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SIL verificatievoorbeeld:

Afsluiter / HIPPS

Herman JansenSafety Solutions Consultants

6 november 2008

Locatie HIPPS

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High Integrity Pressure Protection System

Doel Beschermen trunk line tegen overdrukSIL eis SIL 3Dynamiek 18” afsluiters sluiten binnen 2 seconden

Loop sketch

Logic Solver Yokogawa

ProSafe-SLS

Hydraulic oil

Closure of P luto F lowline B valves

Transmitters Yokogawa EJX

Hydraulic oilsupply

S ol. valves Maxseal ICO4S

Hydraulic oil supply

P ilot valves LODC-XDN S UN

Astava Manifold

Dry ManifoldF low reg

18” Class 1500Mokveld R ZD-X-S AV

valves

P luto F lowline A

P luto F lowline B

Dry Manifold

P ipe spec break

F low reg. valve

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Pressure impulse lines

Blockage or plug may lead to loss of function of the connected pressure measurementconnected pressure measurement.

Dangerous undetected failure rate: 2,5·10-7/hour (Exidascenario ‘plugging unlikely’).* 2 out of 3 architecture (2oo3).* Common Cause factor: 30%* The assumed DC 90%* Yearly proof tests. Proof test coverage factor is 95%.

The calculated PFD = 8.9·10-5

Pressure impulse lines

Info van Exida

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ASTAVA interlocking manifold

Certified for SIL 4 SFF=100%PFDavg= 4.3·10-5

Yokogawa pressure transmitters, Type: EJX530A

Certified by TÜViT and Exidad d f il /hDangerous undetected failure rate: 3.4·10-8/hour

* 2 out of 3 architecture (2oo3).* Common Cause BETA factor: 5%* The assumed DC 90%* Yearly proof tests. Proof test coverage factor is 95%* SFF=93% type B.

The calculated PFD = 6.2·10-5

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Yokogawa Logic Solver ProSafe-SLS

SIL 4 certified

PFD = 1.2 ·10-5 test period: 1 year.

Solenoid valves, type Maxseal ICO4S

CertifiedLambda-DU: 1.4·10-7 / h.1 out of 4 architecture (1oo4).BETA factor: 5%The assumed DC 90%Yearly proof tests.Proof test coverage: 95%SFF>90% type A.Cal. lambda-DU 1oo2: 8·10-9 / h

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Solenoid valves, type Maxseal ICO4S

No vendor information Dangerous undetected failure rate of a single pilot valve is

Pilot valves, type SUN Hydraulic, LODC-XDN

Dangerous undetected failure rate of a single pilot valve is 0.9·10-6 / hour. SFF: 72% Type A (SINTEF)* 1 out of 4 architecture (1oo4).* Common Cause BETA factor: 5%* The assumed DC 90%* Yearly proof tests. Proof test coverage factor is 95%* SFF>90% type A.yp* Dangerous failure rate of the 1oo2 is 5.3·10-8 / hour

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Pilot valves, type SUN Hydraulic, LODC-XDN

Info van Exida

f l iAfsluiter RZD-X-SAVTÜV gecertificeerd:

‘Suitable for safety related applications up to and including SIL 3’.

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TÜV report afsluiter

TÜV report afsluiter

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TÜV report afsluiter

Clean duty

TÜV report afsluiter

Unclean duty

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Failure rate for application

Failure rates acc. to the TÜV report (unclean duty):p yFull stroke failure 8.62·10-8/hLeakage 1.18·10-6/hSFF= 80%.Assumed dangerous failure rate for the flow lines (20% probability that leakage will really lead to LOC):F ll k f il 8 62 10 8/hFull stroke failure 8.62·10-8/hLeakage 20% of 1.18·10-6/h= 2.36·10-7/h +

Totally 3.22 ·10-7/h

PFD afsluiters

The dangerous failure rate of a valve+ 2 Sun pilot valves +2 Maxseal solenoid valves is:2 Maxseal solenoid valves is:3.22 ·10-7/h + 0.08·10-7/h + 0.53 ·10-7/h = 3.83 ·10-7/h.

The PFD 2 valves & 2 flow lines = 2 · 1.27·10-4 = 2.54·10-4.

The calculation is based on yearly proof test, Proof test coveragefactor of 95%, overhaul each 10 years and common cause, yBETA factor of 5%.

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HIPPS SIL 3 verificatie

Functional requirement

The pressure of the downstream piping/equipment will not exceed the design pressure (closure < 2 seconds).

HIPPS SIL 3 verificatie

Independent layer of protectionp y p

The HIPPS is physically and functionally separated from other protective / control systems apart from the monitoring and status signals.

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HIPPS SIL 3 verificatie

Architectural requirementsHWFT SFF t SILHWFT SFF type max SIL

Sensing part:Impulse lines 1 > 60% A 3Astava I. Man. Certified 4Transmitters 1 93% B 3Logic Solver Certified 4Final Elements:Final Elements:Shut off valves 1 80% A 3Solenoid valves 3 >90% A 4Pilot valves 3 72% A 4

HIPPS 3

HIPPS SIL 3 verificatie

Probabilistic requirementsS i t PFD SILSensing part: PFD SILImpulse lines 8.9 · 10-5Astava interlock. Man. 4.3 · 10-5Transmitters 6.2 · 10-5Logic Solver 1.2 · 10-5Final Elements: 2.54·10-4Shut off valvesShut off valvesSolenoid valvesPilot valves

HIPPS 4.6 · 10-4 3

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Conclusie

HIPPS voldoet aan de eisen van SIL 3

Jaarlijks testen10-jaarlijks uitnemen van afsluiters voor interne inspectie / reparatie.

Safety Solutions Consultants BV

Laan van Westenenk 5017334 DT ApeldoornThe NetherlandsTel +31 55 549 3362E il j @ f tE-mail jansen@safety-sc.comWebsite www.safety-sc.com