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De aanval op Fleury

Verdun have been called WW1s Stalingrad and not without reason. Between 400.000 and 600.000men lost their lives during the fighting at Verdun. The battle started as a small operation with nineGerman divisions. But it grew huge, in the ten months the battle lasted three-quarter of the Frencharmy visited Verdun.

Intro:I have in the last couple of months tried to find out what was the decisive factors for DasAlpenkorps success in taking Fleury on June 23rd 1916 at Verdun. Some sections in the analysishave been left out because I found them not important here. The analysis of grounds, the plan andthe manoeuvre have been left out. This is in short what I found out.

I have looked at the situation of Das Alpenkorps and the situation of the French units theyattacked. The area was defended by units from the 130th division. And it is only the period uptowhen they take Fleury.

Das Alpenkorps attack was a smaller part of a larger attack that was to take dominating positions,from where the Germans could force the French to surrender Verdun. Das Alpenkorps had todepend on its neighbours success as well. And this is the reason to why they were unable to holdthe gained grounds later on the 23rd/24th.

The units situation:In general:Das Alpenkorps was an elite unit in the German army, and was considered amongst the very besttroops in the German army. Their training was demanding and good. Compared with their enemywho were conscripts they had a huge advantage. French divisions with the numbers of 100 andabove were divisions that had been reorganized after 1915, this meant that the education of theFrench troops in 130th division wasnt very good. And the French army had, in 1915, lost upto50% of its officers, which must have had a huge effect on the training of the units and the leadingof them in battle. This could be a decisive factor.

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Education and training:Das Alpenkorps had been resting a month prior to the action at Verdun. Furthermore they hadbeen training fighting in trenches like those at Verdun in upto division scale. This meant that theyknew how (on their backbone) supported who, who attacked and gave them the possibility ofattacking with greater pace. The French on the other hand had been fighting in the same area formonths and were fed up with fighting in trenches. The French moral were much worst than the oneof the Germans. The general education and the training upto Verdun could be a decisive factor.

Weapons and support:Small arms:By comparing the machineguns used at Verdun at the time, I found that the Germans had a smalladvantage, but not enough to make it a decisive factor.The rifles used had more or less the same capacity and were therefore not a decisive factor.

Support:Das Alpenkorps had a support from 50 pieces (that is twice the normal amount).The battle of Verdun was dominated by the massive use of artillery. On the 23rd the Ger-mans hadused a new kind of poisons gas (Grnkreuz), a gas the French gasmasks werent effective against.This gas was used against the French artillery and the next days objectives, this meant that on themorning on the 23rd the French artillery had ceased fire, and the only pieces firing were the

German ones. The French were therefore unable to use their, by the Germans feared, Sperrfeuer.It gave the Germans the possibility of attacking with greater pace than what was normal.

The Germans had developed a doctrine where the artillery laid a barrage of fire just in front of theattacking infantry. This made it hard for the defending French to engage the attack-ers. Both theuse of gas and moving barrage could be decisive factors.

All units had Stosstrups attached, but because of the massive use of gas they were unable toinfiltrate prior to the attack and they were therefore not decisive.

The weather:The weather on the 22/23rd was without wind and was hot sunny. This meant that the gas didntmove and lay still making it impossible for the French to get supplies and reserves forwarded.Furthermore the troops were getting dehydrated thus not very combat ready. This could be a

decisive factor.

Conclusion:The use of gas, together with the calm and warm weather caused that the French units wereunable to get neither supplies nor reserves forwarded. It also meant that they were unable tomake use of the Sperrfeuer. This meant that the attack wasnt slowed by the French artillery. Thiswas a decisive factor.

The German use of moving barrage, the corporation between the infantry and the artillery hinderedthe French in engaging the attack before it was over them. This has without a doubt been adecisive factor to the success.

Das Alpenkorps education and training prior to Verdun were far better than what were nor-mal.

This made it possible to attack with greater pace than what the defenders were used to, thussurprising them. The fact that they had been educated together and that they were part of astanding unit meant that they had trained the drills better thus acting as a hole. This must be adecisive factor.

Therefore I think that the high educational and training standard made it possible for them to makeuse of the moving barrage, together with the effect the gas had on the French prior to the attackwere the decisive factors. It made it possible for them to attack with great pace thus surprising thedefenders on their way against their goal.

Outtro:The attack the 23rd brought the Germans close to Verdun, but due to lack of resources andreserves being forwarded the last great German chance of taking Verdun had passed.

The German misfortune continued: On the 24th the preparation fire for the Somme began, and the

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battle the 23rd were what the American politicians needed to get convinced that it did make adifference to participate in the war. The war became a real world war.

Prinz Heinrich of Bavaria and the third battalion of the Bavarian LeibRegimen (I.L.R.) on 23 June 1916.

This article is on the German attack of the second and third battalion (especially the third) on thevillage of Fleury in 1916 and about the Bavarian Prinz Heinrich. On 23 June 1916 the battalions ofthe I.L.R. as mentioned above succeeded in taking almost the whole village of Fleury. Besides thata part of the attackers succeeded in attacking further to the so-called Filzlausstellung. A positionto the Southwest of Fleury, which from the air had the shape of a louse. A quotation from thearticle:

Another German report that day stated that the soldiers of the prince hat pushed on to theFilzlausstellung. That the fighting in this area was fierce notes the French soldier Lon Rogez:Above the Poudrire of Fleury the Germans reach at a distance of fifty meters a battery of theartillery that is surrounded by several soldiers of the Regiment Infantry 39 (R.I. 39). In spite of thefact that the shelters were destroyed they managed to get machine gunfire on the enemy whichstops their attack.Lieutenant Boisdon of the 10th company of R.I. 39:

A relieve of four hours under poisoned gasgranatesWhile reaching the lines I had already lost half of my men. On 11 am I got the order to go to theposition west of Fleury and stop the progress of the enemy. In quick march we crossed the ravineof the Pourdrire and with the bayonets mounted on our rifles we climbed while shooting up thehill. We came just on time. The enemy was at a distance of fifty meters of two 75 millimetre gunsof which the crew fired with courage. The surprised Germans were stopped. They jumped fromshell hole to shell hole and we followed them while firing. In this condition we reached the top thatI had to hold.

Vizefeldwebel Rotthaler of the twelfth company passed with soldiers of Sturmbattailon Rohr theartillery line and arrived at the Filzlausstellung. Arrived he concluded that it was a goodconstructed, not much damaged position with narrow trenches. Because of not getting any supportand under friendly fire, they decided to return. Later that day another group of ninth and fifthcompany reached the position but had to return also because of the same reason. Another source

states that a part of the troops went in the direction of the position but had to stop because offlanking machine gunfire from the left and the right.

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The attack on the Filzlausstellung. The French artillery position is clearly visible. The position onthe map M is the Poudrire.

Later the writer P.C. Ettighofer wrote that the soldiers of the Leib regiment took theFilzlausstellung and not only that but also saw the city of Verdun and shot directly into the city:The Field grey soldiers in the position Filzlaus lift their filthy rifles, aim the barrel into the air andshoot at the highest angle into the city of Verdun. And two heavy machineguns arrive and than

another one. The three guns were installed. Not much later the three machineguns shoot atVerdun. The fortress on the Meuse River, the heart of the battle of attrition, even more, the heartof France, is under German machine gunfire - - - There is no way the German effort, of Bavarianindestructible spirit of attack, can be shown.If one imagines this it must have been an impressive spectacle.William Marin writes eventually in his book on Verdun:

By the end of the day, Bavarian machine gunners were firing admittedly, at long range into thestreets of Verdun.The events, as mentioned above are however not similar to the German sources of the I.L.R. Thesesources dont mention this event. They dont indicate that the Germans took the position. Moreoverthe sources both dont indicate that from this position one could see the city of Verdun. Finally thesources dont indicate that the Germans shot directly into the city itself. Between the city and the

Filzlaus lays a ridge. On this ridge lays in the west the fort of Belleville and in the east the fort of

St. Michel. If one reconstructs the situation than the only conclusion can be that from the positionit is not possible to see the city of Verdun or moreover to shoot into the city. This is because theridge largely is higher or the same height as the hill of the Filzlaus.