The I.N.A Heros 1946

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    THE I N. A. HEROESAutobiographies

    OFMaj. Gen. ShahnawazCol. Prem K. SahgalCol. Gurbax Singh Dhillon

    OFTHE AZAD HIND FAUJ

    Were they " puppets " or men of strongdetermination prepare^ to lay downtheir lives for the honou^ and safety oftheir motherland has bean laidthe pages of this book by the

    their own pens.

    1946

    6, LOWER MALL, LAHORE.

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    Just PublishedNETAJI SPEAKS

    TO THE NATIONA symposium of Important speeches an

    writings of Netaji Suhhas Chandra Bose, (1928-45His broadcasts, addresses, orders of the day froBerlin, Tokyo, Rangoon. Syonan and Burma witproper introductions surveying the history of tlperiod when they were delivered or written.

    The Book provides an insight into the replayed by Subhas Chandra Bose in the Indijstruggle for Independence.

    Introductory notes and arrangement by :THE AUTHOR OF THE REBEL PRESIDEN

    Price 6/14 Post free

    PublishersHERO PUBLICATIONS6, LOWER MALL, LAHORE.

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    01UlDtt111ILJI

    n Malaya to make arrangements for any such men./ho wished to join the I. N. A. to come down to>} *-j~* "The eyes of whole ofIndia nay, the whole world are focussed on you. Thefate of 400 million Indians depends on what youaccomplish on the battlefield. You are the strengthof my arms, I fully realized the magnitude of thetask I had undertaken and my knee** trembled underthis heavy burden of responsibility ; but I was-determined to overcome all obstacles and was certainof victory. I knew that whatever might happen,,nothing could stop me from achieving the greatest vic-torythat of laying down my life for the sake ofmy country, on the battlefield."

    At first I was nervous, I prayed to AlmightyGod to give me the necessary guidance and strengthto enable me to achieve my object.

    The actual achievements and sufferings of"SUBHAS" Brigade is an epic story, which isdescribed in full detail elsewhere, but here sufficeit to say that no army in the world could haveachieved so much with so little ; and no country

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    46 i. N. A. HEROEScould have wished for truer sons. The last wordsof a soldier, who was dying through starvation andlack of medical aid there were hundreds of maggotsin hi* wounds sum up concisely the achievementof the Regiment that lose 60 per cent, of its menin the first campaign. His words were : "Sahib,please tell Netaji, that I died happily and that I didmy duty"

    In Oct. 1944, the Regiment, having returned fromthe front, concentrated at Budalin, near Yeu.During the seven months that they were at the front,they established their superiority over the enemywherever they went. In fact their main difficulty*was that the enemy would not stand up againstthem and fight (See my letter to Nataji writtenfromHaka in May 1944). During this phase therewas never an occasion when they attacked the enemyand did put him to flight or captured their posts, andthere was never an occasion when they withdrew,even an inch, before the enemy's onslaught.

    In Oct. 1944, I went to Mandalay to reportto Netaji and then accompanied him to Rangoon,-where I stayed till December.

    In Dec* 1944, 1 returned to Mandalay to takeover "the command of No. 1 Division and held in its-evacuation to Pyinmana This was completedearly in February 1945.

    On 18th Feb. 1945 Netaji came to Pyinmana.to inspect No. iDi/ision. He told me that No. 2Division had moved from Rangoon to Popaifront, but unfortunately Col. Ari* Ahmad, the

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    MAJOR-GENERAL SHAHNAWAZ 47Divisional Commander, had been injured in an enemybombing raid, and that he was in a difficult situa-tion, because he could not find a suitable officerto replace him. He said Gen. Bhonsle, the Chiefof Staff, was not willing to come forward, becausehe thought that it was a "come down'' for him tocommand a Division, and Gen. Kiani was ^ unableto go because of his ill-health and his inability toco-operate with the Jap Divisional Commander,Gen. Yamamota, in that area.

    Every one at that time realized that the militarysituation was very grave and the battle of Burmahad been lost. However I could not see Netaji indifficulties and offered my services, although at thattime I was under treatment for Ben-Ben.On 20th Feb. 1945, I accompanied Netaji toMeiktilla, when he was going to inspect frontline troops in Popa-Kyauk-Padaung area*When we were at Meiktiila, the enemymechanized columns broke through and almostencircled us. We managed to escape and return toPyinqiana and then to Rangoon.

    On 7th March 1945, 1 bid my last farewell to Netajiand poceeded to Popa to take command of No.' 2Division.

    At the time of my departure Netaji was extremelyupset and worried about the situation in No. 2Division, both from a Military point of view, and theinternal situation, which had become very graveindeed by the desertion of 4 officers of the Divisional

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    48 1. N. A. HEROESHeadquarters, Netaji told me that he was very muchashamed of it and could not show his face to anyone.

    This grieved me immensely and I assured Netajithat the situation was not so bad as he thought, andpromised him that we (I and other senior officersof the Div.) would uphold India's honour, even underthe most adverse conditions. Thus when I leftRangoon for the front, to take over command ofNo. 2 Division, the only thought in my mind was toallay Netaji's anxieties or die in the attempt. Thiswas the frame of my mind at the time when I leftRangoon.

    The events that followed are given in full detailelsewhere. Suffice it to say that with the help andoutstanding leadership of my Regimental Commandersat Popa Lt, Col. P. K. Sahgal and Lt. Col. G. S.Dhillon, the situation was completely restored, andwe halted the enemy's advance for over one monthand rejuvenated the spirit and morale of the men ; andlater to the great joy of all of us received Netaji'smessage expressing his complete satisfaction with thesituation in No. 2 Division, both from a Military aswell as internal point of view*

    On April 12th the Division received orders towithdraw to Magwe Taundwingy area. This wasmuch against my wish, and during the withdrawalNo. 2 Regt. under Col Sahgal was overtaken byenemy tank columns and had to surrender. I withCol. G. S. Dhillon and the remnants of No, 1, 2, and4Regts. withdrew to Pegu, in an attempt to break

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    MAJOR-GENERAL SHAHNAWAZ 49through and reach Moulmein. But we were unableto do so and had to surrender.

    During this retreat from Popa-Pegu, we coveredover 500 miles on foot, with no transport or properration supply ; in doing so we had to break throughsix enemy encirclements, and only surrendered afterwe had heard that Netaji had ordered all I.N.A.units in Rangoon to surrender and when we had noother alternative^left.

    Some soldiers unable to induce themselves toaccept this order, prefered to take their own lives andcommitted "suicide." I did not do so, because I felt itmy duty still to lead my men and share theirhardships as I had done on the battlefield.

    41 JAIHIND"

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    (2)SEPOY MOHD. HUSSAIN'S CASE(SHOT AT POPA ON 29ra MARCH 1945)

    On 5th March 1945, when I was in Rangoon, I wassent for by Netaji, for a talk in which he told methat:

    (a) The Military situation on 2 Div. Frontfead- become very grave and that this had been madeworse by the Divisional Commander Col. Aziz Ahmed'sinability to go there owing to a head injury. Healso stated that he had asked both Major-GeneralJ. K. Bhonsle and Major-General M. Z. Kiani toproceed to that front and take over command, butboth of them had declined to do so, the former,because he considered it below his dignity to commanda division, after holding the appointment of theChief of Staff, and the latter because of ill-health, andhis inability to co-operate with the local JapaneseCommander on that front.

    Netaji then told me that he wished me to takeover the command of 2 Division and proceed toPopa as soon as possible*

    (20 He went on to say that there were other badnews from that front, and it was that four Majors,namely, Mohd. Riaz, Mohd. Sarwar, P. J. Madan and& NL Dey, all of Divisional H. Q., had deserted tq the

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    MAJOR-GENERAL SHAHNAWAZ 51British side a few days earlier. He said that by thiscowardly act they had brought shame and disgraceon India's honour, and that as a result of their actionwe h&d lost all oar respect in the eyes of our Alliesthe Japanese and the Burmese.He impressed upon me the necessity of preventing.any more desertions, and that I had his permission touse any methods including award of Summary CapitalPunishment to stop it.He finally concluded by saying that if there wereany more desertions among the troops, the orily courseleft open to him, would be to "commit suicide." Icould see that Netaji was extremely upset and meantwhat he said.

    I was very devoted to my Netaji and was deter-mined that to allay his anxiety and to uphold India's-honour, I would stop short of nothing.

    This was the frame of mind in which I arrived atPopa on 12th March 1945, and took over command of*No. 2 Division.

    On arrival at Popa, I found the situation very.critical. The troops had lost confidence in theirofficers and their morale was low.A large number of other officers, besides those-who had deserted, were being detained in custody onsuspicion of having intentions to desert.

    The Military situation was evenPowerful enemy mechanized columnsMeiktila and were threatening ofortes were also being massed ortafter their crossing of the Irrau

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    52 I. N. A. HEROEScomplete air superiority and we were being subjected!to constant bombing and machine-gunning fromnumerous aeroplanes the enemy used on this front.These were rendered very devastating by the exactinformation of an H. Q. and troop concentration givento the eqexny by the deserters.

    My first and foremost task was therefore to restorethe lost confidence of the men in their officers, andsecondly to build up their morale, by taking offensiveaction on the enemy and defeating them in battle,and by taking steps for stopping further deserters.Both these objects were achieved to a very greatdegree.

    As given above desertions had two very un-fortunate results :

    (a) They had bad effect on the morale of othersoldiers.

    (6) They revealed the exact location of ourHead Quarters, troop concentrations, supply andammunition dumps and Hospitals, with the resultthat these were bombed and great loss of life andmaterial was inflicted on us.

    On one occasion our Hospital area was bombedand some patients were killed and all our medicineswere burnt, with the result that these could never bereplaced and the sick and wounded naturally suffered.

    There was great indignation against such indis-criminate bombing}and against deserters who were*fee canst of it*

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    TMAJOR-GENERAL SHAHNAWAZ 53In the meantime written orders were received

    frqm the Supreme Commander "AZAD HINDFAUJ" (Netaji S. C. Bose) that in future thepunishment for desertion would be death, and theDivisional and Regimental Commanders were giventhe power to award this punishment summarily.

    A few days later I received a personal letter:feom Netaji, in which he asked me to exercise utmostvig&llance to prevent desertions and to take any steps,\which I considered necessary including award ofCapital Punishment to the offenders. He also askedme to convey his message to all the RegimentalCommanders. 1 did so and obtained the initials.of Cols. P. K. Sahgal and G. S. Dhillon on it.

    Also before my arrival at Popa, four men ofNo. 4 Regiment had been shot for desertion. Thusa precedent had already been created, before Sy.Mohd. Hussain of No. 2 Regt. was brought up beforeme for desertion. The award of Capital Punishmenton him was distasteful to me, but at a time whenthe extreme necessity was to restore confidence ofthe troops in their leaders I could show no weak*ness, especially because Mohd. Hussain was a Muslimand any leniency in dealing with his case might havebeen misinterpreted on communal lines. This wasBlithe more important in view of the fact that Iwas new to the Division and had just taken overits command, and had no previous contact with theofficers and men of that unit.

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    54 I. N. A. HSROESFull facts of the case are as under :On 26th or 27th March 1945, Maj. B.S. Ngi, 2/Itr

    Command to Col. Sahgal, commanding No. 2 Regi-ment and Lt. Khazin Shah, commanding 1st Bn. ofNo. 2 Regiment came to my Head Quarters andreported that they had some men to be brought upbefore me for attempted desertion. I asked them tomarch them in before me*

    They produced three men before me.Sy. Mohd. Hussain1Sy. Alladifa h All on charge of desertionSy. Jagiri Ram jMajor Negi handed over the charge sheet to me

    and explained that owing to being unwell Col. Sahgalcould not come himself, and that he had gone intothe case of those three men and and was of teopinion that they deserved the extreme penalty. Lt.Khazin Shah, the Battalion Commander, was alsoof the same opinion.

    I read out the charge sheet to the three accused,two pleaded not guilty and one Sy. Mohd. Hussainpleaded guilty. I returned the charge sheet to MajorNegi, after full investigation and asked him to bring,up Mohd. Hussain before me the next day for deser-tion, and that the other two were to be dealt withby the Regimental Commander, as they were notguilty of desertion.

    Next day Mohd. Hussain, along with the othertwo. was brought up before me. I read out the chargesheet to him, and asked him to tell me the truth. Hemid, that he did intend to desert and that be had

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    MAJOR-GENERAL SHAHNAWAZ 55also instigated the other two to desert with him. 1then asked the other two witnesses Sy. Alladitta andSy. Jagiri Ram to make their statements. They bothadmitted that Sy. Mohd. Hussain had tried toinstigate them to desert and that he had told themthat he was going to desert.

    Being fully satisfied from the evidence that thenfen was guilty I awarded the punishment of deathto bin. Once the charge was established against theman, there was no other alternative left for me, bythe existing orders on the subject, and by theprecedent of 4 men of No. 4 Regt. shot before myarrival*

    I ordered Maj. Mehr Das, my senior staff officer,who was also present there, to take down in writingthe full statement and confession of Sy. Mohd.Hussain, before the sentence was carried.

    This I understand he was not likely to do, as wehad to move out immediately on active operations tostop a serious advance by the enemy.

    When, where and how (if ever) Sy. Mohd.Hussain was shot is not known to me.I would also like to point out that at the time

    when I awar.ded the punishment to him, I and Sy.Mohd. Hussain were both subject to the I. N. A. Act.He bad voluntarily accepted to join the organization,and to abide by its rules and regulations.Prior to his being sent to the front, he had beengiven undermentioned opportunities of not going tothe front if he did not wish to do so :

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    56 L tf, A. HEROESi

    (a) In Singapore, before the Regt. started movingto the frontjin Burma.

    (ft) At Rangoon^ in a speech by Netaji, and bythe Regimental Commander in which theyasked all men who were physically ormentally unfit to go to the front to stay

    : behind.ptSome men did actually stay behind.Again on arrival at Popa, the Regiment Com*mander Col. P. K. Sahgal gave every one an oppor-

    tunity to go back to Rangoon, if they did not wish tostay on and fight in Popa or to go over to the Allies,but in the latter case, he said the men would not beallowed to take I. N. A. Arms with them. Some manwere actually sent back from Popa.In conclusion, if in spite of voluntarily joiningthe organization and accepting its rules and regulationsand given ample opportunities of staying behind, awayfrom the front, the man still insisted on betraying hiscountry and his pomrades he well deserved the punish-ment which he received.

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    (3)SURRENDER.

    Having left Popa on 12th April in accordancewith orders, we reached the outskirts of Pegu, on 16thMay having marched over 500 miles, without anyproper supply of rations or transport. During thisinarch, by which we intended to join NETAJI atMoulmein, we broke 'six times through enemyencirclements.On 16th May I realized that the situation hadbecome almost hopeless ; this was made worse by thefalse information given to me by a Japanese BrigadeCommander. He said, the British forces had crossedthe Sittang river and that fighting: was probably goingon at Moulmein."

    Rangoon had been captured by the Allies and theBritish forces were stretched out along the roadJRangoon-Pegu-Meiktilla and Mandalay. So I orderedall the troops with me to go and surrender to theBritish at Pegu.

    This they did under command of Major A. B.Singh and Jagir Singh.

    I did not intend ever to surrender to the Britishand so took a party of approximately 5 officers and 40soldiers with the intention of continuing the fight.(See my diaryX In the meantime the British forces

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    58 L N. A. HEROESclosed round us and finally without any rations ormedicines, in a country whose population was veryhostile, there was no other course left for us, but tosurrender.

    The following day. 17th May at about 11.00 hrs.we sent an officer 2/Lt. (I. N. A.) Rai Singh, with awhite flag and a letter. The contents of which were :

    ToThe Commander of British Forces.

    FromThe Commander of L N. A. Tps. 2 Division,

    44 We have ceased fighting and wish to surrender,our party consisting of 45,men."

    It was signed by G. S. Dhillon.At about 16.00 hrs. Lt. Rai Singh returned. He

    was accompanied by a 2/Lt Tehl Singh of 2/lst PunjabRegiment. Lt. Tehl Singh came and met us andasked us to accompany him to his company area;where we were all disarmed and taken to his Coy.H. Qrs. where I met Major Ram Singh, 2/lst PunjabRegiment, who was commanding the Company. Fromthere we were taken to their Batallion Head Quartersand eventually to the Corp. Head Quarters, wherethe officers were separated from the men and takento Pegu Jail.

    The following day 18th May, CoL G. S. Dhillonand I were taken to the F. I. C (Forward Interroga-tion Centre) and a guard was placed over the houseia which we were accommodated. After a few days

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    MAJOR-GENERAL SHAHNAWAZ 99this guard was removed and we were told by MajorOrr, the Officer Commanding F. C. C. that we wereon Parole. Up to this time we had been wearing ourI. N. A. Uniform and Badges of rank.We told him he could make us "take off'9 ourI. N. A. Badges of rank, but could not order us to puton British Badges of rank. He agreed to this.

    On 9th June I left Pegu for Rangoon and fromthere for Calcutta by Air arriving on llth June and.DELHI on 14th June 1945.

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    (4)STATEMENT IN THB COTOT.

    Mr. President and members of this honourable'court*

    In this statement I am going to lay before you,very frankly, the considerations and motives that haveimpelled me from the day of my surrender inSingapore on 15th February 1942 to the day of mycapture by the British forces at Pegu on 16th May1945.

    Before touching on the actual period, I would liketo throw some light on my early history and Armycareer :

    Early HistoryI was born in a family of Janjua Rajputs in

    Rawalpindi. My father who was the leader of theTribe in the District served in the Indian Army for30 years.

    In the first and the second World Wars, everyAble-bodied member of- 'my family joined the army.At present there are over 80 of them serving asofficers in the Indian Army*

    In short I belong to a family in which loyalty toithe Crown has always been a valued tradition.

    I was educated at the Prince of Wmles's Royaljtodian Military College, Dehra Dun,

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    MAJOR-GENERAL SHAHNAWAZ 61In 1933 I passed out into the I. M. A. Dehra Dun.,and received the undermentioned scholarships : -(a) King: Emperor's Cadet-ship.(6) Sir Partap Singh Memorial Prize for being:

    the best cadet and for belonging to a familyhaving the best military services to its.credit.

    I passed out of the I. M. A. as an under officerand was attached to a British Battalion for one year,after which I was posted to 1st Bn. 14th Punjab .Regiment in February, 1937.

    In short I was brought up in an atmosphere whichwas purely military and up to the time of my meetingwith NETAJI S. C. Bos>e at Singapore in July 1943, 1

    i was politically almost uneducated. I was brought up .to see India through the eyes of a young Britishofficer, and all that I was interested in was soldieringand sport*

    Call to MalayaIn March 1941, my Battalion went overseas toMalaya. At that time I was left behind in command

    of a company at the Tiaining Centre at Ferozepore.Early in November 1941, my 0. C. Lt. CoL

    L. V. Fitzpatrick wrote to the G. H. Q. India,asking for my being sent out to join the Battalion*The Officer Commanding of the Training Centre, how-ever, refused to allow me to go, on the grounds that myservices could not be spared. He also protested about itto the G.H.Q, and an Indian Army Order was published v

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    42 L N. A. HEROESstating that in 4?ture the active Bos. should not askfor any officer by name.CoL Fitspatrick, however, again applied forme-through Malaya High Command, but his requestwas again turned down.

    Early in Dec. 1941, he wrote a private letter tothe Officer Commanding the Training Centre, statingthat it was imperative in the interests of the Battalionthat I should be sent out to join it.

    On receipt of this letter I was allowed to proceedto Malaya and join my Battalion.

    I was very proud of my Battalion, and was veryhappy to join it in the fight against the Japanese.

    On 16th January, 1942, I sailed from Bombay,determined to live up to the good name of theSherdil Bn. and to uphold the martial traditions ofmy family.

    I arrived at Singapore on January 29th, 1942, whenthe situation had become very critical. In 'spite ofthis I was determined to put up a brave fight.

    In, the battle of Singapore on 13th, 14th and 15thFebruary 142, when the British officers, on my rightand left flanks, had disappeared with their units, I heldon to my position until ordered by my CommandingOfficer^to surrender.

    I resented this order very much especially becauseI 'felt that I had ,pot been given a fair chance to fightthe enemy. To have brought me to Singapore so lateIn the fight, only to be be ordered to lay down myarms, and to surrender unconditionally, I considered

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    MAJOR-GENERAL SHAHNAWA2 63to be extremely unjust to myself and to my sense ofhonour as a soldier*

    Surrender and the Concentration at the Farr er ParkOn the night of 15/16th Feb. 1942 the day of

    surrender, we received orders that all Indians,including the King's Commissioned Officers, were toconcentrate at Farrer Park : and all British Officersand other ranks were to concentrate at Changi.All of us, especially* the officers, were surprised tohear this order, because according to the laws ofcivilized warfare, all captured officers irrespectiveof nationality, whether Indian or British, are kepttogether, and separate from the rank and file.

    We had heard of the Japanese ways before, andfelt that British brother officers were leaving us in thelurch to face it all by ourselves.

    On the morning of the 16th Feb. 1942. when wewere marching off to our concentration area, ourCommanding Officer Major MaCadam, along withother British Officers, came to see off the Bn ; whenshaking hands with me, he said, "I suppose this is theparting of our ways/ 9

    These words confirmed my belief that we, theIndians, were being left in the lurch. These were thefeelings and the state of mind in which I went toFarrer Park.

    Handing over CeremonyAt Farrer Park we were handed over to the

    commander o'f the Japanese Intelligence Departmen

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    64 I. N. A. HEROESMaj. Fujiwara, by Col. Hunt, the representative of theBritish Govt. When handing over. Col Huntcalled the parade to attention and said : -

    "To-day I, on behalf of the British Govt. handyou over to the Japanese Government, whoseorders you will obey as you have doneours."

    Major Fujiwara then brought the parade toattention and said, "On behalf of the JapaneseGovernment I take you over, under my charge."He then went to say, "I on behalf of theJapanese Govt. now hand you over to G. 0. C.Mohan Singh, who shall have the power of lifeand death over you."

    Major Fujiwara made a speech in which hedeclared that we would not be treated as prisoners,but as brothers by the Japanese, and expressed thehope that all of us would join the Army which wouldbe raised to fight for India's Freedom, under theleadership of G* O. C. Mohan Singh.

    After this Capt. Mohan Singh came to the stageand made a similar speech.These speeches came to me as a complete bomb-shell. The very idea of joining hands with our formerenemies to fight against our own kith and kin was-fantastic.

    I as well as most of the other officers had afeeling of being completely helpless at being handedover iifee cattle by the British to the Japs and by the"japs to Capt. Mohan Singh, whom they gave power*of life and death over us.

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    MAJOR-GENERAL SHAHNAWAZ 65With all due regards to Capt Mohan Singh's

    iincerity and leadership which he displayed later ; Ihad known him well for the last 10 years. He hadalways been an efficient, but an average officer. Themere fact of being handed over to him, and hisannouncement as the G. O. C. having powers of lifeand death over us, made me feel suspicious of theJapanese intentions, as among the Indian P. of W.there were some very senior and brilliant officers likeCol Gill and Col, Bhonsle with at least 15 to 20 years*service in the army, whereas Capt. Mohan Singh hadonly 8 to 9 years' service.

    I was fully convinced, knowing Capt. MohanSingh so well, that politically at any rate, he wouldnot be able to cope with the Japanese politicalintrigues and we would be exploited by them fortheir own ends. I, therefore, firmly made up mymind not to have anything to do with organisa-tion and in spite of the feeling of frustration andhelplessness, the element of traditional loyalty to theKing triumphed and not only did I make up myown mind to keep out of the I. N. A. but as thehead of a famous military tribe I felt it my duty towarn others, especially the men I commanded andthe men that came from my area, to keep out of it.The advice that 1 gave them at that time was thatif any of them was asked to shoot at his own brethren,he should turn round and shoot at the person askinghim to do so.

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    66 I. N. A. HEROESThree stages

    The period from the time of my surrender inSingapore in February 1942 to the time of mycapture by the British in May 1945, can be dividedinto 3 distinct parts :

    Part I. 15th February 1942 to the end ofMay 1942, during which period I was against thevery idea of such an organization coming intoexistence, and fought against it as vigorously as waspossible, under the unfortunate circumstances inwhich we were placed.

    Part II. June 1942 to June 1943. Realizing thatI had failed in my first object, I decided in theinterests of my men, to volunteer for the I. N. A.,with full determination that I would do everythingpossible to break it or to sabotage it from within,as soon as I felt that it would submit to Japaneseexploitation.

    Part III. July 1943 to May 1945, when I wasfully convinced that it was a genuine army of libera-tion,

    I would like to give some details and importantevents that took place in each of the above givenparts :

    In the first part, I was against the idea ofcreating an Indian National Army, because

    (a) I realized that the Japanese were out toexploit us, and none of us was politicallycapable of dealing with them ;

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    MAJOR-GENERAL SHAHNAWAZ 67O) The hmnding over of all the Indian P. O.W

    to Capt. Mohan Singh by the Japanesemade me feel even more suspicious oftheir intentions, and so I felt it my dutyto fight against it .

    Move to WeesoonThe next day, 17th February, 1942, I went withmy Battalion to Neesoon Camp, and after a few

    days I was appointed Camp Commandant.There were approx. 20.000 P. of W. in that

    camp. The accommodation there was sufficient onlyior approx. 8 to 10 thousand men.

    There were no sanitation arrangements.There was no Water Supply.Hospital arrangements were very poor and wehad no medicines.As a result of this, dysentery and other epidemics

    broke out.The discipline of troops had gone off completely,and so I had a very difficult task to perform ; but

    thanks to the strenuous efforts of the camp medicalstaff, particularly Col. Chaudhn, Maj. Elabi Bux.and Major Gilani, disease was controlled, and by theefforts of a S. and M. unit, electric, water and sanitaryarrangements were completed.

    After the events in Farrer Park I was fullyconvinced that the Japanese were going to exploitus, and so on reaching Neesoon Camp, one of theiirst things I did was to organize a block of officers,whose object it was to prevent the formation of theI. N. A.

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    68 I. N. A. HEROESI commanded 'the Neesoon Camp from March

    to June 1942, during which period my only concernwas to improve the unfortunate lot of the men undermy command.

    During the time I was commanding Neesoon,.the largest Indian P. of W. Camp in Singapore,not a single person was ever sent to any concen-tration or detention camp. I allowed every one to-have, and express, his opinion freely and to decidefor himself, without any outside pressure.

    By the end of May 1942 it had become quiteevident that in spice of all our efforts the L N. A,,would come into existence.

    In the same month we had to decide whetheror not we would volunteer for the L N. A. and volun-teers and non-volunteers were to be separated. Ireceived orders from the Head Quarters to forwardlists of volunteers and non-volunteers to them,,for allotment of separate camps to each category.

    In view of this new situation I held severalmeetings of the "Block" and it was decided thatsince we had failed in our first object to prevent theformation of the I. N. A. the next best thing was forsenior officers to join it with the object of :

    (a) Giving protection and help to P. of W.(&) To stop its being exploited by the Japanese,(c) To sabotage and :wreck it from within,,

    thermoment we felt that it would submitto Japanese exploitation.1, however, advisccfthe rank and file to keep out

    of it.

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    MAJOR-GENERAL 8HAHNAWAZ 69t

    In accordance with this decision, in the middleof May 1942, at Neesoon, in the presence of allofficers of the camp, I declared myself a volunteer,but gave every one a free choice to decide lor himself.1 also gave orders that any one trying to persuadeany one else to join the 1. N. A. would be punished. Ialso asked for the list which had to be forwarded toJ. N. A. H.Q. on the following day.

    Mosque MeetingThe same afternoon I called a meeting of all

    Muslim officers in the mosque and told them myreasons for joining the I. N. A. I also told them thatthey would be separated shortly, and I asked themto give an assurance that they would not becomevolunteers, through any force or coercion usedagainst them by the Japanese. They all agreed andsaid a 4| Dua-Khair f| a religious 'confirmation ofthe decision taken.

    PERT IIBangkok Conference

    Early in 'June 1942 Captain Mohan Singh calleda conference of all senior officers at his residence todiscuss the plans for the forthcoming conference to beJheld at Bangkok.

    He revealed that he had to take 90 delegatesthere on behalf of Indian P. of W. He went on tosay that he proposed to take only 30 delegates and 60proxy votes.

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    MAJOR-GENERAL SHAHNAWAZ 71that the Japanese were out to exploit the Indian P. ofW. who resented taking up arms.

    I explained to the Japanese Commander that thequestion of Indian Independence was an affair of theIndians and that the Japanese had no right to forceany Indian against his wishes to participate in it. Heagreed with me and it was decided that in future theIndian P. of W. would be asked to do only labourand other P. of W. duties.A similar trouble arpse at Seremban, whete onrefusal of the P. of W. to take up arms the Japanesefixed machine guns ail round their camp, put theCamp Commander Lt. Ghulam Mohd. 3/16' P. R.,in a cell and gave the P. of W. 24 hours to think aboutit and decide, after which if they sail insisted theywould all be shot.

    I heard about it and at once rushed toSeremban, with the Japanese G. H. Q. decisiongiven at Kuala-Lumpur, and after a great deal ofpersuasion I was able to make the Japanese there tosee our point of view so that future trouble wasaverted. In a similar manner,! visited all IndianP. of W. camps in Malaya and ensured that they werenot coerced to take up arms or undergo any form ofmilitary training under the Japs.

    At Kaula-Lumpur the Japanese tried to teach theIndian P. of W. Japanese foot drill, words of commandand saluting. I refused to allow them to do so,although it will be interesting to know, that theEnglish prisoners of war in Rangoon did this.

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    i 72 I. N. A. HEROESWhile holding this position I managed to secure

    for the Indian P. of W. excellent living conditions~

    very likely the best given to any P. of W. in the FarEast.

    (a) Food was excellent -eggs, fish, chickenand vegetables.

    (b) Work was moderate and pay was givenregularly.

    (c) There were adequate arrangements for therecreation of troops; they played hockey,foot-ball, etc. Cinema shows were given incamps and troops could go out and see anypicture by paying 10 cents.

    (d) P. of W. soldiers could go out of their campon a pass given by their unit commandersfrom 10 A. M. to 4 P. M. daily, and on holi-days officers could go out in Mufti and visitany civilian friends from 10 A. M. to mid-night.

    (e) On Fridays Muslims were allowed to go andsay prayers io the Jumma Masjid, andHindus and Sikhs could go to their respec-tive religious places in the town onSundays.S. &. M. Men selected for execution

    On one occasion when I was out of the station ontour, the Japanese took away 23 N. C. Os. belongingto 42 Fd. Pk. Coy R, Bombay S. & M. on the accusationthat they were too pro-British and selected some of

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    MAJOR-GENERAL SHAHNAWAZ 73them for execution and made them sign their lastwill. When I returned from tour I found this andat once went to the Japanese G. H. Q. and requestedthem to hand over my soldiers to me. I told themthat I was supposed to be the Commander of IndianTroops and that, in principle, it was wrong for theJapanese to deal direct with my subordinate officersand take -away the men under my command withoutmy knowledge.

    Finally I told them that if they insisted ondoing this I would resign from my appointment.They then told me that I could take away 15 of themand the rest they said they must execute as they weretoo " Pro-British'' and being Japanese prisoners theywere still insisting that they had taken an oath to beloyal to the British King. They said they could notallow such Indians to live, I explained the fullsignificance of this oath to them and told them thatthe normal procedure for dealing with any seriousoffence in the Indian Army was to bold a court ofenquiry and I assured them that I would go verythoroughly into the case, and if in the end the courtfound their offence of a serious nature I would myselfhand them over to the Japanese for punishment. Theyeventually agreed to this and I brought back all thetwenty-three N.C.Os. safely to their unit, held a courtof enquiry and released all of them.

    In Dec. 1942 1 was recalled to Singapore. Duringthe period of my stay at Kaula-Lumpur ascommander of P. 0. W. in Malaya.

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    74 I. N. A. HEROES(a) I served them to the best of my ability.Many a time I had to travel by goods train

    without food and had to face insults andhumiliations from junior Japanese officersfor the sake of the men I commanded.

    (6) I refused to allow the Japanese to exploitin any way the Indian P. O. W* for their ownends and at the same time secured for themgood treatment.

    (c) I always upheld the honour and prestigeof my country and refused to accept anyracial superiority of the Japanese.W) I also induced the Japanese not to arrestany Indian soldiers who had turned civiliansduring the War and were honourably earningtheir livincr. The case of one Sy. AbdulMatlab of 2/16 P. R. who had opened atea shop at Sercmbam Railway Station isa typical one.

    (

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    MAJOR-GENERAL SHAHNAWAZ 75Japanese aerodromes. The men refused to go,but the Japanese insisted and it looked as if a serioussituation would develop. Sub Fazal Dad Khan of2/12 F. F. R. then approached me and informed meof the critical situation that had arisen. I went tothe Seletar Camp with Sub. Fazal Dad Khan, talkedto the Japanese Officer and succeeded in convincinghim that it was wrong to persuade P-. O. W. to takeup arms. After this the unit was never troubledby the Japs.

    I was recalled to Singapore in September 1942 andone of the first things I did was to go and pay avisit to all the P. O. W. Camps in Singapore, wherethere were large numbers of men from my area.All along during my stay in Singapore I had beenmost concerned about the welfare of the Pf O. W.,whom I quite often used to visit and distributeamong them my I. N. A. pocket money, and clothingand medicine.

    There ,was the case of one P. O. W, Jem*Mirsaman, 2/10 Balauch Regt., who had anulcer in the stomach ; the doctor said that he wouldnot survive. I took him to my bungalow, kept himwith me for over 4 months and -through goodnourishment, completely cured him and the a senthim back to rejoin his unit which was still a P. O. W.unit. There are several such instances.

    On recall from Kuala-Lumpur, I was appointeda Commandant O. T. S. which had to be disbandedafter a few days, by order of Capt. Mohan Singh,who had some misunderstanding with the Japanese.

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    76 L N. A. HEROESI took full advantage of this situation and to-

    gether with other members of my " Block' 1 persuadedCapt. Mohan Singh to disband the I. N. A. Idid so because I knew that the Japanese were itryingto exploit us.

    I joined the 2nd L N. A. in Feb. 1943-on beingtold that Netaji S. C. Bose would be coming toSingapore to take over its command.

    At this time I also realized that whether weliked it or not, the Japanese were definitely goinginto India.

    I also realized that the fight would, in allprobability, be carried into Indian territory as I didnot think that the British forces would be able tostop the Japanese advance.

    I had also seen with my own eyes the indiscrimi-nate loo ting and raping in Malaya, and I did notwish it to happen in India. I felt that by going intoIndia we would be able to stop this, or at any rate,I would be much more useful to my country with arifle in my hand to save the life, property andhonour of Indians, than as a helpless prisoner of warin MalayA.

    I, therefore, set about to collect such men forthe L N. A* who would be prepared to fight evenagainst the Japanese if they proved dishonest, andthis fact has been established beyond doubt even bythe prosecution witnesses.

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    MAJOR-GENERAL SHAHNAWAZ 7Tjis arrival and its effect on me.When Netaji arrived in Singapore, I watched

    him very keenly. I had never seen or met himbefore, and did not know very much about hisactivities in India. I heard a number of his publicspeeches, which had a profound effect on me. Itwill not be wrong to say that I was hypnotized byhis personality and his speeches. He placed thetrue picture of India before us and for the firsttime in my life I saw India, through the eyes ofan Indian.

    I was most impressed by his selflessness, hisabsolute devotion to our country, his frankness andhis refusal to bow before the Japanese wishes. Iknew that in his hands India's honour was safe ;he would never barter it for anything in the world.Also when I heard him give a free choice to everyonein the I. N. A. to leave its ranks if they were notprepared to make extreme sacrifices and his warn*ing to those who stayed on in the I. N. A. to beprepared to face, "thirst, hunger, forced marches andin the end death " and when with my own eyes Isaw the enthusiasm of thousandsIndians in the Far East, whoall that they possessed andthe Azad Hind Fauj and becaijsake of their country. I knew \and when he, in the namestricken, unarmed and

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    78 I. N. A. HEROESto us to come forward and sacrifice our lives fortheir liberation ; no honourable Indian could haverefused this much to him.

    I found a leader and decided to follow him, andfor me it was the greatest and the most difficultdecision of my life, t.e., of fighting against my kith andkin f who were, in the British Indian Army in very

    ] large numbers, and whom, I was certain, I couldnever induce to see eye to eye with me.At the back of my mind was the traditionalurge of loyalty to the King, I owed all my educationto him. My family and my tribe were one of theprivileged classes in India. They were all prosperousand contented. This, too, we owed to the BritishGovernment and I knew that no change in Indiawould bring them any more prosperity. In fact theywere likely to suffer by it.

    But on the other hand, when I thought of the''starving millions'* who were baing ruthlesslyexploited by the British, and were being deliberatelykept illiterate and ignorant to make this exploitationeasier, I developed a great hatred for the systemof rule in India, which to me, it seemed, was basedon ''injustice*' and to remove this injustice I decidedto sacrifice my everything my life, my home, myfamily and its traditions* I made up my mind tofight even against ' my brother if he stood in myway, and in the actual fighting that followed in1944, we actually fought against each other. -Hewas wounded* My cousin and I were fighting eachother in Chin Hill, almost daily for two months.

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    MAJOR-GENERAL SHAHNAWAZ 79In short the question before me was the King

    or the Country. I decided to be loyal to my countryand gave my word of honour to my Netaji that Iwould sacrifice myself for her sake.

    Differential TreatmentAnother thing, which has always upset me, hasbeen the difference of treatment between an

    Indian and a British soldier.I saw with my own eyes that as far as fighting

    was concerned there was no difference. The Indiansoldier stood his ground and fought to the lastWhy then there should be so much difference intheir pay, allowances, food and living conditions Ihave never been able to understand. It seemed tome to be extremely unjust.

    Secondly, I would also like to point out that theI. N. A. was raised, organized, trained and led in thefield entirely by Indians. Comparatively juniorofficers commanded Divisions and Brigades ; O., C. Os.commanded battalions, and under the circumstances,they did not do it " too badly/' But on the otherhand, out of 2 millions of Indians in the IndianArmy, not a single officer was given the command ofa Division, and only one Indian was given the com-mand of a Brigade.

    There were some very senior and competentIndian officers in the Indian Army, and it appearedto me that the laok of talent could not have been thereason for more Indians not getting higher com-

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    80 I. N. A. HEROESmands. This a'so appeared to my mind ta oe veryunjust

    I was a soldier and once I had taken the decision?I concentrated on fighting from the first to the last.

    In September 1943, Netaji decided to select *picked Regt. consisting of the cream of I. N. A. andsend it into action to form the spearhead of theadvance into India. It was known as "SubhasBrigade " and I was selected to command it. TheBrigade took part in fighting in the Arakan,Haka-Falam and in the vicinity of Kohima.

    In December 1944, 1 was appointed Commanderof No. 1 Division which was at Mandalay then.

    In February 1945, when No. 1 D. Ill H. Q. waat Pyinmama, Netaji came there and told methat No. 2, a fresh Division of the I. N. A., wasmoving to the front in the vicinity of Popa, andthat unfortunately its Division Commander Col. Aziz*Ahmed had beed injured in an air raid. He, there-fore, ordered me to take over its command. I did so,but in April 1945 I had to fall back to Pegu, whereI was captured by the British forces.

    In joining the I. N. A. I was prompted only brmotives of patriotism. I fought a straightforwardand honourable fight on the battlefield, againstmost overwhelming odds. I was further handicapped 1by lack of proper medical, transport and rationsupplies, and for long periods I, with my troops, hadto live on paddy and jungle grass, when' even salt was>a luxury for us.

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    MAJOR-GENERAL SHAHNAWAZ 81During these operations I, with my men, marched

    over 3,000 miles in BurmaI gave good treatment to the' British troops rwhom my soldiers captured, and expected to receive

    the same treatment for my troops when they surren-dered as Prisoners of War.

    Finally Sir ! I wish to bring to your notice, andto the notice of my country, that no mercenary orouppet army could have faced the hardships as theI. N A. did. We fought only for India's Independ-ence.

    I do not deny having taken part in the fight butI dkl so as a member of the regular fighting forces ofthe Provisional Government of Free India who wagedwar for the liberation of their motherland accordingto the rules of civilised warfare and to whom thestatus of belligerency had been accorded by theBritish Forces opposing us. I, therefore, committedno offence for which I can be trifed by a Court Martialor by any other Court.

    As for the charge of abetment of murder, even ifthe facts alleged by the prosecution were true, Icould not be held to have committed any offence.Mohd. Hussain, who had voluntarily joined theI. N. A. and submitted himself to its discipline,admittedly attempted to desert and to induce othersto desert at a very critical juncture. If he had suc-ceeded in his attempt he would have carried .allinformation about the force under my command tothe British, which would have meant complete dig-

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    PART IfCOL. P. K. SAHGAL

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    IICOL. P. K. SAHGALAZAD HIND FAUJ

    (1)LIFE STORY

    1. Born on the 25th March 1917 at Hoshiar-put (Punjab).

    Father. Mr. Justice Achhru Ram, a lawyer fromJullundur.

    Mother. Shrimati Rattan Devi from Hoshiarpur.Early childhood. Mostly spent at Jullundurwas very much interested in the Arya Samaj in theearly days. Attended the 1929-30 Congress session atLahore. At that time a student of Doaba High School,Jullundur. On return from Lahore took active partin the non-co-operation movement and was an activemember of the Jullundur Students Union.Move to Lahore. End of 1930, my fathermoved to Lahore to practise at the High Court andthe whole family moved with him. I matriculatedfrom the Central Model High School, Lahore, in 1932and joined the Government College, Lahore.

    Government College and the Indian MilitaryAcademy. I passed my intermediate in 1934and . in 1935 Sat for the competitive examination of

    85

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    86 L N. A. HEROESentrance to the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun.I was successful and joined the L M. A. in 1936. I wascommissioned with effect from the 29th January 1938and after attachment with a British Unit, I was postedto the 5th Bn. of the Baluch Regiment.

    Malaya. In 1940 I was transferred to the2nd Bn. of the Baluch Regt. and sailed for Malaya with 'the Bn. in October 1940. I landed in Singapore on thellth November 1940 and after a stay of about afortnight there, my Bn. moved to Kotah Bharu inKalaatan State on the North-East Coast of Malaya.At the end of November I was promoted an ActingCaptain.

    Kota Bharu. Soon after our arrival inKota Bharu my Bn. was allotted the task of beachdefences and throughout 1941, we spent most of ourtime preparing these defences. I was commanding acompany which was given the task of defendin geleven thousand yards of the beach.

    Malayan Campaign* The Japanese landed inKota Bharu on the night of the 7/8th December 1941.By the morning of the 9th Japanese occupied KotaBharu aerodrome and the town. At midday onthe 9th I was allotted the task of commanding amixed force which was acting as rear guard to mybrigade. On the llth I rejoined my Bn. and wefought our way down the Mainland of Malaya.During this rime the Company distinguished itself iaaction on more than one occasion.

    Battle of Singapore. We crossed the Johorecrossway on the night of 30/31st January and on arrival

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    COL. P. K. SAHGAL 87in Singapore we were sent to the vicinity of theSambawatig aerodrome, with a counter-attack role incase ot landing on the East Coast. The Japaneselanded in Singapore on the morning of the 8th Feb. 1942.The initial landing took place in the part of the frontwhich was held by the Australians and it was pre-ceded by a very heavy artillery barrage. TheAustralians did not stand up to the Japanese onslaughtand fell back in disorder. On th> 10th my Bn.moved out to counter-attack and llth Ind. Div. towhich my Bn. belonged drove the Japanese back intothe sea but as the Australian front had completelycollapsed, therefore we also had to fall back. My Bn.was involved in heavy fighting throughout the battleof Singapore. I was captured by the Japanese onthe 14th February and Singapore surrendered on the15th Feb.

    Ceremony at Farrear Park. On the 10th Feb.all the Indian troops were marched off to the FarrearPark, where on the 17th they were handed over tothe Japanese by Lt. Col. Hunt. The Japanese intheir turn handed the Indians over to Capt. MohanSingh, G O. C, I. N. A.

    Prisoner of War. On the 18th Feb* my Bn.went to Neesoin Camp where I met Lt. Col. N. S.Gill. Orf the 19th Lt. Col. Gill told me that he wasgoing to form a headquarters in the Neesoin campto administer the Indian prisoners of war and askedme if I would like to take charge of the AdjutantGeneral's branch of this R Q. I agreed and

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    88 I. N. A. HEROESaccordingly posted to the H. Q. in that appointment.My work consisted of keeping the records of IndianOfficers and soldiers and preparing nominal rolls orother routine returns which were demanded byCaptain Mohan Singh's H. Q. I continued to carryout these duties until these H. Qs. were dissolved.

    Bidadari Resolutions. In April 1942, Capt.Mohan Singh and the companions returned fromTokyo and a conference of Senior Officers was heldin Bidadari Camp. I was present at this conference.Four resolutions which later came to be commonlyknown as Bidadan resolutions were passed and Offi-cers and men were asked to volunteer on theseresolutions. I did not trust the Japanese and I alsofelt that there was no sense in asking Officers andmen to volunteer on the basis of those resolutions. Iwas of the opinion that if volunteers are to be askedfor, they must be asked for participation in IndianWar of Liberation. Therefore I refused to acceptthese resolutions and went to Tengali Aerodromecamp which was a non-volunteer camp. When rep-resentatives were going to Bangkok, I was asked if Iwould like to go. I refused to go because I thoughtthat these people were wasting their time and nothingsubstantial would ever come out of all theseconferences.

    Joining the I. !A(. A. Delegates from theBangkok Conference returned to Singapore in themonth of July and at the end of that month Capt.Mohan Singh sent for me and asked me to assist in

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    COL. P. Kt SAHGAL 89the organisation of the I. N. A. I consented to do soand later realising that Capt. Mohan Singh reallymeant business, I volunteered to join the I. N A. Ifinally made up my mind to join the Indian NationalArmy because I felt that the Japanese were absolutelydetermined to go to India and if they were accom-panied by a really strong I. N., A. the Japanese wouldnot be permitted to commit the same atrocities as theyhad committed in Malaya and other countries inEast Asia and also if they did not honour their pledgesregarding Indian Independence, a well armed andorganised I. N. A. would be in a position to put up anarmed opposition against them. After joining theI. N. A. I was posted to H. Q. 1st Hind Field Force

    :Group where I stayed until the I. N. A. broke.Crisis in the I. J{. A. The I. N. A. under

    orders of Gen. Mohan Singh was broken at the endof December 1942. I was one of the few officerswho were opposed to the idea of breaking up theI. N. A. I was convinced that if we broke up theI. N. A. Japanese would revive a puppet army,through which they would be able to exploit theIndians. I was also of the opinion, that having once-started an Indian Independence movement, we hadno excuse for inaction, specially when the Indiansin India had asked the British to quit and the Britishwere employing every possible weapon of oppression-to break their indomitable will to be free. Mr. RashBehari Bose further clarified the issues and the newsthat Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose was coming to the

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    90 i. N. A. HEROESFar East, finally helped the majority of the Officersand men of the I. N. A. to reorganise the I. N. A.Directorate of Military Bureau. The I. N. A.was reorganised under the Director of Mili-tary Bureau and I was appointed the MilitarySecretary in the Directorate.

    Arrival of T^etajL On arrival of Netajtthe Directorate of Military Bureau was reorganisedinto H.Qs. Supreme Command and I continued in mypost of Military Secretary. In the course of myduties I came into very close contact with Netajiand soon became one of his closest and most trustedassociates.

    Arrival in Burma. Netaji with the HeadQuarters of the Provisional Government movedto Rangoon on the 6th January 1944. I followed;him and reached Rangoon on the 20th January. H. Q.Supreme Command was set up in Rangoon and Ibeing the senior most Officer present in the H. Q.took charge ot them, in addition to my dutiesof Military Secretary ; I was also performing theduties of Assistant Chief of Staff and Deputy AdjutantGeneral. In February came the news of the wonder-ful exploits of the I. N. A. in the Arakans. Sooaafterwards No. 1. Division moved towards theManipur front.

    Mamiyo. Netaji left Rangooa on the 8th Apriland moved to Mamiyo with the members of the Provi-sional Government preparatory to going to ImphaLLt. Col. Habib-ur-Rahman arrived in Rangoon 01* the

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    COL. P. K. 8AHGAL 916th April and I handed over the charge of the H. Q~in Rangoon to him. On the 15th April, I went toMamiyo and stayed with Netaji and I returned toRangoon on the 5th May.

    Rangoon Again. I once again took chargeof the H. Q. in Rangoon and Col. Habib-ur-Rahmauwent to the front. Netaji returned to Rangoon inJune 1943. I stayed in Rangoon with H. Q. SupremeCommand until October 1943. During this timeNo. 1. Division had to withdraw back and I wasresponsible for making arrangements to meet theirrequirements on arrival in the back areas. Arrange-ments had also to be made to prepare No. 2 Divisionwhich was arriving in Burma, to move to the front.In September Netaji returned to the front to meetNo. 1 Division and on h?s return we had longdiscussions about our future action. Netaji wasdetermined that in the coming operations No. 2Division must give a good account of itself and hewished to send his most trusted Officers with theDivision. I had been carrying out staff work eversince the inception of the I. N. A. and was very keento participate in active operations ; therefore Irequested Netaji that I should be given commandof No. 5 Grla. Regt. in No. 2 Division which was tobe reorganised into 2 Inf. Regt.

    In October 1943 Netaji went to Japan to conferwith the new Government of Japan. At the endcff October I left Rangoon to go to the front tovisit units No. 1 Division. I returned to Rangoon

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    "92 L N. A. HEROESin the beginning of December and left the H. Q.Supreme Command on the 9th December 1944.

    3\to. 2 Inf. Regt. I took over commandof No. 5 Grla. Regiment on the 10th December 1944.Later on I organised this regiment into an InfantryRegiment which meant the addition of some 600men and certain new weapons such as Mirtans intothe Regiment. Intensive training was carried out to.enable the regiment to fight as a field regiment inWar.

    On assuming the command ot my regiment, Ispoke at great length to the Officers and men ofach unit under my command. I told them that

    they should have no illusions as to what was in storefor them when they went to the front. Iimpressed on them that in the front line they mustbe prepared for hunger, thirst, conditions of greathardships and great dangers and finally death. Any-one who was unwilling or unfit to face these condi-tions was given the option of staying behind at thebase and a certain number of men who were eitherunwilling or unfit to proceed to the front wereleft behind in Rangoon and no action whatsoeverwas taken against anyone.

    T^ietajfs Inspection. On the 26th January1945, Netaji inspected my reginlent in Rangoon andwarned them regarding the hardships and dangersin the front line and once again anyopp who did notfeel himself mentally or physiclly -jj&j&p proceedto the front was given the o

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    COL. P. K. SAHGAL 9$Move to the Front. On the 28t?h January,,my regiment started its move to the front. The

    regiment was moving in parties of 250 Officers andmen which left Rangoon every alternate day, bytrain. I left the same night by car for Pruna. AtPruna I made arrangements regarding transportand ration, etc,, for the second stage of the journey(from Pruna t3 the front) which the whole divisionwas doing on foot.On the 31st at Pruna I issued the administrativeorders for the second stage ' of the move for thewhole division.

    On the 3rd February I came back to Rangoon,and on the 4th reported to the Supreme Commanderthe arrangements I had made for the move of the.whole division.

    On the 8th February I was notified by H. Q:Supreme Command that the role of my regimentwas the defence of Popoa Hill.

    On the 12th. February there was heavy bombingin Rangoon in which Col. Aziz Ahmed, the DivisionatCommander, was injured; therefore I took chargeof the advance H. Q. of the Division ] which was-also moving to Popoa.

    I left Rangoon on the night of the 13th Feb.and the next day I spent at Saku Army H. Q.(Japanese Army H. Q. under whose unified command"my division had been placed for operational purposes).I discussed the war situation in Burma with Major-General Iwakuro, the Chief of Staff of Saku Army

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    4 L N. A. HEROESWe also came to an agreement as to how No. 2Division could best fulfil its role. *

    I arrived in Yomayang, the H. Q. of the Yoma-moto Division, which was operating in the left of theSector allotted to No. 2 Division. On the 17thFebruary, here I learned that the British had alreadycrossed the Irrawadi river and that No. 4 Grla.regiment of the I. N. A. had been badly wanted. Idiscussed with Major-General Yomamoto themeasures to be adopted to meet the new situationand I immediately returned to Popoa.

    Popoa Area. I arrived at Popoa in the earlymorning of the 18th, and met Maj. G. S. Dhillonwho had withdrawn there with the remnants of No. 4Grla. regiment. From him I learned the details ofwhat had taken place on the Irrawadi River. I gavehim orders to immediately reorganise his regimentand get them ready for battle and with all availablemen of my regiment I took up a defensive positioncovering Mount Popoa and also issued instructions tocarry out intensive patrolling in the whole area.On the 22nd Feb Col. Shah Nawaz came toPopoa and told me that he was going to take overcommand of the division. I acquainted him with thecurrent situation and on the 23rd he left Popoa toreport the situation to the Supreme Commanderwho was in Meikhlu area. The day after Col. ShahNawaz reached Meiktila ; that town was attackedby the British and Shah Nawaz could not get backto Popoa therefore once again I assumed temporarycommand of the division.

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    COL. P. K. SAHGAL 95On the 295fd Feb. I received orders from the

    Saku army to carry out Guerilla Warfare in frogt ofMount Popoa to help the Japanese forces whichwere counter-attacking; the British forces east ofIrrawadi. I detailed No. 4 Grla. regiment for thistask.

    Just about this time Khanji regiment of theJapanese army arrived in Popoa to help in thedefence of Mount Popoa. An agreement was arrivedat with the Command of the Khanjo regt. accordingto which he assumed the responsibility of holdingthe road Popoa Myingyian and my regiment tookup defences in the Popoa Pynbin and Popoa KyankPadaung roads.

    During this time the enemy was also carryingout active patrolling in our areas and there weremany clashes between ours and their patrols ; butthe enemy patrols never stopped to give fight. Thishad a wonderful effect on the morale of the Officersand men under my command.

    On the 1st March I sentenced S. O. GangaSaran to death because he had refused to go outwith a patrol when ordered to do so by his BattalionCommander. Later realising that he was capable ofdoing good work, I cancelled the punishment.

    On the early morning of the 2nd March* fiveofficers from the Divisional Headquarters deserted andwent over to the enemy. They carried with them fullinformation about our organisation, arms, equipment

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    96 I. N. A. HEROESand disposition. This was a great blow and had a very-bad effect on the morale of the Units,

    After the desertion of these officers I becamecertain that the enemy would take full advantage ofthe knowledge of my weak points and with the smallgarrison at my disposal I could not possibly defend'Papoa effectively against an organised attack by theBritish. Therefore I decided that in my caseoffensive was the best form of defensive and I issued,intructions to carry out sorties into the enemy occupiedareas. The enemy seemed to be very chary to give a.pitched battle to any of our attacking units with theresult that the morale of the officers and men went upvery high.

    On the 4th March a fighting patrol of myregiment put to flight an enemy patrol and capturedtwo Jeep cars and a wireless set and a quantity of armsand ammunitions. .

    On the 5th March enemy about 500 strongsupported by tanks approached the position held by the*1st Battalion of my regiment. This enemy was met bytwo Platoons (total strength about 40 men) and after-trying to get past them, during the whole day,withdrew back in the evening.

    On the 12th March Col. Shah Nawaz came to*Papao and took over command of the Division.

    CJn the 13th Dhil Ion's regiment went into attackand drove the enemy out of Tongram area.On the 15th March I went to Pynbin with tw

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    COL. P, K. SAHGAL 97positions. The attack was coming out at night andthe enemy on our approach left their positions and ranaway. We encountered only one patrol which wasannihilated. In this action the men marched &0. milesthrough desert, attacked four enemy, positions, all in 36hours and on one gallon of water per head for drink-ing, cooking and washing purposes.

    On the 20th March Col. Shah Nawaz orderedme to undertake .the defence of.Kyank Padam Meiktilaroad, because the enemy threat from that side hadbecome very menacing. I sent the 2nd Battalion ofmy regiment for that task. f

    On the 21st March Capt. Bagri with oneCompany of the 3rd Bn, ot my regiment went toKalyo area and made contact with a mechanical columnof the enemy supported by tanks and artillery. Thefight lasted for about one hour'and then the enemywithdrew back.

    On the 23rd I went to inspect my Bn. positionson the Kyank Padang - Meiktila Road. I also carriedout detailed reconnaissance of that area and sent apatrol to Meiktila to bring back detailed informationof the enemy disposition in that area. On receipt ofthis information I was convinced that if we could drivethe British out of Meiktila, then it would be a simpleaffair to clear the enemy from our own area. I alsohad information that the Indian troDps of the Britishforces at Meiktila were likely to join us if tackled proper-ly. Therefore I prepared plan of attack in Meiktila byour force and submitted it to my DivisionalCommander

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    Sfi L N. A. HEROESwho agreed to it. Unforunately Meiktila was outside ourDivisional area and the Japanese did not agree to ourcarrying out an attack in the sector. They thoughtthat they were strong enough to deal with the enemyin that sector, on their own.

    On the 27th March I got orders to attack Pynbinin co-operation with the Japanese and No. 4 Grla.Regiment.On the night of the 29th March I left Popa withan advance party in a car and a truck. Remainingtroops fo^pwed on foot. Near Seiktin my party wasambushed and one battalion of the enemy opened fireon us from about 25 yards. I had 14 bullet holes inthe radiator of my car. We had to abandon ourvehicles and fall back. But soon, we counter-attackedwith one Company of No. 1 Battalion, and as ourtroops went into attack, the enemy abandoned theirpositions and ran away. We recovered all ourvehicles.

    The troops undeir my command took up a delen-sive position in Lagyi area. On the morning ot the30th an enemy battalion came to Seiktin area about1500 yards away from my position. This battalionIspent the whole day tiring ineffectively towards usbut did not approach anywhere near us.On the 31st an enemy mechanical rolumn attack-ed and surrounded a Japanese Company in Kaleyo.One Company of my 3rd Battalion under the com-mand of Capt. Bagri attacked and drove away theBritish forces and *managed to bring back Japanese

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    COL. P. K. SAHGAL 99wounded officers and aaen who had been abando ,edby the Japanese.On the evening of the 2nd April an enemy forceabout 2000 strong, supported by tanks and artilleryapproached my detences from two directions, butwhen our troops opened fire the enemy withdrewback.

    Earlier in the day thirteen enemy planes bombedand machine-gunned my defences for about 40 minutesand afterwards enemy artillery kept on firing at usuntil 9 P.M. that night.

    One enemy lorry approaching our position wascaptured.On the 3rd April, one complete British Division,supported by 13 medium tanks, 30 light tanks and 30armoured cars and field and heavy artillery started anattack on our position. Our force consisted of No. 1Battalion and one Company of 3rd Battalion. Ouronly defence against the enemy tanks were oursuicide squads consisting of men volunteered to tieexplosives round their body and crash into enemytanks, thus blowing them up.

    Enemy's first attack against my 4B' echelon in therear was successful and the enemy came in behind mecutting me off from Popa.

    After that the enemy made four determinedefforts to attack and break through from my rightflank and one attack was made to break through inthe left flank, but all these attacks were beaten backwith heavy casualties to the enemy. Throughout theday we were under very heavy artillery fire.

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    100 I. N. A. HEROESIn the evening I collected two platoons and at-

    tacked the enemy Battalion which had got it* behindme, this attack was entirely successful and the enemywas driven back.

    By that night the troops under my command weretired and completely exhausted. So arrangements weremade for one Japanese Battalion to move up and re-lieve my units.

    I reached Popa in the morning of the 4th April.Withdrawal from Popa. Qn * the 5th April

    owing to the general situation in Burma, No. 2 Div.I. N. A. was ordered to move to Magwe and NatraukTandangwyi areas. My regiment was to move toTandangwyi and Natmuk areas and the Div. H. Q.and No. 4 Grla. regiment were to move to Magwearea,

    The withdrawal commenced on the 9th April,Units of No. 4 Grla. regiment were the first to with-draw. On the morning of the llth, the British forcesoccupied Kyank Padaung and our direct line of with-drawal was cut off. Therefore it was decided that theDivision Headquarters, remainder of No. 4 Grla.regiment and No. 2 Inf. Regt. would attempt a breakthrough along the jungle route that very night. Inthe evening the enemy attacked and surrounded oneof my Companies which was on outpost duty and allefforts to relieve them were unsuccessful. Later on Iwas informed by a British Intelligence officer that theattacking British Force sent a note to me of ,theHavildars commanding a platoon to surrender. The

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    COL. P. K, SAHGAL 101platoon Havildar of the I. N. A. wrote on the back ofthe note that had been sent to him, * 4 Mr. I do notcome," and his platoon died fighting to the last man.

    The withdrawal was carried out on the night ofthe llth and although the units were ambushed on theway, they managed to assemble in the , KyankPudaung Meiktila road by the morning ot the 12th.On the afternoon of the 12th I receiv >d a notefrom the Commander of my special service Company,whom I had sent on ahead, informing me that a verystrong Mechanical British Column had already movedfrom Meiktila towards Natmuk. I placed the inform-ation before the Divisional Commander and we bothagreed that my regiment should move along thebullock cart tracks and if we found Natmuk underenemy occupation, we were to head further soutri.

    On the night of the 12th I separated from theDivisional Commander, who headed for Magweand I went towards Natmuk.

    On the 17th April I divided my force into twocolumns, one column under Capt. Bagri went on aheadand the second column was under my personalcommand.

    On the 13th morning I arrived in the vicinity ofthe Natmuk Magwe. road. I had already receivedinformation that Natmuk was in enemy hands andthat an enemy column was moving towards Magwe.I decided to break through the enemy positions thatnight. Both the columns managed to do so quitesafely. After another 3 nights' march we approached

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    102 I. N. A. HEROESTaundangwyi Magwe road, and found die enemy inpossession there also and once again we broke throughhis positions. Now I ordered the regiment to headfor AUanmys.

    Capt. Bagri after breaking through the enemyposition for the second time moved one day's marchahead of my column. At Yamatha Captain Bagri'scolumn came into contact with an enemy mechanicalcolumn supported by tanks and armoured cars.Captain Bagri destroyed two tanks and two lorries*and inflicted about 50 casualties on the enemy. Capt.Bagri himself made the supreme sacrifice in this battleand on his death Lt. Sher Singh took over commandof his column. After the incident at Yamatha thecolumn under Lt. Sher Singh got on the main roadand withdrew back to Prume, where it came underthe command of Lt. Col. B. S. Nagi, my second incommand, who had been sent there with the advanceparty.

    The other column undey my command was unableto get on the main road, but proceeded along thetrack following the Irrawadi river. I got informationthat one enemy Brigade was following behind me andthat another mechanical column, i.e., 20th BritishIndian Division, was moving along the main roadtowards Allanmys. My column reached the vicinityof Allanmys on the 27th and the same day Units ofthe 20th British Division occupied Allanmys, Realis-ing that it was not possible to get through that wayI fell back about 10 miles to Magyigaon.

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    COL. P. K. SAHGAL 103On the 28th at Magyigaoti I called a coafefence of

    all the officers under my command and acquaintedthen; with the whole situation. I told them that therewere three courses open to us :

    (a) Break through enemy line and make our wayto Pegu Yomas.

    (b) Turn into civilians.(c) Surrender to the British.I explained to them that I t for myself, had decided

    on tha first course and I would, with those who wishedto follow the same course, attempt a break throughthat night but I would not stand in the way of any onewho wished to follow any of the alternative courses.I orderded them to explain everything to the menunder their command and intorm me regarding theirdecision. Eventually two hundred officers and menvolunteered to follow me and about three dundredsaid that they wished to surrender and about 50 wishedto turn civilians and those people were allowed to goaway immediately.

    I made all arrangements to break through thatnight and issued instructions for the others under Maj.Chatterjee's command of the hospital to surrender tothe British Forces the next day.

    In the atternoon I was attacked by a Gurkhacolumn which had been following us. Now it becameimpossible to break through and as the majority of theofficers and men wished to surrender thereforeI wrote a letter to the Allied Commander offeringthe surrender of the Officers and men updgr my

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    104 1. N. A. HEROEScommand as prisoners of war. I sent this letterthrough Capt. Santa Singh,

    who also carried a flagof Truce.

    The officers and men who were with me hadmarched over three hundred miles of desert in enemyoccupied areas. The only food available was what wecould carry on ourselves and we had been constantlymenaced by enemy aeroplanes. On four occasionswe had broken through the enemy lines and by nowwe were completely exhausted,

    The British Commander accepted our surrenderand we laid down our arms to the 4/2nd Gurkha Rifles.If the British Commander had not accepted oursurrender as Prisoners of War, the officers and menunder my command were determined to fight on till theend.

    Captivity. On the evening of the 28th Lt. Col.Kiterh ordeted the officers to be separated from themen and when I spoke to him about this, he pointedout that this was the usual procedure with the Prisonersof War. Otl my giving an assurance to him that if heallowed my officers to stay with their men for thatnight only, I would hold myself responsible for theconduct of the officers to rejoin the men.

    That night the guerillas were attacked by theJapanese but there was no incident among my men,althoughtour surrendered arms and ammunition werestacked quite near us.

    Oft the morning of the 29th I was first taken toH. Q. 32nd Brigade and later H. Q. 20th Div. Two

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    (2)REASONS FOR JOINING THE I. N. A.

    Background.My father had taken an active part in the 1920-

    21 non-co-operation movement and from him I in-herited an intense dislike lor the alien rule. Addedto this my own study ot History and Political Sciencetaught me that complete freedom was the birth-rightcf every human being and it was the sacred duty ofevery Indian to tight for the liberation of his mother-land. In 1930, I got the first opportunity to partici-pate in the non-violent struggle for Indian Independ-ence. I was far too young and immature to under-stand the real significance of non-violence. I wasonly carried away by the urge to do something vitalfor ray motherland and I followed the creed becauseit had been decreed by the Indian leaders. I did notfully understand the views expressed by various Indianleaders, but I felt certain that if we all did our bit,,victory shall certainly be ours. When we failed toachieve our coveted goal, I felt disillusioned. To meit seemed futile that my countrymen and womenshould have to make such terrible sacrifices and en-dure such sufferings, fighting against an Imperialistpower, which was determined to keep India in herbondage. I felt that the only language the British

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    COL. P. K. SAHGAL - 107would ever understand was violence. The terroristmovement in India appeared to me to be too weak,and unco-ordinated to achieve anything vital. I didnot know what to do and felt at a loose end and even-tually decided to wait and allow coming events todecide my future action.

    My father had intended me to follow in his pro-fession of law and I was attracted by it. About 1932the Government of India issued their scheme for theIndianisation of the Army. It was a new and attrac-tive opening for the young men of India and I made upmy mind to try my hand at soldiering. My planswere quite naturally opposed by my family, but Istuck to my decision. My father consoled himselfby thinking that, owing to my bad record with thepolice, I would never be accepted in the Army. How-ever I was successful in the open competition exami-nation and went to the Indian Military Academy m1936. Although I had often dreamed of a militaryrebellion in India, but when I joined the army, I hadno set plan, my only ambition was to become a success-ful soldier.

    Atter being commissioned, I did a year's attach-ment with two British Units and I grew to like theaverage type of Englishman. I made many friendsand I found that I could get on well with mostEnglishmen. A vast majority of my English friendswere very ignorant about conditions in India but theywere quite willing to learn. I did not consider myselttoo well informed on the subject, but whatever little I

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    108 I. N. A. HEROESknew, I told my friends and found them sympathetic.Once an average Englishman was convinced thatthe Hindus and Muslims would not fly at each other'sthroat, as soon as the British had turned the: - backson India. He was-prepared .to admit that it was sinfulfor the British to stay in India*

    After finishing my attachment with the BritishUnits I joined the 5th Bn. of the Baluch Regt.Majority of the officers :in the Bn. were Indian andpolitically conscious. There was hardly anyone amongthe officers, who wished for the continuance of theBritish rule.

    End of 1940 I was transferred to the 2nd Bn. ofthe Baluch Regt., which was not an Indianised Bn.There was a very good set of British officers in thisBn. and I made a number of friends. The "C. O."was specially kind to me and always listened to my-advice and it was seldom that he rejected any ofmy requests. But I met a number of other Indianofficers who were not quite so fortunate as I was. Theywere badly treated by their commanding officer and'brother English officers.

    Malaya.I arrived in Malaya at the end of 1940 and was

    horrified to learn the contempt and hatred showntowards the Indians who had settled down there.The following three reasons were mainly responsibleior this :

    (a) The British had always used Indian soldiersand policemen.

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    COL P. K. SAHGAL 109*(b) The Indian money-lenders in Malaya were

    reputed to be worse than Jews.(c) The Indian workmen in Malaya accepted

    lesser wages than the workmen of otherraces.

    I also found that colour distinction in Malayawas much worse than in India. Asiaticswere not admitted into clubs and hotels and an' Asiatic was not permitted to travel in the samerailway compartment as a European. There werecertain Europeans who started a press campaign inthe Singapore press advocating that Asiatics shouldnot even be permitted to travel in the same busesand trams as the Europeans.

    End of December 1942, my Bn. moved to Kotaba-lim in Kelantem State. On arrival there I found thatthe local population was absolutely terrified of theIndian soldiers. I soon discovered the reasons for itAt the end of ^the First World War, there was anuprising in Kota Bharm and the British sent a com-pany of Punjabi troops to quell the rebellion. ThesePunjabi troops were very brutal in their dealingstowards the local Malays. The following incidentwill clearly show, how much the Kotablan peoplehated the Indian soldiers

    I became very friendly with the Deputy PrimeMinister Dato Steim of Kelantam State, One day Iwas sitting with him, when his litde son came run-ning and started talking to his father in an excitedmanner. I asked the Dato what the matter was and

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    110 I. N. A. HEROESlie explained to me that his son was very angry tosee him talking to me, a Punjabi (Kota Bham Malayscalled every Indian soldier a Punjabi) because, accord-ing to the little boy, all Punjabies were wicked andthe enemies of the Malays.

    I and a number of other officers did our bestto bring about a better relationship between oursoldiers and the Malays, I was very lucky in havinga number of very good friends among high Malayofficials who were of . great help and by the time thewar started, the relations between our soldiers and theMalays had become really cordial. The Malays are.a charming people but they do not care a greatdeal about their political future. However, I found-that the educated Malays resented the inferior socialstatus that was accorded to all Asiatics in Malaya,by the British.

    In June 1941, we heard the news of the firing inthe Indian labourers and the British action was natur-ally resented by all Indians. I often discussed theBritish Imperialistic ways with the other Britishofficers in my regiment and expressed my opinionthat the British preached one thing and practisedanother.

    Witness. Lt. Col. P. W. Davis The Baluch"Regiment.

    The Malayan Campaign.By the end of November 1941, it became obviousthat war with Japan was imminent. I had read about

    :tbe Russo-Japanese war and admired the Japanese

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    COL.> P. K. SAHGAL 111for the courageous manner in which they had foughtand defeated the Russians. The remarkable progressthat the Japanese had made in a short time and theway that the Japanese had risen to be a first classpower, in spite of the opposition of all the great powersof the world, was in my opinion a wonderful achieve-ment and worthy of praise. But I hated them fortheir aggression against China and the cruel atrocitiesthat they had committed in .China, Manchuria andKorea.

    The British propaganda about their war aimshad also impressed me and I felt that their democra-tic and ^iberal form of government was far to bepreferred to the Fascism of the Axis. In any case Ifelt that if the British won the war they would becompelled to meet Indian's demand for freedom and ifthey were defeated, we would achieve our objectthrough a negotiated pact.

    Therefore, when the war started, I fought loyallyand to the best of my ability. The company which Icommanded, distinguished itself in battle on more thanone occasion and whenever there was a difficultmission to be carried out, I was invariably single4 outfor it. I had the full confidence of my C.O. and theBrigade Comdr. both of whom often commended thework done by my company.

    During the campaign, I felt very much disappointedin the British leadership. The British strategy had beena complete failure and the top leaders stood discredit-ed. The behaviour of many British officers ^a far

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    112 L N. A. HEROESfrom correct, instead of leading their men, they seemto be more concerned with thjir own personcomfort and safety. The callous manner in which t.interests of the Asiatic people of Malaya were dregarded hurt me terribly. We had not only let dovthe people whom we were supposed to protect b'they were also subjected to many insults and hardshrand often exposed to great danger because of the isolent and callous behaviour of the British office!Many Asiatics, including a number of Indians, weishot without any trial, on the suspicion of being eneiragents.

    The fall of Singapore finally convinced me of tfcdegeneration of the British people and I thought thethe last days of the British Empire had come.

    February to September 1942.After the surrender of Singapore, I felt terribl

    let down by the British, who had handed us over to tbJapanese and told us to obey their orders the sanaway as we had been obeying the orders of the BritislI felt that if a British general could be forced to agreto such a handing over, the British nation must havsuch a pretty low level.

    I also felt that the British were not in a position tcheck a Japanese invasion of India. Little attentiohad been paid to the preparation of the defence iIndia's North Eastern frontiers and the best India:troops had been sent out on service overseas. Th>British officers and men during the Malayan Gampaigrhad shown a marked disinclination to fight for

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    COL. P. K. SAHGAL 113preservation of the overseas possessions of the BritishCrown.

    In spite of my disillusionment with the British.I was far too distrustful of the Japanese and their inten-tions. I was horrified by the atrocities committedby the Japanese, and their economic exploitation ofMalaya clearly showed the hollowness of their bom-bastic claims about the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and their war for the liberationof the Asiatic people.

    I was in sympathy with Capt. Mohan Singh's causebut I did not think that we could do any good toIndia hy allying ourselves with the Japanese. Thatis why, I did not accept che Bidadari resolution andrefused to attend the Bangkok conference.The Bangkok Conference.

    In July the delegates from the Bangkok con*ference returned to Singapore. This conference wasthe first concrete step that had been taken in theIndian Independence movement. The internationalcharacter of the Bangkok conference and the exhibitionof the spontaneous desire of the Indians in the FarEast