............................................................................19 Statutes

Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq ....................................................................................4 Cal. Civ. Code § 1760 ...............................................................................................4 Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(e) ...........................................................................................4 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5 ...............................................................................4, 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h) ..................................................................................................3 Other Authorities

H. NEWBERG & A. CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, §12.08 (2d ed. 1993) ...19 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §14.13 (2004) ..................................3 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.7 ...............................................................7 POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 534 (4th ed. 1992) .....................................15


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I. Introduction

Plaintiffs respectfully submit this Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

Support of the Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees, Expense Reimbursement, and

Service Awards. Plaintiffs file this Motion contemporaneously with Plaintiffs’

Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Final Approval of Settlement (“Final

Approval Brief”). By this Motion, Class Counsel apply for: (1) a collective award of

attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $1,976,141.10; (2) expense reimbursement of

$30,166.01; and (2) approval of $2,500 service awards to each of the four

representative Plaintiffs.

After many months of hard-fought, arm’s length negotiations, facilitated by

Catherine A. Yanni, Esq., a highly regarded private mediator with significant

experience in mediating large, complex class actions, the Parties reached agreement

to settle this case under the terms set forth in the Settlement Agreement and Release

dated October 1, 2013 (“Settlement Agreement”) (ECF No. 89-3).1 A litigation

summary and a chronology of negotiations is set forth in the Final Approval Brief

and the Joint Declaration of John Lowther and William J. Doyle II in Support of

Motion for Final Approval of Settlement, ¶¶ 27-99 (“Joint Declaration”). The Court

has granted preliminary approval of the Settlement and approved the proposed Notice

program. (ECF No. 92.) Notice has been disseminated to over 500,000 potential

Settlement Class Members.

Once the Parties finalized the material terms regarding Settlement Class relief,

they negotiated, with guidance and oversight from Ms. Yanni, the fee-related aspects

of Settlement. Joint Declaration ¶¶ 17, 117. Although the Parties agreed on an

amount to request the Court approve for the class representatives, the Parties failed to

1 All capitalized terms shall have the same meaning as in the Settlement Agreement, unless otherwise indicated.


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agree on the attorneys’ fees and costs to be awarded to Class Counsel and instead

agreed to submit the issue to the Court. Joint Declaration, ¶ 117. Based on their work

in this case, Class Counsel requests a collective award of $1,976,141.10 for attorneys’

fees and $30,166.01 for reimbursement of expenses incurred during the Litigation.

The amount requested for fees reflects a modest 1.2 multiplier, based on the

$1,646,784.25 in lodestar Class Counsel has devoted to this case for nearly three

years.

The complexities of the Litigation, the contentious nature of the case, and the

extent and type of alleged defects at issue justify a minor multiplier to compensate

Class Counsel for the excellent results achieved for the Settlement Class. This

multiplier is well within the standard range California courts approve. Class Counsel

undertook legal representation on a contingent basis and advanced all litigation costs.

Although this case has been pending for nearly three years, Class Counsel has not yet

been paid or reimbursed for their time or costs expended on the Settlement Class’s

behalf. The requested fee and expense reimbursements are reasonable based on a

lodestar/multiplier approach, cross-checked against a reasonable percentage of the

amounts being made available to Settlement Class Members by virtue of this

Settlement.

The Settlement allows Class Counsel to request service awards for each of the

Plaintiffs (in an amount not to exceed $2,500 each) to reimburse Plaintiffs for the

time they devoted to, among other things, overseeing the Litigation, gathering

evidence, responding to discovery requests, traveling considerable distance to San

Diego and taking time off from work for settlement conferences with Magistrate

Judge Brooks, and making themselves available for additional Court appearances.

Settlement Agreement ¶ 8.2 (ECF No. 89-3). The requested amount is reasonable,

given the considerable labor each of the Plaintiffs expended for the benefit of the


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Settlement Class. Declaration of Terry Horvath, ¶¶ 2-9, Declaration of Jeremy

Forsythe, ¶¶ 2-9, Declaration of Fred Montgomery, ¶¶ 2-10, Declaration of Ronald

Johnson, ¶¶ 2-8.2 The Parties negotiated the payment of service awards to the

Plaintiffs only after agreeing on all other material Settlement terms. Joint Declaration,

¶ 17.

By this Motion, Class Counsel respectfully requests the Court award attorneys’

fees and reimbursement of costs and grant the requested service awards to the

Plaintiffs as fair and reasonable.

II. Class Counsel’s Fee And Expense Application Should Be Approved

“In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and

nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 23(h). “An award of attorneys’ fees incurred in a suit based on state substantive

law is generally governed by state law.” Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson

Co., 342 F.3d 1016, 1024 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290

F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002). Under California law, courts award reasonable

attorneys’ fees and costs where, as here, a litigant proceeding in a representative

capacity secures a “‘substantial benefit’ of a pecuniary or nonpecuniary nature” for a

class of persons. Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 38 (1977) (“Serrano III”). A. California law provides fees for successfully prosecuting

consumer class action claims “Shifting fees in a statutory-fee case serves the public policy of encouraging

private enforcement of statutory or constitutional rights.” MANUAL FOR COMPLEX

LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 14.13 (2004). In this case, two California statutes provide for

an award of attorneys’ fees, the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ.

2 Declarations are attached as Exhibits 5-8, respectively, to the Declaration of William J. Doyle II, filed concurrently herewith (“Doyle Decl.”).


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§§ 1750 et seq., and California’s Private Attorney General Statute, Cal. Code Civ.

Proc. § 1021.5.

1. Plaintiffs are “Prevailing Plaintiffs” entitled to fees and costs under the CLRA

The CLRA is “liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying

purposes, which are to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive business

practices and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such

protection.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1760. The Act includes a fee-shifting provision, which

directs courts to “award court costs and attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff in

litigation filed pursuant to this section.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(e). Plaintiffs asserted

CLRA claims against LGEMU, and CLRA claims survived LGEMU’s motion to

dismiss. Horvath v. LG Elecs. Comms. U.S.A., Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19215, at

*27-28 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2012).

The “availability of costs and attorneys fees to prevailing plaintiffs is integral

to making the CLRA an effective piece of consumer legislation, increasing the

financial feasibility of bringing suits under the statute.” Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum

L.P., 45 Cal. 4th 634, 644 (2009) (quoting Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans, 21 Cal.

4th 1066, 1086 (1999)). “Accordingly, an award of attorney fees to ‘a prevailing

plaintiff’ in an action brought pursuant to the CLRA is mandatory, even where the

litigation is resolved by a pretrial settlement agreement.” Kim v. Euromotors

West/The Auto Gallery, 149 Cal. App. 4th 170, 178-79 (2007).

In the settlement of a CLRA claim, as in this case, a plaintiff prevails if there is

a “net monetary recovery,” Reveles v. Toyota by the Bay, 57 Cal. App. 4th 1139,

1151 (1997), even where the plaintiff is “denied direct relief,” but nonetheless “has

otherwise achieved its main litigation objective.” Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales,

Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 140, 151 (2006); see also Kim, 149 Cal. App. 4th at 178-81


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(holding a plaintiff prevailed if “he obtained a net monetary recovery or because he

achieved most or all of what he wanted by filing the action or a combination of the

two.”) Id. at 181.

The Settlement Agreement provides: Defendant reserves the right to oppose the payment of some or all such [fee] amounts requested as unreasonable, but shall not challenge the entitlement to Class Counsel to request such amounts as a “prevailing party.”

¶ 8.1 (ECF No. 89-3). Both the Reveles and Graciano factors are satisfied here. First,

Plaintiffs obtained a net monetary recovery for the Settlement Class and in

combination achieved “most or all of what” they wanted in filing the action. Kim, 149

Cal. App. 4th at 180. Each Settlement Class Member is entitled to monetary relief of

$19.00 for each G2x Phone purchased, including replacement phones, which

exhibited the Shutdown Defect, the Screen Bleed Defect, or both. Settlement

Agreement ¶¶ 3.1, 3.2 (ECF No. 89-3). Second, Plaintiffs achieved their main

litigation objective by vindicating the legal rights of consumers in the Settlement

Class. The Settlement accomplishes all the Litigation’s objectives. Kim, 149 Cal. App.

4th at 178-81; Graciano, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 151.

2. Plaintiffs are a successful party entitled to fees and costs under California’s private attorney general statute

California’s private attorney general statute allows for an award of attorneys’

fees to a “successful party,” providing “in any action which has resulted in the

enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant

benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public

or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private

enforcement … [is] such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should

not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc.

§ 1021.5; see Serrano III, 20 Cal. 3d at 34.


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“Similar to California’s fee-shifting statute, the private attorney general statue

makes a plaintiff a ‘successful party’ if it achieves its litigation objectives.”

Parkinson v. Hyundai Motor Am., 796 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1170 (C.D. Cal. 2010). The

statute applies “when a plaintiff ‘acts as a true private attorney general, prosecuting a

lawsuit that enforces an important public right and confers a significant benefit,

despite the fact that his or her own financial stake in the outcome would not by itself

constitute an adequate incentive to litigate.’” Heston v. Taser Int’l., Inc., 431 Fed.

Appx. 586, 589 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Flannery v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 61 Cal.

App. 4th 629, 635 (1998)). As noted above, the Settlement confers significant

financial benefits on persons who had little economic motivation for pursuing an

individual case. B. The Court’s equitable basis

The Court may also award attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of expenses on

an equitable basis. Class actions serve the policy goals of efficient judicial

management by setting a procedure whereby one judgment covers all claimants, and

the rights of citizens are protected even where, as here, their individual claims are

relatively small. Keating v. Sup. Ct., 31 Cal. 3d 584, 609 (1982) (“[T]he class suit

‘both eliminates the possibility of repetitious litigation and provides small claimants

with a method of obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too small to

warrant individual litigation.’” Serrano III, 20 Cal. 3d at 34. The Settlement provides

significant monetary relief to Settlement Class Members, who otherwise would have

insufficient financial stakes to pursue individual cases. III. An Award Of Attorneys’ Fees Is Appropriately Calculated Using The

Lodestar/Multiplier Method In cases involving fee-shifting statutes, the primary method for establishing the

reasonable attorney fees is the lodestar/multiplier method. Numerous California


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Federal District Courts have applied the lodestar method for calculating attorneys’

fees in settled class actions involving California consumer protection statutes,

including the CLRA. See Bruno v. Quten Research Inst., LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 35066, at *8-10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2013); Parkinson, 796 F. Supp. 2d at

1171; Hartless v. Clorox Co., 273 F.R.D. 630, 642 (S.D. Cal. 2011). “Courts

generally regard the lodestar method … as the appropriate method in statutory fee

shifting cases.” Shames v. Hertz Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158577, at *59 (S.D.

Cal. Nov. 5, 2012); In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 941

(9th Cir. 2011); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.7 (“Statutory awards are

generally calculated using the lodestar method.”).

IV. The Requested Fee Award Is Reasonable

Fee awards in class actions encourage and support compliance with federal and

state law. “The guiding principles in determining awards of attorneys’ fees should be

to provide compensation sufficient to stimulate the motive for representation of

classes.” In re Equity Funding Corp. Sec. Litig, 438 F. Supp. 1303, 1325 (C.D. Cal.

1977). Payment at full market rates is essential to fulfill the goal of encouraging well-

qualified counsel to undertake difficult consumer interest litigation. San Bernardino

Valley Audubon Soc. v. San Bernardino, 155 Cal. App. 3d 738, 755 (1984). A. Class Counsel’s lodestar is presumptively reasonable

When determining a reasonable fee upon the settlement of a class action, the

lodestar figure is “presumptively reasonable.” In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 941

(quoting Cunningham v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 488 (9th Cir. 1988));

see also Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 18 (9th Cir. 1994) (the lodestar

“presumptively provides an accurate measure of reasonable fees”). Under California

law, “a court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure,


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based on the careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly

compensation of each attorney involved in the presentation of the case.” Ketchum v.

Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1131-32 (2001).

1. Doyle Lowther LLP total lodestar and billing judgment reduction

Doyle Lowther’s hours for which it seeks compensation, we believe, are

reasonable given the specific facts and circumstances of this case. Doyle Lowther

was principal counsel in this case and performed the majority of legal services in this

Litigation. In working with the two other firms who also represented Plaintiffs in this

case, Doyle Lowther made good faith efforts to prevent redundant and duplicative

work by all of the counsel for plaintiffs.

We have reviewed records reflecting the legal services performed by Doyle

Lowther LLP on the Settlement Class’s behalf. Doyle Lowther LLP incurred a total

of 3,299.25 hours for a total lodestar of $1,634,658.75. Upon reviewing Doyle

Lowther’s time records, we have exercised our billing judgment and have reduced

our aggregate lodestar by $199,162.50.

After the billing judgment reduction, Doyle Lowther LLP’s collective lodestar

request is $1,435,496.25 based on 2,916.50 hours, and is supported by fair and

reasonable billing rates for complex litigation firms, ranging from $135–$260/hour

for paralegals, $300–$400/hour for associates, and $500-$700/hour for partners. See

Joint Declaration ¶¶ 125-128.


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2. Consumer Law Group of California and Glynn Law Group

Consumer Law Group of California and Glynn Law Group have respective

lodestars of $129,138 and $82,150. See Doyle Decl. Exs. 2, 3. These amounts are

supported by fair and reasonable billing rates for complex litigation firms. See Joint

Declaration ¶¶ 125-128.

3. Class Counsel’s collective lodestar request

Collectively, Class Counsel have $1,646,784.25 in lodestar. Joint Declaration ¶

138; Doyle Decl. Exs. 2, 3. Class Counsel seek a total fee award of $1,976,141.10,

representing just a 1.2 multiplier on time expended through December 15, 2013, and

does not reflect the time and expense Class Counsel will need to incur to ensure this

Settlement is finally approved, including time needed to complete the final approval

briefing, prepare for and attend the final approval hearing, oversee the claims

administration and payment processing, and litigate any possible appeal of a final

approval order or attorney fee award. Joint Declaration ¶¶ 138-139. Counsel expects

this additional time will be substantial. Id. ¶ 139.

4. Class Counsel’s rates are reasonable

Courts look to the prevailing market rates in the community in which the court

sits. Schwarz v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 73 F.3d 895, 908 (9th Cir. 1995);

see also Camancho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008).

Accordingly, Class Counsel’s current rates are presumptively reasonable if they

conform to the prevailing rates for other attorneys practicing complex litigation in

San Diego. As set forth in the accompanying Declarations and the decisions

referenced below, Class Counsel’s rates are reasonable, have been approved by other


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Courts in Southern California, and conform with hourly rates charged by attorneys of

comparable skill, reputation, and experience with complex consumer class actions.

See Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1133; Shames v. Hertz Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

158577, at *59-60 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2012).

“Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing

fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those

setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing

market rate.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407

(9th Cir. 1990); see Wershba v. Apple Computer, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 254-55

(2001).

Here, Class Counsel has submitted declarations stating the number of

reasonable hours spent working on this case and setting forth their standard hourly

rates, approved by state and federal courts throughout Southern California. Joint

Declaration ¶¶ 124-128 and Doyle Decl. Exs. 2, 3. Class Counsels’ lodestar is

calculated using rates that are comparable to those approved in other class actions in

the Southern District of California. Hartless v. Clorox Co., 273 F.R.D. 630, 643-44

(S.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d in part, 473 F. Appx. 716 (9th Cir. 2012) (approving hourly

rates in the San Diego area of $675-795 for partners and, as set forth in moving

papers, up to $410 for associates and up to $345 for paralegals); Shames, 2012 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 158577, at *59-60 (finding hourly rates ranging from $675 per hour for

partners to be reasonable for the San Diego legal market); Iorio v. Allianz Life Ins. Co.

of N. Am., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21824, at *31-32 (S.D. Cal. March 3, 2011)

(approving partner rates of $750 per hour; associate rates of $595 per hour); Kohler

Co. v. Domainjet, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50452, at *3-7 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 7,

2013) (approving rates of up to $640 for partners and up to $245 for paralegals);

Gallucci v. Boiron, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157039, at *25-26 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 31,


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2012) (approving rates of $650 per hour for partners, up to $500 per hour for

associates and up to $215 per hour for paralegal time); Brazil v. Dell Inc., 2012 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 47986, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2012) (approving rates set forth in

moving papers of $525 to $875 per hour for partners, $250 to $475 per hour for

associates, and $165 to $375 per hour for law clerks and paralegals). Further, Class

Counsel’s hourly rates, which they charge to all clients, are within or below the range

of rates billed by comparable attorneys in the San Diego market. Joint Declaration ¶¶

141-143.

5. Class Counsel’s hours expended are reasonable

The number of hours Class Counsel spent on this Litigation is reasonable.

Class Counsel expended a collective total of 3,282.10 hours, after reduction, in

litigating this complex class action. Joint Declaration ¶ 125. This includes time billed

for: (1) extensive investigation of the claims, both prior to filing the initial complaint

and shortly after during an initial round of settlement discussions; (2) researching and

drafting the complaints; (3) substantial law and motion practice associated with

LGEMU’s motions to dismiss the complaints; (4) amending the complaint; (5)

drafting and negotiating a protective order and ESI protocol; (6) drafting and serving

discovery on LGEMU and a third party; (8) enforcing a third-party subpoena in

Washington state; (9) responding to written discovery served on Plaintiffs; (10)

preparing for and participating in meetings and settlement conferences with

Magistrate Judge Brooks; (11) preparing for and participating in two formal

mediation sessions; (12) researching and drafting an initial motion and memorandum

for class certification; and (13) conducting five months of detailed negotiations

regarding a term sheet and the final iteration of Settlement documents. Joint

Declaration ¶¶ 25-99. This summary, along with the Joint Declaration, provides

sufficient explanation of the substantial work performed by Class Counsel. Lobatz v.


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U.S. W. Cellular of Cal., Inc., 222 F.3d 1142, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2000); Hemphill v.

San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, Inc., 225 F.R.D. 616, 623-24 (S.D. Cal. 2004). When all

of this effort is considered, a total 3,282.10 expended hours is reasonable. See, e.g.,

Hartless, 273 F.R.D. at 643-44 (holding 5,995.4 hours spent on a consumer class

action that settled prior to class certification with no appeals was reasonable). B. A modest lodestar enhancement is warranted

The lodestar/multiplier method best mirrors the legal marketplace. Lealao v.

Beneficial California, Inc., 82 Cal. App. 4th 19, 50 (2000) (adjusted lodestar should

not significantly differ from the percentage fee freely negotiated in comparable

litigation).

When determining the multiplier, trial courts should consider all factors

relevant to a case. Lealao, 82 Cal. App. 4th at 40. Factors courts consider include

“the quality of representation, the benefit obtained for the class, the complexity and

novelty of the issues presented, and the risk of nonpayment.” In re Bluetooth, 654

F.3d at 941-42; see also Hartless, 273 F.R.D. at 642.

Enhancements or multipliers “can range from 2 to 4, or even higher.” Wershba,

91 Cal. App. 4th at 255; see also Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1051 (multiplier of 3.65);

Steiner v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 248 Fed. Appx. 780, 783 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2007)

(“this multiplier [of 6.85] … falls well within the range of multipliers that courts have

allowed”); Buccellato v. AT&T Operations, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85699, at *5

(N.D. Cal. June 30, 2011) (collecting cases and approving multiplier of 4.3). Class

Counsel here requests a multiplier of only 1.2, which is truly modest considering the

benefits to the Settlement Class in this case.


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1. The results achieved for the class

“Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a

fully compensatory fee.” Hogar Dulce Hogar v. Cmty. Dev. Com. of City of

Escondido, 157 Cal. App. 4th 1358, 1369 (2007). Settlement Class Members may

recover $19.00 for each G2x Phone purchased, including any replacement phones

that exhibited the Shutdown Defect, the Screen Bleed Defect, or both. Settlement

Agreement ¶¶ 3.1, 3.2 (ECF No. 89-3). To date, over 10,000 Settlement Class

Members have made claims, including submissions for multiple defective G2x

phones. Gardella Decl. ¶ 16. This excellent Settlement benefit was made available to

all Settlement Class Members without a cap on the amount LGEMU would pay. As

part of the Settlement, LGEMU also agreed to pay all Notice and Claims

Administration Expenses incurred in effectuating the Settlement. Settlement

Agreement ¶¶ 1.13, 4.6. The expenses include all costs from preparing, printing, and

disseminating the Notice via direct mail to all persons who purchased a G2x Phone,

operating the Settlement website and a toll-free telephone number Settlement Class

Members can call to inquire about the Settlement, and all other functions for

processing claims online and offline and administering the Settlement. Id. at ¶¶ 1.13,

4.1-5.8. Moreover, LGEMU agreed to pay the award of Class Counsel’s fee and

expense reimbursement separate and apart from the class benefits. Id. at ¶¶ 3.6(a).

These results strongly support the requested multiplier of 1.2 based on

Counsel’s reasonable lodestar.

2. The novelty and difficulty of issues

The existence of novel and complex legal questions and the stage of the

proceeding when the matter settles also should be considered when assessing

Counsels’ fee. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898-900 (1984); Serrano III, 20 Cal.


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3d at 48-49. This case presented Class Counsel with several difficult issues to

overcome.

Much of the difficulty in this Litigation was inherent to the G2x Phone itself,

which required Counsel to understand the internal engineering components and

electronic structure of the G2x Phone and its operating software to evaluate potential

root causes of the Shutdown Defect and the Screen Bleed Defect. Joint Declaration

¶¶ 28-30. As a result, Counsel investigated many sources of information, including

consumer complaints, which involved reviewing written complaints as well as

interviewing approximately 25 affected consumers and corresponding with more than

150 more, available technical reports and bulletins, and a review of analogous

products and consulted several experts to identify the mechanical causes of the

alleged defects in the G2x Phone. Id. at ¶ 7. Class Counsel also sought and reviewed

nearly a gigabyte of information produced in this case, including voluminous

spreadsheets with hundreds of thousands of entries, tens of thousands of pages of

internal documents, and technical data and reports from LGEMU and from third

party T-Mobile. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 81-82.

Obtaining discovery was no easy task. Discovery was hard-fought, and

LGEMU and third-party T-Mobile objected to nearly every discovery request. Joint

Declaration ¶¶ 57, 73. The Parties had significant disagreements over the nature and

scope of the protective order and the electronic document production protocol, as

well as the scope of discovery. Id. at ¶ 57. Only after an in-person discovery

conference with the magistrate was set, and after Plaintiffs moved to compel

discovery from T-Mobile in Seattle, Washington, did a full production occur. All of

the data and information produced, together with Class Counsel’s independent

investigation, was comprehensively analyzed and reviewed by Class Counsel. Id. at ¶

79. This hard-fought process, although difficult and time consuming, produced


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substantial results and allowed the Plaintiffs to reach informed conclusions about the

strengths and weaknesses of the claims and defenses.

3. Risk of non-payment

Commencement and prosecution of class action litigation is a high-risk activity

due to: (1) the contingent nature of counsel’s representation; and (2) the formidable

barriers to achieving a successful outcome, such as the need to certify a class. With

these dangers in mind, courts consider the contingent nature of any fee when

determining the proper fee award. See In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig.,

19 F.3d 1291, 1299-1300 (9th Cir. 1994) (declaring attorneys should be rewarded for

taking the risk of non-payment, because if there was not, “very few lawyers could

take on the representation of a class client given the investment of substantial time,

effort, and money, especially in light of the risks of recovering nothing.”); Fischel v.

Equit. Life Assurance Soc., 307 F.3d 997, 1008 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding it appropriate

for court to consider litigation risk of non-payment in setting multiplier where

counsel expected to receive additional compensation for such risk).

Courts recognize a contingent fee that is limited to the hourly rate a fee-paying

client would pay, win or lose, falls short of being reasonable under market standards.

Cazares v. Saenz, 208 Cal. App. 3d 279, 287-88 (1989). Without the incentive of a

premium for the contingent risk, few attorneys will accept cases on a contingency

basis. A contingent fee therefore: must be higher than a fee for the same legal services paid as they are performed. The contingent fee compensates the lawyer not only for the legal services he renders but for the loan of those services. The implicit interest rate on such a loan is higher because the risk of default (the loss of the case, which cancels the debt of the client to the lawyer) is much higher than that of conventional loans.


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Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1132 (quoting POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 534,

567 (4th ed. 1992)). Risk multipliers are “intended to approximate market-level

compensation for [ ] services, which typically includes a premium for risk of

nonpayment or delay in payment.” Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1138; see also Lealao, 82

Cal. App. 4th at 50 (holding the trial court has the discretion to use a multiplier as

“necessary to ensure that the fee awarded is within the range of fees freely negotiated

in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation.”).

From the outset, Class Counsel litigated this matter on a contingent fee basis

and placed their own financial resources at risk. Absent this Settlement, there was no

guarantee Plaintiffs would succeed on class certification, summary judgment, trial or

appeal. Never did LGEMU concede liability, the appropriateness of class certification,

or the proper amount of relief. See Settlement Agreement ¶ 9, Joint Declaration ¶ 110.

Despite this uncertainty, Class Counsel provided zealous representation throughout

this Litigation and obtained an excellent result for the Settlement Class.

Moreover, Class Counsel’s work continues. Among other things, Class

Counsel still must: (1) prepare for and attend the final approval hearing, including the

research and drafting of the reply papers and responding to any objections; (2)

oversee the claims administration process, including addressing any claim review

issues and monitoring payments to the Settlement Class; and (3) brief and argue any

appeals. Responding to objectors often involves serving written discovery and taking

depositions. If an appeal ensues, hundreds of thousands of dollars of additional

attorney time may be incurred in post-judgment motions, such as appeal bond

requests and defending the Settlement in the Ninth Circuit. If and when this

prospective work is performed, Class Counsel anticipates receiving no multiplier at

all. Accordingly, a modest multiplier is justified in light of the contingent nature of


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this action, the work performed to date, and the significant amount of additional work

Class Counsel will likely undertake in the future.

4. Skill and experience class counsel displayed in coordinating a prompt resolution to this Litigation

Counsel’s skill in overcoming the difficulties of this Litigation are additional

factors that support a lodestar enhancement. Serrano III, 20 Cal. 3d at 49; Blum, 465

U.S. at 898, 901 (court should also consider the experience, skill and reputation of the

attorneys as part of the lodestar calculation). The abilities of Class Counsel were

essential to the success of this Litigation. Counsel has substantial experience in

consumer class action litigation, particularly involving technology products. (See

ECF No. 89-10, 89-11, 89-12.) Their skills in developing evidence, technical

expertise with sophisticated consumer electronics, working with consultants, and

understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the respective case were critical to

achieving a favorable outcome. Class Counsel developed a significant level of

familiarity with the legal and factual issues sufficient to make a thorough appraisal of

the adequacy of the Settlement and provide meaningful relief to the Settlement Class.

The skill and competence of opposing counsel also should be considered when

awarding a fee. See, e.g., In re Equity Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., 438 F. Supp. 1303,

1337 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (noting plaintiff’s counsel faced “established and skillful

defense lawyers”). Three teams of top-notch defense attorneys, including prominent

complex litigation attorneys from the New York and San Francisco offices of

Shearman & Sterling LLP, and experienced litigation counsel from Cohen & Gresser

LLP and Park & Jensen LLP in New York, represented LGEMU. Class Counsel

should not be penalized because LGEMU received a zealous and skilled defense.

Success here required attorneys experienced in technology and class action

litigation to manage the complex issues set forth above and in the Joint Declaration.


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The result of this combination of skill and diligence directly benefitted the Settlement

Class. Accordingly, the skill and experience shown by Class Counsel weigh in favor

of the requested multiplier.

V. The Percentage-Of-The-Benefit Method Confirms The Requested Award Is Reasonable And Appropriate The Ninth Circuit and California state courts “recognize two methods for

calculating attorney fees in civil class actions: the lodestar/multiplier method and the

percentage of recovery method.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th

Cir. 1998); Wershba, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 254. The guiding principle for both courts is

attorneys’ fees “be reasonable under the circumstances.” Rodriguez v. Disner, 688

F.3d 645, 653 (9th Cir. 2012).

The Ninth Circuit approves of cross-checking lodestar calculations against the

percentage-of-recovery method. In re Bluetooth, 654 F. 3d at 944-45. Under the

percentage-of-recovery method for calculating attorney’s fees, the court awards

counsel a percentage of the total value of the common fund. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at

1029. Here, there is no common fund, but a constructive common fund can be

calculated using reasonable estimates.

The estimated value of monetary compensation made available to the

Settlement Class is at minimum $5.7 million. Joint Declaration ¶ 102. LGEMU

agreed to pay all costs associated with direct mailed notice, online claims processing

and claims administration, with an estimated value of $400,000. Joint Declaration ¶

15. In calculating the constructive common fund recovered, the court includes the

amount of any attorney fees and costs that are to be separately paid by the defendants.

Hartless, 273 F.R.D. at 645 (“This amount includes notice and administration costs

and separately paid attorneys’ fees and costs.”); In re Consumer Privacy Cases, 175

Cal. App. 4th at 553–54. Although there is no agreed-to fee amount in this action, it


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would be reasonable to use Class Counsel’s collective lodestar of $1,646,784.25.

Thus, the estimated minimum value of the Settlement is approximately $7.7 million.

Considering the full settlement value, as this Court must, Williams v. MGM-Pathe

Commc’ns Co., 129 F. 3d 1026, 1027 (9th Cir. 1997); Stern v. Gambello, 480 Fed.

Appx. 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2012), an attorney fee request of $1,976,141.10 million is

25.5% and represents the benchmark for contingency fees. In the Ninth Circuit, the

“benchmark” contingency fee award is 25% of the recovery obtained. Staton v.

Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 968 (9th Cir. 2003); Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v.

Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1989). California state courts have also

considered 25% a benchmark. Lealao, 82 Cal. App. 4th at 24 n.1; see also Glendale

City Emps.’ Ass’n, 15 Cal. 3d 328, 341 n.19 (1975) (approving award of 25% of the

recovery); Sanders v. City of L.A., 3 Cal. 3d 252, 261 (1970) (approving award of

25%); Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 115 Cal. App. 4th 715, 726 (2004) (noting fee

award of 25%).

The percentage of recovery test as a cross-check to the lodestar multiplier

amount confirms the reasonableness of Class Counsel’s fee request.

VI. The Requested Costs Are Fair And Reasonable

Both the Ninth Circuit and California state courts allow recovery of pre-

settlement litigation costs in class action settlements. See Staton, 327 F.3d at 974; In

re Businessland Sec. Litig., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8962, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. June 14,

1991) (and cases cited therein); see also H. NEWBERG & A. CONTE, NEWBERG ON

CLASS ACTIONS, §12.08 (2d ed. 1993). “Attorneys may recover their reasonable

expenses that would typically be billed to paying clients in non-contingency matters.”

In re Omnivision Techs., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2007); see also

Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1994).


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Class Counsel incurred expenses in the aggregate amount of $30,166.01 in

costs “reasonably necessary to conduct the litigation.” These expenses are set forth in

the declarations submitted to the Court. Joint Declaration ¶¶ 129-130, and Doyle

Decl. Exs. 2, 3. Class Counsel incurred these costs for mediation fees, filing fees,

discovery experts, travel, research services, photocopies, postage, and telephone

charges. All of these expenses were reasonably and necessarily incurred, and are of

the sort of expense typically billed to paying clients in the marketplace. Id.

Accordingly, the Court should grant Class Counsel’s requested expense

reimbursement of $30,166.01.

VII. The Requested Service Awards Are Fair And Reasonable

Service awards “are fairly typical in class action cases.” Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at

958. Such awards compensate representative plaintiffs for “work done on behalf of

the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the

action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney

general.” Id. at 958-59.

Service awards are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and

should be awarded based upon the Court’s consideration of the time and effort spent

on the Litigation, the duration of the Litigation, and, among other things, the degree

of personal gain obtained as a result of the Litigation. See Van Vranken v. Atlantic

Richfield Co., 901 F. Supp. 294, 299 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see also In re Mego Fin. Corp.

Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 462-63 (9th Cir. 2000).

Class Counsel request the Court approve a modest service award of $2,500 per

named plaintiff, in recognition of the time and effort expended on the Settlement

Class’s behalf. Settlement Agreement ¶ 8.2 (ECF No. 89-3); Horvath Decl., ¶ 9;

Forsythe Decl., ¶ 9; Montgomery Decl., ¶ 10; Johnson Decl., ¶ 8. These amounts are

based on time Plaintiffs expended dealing with LGEMU and their wireless carrier on


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these issues, communicating with Class Counsel, gathering documents, responding to

discovery, reviewing court filings and rulings, attending a settlement conference in

San Diego, consulting for mediation, providing declarations and considering the

Settlement to ensure it was reasonable, thereby devoting significant time to this

Litigation for the benefit of the Settlement Class. Horvath Decl. ¶¶ 2-8; Forsythe

Decl. ¶¶ 2-8; Montgomery Decl. ¶¶ 2-9; Johnson Decl. ¶¶ 2-7.

The $2,500 sought here is on the low end of the acceptable range awarded in

similar cases. See, e.g., Cox v. Clarus Mktg. Group, LLC, 291 F.R.D. 472, 483 (S.D.

Cal. 2013) (approving $5,000 award); Fulford v. Logitech, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 144437, at *7 n.1 (N.D. Cal. March 5, 2010) (collecting cases awarding

service payments ranging from $5,000 to $40,000); In re Mego Fin., 213 F.3d at 457,

463 (approving $5,000 awards); Cicero v. DirecTV, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

86920, at *19-20 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2010) (approving $7,500 and $5,000 awards);

Williams v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67731, at *19-20 (S.D.

Cal. July 7, 2010) (approving $5,000 award); Garner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49477 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2010) (approving $20,000

award and compiling cases approving awards of $20,000 or higher).

Here, LGEMU has already agreed to pay $2,500 to each Plaintiff if approved

by the Court. Settlement Agreement ¶ 8.2 (ECF No. 89-3). Considering the above

factors, this modest service award is fair and reasonable and should be approved by

the Court.

VIII. Conclusion

For the above reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court award Class

Counsel $1,976,141.10 in collective attorneys’ fees, $30,166.01 in reimbursable

expenses, and also $2,500 to each of the Plaintiffs as service award. These requests


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are reasonable and appropriate, and will in no way reduce the benefits provided to the

Settlement Class.

DATED: December 16, 2013 Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ William J. Doyle II WILLIAM J. DOYLE II DOYLE LOWTHER LLP John A. Lowther James R. Hail Samantha A. Smith Katherine DiDonato 10200 Willow Creek Road, Suite 150 San Diego, CA 92131 Tel: (858) 935-9960 Fax: (858) 939-1939 email: [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]

[email protected]


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GLYNN LAW GROUP THOMAS E. GLYNN 10200 Willow Creek Rd., Suite 170 San Diego, CA 92131 Tel: (858) 271-1100 Fax: (858) 876-1530 email: [email protected] THE CONSUMER LAW GROUP ALAN M. MANSFIELD 10200 Willow Creek Rd., Suite 160 San Diego, CA 92131 Tel: (619) 308-5034 Fax: (888) 341-5048 email: [email protected]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Class


DOYLE LOWTHER LLP KATHERINE S. DiDONATO (272704) · 2013-12-19 · Case No. 3:11-cv-01576-H-RBB...

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Transcript of DOYLE LOWTHER LLP KATHERINE S. DiDONATO (272704) · 2013-12-19 · Case No. 3:11-cv-01576-H-RBB...