6AB1Bd01 Louis Albrechts

8/6/2019 6AB1Bd01 Louis Albrechts

1/21


2/21

R E C O N S T R U C T I N G D E C I S I O N - M A K I N G :

P L A N N I N G V E R S U S P O L I T I C S

Louis Albrechts

University of Leuven, Belgium

249

Copyright 2003 SAGE Publications(London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)Vol 2(3): 249268[1473-0952(200311)2:3;249268;041986]www.sagepublications.com

Article

Abstract The purpose of this article is to explore the role of politicsin planning and the highly political role of planners. The structureplanning process for Flanders illustrates that planners are an activeforce in enabling change and that political decision-making is aprocess of its own with its own actors. Interviews with key politicalactors allow unravelling the planning process from the perspective ofthe political class. The case brings powerful informal arenas to the

open and documents power plays involving planners and politicians.The case also illustrates that much of the actual planning discourse isat odds with the rationale of some politicians.

Keywords decision-making, Flanders, planning process, politics,power, role of planners

at Katholieke Univ Leuven on March 30, 2011plt.sagepub.comDownloaded from
http://www.sagepublications.com/http://plt.sagepub.com/http://plt.sagepub.com/http://plt.sagepub.com/http://plt.sagepub.com/http://www.sagepublications.com/


3/21

1. Introduction

In planning literature there are ample examples of well-documented cases

of plan-making and formal decision-making (Altshuler, 1965; Benveniste,1989; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Meyerson and Banfield, 1955) and substantive litera-ture on implementation is also available (Gualini, 2001; Majone andWildavsky, 1979; Mastop and Faludi, 1997; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1974;Wildavsky, 1979). Hardly any examples of cases analysed from the perspec-tive of the political class are available. Therefore political decision-makingoften seems like a black box to planners. Planning needs a fine-grainedanalysis of what actually takes place in formal decision-making andimplementation, in the transition from plan to formal adoption of the planand in its actual implementation, as opposed to what they normativelywould like to see happen (see Friedmann, 1998). Research by Flyvbjerg(1998) makes it clear that critical analysis of cases is needed to discover thewhys and wherefores of how elected representatives or preferential actorschange the plan and why and how executive officers depart from theformally approved plan.

In this article I focus on the dynamic interactions between planners andthe operation of the political process (see Kitchen, 1997; Krumholz andForester, 1990). The key issue I want to deal with is how regional govern-ment ministers and planners interact, and to some extent which players

were dominant in the case at hand (Structure Plan Flanders). Through theanalysis of the case I want to illustrate that planning and decision processeshave to focus on the design of institutional mechanisms (Gualini, 2001;Healey, 1997a) through which to address common problems, values andimages of what a society wants to tackle and to achieve (De Jouvenel, 1964;Ozbekhan, 1969; Weeks, 1993). The case also demonstrates that theseprocesses need expertise skilled in communicative people-centred practices(Forester, 1989; Sager, 1994; Innes, 1996; Healey, 1997a) and shrewdstrategic actors understanding the power dynamics of the wider political

context (Huxley, 2000; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Forester, 1989; Tewdwr-Jones andAllmendinger, 1998; Yiftachel, 1998).

Besides a selective review of planning literature and interviews with keypolitical actors the article relies on the analysis of a case study. The scale(central versus city level in most cases), the subject matter (an integratedstrategic spatial plan not a project), a different political tradition (moreLatin in comparison to Danish, UK and US traditions) all add to the speci-ficity and uniqueness of this case as compared to others (see Meyerson andBanfield, 1955; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Friend and Jessop, 1969; Kitchen, 1997;

Tewdwr-Jones, 2002).The article is biased and somehow unbalanced to the extent that it ispartly written from an insiders perspective as I was, with a colleague, incharge of the case. My immediate involvement makes it however a real-lifeaccount of planning-in-action (see Schn, 1984). It affords me a more

Planning Theory 2(3)250

http://plt.sagepub.com/http://plt.sagepub.com/http://plt.sagepub.com/http://plt.sagepub.com/


4/21

intimate view of the decision-making process than I could obtain from anyother perspective (for a comparable approach see Meyerson and Banfield,1955; Krumholz and Forester, 1990; Kitchen, 1997). This involvement made

it possible to interview the main political actors: four ministers, includingthe prime minister, and six key political advisers to these ministers.The article is structured to reflect the key issue. Following a short view

on how I see planning, the planning context and the political context of thecase are considered. Then the case discusses the relationship betweenplanners and the ministers and the role of political decision-makers in theprocess. Concluding remarks reflect on the added value of the case forplanning and decision-making.

2. Planning as political choice

Planning is not an abstract analytical concept but a concrete socio-historicalpractice, which is indivisibly part of social reality. As such, planning is inpolitics, and cannot escape politics, but is not politics. Since planning actionsare clear proof that they are not only instrumental, the implicit responsi-bility of planners can no longer simply be to be efficient, to functionsmoothly as neutral means of obtaining given and presumably well-definedends. Planners must be more than navigators keeping their ship on course.

They are necessarily involved with formulating that course (see alsoForester, 1989). In order to avoid planning being more concerned with howto plan rather than with the content of planning, substantive rationality(Mannheim) or value rationality (Weber) must become an intrinsic part ofplanning processes (De Jouvenel, 1964; Ozbekhan, 1969). Speaking ofvalues is a way of describing the sort of environment in which we want tolive, or think we should live. The values and images of what a society wantsto achieve are defined in the planning process. Values and images are notgenerated in isolation but are created, given meaning and validated by

traditions of belief and practice, they are reviewed, reconstructed andinvented through collective experience (see Ozbekhan, 1969; see alsoElchardus et al., 2000: 24; Foucault, 1980: 11). Just as there are manytraditions and collective practices, there are also many images of whatcommunities want to achieve (see Weeks, 1993). The opportunities forimplementing these images are not equal. Some individuals and groupshave more resources and more power, which allow them to pursue theirimages. To give power to the range of images in a planning process requiresthe capacity to listen, not just for an expression of material interest, but for

what people care about, including the rage felt by many who have grown upin a world of prejudice and exclusion, of being outside, being the other(Forester, 1989; Healey, 1997a). The core is a democratic struggle forinclusiveness in democratic procedures, for transparency in governmenttransactions, for accountability of the state and planners to the citizens for

Albrechts Reconstructing decision-making 251



5/21

whom they work, for the right of citizens to be heard and to have a creativeinput in matters affecting their interests and concerns at different scalelevels and for reducing or eliminating unequal power structures between

social groups and classes (see also Friedmann and Douglas, 1998). Forester(1989) stresses that planners must use the power available to them to antici-pate and to counter the efforts of interests that threaten to make a mockeryof a democratic planning process by misusing their power. Developmentstowards more direct forms of democracy, the focus on debate, publicinvolvement and accountability even with the best intentions imply thedanger of making democratic public involvement more and more depend-ent on knowledge and on the skills of the more highly educated (seeBenveniste, 1989: 67). These developments may contribute towards turningsocio-economic inequality into political inequality. Research (Elchardus etal., 2000) into public involvement in a local referendum illustrates that themore highly educated were 12 times over-represented. To overcome thestructural elements of unequal access to and distribution of resources,inequalities in social position, class, skills, status, gender and financialmeans, empowerment is needed for ordinary citizens and deprivedgroups. Rather than being a neutral eunuch, the planner him- or herself isa strong partisan for certain outcomes as opposed to others, for the inter-ests of some groups over others, for some styles of governance, for someconcepts of justice, some patterns of future development and so on (Beau-

regard, 1989; Forester, 1989; Webber, 1978). Power relations must be builtinto the conceptual framework of planning (Forester, 1989; Friedmann,1998; Healey, 1997a; Sager, 1994) and must be looked at in a given context,place, time and scale, regarding specific issues and particular combinationsof actors.

3. Planning context and political context

3.1. Planning contextIn 30 years, Belgium has experienced a shift away from a tight central statetowards a new form of government in which the three regions, Flanders,Wallonia and Brussels, all have considerable autonomy. Spatial planning,housing, transport, the environment and regional aspects of economicpolicy are now the exclusive responsibility of the three regions. Each regionhas its own legislative body (parliament), a government and its ownadministration. In Flanders, the second largest region, with a surface areaof 13,522 km2 and a population in 2001 of nearly 6m, a three-tier planning

system was adopted with structure plans and spatial implementation plansat each level: Flanders, Province, Municipality. The new planning systemreplaces a statutory multi-layered system of planning; embracing bindingland use plans at the sub-regional and local levels. The development of an




6/21

overall spatial framework for Flanders as a whole was on the politicalagenda for 20 years and, in 1992, the process was finally launched. In 1997,the Spatial Structure Plan Flanders, with a timeline of 15 years, was

approved by the Flemish Government for the indicative part (variationsonly possible for very important reasons) and by the Flemish parliament forthe binding part (variations require a formal revision of the plan). Thestructure planning approach in Flanders merges innovative local practiceswith new scientific planning thinking drawn from academic arenas.

The activities surrounding the Structure Plan Flanders have theirorigins in planning problems which have been accumulating for years: thead hoc adjustments of traditional land use plans to changing circumstances,the use and abuse of rural land, urban decay, the daily reporting of trafficjams, dissatisfaction with the astronomical investments in the High-SpeedTrain at the expense of the local railway network. Rarely had a link beendrawn between all these issues. Again and again, it seems that other sectors,other interest groups and other administrations are at stake. Nonetheless,the government gradually realized that all these problems urban decay,traffic congestion, the use of open spaces, irreconcilable demands for spacefor housing, nature and the economy reveal structural shortcomings in theoverall planning framework (Albrechts, 1995; Loeckx, 1995).

What caused the tide to turn was a realization of the enormous planningchallenges facing Flanders. Located at the nerve centre of Western Europe,

Flanders feels the full force of the spectacular restructuring of economic,political, ideological and social relations. Moreover, various sectoral spatialdemands (housing, industry, transport, etc.) take on a pronounced quali-tative significance. The Structure Plan Flanders shifted from passiveplanning towards a more action-oriented form of planning, introducedsustainability as a new basic attitude, new planning concepts (such asdeconcentrated clustering) and planning strategies to respond to the chal-lenges Flanders was facing (see Albrechts, 1999) and integrated the keyactors in the planning process.

3.2. Political context

In the Belgian political tradition ministers rely much more on their politicalcabinet than on their traditional administration. Politically sensitiveproblems are discussed in arenas with representatives of all ministers of theFlemish government. These arenas involve negotiation in working throughall kinds of problems. The inner circle of advisers consists mostly of maturespecialists in the field. Some advisers received a political training (i.e. from

the study centre of a political party); others did not (coming from adminis-trations or semi-governmental organizations).From 19915 the Minister of Planning was a Christian democrat and the

Minister of the Environment a socialist, from 19959 it was the other wayround. The Christian democrat minister initiated the process in 1992 and a




7/21


8/21

cabinet and between the different cabinets, in what way were the partymembers and others persuaded of some lines of thought?

To get a true picture sayings were crosschecked with other ministers,

political advisers and the diary the author kept during the process. The factthat the interviews were conducted five years after the approval of the plan,that all ministers had left office and the author was not actively involved anymore in major governmental projects allowed a more detached attitudefrom both sides. Trust and mutual respect built during the authors immedi-ate involvement in the project (19926) created a willingness to respond ina very open way in the interview. There are some similarities and differ-ences in approach with other authors dealing with case studies. Flyvbjerg(1998) looks at the Aalborg case from the outside as a critical observer whileKrumholz (1982) and Kitchen (1997) provide a first-hand experience asplanning practitioners and take an action point of view. I myself try tocombine both in this article: an action point of view as a planning prac-titioner in charge with the project (19926) and a more reflective view as anacademic while interviewing the main political actors in 2002. To my know-ledge it is the only case where government ministers have been interviewedabout their role in a planning process.

4.2. Planners and politics

The interviews with the ministers and their political advisers in office duringthe Structure Plan Flanders project revealed that politically sensitiveproblems were discussed in closed arenas with the political advisers of allministers of the Flemish government. The political advisers constructed theconsensus for the decisions to be taken by the Council of Ministers. Welearned that here was the added complication of taking on board thepolitical preferences and sector logic of other ministers and planning stancesof other tiers of government (see also Tewdwr-Jones, 2002). The consensusreached was hardly ever changed by the Council of Ministers. Political

decision-making has its own logic; it relies on arenas with specific actors. Afew selective stories expand and explain how political decision-making tookplace during the process and the role planners played in this process.

4.2.1. Planning and institutional change

The two university professors approached for the project formulated threepreconditions for accepting the challenge of the Structure Plan Flandersproject (see Albrechts, 1999; see also Krumholz and Forester, 1990). Firstthey prepared a document to construct the problems and to illustrate their

view on the process and the content. This document included a clear norma-tive dimension indicating that they did not aim only to be instrumental butthat they were partisans towards certain outcomes as opposed to others,for the interest of weak groups over others, for some pattern of future




9/21


10/21


11/21

and used. A first informal arena included the planning team and a fewpolitical advisers. According to members of the political cabinet of severalministers, this arena was built on a certain level of reciprocal trust between

the participants. They shared the same values and they met and talked overthe phone to discuss and to reach a consensus about the content as well asabout possible strategies. These people had no hidden agendas and jointlyembarked on an intellectually challenging odyssey. A second more formaland very closed arena included the political advisers of all ministers of theFlemish government. They constructed the consensus for the decisions tobe taken by the Council of Ministers. A few advisers became the engine tostart the dialogue in this arena and to keep it going in a certain direction.Such a dialogue requires a certain degree of understanding about the under-lying values, goals, spatial concepts of the project and how to turn them intoworkable instruments. It explored political feasibility and it resulted in anengagement, based on winwin solutions, where the different cabinetsapproved the plan. Building reciprocal trust and understanding was import-ant (see Healey, 1997a; Innes and Booher, 1998). In this way the actorsgained a deeper understanding of each others perspective, of the differentpolitical, sectoral and regional interests and of the political sensitivity ofcertain issues.

These arenas became loci of power that acknowledged and accounted forthe working of power (see Forester, 1989; Hillier, 2002; Sager, 1994), for

the passionate engagement of some actors who cared deeply for the issuesat hand and a detached attitude of other actors mainly driven by politicalcalculation without a commitment to the issues.

Minister of Planning versus the planning team

For the Christian Democrat Minister of Planning (19925) the planningteam was fully in charge of the plan, fully responsible for its content, it hadto explain and to defend the plan for the Council of Ministers, for the parlia-ment, for the media and obviously it had to face all possible criticism and it

was to blame if something went wrong. This strategy proved to be verybeneficial for both parties. The minister hides behind a scientific authority.He takes up the position of an observer viewing the process from theoutside. This position allows the Minister to cover himself against someform of criticism and thus reduces the political risk for him, in the sense thathe can wait for reactions from key groups in society before he formulateshis own policy. This strategy provided access for the planners to somewhatclosed arenas: the Council of Ministers, the parliament and party meetings.This gave the planners a considerable amount of enabling power (Foucault,

1984) since they had a direct link to important actors in the process. Thismade it possible to inform these key actors correctly, to answer all possiblequestions immediately, to reply to remarks, to refute rumours to explainthe logic of the plan, its sense of reality, the (spatial) challenges nationalas well as international facing Flanders and the kinds of answers given in




12/21


13/21

the discussions with other cabinets, lobbying with politically influentialpeople. These discussions took place in arenas where sector andregional/local rationales played a major role. It proved to be difficult for

the advisers of some other cabinets to overcome pure sector (agriculture,economy etc.) and regional/local (their ministers constituency, or their ownpolitical backyard) logics. The traditional vertical division along sectorlines in these arenas was at odds with the distinctive contribution of spatialplanning to interlink social, economic, ecological and environmental dimen-sions of its object.

To put pressure on their opponents the political advisers of the Ministerof Planning built alliances with influential actors in political parties, withpressure groups, with trade unions, with the press. In this way they strength-ened their viewpoints and their negotiation position and they weakened theposition of their opponents.

A constant in all the interviews was that the political advisers had a lotof power and enjoyed an enormous freedom. They constructed the consen-sus within their cabinets and between the different cabinets. Theyprovoked the Council of Ministers to approve important intermediatereports so that they reached step-by-step points of no return. They briefedtheir minister about the position he/she should take in the Council of Minis-ters. The consensus they reached was hardly ever changed by the Councilof Ministers. So these advisers, although they are not elected, seem more

powerful than elected members of parliament.

The Minister of Planning

Many members of parliament have a local/regional reflex. A criticalmoment was the revolt of the Christian Democrat mayors, some of thembeing at the same time members of parliament and mayors of smallmunicipalities. These mayors/members of parliament are somehow trappedbetween the global, what is best for Flanders, and the local, what is best fortheir municipality. Many of them were tempted to use constantly a local

lens for tackling issues rather than a regional (level of Flanders) one. Theyare very well placed to introduce the daily problems of ordinary citizens,but as they are closely tied up with the local political scene they becomevulnerable to all kind of local influences and clientelism. This developedinto a political line of fracture within the Christian Democrat party andbrought them on one line with the political opposition. It is obvious thatthis provoked some tension within the coalition. The mayors feared that,with the new planning and connected legislation, they would lose (local)power.

The Minister of Planning (19925) himself invited opponents andpolitical allies bilaterally or as a group to win and to keep their support. Byconvincing them that they would be able to solve some of their lastingproblems as soon as the Structure Plan would be approved the ChristianDemocrat Minister of Planning could dispel their fear of losing power.




14/21

The second (19959) Minister of Planning came under serious attack byall elected members of parliament from his home province because he,rightly, refused to accept a major city of that province as a gateway city.3

He had to use his full political weight to refute the threat. The interviewswith several ministers made it clear that as soon as the Council of Minis-ters reached a consensus on an issue it became difficult for the parliamentto structurally change this consensus.

It also became clear during the interviews that neither the advisers northe ministers were aware of the full impact of the plan, the consequencesof its main goals and its spatial concepts. Some politicians and advisers nowconfronted with the impacts of the plan as mayor, as consultant or beingemployed in the private sector, feel the full force of the plan included unex-pected and, for some, unwanted consequences. A former Minister ofPlanning explained during the interview that now, as mayor of a smallmunicipality, I am confronted with the fact that the central governmentwithdraws the recognition of the cultural centre because my municipalitywas not specified as a small town in my Structure Plan Flanders.

The media

Power shifts to sectors such as the media that, in theory, belong to theworld of non-politics (see also Huyse, 1994). The media became animportant political actor during the whole process. An issue raised in the

media became almost automatically an item on the agenda of the partyexecutive, the ministerial staff meeting and the Council of Ministers.

The socialist Minister of Planning (19959) focused, not only on planningand the issuing of rules, but also on their enforcement. This led to the forceddemolition of illegal houses. A commercial Flemish TV station broughtimages of a huge crane destroying a house mixed with images from thePalestinian territory accompanied by music of Bob Marley. This image wasso strong that it became disconnected from the, till then, positive discoursein the written press. As a result the socialist party refused to take the port-

folio of planning in the next coalition. The outcome was that the actualMinister of Planning and the Prime Minister (both liberal conservatives)challenged some of the achievements in the field of planning of the previousgovernment. It proves, according to one minister, that the media do not justmake analyses but also propose projects that influence in a fundamental waythe course of events in our societies.

4.2.4. Power plays

Using inaction as a power instrument

In 1966 the minister in charge of planning decided to draw up in one majorconcentrated effort 48 sub-regional land use plans (scale 1/25,000) for theentire country. These plans became very detailed because of a lack ofmunicipal plans. Sub-regional plans determine the exact land use of the




15/21

whole country and are used in many places for delivering building permits.These plans are rigid and can in principle only be adapted/revised byanother plan at the same level. In this way the plans are somehow timeless.

It is obvious that after almost 20 years most original sub-regional plans arenot any more adapted to the changing socio-economic context. Clear andsome justified demands that could not be met by the existing plans werepiling up. The grievances were aired to local political representatives, tothe central government, to political parties, to the press. Hence, there wasa clear and urgent request to revise these plans. The Minister of Planning islegally in charge of these revisions. As the Structure Plan Flanders processlost part of its lan the minister used his right of initiative and refused toinitiate any revision. In this way, mainly economic development wasblocked in certain parts of Flanders. It also blocked the implementation ofan agreement, reached after difficult negotiations with the EuropeanCommission that allowed taking some regional initiatives in support ofmunicipalities bordering an Objective 1 region. This provoked majordiscontent with the economic sector and with specific dynamic areas.4

Obviously by his tactics of inaction the Minister of Planning made theopponents of the structure plan the demanding party without taking anyaction himself. This power game increased the political tension betweenthe coalition partners, in and outside the government. In the FlemishGovernment the dissatisfaction of mainly the Christian Democrats was

aired through a party member of the Minister of Planning, the socialist viceprime minister. The pressure on the Minister of Planning, as well as fromparty members, coalition partners and the opposition increased, but theminister remained very calm and as a man of principle he refused to give in.He understood very well that giving in for one simple case meant that therewould be no stopping the political opponents. Pressure was exerted on himto dismiss his chef de cabinet and his main adviser for spatial planning. Herefused to do so. If his opponents pushed too hard they ran the risk of acabinet crisis. Apparently that was a bridge too far. The minister carried on

with his inaction policy for almost 18 months.After bilateral talks, among others with the Prime Minister and a threat

from the coalition partner not to vote the budget for his mobility covenants,an agreement was reached about the approval of the Structure PlanFlanders.

The planners versus politics

During the entire process (19926) the planning team acquired an auton-omous position it used to diffuse its ideas as widely as possible. This caused

some unarticulated resentment by the government. This came up in nego-tiating the terms of the planning teams last contract with the Council ofMinisters in December 1995. This council did not accept the financialproposal formulated by the planning team and decided to cut its means. Thetwo professors legally in charge of the planning team refused to sign the




16/21

contract and, as for budgetary reasons the contract had to be signed before24 December 1995, this created considerable tensions. Faxes and telephonecalls went back and forth. All possible pressure was put on the planning

team. Without the planning team the process would have come to an endand this would provoke major discontent with some important actors insociety. The matter was discussed very openly within the planning team andalthough it ran the risk of being out of work by 1 January 1996 it was decidedunanimously not to give in. On 23 December at 6pm the two professors incharge were convoked on the very last meeting of the Council of Ministers.As part of the power game the Council kept them waiting for more thanone hour and then confronted them with a small committee of three minis-ters: the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Planning and the ministerresponsible for civil service. The planners explained their case, theirconcern about the quality of the process and also made it clear that theywould not give in. A compromise was reached there and then. This com-promise gave the planners fewer financial resources but allowed it to hireadditional, more permanent, staff members, under the budget for the civilservice. The contract was signed the next day and the terms of theagreement were confirmed in writing to the three ministers. As a result asubstantial permanent cell fully persuaded of the ideas of the Structure Planwas installed in the planning department (institution-building; see alsoGualini, 2001; Healey, 1997b) and in doing so it provided the basis for struc-

tural change in the planning department.

5. Concluding remarks

The article aims to contribute a small part to filling a gap in theory by com-bining instrumental rationality (Etzioni, 1967), substantive (Mannheim) orvalue (Weber) rationality and communicative (Habermas, 1984) rationalitywithin a broader contextual understanding of power (strategic rationality)

in plan-making and formal decision-making. Contrary to Flyvbjerg (2001)who states that Habermas and Foucault are so profoundly different that itwould be futile to envisage any kind of theoretical or meta-theoreticalperspective within which these differences could be integrated into acommon framework, we see, as Reuter (2000) does, these concepts asnecessarily separate in inevitably complementary interrelations (see alsoAlexander, 2001; Healey, 2001). Indeed in contrast to the Danish case(Flyvbjerg, 1998) which reveals that raw exercise of power tends to be moreeffective than appeals to objectivity, facts, knowledge and the better

argument, the Flanders case shows a much more diverse picture. In thelatter case agreements on values are very much a precondition for the startof the project this corresponds very well to equity planning (Krumholz,1982). Moreover the minister of planning actively searches for objectivityand the scientific character of the plan. The planners use their expertise




17/21

and knowledge in the confrontations with the council of ministers and theparliament. The Flanders case further exemplifies that spatial planningpractice is not just a contingent response to wider forces, but it is also an

active force in enabling changes (Foucault, 1984; see also Forester andStitzel, 1989; Healey, 1997b). It forms knowledge, produces discourse,constitutes a productive network and builds institutions that act as acatalyst for change. The enabling power (Foucault, 1984) is combined withinteractive processes that contribute to plan-identity construction,mobilization and produces real change. In this interactive process, multi-plier effects (Benveniste, 1989: 27) take place, as advisers of other minis-ters perceive that, through the agreement between two main actors, theproject gets a high probability of adoption.

Planners in the Flemish case acted as institution builders (see also Gualini,2001; Healey, 1997b), as counterweights, as catalysts and as initiators ofchange (Albrechts, 1999), a way of mobilizing, building alliances and present-ing real political opportunities, learning from action not only what works butalso what matters. They substantiated change and refused to functionsmoothly as neutral means to given and presumably well-defined ends. In thisway the planner is deeply and inextricably implicated in the real relations ofpower (see Castells, 1978). In this way the Flemish case illustrates thatplanning is not an abstract analytical concept, but a concrete process, that isinextricably part of social, cultural, economic and political reality.

The interviews reveal (see also Flyvbjerg, 1998) that plan-making andpolitical decision-making are dealt with in different arenas and thatdifferent actors are involved (see also Hillier, 2002). Political decision-making is a process of its own, with different actors and with a differentrationale interspersed with sector and local/regional logics. New actors,new agendas, new goals and new strategies turn up with political decision-making. Political decision-making uses its own networking as a way tomobilize, to build alliances for its political objectives and to reach anacceptable political consensus. As few actors take part in both plan-making

and formal decision-making it becomes clear that most actors in the formaldecision-making process are unable to grasp the sensitivities, the gainingof a deeper understanding of the different perspectives and of the differentinterests; the understanding, the ambiance, the social, intellectual andpolitical capital built during the plan-making process.

Political actors are confronted with the spatial complexity of a widevariety of activities in the context of sectoral fragmentation and the result-ant diversity of power coalitions (mayors, cities, economy, agriculture,etc.). The interviews made it crystal clear that none of the political actors

intensively involved in the formal decision process was fully aware of theconsequences of the plan, neither for Flanders as a whole nor for specificsectors or areas. As sectors and local governments have the feeling thatsomething they did not fully grasp was imposed on them and that now they




18/21

have to suffer the plan, planning, planners but also formal decision-makersface a challenge.

In the ongoing process of political modernization on the one hand there

is a clear demand for a decision style where stakeholders become moreactively involved in solving policy problems on the basis of a joint definitionof the action situation and of the sharing of interests, aims and relevantknowledge (see Scharpf, 1989). Active involvement, open dialogue,accountability, collaboration, consensus building become key terms in mostof the actual planning discourse. This results in involving additional actors,a growing input of the private sector, an increasing self-awareness of citizensclaiming a larger say in issues affecting their environment. This is needed toovercome individual and sector logics and not to fall back on the traditionalmore hidden way of influencing decisions. It implies a minimal willingnessto tackle the problems through interactive policy processes allowing othersto have a say in their own policy domain. It also implies a willingness toaccept decisions made through a network organization but also decisionsthat may depart from a generic policy. As it was the first major project ofthe kind, there was no store of mutual understanding, the kind of social andintellectual capital Innes (1996) talks about.

On the other hand all political actors were extremely clear in their viewthat the project would never have been brought to a favourable (in thiscontext, approved by the government and the parliament) conclusion with

more actors (parliament, lower tiers of government) actively involved fromthe beginning. This illustrates that some politicians and some planners havea different view on the openness of a process and that much of the actualplanning discourse is at odds with the rationale of these politicians.

As planners are sensitive for the performance of their plan there is aneed for planners to unravel the political decision-making process and tograsp its rationale. Critical analysis of a wide variety of case studies (relatedto scale, issues dealt with, contexts and traditions, complexity) is needed todiscover the whys and wherefores (Flyvbjerg, 1998) of how political actors

handle plans, projects and planning processes. Moreover, abstractconceptualization and generalization of the accumulated knowledge ofthese cases may help academics see some of what can be learned frompractice and help them to gear their teaching to the realities of practice(Forester, 1999; Hoch, 1994; Schn, 1984).

Acknowledgement

My thanks in particular to Jean Hillier for her constructive comments on a

previous version of this article.




19/21

Notes

1. One of these allowed, as an exception and under very strict conditions, to fill upthe space between existing constructions outside the building area. This became

the rule rather than the exception even without paying much attention to theconditions.

2. The Christian Democrat party traditionally consisted of several socio-economicgroupings (pillars): trade unions, farming class, the middle class.

3. Gateways are places where, at the Flemish level, development is stimulatedbecause of their actual or potential position in the international communicationnetwork (water, road, air, rail, telecommunication).

4. The European Union uses structural funds to reduce disparities between levelsof development of its regions. The reform of 1988 structured these funds

around a set of objectives. Objective 1 focuses on economic adjustment ofregions whose development is lagging behind.

References

Albrechts, L. (1995) Btir le Visage dune Region (Constructing the Image of aRegion), DISP122: 2934.

Albrechts, L. (1999) Planners as Catalysts and Initiators of Change: The NewStructure Plan for Flanders, European Planning Studies 7(5): 587603.

Alexander, E. (2001) The PlannerPrince Interdependence, Rationalities and

Post-communicative Practice, Planning Theory and Practice 2(3): 31124.Altshuler, A. (1965) The City Planning Process. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University

Press.Beauregard, R.A. (1989) Between Modernity and Postmodernity: The Ambiguous

Position of US Planning, Environment and Planning: Society and Space 7(4):38195.

Benveniste, G. (1989) Mastering the Politics of Planning. San Francisco, CA:Jossey-Bass.

Bryson, J. and Crosby, B. (1992) Leadership for the Common Good: TacklingPublic Problems in a Shared-power World. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Castells, M. (1978) City, Class and Power. London: Macmillan.De Jouvenel, B. (1964) LArt de la Conjecture (The Art of Conjecture). Monaco:

Du Rocher.Elchardus, M., Hooghe, M. and Smits, W. (2000) De Vormen van Middenveld

Participatie (Participative Models in Civil Society), in M. Elchardus, L. Huyseand M. Hooghe (eds) Het Maatschappelijk Middenveld in Vlaanderen (CivilSociety in Flanders), pp. 1546. Brussels: VUB Press.

Etzioni, A. (1967) Mixed Scanning a Third Approach to Decision-making, PublicAdministration Review 27: 38592.

Flyvbjerg, B. (1998) Rationality and Power Democracy in Practice. Chicago, IL:

University of Chicago Press.Flyvbjerg, B. (2001) Making Social Science Matter. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.Forester, J. (1989) Planning in the Face of Power. Berkeley: University of

California Press.




20/21

Forester, J. (1999) The Deliberative Practitioner. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Forester, J. and Stitzel, D. (1989) Beyond Neutrality: The Possibilities of Activist

Mediation in Public Sector Conflicts, Negotiation Journal(July): 25164.Foucault, M. (1980) The History of Sexuality. New York: Vintage.

Foucault, M. (1984) Space, Knowledge and Power, in P. Rabinow (ed.) TheFoucault Reader. New York: Pantheon.

Friedmann, J. (1998) Planning Theory Revisited, European Planning Studies 6(3):24553.

Friedmann, J. and Douglas, M. (1998) Editors Introduction, in M. Douglas and J.Friedmann (eds) Cities for Citizen. Chichester: Wiley.

Friend, J. and Jessop, W. (1969) Local Government & Strategic Choice. Oxford:Pergamon Press.

Gualini, E. (2001) Planning and the Intelligence of Institutions. Aldershot: Ashgate.Habermas, J. (1984) The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1. London:

Heinemann.Healey, P. (1997a) Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies.

London: Macmillan.Healey, P. (1997b) An Institutionalist Approach to Spatial Planning, in P. Healey,

A. Khakee, A. Motte and B. Needham (eds) Making Strategic Spatial Plans:Innovation in Europe, pp. 2136. London: UCL Press.

Healey, P. (2001) Editorial, Planning Theory and Practice 2(3): 2558.Hillier, J. (2002) Shadows of Power: An Allegory of Prudence in Land-use

Planning. London: Routledge.Hoch, Ch. (1994) What Planners Do: Power, Politics and Persuasion. Chicago, IL:

Planners Press.Huxley, M. (2000) The Limits of Communicative Planning,Journal of Planning

Education and Research 19(4): 36942.Huyse, L. (1994) De Politiek Voorbij(After Politics). Leuven: Kritak.Innes, J. (1996) Planning through Consensus-building: A New View of the

Comprehensive Planning Ideal,Journal of the American Institutes of Planners62(4): 46072.

Innes, J. and Booher, P. (1998) Network Power and Collaborative Planning:Strategy for the Informational Age, paper presented at the ACSP Congress,Pasadena, 58 November.

Innes, J., Grber, J., Thompson, R. and Neuman, M. (1994) Coordinating GrowthManagement through Consensus Building: Incentives and the Generation of

Social, Intellectual and Political Capital. Berkeley: Institute of Urban andRegional Development, University of California.

Kitchen, T. (1997) People, Politics, Policies and Plans. London: Paul Chapman.Krumholz, N. (1982) A Retrospective View of Equity Planning, Cleveland,

19691979,Journal of American Planners Association 48(4): 16374.Krumholz, N. and Forester, J. (1990) Making Equity Planning Work. Philadelphia,

PA: Temple University Press.Loeckx, A. (1995) The Difficult Art of Duality: The Structure Plan for Flanders,

Archis 10: 4853.Majone, G. and Wildavsky, A. (1979) Implementation in Evolution, in J.

Pressman and A. Wildavsky (eds)Implementation, pp. 17794. Berkeley:University of California Press.




21/21

Mastop, H. and Faludi, A. (1997) Evaluation of Strategic Plans: The PerformancePrinciple, Environment and Planning B 24(6): 81522.

Meyerson, N.M. and Banfield, E.C. (1955) Politics, Planning and the PublicInterest: The Case of Public Housing at Chicago. New York: Free Press.

Ozbekhan, H. (1969) Towards a General Theory of Planning, in E. Jantsch (ed.)Perspectives of Planning, pp. 45155. Paris: OECD.

Pressman, J. and Wildavsky, A. (eds) (1974)Implementation. Berkeley: Universityof California Press.

Reuter, W. (2000) Komplementaritt von Diskurs und Macht in der Planung(Complementarity of Discourse and Power in Planning), DISP141: 3465.

Sager, T. (1994) Communicative Planning Theory. Avebury: Aldershot.Salet, W. and Faludi, A. (2000) Three Approaches to Strategic Planning, in W.

Salet and A. Faludi (eds) The Revival of Strategic Spatial Planning, pp. 110.Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen.

Scharpf, F.W. (1989) Decision Rules, Decision Styles and Policy Choices,Journalof Theoretical Politics 1(2): 15178.

Schn, D. (1984) The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action.Aldershot: Avebury.

Tewdwr-Jones, M. (2002) The Planning Polity. London: Routledge.Tewdwr-Jones, M. and Allmendinger, P. (1998) Deconstructing Communicative

Rationality: A Critique of Habermassian Collaborative Planning, Environmentand Planning A 30(n): 117589.

Webber, M. (1978) A Difference Paradigm for Planning, in R.W. Burchell and G.Sternlieb (eds) Planning Theory in the 1980s, pp. 15162. New York: Center for

Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University.Weeks, J. (1993) Rediscovering Values, in J. Squires (ed.) Principled Positions:

Postmodernism and the Rediscovery of Value, pp. 189211. London: Lawrence& Wishart.

Wildavsky, A. (1979) Implementation in Context, in J. Pressman and A.Wildavsky (eds)Implementation, pp. 16376. Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress.

Yiftachel, O. (1998) Planning and Social Control: Exploring the Dark Side,Journal of Planning Literature 12(4): 395406.


Louis Albrechts is Professor of Planning in the Institute for Urban andRegional Planning at the University of Leuven. He is currently working onthe practice and nature of strategic spatial planning and on diversity inplanning.

Address: IISRO Kasteelpark Arenberg 51, B-3001 Leuven, Belgium. [email:[email protected]]

6AB1Bd01 Louis Albrechts

Documents

Transcript of 6AB1Bd01 Louis Albrechts