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ONCASE STUFF

ADVANTAGE 1: IRAN PROLIFERATION

TURN: In response to his Kahili 2010 card:The United States military presence is actually currently warding off Irans growing nuclear arsenal.

The Obama administration is intensifying pressure on Iran by increasing its missile defences inthe Middle East to defend against potential missile strikes in the region by Tehran, it emerged today.

US Boosts missile presence in Gulf as warning to Iran, The Guardian, January 31, 2010

The US military has boosted the capability of land-based Patriot defensive missiles in several Arabnations in the Gulf, and one official told the Associated Press the navy was also increasing the presenceof ships capable of knocking out hostile missiles in flight.

The move reported in several US newspapers this morning appears to be a deliberate attempt by theWhite House to ratchet up pressure on Iran ahead of attempts to increase sanctions against the country. The US is reappraising its Iran policy after months of unsuccessful diplomatic moves, and is attempting to win broad international consensus for sanctions against the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, believed tocontrol a covert nuclear arms programme, the New York Times reported.

Last week, in his state of the union speech, Barack Obama spoke of "consequences" if Iran failed tocomply with UN demands to stop nuclear fuel production.


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In the Persian Gulf, U.S. withdrawal is likely to lead to an intensified struggle for regional domination.Iran and Iraq have, in the past, both sought regional hegemony. Without U.S. protection, the weak oil-rich states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would be unlikely to retain their independence. Topreclude this development, the Saudis might seek to acquire, perhaps purchase, their own nuclearweapons. If either Iraq or Iran controlled the region that dominates the world supply of oil, it could gaina significant capability to damage the U.S. and world economies. Any country that gained hegemonywould have vast economic resources at its disposal that could be used to build military capability as wellas gain leverage over the United States and other oil-importing nations. Hegemony over the Persian Gulfby either Iran or Iraq would bring the rest of the Arab Middle East under its influence and domination

because of the shift in the balance of power. Israeli security problems would multiply and the peaceprocess would be fundamentally undermined, increasing the risk of war between the Arabs and theIsraelis.

The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulfwould harm the economy of the United States even in the unlikely event that it was able to avoid involvement in major wars and conflicts. Higher oil prices would reduce the U.S. standard of living.Turmoil in Asia and Europe would force major economic readjustment in the United States, perhaps reducing U.S. exports and imports and jeopardizing U.S. investments in these regions. Given that totalimports and exports are equal to a quarter of the U.S. gross domestic product, the cost of necessaryadjustments might be high.

The higher level of turmoil in the world would also increase the likelihood of the proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means of their delivery. Already several rogue states such as North Korea and Iran are seeking nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. That danger would onlyincrease if the United States withdrew from the world. The result would be a much more dangerousworld in which many states possessed WMD capabilities; the likelihood of their actual use would increase accordingly. If this happened, the security of every nation in the world, including the UnitedStates, would be harmed.

Losing the Moment? The United States and the World after the Cold War, Zalmay Khalilzad, WashingtonQuarterly Reader, Order and Disorder after the Cold War, editor Brad Roberts, 1995, p. 60

And, US presence is key to deterring Iran from nuclear weapons. Withdrawing incurs many impacts.


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ADVANTAGE 2: TERRORISM THINGY

In response to his Turner 2006 card:

Al Qaeda is not just biding its time. His evidence is from 2006 and Al Qaeda wouldve attacked by now.

MUELLER 2006 (John, Professor ofPolitical Scienceat Ohio State University, Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct)

Another commonexplanationisthatal Qaedaiscraftily bidingitstime. But whatfor? The 9/11 attacks

tookonlyabouttwoyearstoprepare. Thecarefullycoordinated,verydestructive,andpoliticallyproductiveterroristattacks

in Madridin 2004 wereconceived,plannedfromscratch,andthenexecutedall withinsixmonths;the bombs weresetofflessthantwomonthsafter theconspiratorspurchasedtheir firstsuppliesofdynamite,paidfor withhashish.(Similarly, Timothy McVeigh's

attackin Oklahoma Cityin 1995 tooklessthanayear toplan.)GiventheextremeprovocationoftheinvasionofIraqin

2003,one wouldthinkthatterroristsmight beinclinedtoshifttheir timetableintohigher gear. Andif

theyaresopatient, whydotheycontinuallyclaimthatanother attackis justaroundthecorner? It wasin2003 thatal Qaeda'stopleaderspromisedattacksin Australia, Bahrain, Egypt, Italy,Japan,Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,the United

States,and Yemen. Threeyearslater,some bombshadgoneoffin Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen,andJordan(as wellasinthe unlisted Turkey)

butnotinanyother oftheexplicitlythreatenedcountries.Thoseattacks weretragic, buttheir sparsenesscould be

takenasevidencethatitisnotonly Americanalarmists whoaregiventoextravaganthuffingandpuffing.

Even if the Al Qaeda do have plans, they cant get nuclear weapons by any means

FROST 2005 (Robin,teachespoliticalscienceat Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, Nuclear

Terrorismafter 9/11, Adelphi Papers, December)

Nonetheless,thereisconsiderableevidencethatmustinformthisspeculationandnarrow its range.

First,therearetechnicalconsiderations. Assemblingenoughfissilematerialfor eventhecrudest

nuclear device andtheamountsneededvaryinversely withsophistication would beverydifficult

andprobablyextremelyexpensivefor aterroristorganisation. Thetheoreticalknowledgeandpractical

skills requiredtodesignand buildanuclear weaponareofahighorder, whilesetting up,equippingand

successfullyoperatingan undetectableclandestine weaponslaboratory would bedifficultandexpensive,

evenfor the best-fundedterroristorganisation. Aum Shinrikyo, whichoperated relativelyopenly under

Japaneselaws regarding religiousorganisationsthatmadeitall-but-untouchable,and whichhada

billion-dollar war chest,gave uptheattempttodevelopanuclear weaponveryearlyonintheprocess,preferringto work withchemicaland biologicalagentsinstead. Theevidence,muchofitadmittedly

negative,suggeststhat buyingor stealingafunctionalnuclear weapon would beanevenmoredifficult,

perhapsimpossible,task. Nuclear weaponsareguardedlikenationaltreasures;indeed,nuclear

weaponsareinsomesensenationaltreasures,symbolsofnationalstrengthandmodernity boughtat

immensecost. Nostatethatpossessedthem, whether establishedor rogue, would belikelytohand

over such weaponstoterrorists unlessthey wereactingasmercenaryagentsofthestateitself. The


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threatofnuclear retaliation,evenifthepossibilityoftracingthe weapon backtoitssource were

thoughtto below,should beenoughtodeter any rationalstatefrom usinganuclear weaponagainst

another nuclear-weaponstate,or acountry under theprotectionofone.

Terrorists cant steal a nuclear weaponsecurity is tight and the weapons are too complicated

ROTHSTEIN, AUER AND SIEGEL 2004(Linda,editor, Catherine,managingeditor,andJonas,assistanteditor ofthe Bulletinof

Atomic Scientists, BAS, November/December,http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=nd04rothstein)

Ofthese,thefirstistheleastlikely.It would beextremelydifficultfor terroriststoacquireanintact weaponfrom

oneoftheeightnuclear weaponstates. Thesecurityofthese weapons,especiallythoseinRussiaand Pakistan,isavalidconcern. Butto

detonateanintact,stolenRussiannuke,aterrorist wouldhavetogetpastsecuritysafeguards builtinto

the weapon,suchasauthorizationcodes. And Pakistaninuclear weapons(believedtonumber upto 50)are

reportedlystoredseparatelyfromthe weapons'cores. Besidesthedifficultiesassociated withobtaininga

ready-made,good-to-gonuke,there would beother barriers--suchastransportingandpreparingto

deliver it undetected. Thisisperhapsthelowestprobability,highestconsequencescenarioofnuclear

terrorism.

ALSO, THERES A LITTLE CONFUSING PART ABOUT HIS AFF. HE CLAIMS IN HIS 1AC AND CROSS X THAT

IRAN IS PROLIFERATING AS A RESULT OF VIEWING TURKEY AS A THREAT AND TRYING TO KILL THE

NON-BELIEVERS.

BUT, IN HIS BEN MEIR 2009 CARD, IT SAYS THAT TURKEY IS THE ONLY COUNTRY THAT IRAN WILL

TRUST IN NEGATIONS OF NUCLEAR TALK. CONTRADICTION! HE TRIES TO CLEAR THIS UP IN CROSS X BY

PUTTING OUT MULTIPLE REASONS WHY IRAN IS PROLIFERATING, BUT HE IS OBVIOUSLY NOT SURE

WHICH ONE IS TRUE. THIS LEADS ME TO MY NEXT OFFCASE WHICH IS VAGUENESS.

ALSO, THIS MEANS THAT HE HAS NO SOLVENCY AT THE MOMENT FOR HIS ADVANTAGE 1.


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OFFCASE 2: BUNKER BUSTERS COMPENSATION (AKA ISRAEL DA) HEHE

Israel will get scared from withdrawal fears loss of deterrence against Iran

Susser 04 (Leslie Susser, Staff Writer, Israel Worried About U.S. Iraq Withdrawl, April 15 2004)http://www.jewishjournal.com/world/article/israel_worried_about_us_iraq_withdrawl_20040416/

As Shiite and Sunni resistance to the American presence in Iraq intensifies, Israel's defense

establishment is worried that a U.S. withdrawal under fire could have devastatingconsequences for the battles against weapons of mass destruction and global terrorism.

And Israel could be one of the big losers: Israeli officials believe a loss of Americandeterrence would encourage Iran to continue its nuclear weapons program, and its support

for terrorism could lead to a hardening of Syrian and Palestinian attitudes against accommodation withIsrael and could spark more Palestinian and other terrorism directed against Israeli targets. WithoutAmerican deterrence and a pro-Western Iraq, the officials say, Israel might have to

rethink its attitude on key issues like the concessions it can afford to make to thePalestinians, its readiness for a land war on its eastern front and the size of its defense

budget. But there is an opposing, minority view in Israeli academic and intelligence circles: The quickerthe Americans leave, this view holds, the quicker the Iraqis will have to get their act

together. And once they do, they will not necessarily pose a threat to Israel or the West.

Israel asks for American bunker buster bombs to feel safer

UPI 6/9/10

(Israel asks U.S. for more precision bombs http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2010/06/09/Israel-asks-US-for-more-precision-bombs/UPI-58021276096834/)

Amid growing fears of a new Middle Eastern war, Israel's defense ministry has asked

Washington for more JDAM precision-guided bombs for its air force, the Haaretz dailyreports.

The ministry has also asked the Pentagon to expand the U.S. arsenal pre-positioned in

the Jewish state in December 2009 so that Israeli forces can access the weapons in anemergency, the liberal newspaper reported Tuesday.Israel first used the Joint Direct Attack Munitions in combat against Hezbollah forces in its 34-day war in

July-August 2006. They were used again in Operation Cast Lead, the 22-day invasion of the Gaza Strip

launched Dec. 27, 2008, against fighters of the Hamas fundamentalist Palestinian group.

JDAM systems provide precision guidance for "dumb bombs," making them immenselymore accurate.There was nothing to indicate that the request pointed to any imminent operations by the Israeli air forceagainst the Jewish state's main foes, Iran and its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah.


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Israeli bunker busters causes Iran strikes and war with IranInstitute for Research Middle Eastern Policy 05(5/1/2005Arming an Israeli Attack on Iran: Why the US should cancel "Bunker Buster" Bombs for Israel

http://www.irmep.org/GBU.htm)

There are many factors motivating Israel to strike Iran immediately upon receipt of

GBU-28's. Its current status as a nation under pressure to conform with the quartet's road-map for topeace is causing an internal situation close to civil war and leave Israel's Likud leadership looking for a

way to solidify its hold on occupied territories. The US presence in Iraq will at some point wind down,

leading to troop withdrawal and a diminished possibility of drawing the US into a costly "regime change"

exercise in Iran. The Israeli option of disrupting the road map for peace while drawing theUS into a conflict with Iran by conventional means is more likely with bunker busters.

Israel has many motivations to immediately use the GBU-28. Tactically, it is not in theUS interest to enable any catalyst of a three way conventional war with Iran. Strategically,the US will have to deal with Israeli nuclear weapons if it hopes to encourage regional players to enter the

NPT and disavow nuclear weapons.

Iranian War causes extinctionJorge Hirsch, a professor of physics at the University of California San Diego. He is one of the originators of the

physicists' petition on nuclear weapons policies started at the UCSD, 1/3/2006, America's nuclear ticking bomb,http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060103/news_mz1e3hirsch.html

If only conventional bombs are used in an unprovoked U.S. or Israeli aerial attack against Iran's facilities,Iran is likely to retaliate with missiles against coalition forces in Iraq and against Israel, as well

as possibly a ground invasion of southern Iraq, that the 150,000 U.S. troops in Iraq would not be able towithstand. Iranian missiles could potentially contain chemical warheads, and it certainly would beimpossible to rule out such possibility. Iran has signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (in

1993 and 1997 respectively), however it is still likely to have supplies, as determined by the U.S. State

Department in August 2005. Early use by the United States of low-yield nuclear bombs withbetter bunker-busting ability than conventional bombs targeting Iranian nuclear, chemical and missile

installations would be consistent with the new U.S. nuclear weapons doctrine and could beargued to be necessary to protect the lives of 150,000 U.S. soldiers in Iraq and of Israeli citizens. It would

also send a clear message to Iran that any response would be answered by a far more devastating nuclear

attack, thus potentially saving both American and Iranian lives. However, the nuclear threshold is aline of no return. Once the United States uses a nuclear weapon against a nonnuclear adversary,

the 182 countries that are signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty will rightly feel at

risk, and many of them will rush to develop their own nuclear deterrent while they can.A new world with many more nuclear countries, and a high risk of any regional conflictexploding into all-out nuclear war, will be the consequence. The scientific community(which created nuclear weapons) is alarmed over the new U.S. nuclear weapons policies. A petition to

reverse these policies launched by physicists at the University of California San Diego has gathered over1,500 physicists' signatures including eight Nobel laureates and many prominent members of the U.S.

scientific establishment (http://physics.ucsd.edu/petition/). Scientists object strongly to the concept of

WMD, that lumps together nuclear weapons with other "weapons of mass destruction" and blurs the sharp

line that separates immensely more destructive nuclear weapons from all other weapons. An


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escalating nuclear war could lead to the destruction of civilization. There is no fundamentaldifference between small nuclear bombs and large ones, nor between nuclear bombs targeting

underground installations versus those targeting cities or armies.

OFFCASE 3: TURKEY COMPENSATION AND REARMAMENT

Turkeys committed to nonproliferation nowstrong NATO nuclear commitment is key.

TarikOguzlu, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of International Relations, Bilkent University, July 2009. [SETAFoundation for Political Economic and Social Research Policy Brief No. 33, Turkey and the Transformation of

NATO, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-182507-159-turkey-and-the-transformation-of-nato.html]

Today, there is an intra-alliance consensus that contemporary threats concern transnational

terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, organized crime,cyber-terrorism, the spreading of epidemics, piracy, environmental pollution, and the lack of good

governance in failed or weak states. From the contemporary perspective, the maintenance of standing

mass armies in anticipation of conventional territorial attacks no longer serves to address todays global

and soft security challenges. The old strategies of deterrence and containment do not suffice in dealing

with the asymmetrical threats posed by non-state actors.This consensus

, however,does not relieveTurkey of anxiety regarding the question of whether NATOs transformation will erode

its traditional territorial/nuclear security commitments. Two occasions in the recent pastappear to have led Turkish decision-makers to doubt whether the European members of the

alliance continue to view Turkeys territorial defense as part of their responsibilities.Both took place in the context of Turkeys proximity to Iraq. First, although in 1991 and 2003 Turkey

asked NATO to deploy early warning systems and Patriot missiles to Turkish territoryagainst the possibility of an Iraqi attack, some European members of the alliance initially

hesitated to respond to Turkeys demands positively. Second, the reluctance of some westernEuropean members of the alliance to recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization or to

commit to ending the PKKs activities in their territories has worried Turkey. As long as Turkishpublic opinion remains convinced that the PKK owes its existence, at least in part, to support coming

from European countries, Turkeys commitment to NATO will be bound to decrease in theyears to come.4Turkey has signed on to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has thus far adopted a

position of non-nuclearization in its foreign policy. However, the changing nature of regionalpolitics in the Middle East in the wake of the latest war in Iraq might pose challenges in this

regard. For example, Irans nuclear ambitions raise strong concerns that it may acquire the technology toproduce nuclear weapons. It is no secret that other countries in the region might then follow suit.

Turkish decision-makers will find it hard to resist domestic calls for nuclearization if

NATO prevaricates in offering a full nuclear commitment to Turkey.


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Turn: In response to his Kibaroglu 2007 card, TNW withdrawal would actually cause

Turkey to proliferate because US deterrence would be gone.

Catherine M. Kelleher and Scott L. Warren, Kelleher was defense adviser to the U.S. mission to NATO and

deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, 10-09, Getting to Zero Starts Here: TacticalNuclear Weapons, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_10/Kelleher#bio

The role of tactical nuclear weapons in these discussions has not loomed large in much of the public or

private Washington discourse. It has received more informal play in Brussels, where the efforts to craft anew NATO strategic concept quickly ran into private concerns about the ultimate fate of tactical

weapons. Several new working papers circulated by opponents of continued tactical nuclear deployment

in Europe have garnered quiet support from others. Germany, in particular, stimulated the push forelimination of tactical weapons, as Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who also was a candidate

for chancellor in the September 2009 elections, advocated the elimination position. Turkey, however,

has reportedly suggested in internal conversations that a decision by the United States toreduce its tactical nuclear weapons further would mark the end the grand alliance

bargain of the 1960s: Turkey, like other hosts, would have the U.S. nuclear shield andwould share in the physical control of the weapons in return for Ankaras promise not to

develop its own nuclear weapons.[9]

TNW reductions cause Turkish nuclearization even though weapons symbolic

Arbman and Wigg 02 (Gunnar Arbman and Lars Wigg, security analysts at Pugwash. From the Pugwashmeeting number 270, Workshop on Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Sigtuna, Sweden. May 24th-25th, 2002,

http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/situgna.html)

The discussion then turned to American TNWs deployed in some NATO states. Argumentsfor and against this deployment were presented, and it was regretfully concluded by the participants that

there seems to be no unanimous European wish to have them removed at present, even ifthey mostly have a symbolic, political value. One view was that Turkey might decide to

develop an indigenous nuclear arsenal if NATO TNWs were withdrawn from its territory.Moreover it was argued that there is a general American belief, perhaps erroneous, that its European

allies want TNWs to remain deployed in some NATO countries.

Turkish proliferation would snowball in the middle east leading to Nuclear War and

Terror

Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 6-14-07, The EU FacingNuclear Weapons Challenges http://www.npolicy.org/files/20070616-Sokolski-Talk-AixEnProvence-

Conference.pdf

One country that might disagree with this view, though, is Turkey. It is trying to figure out how to live

with a nuclear weapons armed neighbor, Iran; is disappointed by its inability to be fully integrated intothe EU; and is toying with getting its own nuclear capabilities. Whether or not Turkey does choose to go

its own way and acquire a nuclear weapons-option of its own will depend on several factors, including

Ankaras relations with Washington, Brussels, and Tehran. To a very significant degree, though, it also

will depend on whether or not the EU Members States are serious about letting Turkey join the EU. The

dimmer these prospects look, the greater is the likelihood of that Turkey will chose to hedge its political,economic, and security bets by seeking a nuclear weapons-option of its own. This poses a difficult choice

for the EU. Many key members are opposed to letting Turkey join the EU. There are arguments to favor

this position. Yet, if Turkey should conclude that its interests are best served by pursuingsuch a nuclear weapons-option, it is almost certain to fortify the conviction of Egypt,

Algeria, and Saudi Arabia to do the same. This will result in the building up a nuclearpowder keg on Europes doorstep and significantly increase the prospect for nuclear

terrorism and war.


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OFFCASE 4: HEG GOODDA

TNW withdrawal kills US credibility, spurs allied prolif and collapses NATO

cohesion.

Yost, 2009

[Dr. David S., Professor atthe Naval Postgraduate School, International Affairs, Assuranceand US

extendeddeterrencein NATO,July, 85: 4 (2009) 755780, Wiley InterScience Database]

Possibleconsequencesofa rupture withestablishedarrangements Giventheviewsofpolicy-makersandexpertsin NATO countries,

notablyin Turkeyandinsomeofthenew alliesin Eastand Central Europe,someobserversareconcernedthatitcould be

deeplydamagingto US credibility,disruptiveofalliancecohesionandpotentiallydestabilizingto

Europeansecurityto withdraw the remaining US nuclear weaponsin Europe.Withdrawingthe weapons

could beperceivedasasignalofUS disengagementandasevidenceofadiminished US commitmentto

thesecurityofNATO Europe. Sucha withdrawal would beinconsistent withtheobjectiveofassuring US allies,andnotonlyin

Europe.Thereareconnections betweenthe US deterrenceposturein Europeand US securitypartnersandinterestselsewhere. AustralianandJapaneseofficialsandexpertsare,for example,monitoring US decisions

aboutextendeddeterrenceglobally;andtheysee US decisionsabout NATOsnuclear postureandpolicy

asemblematicofthe US extendeddeterrencecommitmenttotheir ownsecurity. A lossofconfidence

inthe reliabilityoftheprotectionprovided by US extendeddeterrencecouldleadsome US alliesand

securitypartnerstoconsider seekingtheir ownnationalnuclear forcesor toinvestmoreinpotentialhedging

measuressuchasair andmissiledefencesand/or enrichmentand reprocessingcapabilities.The United Stateshas beenengagedinnuclear

forcecooperation withitsalliesin Europesincethe 1950s,andthishalf-centuryofhistoryhasacertainpolitical weight.Ifthe United

States unilaterally withdrew its remainingnuclear forces,the Europeanallies would recognizethat

somethingfundamentalhadchangedintheir relationship with Washington. Ifthe withdrawal was undertakenat

the behestofthe Europeans, US politicalleaderscouldfor their partcometoquestionthecommitmentofthe Europeanalliesto bear their

shareofthe risksand responsibilitiesassociated withthealliancesnuclear deterrenceposture.Withdrawalofthe remaining US

weaponscouldleadtoanerosionofconfidenceon bothsides. Somealliedobserversareconcernedthatdepending

onoffshoreanddistant US centralstrategicsystemstoprotectthe Europeanallies wouldnothavethe

samepoliticalsignificanceascontinuedalliedinvolvementin risk-and responsibility-sharing.NATOs

nuclear burden-sharingarrangementshelptomaintainacommonsecurityculture withintheallianceandto

preventadivision betweenthealliesthatpossessnuclear armsandthosethatdonot. Theinvolvement

ofnon-nuclear weaponstatesinnuclear-sharingarrangementscreatesaqualityofengagementand

solidaritydistinctfromthat which would befeasible withoutthatinvolvement. Thepoliticaldynamicsofthealliancemight wellchange without US nuclear weaponsin Europeandnotfor the better,intheview ofsomealliedobservers. Over timethe

non-nuclear-weapon-stateallies wouldalmostcertainlyhavelessexpertise regardingnuclear issuesandlessinfluenceover (andlessinsightinto) US policy-making.70 Somealliedobserversfear that withno US nuclear weaponsin Europe,the United Statesmight belesslikelyto

engageinconsultations withalliesindefiningdoctrineandinmakingoperationaldecisions.Inshort,somealliedobserversareconcernedthat

giving upthesharednuclear responsecapabilitycould weakenthe bondsthattiethe NATO allies

together asasecuritycommunity.Becausethe US extendeddeterrentprovides NATO withacapabilitythatis

jointlyownedandoperated,thereisahighlevelofcohesion basedonshared risksand responsibilities,particularlyamongthe NATO DCA states. Moreover,somealliedobserversmaintain,somecurrentnon-nuclear weapon-state NATO allies

cannot beprotectedfromaggressionor coercion withoutnuclear deterrencecapabilities.Ifthealliesgave upthecurrentnuclear


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sharingarrangementsand reliedsolelyonthestrategicnuclear forcesofFrance,the United Kingdomandthe United

States,thealliancesnuclear deterrentposturecould beseenaslesscredible bythenon-nuclear-weapon-

stateallies,ifnot bypotentialadversaries. A securitygapdividingthenuclear-weapon-statealliesfromnon-nuclear-weapon-

statealliescouldemergeintheperceptionsofthelatter groupofcountries. Indeed,ifthe Britishand Frenchforces were reducedfurther,the

politicalgap betweenthe United Statesandmostofits NATO alliesinnuclear risk-and responsibility-sharingcould be widened. Moreover,

the withdrawalofthe US nuclear weaponsremainingin Europecould beseenasa break withthehistorictransatlantic bargainwherebythe United Statesplaysaleading rolein returnfor providingasecurityguarantee.Itcould

contributetolaunchingadebateonthecredibilityofthe US commitmenttothecollectivedefence

pledgein Article 5 ofthe North Atlantic Treatyatatime whenthemeaningofcollectivedefenceis being reconsidered,owing

inparttotheemergenceofnew challengessuchascyber warfare. Some Europeanalliedobserversholdthatthecomplete withdrawalof

US nuclear weaponsfrom Europewould beinterpreted,atleastinsomequartersofthealliance,asanipso

facto weakeningofthecredibilityofthe US extendeddeterrent. Theimplicationsfor assuranceofthe NATO European

alliescouldtherefore beprofound. Theconsequencesofthe withdrawalofthe remaining US nuclear weaponsin

Europe wouldincludethelossofthecrisismanagementoptionsprovided byanalliancedeterrentpostureinvolving

aircraftfrommultipleallies. Thisarrangementmakespossiblethetransmissiontoadversariesofapoliticalsignaloneofa unitedand resolute

alliancedistinctfroma US (or Britishor French)nationalaction. Itisdifficulttoimagineanalternativetothecurrentarrangementsfor nuclear

risk-and responsibility-sharingthat wouldprovideequivalent benefitsfor alliancecohesionas wellasassuranceandextendeddeterrence, but

theexaminationofother approachesmay well beanissueinthealliances Strategic Concept review. Inthis review assuranceandextended

deterrence will beconsideredinadynamiccontextinvolvingother NATO policychallengesincludingmissiledefence, relations withRussia,

themeaningofcollectivedefenceinlightofnew risks,forcetransformation(includingaircraftmodernization),armscontrolanddisarmament,

andcurrentoperations,notablyin Afghanistan. Thetradeoffsthatmay bemade remainto beseen.

In response to Kahili 2010, we are not hypocritical in foreign policy because

we are the only nation that should stands in the way of great power conflict.

Scenario 1: US heg collapse will indefinitely result in nuclear wars around the

globe

Kagan, 2007

[Robert, Senior Associateatthe Carnegie Endowmentfor International Peace,EndofDreams,Return

ofHistoryPolicy Review, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10]

This is a good thing, and it should continue to be a primary goal of American foreign policy t o perpetuate this relatively benign international configuration of power. The unipolar order with the

United States as the predominant power is unavoidably riddled with flaws and contradictions. It inspires fears and jealousies. The United States is not immune to error, like all other nations, and

because of its size and importance in the international system those errors are magnified and take on greater significance than the errors of less powerful nations.Comparedtothe

ideal Kantianinternationalorder,in whichallthe world'spowers would bepeace-lovingequals,

conductingthemselves wisely,prudently,andinstrictobeisancetointernationallaw,the unipolar

systemis bothdangerousand unjust. Comparedtoanyplausiblealternativeinthe real world,however,

itis relativelystableandlesslikelytoproduceamajor war betweengreatpowers.It is also comparatively benevolent,

from a liberal perspective, for it is more conducive to the principles of economic and political liberalism that Americans and many others value.Americanpredominance

does not stand in the way of progress toward a better world, therefore. Itstandsinthe wayofregressiontowardamoredangerous world.

Thechoiceisnot betweenan American-dominatedorder anda worldthatlookslikethe European Union.

Thefutureinternationalorder will beshaped bythose whohavethepower toshapeit.Theleadersofapost-Americanworld willnotmeetin Brussels butin Beijing, Moscow,and Washington. The returnofgreatpowersandgreatgames Ifthe worldismarked bythepersistenceofunipolarity,itisnevertheless

also beingshaped bythe reemergenceofcompetitivenationalambitionsofthekindthathaveshapedhumanaffairsfromtimeimmemorial. Duringthe Cold War,thishistoricaltendencyof

greatpowersto jostle withoneanother for statusandinfluenceas wellasfor wealthandpower waslargelysuppressed bythetwosuperpowersandtheir rigid bipolar order. Sincetheendof

the Cold War,the United Stateshasnot beenpowerfulenough,andprobablycouldnever bepowerfulenough,tosuppress byitselfthenormalambitionsofnations. Thisdoesnotmeanthe


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burgeoningnationalism,thefutureislikelyto beoneofintensifiedcompetitionamongnationsandnationalistmovements.Difficultasitmay betoextend Americanpredominanceintothe

future,nooneshouldimaginethata reductionofAmericanpower or a retractionofAmericaninfluenceandglobalinvolvementwillprovideaneasier path.

Scenario 2: Allied prolif causes nuclear war.

Millot,Defense AnalystatRAND,1994 [Marc Dean, Washington Quarterly, Summer,Lexis]

Theoutcomeofthis refusaltofacetheemerging realityofregionalnuclear adversariesisthattheUnited Statesisnotpreparingseriouslyfor thepossibilityof

havingtofightina regionalnuclear war. Ifitcontinuesdownthispath,it will be unabletocope withthepotentialthreatofnuclear aggressionagainstitsallies. If

itcannotassurethesecurityofitsalliesagainstthisthreat,the resultislikelyto befurther proliferation

amongtheseallies,highly unstable regionalmilitarysituations,asevere reductionofthe UnitedStates'

internationalinfluence,andagrowingprobabilityofregional nuclear wars involving U.S.forces.

NATO solves multiple escalatory nuclear wars.

Duffield, 1994

[John Duffield, Assistant Professor ofGovernmentand Foreign Affairsatthe UniversityofVirginia,

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 109, 1994,p. 766-7.]

InitialanalysesofNATO'sfutureprospectsoverlookedatleastthreeimportantfactorsthathavehelpedtoensurethealliance'senduring

relevance.First,they underestimatedtheextentto whichexternalthreatssufficienttohelp justifythepreservationofthe

alliancewouldcontinuetoexist. Infact, NATO stillservestosecureitsmembersagainstanumber ofactualor potentialdangersemanatingfromoutsidetheir territory.

Theseincludenotonlythe residualthreatposed byRussianmilitarypower, butalsothe relativelynew concerns raised byconflictsin

neighboring regions.Second,thepessimistsfailedtoconsider NATO'scapacityfor institutionaladaptation. Since

theendofthecold war,thealliancehas beguntodeveloptwoimportantnew functions.NATO isincreasinglyseenashavingasignificant roletoplayincontaining

andcontrollingmilitarizedconflictsin Centraland Eastern Europe. And,atadeeper level,it workstopreventsuchconflicts

fromarisingatallbyactivelypromotingstabilitywithintheformer Soviet bloc. Aboveall, NATO pessimistsoverlookedthevaluableintra-alliancefunctionsthatthealliancehasalwaysperformedandthat remain relevantafter thecold war. Mostimportantly, NATO hashelpedstabilize Western Europe, whosestateshadoften been bitter rivalsinthe

past. Bydampingthesecuritydilemmaandprovidinganinstitutionalmechanismfor thedevelopmentofcommonsecuritypolicies,NATO hascontributedtomaking

the useofforcein relationsamongthecountriesofthe regionvirtuallyinconceivable. Inallthese ways, NATO clearlyservestheinterestsofits Europeanmembers. Buteventhe United Stateshasasignificantstakeinpreservingapeacefulandprosperous Europe. Inadditiontostrongtransatlantichistorical

andculturalties, Americaneconomicinterestsin Europeasaleadingmarketfor U.S.products,asasourceofvaluableimports,andasthehostfor considerabledirectforeigninvestmentby

Americancompanies remainsubstantial. Ifhistoryisanyguide,moreover,the United Statescouldeasily bedrawnintoafuturemajor

war in Europe,theconsequencesofwhich wouldlikely beevenmoredevastatingthanthoseofthepast,

giventheexistenceofnuclear weapons.

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