lade WALAWBUM inkangawtaung nhpum-ga shadazup MYITKYINA

TheOffic~l~n~M~~~,ocw~n~ WS INovember, 1984

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38thReunionHugeSuccessThis recent reunion was one of our better

ones.This was the fortieth anniversary of the

Burma Breakthrough to Myitkyina. Lo-cated as it was in the Southwest, we had anopportunity to have both Eastern and West-ern members join together.

After the Friday night dinner, we had ashowing of a video-cassette created byDavid Quaid, former combat photographerwith the 3rd Bn, 5307th. Taken from actualcombat film on the trail enroute fromHsamshingyang to Myitkyina, Burma, inMay of 1944, with narration by Quaid, itgives a true, realistic portrayal of the dif-ficulties encountered. Quaid gave up hisbusiness for a month to make this film. Hehas also indicated that the profits from saleof this unique piece of our history is to beused for charitable purposes. Cost at thistime is $30. Check to Merrill's MaraudersAssociation, care of Executive Secretary,address on front of this issue.

The Saturday night banquet began with aPresentation of the Colors by a Ranger De-tachment, 2nd Bn, 75th Inf, Ft. Lewis,Washington. Seven of the eight Rangers onhand participated in the Grenada Cam-paign. Command M-Sgt. James Voyles pro-vided us with a highlight briefing on theaction on Friday night. Attendance at thedinner was 303.Speech! Speech!

The forceful, patriotic talk given byDarrow Tully, Fighter pilot in Korea andVietnam and currently publisher of the Ari-zona Republic and Gazette newspaperscame as a surprise to some of us. But itwas a delight to all of us. Certainly, one ofthe best speakers we have heard. After thedinner, many people came up to congratu-late Mr. Tully. Some asked for copies of histalk. Mr. Tully made a copy available to us.We have retyped it for those who want acopy. Send $2check to Merrill's Marauders,11244N. 33rd St., Phoenix, AZ 85028to covercost of photocopy and mailing.Business Meeting

For the first time, the annual businessmeeting of members was held on Saturdayafternoon. Chairman Herb Clofine con-ducted the first part of the meeting. He wassucceeded by Lawrence Lew after theelection of officers. The new officers forthis year are: President Philip B. Piazza;Chairman Lawrence Lew; Treasurer Herb

lofine; Executive Secretary Ray Lyons;:istorian Ralph Kouroyen; Military Liai-on Offi~er Dave Hurwitt.

Reunion Site ProposalsHurwitt and Ketcham proposed the

American Dutch Resort at Lake BuenaVista. near Orlando, Florida. It is 15 min-utes from airport and convenient to DisneyWorld Village and Epcot. Cost $275 percouple. Tom Martini proposed the HenryVIII Hotel at St. Louis, Missouri. This was areunion site in 1981. Cost: $185 per couple.

The third proposal by Sam Rapisardawas for the Cleveland Hilton South, nearCleveland, Ohio. Costs are as follows:Package for two persons including 4 mealsand 2 nights, $205; Package for one personincluding 4 meals and 2 nights, $155. Thereis no charge for children in the guest roomregardless of age, when they occupy thesame room as their parents. Package forchildren 12 years and under with 4 meals,$25; package for children, ages 12-18, with 4

meals, $55.00.Non-package room rates: Room rates for

single or double occupancy will be $50 plus12.5 percent sales tax. This rate will applyone week prior to your convention date andone week following your convention date.

Airport transportation is available to andfrom the Cleveland Hilton South.

The vote tally for each of the proposalswas: St. Louis - 14; Lake Buena Vista -16; Cleveland - 70. Therefore, next yearthe reunion will be in Cleveland, Ohio. Seeyou there. Details and registration forth-coming.

Address of new Historian Ralph Kouro-yen is 198 Cavalier Ct., North Ft. Myers, FL33903. Reunion Chairman Sam Rapisarda,12937, County Line Road, Chesterland, Ohio44026.

\NJ)\A -BURMA CAMPAIGN

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Kenneth 1 GumaerDove RudermanPhillip A KerriganAlbcrt E King Jr.Georgs RobertsonBob NelsenCaifson JohnsonBob SpeerBob KatchamC H Doallas (Doc)Gus McKinneyNorman PageBill PattonTom HendersonAldo FontanaJames W ClarkRalph KouroyenRobert J! Passaru.siVirgil A WeeDinkLeroy Dickinson

James Holcomb 10>"Harvey Bro>m It,]!H J CaulfieldBan L JacksonVernon Whi teHarold BurnsideBill WoibleJ B TalleyJoe R Cordeiro I&RThomas H Matney I&R

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Charles J LottieriRoland W R mussenHenry E Baldwin

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Page Two The Burman Newi---------------FATHER JAMES STUART'S

CHRONICLE OF THE MARAUDERSTHROUGH THE TAKING OF THE

AIRFIELD AT MYITKYINA--------------_.Editor's Note: Withthis issue we begin

the printing of notes made by Father Stuartthat appears to be a report made to OSSHeadquarters in Burma. During a visit toColumban Fathers Headquarters, outsideof Omaha, Nebraska, we found that he hadmade a similar report to his religious su-periors which stressed his missionary role.You will find this report reflects his plain-talking manner. The report was obtainedfrom Dave Contess and Al Sokolnicki. Itwill be issued on a space-available basis inthe future.

Father James Stuart, born in Ireland,was a Calumban missionary among tlreKachins. He died August 11, 1955, in hisfamily home in Moneymore, Co. Derry,Ireland, at the age of 46. He is buried atNavan, headquarters of the CalumbanFathers in Ireland

*****

During the Fall of 1942 the late BrigadierOrde Wingate organized Gurkha and Brit-ish soldiers into compact units to be used inlong-range penetration operations. Knownas Jungle Columns, these units engaged in

marauding expeditions in northern Burma,harassing the enemy and disrupting hiscommunication and supply lines. They,made no attempt to engage main enemyforces or to seize and hold territory, beingconcerned only with hit-and-run raidingtactics.

The exploits of this expedition received agood deal of publicity. A proposal wasmade at the Quebec Conference in August,1943, that the United States should furnishsuch a force for a similar mission inBurma.

On September 1st, the Chief of Staff,directed that "approximately 3000 officersand men be shipped at once to the Asiatictheatre to form three special units for em-ployment in Burma on long-range penetra-tion operations similar to the expeditioncommanded by Brigadier Wingate in theSpring of 1943." It was further directed thatthese troops be selected from". . . volun-teers, in excellent physical condition, andwho were informed that they were toengage in a hazardous mission within a fewmonths."

A letter was dispatched on September 7thto the Commanding General, CBI, RearEchelon, New Delhi, acquainting him withthe action taken and outlining the proposeduse of the force thus: "It is visualized thethree battalions will be employed separ-ately - probably two in Assam and onefrom Yunnan, and that they will operate infront of main efforts. They will have packtransport and will be resupplied by air. AI-

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James HolcombDavid ,ludermanCaleb !~ Hyden A Cochilli;, A KerriganAlbert Ie King Jr 11£Harvey BrO1ffi """ CoBob HelsenCaifson JohnsonBill 'daibleBob Ketchll.'11Virgil \feeninlcGus HcKinneyAl HobleJ B TalleyLeo PrzeborowskiJoe a Cordeiro lIonBill PattonJames J Chatho.xnLemuel II King IIQAlbert FedderAlbert B !!i3ginsBen L JacksonlI!,rold BurnsideEarl J JemaJ.

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though operating separately, the threeefforts should be coordinated by one'Group' Headquarters composed of person-nel who will train with the battalions andthus become familiar with their capabili-ties, personalities, communication andsupply problems, and other vital factors, aswell as to maintain liaison and coordinatewith other friendly troops in the area."

There was nothing in the letter to indicatethat the force would be controlled by theBritish, although five days earlier GeneralStilwell had received information that theAmerican troops were to operate underWingate. (Radio NR 3283 2 Sept 43 EA Stil-well fr Marshall File 2 JWS Personal.)

Attached to this letter were proposedT-O's covering all anticipated require-ments and plans for the composition, equip-ment, supply and training of the unit. Therewas also a clause permitting "alterationsas desired." A large amount of materialover and above the T-E was provided. (Ed.Note - not found). In paragraph VI thisstatement appeared: "Every conceivabletype of weapon and special equipment, in-cluding new developments, that will furtherthe success of this operation has beenamply provided, with provision for aerialdropping losses and false drops for de-ceptive purposes."

By this time there had sprung up a differ-ence of opinion regarding the value of long-range penetration group~. Some Britishcommanders were not in favor of Wingate'splans for a second campaign because thenature of the task demanded the cream ofthe trained troops, thus depleting their reg-ular military forces; others felt that thelack of a definite military objective and theprobably small scale results were not suf-

(Continued on page 3)

Officers RowPresident - We will send a condolencecard to families of deceased Marauders.Let me know. Phil Piazza, Rt. 3, Box 358,Timber Lake 1, Seneca, SC 29678.

Treasurer - Expenses were high lastyear. Herb Clofine.

Executive Secretary - If you like thematerial in this issue of "Burman News"and would like it to be continued, we needyour financial support. Send donations toMerrill's Marauders, 11244 N. 33rd St.,Phoenix, AZ 85028.

GOING! Going! going!We have a license plate that displays the

Ranger Tab and our Marauder patch. Youcan mount it on top of your present license,stick it in the back window, or tack one upin your workshop. Send $6 check toMerrill's Marauders at 11244 N. 33rd St.,Phoenix, AZ 85028.

The Burman News Page Three

FATHER STUART...(Continued from page 2)

ficient to justify the enormous expenditureinvolved.

In accordance with the Chief of Staff'sSeptember 1st directive, various commandheadquarters received radio instructionsregarding the recruitment of personnel forthe new force. The 950 troops who hadserved on Trinidad were secured throughthe Caribbean Defense Command; another950 were found among the veterans ofGuadalcanal and other South Sea opera-tions; and a similar number, many withtropical service behind them, volunteeredfrom the United States.

Lt. Col. Charles N. Hunter was the seniorofficer among those selected. He had justcompleted a tour of duty at Foit Benning"Infantry School where he served as Chief ofthe Rifle Platoon Combat Section. Hunterwent dir:ectly to Washington and sat in onsome of the planning conferences. OnSeptember 15th, he flew to San Franciscowhere the men destined to form two of thethree battalions had assembled. Personnelfor the third battalion would be picked upenroute to India.

In order that the unit's departure mightbe expedited, the Trinidad volunteers hadflown to Miami and crossed the continentby rail. On the 21st of September the unitsailed out through the Golden Gate on theSS Lurline. As much of their equipment ascould be accommodated went with them;the remainder was sent to San Diego fromwhich port it was to be forwarded in oneshipment to Bombay. (The equipmentshipped from San Diego reached Bombayin almost 40 different cargoes. In May,when the siege of Myitkyina was well un-derway, the last of it arrived in Calcutta.Because of this the unit started up the LedoRoad lacking some items it was scheduledtohave.)

Lt. Col. Hunter knew that there wouldprobably be little time before the unitentered into combat. Therefore, he initi-ated on shipboard a training programwhich was carried out as extensively aspossible under crowded conditions. Thisprogram consisted of physical hardeningexercises, small arms practice, classes inscouting and patrolling, and special first-aid and preventive hygiene training whichwould be useful in the jungle for which theywere headed.

The Lurline proceeded SW to a point be-tween Hawaii and Christmas Island, thenceW to Noumea, New Caledonia. Here theunit was augmented by 650 officers andmen; and the other volunteers needed to fillout the third battalion were waiting at thenext port of call, Brisbane, Australia.

After a brief stop at Perth, the Lurlinesped across the Indian Ocean and up theArabian Sea to her destination, Bombay.The three battalions disembarked on the29th, 30th, and 31st of October, 1943.Waiting to meet them was Col. Francis G.Brink, USA, who was charged with thesupervision of their training. With him wasMaj. Edward T. Hancock who acted assupply officer of the organization until itsdissolution in August, 1944.

The status of the unit was not yet clear.Complete arrangements had been made by

the Americans to move and receive thetroops in Assam but this move was not per-mitted by the British, who desired to keepthem in India proper for training. Conse-quently, no adequate provision had beenmade for the reception and housing of thetroops in India. Some immediate actionwas imperative. The British assignedtemporary camp grounds at Deolali, butthese proved unsuitable. Messing facilitiesin particular were so bad that Hunter madea protest through General Ferris. (Brig.Gen. B. G. Ferris, deputy C-S of CBI.)Three weeks later they moved to virgincountry near Deogarh where a tent campwas partly established and where a train-ing area was accessible.

Under the direction of Col. Brink who wasas.sisted..by LL..coL D. E"Still, the troopsbegan to receive intensive instruction andtraining. Naturally, great emphasis wasplaced on jungle operations. General Win-gate was very much in evidence aroundDeogarh. He brought in some British offi-cers together with some officers and men

from the Burma Rifles to inject into theunit his ideas on training. It was obviousthat he expected to have this group underhis command. At his insistence, the Ameri-can battalion formation was broken downinto two Jungle Columns (later called Com-bat Teams) and training was shaped ac-cordingly. In adopting this organization itwas necessary to break up companies forthe permanent tactical formation, yet, fornormal administrative purposes it wasequally necessary to maintain the originalorganization on paper as the British set-updid not contemplate or provide any per-sonnel for administration in the Jungle Col-umns. This resulted in officers in charge ofrecords being responsible for men con-cerning whose status they had no knowl-edge or control.

The administrative difficulties encount-ered during these early days, when the unitattempted to adopt the prescribed Britishorganization, were responsible for the inac-

(Continued on page 4)

PASS IN REVIEWDeaths reported in the past year

Name and Hometown [where known] Where, When DiedThomas K. Armstrong-, Titusville, FL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 11/27/83Ernest Beauchesne. Manville, RI, 3 Bn 0 Med. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6/4/83Robert Wayne Beck, Tell City, IN, New Galahad. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 7/8/83Raymond Bratten, 2Bn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Warong, Burma, 3/10-12/44LioneIBuchette.. Walawbum,BurmaLloyd (Clem) Caldwell,475/2/HqCo 11/21/82William Connery, S/Sgt, 475/3/K. . . ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Myitkyina, Burma, 6/44George CrispAlponseDePalma.Uniondale,NY,lBnW. 6/84FredDomino,Depew,NY,5307/1/R 6/1/84Virgil C Flatter, Mesa, AZ, 475/2/Hq Co . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Mesa, AZ 5/13/84Ralph Fowler, Rev., Quitman,AR 3/31/82Joseph Garcia, Phoenix, AZ475/3/K . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Myitkyina, 6/44RichardFGervois,Bristol,CT,3Bnl&R 8/2/44John F Gestring, Col., Moraga, CA, 3Bn 10/7/83WilliamGrams,Sturgis,SD FtMeade,VH,6/26/83KooreHanson,Salem,OR,5307/1/R 12/22/83RichardHejdak,Milwaukee,WI Woods,VH,12/81Duane T Hosler, Flint, MI, 5307/Hq (MP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Flint, MI 7/19/84Raymond C Houghton, Edgartown, MA, 5307/2/F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Mass, 5/9/84Charles L Joyner, Capron, VA, 5307/HQ (MP). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 12/22/83Robert E Kadgihn, Capt, Iowa City, Iowa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Burma, 1944JosephKwiatowski,Reading,PA 1954Lake,Lt.,(CaptMaxon,CO) June1944Elmer R Levesque, Bristol,CT,2Bn 7/2/44Edward Ludwig, Akron,OH 1978-79CharlesLutz,Philadelphia,PA Fall1957William Maddock WestGermany,1978Joseph Maloney, Dayton, OH5307/3/0CT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1968Joseph Patrick Manzione, Portsmouth, tvA, 236th. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Portsmouth, VA 7/10/84GeorgeMikulan,Pittsburgh,PA 1963Edgar Morris, Lt., 475/3/K Myitkyina,June1944"Nick" Nichols, 5307/3/0 CT Walawbum,Burma,Mar'44Charles Albert Ogden, 5307/3 Bn. Korea, Dec. 1950, 38th InfoRaymondOstrolecki,475/3/K Myitkyina,Burma,June'44JohnPloerderl,Oshkosh,WI,3Bn Nhpum,GA,BurmaISRavdin,DR,Philadelphia,PA20GH 1976-77PauILRogers,Braintree,MAlBn 7/12/84ClarenceSalts,Leavenworth,KS VAMedCent,July1983William Joseph Spielman, Bristol, CT, 2 Bn 7/2/44ETrout,Akron,OH 1970'sOscar Tudor, Sacramento, CA 1983-84NorveIPTyler,Norfolk,VA475th 12/9/83JosephVolpe,Somerville,NJ Fall1966EGZeranski,Bristol,CT5307/3Bn 6/13/44DanieIZidna,Akron,OH2Bn 1978-79

Page Four The Burman News

FATHER STUART. . .(Continued from page 3)

curacies in records which later createdtrouble.

Lt. Col. Hunter continued to administerthe unit. He drew some personnel from thebattalions, and with other personnel madeavailable by Theatre Headquarters, organ-ized a provisional central headquarters.C.O. 39 Headquarters USAF, CBI, 10October 1943 assigned the number 5307 tothe provisional unit.

In December, Lt. Col. Hunter issued ageneral order from "Regimental Head-quarters" activating the "Regiment," andsent the order to CBI Headquarters for ap-proval. Theatre Headquarters approvedthe action, thus officially activating theunit as a regiment as of 1 January 1944.

The regiment was an aggregation ofBranch Immaterial troops, and includedartillerymen, cavalry troopers, infantry-men and others. Plans for a combined op-eration for the recapture of Burma havingfailed to materialize, the contemplated useof long-range penetration troops now intraining had to be shelved. With theapproach of the offensive to open up theway for the Ledo Road, General Stilwell de-sired to use his regiment in the NorthBurma campaign. The Supreme AlliedCommander approved this request, and theorganization was transferred to Stilwell'sBurma command. (Rad NR 42 8 .Tan '44,EA.)

The 31st and 33rd QM Pack Troops wereadded to the unit early in January, togetherwith a detachment from the 835th SignalService Battalion and a platoon of MilitaryPolice from the 502nd MP Battalion. OnJanuary 6th, Brigadier General Frank D.Merrill was assigned to command thiscombined force and its destination was an-nounced as the 5307thProvisional Unit. The31st had sailed from New Orleans on theeighteenth of October. The 33rd, which leftthe same port on the first of November,

travelled on a ship which was torpedoed enroute, and lost all its equipment andanimals. Twelve days before the start ofthe campaign they arrived at Deogarhwhere they found horses and mules thathad been brought from Australia waitingfor them.

Elements of these two pack troops, plusan extemporized pack troop made up ofpersonnel borrowed from other units in thetheatre, were attached to the three bat-talions and to the unit headquarters. Theunit started out with an animal strength of700. At the end of the campaign less than100remained, 600animals having been cas-ualties. The First Battalion alone lost 60animals on the march to Myitkyina.

Plans had been made to employ Galahadin February, 1944,and the tactical situationin northern Burma in early January madeits entry into combat activities on its timeschedule most expedient.

Chinese units which had been sent toLedo during October, 1943, to rout theenemy from forward areas in advance ofthe road engineers, after making initialgains in the Hukawng Valley, ran intostrong oppposition from prepared enemypositions and by January 1944 had beenslowed down. Enemy reinforcements wererumored to be moving northward in theHukawng Valley. Japanese patrols had at-tacked the Ledo Road, and raids on theBengal-Assam Railway were feared. Anysuch enemy action could have a seriouseffect on our effort to get supplies throughto China and it was essential to get the rateof advance by our troops speeded up.

When General Merrill assumed com-mand of Galahad on January 6th, his in-structions were "to close in on Ledo byFebruary 7th." Ledo area was then theforward base of operations. This meantthat within one month 3000men and 700 ani-mals had to be transported a distance ofover one thousand miles, a monumentaltask because the route necessitated a

(Continued on page 5)

India-Burma Campaign, Northern Burma, 1944, 5307Headquarters. Kachin tribes-man making a gift of chicken, deer meat, bamboo bottle of rice beer to BG F. D.Merrill. With the Commanding General is Father Stuart.

HEADQUARTERS5307th COMPOSITE UNIT (PROV)

SPECIAL ORDERS:)

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A.P.0.487NUMBER 142 ) 1 August 194,

1. PAC secret radio, Hq. USAF, CBI,APO 885, dtd 2 Jul 1944, the followingnamed 0, are reld fr further asgmt to anddy with this unit, and WP fr this sta to APO883, for air transportation to Cont US.

Maj LAWRENCE L. LEW 0401329,Inf, Hq Co 3rd Bn

Maj LOUIS J. WILLIAMS 0372083,Inf, Hq & Hq Det

Capt. G. CLARE THOMAS 0402885,Inf, Hq & Hq Det

2. T /5 Marvin C. Corbin, 6295608, QMCHq & Hq Det, is placed on DS to MyitkyinaTask Force.

3. VOCO of 27 Jul1944 directing that Cap1MARK J. SABLOSKY, 047144, DC, havin!reported this Hq be asgd to Hq Co 1st Brare hereby confirmed and made of record

4. Having reported this Hq, Pfc James MMoll, 36155140,Inf, MOS 745,is asgd to CoF

5. Having reported this Hq, the followin!named EM are asgd to Hq & Hq Det, atchcto Casual Det for administration ancfurther atchd to Hq & Hq Det, RE, for dyrats &qrs.

S / Sgt. John R. Buzzard 6142092Pvt. Mack Johnson 6970348Pvt James O. McFarland 150456006. Capt WILLIAM Z. SCOTT, 0375971,Inf

Hq & Hq Det, is aptd Cl A Agent 0 to Lt CoJ. E. KIRK, FD, Disbursing 0, AdvancISec 2, SOS, USAF, CBI, APO 629, for th.purpose of making pmts to EM of Hq & H(Det on Jul 1944payroll.

7. The following named EM, organizations indicated are rd to gr of Pvt.

Sgt Lewis E. Brown 34160396,Co CPfc Edward A. Hahn 32751209,Casual De8. The following named 0, organization

indicated are placed on DS at MassouriIndia, for a period of 21 days, and WP 0I ~5 Aug fr this sta to Massouri, India.

2nd Lt THEORDORE T. CHAMALAS0512157,Inf

2nd Lt WILLIAM B. FILIAK01642858,SC

9. The following named 0, are placed 0DS at Simla, India, for a period of 21 day!and WP 0/ a 5 Aug 1944fr this sta to SimhIndia.

1st Lt KENNETH I. GUMAER01715248,VC

2nd Lt EARL H. HEISS01321407,Inf

10. 2nd Lt WILLIAMN. PAYNE, 0132470'Inf, Casual Det, is placed on DS at US ArmRest Cp 1, APO 465, for a period of 21 day!and WP 0/ a 5 Aug 1944fr this sta to AP465.

By order of Colonel HUNTER:OFFICIAL:TOM P. SENFF,Capt., Inf,Adjutant.

TOM P. SENFICapt, Inf,Adjutant.

WAR STORYLittle Shan boy watching Colonel Kim

son at Myitkyina. Colonel was wearing eyglasses to read map. Boy observes, "U:big eyes, see little word."

The Burman News Page Five

FATHER STUART...Continued from page 4)

change-over from a broad-gauge to anarrow-gauge line, and a different move-ment up to the Brahmaputra River by boat.The inadequate transportation facilitieswould not permit the completion of themove within the time alloted, and not untilthe 9th of February did the last of thetrailing Third Battalion hit the ground atMargherita, six miles west of Ledo.

General Merrill was eminently fitted tolead such an expedition. He was thirty-nineyears old, and had been a classmate of Lt.Co!.Hunter's at the United States MilitaryAcademy from which he graduated in 1929.He.had been a language student in Japanand had spent time in the field with theJapanese Army. December 7, 1941, hadfound him in a plane on his way to Ran-goon from the Philippines. He servedwith General Stilwell in the first Burmacampaign as liaison officer with the BritishForces, and after the famous retreat be-came G-3 at CBI Rear Echelon Head-quarters. This assignment enabled him toacquire a rich background on both thestrategic plans of the theatre and its ad-ministrative ramifications. He was fa-miliar with the country in which he wasscheduled to operate and with the charac-teristics of the foe against whom he wasmoving.

His new command pleased him. On Janu-ary 6th, he sent a message to General Stil-well that the outfit was in excellent shape,had high morale, and was ready andanxious for field service. Upon his arrivalin Ledo, General Merrill had received fur-ther instructions to march up the LedoRoad as far as Ningbyen. The First Bat-talion moved forward on the 9th as theThird Battalion detrained at Margherita.

There had not been enough time tochange the unit from the British type of or-ganization back to an orthodox Americanbattalion organization. Each of the batta-lions was still formed into two combat ele-ments which were now called CombatTeams. These were not combat teams inthe accepted sense, since they were merelysub-division of the battalion into smallerunits rather than a grouping of associatedarms (such as artillery and engineers withinfantry for unit employment).

The First Battalion was commanded by11. Col. William L. Osborne, and its twoteams, Red Combat Team and White Com-bat Team were under Maj. Edward Ghizand Maj. Caifson Johnson respectively. Lt.Co!. George A. McGee had the SecondBattalion which was composed of the BlueCombat Team commanded by Maj. Rich-ard M. Healey and the Green Combat Teamunder Capt. Thomas E. Borgardus. TheThird Battalion was given to Lt. Col.Charles E. Beach and comprised theOrange Combat Team under Maj. Law-rence L. Lew and the Khaki Combat Teamled by Maj. Edwin J. Briggs.

General Merrill appointed Col.'Hunter as

l

executive officer. A small and mobilecommand group, consisting of GeneralMerrill, a few guards and an operatingtaft, accompanied the troops. In addition,

a liaison group was placed at General Stil-,well's Burma Headquarters. An Air Base

detachment, under Maj. Hancock, was leftin the rear area to handle supply for theunit.

Operations behind enemy lines depend onmobility and secrecy. For this reason nor-mal methods of supply were impractical.Because any attempt to encumber thetroops with an appreciable amount ofsubsistence for themselves and their ani-mals would destroy tactical mobility, ar-rangements were made to supply the or-ganization by air-dropping food and muni-tions at pre-determined locations. (see Ap-pendix No.3). (Ed. Note - No Appendixattached). The unit normally carried ra-tions for three days at all times.

The unusual effectiveness of this air sup-ply contributed greatly to the unit's swiftmobility and its ability to function properly.In some measure the success of the cam-paign was made possible by the splendidcooperation of Galahad's air base detach-ment in furnishing critically needed itemsdespite the obstacles that often confrontedthem. (Three factors are responsible forthe enviable success of Galahad's air basedetachment in supplying the forward unit.A. The job was in charge of a line officer,Maj. E. T. Hancock, who kept abreast ofthe tactical situation and was frequentlyable to anticipate requirements before theneed for them actually occurred. B. The ef-ficiency, hard work, and devotion to duty ofCapt. W. C. Nelson who was the mainspringthat never ran down; and the tireless ef-

forts and complete cooperation of Lt. Ro-bert O. Gardiner who supervised thepacking of parachutes, and of Capt. M. E.Lowell who provided outstanding air liaisonand flying performances under adverseconditions, formed close parallels inachievement. Lowell was later command-ing officer of First Troop Carrier San atSukreting (?). He did most of Det. 1O1'sdangerous personnel night parachutinghimself when he was a major. He was agrand character and always most obliging.)

The First Phase of the CampaignOn February 19th, the leading First Bat-

talion reached Ningbyen and the Third Bat-talion, at the tail of the column, pulled in onthe 21st, two days later. At Niagbyen, thefirst air-drop supplies took place. Maj.Hancock had come up from Rear Echelonat Dinjan to witness it. Some of the para-chutes failed to handle their loads. Somecontainers weighed so much that men onthe ground couldn't handle them, and thetime consumed in breaking down the pack-ages and distributing their contents waslonger than had been anticipated. But be-fore being removed from the field each par-cel was examined and the mistakes madein packing and overloaditlg them carefullynoted. As a result of this experiment,changes in air-dropping technique were in-augurated and future dropping of supplies

'"(Continued ~n page 6)

FALLIN!Hereare the latest additions to our assembly. Remember them?

John Aschenbach, Hope, Idaho 83836; 5307/2/B P&DRobert T Berter, 475/3 Bn/K Co HW, 247 Aquarius Dr., Cincinnati, Ohio 45231C W "Bucky" Bryan, 5th Liaison, 4538 Van Noord Ave., Studio City, California 91604,Buddy R Chambers, 75th Rgt C. T., 437 N 110 St., Apache Junction, Arizona 85220Thomas B Gehan, 475th Rgt C.T., 103 Greensheads Dr., Camillus, New York 13031Ralph A Hatch, 5307/35 QM PkTr C.O., 766 Picador Blvd, San Diego, California 92154James Heaton, 5307/3/K, P.O. Box 14, Larkspur, Colorado 80118Norman N Janis, 5307/3/0 I&R, P.O. Box 1568, Pine Ridge, South Dakota 57770Ray Ruksas, 1st Air Command (Liaison Pilot), 5617 N 10th Ave., Phoenix, Arizona 85013James C Sodowsky, 5307/3/0 HW, 815 S D, Arkansas City, Kansas 67005Albert T Willis Jr., 475th, 814 Chattawka Ln, New Bern, North Carolina 28560Richard E Young, 5307/1/A Air Drop, 1674 Palm Grove #184, Las Vegas, Nevada 89104George Atwood, 3 Bn HQ CO,address not known, Bristol, Connecticut 06010Thomas Cronkite, Hq Co, 3 Bn, East Road, Bristol, Connecticut 06010Mitchell Burch, 475th, Route 1, Box 524, Osyka, Mississippi 39657Jay D Campbell, 5307th, 20905 Bon Heur St., St Clair Shores, Michigan 48081Donald M Drake, 5307/3/0, 6825 Sunnyslope Dr., Sacramento, California 95828Ken Dunham, 304 Stanolind, Healdton, Oklahoma 73438Kenneth H Dunn, 5307/1/R Co C, 96 Rockingham Ave., Lowell, Massachusetts 01852Robert A Emmett, 5307/2/E; 475/2/E, 16530 Stoddard Wells Rd., Victorville, California 92392Glen C Friel, 33 QM PkTr, 2130 21st St., Rock Island, Illinois 61201Elmer Gossage, 5307/2/G I&R Radioman, 3543 So 57 St., Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53220Robert S Jenkins, 475th, R D 4, 4441 Mountville Rd., Frederick, Maryland 21701Kenneth LaGrange, 475th 1 Bn Co B, address not known, Tucson, Arizona 857.-Leo E. Lemons, 475th, 1908 Piccadilly St., Lexington, Kentucky 40504Julio Maghini, 475th 2 Bn, address not known, Bristol, Connecticut 06010William McKee, 8408 Huron River Dr., Union Lake, Michigan 48085Martin KNess, C.O. Battery C, 612th Fld Aty, 1739 11th St S, Fargo, North Dakota 58103Herman R Newman, 475/3/K 3 PIt, 4032 Camino Venido, Martinez, California 94553Wilson H Paul, 475th, L.7 Eastern Dawn Tr Pk, Brownsville Rd, Langhorne, Pennsylvania 19047Dominick Piccinini, 475/2/Hq/I&R, Box 18, Forbes Road, Pennsylvania 15633Richard Reinheart, Arty 612 ? 613 ?, 68 Lawndale Dr, Tiffin, Ohio 44883LeRoy Robarge, 475th, Box 45, New Haven, New York 13121Roy Silverling, 475th, Box 100A, RD 2, DuBois, Pennsylvania 15801Paul LaHaie, 5307/1/R, 812 N ,Cooper St., Peoria, Illinois 61606Pedro V Rosales, 33rd PkTr, Rt 4, Box 887, Las Cruces, New Mexico 88001Arthur A Werner, 5307/3/K CT, 6016 Nyanza Pk Dr SW, Tacoma, Washington 98499Rev Dr Thomas J Hart, 5307/2/I&R; 475/2, 709 East Elm St., West Frankfort, Illinois 62896

Page Six The Burman Ne\\

FATHER STUART...(Continued from page 5)

was highly successful.General Merrill went to Taipha Ga on

February 22nd to meet General Stilwell andreceived his first mission; to cut the road inthe vicinity of Walawbum and to attack the18th Japanese Division Command Post, be-lieved to be near there, when Chinese op-erations then underway reached a climax.

Meanwhile, he was to move to the TanjaGa area and await orders to jump off. (Ihad been to Tanja Village in January' 44and visited some of the other trails in thearea to get information on trails and Japdispositions. Later, I brought 285 refugees,women and children over these trails to tryand reach Shing. We got ambushed by Japsand, worst of all, by Kachins and Chineseunder an American Major Lutkins (Miss.)who had been sent to meet us. We had to re-treat. (Women and kids are not the bestfighting material. Twice during ambushesa woman gave birth to a child.) Accurateand very detailed information regardingthe terrain to be encountered was neces-sary for the success of this mission. Mer-rill personally assigned three Intelligenceand Reconnaissance Platoons the job of in-vestigating the trails to Pup Ga, MBA Ting-krang Ga, and the trail leading throughNzang Ga as far as the Tawang HKA(River) .

At 0600hours on February 24th, the FirstBattalion moved out toward Ngukun Ga.The Second Battalion followed at 0900hoursand the Third at llOO hours. Each mancarried one C ration and two K rations. Un-friendly aircraft, apparently reconnoiter-ing in the vicinity, convinced the Americanthat the Japanese were aware of theirpresence. In order to deceive the enemy ar-rangements were made with local Kachinsto build fires throughout the bivouac siteand to maintain there the appearance ofcontinued occupation.

Ngukun Ga was reached the first night.The normal order of march obtained thefollowing day. On February 26th, the ThirdBattalion led off followed by the Second andFirst Battalions. By nightfall Nchaw Gahad been passed.

Meanwhile, during the day of the 25th theIntelligence and Reconnaissance Platoonof Maj. Lew's Orange Combat Team hadrun into a Japanese patrol betweenNdawng Ga and Nzang Ga. A sharp ex-change of shots resulted in the killing of oneJapanese and the wounding of one Ameri-can slightly.

On that same day, February 25th, Pvt.Robert W. Landis of Youngstown, Ohio,leading scout of the Intelligence and Recon-naissance Platoon from Maj. Healey's BlueCombat Team, was approaching LanemGa. (I had been ambushed here earlier inFebruary.) A hidden machine gun pouredout a sudden burst of fire, killing Landis in-stantly. He was the first American infantrysoldier since the Boxer Uprising to lose hislife in any combat engagement of Ameri-can troops on the Asiatic Continent. (Threeplanes were shot down east of Sumprabumon the 18th of January '44. They had beenmaking an air drop to OSS. Those killed,apart from Air Corp men, were six OSS per-sonnel. One was a Navy Pharmacist Mate,

a Navy photographer (Warrant Officer, Ithink) and one paratrooper, Lt. TomO'Reilly, another, Lt. Hank Gibbons, whosebranch of service I don't know, and twoother OSS men whom I didn't know. Somewere going to jump into the Triangle, sothere is a possibility that some were infan-try. If so, Landis was not the first infantry-man to die in combat on the Asiatic main-land.

As the three battalions continued theirmarch on the 27th, no contact was madewith the enemy, although sizeable groupsof Japanese were known to be in thevicinity. During this day newspaper cor-respondents with the unit invented thename "Marauders" which became the pop-ularly used designation in press reportsthereafter.

On the afternoon of February 28th, a liai-son plane brought to General Merrill ordersto proceed with all haste to Walawbum in

. the execution of his mission, and block theenemy, who was retreating down the roadunder pressure from a determined and

vigorous Chinese advance. (This mairoad, known as the Kamaing Road, was thonly motorable route in the HukawnValley and the chief artery in the Japanessupply line. Although it was usable onlduring the dry season, whoever controlleit controlled the Hukawng Valley.) (Throad was west of the present Ledo Roa(but joined it at Tinhawk. Tinhawk to Wanzup was also the old Kamaing Road.)

During the night of February 28-29th, thMarauders crossed the Tawang River. Thcrossing of the Third and Second Battalionwas covered by the First Battalion whicfollowed just as dawn was breaking.

At this time the main Chinese forces werengaged with the 18th Japanese Divisionear Taihpa Ga, some 30miles northwest cWalawbum, and were gaining groun,steadily.

March 2nd found the Marauders in aassembly area at a point below where thPup Ga trail (over which their movemenwas made) crossed the Tanai Hka (River)

Continued on page 7)

So this is what Dave Quaid looked like! In 1944, that is.

The Burman News Page Sever

FATHER STUART. . .(Continued from page 6)

On that same day (March 2nd) GeneralMerrill held a staff meeting with thebattalion commanders and their S-3's andissued combat orders.

Lt. Col. Beach with his Third Battalionwas ordered to move out at 1600hours viaSabaw Ga and Lagang Ga to Walawbum,seize the high ground along with theNumpyek Hka (River) adjacent to the roadand to secure control of the Kamaing Roadat Walawbum, denying it to the enemy.

Lt. Col. McGee with his Second Battalionwas directed to proceed to Wesu Ga, cut atrail through the jungle westerly to strikethe Kamaing Road at a point two and a halfmiles west of Walawbum, and there to con-struct and hold a road block.

Lt. Col. Osborne with the First Battalionwas given the task of blocking the trails atSana Ga and Nchet Ga with a minimum ofone platoon at each point, and establishingstrong combat patrols along the NambyuHka (River) between Shimak Ga and UgaGa with one combat team. The balance ofthe battalion would be held in reserve nearWesu Ga.

By dawn of March 3rd all of the Mar-auder groups were on the move. Eachgroup encountered Japanese patrols whichwere successfully disposed of without ap-preciable delay-. Just south of the village of ,

Lagang Ga the Third Battalion ran into alarger enemy force. The ensuing actionwas sharp and short. Fifty Japanese werekilled and the village was cleaned out. TheThird Battalion moved ahead.

Maj. Lew's Orange Combat Team fromthe Third Battalion reached the highground facing Walabum and dug in with hismortars and machine guns covering themain road. Lew sent his Intelligence andReconnaissance Platoon up the NumpyekHka (River) which they were to cross inorder to reconnoiter the area. By darkthis platoon had crossed to the west bank ofthe river.

The night of March 3rd found the FirstBattalion two miles east of Wesu Ga andthe Second Battalion in the Wesu Ga area.All elements put out heavy local securityand before morning all had tangled withJapanese patrols. However, no casualtieswere suffered.

It seemed evident that the enemy wasconfused and uncertain about the Ameri-can movement. On several occasions Jap-anese parties, carrying wounded appar-ently destined for rear hospitalization,walked directly into Marauder positions.

Maj. Briggs' Khaki Combat Team of the,Third Battalion constructed and was pro-tecting a liaison plane field at Lagang Ga.Early on the morning of March 4th aJapanese force made a vigorous attackupon this field, but they were quicklydriven off after ten of their number hadbeen killed. Two men from I Company ofthe Khaki Combat Team were woundedduring the engagement.

General Merrill established temporaryheadquarters at Wesu Ga. During the dayof March 4th, two Japanese soldiers con-trived to infiltrate the American lines andalmost succeeded in reaching Merrill'scommand post. When discovered one was

setting up a machine gun with which hecould have wiped out the entire commandgroup. The other was located while worm-ing his way through the heavy growthsurrounding the headquarters. Both ofthese Japanese escaped, but there wereindications that at least one was wounded.

Now Lew's Orange Combat Team openedfire on the enemy in Walawbum with mor-tars and received heavy mortar and some77 mm fire in return. Shortly afterwardOrange Combat Team observed strongJapanese patrols moving in with theevident intention of feeling out the Ameri-can flanks. To do this it was necessary forthe Japanese to cross to the east bank of theNumpyek Hka (River). But during the pre-vious night, Orange Combat Team hadtaken the precaution of placing booby trapsand preparing ambush positions along theriver in anticipation of just such an enemymaneuver. Because of these precautions,Orange Combat Team took a heavy toll ofthe enemy as this crossing was being made.Seventy-five dead Japanese were counted,while Orange Combat Team had but oneman killed and seven wounded. Thesewounded were evacuated by plane fromLagang Ga late that afternoon.

While Lew's Orange Combat Team fromthe Third Battalion was engaged at Wala-bum, the Second Battalion had chopped itsway through the jungle to a point just westof Wesu Ga. They reached the KamaingRoad as dusk approached without meetingserious resistance. They constructed a roadblock, a perimeter defense, and dug in toprotect both.

Headquarters of the 18th Japanese Divi-sion was at Kamaing, but the majority ofthe troops from this enemy division (ap-proximately 7000) were scattered aroundMaingkwan and spread north from thattown into the Hukawng Valley. The Japa-nese telephone communications ran alongthe Kamaing Road, and so passed throughthe perimeter established at the road blockby the Second Battalion. T-4 Roy H.Matsumoto, Nisei NCO assigned to theSecond Battalion for intelligence opera-tions, tapped in on the enemy telephoneline. The conversations which they over-heard contained information which provedto be of great value to the Americans.

One of the conversations concerned thetroubles of the Japanese sergeant who wasin charge of an ammunition dump. He hadwith him only three soldiers armed withrifles and begged help and advice from hiscommanding officer. Matsumoto managedto discover the location of the ammunitiondump. Soon afterward, when Americanplanes appeared for a supply drop, ar-rangements were made for "help andadvice" to be dispatched to the Japanesesergeant from unexpected quarters.

Meanwhile, the First Battalion had es-tablished blocks near Sana Ga and NchetGa on the trails leading into Walawbum.Their patrols took heavy toll of unwarysmall parties of the enemy, but nothing ap-proaching a heavy engagement material-ized in that section.

Toward evening of March 5th, all activityslackened around Walawbum and, from thequiet that settled over the town, it appearedthat the enemy might have evacuated theplace. This was not the case. Intercepted

messages on the telephone-tap made by theSecond Battalion proved that the Japanesewere surprised and confused by the Amer.ican activities. Finally, Matsumoto reoported that the Japanese 18th Division hadbeen ordered to withdraw to a point south ofWalawbum - crossing the Nabbyu Hkasouth of Kumnyen and using a by-pass roadwhich permitted them to avoid the SecondBattalion's road block position. Increasedpressure was put on the Second Battalion tocover this movement. By now the SecondBattalion was almost out of ammunition. Itwas impossible to get supplies to them.General Merrill ordered them to hold theirpositions until after dark then withdrawand rejoin the main force in the Walawbumarea, picking up the ammunitions whichwould be dropped at Wesu Ga and heldthere for them by a part of the FirstBattalion.

Besides being short of ammunition, theSecond Battalion had fought 36 hourswithout food or water. They had withstoodconsiderable shelling and six separate at-tacks with a surprisingly low casualty listof only one man killed and five wounded.When they received orders to return toWesu Ga, they first blocked the road withtrees, placed booby traps in the area, thenwithdrew along the trail they had cut twodays before. Fortunately, they were alertto the danger of booby traps themselvesand drove a mule' "al1ead of them on thetrail. The mule was blown to bits. Arrivingat Wesu Ga by noon the following day,March 6th, Lt. Co!. McGee and his men ofthe Second Battalion picked up an air-dropof rations and ammunitions, filled theircanteens, and hurried to support the ThirdBattalion which was by then heavily en-gaged in a fire fight close to Walawbum.(General Merrill said that Co!. McGee wasthe only commanding officer he had recom-mended for decoration for the Walawbumshow. A Battalion was reputedly the best ofthe three, but B Battalion took the worstbeating all through.)

During the day of March 5th, Allied air-planes bombed every visible formation ofthe enemy. By heavy mortar concentrationLew's Orange Combat Team succeeded inbreaking up several incipient attacks onits position overlooking the town of Walaw-bum. Japanese reinforcements, arrivingby truck from the direction of Kamaing,were strafed and bombed by our planes andtook to cover. But the flow of incomingenemy troops from the south was resumedafter dark, as was indicated by the noisyslamming of tail-gates as truck after truckarrived and discharged its human cargo.

The Intelligence and Reconnaissance Pla-toon of Lew's Orange Combat Team, nowacross the Numpyek Hka (River) recon-noitering the area northwest of Walawbum,reported profitable targets by SCR radio.Soon after daylight on March 5th, thisplatoon brushed with an enemy patrol andshortly afterward met resistance from aJapanese group north of them. A little lateranother enemy group came at them fromthe northwest and a third advanced uponthem from the northeast. '

Sgt. Henry Gosho, Nisei interpreter withthe platoon, was fortunately able to antici-

(Continued on page 8)

Page Eight The Burman News

FATHER STUART. . .(Continued from page 7)

pate these attacks from enemy orderswhich he overheard. This enabled the pla-toon commander, Lt. Logan E. Weston, toshift automatic weapons in time to meeteach attack successfully. Nevertheless,knee mortar fire began to come very close.By 1100 hours, Lt. Weston's platoon wasflanked on three sides by superior enemyforces.

By radio, Weston contracted Maj. Lewwith Orange Combat Team and asked formortar fire on targets in the vicinity of hisendangered platoon. But Orange CombatTeam's mortars were busy. Maj. Lew con-tacted one of the other Marauder outfitsand soon mortar fire"was ranging..in fromWeston's radioed directions. A smoke bar-rage was fired on the Japanese positionsthat covered the river bank, and Westonwas able to lead his men back across tosafety on the east bank of the stream.

At 0700 hours on March 6th, GeneralMerrill moved his command post fromWesu Ga to Lagang Ga where Maj. Brigg'sKhaki Combat Team of the Third Battalionhad been protecting the dropping field.Khaki Combat Team now left Lagang Ga tosupport Lew's Orange Combat Team froma position where the Numpyek Nka (River)makes a sharp bend just south of Walaw-bum.

Orange Combat Team was well dug in.The trees overhead had been choppeddown, and logs covered their foxholes.From dawn of March 6th on, they receivedan almost steady stream of mortar firewhich, about mid-morning, was supple-mented by medium artillery. Because oftheir excellent protection Orange CombatTeam received little damage. However,their animals, which could not be dug in,suffered considerably.

Sgt. Andrew B. Pung of Orange CombatTeam directed mortar fire from the 81 mmsection with great accuracy. Perched in atree 30 feet from the ground, he secureddirect hits on the Japanese concentration

51

area at the rear of Walawbum. One of thesehits landed in the bed of a truck from whichreinforcements were being unloaded. Atree burst finally stunned Pung and tem-porarily incapacitated him.

At 1430 hours, 77 and 150 mm shellsstarted falling on the airstrip at LagangGa, causing some casualites among themen and many among the animals. At 1715hours a reinforced enemy company, fol-lowed by another, in line of skirmishesstarted from across the river to attackOrange Combat Team's position undercover of heavy Japanese fire. The Mar-auders continued their mortar fire and laylow until the enemy line came within 50yards. They then let loose with automaticweapons that tore great gaps in the Japa-nese line. Two of their heavy machine guns,placed low on the river bank, had clearfields of fire. Each of these guns used 5000rounds with deadly effect. The attackwilted, and 400 Japanese lay dead on theopen ground eastward and along the riverbank. There was only one reason whyenemy casualties were not greater; thesupply of Japanese ran out. .

By now Orange Combat Team's ammuni-tion was low. Five mule-loads were rushedup by Khaki Combat Team (not engaged atthe moment) from its new position 100yards or so downstream. Before the ammu-niton arrived, however, the Japanese hadretired.

At 1600 hours on March 6th, GeneralMerrill went to Kasan Ga. There he metCol. Brown (in charge of the tank unit) anda Chinese battalion commander who hadjust arrived with his battalion with ordersto relieve the Marauders at Walawbum andwith information that the remainder of hisregiment was close behind him. Informa-tion from intelligence sources indicatedthat the enemy was bringing up reinforce-ments from the south. General Merrilldecided to disengage at Walawbum, pullback, circle around, and cut the road nearChanmoi, thus again maneuvering hisforces to the rear of the Japanese. The tank

MERRILL'S MARAUDERSASSOCIATION,INC.RAYMOND V. LYONS

11244 N. .3.3rdSt.Phoenix, AZ 85028

Address correction requested

Hey Medics!Jim Proper, Platoon Ldr, I&R, 1st Bn,

475th, is laid up in the Castle GardenNursing Home, 401 Malley Drive, Denver,Colorado 80233. Drop in if you are passingby or send a card to your Marauder buddy.

If you know of another Marauder who isinvalided, let the executive secretary knowand we will list them in this section of"News.".---------------

The publisher of the Ex-CBI Roundup,Dwight O. King, has offered to mail a freecopy of the April 1984 issue to you. Thiscopy had a reprint of May 25, 1944, articleabout march to Myitkyina. His address:Ex-CBI Roundup, P.O. Box 2665, La HabraCA 90631.---------------unit which could not operate in the terrainaround Walawbum would operate north andwest of the Nambyu Hka (River) betweenNingheu Ga and Kumnyen, while theChinese Regiment took over at Walawbum.The main body of the Chinese 22nd and 38thDivisions were then pushing rapidly fromthe north and had captured Maingkwan.

Orders were therefore issued to displaceto the south of Wesu Ga. The Second Bat.talion moved at 2000 hours and the ThirdBattalion followed at midnight. The Firs!Battalion was directly in the vicinity 01Wesu Ga, patrolling and manning traiiblocks. Subsequent orders cancelled thaipart of the above plan as concernecGalahad, since rapid moved by the 22ncand 38th Divisions had made further efforlby the Americans unnecessary and GeneraStilwell desired to get them ready fOJanother phase of operations.

Meanwhile, the Chinese 38th Division ha<been pushing down from the North in rapi<pursuit of the retreating Japanese. Thlfollowing morning (March 7th) the Chineslentered Walawbum with almost no opposition.

(Continued in next issue)

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U.S. PostagePAID

Scottsdale, AZ.Permit No. 324