Chapter 1: Geschiedenis

InleidingEuropean Community = ECSC + Euratom + EEC ( EC na Maastricht)

Verdrag van Lissabon = TEU + TFEU

Integratie theorien

Centraal: Rol van staat in Europese integratieproces

A. Functionalisme (Monnet)

Gedachte: Integratie in economische sectoren die technocratisch bestuurd zouden worden door overdracht aan supranationale instellingen

Functionele noodzaak doet disputen tussen staten verdwijnen en voorkomt oorlog zo positief (door samenwerking)

B. Neo Functionalisme (Monnet)

Gedachte: Integratie start in een niet controversile / technische sector Spillover naar sectors met groter politiek belang door functionele noodzaak

C. Intergouvernementalisme

Gedachte: Staten zijn het belangrijkste. Werd vooral duidelijk in jaren 70 toen gemeenschapsinstellingen (community instituties) aan waarde verloren

D. Liberaal intergouvernementalisme

Keuzes in voordeel EU = Nationale (supranationale) voorkeuren

E. Federalisme = United states of Europe

F. Multilevel of network governance = Wijdere invulling begrip institutie, invloed ideen en principes benadrukt

Geschiedenis EU integratie

Europa na WO II

Economisch, sociaal en politiek herstel is nodig, hetgeen leidt tot de gedacht van stimulatie van vrede en economische groei door grotere verbondenheid

Gedachten van Federalisme leiden tot creatie intergouvernementele (want politeke wil ontbrak) Council of Europe (1949) ECHR / EVRM

Markt liberalisatie, GATT & Marshal plan leiden tot creatie OEEC in 1947 ( OECD in 1960)

Verdrag van Brussel, WEU & NATO zijn voorbeelden van samenwerking op defensieniveau

Strategie: Eerst economische integratie, erna (eventuele) politieke integratie (*) Doelen bereikt!

Europese Gemeenschap voor Kolen en Staal

1950: Schuman plan tot het poolen van de soevereiniteit inzake K&S

Oorlog tussen Frankrijk en Duitsland zou zo materieel onmogelijk worden Eerste stap (*)

1951: Verdrag van Parijs tot oprichting ECSC Tot 2002

1952: Oprichting ECSC (DU, Benelux, IT, FRA GB niet genteresseerd in supranat. Institutions: High Authority, Assembly (Meerderheidstemming), Council (vaak spanningen met HA) and Court of Justice

Europese Defensie/politieke Gemeenschap

1950: Pleven Plan Creatie Europese Defensie Gemeenschap ( en dus Europees leger)

Gefaald omdat high politics

Quid gemeenschappelijk buitenlands beleid? Oprichting Europese Politieke gemeenschap (1953)

1952: Ondertekening EDC verdrag Geen ratificatie (Fra) EPC ook teniet Oprichting WEU + Duitsland in NATO

EEC & Euratom (Verdragen van Rome 57) Op basis Spaak rapport (opgericht in Mesina)

A. EEC

Instellingen: Commission, Raad van Ministers EPV (advies + overzicht) + ECJ gedeeld met ECSC

Merger treaty (1967) = Council + Comm drie gemeenschappen samen

Minder wetgevende macht Commissie (i.v.m ECSC) Maar initiatiefrecht + Bewaker verdragen + Onderhandelingsbevoegdheid internationale overeenkomsten

Doel 1: Common market Hoe bereiken? Four freedoms, Harmonization, (afschaffen trade bariers, gemeens. douane tarief..), common commercial policy, competetition policy

Policy 2: Common Agricultural, sociaal and transpart policy

B. Euratom = Minder succesvol

Doelstellingen

Promoten research en investment + Uniforme veiligheidsstandaards

Gemeenschappelijke markt in gespecialiseerd materiaal

Luxemburg akkoorden n-f (hallstein) versus ig (de gaulle/fouchet plan)

Jun 1965 Jan 66: Empty chair crisis Franse boycot tijdens vergadergingen van de Council (unanimiteitsbeslissingen) Protest tegen voorstellen (*):

Voorziening in Verdrag van Rome om van unanimiteit naar QMV te gaan

Voorstellen Commissie: eigen financiering CAP + Budgettaire bevoegdheid EP

1966: Luxemburg akkoorden (IG)

Voorstellen Commissie (*) afgekeurd

Geen QMV in Raad Veto ( = eigenlijk blijven praten tot consensus werd bereikt) indien vitale nationale belangen op spel staan

Toch Supranationaal = Een stem in GATT onderhandelingen

1969: Den Haag (NF) Akkoord over eigen funding

1973: European Political Council (IG op basis Davignon rapport) + comitology (oversees delegated acts) = Meer fetelijke macht MS

1974: European Council (IG) geformaliseerd Pas rechtsgrond in SEA

1976: Direct Elections EP (NF) overeengekomen

Jaren 70: ECJ Direct effect, supremacy, broad interpretation of 308 EC

Single European Act

Jaren 60 70: Malaise en vertraging van het bereiken van verdragsobjectieven Nood aan institutionele hervormingen

1985: Delors Commission Voltooiing interne markt (vrijmaken van handelsbelemmeringen + vier vrijheden) Zou integratie stimuleren

Op basis Genscher Colombo Dooge Raport (na Fontainebleu) EC Milaan (85) White paper van Cockfeld IGC (op basis QMV) = Politieke verbintenis tot afschaffing van belemmeringen in white paper tegen 1992

1987: Inwerkingtreding SEA

Institutionele veranderingen:

QMV voor single market (Council) + Uitbreiding EC bevoegdheden

Uitbreiding wetgevende macht EP instellen cooperation procedure + veto over accession of new states

Rechtsgrond EPS + Formal recognition European Council

Rechtsgrond Comitology procedure = 202 EC

Creatie court of first instance

Maastricht: TEU ( twee igc op basis delors report voor emu en epu)

1992: Ondertekening TEU (in werking in 1993) Op basis van IGCs

Economisch en sociale voorruitgang gewenst in een Europa zonder binnengrenzen, met versterkte sociale en economische cohesie en een EMU met gemeenschappelijke munt

EEC wordt EC

Drie pijler structuur: EC/Euratom/ECSC, CFSP + JHA overkoepeld door European Union

S-N in eerste pijler, overige twee IG (samenwerking gewenst, maar niet op comm method) J&HA vooral bepaald door Council (rol ECJ beperkt)

Geen rechtspersoonlijkheid voor Unie

Uitbreiding bevoegdheden EC = onderwijs en opleiding, milieu, gezondheid en industrie

Institutionele hervormingen = Medebeslissingsprocedure (meer macht EP), principe van subsidiariteit & comit der regios en lokale autoriteiten

Subsidiarity. (Art 5 EC)

Further areas of competence (European Citizenship/social policy + introduction EMU)

Introductie Co decision procedure (EP) 251 EC

Uitbreiding Co operation procedure (EP)

1995: Uitbreiding (EC Corfu) = FI, AUS, SW (+ NO Negatief referendum)

Amsterdam (1997) Santer In werking in 1999

Legitimiteit EU = Trachten tot versterking

Art 6 TEU = Respect voor HR, democratie en rule of law Fundamentele eigenschappen unie = voorwaarden voor lidmaatschap

Macht EP = Uitbreiding co-decisieprocedure (afschaffen co-operation behalve in EMU)

Protocol over subs. en prop.

Freedom, security and justice = Immigratie, asiel + schengen (Part JHA) now in first pillar (community method)

Police and Judicial cooperation in criminal matters Vervangt JHA als derde pillar ECJ had jurisdictie over verschillende aangelegenheden (eroderen 1ste en 3de pillar)

CFSP = Council mag internationale overeenkomsten aangaan (Art 24 EU) + high representative in council Weinig verdere verandering

Flexibele integratie = Artikel 43 TEU

Nice

Uitbreiding (noodzaak voor institutionele hervormingen) + legitimiteit niet fatsoenlijk aangepakt door Amsterdam Europese Raad van Nice (2000)

Ook simplificatie van treaty structure, transparantie, accountability en bevoegdheidsverdeling behandeld

QMV = Uitbreiding naar ongeveer 30 beleidsdomeinen

Council kan president Commissie aanduiden met QMV Deze kan ontslag van Commissaris vorderen ( = versterkte bevoegdheid)

Weging van stemmen = Triple majority

MEP = Uitbreiding naar 732

Charter of FdR = Convention (opgesteld op Cologne EC 99) bestaande uit EP, Commissie, nationale regeringen + parlementen

Belangrijk voor legitimiteit

Laeken

Constitutioneel verdrag (NF) Turbulente ontstaansgeschiedenis

2001: Europese Raad van laken Declaration on the future of Europe

2004: Convention on the future of Europe

Vertegenwoordigers nationale parlementen + EP en Commissie Destaing

Voorstellen: En rechtspersoonlijkheid, Charter in Verdrag, Alle bestaande verdragen in n, principe van Primauteit, nieuwe legale instrumenten (Eur. Law),

Juni 2004: Verdrag tot vaststelling van een grondwet voor Europa

Frankrijk (55% tegen) + Nederland (62%) verwerpen grondwet in referenda

2005: Periode van reflectie Grondwettelijk verdrag aanpassen Declaration of Berlin (min met max in overeenstemming brengen) Vormde basis voor Reform treaty (= Verdrag van Lissabon)

Verdrag Lissabon

Belangrijkste bepalingen van het Verdrag van Lissabon ( = reform treaty) In werking 2009 Aanvankelijk negatief referendum in Ierland

1. Afschaffen driepijlerstructuur = slechts een rechtspersoonlijkheid

CFSP bleef toch nog ver verwijderd van Unie.. Eigenlijk aparte pijler

2. Revisie TEU en TEC ( TFEU)

3. Het Handvest van de Grondrechten werd bindend Artikel 6 (1) TEU

4. Een permanente Voorzitter van de Europese Raad

5. Een Hoge Vertegenwoordiger van de Unie voor Buitenlandse Zaken en Veiligheidsbeleid.

6. Grote Commissie (2/3 lidstaten Commissaris Later toch elk een) en Parlement (750) werden gereduceerd.

Toekomstprobleem

7. De QMV werd uitgebreid tot nieuwe beleidsdomeinen en een nieuwe dubbele meerderheid werd overeengekomen voor 2014. (55% nationale regeringen + 65% populatie)

8. De macht EP werd uitgebreid

Toekomstprobleem = Seat in Straasbourg + gemeenschappelijke verkiezingsregels

9. Rol nationale parlementen werd uitgebreid: deze zouden met 1/3de meerderheid aan de Commissie kunnen verzoeken een voorstel te wijzigen. En ook noodprocedure voor nationale soevereiniteit in aantal beleidsgebieden

Uitbreidingen

Tijdlijn

2004 = CZ, EST, CY, LAV, LITH, HUN, MAL, PL, SLOVE + SLOVA

2007 = BUL + ROM

2013 = CROA

1973 = DE, IR + GB (veto DG in 1963)

1981 = GR

1986 = SP + PO

1995 = AU, FI + SW

Aspecten uitbreiding

1960 = EFTA

1985 = Greenland weg

1991 = European Economic Area Middenweg tussen EC en EFTA (free movement, competition policy)

Voorwaarden uitbreiding

Artikel 49 TEU Wel enkel EU staten

Kopenhagen criteria: Stabiele instituties, functionele markt, aan eisen lidmaatschap voldoen, EU legislatief omzetten in Nationale voordat datum werd bepaald, democratie

Verzoek bij Raad Unanimiteit na consulting the Commission and receving consent of EP

withdrawel EU

Artikel 50 TEU Wel praktische problemen door grote verbondenheid

Chapter 2: Instellingen (13 TEU)

European Commission

Algemeen

Samenstelling = Art 17 (4+5) TEU

Nuance: Momenteel nog altijd een commissaris / Lidstaat

President = Art 17 (6) TEU (EC proposes EP votes)

Zie ook artikel 14 (1) TEU Kandidaat moet dus steun hebben dominante groepering in EP

Speelt belangrijke rol in de algemene commissie politiek door onderhandelingen met Council

Appointment = Art 17 (7) TEU

President kiezen: EC stelt voor (met inachtneming verkiezingen EP) EP elects

College van Commissarissen: MS doen suggesties EC + President Comm List EP votes on Comm as body (!) EC appoints (Dit is Lissabon systeem C.o.F.EU)

End of Mandate Commissaris

Voluntary/death = Art 246 TFEU

Door President Comm = Art 17 (6) TEU + 248 TFEU ( = herverdeling portfolios )

Compulsory retirement = Art 245 / 247 TFEU (= CJEU op verzoek!)

Deprivation of right to pension or other: Art 245 TFEU Commission v. Cresson

Independence Commissarissen

Geen instructies van MS = Independence beyond doubt

Geen acties onverenigbaar met hun functies Santer Commissie, Edith Cresson

Bureaucratie + beslissingsvorming

Vier lagen = College van Commissarissen Cabinets (chefs) DG = directoraten (directors) & divisions/units (head)

Vier manieren van besluitvorming = Zie Rules of Procedureof the Commission

Oral procedure = Formal discussion of the College voor belangrijke zaken Indien voorheen reeds overeenkomst in kabinet = geen formal discussion

Written procedure = proposal door bevoegde Comm. Goedkeuring door DG en legal service vereist Indien geen tegenstand cabinetten van andere Commissarissen Goedkeuring als Commissie beslissing

Empowerment = Comm. draagt beslissingsbevoegdheid over aan indiv Commissaris (collectieve aansprakelijkheid blijft)

Delegatie = Enkel aan directors generals & heads of service

Functies = Art 17 TEU

Legislative power

Initiatiefrecht = Monopolie ( enkel legislatieve acten op voorstel Comm. Goedkeuring EP / EC nodig)

Uitzonderingen: Art 225 TFEU (voorstel EP) + citizen initative (OG2)

Gedelegeerde bevoegdheid = Art 290 TFEU

Agenda setting = Legislatief plan/jaar bepalen

Supervisory power = Guardian of the treaties

Kan legal proceedings instellen Tegen bedrijven ( = initial judge, reviewable voor CJEU) & Lidstaten ( = Art 258 TFEU)

Speelt belangrijke rol in de algemene commissie politiek door onderhandelingen met Council

Executive power = Budget & External representation Union N. Nugent (uitz CFSP)

High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

Nieuwe functie = Combinatie External relations Commissioner + High respresentative for CFSP

Benoeming: EC (QMV) met goedkeuring van President Comm.

Niet in Artikel 13 TEU = Geen EU instelling

Functies = Voorzitterschap foreign affairs council, vice president of the Commission, external representation in CFSP

EEAS = Opgericht in Lissabon verdrag tot ondersteuning High representative

Council (of the EU)

Zetel: Brussel (1x month / April June October in Luxemburg)

Algemeen

Samenstelling = Art 16 (6) TEU + 237 TFEU

Samenstelling naar gelang van de agenda Nationale ministers = 28 leden per materie dus

Niet noodzakelijk federale minister Deelstaten en Secretaries of state (op basis van gewoonte) kunnen ook zetelen

Council configurations = Art 236 TFEU + Art 4 protocol 36

Geen hirarchie Maar General affairs council verantwoordelijk voor cordinatie en institutionele en administratieve aangelegenheden

Zie slides voor verschillende samenstellingen

President = Rotatiesysteem tussen lidstaten (6m Troijka = oude, huidige en toekomstige werken samen)

Meetings of council worden voorgezeten door minister die voorzitterschap houdt (Italie nu)

Uitzondering: Foreign affairs Council door High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) = Werk voorbereiden + procedurele beslissingen (Art 16 TEU + 240 TFEU) Op basis consensus

Samenstelling = Coreper I (Ambassadorial rank) & Coreper II ( permanent representatives)

Agenda = Legislatieve en niet legislatieve punten + Punten A (no discussion in EC nodig) + punten B (discussion)

Functies

Legislative functies

Main legislator = Art 16 (1) TEU

Vooral QMV: Art 16 (3) TEU

Delegatie = Art 290 TFEU

Request Comm = 241 TFEU

Budgetary functions = Art 16 (1) TEU

Cordinering functions = Inter institutionele overeenkomsten met Comm, EP en Council

Policy making functions = Vooral op CFSP (Art 24 TEU)Voting system

1. Simple Majority = 15 MS voorstander

Toepassingsgebied = Procedurele zaken

Voorbeeld = Art 160, 240 (2 + 3), 241 en 247 TFEU

2. Qualified Majority = Art 16 (4) TEU

Tot 31/10/14 = Protocol 36 Kan op verzoek worden toegepast tot 31/03/17

Voorstel Comm: 260 stemmen + Meerderheid MS + 62% bevolking

Geen voorstel: 260 stemmen + 2/3de MS + 62% bevolking

260 in totaal want toetreden Malta (7 stemmen)

Vanaf 01/11/14 = Art 238 TFEU

Voorstel Comm: 55% MS + minstens 15 MS + 65% bevolking

Geen voorstel: 72% MS + 65% bevolking

Blocking minority = 91 in oud systeem + At least 4 MS (nieuw systeem: anders QMV bereikt)

Speciaal regime = Indien niet alle MS stemmen (niet afwezig) 238 (3) TFEU

3. Unanimity = Toetreding, CFSP, Citizenship (rechten), Harmonisatie indirect taxation, EU finances, Harmonisatie Social security and social protection.

European Parliament

Historie

Onstaan = Na merger of assemblies in 1985

European Parliamentary assembly EP (vanaf 1962)

Heeft meeste macht verworven (van consultatieve rol naar co-legislator) door legitimiteit

Change in number Meps = sensitive topic (gradually increased)

Algemeen

Direct verkozen = Als enige EU instelling

Aanvankelijk: National MeP = European Meps (double mandate)

Direct elections: Sinds 1979

Kritiek: No EU procedure LT voorziet in mogelijkheid (Art 223 (1) TFEU)

Stemrechten: Art 20 TFEU

Turnout: Zeer slecht! Dalend vanaf aanvang

Samenstelling = 751 leden (min 6 max 96/MS)

Verdeling volgens degressively proportional (grote MS zijn slechter af)

Representatives of the people of MS Representatives of Unions citizens (na Lisabon)

Zetel Parlement = Strasbourg

Non plenary sessions & Parliamentary committees mees in Brussel Verhuizing

Secretariaat in Luxemburg

Zeer duur Verschillende zaken voor CJEU Geen beslissing want politiek thema

Varia

Mandaat voor 5 jaar

President wordt verkozen

Meps volgens politieke partijen, niet nationaliteit: Art 224 TFEU

Bureau of Parliament = President + vice presidenten Budget, administratie,..

Conference of presidents = President + leader politieke partijen

Committes =Belangrijk want onderzoeken voorstellen Commissie

Voting

1. Simple Majority (Art 231 TFEU) = Meerderheid van de stemmen

Toepassingsgebied = Algemene regel (=Altijd tenzij anders bepaald)

2. Absolute Majority = Meerderheid van de component Members

Toepassingsgebied = Art 225 (request Comm) + Art 294 (7) TFEU (second reading)

3. Quarter of component Members = Art 226 TFEU

4. Double Majority = 2/3de van de stemmen + meerderheid Members

Toepassingsgebied = Art 234 (Motion of censure) + Art 354 TFEU (breach of values)

Functions

Legislative functies

Adoption of legal acts = In samenwerking met Council (Art 14 TEU + 289/290 TFEU)

Initiatiefrecht = EP asks Comm. to propose (Art 225 TFEU)

Budgetary functions = Annual budget (met Council) = Art 314 TFEU

Political monitoring

Commissie = Verkiest President (14 TEU) + motion of censure + asking questions to commission (230 TFEU)

Ombudsman = Verkiest ombudsman (228 TFEU) EU courts + nationale instellingen uitgesloten van jurisdictie

Committee of inquiry = Art 226 TFEU

Conclusion of int. agreeements = Art 218 TFEU

Rol van nationale parlementen & burgers

National Parliaments

Comm. draft 8 weken om na te kijken Indien oppossition (due to subsidiarity) Comm. must review it

Citizens petition = Art 227 TFEU

Citizens right of initiative = Art 11/4 TFEU, 24 RFEU

1 miljoen handtekeningen Comm vragen om proposal in te stellenEuropean Council

Algemeen

Ontstaan: Lisbon Treaty (de facto: 1961)

Composition: 15 TEU

Heads of state or government of MS + European council & Commission president

Zetel: Bxl 4/jaar Buitengewone zittingen mogelijk

President = Nieuw in Lisbon Treaty

Tasks: Artikel 15 (5) TEU

Mandate: 2,5 years, renewable once Kan geen nationaal mandaat houden

Elected by European Council (QM)

Functies

General political directions and priorities

NO legislative function ( Council)

Dicision making

1. Consensus = Art15/4 TEU ( Rule tenzij anders bepaald)

2. Simple majority: adoption of rules of procedure (235/3 TFEU)

3. Qualified majority: election of President of European Council (15/5 TEU)

If vote: President and Comm.President do not vote!

Interplay

Proposes candidate for president + appoints Commission (QM) (after the vote of the EP)

Appoints the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (QM, with agreement of President of Comm.)

Can unanimously alter the number of Commissioners

Advies gevende organen

1. The Court of auditors = governed by articles 285- 287 TFEU.

Role: Onderzoekt EU finance + Ensures sound financial management

2. Economic and social committee = Art 300, 301 en 302 TFEU

Sectional/functional interests van drie groepen: WG, WN en anderen

3. Committee of the regions = Art 300 (4), 305 TFEU:

4. Agencies = They facilitate (vergemakkelijken) use of experts outside the normal bureaucratic structure:

Merone principe = Geen delegatie met ruime beslissingsmarge mogelijk

Varia

Council (of the EU) European Council (heads of state) Council of Europe (IG for protection FdR)

Single hat (1 president voor Unie Pres. van Comm) versus separate hats (Pres. Comm + EC)

Court of Justice of the EU (bestaat uit I., II & III.)

Historie + algemeen

1951: Court of Justice of the ECSC

Treaty of Rome (1957): single judicial institution for the 3 communities

1988: Court of First Instance created

2004: Civil Service Tribunal created

2009: Lisbon Treaty Changes:

Name: CoJ EU (before: CoJ EC)

Selection process: Zie hieronder

Possibility to enhance the number of AG (11)

Relatie tussen Courts

Afkortingen

C370/12, Pringle = Cour

C583/11P, Inuit and Others = pourvoi

T-40/04, Bonino v Parliament and Council = tribunal

Opinion 2/93 = opinion pursuant to 218/10 TFEU

I. European Court of justice = Art 4 + 6 TFEU

Samenstelling

Achtentwintig judges = One judge from each MS (mandaat 6 jaar) Art 19 TEU

Judge cabinet composition

Negen advocates general = Six permanent, 3 rotation (mandaat 6 jaar)

Role: opinion (most important cases) Voor uitspraak Invloedrijk op beslissing toch niet bindend

AG cabinet composition

Procedure

Voorwaarden = Art 253 TFEU

Appointment: Two step:

a. MS: different procedures (your MS?)

b. Committee (Art. 255 TFEU) to prevent political nominations

Oath after nomination

Chambers = 251 TFEU

1. Full court (28) (Pringle)

2. Grand chamber (15) (C274/11 and C295/11, Spain & Italy v. Council)

3. Five judges chamber

4. Three judges chamber

Rechtsprocedure = Art 20 Statue Geen beroep, maar Art 42 Statue

Lingustiek system

1. Official Languages of the EU (24)

2. Internal working language of the Court = French (Uitz: Opinies AG)

3. Authentic version of the judgment

4. Language of the procedure

Preliminary rulings procedure language of national court Direct actions language chosen by the party Strict approach hearing Communication with parties

II. General court = Art 19 TEU

Algemeen

Creation as the Court of First Instance (1988) General Court (LT) Own rules of procedure

Ontstaan redenen : Workload of the ECJ + cases with complex facts

Samenstelling = Art 254 TFEU

Achtentwintig judges Veranderingen LT:

At least one judge per Member State = Art. 19 TEU

Geen AG New referendaires (law clerks) added 1 to each chamber (9)

Bevoegdheid = Art 256 TFEU

1. Community trade marks

2. Competition

Cartels

State aid

Mergers

3. CFSP

4. Access to documents

III. Civil service tribunal

Treaty of Nice = Council can create judicial panels

Lisbon Treaty = Specialised courts (257 TFEU)

Function: hear cases in specific areas

Possibility of appeal before the General Court Binnen twee maanden + enkel over question of law

Creation of the Civil Service Tribunal (2004): Council Decision 2004/52/EC EURATOM

Purpose: disputes civil servants from EU institution straff

NOT for other workers National administration for exemple

Samenstelling: 7 judges (mandaat 6 jaar)

Procedure for nomination: different from ECJ and GC (Zie Art. 3 Annex I Statue CJEU)

Open selection procedure: Call for applications committee opinion ( Than Art. 255 TFEU) Appointed by the Council

Own rules of procedure

Chapter 3: Bevoegdheden

Algemeen

Principle of conferral = EU heeft enkel overgedragen bevoegdheden (Art 4 + 5 TEU / Art 2 TFEU)

1. Express competence: expressly provided for in the Treaties

2. Implied competence: the existence of one competence implies the existence of another competence

Limieten op attributed competences

Problematiek van de limieten hierop? Art 5 EC bood onvoldoende bescherming MS (invloed EU courts, interpretaties,..)

LT oplossing Categorien (I,II en III) + subsidiariteit

Bepaald welke institutie kan optreden, welke procedure, voting req. & welk legal instrument

Implied competences = Vb: Germany v. Commission Zeer gelimiteerd enkel indien noodzakelijk om in de practical effects van het artikel te voldoen

Tobacco Advertising case = Limieten op ruime uitlegging van Artikels (Artikel 114 TFEU)

Praktisch = Heeft EU bevoegdheid Welke (zie artikel) Subsidiariteit indien II en III Proport.

I. Exclusieve bevoegdheden ( Proportionaliteit)

Artikel 3 (1) TFEU = MS geen enkele bevoegdheid meer

Conditionele Exclusiviteit = International agreement (Art 3 (2) TFEU) Moet eerst voldoen aan Art 216 TFEU zelfs al is bevoegdheid exclusief

Pre Lissabon = Kramer & Inland waterways EU externe bevoegdheid is exclusief indien MS, door het gebruik van hun bevoegdheden de reeds bestaande regels konden benvloeden of hun toepassingsgebied konden wijzigen

II. Gedeelde bevoegdheden ( Subsidiariteit + prop)

Artikel 4 TFEU = Niet exclusieve lijst, in alle velden die niet I of III zijn

MS verliest bevoegdheid indien en vanaf Unie deze heeft uitgeoefend ( = Pre emption)

Zie Artikel 2 (2) TFEU

Subsidiariteit is van toepassing = Art 5 TFEU

Nuance = Verliest bevoegdheid enkel in de mate (extent) dat de Unie deze heeft uitgeoefend + Indien Unie ophoudt deze uit te oefenen keert ze terug naar MS + Art 4 (3+4) TFEU

III. Supporting, coordinating or supplementary action ( Subsidiariteit + prop.)

Artikel 6 TFEU = Geen exclusieve lijst EU actie houdt geen schorsing van MS actie in + EU kan niet harmoniseren (!) ( = dus geen legal act op basis van 114 TFEU)

Zie Artikel 2 (5) TFEU

Persuasive soft law = Guidlines on best practice, legal incentive measure

Subsidiariteit in praktijk weinig toegepast

Overige bevoegdheden

Economic, employment and social policy = Art 2 (3) / Art 5 TFEU Sommigen in II, andere in III

Legale gevolgen = Normaal bepaald op basis categorie Art 5 TFEU = uitzondering Kijken naar gedetailleerde provisies

CFSP = Art 3 (3) TFEU + Titel V TEU

Intergouvernementalisme: EC + Council

Flexibility Clause = Indien er een EU objectief is, maar geen expliciete bevoegdheid toegewezen

Artikel 352 TFEU ( Vorig 308 EC Voor EU doelen te bereiken)

Comm proposes, EP consents en Council adopts with Unanimity

Unanimiteit Want is eigenlijk impliciete overdracht van bevoegdheid

Subsidiariteit moet altijd gecontroleerd worden

Geen harmonisatie + Geen CFSP

Artikel 114 TFEU ( Vorig 95 EC) = Voor interne markt

Wanneer verschil in nationaal recht zorgt voor een belemmering binnen de interne markt en EU harmonisatie bijdraagt tot verwijdering van obstakels voor de free movement

Is niet gelijk aan unification Meer beslissingsvrijheid bij harmonisatie

Subsidiariteit = Enkel van toepassing in II en III

Pre Lissabon = Artikel 5 EC

Niet in exclusieve bevoegdheid Voor Lissabon geen lijst Brede interpretatie dus

Drie bestandsdelen = Test of comparative efficiency (Art 5 (3) EC) + Inter. Instit. Agreem. + protocol

Post Lissabon = Art 5 TFEU + Protocol 1 & 2

Artikel 2 9 protocol 2

Reasoned opinion van Nationale parlement (binnen 8 weken) enkel op subsidiariteit, niet proportionaliteit

Artikel 263 TFEU = Schending van subsidiarity voor ECJ door MS Nog nooit gebeurd (vb: Zie Germany v EP en Council + Working time directive cases)

Rol nationale parlement = Yellow en Orange card procedures

1. Yellow

a) Each national parliament: two votes 56 votes

b) Reasoned opinion at least 1/3 of all votes (if freedom, security & justice: 1/4)

c) Proposal reviewed = maintain, amend, withdraw (niet noodzakelijk amendenderen)

d) Always reasons givin!!

2. Orange

a) Only proposals intended to be adopted under ordinary legislative procedure

b) At least of votes noodzakelijk

c) Proposal reviewed = maintain (a), amend, withdraw

d) If maintains (a): Commission reasoned opinion EU legislator decides

55% of Council members OR

majority of votes cast in EP

if not compatible: proposal dismissed

Proportionaliteit = Eu mag niet te ver gaan bij het uitoefenen van haar bevoegdheden Vb = Data retention directive (doel terrorrisme) Iedereen zijn data werd opgeslagen = niet proportioneel

Chapter 4: Bronnen van EU recht

Algemeen ( In combinatie met hoofdstuk 5 leren)

Drie level sources

1. Primary sources (e.g. Treaties)

2. Secondary sources (e.g. regulations)

3. Tertiary sources (e.g. implementing regulations)

First level

1. Treaties (Founding, Accession and International Agreements)

2. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

3. Fundamental principles (principle of conferral, subsidiarity, proportionality)

4. Customary law

5. Case-law of CJEU

Second level

Article 288(1) TFEU: To exercise the Union's competences, the institutions shall adopt:

Geen formele hirarchie Vb: Fundamental regulation waaruit directives voortkomen

In de vorm van legislatieve, gedelegeerde of gemplementeerde acts

Zie ook artikel 296 (instrument niet bepaald) en 297 (voorwaarden) TFEU

i. regulations

Main characteristics:

General application: it has legal effects for a category (all MS) of generally determined addressees

Addressees: MS, legal & natural persons

Binding in its entirety = but sometimes MS has to adopt implementing measures ( = change national law)

Directly applicable in all MS direct applicability no transposition measures needed courts can rely on it directly (distinguish from direct effect)

Wie?

Joint adoption by the European Parliament and the Council ordinary or special legislative procedure

European Commission: if legislative delegates it the power to adopt non-legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative act

European Central Bank: to carry out its tasksHierarchie van regulations

Regulations can be a source of secondary (based on primary law) or tertiary (based on 2de law) EU law (implementing regulations Commission)

Dus eigenlijk gebruikt als primary law (om zaak te regelen) en secundary law (gebaseerd op primary regulation)

Depending on content provisions of regulation

Different designations (Schengen code, Customs code), but adopted in form of existing legal acts (regulations)

ii. directives

Main characteristics:

Binding on MS (not all of them) NOT natural/legal persons

Binding only as to the result to be achieved MS have vrijheid in transposition

MSs have to transpose a directive into their national legal order in its entirety before deadline

Why? = Specificities of MS legal order & Terminology of MS different legal concepts

When? = Mostely used when harmonization is vereist

Omzetting op welke wijze

Adoption of new legislation

Change of existing legislation (if necessary)

MS can choose the means and the form of act for transposition not necessarily act of legislative nature (can be decree etc.)

Validity as of date in directive or 20 days after publication in OJ

Falen van omzetting legal consequences possible ( judicial protection)

Geen omzetting

Omzetting na deadline

Foutieve of onvolledige omzetting

Verplichtingen MS

Before: not to adopt measures that compromise the achievement of the goal of directive (negative obligation)

After: transposition (positive obligation)

Onderscheid tussen regulation en directive

Minimum harmonisatie = Minimum opleggen MS kunnen strenge maatregels nemen

iii. decisions

Main characteristics:

Binding in its entirety unless a addressee is specified

Can be addressed to legal/natural persons depends on its provisions (vb: Microsoft)

Adopted by Council, Commission, Parliament

iv. non binding acts

Article 288(5) TFEU: Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force. (forms of soft law) and are not direct applicable

Recommendations

Opinions

Article 295 TFEU: Inter institutional agreements (tussen Council, Comm en EP) Voor betere samenwerking

Hirarchie

Hierarchy of norms (vanaf LT)

1. Treaties (CJEU = constitution) & Charter of Fundamental Rights

2. General principles Subsidiariteit + proportionaliteit,..

Gebaseerd op doctrines MS Belangerijk voor EU courts voor interpretatie

Vb: Artegodan GMBH vs Others / Audiolux v Groupe Bxl Lambert

3. Legislative acts Art. 289 TFEU (LT! Voor het eerste hierin)

4. Delegated Acts Art. 290 TFEU (LT!)

5. Implementing Acts Art. 291 TFEU (LT!)

6. Other acts (e.g. in context of CFSP)

Basic principle

Primary secondary law

Secondary law in conformity with primary law (vb: regulation dat foltering toestaat is illegal in vergelijking met primary law)

Sources of the same level

lex posterior derogat legi priori

lex specialis derogat legi generali

Institutional balance of powers! = Seperation of power?

Onderscheid Legislatieve en niet legislative acts

Legislatieve acts = (Art. 289(3) TFEU): Legal acts (I, II & III) adopted by legislative procedure. (O + S) inhoud dus onbelangrijk

Non-legislative acts

Delegated acts (Art. 290(1) TFEU): non-legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative act.

Vb: tegen schadelijk stoffen Delegated act om lijst op te stellen

Implementing acts (Art. 291 TFEU): implementing powers on the Commission

Onderscheid implementing en delegated acts soms problematisch = Time problem (slechts mogelijkheid tot onderscheid na maken van beslissing + language problem

Chapter 5: Legislative procedures

Algemeen

Legislative procedures

Ordinary legislative procedure (294 TFEU)

Special legislative procedures

Consultation

Consent

Non-legislative procedures

Delegation (Art. 290 TFEU)

Implementation (Article 291 TFEU, comitology, Reg. 182/2011)

I. legislative acts

1. Eu competance = Is er een legal basis ( Deze bepaalt ook toepasselijke procedure)

2. Proposal van Commissie Initiatiefrecht (Art 17 (2) TEU)

Zie ook 241 TFEU (Council) en 225 TFEU (EP) + citizin initiative

3. Proposal doorgestuurd naar DGs (want commissie neemt beslisisng als body)

4. Legislator Legislatieve procedure

Ordinary legislative procedure (294 TFEU!!)

ZIE SCHEMA

Co-decision procedure = OLP (EP en Council op hetzelfde niveau)

Commentaar OLP

European Parliament = 3 x veto: 2nd reading, Conciliation Committee and 3rd reading

Council:

QMV

Unanimity: change of COM proposal (Art. 293 TFEU) + approval of EP amendments, but on which COM had delivered negative opinion (2nd reading)

Commission:

Right of initiative

negative opinion in second reading

power to alter and withdraw proposal

Trilogues = Respresentatives van Comm, Council en EP (max 10) Meetings om gemakkelijke compromissen en inter-institutionele afspraken te bereiken Beperkt dus mogelijkheid tot grotere dialoog

Consultation procedure

1. Comm proposes EP consulted Council decides

2. Commission

right of initiative

Political significance of right to amend or withdraw (293 TFEU)

3. EP: in principle only advisory role, however:

EPs advice cannot be ignored (procedural req!)

Can delay the procedure not absolute (eg. tariff pref.)

4. Council decides (can start before EP advice) unanimity!

5. Legal (Council) vs. political (EP & Comm) control

Consent procedure

Opmerkingen SLP

Commission: NO monopoly for proposal

Decision by (European) Council and EP consent by EP

No Time-Limits

voting rules can differ

Passerelle Clause = Waar SLP vereist is kan EC met toestemming EP beslissen OLP van toepassing te maken, indien geen tegenstand nationale parlemten ( 48 (7) TEU)

II. Delegated acts (= Secondary legislative measures)

LA delegates to Commission power to adopt non-legislative act of general application ( non legislative = Niet volgens beslissingsprocedure (formeel dus))

Purpose: DA supplements or amends non-essential elements of LA

Limits:

LA defines: objectives, content, scope, duration of delegation

Essential elements reserved for LA

Control (ex post) Kijk hieronder Council / EP eigenlijk geen recht tot amendering

Dient binnen termijn uit LA te worden gedaan

Delegated Regulation or Directive

III. Implementing acts (= Executive measures)

Lay down uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts = IA does not supplement or amend (!) Kan in kader LA of DA worden aangenomen door Commissie

Control: Comitology (ex ante Before it adopts )

Regulation No 182/2011 = Comitology regulation (!!)

Comitology (300 committees ) = assist Comm in preparing implementing acts

composed of MS representatives and scientific experts or representatives from business/industry

Two types of comitology procedure:

examination procedure = IA adopted if pos.opinion

Advisory procedure = Geven advies

Legal basis

Algemeen

Choice of legal basis

Reason: principle of conferral

Wrong basis: annulment (eg. Art. 263 TFEU, Art. 267 TFEU)

Choice of legal base determines:

Procedure

Voting requirements

Instrument

Category of power

Limitations of legal bases (e.g. Art.114 TFEU and Tobacco Advertising)

Main rules

CJEU settled case-law:

choice of legal basis for EU measure must rest on objective factors that are amenable to judicial review

these include the aim and content of that measure

more specific provision prevails

Difference:

Existence of competence

Legal basis policy area!

How is legal base determined in practice?

E.g. common commercial policy: Art.206 or 207?

Single or double

single legal base:

if measure twofold purpose (one is main or predominant, other is merely incidental)

centre of gravity

double legal base:

if simultaneously several objectives (inseparably linked)

BUT: not possible where the procedures for each legal basis are incompatible Wel sinds 2009 zie case C-166/07 (!)

Case law

Case C-300/89, Commission v Council (Titanium Dioxide)

Directive harmonizing elimination of pollution caused by waste from titanium dioxide

Commission proposal: internal market legal base (cooperation procedure: QMV and strong EP)

Council: Environmental legal base (consultation procedure and unanimity in Council)

CJEU:

Directive pursues both environment & internal market

BUT: cooperation procedure deprived of substance

double legal base impossible aim & content: Art. 114

Victory democratic decision-making

C-376/98, Germany v EP and Council (Tobacco Advertising)

Directive prohibits advertising of tobacco products

Internal market legal base (100a EC, now 114 TFEU)

Germany:

measure must contribute to the improvement of the internal market not here (only incidental)

centre of gravity here public health (harm.excluded)

CJEU:

genuenily contributing to establishment of int.market

here: directive does not ensure free movement of products complying with directive

C-130/10 EP v Council (Smart sanctions)

Restrictive measures bin Laden, AlQaeda, Taliban

contested regulation based on Art.215(2) TFEU (restrictive measures vs. natural/legal persons)

EP: correct legal basis is Article 75 TFEU (prevention of terrorism and related activities)

CJEU:

Article 75 TFEU: ordinary legislative procedure (QMV, EP)

Article 215(2) TFEU: merely informing the Parliament (and previous CFSP decision-unanimity)

procedures are incompatible

confirms legal base (although several objectives)

C-178/03, Commission v EP and Council (Export of chemicals)

Commission: annulment of Regulation on export and import of dangerous chemicals

Comm proposal CCP (207 TFEU): purpose of reg.: regulate intern. trade in hazardous chemicals

Legal base: environmental policy (192 TFEU)

CJEU:

double legal basis would be necessary (double objective)

procedures not incompatible

annuls regulation

limits effects of the judgment

Varia

Pre Lissabon DA = Geen onderscheid tussen gedelegeerde en implementing acts + Grote invloed MS in comitology

Council wenste commissie immers geen blaco cheque te geven bij secundary norms

Management & regulatory committee = MS representatives hadden input in beslissingsvorming Mogelijkheid tot doorverwijzing naar Council Deze kon veto stellen

Pre Lissabon Initiatief = Veel voorstellen voor legislatieve akten kwamen van Council of EC (Comm maar weinig effectieve macht)

Artikel 225 TFEU = Twee procedures, normaal initiatiefrapport door verantwoordelijk EP committee dat basis vormt voor voorstel aan Comm, maar ook mogelijkheid voor MEP om verzoek tot EP president te richten die het aan committee richt

Voorwaarden = Voorstel moet legal basis omvatten, gedetailleerde inhoudsomschrijving en fdr en subsidiariteit in acht nemen

Indien Comm niet volgt = Redenen meedelen aan EP

Pre Lissabon legislative procedure = Macht EP belangrijk Van advies (Verdrag Rome) Cooperation (SEA) Co-decision (Maastricht) Co-decision wordt OLP

Enhanced cooperations = Bepaalde MS kunnen verdere gaan, zelfs al doen niet alle MS mee (Art 20 TEU 326/333 TFEU)

Gedachten achter instituties = Comm (federaal) versus Council (MS / IG)

Onstaan structuren buiten treaties om (vanwege dominante positie Comm Vb: luxemburg akkoorden) = Positief intergouvernementalisme (EC, coreper,)

Negatief intergouvernementalisme = Veto

Planning legislatieve agenda = Activity based managament (political) + impact assessment (gevolgen voor bereiken van doelen)

Annual police strategy door Commissie (1) Dialoog in EP (2) 1 + 2 vormen Commission work plan (bepaald door college) bepaalt dus policy objectives Annual management plans (per DG) op basis hiervan bepaalt concrete operaties Synthesis Report

Invloed op beslissingen = interactie in Commissie (cabinet College), interest groups (lobby Consulteren ad hc door advisory committee), national experts and senior civil servants

Democratie = Geen democratische druk (stemmers kunnen OH niet veranderen), distance issue (Bxl), transparency and complexity issue, weaking of judicial control (door nationale Rb), executive dominance (overdragen bevoegdheden zorgt voor kleinere rol nationale parlementen)

Chapter 6: Judicial Review of EU Acts Judicial review of EU acts

I. Action for annulment

Doel = Direct control of legality parties can go directly to CoJ or GC

Consequence = annulment of EU acts

Complementary = indirect control of legality through Art. 267 TFEU

Analysis always in 3 steps = Jurisdiction? Admissibility Substantive analysis

step 1:Which court has jurisdiction?

Division of competences between GC and CoJ:

1. General rule (256 TFEU): General Court has jurisdiction for action for annulment except in cases reserved for CoJ in Statute

2. Statute (Protocol no. 3): Article 51 CoJ is competent only:

If the action is brought by a MS against EP or Council (except in certain cases)

If the action is brought by an EU institution against another EU institution

Legal consequence = Article 54 of the Statute CJEU

If the GC finds that it has no jurisdiction Verwijzen naar CoJ (indien deze justitie heeft)

If the CoJ finds that an action falls within the jurisdiction of the GC Verwijzen GC

Step 2: admissibility

Cummulatieve voorwaarden = If action inadmissible No substantive analysis

A. Time Limit

Rule = Article 263(6) within 2 months after:

Publication (in OJ 297 TFEU)Details: see CoJ & GC Rules of Procedure

Notification to plaintiff

Moment it came to knowledge of applicant

Voorbeeld = Art 102 RoP GC: calculation:

From the end of the 14th day after publication thereof in the OJ

The prescribed time-limits shall be extended on account of distance by a single period of ten days

Article 49-52 RoP CoJ Blackstones (after 2012!)

Case = Gbagbo e.a. v. Council(C478/11P to C482/11P)

Regulation: restrictive measures against Cte dIvoire Mr Gbagbo challenges the regulation No notification

GC & CoJ:

Notification not necessary

Publication in OJ sufficient

Action inadmissible

B. Reviewable act

Definitie = all binding (i) acts which intend to produce legal effect (ii) vis--vis third parties form not important

Regulations, Directives, Decisions Only final measures, not preparatory (IBM case)

Not reviewable: Recommendations, Opinions, Proposals

Soms problematisch Zie ook Inuit

E.g. non-existing acts (have no binding effect Eigenlijk hetzelfde annulement BASF)

Acts tainted by serious illegality (normal time limit niet van toepassing, annulment niet mogelijk, want er bestaat geen legale act om te annuleren)

E.g. competition = Commission letter announcing dawn raid Decision no dawn raid legal effects for competitorC. Passive standing ( = Whos acts)

Against who = EP & Council (for legislative acts) Council Comm ECB EP EC Agencies

D. Active standing ( = Who?)

Who can bring case before court?

I. Privileged Applicants = MS, EP, Council & COM

When = No Requirements - General Interest (zelfs indien addressee is other person)

EP evolution = Before Maastricht niet vermeld in artikel Maastricht (codif) semi-privileged

Nice privileged

Comitology (1988) semi - privileged

Chernobyl (1990) semi-privileged

II. Semi-Privileged Applicants = Court of Auditors, ECB & Committee of Regions

When = For the purpose of Protecting their Prerogatives

Which institution missing EC Privileged for art 265 / Semi for article 263 TFEU

III. Non-Privileged Applicants = Natural and Legal Persons Drie mogelijkheden:

1. Act is addressed to applicant Geen voorwaarden

Vb: decision tegen Microsoft

2. Indien niet direct geadresseerd = Act is of direct & individual concern Twee voorwaarden:

Act directly affects the legal situation of applicant ( Zie ook Plaumann voor IC)

No discretion to addressees of measure who have to implement the act (MS)

3. Regulatory Act Drie voorwaarden

It can be no legislative act

Direct concern must be proven

Geen implementing measures

Cases Direct concern

I. Front National v. European Parliament = legal right not directly affected

Independent MePs want to create political group (Technical Group of Independent Members) want deze kregen subsidies

Action: annulment of EP decision prohibiting

CoJ: Quashes GC judgment Front National (national political party) is not directly affected (MePs are)

II. International Fruit Company = No discretion

EC Regulation limits import of apples from third countries (import licenses) Commission grants import licenses for particular week DE vraagt uitzondering aan

Comm refuses to grant import license action for annulment by IFC by importer

CoJ = finds individual concern (regulation a bundle of decisions) national authorities: no discretion in issuing licenses act directly affects legal position direct concern ok

III. Differdange v. Commission = No direct concern

Comm: state aid to steel firms, but reduction of capacity

Differdange: action for annulment: reduction of capacity reduces collected taxes

CoJ: Decision gives Luxembourg discretion Lux can decide which factories will be closed

Cases Individual Concern

Plaumann case 1963 = Geen individual concern want alle importeurs droegen last

Ms. Plaumann = importer of clementines

Decision of Commission not to allow DE to suspend duty to pay customs duties addressed to DE

Plaumann annulment action

CoJ: If an act affects persons by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons

Plaumann test = Bewijs van individuele concern ( onderscheid met anderen dus = closed group)

Extremely restrictive

Complementarity: Plaumann vs. Van Gend & Loos (1963)

Applicants should go to national court

Vooral in anti dumping (extramet vs Council), competition (Metro-SB-Gross) en state aid (metro case)

Cases closed & open groups (Individual concern)

Open: membership not fixed at time of decision (Plaumann) Closed: membership fixed (IC bewezen dan)

Article 263(5) TFEU: Acts setting up agencies can lay down rules for active standing of natural or legal persons

I. Toepfer = CoJ annuls Comm decision

Comm decision (1.10.1963) = fixing new prices for maize imported into DE Toepfer challenges decision

CoJ = Only persons concerned importers who applied for import license on a particular date (1.10.1963) fixed number

II. Piraiki-Patraiki = CoJ annuls Comm decision

Import of cotton from Greece to France Comm decision (addressed to FR) authorises FR impose quotas reduction cotton import from GR In principle no individual concern

Some importers signed salecontracts contracts cannot be performed due to quota closed class

III. Codorniu = EC regulation annulled

EC regulation on alcoholic beverages

Crmant = Can only be used for sparkling wine from France & Luxembourg Spaanse Codorniu (trade-mark for Grand Crmant de Cordoniu) individual concern (only company trade-mark)

Standing: Interest Groups ( see also Associations)

Voorwaarden:

Legislative provision gives procedural powers

Members have standing

Own interests are affected

Case = C-321/95 P - Greenpeace v Commission

Claim: environmental interests underpinning their action should be taken into account

CoJ: only indirectly affected

Individual concern: critique

Critique: principle of effective judicial protection not respected Art.6 ECHR + 47 EU Charter FR

CoJ reasoning: solution via preliminary ruling procedure (Article 267 TFEU) in eerste instantie:

Challenge before national court

Breach of contested provision

Associations (cases hebben geleid tot treaty reform / afschaffing Plaumann)

I. UPA (= Association of Farmers)

UPA challenges regulation on organisation of olive oil market

GC: no individual concern

AG Jacobs in UPA: suggests a change of Plaumann test A person is individually concerned where, by reason of his/her particular circumstances, the measure has a substantial adverse effect on his/her interests

CoJ: does not follow confirms Plaumann

II. Jego-Qur

Comm Regulation size of holes in fishing nets Jego-Qur (fishing company) has smaller holes new nets almost bankrupt

Is this a dicision against Jego-Qur? GC = no individual concern

CoJ: Overrules GC decision confirms Plauman reform of standing requirement requires Treaty revision ( Zie hieronder)

Treaty revision: Lisbon (geldt nu dus!!)

263(4): Any natural or legal person may institute proceedings againsta regulatory act (zie inuit) which

Is of direct concern to them

Does not entail implementing measures ( Regulations / No directives Hiervoor nog steeds individual concern aantonen)

Dit is een uitzondering dus! Enkel de normen die voldoen aan het artikel kunnen worden aangevochten zonder individual concern

Difference: NO individual concern required!!!!!

Definition of Regulaory act

Legal problem: Inuits challenge the regulation Not addressed to them! Admissibility (standing)?

Regulation 1007/2009 prohibits import and export of seal products legal basis 114 TFEU

Exception: Inuit seal products which are the output of classic hunting and necessary for subsistence

Inuit: too strict will affect our subsistence

General Court = Regulatory Act is an act of general application (*) that is not a legislative act

Reg.1007/2009 not regulatory act (but legislative act)

CoJ = Confirms GC judgment

Consequence for amissibility: LA challenged by natural or legal person only if direct and individual concern

Admissibility?Direct & individual concern

Hunters = No direct concern (only trade) inadmissible

Traders = Direct concern ok No individual concern inadmissible

Step 3: substantive review

A. Lack of competence

No competence of EU No legal basis

Institution uses power of other institution

Excession of delegated power

B. Infringement of an essential procedural requirement

Requirements to consult (EP, EcoSoc, etc determined in legal basis)

Duty to give reasons

Right to be heard (e.g. competition law)

C. Infringement of the Treaties or any rule of law

Fundamental rights

General principles

Legal certainty and legitimate expectations

Non-discrimination

Proportionality = Suitable, Necessary & Balancing (strictu sensu)

D. Misuse of power

Definition = Use of power for a purpose other than for which it was granted

Vb = Giuffrida v Commission contrary to the aims of any recruitment procedure and is a misuse of powers

If annulment action is well founded

Gevolg = Art.264 TFEU CJEU declares the act void (partially or completely)

Effects voor regulatie

Ex tunc From day legal act came into force

Erga omnes effect For everyone

Possibility Limitation of effects in time

Art.266 TFEU = All necessary measures must be taken to comply

Art.340 TFEU = Possible claim for damages

Plea of Illegality Art.277 TFEU

Rule = Not independent right of action but incidental (enkel voor ECJ, niet national)

Annulment (legislative vs. delegated acts) = LA acts niet legal dus DA ook niet

Enkel acts of general applications

Time limit tot primary challenge moet in acht worden genomen

Niet wanneer actie alreeds aanhanging is voor ander court

Case TWD: if the party had an earlier opportunity to challenge the contested act Article 277 cannot be used to circumvent the time limit of Article 263 TFEU

Simmenthal case: if the party had an earlier opportunity to challenge the contested act Article 277 cannot be used to circumvent the time limit of Article 263 TFEU

Action for failure to act

Voorwaarden:

Only if a clear obligation to act

Active standing: MS and EU institutions ( = Privileged) & Natural of legal persons (N-P)

Non-privileged

Fail to address them

ENU case = Individual and direct concern (not only if addressed) same test as 263 (regulatory?)

Passive standing: EP Council Comm ECB EP EC Agencies

Procedure = Call upon to act binnen redelijke termijn act within two months Geen reactie (2m) action may be brought

Liability of the EU= Art. 268 juncto 340 TFEU (onafhankelijk van 263 TFEU)

Contractual and non-contractual

Geen nood aan annulement = Action for damages seen as an independent cause of action

Non-contractual liability (140 TFEU) = Union has to make good damage caused by its institutions or by its officials in the performance of their duties Voorwaarden (bergaderm):

Infringement of rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals

When sufficiently serious breach = Discretion (beslissingsmarge) (i) & any breach of substantive or procedural law (ii)

Voorwaarden voor ernstige schending in Bracherie de Pecheur

Kan ook toekomstige schade zijn (indien voldoende zekerheid) Kampffmeyer

Direct causal link between breach and damage = EU heeft schade veroorzaakt + geen breuk in causaliteit ( Negligence / Ought to have foreseen)

Active standing = MS & Natural or legal persons

Time limit = 5 years (Statute)

Criteria aligned with MS liability (Bergaderm - Francovich)

Indirect check of validity preliminary ruling procedure

Validity of EU secondary legislation = Article 267 TFEU Verwijzing nationale hoven naar ECJ

Legaliteit van directives/regulations kan dus voor nationale hoven worden aangevochten

Decisions = Indien niet addressee individuele decision, toch mogelijk (Rau case)

Cases

I. AJD tuna: Regulation No 530/2008 is invalid

Verschillende datum van inwerkingtreding (23/06 voor Spaanse boten & 16/06 voor Malta, Griekse, Franse, Italiaanse en Cyprus boten) zonder enige objectieve justificatie voor dit onderscheid

II. Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats

Action before the Constitutional Court for annulment of the Law transposing Directive 2004/113 into Belgian law (= equal treatment between M&W for access to good/services)

Claim: law which implements the derogation provided for in Article 5(2) of Directive 2004/113, is contrary to the principle of equality between men and women

MS may decide before 21 December 2007 to permit proportionate differences in individuals premiums and benefits where the use of sex is a determining factor in the assessment of risk based on relevant and accurate actuarial and statistical data.

CJEU = Article 5(2) of Directive 2004/113/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services is invalid with effect from 21 December 2012

III. TWD case

IV. Accrington beef Case

V. Eurotunnel case

Varia

Limieten op judicial review

1. Freedom, security and Justice = normale principes van toepassing, behalve inzake validity of proportionality van operations van police agencies + de uitoefening van bevoegdheden MS voor interne veiligheid

2. CFSP = Geen bevoegdheid behalve monitoring compliance met article 40 TEU + restrictive measures tegen personen ( 275 TFEU)

Joint Liability MS & EU

1. Inadequate steps taken to prevent breach of Union law by Nat. Court = EU kan nationale actie authoriseren, maar kan hiervoor worden aangeklaagd aldus Kampffmeyer

2. MS applies unlawful legislation = Geen bevoegdheid behalve monitoring compliance met article 40 TEU + restrictive measures tegen personen

Calpak case = Court moet verder dan vorm kijken, maar ook naar inhoud om te bepalen of regulation wel een werkelijke regulation dan wel een decision is

Abstract terminology test = Objectively determined situations and produces legal effect with regard to categories of persons described in a generalized and abstract manner

Calculation of time-limit

Last week: Article 102 RoP GC because the GC was competent

But not in blackstone Same rules before CoJ: Articles 49-52 Rules of Procedure CoJ

Chapter 7: Basic principles of EU law

Inleiding

Rights of private parties before national courts!

Action of private party against private party

Action of private party against MS

In principe voor al het bindend EU recht Directives / international agreements zijn problematisch

Geschiedenis = Ontstaan door jurisprudentie ECJ Problemen met public enforcement (artikel 258 TFEU) Treaties moeten private inforcement mogelijk maken ( = direct effect) Obj vs Subj (envoce versus confer) direct effect Condities vereenvoudigen Knock out of substitution effect?

Direct effect

Theorie of International law vs. national law

Dualism

Citizens cannot directly rely on international law

International treaty must be incorporated into national law

If not incorporated: citizen cannot directly enforce your rights

Monism:

You can rely directly on international law

No incorporation measure necessary

Direct enforcement possible

Direct effect: CoJ

Van Gend en Loos (1963) = Leading case of EU law

Why revolutionary? Created door national constitutional law & judicial creation

Plaralism with Plaumann Voor CoJ beperkt dus tegemoedkomen door direct effect

Facts: Importer of chemical substances (DE NL) Change of tariff-heading increase of duty/import tariffs Infringement of Treaty (Art.12 EEC)

Legal issue: can you rely directly on Treaty provision before national court

Van Gend en LoosOpinion of AG = Was not followed, want (*)

Legal issue: can you rely directly on Treaty provision before national court?

AG looked at EEC law as ordinary international law it is not for CoJ to decide

Van Gend en Loos oordeel CoJ

Art. 12 EEC Treaty MS should refrain from introducing new customs duties (~ Art. 30 TFEU)

Art. 12 EEC Treaty direct effect arguments:

Community constitutes a new legal order (*) of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights Niet een verdrag zoals een ander dus

EC law not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights (bewoording art 267 TFEU niet gelimiteerd tot publieke organen)

The wording of Art. 12 contains a clear and unconditional prohibition which does not make its implemention conditional upon a legislative measure enacted under national law

Belang = EEC law is MONIST

Nuance

In national law: national constitution

In EEC law: the Courts interpretation of Treaties

Regardless of national system (monism/dualism) meaning for national law

Andere international recht blijft gebonden door nationale systemen

Direct effect: conditions

Provision has direct effect if self-executing: (voorwaarden negative en no reservations zijn weg)

Clear (necessity of preliminary ruling irrelevant)

Unconditional

No national implementing measure needed No longer needed

Voorbeeld = General objectives EU (NO), no discrimination on basis (YES)

Consequences:

Individuals may derive rights directly from EU law

Immediate enforceability by individuals of EU provisions in national courts

Defrenne = loosening of conditions (laatste voorwaarden wegwerken)

Facts:

Defrenne not the same salary as male colleagues

Wants to rely directly on Art.119 EC (discrimination)

EC law (Art.119 EC): same pay for same work not unconditional (MS shall introduce this principle) Normally no direct effect

CoJ:

BE did not introduce it (14 yrs)

Art.119 has direct effect!

Direct effect: precisions

Vertical direct effectDirect effect = You as Individual can rely on it

Direct Applicability = Court can base itself directley on law

Primary law

Secondary law (regulations, directives)

Horizontal direct effect = Ook mogelijk

Exception: directives Voor alle andere mogelijk

Zie international Transport workers Federations v Viking line case voor direct horizontal effect treaty article

Van Duyn & Ratti case Direct effect of directives

Facts: scientology Members refused to enter UK (on base of UK act)

CoJ ruling: Direct effect of directives possible why?

Binding effect of directives in gedrang anders wordt versterkt door direct effect (functional argument)

Individual can invoke directives in 267 procedures (textual argument)

MS cannot rely on their failure to implement om zo binding force van directives te ontlopen (estoppel argument) Indiv. zou eigenlijk op nationale implementatie act moeten kunnen beroepen, maar kan dit dus niet

Limitations on direct effect of directives

Only possible if deadline for transposition expired (directive unimplemented or incorrectly implemented)

Claim against MS (Marshall I: directive may not impose obligations on / be relied upon against an individual)

A clear right (van Dijck case)

No horizontal effect

Cases

Inter invironnement Wallonie case (geen measures nemen voor omzetting die resultaat directive in gedrang brengen), Mangold case (alle maatregels die strijdig zijn aan de kant, zelfs voor omzetting)

Na time limit eigenlijk dezelfde waarde als regulation, maar ervoor ook al verplichtingen (infra)

Direct effect: regulations

Maken direct deel uit van nationale rechtsorde Indien aan voorwaarde voldaan, dus direct effect

Nationale maatregels niet vereist Deze zullen enkel ongeldig zijn indien ze de artikelen van de regulation veranderen, obstructs or obscures

Voorbeelden: Slaughtered cow case, Munoz case, Amsterdam bulb case (voorzien in sancties die niet in regulation stonden)

Direct effect: Decisions

Indien aan voorwaarde voldaan, dus direct effect op basis effectiveness principle

Decision tegen MS ECJ terughoudend om deze te laten binden tegen private party (vertical direct effect)

Beslissing tegen private party creeert horizontal direct effect indien voorwaarden vervuld

Voorbeelden: Paradigm case, carp case

Cases no horizontal effect

Marshall I case + Dori case

Facts:

Dismissed after 14 years employment (over 60)

Relied on directive against employer (horizontal situation) discrimination on grounds of sex

CoJ: NO horizontal direct effect Why?

Binding nature of directive Only for MS (textual argument art 288 TFEU geen schitterend argument)

Directives addressed to MS No obligations for individual

Verschil directives & regulations zou vervagen

Remedying lack ofhorizontal direct effect Want eigenlijk discriminatie private/public parties

Broad interpretation of notion Member State (bodies subject to control of the State = tax, local authorities, public employers) (*)

Interpretation in conformity with the directive

State liability for damages

Foster case (*) Wat is een MS?

Facts:

British Gas public body that privatized

Women: retirement at 60

CoJ:

De facto public body

public service under control of MS!

Voorwaarden bodies (foster)

Voorwaarden qualificatie als MS

Subject to control/autority of the state

That have special powers beyond those applicable between individuals

Directives can be relied against Administrative direct effect

Tax authorities

Local/regional authorities

Authorities for maintenance of public order and safety

Authorities providing public health services

Kan problematisch zijn aangezien organ geen invloed heeft over implementatie en de mate van special powers aanzienlijk verschilt

Varia

Discretion doet niks aan direct effect Direct effect kan dus in volgende omstandigheden

Indien MS discretie heeft gebruikt bij implementatie

Indien niet gebruikt

Indien een precies / clear obligation onderscheiden kan worden

Een duidelijke (clear) resultaatsverbintenis wordt duidelijk

Kortas case = ookal heeft MS recht af te wijken van directive, doet dit niks aan binding nature ervan (indien voorwaarden vervuld zijn)

Wells case = Individual kan zich niet beroepen op artikel in directive indien state obligation direct gelinked is aan de verplichting van een derde partij

Principle of primacy

Principle of primacy (onafhankelijk van direct effect)

If national law is in conflict with EU law which law prevails?

Question was not asked in Van Gend but implicit

CJEU: Costa/ENEL (1964)

Facts:

Italy nationalised production/distribution of electricity ENEL

Flaminio Costa: no payment of electricity bill ENEL files a law suit

Nationalization infringes EEC law

Italian government = Case inadmissible (Want national law voorrang op EU)

Does EEC law prevail over MS law?

Argumenten CJEU = Community law has primacy over national law

Treaty created own legal system integral part of MS legal systems door direct effect

By creating the Community MS created body of law binding for nationals & MS (contractarian argument)

Text & spirit of the Treaty make it impossible that national measure would have precedence

Such precedence of national law would take away from the Treaty its character of Community law (functional argument)

Belang Costa/ENEL

Consequence for national constitutional courts Niet langer hoogste autoriteit

Kritiek: CoJ put itself on higher position Hiervoor is echter no explicit legal basis in Treaties

Why decision of CoJ?

If EEC was ordinary international law enforcement of EEC law difficult

Difference in enforcement in different MS (monism/dualism)

Primacy: precisions

Primacy over which provisions? Geen annulatie maar gewoon voorrang

Toepassingsgebied = All national provisions, however framed (Costa)

Even for national provision adopted later (no lex posterior) Simmenthal case

Including principles of a national constitutional structure (Internat. Handelsgesellschaft case, Kreil case)

Consequences?

National authorities:

1. Inapplicability of conflicting national rules (Simmenthal en IN.CO.GE cases)

2. Duty to change & avoid adopting conflicting national legislation (106/77 Simmenthal II)

CJEU = No competence to nullify conflicting national rules (interpretation precludes National Law / not breaches) recht blijft gelden in andere situaties

Simmenthal case

Indien conflict tussen EU en Nationaal Recht EU wint

Nationaal recht zal niet vernietigd worden (IN.CO.GE case)

Toepassing geldt voor alle hoven (geen bevestiging constitutional court vereist) Alle hoven moeten dit direct toepassen

Toepassing geld took voor administratieve agencies (larsy case)

Primacy:hierarchy of legal sources

First rebelion of NCCs Solange cases (DE)

ECJ had zichzelf hoogste hof gemaakt Was nergens voorzien in verdragen

Fundamental rights catalogue in DE constitution

At the time: no EEC catalogue of FdR

German CC: if EEC breaches FdR No acceptance of supremacy (DE law would apply)

As long as EEC respects FdR they will refrain from applicability EU law over DE law

Response of CoJ to rebelion:Recognition of FdR protection in EEC

Gebaseerd op Common Constitution traditions + EU convention of Fdr ( = no formal sources)

Principle of primacy:Treaty of Lisbon

CT bevatte het principe van primacy LT had dit niet (wegens tegenstand CT) Declaration 17 on primacy in de plaats

Primacy: absolute?

Limitations by national constitutional courts Ultra vires control of EU acts and CJEU judgments

BVerfG: Honeywell (6.7.2010, 2 BvR 2661/06)

Tsjechisch Constitutional court (2012): reaction to CoJ judgment Landtov case: no cross-border element

Kern = CZ CC: constitutional courts maintain their role of supreme guardians of constitutionality even in the realms of the EU

Member states

Frankrijk = Aanvaard (Caf Jacques Vabres case (jud. courts) + Nicolo case (adm. courts)

Niet over GW

Duitsland = Aanvaard (Honeywell ruling) Limieten

International Handeslgesellshaft + Solange = Geen onvaarwaardelijk supremacy over Fdr

Competance/ultra vires lock = Maastricht Urteil (competences controleren) + ultra vires conditions

ECJ must have opportunity to judge EU law must be in manifest violation of competences Act was highly significant in structure of competences EU and MS

Identity lock = Criminal Law, War & peace, public expenditures, taxation, welfare, religion and culture (lissabon urteil) Kan bevoegdheden EU nagaan in deze gebieden

Kompetenz Kompetenz = DE court regard themselves to have jurisdiction to decide whether EU action is within scope EU competence

Italy/GB/poland = Aanvaard (Frontini case, Thoburn case, EAW ruling) Niet op FdR in GW

Member states

Niet langer in Lisbon verdrag (zoals in GW verdrag) Declaration on primacy bestaat nu

Interpretation in conformity with EU law

Principle of conform interpretation (!) Indirect direct effect

Vooral voor directives uitgevonden, maar geldt voor alles Von Colson & Kaman cases

Voorwaarden direct effect moeten niet voldaan zijn

Von Colson and Kamann case

Facts = Applied for job in prison gender discrimination?

CoJ = national courts are required to interpret their national law in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directiveto achieve the result [envisaged by the directive]

Gebaseerd op principle of sincere cooperation (duty tot samenwerking EU / geen inbreuk EU law maken)

Marleasing case Which provisions?

Provisions for implementation of the directive

All other provisions adopted before/after directive (vb oude regels op basis nieuw directive)

Ook indien geen special connective bestaat tussen oud national recht en nieuw directive (marleasing case)

Conform interpretation when?

Before the deadline for transposition = Obligation to refrain from interpreting national law in a way that would seriously compromise the attainment of the objective of directive

Inter-Environnement Wallonie case (passive duty)

After the deadline for transposition = General obligation of conform interpretation

Adeneler case (active duty)

Limits of conform interpretation How far? as far as possible (Marleasing)

Two limitations

General principles of EU law = legal certainty & non-retroactivity (Kolpinghuis Nijmegen) no criminal liability

No interpretation contra legem (C-212/04, Adeneler)

Importance of conform interpretation

Importance for horizontal relations (btw. individuals) no direct effect of directives

Non-implemented / wrongly implemented directive effect vis--vis individuals

Cases principle of conform interpretation (!)

Quelle caseExample of conform interpretation

German civil code = where goods not in conformity are replaced right of the seller to require the consumer to pay compensation for the use of those goods

Directive 1999/44/EC sale of consumer goods = where goods not in conformity are replaced free of charge

CJEU: German law not in conformity with directive German Supreme Court: conform interpretation not possible (contra legem)?

German Supreme Court: Quelle

Theologische reductie = the provision is to be interpreted restrictively (consumers niet binnen toepassingsgebied)

In case of sale of consumer goods, no compensation for use

Change of German civil code (December 2008)

Liability of Member State for breach of EU law

C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich

Francovich and Bonifaci were two employers Bedrijf gaat failliet

Insolvency directive = all MS verplichting tot oprichting guarantee fund Want geen implementatie directive

No indirect (no nat. rule to interpret) & direct effect (not suff. precise) Damages action against Italy

MS has to pay damage caused to individual by breach of Community law arguments:

National courts must ensure that the Community law has full effect Want staat niet expliciet in treaties

Full effectiveness would be impaired if individuals were unable to obtain redress when their rights are infringed

The principle of Member State liability is inherent in the system of the Treaty

Liability: Conditions

1. Rule of law infringed confers rights to individuals

2. Sufficiently serious breach

Has MS manifestly disregarded the limits on its discretion? Zeer moeilijk aan te tonen (vrijwaring indien provisie niet clear and precise genoeg British telecom case)

No discretion = simple breach suffices

Geen tijdige omzetting directive = genoeg (dillenkofer case)

3. Direct causal link between breach of obligation and damage

4. Which court (Nat. Court) National substantive & procedural conditions van toepassing

Not less favourable than those for domestic claims (inachtneming principle of equivalence) Uitputting nationale rechtsmiddelen = schending van dit principe (Transportes Urbanos case)

Should not make redress impossible or excessively difficult (inachtneming principle of effectiveness)

Also national (highest) judicial bodies (C-224/01, Kbler)

5. In geval judicial breach (Kobler) = Geen preliminary Q gesteld (+ 1,2 en 3) Hoogste RH

Cases Liability

Kbler case

Facts:

Austrian professor Deeltijds AT & DE

Refused loyalty bonus Enkel indien werk in AT voor bepaalde periode (samentelling werk in DE?)

Problem:

Similar case (Schning) = Years worked elsewhere must be taken into consideration

CoJ asks: withdrawal of preliminary request AU? Want vraag al beantwoord

Austrian Court = withdraws, but denies Kbler bonus Breach of EU law?

Hierdoor vraagt Kbler damages against Austria

Preliminary Q to CJEU: State liability for judicial breaches? YES highest courts

Arguments against? Independence & Res Iudicata

Application to facts of the case? Manifest breach? & Breach but not manifest

Steps in analysis!

1. Conform interpretation: always first step

2. Direct effect: if possible!

3. State liability

Varia

State liability gebaseerd op Artikel 340 TFEU ( = gemeenschappelijke principes MS)

State is liable voor zijn organen (constitutionele bevoegdheidsverdeling boeit niet)

Chapter 8: Enforcement actions against MS

Central issues

Article 17 (1) TEU entrust to the Commission the task of ensuring and overseeing the application EU law under the control of the Court of justice.

The TFEU provides for various enforcement mechanisms involving judicial proceedings against the Member States, which are brought either by the Commission (= art 258 TFEU) or by a Member State (= art 259 TFEU).

The pecuniary penalty mechanism of article 260 TFEU allows the Commission to request the ECJ to impose a penalty payment on a Member State which has failed to comply with a previous judgment pursuant to article 258 TFEU.

The function and operation of the infringement procedure

Article 258 TFEU refers to the failure to fulfil an obligation under the treaties This means that infringement proceedings can now be brought for violation of obligations under both the TEU and the TFEU. Before the Lisbon Treaty this was not the case, it was only possible under the TFEU.

The Commission initiates article 258 proceedings either in response to a complaint or on its own initiative.

The Commission has regularly acknowledged that complaints from citizens constitute a significant source for its detection of infringements and has suggested that the article 258 procedure thus contributes to creating a more participatory community in which citizens can play a role in law enforcement. But the individual has no say in determining whether or not the Commission actually initiates proceedings against a Member State.

The infringement procedure can be divided into four distinct stages:

I. The initial pre-contentious stage gives the Member State the occasion to explain its position and the opportunity to reach an accommodation with the Commission.

II. If the matter is not clarified or resolved informally between the two at this stage, the state will be formally notified of the specific infringement alleged by the means of a letter from the Commission. The state is usually given two months to reply, except in cases of urgency, and the Commission normally decides within a year either to close a case or to proceed.

III. If, after an exchange with the state, the matter has not been resolved, the Commission may proceed to the state of issuing a reasoned opinion. The reasoned opinion sets out clearly the grounds on which the alleged infringement rests, and marks the beginning of the time period within which the Member State must comply, if it is to avoid to final stage.

IV. The final stage is referral of the matter by the Commission to the Court of Justice.

Relationship between Public and Private enforcement mechanisms

Molkerei Zentrale = The ECJ ruled that proceedings brought by an individual were intended to protect individual rights in a specific case

Commission enforcement proceedings were intended to ensure the general and uniform observance of Community law. This meant that the two kinds of proceedings have different objects, aims, and effects, and a parallel may not be drawn between them.

Commission v UK = The ECJ in the context of its preliminary ruling interpretative jurisdiction often effectively declares that a Member State is in breach of EU law, leaving a little scope for a different conclusion on the part of the referring domestic court.

Commission v Germany = The ECJ has ruled that the direct effect of a Community provision, and hence the ability of individuals to enforce it before national courts, is no defence to a Commission action under article 258 TFEU for failure to implement that provision.

The Commissions discretion

The language of paragraph 2 of article 258 clearly suggest that, once it has issued a reasoned opinion indicating a breach by a Member State, the Commission has discretion whether or not to bring the matter before the ECJ.

Motieven van Commissie worden niet onderzocht door ECJ, enkel inbreuk

The ECJ ruled that although article 258 deliberately laid down no particular time-limit for bringing proceedings, excessive delay might nonetheless be prejudicial. (=schadelijk)

The Court ruled that a reasonable period must be allowed, although very short periods could be justified in circumstances of urgency or where the Member Sate was fully aware of the Commissions view long before the procedure started.

Important note:The ECJ has consistently refused to admit actions for failure to act brought by non-privileged parties against the Commission under article 265 TFEU, which seek to require the Commission to initiate infringement proceedings under article 258.

The reasoned opinion

Together with the letter of formal notice, the reasoned opinion is the official means by which the Commission communicates to the state the substance of the complaint against it, and specifies a time period within the violation of community law must be remedied.

Article 296 TFEU requires that legal acts state the reasons on which they are based. Although the reasoning requirement is an essential procedural requirement of EU law, breach of which constitutes a ground for annulment of a measure under article 263 TFEU, the Commissions opinion under article 258 is not subject to an action for annulment because it lacks binding effect.

Although a reasoned opinion may not be the subject of an action for annulment, a Member state which is the subject of such an opinion may contest the lack of adequate reasoning in a different way, by raising the matter before the ECJ. (Commission v Germany)

Commission v Portugal = The commission is not obliged in its reasoned opinion to address or to answer every argument made by the state at the pre-litigation stage, nor to indicate what steps should be taken by the state to remedy the alleged breach

When will the reasoning requirement will be satisfied?As the commission sets out clearly the grounds on which it has relied in concluding that the state has violated Union law, and the particular complaints which will form the subject matter of the proceedings.

Important note:Since the reasoned opinion is intended to operate as a procedural protection for the Member State , the Commission is not entitled to amend the substantive content of its submission when the case comes to be heard before the Court, even if both parties wish the court to consider other aspects of the states conduct which took place after the date of the reasoned opinion.

Where enforcement proceedings brought by the Commission have been found by the ECJ to be inadmissible on the ground that the Commissions application is based on an objection different from that in the reasoned opinion, the Commission is not obliged to recommence the entire pre-litigation procedure but may lodge a fresh application before the Court based on the same objections as the reasoned opinion originally issued.

There is one circumstance in which the Court will accept an application made by the Commission which is not the same as it was under the reasoned opinion, and that is where the change limits what is contained in the reasoned opinion rather than expanding it in a way which could be disadvantage the respondent state.

However, while the Commission is procedurally bound to raise all of the grounds on which it is bringing the case during the pre-litigation procedure, Member States are not similarly bound to raise their defence during the pre-litigation procedure, but may raise new matters as defences before the court.

Why is an enforcement action admissible after the breach is remedied?

Wanneer = Once the procedural conditions for bringing article 258 proceedings have been fulfilled, and the period laid down by the Commission for compliance has expired without an adequate response by the Member State, it is no answer for that state to assert (=beweren), when the case is heard before the ECJ, that the breach has since been remedied.

The Commissions argues that it has a continued interest in bringing the action, not least to prevent states from undermining infringement proceedings by bringing their illegal conduct to an end just before judgment is delivered, and possibly re-commencing that same conduct again afterwards.

It is important for the Court to be able to rule on the legality of breaches of short duration, since these may be no less serious than longer.

Types of breach by Member States of EU law

Article 258 is very general = The Commission must simply consider that a state has failed to fulfil an obligation under this Treaty.

A. Breach of the o