David Kimball University of Missouri, St. Louis

Conference on Electoral System Reform

Stanford University March 14-15, 2014

Voter Participation with Ranked Choice Voting in the United States

RCV Might Increase Participation �  Return of “deliberative” democrats. �  Reduce “wasted vote” concerns �  More candidates = more mobilization

Participation in RCV and Plurality Elections 2

RCV Might Reduce Participation �  Americans are used to plurality voting. �  RCV is more cognitively demanding.

Participation in RCV and Plurality Elections 3

Research Design

RCV City

Matched Plurality Cities

Elections before RCV

Elections after RCV

Minneapolis, MN Boston, MA Cincinnati, OH Tulsa, OK Seattle, WA

2005 2009, 2013

St. Paul, MN Cedar Rapids, IA Des Moines, IA Madison, WI Spokane, WA

2009 2013

Cambridge, MA Ann Arbor, MI Lowell, MA Stamford, CT Worcester, MA

---- 2013

Participation in RCV and Plurality Elections 4

Match RCV cities to similar cities with plurality elections on the same date.

Statistical Model �  Difference-in-difference (DID) method: �  𝑌= 𝛽↓0 + 𝛽↓1 𝑅𝐶𝑉+ 𝛽↓2 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟+ 𝛽↓3 𝑅𝐶𝑉∗𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟+𝜃𝑋

�  𝛽↓3   𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑅𝐶𝑉  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡. �  Measures of participation:

� Turnout � Residual votes �  Spoiled ballots

Participation in RCV and Plurality Elections 5

Mean Turnout in RCV and Plurality Elections

Participation in RCV and Plurality Elections 6

0

10

20

30

Mea

n Vo

ter T

urno

ut (P

erce

nt)

Before Adoption After AdoptionPlurality RCV Plurality RCV

Mean Residual Vote Rate for Top Contest in RCV and Plurality Cities

Participation in RCV and Plurality Elections 7

0

1

2

3

4

5

Mea

n R

esid

ual V

ote

Rat

e (P

erce

nt)

Before Adoption After AdoptionPlurality RCV Plurality RCV

The Minneapolis Case: 2013 �  In 2013, turnout was higher in high income and white

majority wards (Jacobs and Miller 2014). �  Is this bad?

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The Minneapolis Case: 2013 �  In 2013, turnout was higher in high income and white

majority wards (Jacobs and Miller 2014). �  Is this bad? Compared to what?

Participation in RCV and Plurality Elections 9

Minneapolis Voter Turnout by Ward Before and After RCV Adoption

Participation in RCV and Plurality Elections 10

38.1

28.5

24

41.7

31.427.7

0

10

20

30

40

Vot

er T

urno

ut (

Per

cent

)

2005 2013

High income wards Middle income wardsLow income wards

Income Level

Spoiled Ballot Rates by Ward Before and After RCV Adoption

Participation in RCV and Plurality Elections 11

.71.2

1.8

3.5

4.3

5.2

0

1

2

3

4

5

Spo

iled

Bal

lots

(Per

cent

)

2005 2013

High income wards Middle income wardsLow income wards

Income Level

Residual Vote for Mayor (1st choice) Before and After RCV Adoption

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.7

1.1

1.5

.4

1.3

2.1

0

.5

1

1.5

2

Res

idua

l Vot

e R

ate

(Per

cent

)

2005 2013

High income wards Middle income wardsLow income wards

Income Level

Residual Vote for City Council (1st choice) Before and After RCV Adoption

Participation in RCV and Plurality Elections 13

3.4

5.5

6.4

3.9

7.2

3.6

0

2

4

6

8

Res

idua

l Vot

e R

ate

(Per

cent

)

2005 2013

White wards Mixed wardsMinority wards

Racial Composition of Wards

Conclusion �  Preliminary results �  Caution: small amount of evidence �  Database will be expanded �  Careful comparisons are needed to assess electoral reforms.

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Additional Sources �  Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and David Brockington. 2003. Electoral

Reform and Minority Representation. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press.

�  Francis Neely and Corey Cook. 2008. “Whose Votes Count? Undervotes, Overvotes, and Ranking in San Francisco’s Instant-Runoff Elections.” American Politics Research 36:530-554.

�  Neely, Francis, Corey Cook, and Lisel Blash. 2006. An Assessment of Ranked-Choice Voting in the San Francisco 2005 Election: Final Report. Public Research Institute, San Francisco State University.

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