China DA

A. New Chinese leadership creates an opportunity to improve unstable Sino-U.S. relations Agence Frane Presse 13 (Retrieved May 24, 2013, from Lexis/Nexis)

Christopher Johnson, a former CIA analyst on China, said that Xi -- thanks in part to his elite background --

consolidated power more quickly than many US policymakers had anticipated. "Xi Jinping is much more relaxed and

cosmopolitan and more likely to go off the talking points. Hu Jintao was very robotic and oftentimes seemed to be

talking more to the Chinese in the room than to his counterpart," said Johnson, now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The Obama administration has already invested time in cultivating a relationship with Xi, and Vice President Joe Biden spent an unusually long five days in China in 2011 to mingle with him.

B. The US & China will clash over economic ties to Latin America. Schimia 12 (Emanuele, journalist and geopolitical analyst, 2012, Retrieved May 30, 2013, from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/NG18Cb01.html)

The United States keeps on looking to Asia, but it had better watch its back, where China's penetration in Latin America is intensifying. Meanwhile, region's countries are taking their countermeasures to minimize the Sino-Western dispute, using multilateral regional and sub-regional institutions as the first line of defense. During her latest roadshow in Asia, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton shifted the debate over the much-trumpeted United States "pivot" towards the Asian-Pacific region from military confrontation to trade competition with China. Over the past decade, trade assertiveness has turned out to be the master key to another , often underestimated, geopolitical pivot: that of Beijing to Latin America - Washington's historical and geographical backyard. China's drive for enhancing its vested positions across Central and South America is not without pitfalls , much as those the US faces in its efforts to protect its strategic interests in East Asia. China is Latin America's third-largest trading partner, immediately after the U nited S tates and European Union ( EU ). Beijing's commercial exchanges with Latin-American countries were worth more than US$241 billion in 2011, according to data released by the Chinese Trade Ministry in April. Of US$153 billion from foreign direct investments which Latin-American and Caribbean nations attracted in 2011, $8 billion came from China (down $7 billion compared with 2010), the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) reported in May. That puts Beijing well behind the EU, US, Latin America and Caribbean and even Japan. The EU, top investor in this region, has funneled an average of $30 billion a year into Latin America since 2002. Recent trade and economic tensions between the United States, Canada and Europe on one side, and some Latin-American countries on the other seem to be playing into Beijing's hands. In May, the EU filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO) against Argentina's import barriers, after it had already challenged Buenos Aires's decision in April to nationalize YPF, the local energy company which until then was controlled by Spain's oil and gas major Repsol. Left-leaning governments such as Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador have made numerous nationalizations over the past years, which have affected mostly North American and European companies.

C. China benefits for the US embargo on Cuba- lifting it will cause tensionNash 13 (Paul, contributor for the Diplomatic Courier, “How the Chinese are Helping to Transform Cuba, Again” May 24, 2013 http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/regions/brics/1465)

China is Cuba’s second largest trading partner after Venezuela, and Cuba is China’s largest trading partner in the Caribbean, with bilateral trade now standing at around $2 billion. Beijing wants to help

Cuba push through market-oriented economic reforms, knowing from its own experience over the past three decades that private sector entrepreneurial activity can stimulate foreign investment, build national capital and promote domestic consumption. To this end, China has granted Cuba numerous long-term low or interest-free loans to support development and maintain financial and social stability through the reform process. It has also undertaken significant technology transfers and entered into joint ventures in farming, light industry, and tourism.¶ Cuba has started the reform process focussed on its biggest export industries. It has, for example, begun restructuring its ailing sugar industry by abolishing the sugar ministry and creating Azcuba, a state holding company consisting of 13 provincial sugar companies that operate 56 sugar mills and 850 sugarcane farms. Azcuba signed foreign investment agreements with companies from Brazil and Britain in 2012 to modernize harvesting equipment and build biomass energy plants. Cuba exports about 400,000 tonnes of sugar annually to China, more than half the amount it produces for domestic consumption.¶ China’s interest in Cuba is, of course, inseparable from the Caribbean’s natural resources and those of Latin America more broadly. The Sino-Cuban economic fraternity, from Beijing’s viewpoint, is largely pragmatic rather than idealistic. Beijing has demonstrated that it will conduct business with left-

leaning governments like Venezuela and Ecuador as readily as with right-leaning governments like Chile and Colombia. The Sino-Cuban partnership may represent a lost opportunity for the United States in promoting liberal democracy in the Western Hemisphere. But it may also represent a path to normalized relations if China can help Cuba’s economy reform such that it, like Vietnam’s, no longer justifies the continuation of a decades-old U.S. trade embargo on the basis that Cuba’s economy is “dominated or controlled by international communism.”

D. Relations are not stable- increased tensions risk crisis escalation. Dingli 13 (Shen, professor and associate dean at Fudan University’s Institute of International Studies, interviewed by Emeritus Professor Joseph Camilleri, La Trobe University, May 21, 2013, Retrieved from May 24, 2013, from http://www.thepowerofideas.com/post/50987680565/the-future-of-us-sino-relations-an-interview-with)

SD: Current Sino-US relations can be described as a n interesting mix of necessary cooperation and increasing competition, with some controlled confrontation. So long as it views itself as a “City upon a hill,” the United

States will remain fundamentally opposed to the emergence of a multipolar system. In particular the United States will resist anyone, China included, from sharing its leadership. America may accept certain partnerships as part of a US-centric world, but not as part of a multipolar one. America may eventually agree to engage with China in the development of a multipolar order, but out of necessity, not out of choice. There are many examples of expanding China-US cooperation: collaborating against North Korea’s nuclear and missile development; jointly stabilizing the world financial market; and, dispatching large numbers of

students reciprocally to learn from each other etc. But areas of suspicion are increasing even faster when it comes to

perceptions of each other’s strategic intentions: why the US has moved its pivot to Asia, and how China perceives its interests in the South China Sea, to name a few. The US is wondering whether Beijing, especially during China’s military modernization, will follow through on its international commitment , especially to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS) which allows Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia respective exclusive economic zones (EEZs), thereby denying China’s claim of the right to tap maritime economic resources in some of these exclusive areas. China, for its part, is deeply concerned about

the US shift to a pro-Japan position in the China-Japan sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu Islands. Such deep mutual suspicion

and subsequent hedging, if poorly managed, could lead to serious crisis escalation .

E. Strong US-Sino relations cause political reform and peace in China as well as prevent several scenarios for global war, disease, terrorism and prolifGross 13 (Donald senior associate at the Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a former State Department official, and author of The China Fallacy), Mar. 19, 2013, Retrieved May 24, 2013 from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/donald-gross/us-china-relations_b_2891183.html?view=print&comm_ref=false)

Better relations with China would support wide-reaching political reform and liberalization . They would undercut the repressive internal forces that legitimize one-party authoritarian rule as a means of

protecting the country against foreign military threats, particularly from the United States. In the field of national security, through an ongoing process of mutual threat reduction, the United States can ensure that China is a future partner and not a danger to the interests of America and its allies. The greatest benefit is that the U.S. would avoid a

military conflict for the foreseeable future with a country it now considers a major potential adversary. Other critical security benefits to the U nited S tates and its allies include: • Significantly reducing China's current and potential military threat to Taiwan , thus securing Taiwan's democracy; • Utilizing China's considerable influence with North Korea to curb Pyongyang's nuclear weapon and missile development programs; •

Increasing security cooperation with China on both regional and global issues, allowing the United States to leverage Chinese capabilities for meeting common transnational threats such as climate change, energy insecurity, pandemic disease, cyberterrorism and nuclear proliferation; • Curtailing cyberattacks by the Chinese military on U.S.-based targets as well as enforcing stringent measures against private individuals and groups in China

that engage in cyber-hacking; • Having China submit its maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas to an independent international judicial body to prevent festering conflicts over uninhabited islands and energy resources from escalating to armed conflict; and • Reducing the scope, scale, and tempo of China's military modernization programs by discrediting the rationale for conducting a focused anti-U.S. buildup,

especially since the country has so many other pressing material needs. In his second term, President Obama should seize the opportunity created by the emergence of China's new leadership to stabilize U.S.-China relations -- by pursuing a diplomatic strategy that minimizes conflict, achieves greater mutually beneficial Sino-American cooperation, and significantly expands trade and investment between the two countries. This approach would enable the United States to maintain an effective military presence in the Asia Pacific in coming years, despite defense budget cuts, while also rebalancing economic and political resources to the region to ensure stability and mutual prosperity.

What this means judges is that our impact solves everything the affirmative team’s plan does, without severing relations with China, which are key to multiple more impact scenarios that Cuba could never solve for. By maintaining relations with China, the world’s largest economy, the United States’, the world’s 2nd largest economy, can improve each other’s trade while SIMULTANEIOUSLY solving human rights violations in CHINA, THE COUNTRY WITH 1/5 OF THE WORLD’S POPULATION. This then LANDSLIDES, as the two largest world powers cooperate on security, terror, proliferation, armed conflict, cyberterrorism, pandemic disease, CLIMATE CHANGE, and energy insecurity.

Iran

Diplomacy can solve the Iran nuclear issue- new leader provesTorbati and Hemming- 13Yeganeh, Jon, ( Journalist for Reuters), “Iran, U.S. waiting for other side to make nuclear compromise”, August 7. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/07/us-iran-nuclear-usa-idUSBRE9760SW20130807. Google. 8/7/13. Euro.

The presidency of moderate cleric Hassan Rouhani has opened a window of opportunity in Iran's delicate nuclear diplomacy with the West but Tehran-watchers say that window could close as each side waits for the other to make the first move. Cautious optimism about talks between Iran and six world powers due to restart in September is a stark contrast to the gloom over on-off negotiations under eight years of previous President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In that time, ever more stringent U.N., U.S. and European Union sanctions on Iran's energy, shipping and banking sectors have helped weaken its currency, contributed to a steep rise in inflation and nearly halved oil exports since 2011. Meanwhile the Islamic Republic has continued to enrich uranium, edging towards Israel's "red line" after which it says it will launch military strikes on Iranian facilities. The leadership of Rouhani, who defeated more conservative rivals in a June 14 election with just over 50 percent of the vote, appears to offer the prospect of an alternative to the worst case scenario. " We are prepared, seriously and without wasting time, to enter negotiations which are serious and substantive with the other side," Rouhani said at his first news conference as president on Tuesday, and in answer to a question did not rule out direct talks with the United States. The United States, which has said it would be a "willing partner" if Iran were serious about resolving the problem peacefully, was careful in its response.

American trade in Latin America is used to push back against Iran, disrupts negotiations.CSIS- 13(Center for Strategic and International Studies, Brandon Fite and Chloe Coughlin-Schulte). “US and Iranian Strategic Competition: Latin America, Africa, and the Periphery States”, July 9. http://csis.org/publication/us-and-iranian-strategic-competition-latin-america-africa-and-periphery-states. Google. 8/8/13. Euro.

Strategic competition between the US and Iran in Latin America and Africa remains a critical aspect of any national security discussion. Recent developments in Latin America, Africa, Iran, and elsewhere necessitate a reevaluation of Iran’s presence in the region, as well as the threat it poses to the United States. The Burke Chair in Strategy’s recently released report, “US and Iranian Strategic Competition: Latin America, Africa, and the Periphery States” provides new analysis on these issues. The death of Hugo Chavez and the end of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency remove two of the most important figures in the Iranian-Latin America relationship. Additionally, despite Iranian vows of increased aid to both Africa and Latin America, funds have been either nonexistent or far smaller than promised. Analysis of such developments and their implications have been published in an updated report entitled “US and Iranian Strategic Competition: Latin America, Africa, and the Peripheral States,” which is now available on the CSIS website at: http://csis.org/files/publication/130709_Iran_Latinamerica_otherstates.pdf As newly imposed American and European sanctions begin to take hold on the Iranian economy, the government in Tehran has sought to mitigate their punitive effect and side-step Western

pressure by seeking partnerships with states on the geographic and strategic periphery of the US-Iran competition. Iran has worked to build relationships with other politically isolated governments with which it has somewhat of an ideological connection, like Venezuela and Zimbabwe. However, Tehran also forged closer ties with states that are drawn to Iran for economic, rather than political, purposes. Although states such as Argentina and Brazil may not politically align themselves with the Islamic Republic, both have strong trade partnerships with Iran. Despite these efforts, however, Iran’s embrace of these periphery states is limited and has been hindered by the overwhelming degree of US economic integration in both regions. This report shows that Iran pursued cooperation with states on the geographic and strategic periphery. In addition to general trade and diplomatic ties, these peripheral partners also have served as alternative markets for Iranian oil, provided diplomatic cover for Iran’s nuclear efforts, and aided Iran’s acquisition of goods proscribed by international sanctions. Tehran’s strategy pragmatically subordinated concerns for ideological and religious homogeneity to the goal of creating a coalition of non- or anti-Western states capable of influencing its competition with the United States. The states involved have been drawn to Iran by both promises of economic help—particularly in the energy sector—and by Iranian appeals to commonly oppose the Western international system. The Islamic Republic has also characterized its present isolation by the US and Europe as a continuation of Western imperialism, and drew on its credentials as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement to elicit support from the disparate states throughout Africa and the Americas that have preexisting grievances with the Western order and its leading states. According to Iranian leaders, the IRI’s competition with the US and its allies is not a just a contest between states, but a clash of worldviews. The US represents an exploitative status quo, and Iran offers the promise of an alternative order geared toward promoting the sovereignty and interests of developing nations. Though many of the countries Iran has sought cooperation with are militarily and economically weak, Tehran cast a wide net in trying to build an array of partners to counterbalance what it sees as Western dominance of the global order. Iran has sought to be the hub of a non-Western bloc, and worked to frustrate American influence over Iran and throughout the developing world. US ability to push back against Iran ’s attempts to

widen its network of such countries is strongest in countries that benefit from US aid, trade, or that lack a significant basis for ideological disagreement with US practices. While Iran’s overtures to peripheral states have the potential to weaken US attempts to contain and isolate Iran, Tehran’s web is fragile and possibly illusory.

Israel will attack if diplomacy failsGant Daily- 13AHN, (online Pennsylvania newspaper), “U.S. seeks direct talks with Iran as Israel warns of attack”. July 14. http://gantdaily.com/2013/07/14/u-s-seeks-direct-talks-with-iran-as-israel-warns-of-attack/. Google. 8/7/13. Euro.

Netanyahu said Iran is building faster centrifuges to enrich uranium to 20 percent for nuclear weapons production. He said he will make the decision to attack Iran by winter if the U.S. fails to stop Tehran from making nuclear weapons through diplomacy.

Israel first strike goes nuclear – this draws in regional powers and escalates.Russell 2009

James (Russell is a Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East”. http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26_Russell_2009.pdf -bg], google, 12/14/11, AW)

The chances of clandestine program development increases as more states enter the nuclear business. The motivations for clandestine development increase in the region if Iran successfully crosses the nuclear threshold – a situation greatly feared by the Sunni-led states in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. The emergence of clandestine programs in the region creates incentives for preventative attack by a number of actors, some of whom may be nuclear armed. As with the case in the near-term scenarios, any wartime scenarios create the prospect of escalation and nuclear use. Regional powers might also, under extreme circumstances, be tempted to resort to nukes with the belief that it can successfully break the will of its opponent, much like the United States did against its Japanese opponent in 1945. While it currently appears remote, regime(s) change that brings to power millennial extremists constitute another prospect that might factor into long-term use scenarios. Extremist religious and/or ideologically motivated leadership may view nuclear weapons as a useful tool in pursuit of their objectives. The prospect of use by a clandestinely-armed state cannot be dismissed over the longer-term either as a calculated attack on an unsuspecting adversary or in the context of a war for national survival. A nuclear “bolt-from-the-blue” attack by violent non-state actors or a resort to nuclear use in the belief that it can successfully break the will of its opponent, much like the United States did against its Japanese opponent in 1945, is possible both in short- and long-term scenarios, but is deemed a remote possibility in this analysis. In the Middle East, most terrorist groups fall into the category of “religious nationalists” that seek localized political objectives. It is difficult to see how using a nuclear weapon advances the cause of groups like Hamas or Hezbollah. On the other hand, millennial extremist groups like Al Qaeda might be more attracted to the possibility of using a nuclear weapon should they come into possession of one.

Extend gant’13, which gives the neg the best timeframe of the entire debate. Israel’s PM Netanyahu has PROMISED to bomb Iran, also giving you probability. Then extend Russell’09 which says that any nuclear conflict goes global, thus wnning you magnitude as well.

On Case

Agriculture/tRADE

They emphasize trade deficite, except the United States’ trade deficite is huge and will not be solved by opening our agricultural sector to a small island nation. Emphasize this solvency defict. THEY CAN NOT SOLVE FOR THE ADVANTAGE.

Cuba is a risky market – exports would decrease without “cash only” provision.United States International Trade Commission 2007 Estimated Effect on U.S. Sales of Agricultural Products to Cuba if Restrictions on Financing were Lifted , http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub3932.pdfMr. Messina cited Cuban credit risk and the U.S. “cash only” sales provision, travelrestrictions, and general distrust as potential factors limiting trade. He said the Cuban marketis widely recognized as a very risky market in which to conduct credit sales and otherfinancial transactions. According to Mr. Messina, some large firms may be willing to takeon this credit risk, which is currently minimized through the “cash only” sales provision, toincrease exports. Conversely, he could also envision a situation where exports woulddecrease without “cash only” sales as firms would be unwilling to assume such a high risk.

Lifting restrictions won’t dramatically increase exports – US firms won’t issue open credit to Cuba.William Messina, Coordinator of Economic Analysis, Department of Food and Resource Economics, Florida Cooperative Extension Service, 2003 U.S.-Cuban Agricultural Trade: Present Realities and Future Prospects1 http://www.ilfb.org/media/253618/u_of_florida_testimony_on_cuba.pdfCuba's trade flows were more or less in balance ¶ until the early 1960s when the economy suddenly had ¶ to adjust to the shock of losing its most important ¶ trade partner, the United States.4¶ The immediate ¶

impact was a rapid growth in Cuba's trade deficit. ¶ However, once the Cuban economy began to be ¶

supported and subsidized by the Soviet Union, these ¶ trade deficits were not particularly important. ¶

However, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the ¶ subsequent dissolution of the Council for Mutual¶

Economic Assistance (COMECON),5¶ Cuba once ¶ again lost its most important trading partner and, in ¶

this case, its all-important source of economic ¶ support. At this point, the flaws in Cuba's economic ¶

system, which were responsible for generating its ¶ large trade deficits, began to manifest themselves. ¶

Foreign investment flows, net revenues from tourism, ¶ and even the aforementioned hard currency ¶ remittances from Cuban-Americans are not sufficient ¶ to offset trade deficits that increase each year and ¶ totaled nearly 3.3 billion pesos in 2002 (Anuario de ¶ Estadístico de Cuba, 2002).6¶ As a result, Cuba is ¶ considered an extremely high credit risk in global ¶ financial markets, with Euromoney Magazine ¶ ranking Cuba 181st out of 184 countries in their 2003 ¶ analysis of country credit risk (Euromoney ¶ Magazine, 2003). Only Somalia, Iraq, North Korea, ¶ and Afghanistan ranked lower. Under such circumstances, it is unlikely that ¶ many U.S. firms are going to issue open credit to ¶ Cuba, so allowing credit sales alone likely would not ¶ be sufficient to dramatically increase U.S. ¶ agricultural and food exports to Cuba. Following an ¶ opening of credit sales to Cuba, the next step might ¶ be for U.S. firms to seek access to U.S. government ¶ Export Credit Guarantee programs for

agricultural ¶ and food sales to Cuba. However, that would be a ¶ very contentious issue and one that would generate a ¶ great deal of animated discussion and debate on ¶ Capitol Hill.

No boost to ag sales – Cuban economy can’t support additional imports, economy in shambles.William Messina, Coordinator of Economic Analysis, Department of Food and Resource Economics, Florida Cooperative Extension Service, 2003 U.S.-Cuban Agricultural Trade: Present Realities and Future Prospects1 http://www.ilfb.org/media/253618/u_of_florida_testimony_on_cuba.pdfSome have argued that a relaxation of the cash ¶ sale provisions of the TSRA legislation to allow U.S. ¶

firms to offer credit sales would significantly boost ¶ U.S. sales of agricultural and food products to Cuba. ¶ However, that fails to take into consideration the ¶ economic realities in Cuba. The Cuban economy is a ¶ shambles and it faces serious hard currency shortages ¶ as a result of its ever-escalating trade deficit.

EMPHASIZE THAT THEY ONLY PARTIALLY LIFT THE EMBARGO ON CUBA FOR THEIR AGRICULTURE. THIS MAKES SOLVING THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS/DEMOCRACY IMPACT IMPOSSIBLE. WE DENY CUBA MEDICAL SUPPLIES, TECHNOLOGY, AND OTHER VITAL NECESITTIES TO LIVE.