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Part I: Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) Analysis 7.1 Introduction

Accidental risk involves the occurrence or potential occurrence of some

accident consisting of an event or sequence of events resulting into fire, explosion or

toxic hazards to human health and environment.

Risk Assessment (RA) provides a numerical measure of the risk that a

particular facility poses to the public. It begins with the identification of probable

potential hazardous events at an industry and categorization as per the

predetermined criteria. The consequences of major credible events are calculated for

different combinations of weather conditions to simulate worst possible scenario.

These consequence predictions are combined to provide numerical measures of the

risk for the entire facility.

MCA stands for Maximum Credible Accident or in other words, an accident

with maximum damage distance, which is believed to be probable. MCA analysis

does not include quantification of the probability of occurrence of an accident. In

practice the selection of accident scenarios for MCA analysis is carried out on the

basis of engineering judgement and expertise in the field of risk analysis especially in

accident analysis.

Chapter 7: Risk Assessment and Disaster Management Plan

7.2

A disastrous situation is the outcome of fire, explosion or toxic hazards in

addition to other natural causes that eventually lead to loss of life, property and

ecological imbalances.

7.1.1 Methodology of MCA Analysis The MCA analysis involves ordering and ranking of various sections in

terms of potential vulnerability. The data requirements for MCA analysis are:

Operating manual

Flow diagram and P&I diagrams

Detailed design parameters

Physical and chemical properties of all the chemicals

Detailed plant layout

Detailed area layout

Past accident data

Following steps are involved in the MCA analysis:

Identification of potential hazardous sections and representative failure

cases

Visualization of release scenarios considering type and the quantity of

the hazardous material

Damage distance computations for the released cases at different wind

velocities and atmospheric stability classes for heat radiations and

pressure waves

Drawing of damage contours on plot plan to show the effect due to the

accidental release of chemicals

7.2 Past Accident Data Analysis Analysis of events arising out of the unsafe conditions is one of the basic

requirements for ensuring safety in any facility. The data required for such analysis

has either to be generated by monitoring and/or collected from the records of the

past occurrences. This data, when analysed, helps in formulation of the steps

towards mitigation of hazards faced commonly. Trends in safety of various activities

can be evaluated and actions can be planned accordingly, to improve the safety.


7.3

Data analysis helps in correlating the causal factors and the corrective

steps to be taken for controlling the accidents. It is, therefore, of vital importance to

collect the data methodically, based on potential incidents, sections involved, causes

of failure and the preventive measures taken. This helps to face future eventualities

with more preparedness.

A) August 25, 2012, Paraguana Refinery Complex, Punto Fijo, Venezuela On 25 August 2012 at 01:11 (05:41 GMT), an explosion caused by the

ignition of a leaking gas at the refinery killed 48 people, primarily National Guard

troops stationed at the plant, and injured 151 others. According to Refinery Vice-

President Eulogio Del Pino a leak of propane and butane gas was detected an hour

before the blast. However, the contingency plan was not implemented. No operating units

were reported damaged by the blast but three storage tanks were burning. All three

burning storage tanks were extinguished by 28 August 2012.

In addition to the refinery, more than 1,600 homes were damaged by the

shockwave.

B) April 30, 2013, Marathon oil’s Refinery, Detroit, USA A tank of sour water, a mixture of hydrogen sulfide and ammonia

generated from refining crude oil, exploded at the Marathon Detroit Refinery in

southwest Detroit during maintenance work on 30th April 2013 evening. No injuries

were reported. It was unclear whether the maintenance check or some other factor

sparked the explosion. In the immediate aftermath of the explosion, a mandatory

evacuation order was issued for 3,000 residents of Melvindale, a suburb of Detroit,

due to concerns of deteriorating air quality caused by the resulting fire. Residents

were told to go to the city’s ice arena-civic center. The fire that erupted after the

explosion just before 6 p.m. on Saturday was extinguished within two hours by a

combined crew of Marathon, Detroit and Melvindale fire fighters. Despite the

relatively small scale of the fire, similar to the scale of a previous fire at the refinery in

2011, it raised the specter a much larger industrial catastrophe.

C) August 06, 2012, Chevron Richmond Refinery, California, USA On August 6, 2012, a large fire erupted at the refinery at about 6:15 p.m.

and reported to be contained at 10:40 p.m. Flames were seen issuing from at least

two of the refinery's towers. Private Health Services responded by notifying

residents shelter in place. The shelter-in-place order was lifted at 11:15 p.m. Initial

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propane

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Butane

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shelter_in_place


7.4

reports estimated that 11,000 people sought treatment at area hospitals and later

reports placed the number above 15,000 people.

A refinery spokeswoman stated that the fire erupted in the number 4 crude

distillation unit, or CDU. Just before 6:30 p.m., an inspection crew discovered that

there was a diesel leak in a line in the CDU—and that the leak was growing. Three

refinery workers were given first aid at the refinery. On April 15, 2013, the US

Chemical Safety Board released their preliminary report citing Chevron for a chronic

failure to replace aging equipment and called for an overhaul of regulatory oversight

of the industry to prevent such accidents from happening again

D) October 29, 2009, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Jaipur A massive fire broke out on 29th October at an oil storage depot in the

western state of Rajasthan, killing at least 11 people and injuring 135 others. Two

huge explosions were heard before the fire ignited and spread. The fire broke out

around 19:30 local time at the Jaipur storage depot run by Indian Oil Corporation

(IOC) Ltd. and was visible from over 25 kilometers away, according to reports.

Company officials said the depot covers an area of several square kilometres and the

oil tanks store gasoline, diesel and kerosene fuel for several state-owned oil

companies. Reports said the depot had a 100,000-kilolitre capacity. Initial estimates

indicate that products valued at 1.5 billion rupees have been burnt, and the

petroleum stocks were insured.

7.3 Hazard Identification Identification of hazards is an important step in Risk Assessment, as it

leads to the generation of accidental scenarios. The merits of including the hazard for

further investigation are subsequently determined by its significance, normally using

a cut-off or threshold quantity.

Once a hazard has been identified, it is necessary to evaluate it in terms of

the risk it presents to the employees and the neighbouring community. In principle,

both probability and consequences should be considered, but there are occasions

when either the probability or the consequence shown are sufficiently low or

sufficiently high, decisions can be made on just one factor.

During the hazard identification component, the following considerations

are taken into account.

Chemical identities

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_refinery#The_crude_oil_distillation_unit

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_refinery#The_crude_oil_distillation_unit


7.5

Location of process unit facilities for hazardous materials

The types and design of process units

The quantity of material that could be involved in an airborne release

and

The nature of the hazard (e.g. airborne toxic vapours or mists, fire,

explosion, large quantities stored or processed handling conditions)

most likely to accompany hazardous materials spills or releases

7.3.1 Fire and Explosion Index (FEI) Fire and Explosion Index (FEI) is useful in identification of areas in which

the potential risk reaches a certain level. It estimates the global risk associated with a

process unit and classifies the units according to their general level of risk. FEI

covers aspects related to the intrinsic hazard of materials, the quantities handled and

operating conditions. This factor gives index value for the area which could be

affected by an accident, the damage to property within the area and the working days

lost due to accidents. The method for evaluation of FEI involves following stages.

Selection of pertinent process unit which can have serious impact on

plant safety

Determination of Material Factor (MF): This factor for a given

substance in the process unit gives intrinsic potential to release energy

in case of fire or an explosion. Material Factor can be directly obtained

from Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index Hazard classification Guide of

American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York. The factor can

also be evaluated from NFPA indices of danger, health, flammability

and reactivity

Determination of Unit Hazard Factor: The Unit Hazard Factor is

obtained by multiplication of General Process Hazard (GPH) factor and

Special Process Hazard (SPH) factor. GPH factor is computed

according to presence of exothermic reactions and loading and

unloading operations. The penalties due to each of these reactions /

operations are summed up to compute GPH factor. Similarly, SPH

factor can be evaluated for the operations close to flammable range or

pressures different from atmospheric. Penalties of these operations for

both factors can be obtained from Dow’s EFI index form


7.6

Fire and explosion index is then calculated as the product of Material

Factor (MF) and Unit Hazard Factor. Degree of hazards based on FEI is given in the

following Table 7.1.

Table 7.1 Degree of Hazards Based on FEI

FEI Range Degree of Hazard 0 - 60 Light 61- 96 Moderate 97 - 127 Intermediate 128 - 158 Heavy 159 and Above Severe

Preventive and protective control measures are recommended based on

degree of hazard. Therefore, FEI indicates the efforts to be taken to reduce risks for

a particular unit. FEI computed for various pipeline are given in Table 7.2.

Table 7.2 Fire and Explosion Index for Chemicals

Sr. No.

Chemical FEI Category

Aromatic Compounds 1 Naphtha 86 Moderate 2 Benzene 68 Moderate 3 Paraxylene 65 Moderate 4 Phenol 46 Light Aliphatic Compounds 1 Vinyl Acetate Monomer 128 Heavy 2 Acetic Acid 63 Moderate 3 Glycol 15 Light Others 1 Diesel 33 Light

7.4 MCA Analysis MCA analysis encompasses defined techniques to identify the hazards

and compute the consequent effects in terms of damage distances due to heat

radiation, toxic releases, vapour cloud explosion etc. A list of probable or potential

accidents of the major units in the complex arising due to use, storage and handling

of the hazardous materials are examined to establish their credibility. Depending

upon the effective hazardous attributes and their impact on the event, the maximum


7.7

effect on the surrounding environment and the respective damage caused can be

assessed. Flow chart of accidental release of hazardous chemicals is presented

in Fig. 7.1.

Release of Chemical

Instantaneous Continuous

Bottom Top

Two Phase Outflow Liquid

Ignition Vapours

Ignition ?

Pool Formation

Ignition ?Flare

Pool Fire

Evaporation

Dispersion

Vapour Cloud Formation

Ignition ?

Detonation

Toxicity

Vapour Cloud Explosion

Pressure Wave

CONSEQUENCE MODELLING

Heat Radiation

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

TOXICITY COMPUTATION

Fig. 7.1: Accidental Release Scenario


7.8

Hazardous Gases, on release can cause damage on a large scale. The

extent of the damage is dependent upon the nature of the release and the physical

state of the material. In the present report the consequences for flammable hazards

are considered and the damages caused due to such releases are assessed with

recourse to MCA analysis.

Flammable Gases on release may cause Jet fire and Flash Fire and less

likely unconfined vapour cloud explosion causing possible damage to the

surrounding area. The extent of damage depends upon the nature of the release.

The release of flammable gases and subsequent ignition result in heat radiation

wave or vapour cloud depending upon the flammability and its physical state.

Damage distances due to release of hazardous materials depend on atmospheric

stability and wind speed. It is important to visualize the consequence of the release

of such substances and the damage caused to the surrounding areas. Computation

of damage distances are carried out at various atmospheric stability conditions for

various wind velocities and the result is tabulated. Pasquill-Gifford atmospheric

stability classes with corresponding weather conditions are listed in Table 7.3.

Table 7.3 Pasquill – Gifford Atmospheric Stability

Sr. No.

Stability Class

Weather Conditions

1. A Very unstable – sunny, light wind 2. A/B Unstable - as with A only less sunny or more windy 3. B Unstable - as with A/B only less sunny or more windy 4. B/C Moderately unstable – moderate sunny and moderate wind 5. C Moderately unstable – very windy / sunny or overcast / light wind 6. C/D Moderate unstable – moderate sun and high wind 7. D Neutral – little sun and high wind or overcast / windy night 8. E Moderately stable – less overcast and less windy night 9. F Stable – night with moderate clouds and light / moderate wind 10. G Very stable – possibly fog

7.4.1 Fire and Explosion Scenarios Combustible Gases within their flammable limits may ignite and burn if

exposed to an ignition source of sufficient energy. During transportation this normally

occurs as a result of a leakage or spillage. Depending on the physical properties of

the gas and the operating parameters, the combustion of gas in a pipeline may take

on a number of forms like jet fire, flash fire and pool fire.


7.9

7.4.1.1 Jet Fire Jet fire occurs when flammable material of a high exit velocity ignites. In

transportation lines this may be due to design or an accidental release. Ejection of

flammable gases from pipes or pipe flanges may give rise to a jet fire and in some

instances the jet flame could have substantial “reach”. Depending on wind speed,

the flame may tilt and impinge on pipeline, equipment or structures. The thermal

radiation from these fires may cause injury to people or damage equipment some

distance from the source of the flames.

7.4.1.2 Flash Fire A flash fire is the non-explosive combustion of a vapour cloud resulting

from a release of flammable material into the open air, which after mixing with air,

ignites. A flash fire results from the ignition of a released flammable cloud in which

there is essentially no increase in combustion rate. The ignition source could be

electric spark, a hot surface, and friction between moving parts of a machine or an

open fire.

Flash fire may occur due to its less vapour temperature than ambient

temperature. Hence, as a result of a spill, they are dispersed initially by the negative

buoyancy of cold vapours and subsequently by the atmospheric turbulence. After the

release and dispersion of the flammable fuel the resulting vapour cloud is ignited and

when the fuel vapour is not mixed with sufficient air prior to ignition, it results in

diffusion fire burning. Therefore the rate at which the fuel vapour and air are mixed

together during combustion determines the rate of burning in the flash fire.

The main dangers of flash fire are radiation and direct flame contact. The

size of the flammable cloud determines the area of possible direct flame contact

effects. Radiation effects on a target depend on several factors including its distance

from the flames, flame height, flame emissive power, local atmospheric transitivity

and cloud size. Most of the time, flash combustion lasts for no more than a few

seconds.

7.4.1.3 Vapour Cloud Explosion The Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) begins with a release of a large

quantity of flammable vaporizing liquid or gas from a storage tank, transport vessel or

pipeline producing a dangerous overpressure. These explosions follow a well-

determined pattern. There are basically four features, which must be present for an

effective vapour cloud explosion to occur with an effective blast. These are:


7.10

First, the release material must be flammable and at a suitable condition of

temperature and pressure which depends on the chemical. The materials which

come under this category, range from liquefied gases under pressure (e.g. Methane,

butane, propane); ordinary flammable liquids (e.g. cyclohexane, naphtha) to non

liquefied flammable gases (e.g. ethylene, acetylene)

Second, before the ignition, a cloud of sufficient size must have been

formed. Normally ignition delays of few minutes are considered the most probable for

generating the vapour cloud explosions

Third, a sufficient amount of the cloud must be within the flammable range

of the material to cause extensive overpressure

Fourth, the flame speed determines the blast effects of the vapour cloud

explosions, which can vary greatly

The flammable content of a gas cloud is calculated by three-dimensional

integration of the concentration profiles, which fall within the flammable limits. If the

gas cloud ignites, two situations can occur, namely non-explosive combustion (flash

fire) and explosive combustion (flash fire + explosion).

7.4.1.4 BLEVE If the liquid is stored under pressure at a temperature above its boiling

point, the initial physical explosion that breaks the receptacle produces a sudden

decompression giving rise to a massive evaporation of the saturated liquid. This is

known as Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE). These explosions

are of great destructive power due to the high increase in pressure caused by the

sudden incorporation of liquid into the gas phase. The ignition of BLEVE produces a

mass of gases at high temperature known as ‘fireball’ with significant thermal effects.

Historically, BLEVEs have been produced with some frequency and have almost

caused human casualties.

7.4.1.5 Lower and Upper Flammability Limit In case of any spillage and leakages of hydrocarbons / flammable material,

probability of getting ignited is depending on whether the air borne mixture is in the

flammable region. The Lower flammability limit corresponds to minimum proportion of

combustible vapour in air for combustion. The Upper flammability limit Correspond to

maximum proportion of combustible vapour in air for combustion and the


7.11

concentration range lying between the lower and the upper limit is called as

flammable range.

7.4.2 Models for the Calculation of Heat load and Shock Waves If a flammable gas or liquid is released, damage resulting from heat

radiation or explosion may occur on ignition. Models used in this study for the effects

in the event of immediate ignition (torch and pool fire) and the ignition of a gas cloud

will be discussed in succession. These models calculate the heat radiation or peak

overpressure as a function of the distance from the torch, the ignited pool or gas

cloud. The physical significance of the various heat loads is depicted in Table 7.4.

Table 7.4 List of Damages Envisaged at Various Heat Loads

Sr. No.

Heat loads (kW/m²)

Type of Damage Intensity Damage to Equipment Damage to People

1 37.5 Damage to process equipment 100% lethality in 1 min. 1% lethality in 10 sec

2 25.0 Minimum energy required to ignite wood

50% Lethality in 1 min. Significant injury in 10 sec

3 19.0 Maximum thermal radiation intensity allowed on thermally

unprotected equipment

--

4 12.5 Minimum energy required to melt plastic tubing

1% lethality in 1 min

5 4.0 - First degree burns, causes pain for exposure longer

than 10 sec

6 1.6 -- Causes no discomfort on long exposures

Source: World Bank (1988). Technical Report No. 55: Techniques for Assessing Industrial Hazards. , Washington, D.C: The World Bank.

7.4.3 Model for Pressure Wave

A pressure wave can be caused by gas cloud explosion. The following

damage criteria are assumed as a result of the peak overpressure of a pressure

wave:

0.03 bar over pressure wave is taken as the limit for the occurrence of

wounds as a result of flying fragments of glass


7.12

Following assumptions are used to translate an explosion in terms of

damage to the surrounding area:

- Within the contour area of the exploding gas cloud, Casualties are

due to burns or asphyxiation. Houses and buildings in this zone will

be severely damaged.

- In houses with serious damage, it is assumed that one out of eight

persons present will be killed as a result of the building collapse.

Within the zone of a peak over pressure of 0.3 bar the risk of death

in houses is 0.9 x 1/8 = 0.1125, and in the zone with a peak over

pressure of 0.1 bar the probability of death is 0.1 x 1/8 = 0.0125,

i.e. one out of eighty people will be killed

The significance of the peak over pressure 0.3 bar, 0.1 bar, 0.03 bar and

0.01 bar are depicted in Table 7.5.

Table 7.5 Damage Criteria for Pressure Waves

Human Injury Structural Damage

Peak Over Pressure (bar)

Type of Damage

Peak Over Pressure (bar)

Type of Damage

5-8 100% lethality 0.3 Heavy (90% damage)

3.5-5 50% lethality 0.1 Repairable (10% damage)

2-3 Threshold lethality

0.03 Damage of Glass

1.33-2 Severe lung damage

0.01 Crack of windows

1-1.33 50% Eardrum rupture

- -

Source: Marshall, V.C. (1977)’ How lethal are explosives and toxic escapes’.

7.4.4 Vulnerability Models Vulnerability models are used in order to determine how people are injured

by exposure to heat load. Such models are designed on the basis of animal

experiments or on the basis of the analysis of injuries resulting from accidents, which

have occurred. Vulnerability models often make use of a probit function. In this

function, a link is made between the heat load and the percentage of people exposed

to a particular type of injury.


7.13

It is assumed that everyone inside the area covered or gas cloud will be

burnt to death or will asphyxiate. Human fatality is a function of heat flux and

exposure time. The probit expressions for the prediction of mortality due to thermal

radiation from fire scenarios are proportional to the product of t and q4/3. The probit

equation usually used is that proposed by Eisenberg and coworkers*

Pr = -14.9 + 2.56 In (10-4 q4/3 t)

In which,

Pr = Probit the measure of the percentage of people exposed to a

particular injury

t = exposure time in seconds

q = thermal load in W/m²

For 1% lethality in the exposed persons the corresponding probit value is

2.67. Table 7.6 gives time is seconds for percentage of fatality at various heat

radiations.

Table 7.6 Range of Thermal Flux Levels and their Potential Effects

Heat Flux (kW/m²)

Seconds Exposure For % Fatality 1% 50% 99%

1.6 500 1300 3200 4 150 370 930

12.5 30 80 200 37.5 8 20 50

*Eisenberg, N. A., Lynch C. J. and Breeding, R. J. (1975) Vulnerability

Model. A Simulation System for Assessing Damage Resulting from Marine Spills

National Technology Information Service Report AD-A015-245, Springfield, MA

7.5 Computation of Damage Distances Damage distances for the accidental release of hazardous materials have

been computed at 2F, 3D and 5D weather conditions. In these conditions, 2, 3 and 5

are wind velocities in m/s and F and D are atmospheric stability classes. These

weather conditions have been selected to accommodate worst case scenarios to get

maximum effective distances. DNV based software PHAST Micro 6.51 has been

used to carry out consequence analysis. Damage distances computed for Loading

Arms and Transfer pipeline are described below:


7.14

Jet Fire: This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm and 50

mm in Motor Spirit Loading Arm at various heat radiation levels under the different

atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities. The damage distances for naphtha

due to 50 mm leak at stability class 5D conditions are 30 m, 47 m, 76 m for heat load

37.5 KW/m², 12.5 KW/m² and 4 KW/m² respectively.

The computed damage distances for other compounds for 25 mm and 50

mm leak sizes at heat loads of 37.5 KW/m², 12.5 KW/m² and 4.0 KW/m² are given in

Table 7.7 and Table 7.8 respectively for loading arms and pipelines.


7.15

Table 7.7 Consequence Analysis for Jet Fire Scenario: Loading Arm Handling

Various Chemicals

Scenario Considered

Leak

Leak Size (mm)

Source Strength (kg/sec)

Weather Conditi

on

Damage Distance (m) for Various Heat Loads

37.5 kW/m²

12.5 kW/m²

4.0 kW/m²

Aromatic Compounds Naphtha 25 5.14 2F 13 27 45

3D 17 28 47 5D 17 27 44

50 20 2F 27 52 86 3D 30 50 84 5D 30 47 76

Line Rupture 764.48 2F 66 123 203 3D 75 130 215 5D 85 137 227

Benzene 25 5.71 2F 8 27 45 3D 15 28 47 5D 19 30 48

50 22.84 2F 21 52 86 3D 31 53 89 5D 34 54 87

Line Rupture 848.79 2F 55 114 187 3D 79 138 228 5D 87 140 232

Paraxylene 25 5.8 2F 9 24 39 3D 14 24 41 5D 16 26 42

50 23.24 2F 19 41 68 3D 26 43 72 5D 29 45 73

Line Rupture 863.96 2F 28 56 93 3D 46 76 127 5D 52 82 135

Phenol 25 6.06 2F - 6 11 3D - 7 12 5D 5 8 13

50 24.24 2F - 11 19 3D - 12 21 5D 9 15 24

Line Rupture 625.66 2F - 13 23 3D 5 19 32 5D 18 28 45


7.16

Scenario Considered

Leak

Leak Size (mm)


Weather Conditi

on


37.5 kW/m²

12.5 kW/m²

4.0 kW/m²

Aliphatic Compounds Vinyl Acetate Monomer

25 6.19 2F 1 20 36 3D 6 23 38 5D 15 24 40

50 24.76 2F 37 40 69 3D 17 43 71 5D 28 45 74

Line Rupture 637.74 2F 30 92 155 3D 58 119 194 5D 86 139 231

Acetic Acid 25 6.72 2F - - 2 3D - - 3 5D - 2 4

50 26.91 2F - - 5 3D - - 6 5D - 4 7

Line Rupture 640.04 2F - 5 22 3D - 14 26 5D - 19 31

Glycol 25 - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

50 - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

Line Rupture - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

Others Diesel 25 5.85 2F - 2 5

3D - 2 5 5D 2 3 5

50 23.40 2F - 5 8 3D 3 5 9 5D 4 6 10

Line Rupture 850.46 2F - 4 7 3D 3 6 10 5D 6 9 14


7.17

Table 7.8 Consequence Analysis for Jet Fire Scenario: Pipelines Handling

Various Chemicals

Scenario Considered

Leak

Leak Size (mm)


Weather Conditi

on


37.5 kW/m²

12.5 kW/m²

4.0 kW/m²

Aromatic Compounds Naphtha 25 13.6 2F - 34 60

3D 17 35 59 5D 22 34 57

50 54.41 2F 15 59 104 3D 28 61 101 5D 36 59 99

Line Rupture 8087.9 2F 156 444 782 3D 199 448 745 5D 233 441 709

Benzene 25 15.10 2F - 39 68 3D 22 42 70 5D 25 40 67

50 60.42 2F 22 71 123 3D 36 72 119 5D 42 69 115

Line Rupture 2245.41 2F 128 325 556 3D 154 321 527 5D 168 299 486

Paraxylene 25 16.1 2F 11 38 67 3D 20 39 65 5D 24 38 63

50 64 2F 18 66 116 3D 32 68 112 5D 40 65 109

Line Rupture 4242. 2F 98 252 430 3D 118 245 401 5D 153 271 443

Phenol 25 15.45 2F - 17 32 3D 6 21 35 5D 18 29 49

50 61.80 2F - 32 57 3D 15 36 60 5D 31 49 81

Line Rupture 2296.89 2F 20 66 112 3D 36 73 120 5D 55 86 145


7.18

Scenario Considered

Leak

Leak Size (mm)


Weather Conditi

on


37.5 kW/m²

12.5 kW/m²

4.0 kW/m²


25 15.78 2F - 28 54

3D 10 33 55 5D 22 34 58

50 63.13 2F 8 56 103 3D 26 64 104 5D 40 66 110

Line Rupture 2346.07 2F 126 317 540 3D 151 312 512 5D 163 290 472

Acetic Acid 25 17.16 2F - - 6 3D - - 10 5D 13 37 60

50 68.64 2F - - 14 3D - 8 17 5D - 12 20

Line Rupture 2403.44 2F - 17 45 3D - 25 45 5D 9 29 47

Glycol 25 - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

50 - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

Line Rupture - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

Others Diesel 25 5.85 2F - 12 20

3D 7 13 22 5D 9 14 23

50 23.40 2F - 18 31 3D 9 18 30 5D 14 22 36

Line Rupture 850.46 2F 17 36 60 3D 20 34 57 5D 26 41 66


7.19

Flash Fire: This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm and

50 mm Leak of Cyclohexane pipeline at LFL concentrations under the different

atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities. The damage distances due to Leak

are 22.31m, 18.26m, 16.98m for stability classes 2F, 3D and 5D conditions

respectively. The computed damage distances for other process units at LFL

distances are given in Table 7.9 and Table 7.10 respectively for loading arms and

pipelines.


7.20

Table 7.9 Consequence Analysis for Flash Fire Scenario: Loading Arms Handling

Various Chemicals

Scenario Considered

LFL Concentration

(ppm)

Leak Size (mm)


Weather Condition

LFL Distance

(m) Aromatic Compounds Naphtha 10000 25 5.14 2F 9

3D 11 5D 11

50 20 2F 15 3D 17 5D 22

Line Rupture

764.48 2F 260 3D 190 5D 185

Benzene 12000

25 5.71 2F 8 3D 11 5D 13

50 22.84 2F 12 3D 14 5D 22

Line Rupture

848.79 2F 245 3D 202 5D 192

Paraxylene 11000

25 5.8 2F 9 3D 11 5D 11

50 23.24 2F 11 3D 13 5D 21

Line Rupture

863.96 2F 68 3D 34 5D 7

Phenol 15000 25 6.06 2F 7 3D 9 5D 10

50 24.24 2F 8 3D 11 5D 16

Line Rupture

625.66 2F 2 3D 3 5D 6


7.21

Scenario Considered

LFL Concentration

(ppm)

Leak Size (mm)


Weather Condition

LFL Distance

(m) Aliphatic Compounds Vinyl Acetate Monomer

26000

25 6.19 2F 6 3D 6 5D 4

50 24.76 2F 9 3D 11 5D 13

Line Rupture

637.74 2F 162 3D 133 5D 107

Acetic Acid 27000

25 6.72 2F 8 3D 6 5D 5

50 26.91 2F 15 3D 16 5D 14

Line Rupture

640.04 2F 3 3D 3 5D 7

Glycol - 25 - 2F - 3D - 5D -

50 - 2F - 3D - 5D -

Line Rupture

- 2F - 3D - 5D -

Others Diesel 5000 25 5.85 2F 11

3D 13 5D 11

50 23.40 2F 14 3D 15 5D 24

Line Rupture

850.46 2F 4 3D 4 5D 8


7.22

Table 7.10 Consequence Analysis for Flash Fire Scenario: Pipelines Handling

Various Chemicals

Scenario Considered

LFL Concentration

(ppm)

Leak Size (mm)


Weather Condition

LFL Distance

(m) Aromatic Compounds Naphtha 10000 25 13.6 2F 10

3D 9 5D 9

50 54.41 2F 30 3D 26 5D 22

Line Rupture 8087.9 2F 2184 3D 1414 5D 1312

Benzene 12000

25 15.10 2F 16 3D 13 5D 11

50 60.42 2F 32 3D 30 5D 32

Line Rupture 2245.41 2F 1360 3D 970 5D 737

Paraxylene 11000

25 16.1 2F 9 3D 8 5D 7

50 64 2F 28 3D 25 5D 20

Line Rupture 4242. 2F 37 3D 27 5D 49

Phenol 15000 25 15.45 2F 8 3D 7 5D 7

50 61.80 2F 27 3D 23 5D 20

Line Rupture

2296.89

2F 20 3D 17 5D 33


7.23

Scenario Considered

LFL Concentration

(ppm)

Leak Size (mm)


Weather Condition

LFL Distance

(m) Aliphatic Compounds Vinyl Acetate Monomer

26000

25 15.78 2F 4 3D 4 5D 4

50 63.13 2F 9 3D 8 5D 8

Line Rupture 2346.07 2F 760 3D 440 5D 120

Acetic Acid 27000

25 17.16 2F 4 3D 4 5D 4

50 68.64 2F 9 3D 8 5D 9

Line Rupture 2403.44 2F 36 3D 30 5D 56

Glycol - 25 - 2F - 3D - 5D -

50 - 2F - 3D - 5D -

Line Rupture - 2F - 3D - 5D -

Others Diesel 5000 25 16.02 2F 9

3D 9 5D 8

50 64.10 2F 34 3D 27 5D 22

Line Rupture

9528.49 2F 46 3D 32 5D 58


7.24

Pool Fire: This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm and 50

mm and catastrophic rupture of Methanol pipeline at various heat radiation levels

under the different atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities. The damage

distances due to catastrophic rupture at stability class 3D conditions are 115.5m,

158.3m and 232.2 for heat load 37.5 kW/m² 12.5 kW/m² and 4.0 kW/m² respectively

and damage contour are shown in Table 7.11 and Table 7.12 respectively for

loading arms and pipelines.


7.25

Table 7.11 Consequence Analysis for Pool Fire Scenario: Loading Arms Handling

Various Chemicals

Scenario Considered

Leak Size (mm)


Pool Radius

(m)

Weather Condition


37.5 kW/m²

12.5 kW/m²

4.0 kW/m²

Aromatic Compounds Naphtha 25 5.14 0.01 2F 15 23 31

3D 21 29 36 5D 34 39 44

50 20 0.02 2F 24 32 51 3D 26 36 56 5D 38 50 58

Line Rupture

764.48 0.15 2F - 85 173 3D - 84 185 5D - 88 205

Benzene

25 5.71 0.01 2F 15 25 41 3D 18 30 45 5D 26 42 54

50 22.84 0.02 2F - 29 55 3D - 31 59 5D - 40 70

Line Rupture

848.79 0.15

2F - 80 164 3D - 80 176 5D - 82 193

Paraxylene

25 5.8 0.01 2F - 19 36 3D - 23 42 5D - 31 53

50 23.24 0.02 2F - 28 56 3D - 30 62 5D - 40 76

Line Rupture

863.96 0.15 2F - 83 166 3D - 83 178 5D - 87 197

Phenol

25 6.06 0.01 2F 17 24 39 3D 20 29 43 5D 26 38 50

50 24.24s 0.02 2F - 26 52 3D - 32 58 5D - 40 67

Line Rupture

625.66 0.13 2F - 69 132 3D - 70 139 5D - 73 150


7.26

Scenario Considered

Leak Size (mm)


Pool Radius

(m)

Weather Condition


37.5 kW/m²

12.5 kW/m²

4.0 kW/m²


25 6.19 0.01 2F 15 24 36 3D 20 31 41 5D 24 37 47

50 24.76 0.02 2F - 27 47 3D - 31 52 5D - 42 61

Line Rupture

637.74 0.13 2F - 72 141 3D - 71 148 5D - 73 159

Acetic Acid

25 6.72 0.01 2F 37 48 67 3D 43 54 71 5D 57 67 84

50 26.91 0.02 2F 54 74 106 3D 63 81 112 5D 77 95 124

Line Rupture

640.04 0.13 2F 120 177 270 3D 124 179 271 5D 132 182 273

Glycol 25 - - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

50 - - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

Line Rupture

- - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

Others Diesel

25 5.85 0.01 2F 20 31 45 3D 26 39 51 5D 32 46 58

50 23.40 0.02 2F - 33 57 3D - 36 61 5D - 48 74

Line Rupture

850.46 0.15 2F - 80 154 3D - 81 164 5D - 85 179


7.27

Table 7.12 Consequence Analysis for Pool Fire Scenario: Pipelines Handling Various

Chemicals

Scenario Considered

Leak Size (mm)


Pool Radius

(m)

Weather Condition


37.5 kW/m²

12.5 kW/m²

4.0 kW/m²

Aromatic Compounds Naphtha 25 13.6 0.01 2F - - -

3D - - - 5D - - -

50 54.41 0.02 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

Line Rupture

8087.9 0.15 2F - 186 3158 3D - 174 322 5D - 186 353

Benzene

25 15.10 0.01 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

50 60.42 0.02 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

Line Rupture

2245.41 0.15 2F - 118 210 3D - 112 215 5D - 122 234

Paraxylene

25 16.1 0.01 2F 50 54 61 3D 60 64 67 5D - - -

50 64 0.02 2F - 66 83 3D 71 73 74 5D 136 139 141

Line Rupture

4242.63 0.15 2F - 160 271 3D - 150 277 5D - 171 316

Phenol

25 15.45 0.01 2F - 57 78 3D - 64 85 5D - 98 118

50 61.80 0.02 2F - 75 107 3D - 76 111 5D - 118 156

Line Rupture

2296.89 0.13 2F - 118 199 3D - 116 205 5D - 133 232


7.28

Scenario Considered

Leak Size (mm)


Pool Radius

(m)

Weather Condition


37.5 kW/m²

12.5 kW/m²

4.0 kW/m²


25 15.78

0.01 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

50 63.13 0.02 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

Line Rupture

2346.07 0.13 2F - 111 190 3D - 106 193 5D - 112 200

Acetic Acid

25 17.16 0.01 2F 124 140 166 3D 351 367 393 5D - - -

50 68.64 0.02 2F 168 196 243 3D 227 254 299 5D 514 540 583

Line Rupture

2403.44 0.13 2F 198 275 399 3D 198 272 395 5D 230 300 420

Glycol 25 - - -

- - -

2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

50 - - -

- - -

2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

Line Rupture

- - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

Others Diesel

25 16.02 0.01 2F - 97 124 3D - 129 157 5D - 363 394

50 64.10 0.02 2F - 137 178 3D - 121 167 5D - 261 311

Line Rupture

9528.49 0.15 2F - 210 332 3D - 197 333 5D - 223 378


7.29

Vapour Cloud Explosion: This scenario was visualized by considering leak sizes of 25 mm and 50

mm and catastrophic rupture of paraxylene loading arm at various overpressure

waves under the different atmospheric stability classes and wind velocities. The

damage distances due to catastrophic rupture at 3D conditions are 554.9m, 351.3m,

275.5m for 0.03bar, 0.1 bar, and 0.3 bar respectively.

The computed damage distances for other compounds for 25 mm and 50

mm leak sizes and catastrophic rupture for overpressure waves of 0.3 bar, 0.1 bar

and 0.03 bar given in Table 7.13 and Table 7.14 respectively for loading arms and

pipelines.


7.30

Table 7.13 Consequence Analysis for VCE Scenario: Loading Arms Handling Various

Chemicals

Scenario Considered

Leak Size (mm)


Weather Condition

Damage Distance (m) 0.03bar 0.1bar 0.3bar


3D 61 32 21 5D 52 28 19

50 20 2F 206 145 122 3D 130 72 51 5D 118 67 48

Line Rupture 764.48 2F 639 429 359 3D 596 391 318 5D 598 404 335

Benzene 25 5.71 2F 69 35 22 3D 64 33 21 5D 67 40 30

50 22.84 2F 190 132 111 3D 137 81 60 5D 122 69 49

Line Rupture 848.79 2F 604 387 327 3D 611 400 330 5D 617 412 338

Paraxylene 25 5.8 - - - - - - - - - - - -

50 23.24 - - - - - - - - - - - -

Line Rupture 863.96 - - - - - - - - - - - -

Phenol 25 6.06 2F - - - 3D 20 30 58 5D 18 26 49

50 24.24 2F - - - 3D 28 46 95 5D 25 40 82

Line Rupture 625.66 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -


7.31

Scenario Considered

Leak Size (mm)


Weather Condition


Aliphatic Compound Vinyl Acetate Monomer

25 6.19 2F - - -

3D 17 24 44 5D 16 22 38

50 24.76 2F 87 43 26 3D 80 40 25 5D 80 45 32

Line Rupture 637.74 2F 474 296 233 3D 456 292 231 5D 393 265 217

Acetic Acid 25 6.72 2F - - -

3D - - - 5D - - -

50 26.91 2F 91 44 27 3D 97 53 36 5D 82 46 33

Line Rupture 640.04 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

Glycol 25 - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

50 - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

Line Rupture - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

Others Diesel 25 5.85 2F 92 36 23

3D 64 33 21 5D 65 39 29

50 23.40 2F 112 53 31 3D 104 50 30 5D 113 59 39

Line Rupture 850.46 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -


7.32

Table 7.14 Consequence Analysis for VCE Scenario: Pipelines Handling Various

Chemicals

Scenario Considered

Leak Size (mm)


Weather Condition



3D 81 46 33 5D 72 42 31

50 54.41 2F 180 99 69 3D 169 95 67 5D 156 95 72

Line Rupture 8087.9 2F 2947 2530 2503 3D 2541 1984 1941 5D 2770 2201 2055

Benzene 25 15.10 2F 16 22 39 3D 15 21 36 5D - - -

50 60.42 2F 191 104 72 3D 184 101 70 5D 170 101 75

Line Rupture 2245.41 2F 2074 1657 1598 3D 1833 1477 1413 5D 1881 1456 1297

Paraxylene 25 16.1 2F 86 48 34 3D 80 45 32 5D 72 42 31

50 64 2F 178 99 69 3D 168 94 67 5D 156 95 72

Line Rupture 4242. 2F 772 495 392 3D 934 651 545 5D 898 555 427

Phenol 25 15.45 2F 78 44 32 3D 73 42 31 5D 56 29 19

50 61.80 2F 166 94 67 3D 154 88 64 5D 136 81 60

Line Rupture 2296.89 2F 302 140 80 3D 222 100 55 5D 403 189 109


7.33

Scenario Considered

Leak Size (mm)


Weather Condition


Aliphatic Compound Vinyl Acetate Monomer

25 15.78 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

50 63.13 2F 102 55 37 3D 98 53 36 5D 86 48 34

Line Rupture 2346.07 2F 1152 939 924 3D 1032 868 858 5D 1159 907 813

Acetic Acid 25 17.16 2F 19 29 56 3D 17 25 46 5D - - -

50 68.64 2F 117 67 48 3D 102 55 37 5D 91 50 35

Line Rupture 2403.44 2F 458 212 121 3D 498 229 129 5D 529 254 152

Glycol 25 - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

50 - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

Line Rupture - 2F - - - 3D - - - 5D - - -

Others Diesel 25 16.02 2F 98 59 44

3D 84 47 33 5D 75 43 31

50 64.10 2F 203 121 90 3D 183 106 78 5D 163 98 74

Line Rupture 9528.49 2F 615 285 162 3D 671 303 166 5D 792 366 208


7.34

Part II: Risk Mitigation Measures 7.6 Introduction

The scope of the study covers mitigation measures based on Maximum

Credible Accident (MCA) Analysis. The Fire and Explosion Indices were computed

for the identification and screening of vulnerable sections and consequence analysis

was carried out for the accidental release scenarios of hazardous chemicals at

various atmospheric conditions. The following are mitigation measures for pipeline

hazards.

7.7 Pipeline Hazards Pipeline External Corrosion Protection and Monitoring:

Pipeline should be epoxy coated line with 4” PUF insulation and HDPE top

sheath. Periodic intelligent pigging survey and pipe-to-soil potential surveys shall be

conducted for pipeline health monitoring in accordance with the requirement of codes

and best industry practices. Following are some common design criteria used in

insulation system design for piping application

Providing personnel protection

Limiting or retarding surface condensation

Providing process control

Economic optimization or energy conservation

Providing fire protection

Providing freeze protection

Providing noise control

Pigging Facilities: For maintenance of the pipeline, pig launching and pig-receiving facilities

should be provided at the beginning and end. The launchers and receivers should be

suitable for intelligent pigging.

Pigging is partly an experience-driven technique. From a wide selection of

pig types, the knowledge operator must choose an appropriate model, design the

pigging protocol including pig speed, distance and driving force and assess the

progress during the operation. The evaluator should be satisfied that the pigging


7.35

operation is indeed beneficial and effective in removing corrosive products from the

line in a timely fashion.

Pipeline Testing: All welds should be radio graphed and hydrostatic testing of the pipeline

should be performed at a pressure up to 1.4 times the design pressure of the pipeline

system based on the design code requirements. The test pressure should be held for

a minimum period of 30 minutes. This will ensure complete structural integrity of the

pipeline.

Leak Detection System: State-of-the-art Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system

supported by leak detection software module, precision instrument and dedicated

communication system should be installed to monitor the integrity of the pipeline. The

shut down system of the pipeline will act to close the sectionalizing valves based on

leak detection system and will alert the pipeline operator about the potential leaks

along the pipeline route. Typically, time required to detect/confirm a leak, raising

alarm and taking action to isolate the leaking section is around 100-150 seconds.

The entire pipeline system should be monitored continuously from a control station

having a SCADA system. The remote control and monitoring is typically done from a

centralized system on a 24/7 basis. The systems are typically computer based and

most have a back-up computer and other redundant features. The centralized

SCADA system typically communicates with the field and remote devices through a

dedicated communication network such as land telephone lines, satellite system,

microwave towers, or directional radio frequencies with most systems having

reluctant communication frequencies.

The measures that should be employed to protect security of SCADA

systems include:

Maintain integrity of communication parts through out the system

Verification of transmitted signals on regular basis

Inspection of status of field devices through fixed time schedule

Regular feedback of control signals to check its reliability

Database protection from viruses to avoid system failure

Accessing control to the control centre by defined procedure


7.36

Other Safety Aspects:

The pipeline will be physically patrolled by walk-through during day to

day operational and maintenance activities, company employees

should be aware of all activities occurring around the pipeline and

report such activities to the appropriate authorities

Pipeline appurtenances like valves and meters should be painted to

prevent atmospheric corrosion

Nearby population, if any along the pipeline route should be made

aware of the safety precautions, to be taken in the event of any mishap

due to pipeline.

7.8 Pumps Preventive Maintenance Inspection Schedule for Pumps

All the following items shall be checked / recorded after the specified

period:

After 1000 running hours or 3 months whichever earlier:

Bearing lubricant (for water contamination and sediments)

Oil ring for performance

Deflector for looseness

Constant level oiler for leakage

Mechanical seal for leakage

Seal flushing/quenching system (of Mechanical Seal) for clogging and

chocking.

Cooling water flow in both the bearing housings

Condition of bearing by sound and temperature (in running condition)

Performance of all measuring instruments (Pressure/Temperature

gauges and Flow meters)

After 4000 running hours or 1 year whichever earlier:

Repeat all checks given above

Flushing of bearing with lube oil and refilling of oil to required level,

whether carried out or not


7.37

Flushing of cooling water lines and strainers to ensure proper flow of

cooling water.

Foundation, foundation bolts and supports

Replacement of old packing with new ones and condition of gland

follower, lantern ring and sleeves (in case of gland packing)

Condition of coupling, coupling bolts, nuts, spring washers and their

conformity to uniform size. Change grease in half coupling in case of

gear type

After 8000 hours or 2 years whichever earlier:

Repeat all checks given above

Condition of outboard bearing, lock nut and lock washer (in case lock

washer found damaged and lock nut loose, shaft axial play shall be

checked)

Following items of Journal bearings:

- Clearance of I/B and O/B bearings

- High spot (High Spots shall be scrapped)

- Condition of thrust bearing, lock nut and lock washer (in case lock

washer found damaged and lock nut loose, shaft axial play shall be

checked)

Pump float (adjust, if necessary)

Condition of mechanical seals

Alignment (Misalignment shall not be more than 0.05 mm)

Painting of equipment, whether carried out or not

After completing the checks listed above the pump shall be started and the

following shall be checked during the trial run (the trial run duration shall be half to

one hour for electric driven and 3 to 4 hours for diesel driven):

Discharge pressure

Suction pressure

Condition of Mechanical Seal/Gland Packing


7.38

Electric Motor load current at discharge valve shutoff and open

condition

Condition of bearing by sound and temperature

Any leakage

Vibration and shock pulse reading.

7.9 General Recommendations Fire prevention and code enforcement is one of the major areas of

responsibility for the fire service. Following are the general recommendations for the

proposed facility

Following fire fighting facilities can be used to tackle the fire

- Water supply

- Fire hydrant and monitor nozzle installation

- Foam system

- Water fog and sprinkler system

- Mobile Fire fighting equipment

Surrounding population (includes all strata of society) should be made

aware of the safety precautions to be taken in the event of any mishap

due to pipeline. This can effectively be done by conducting the safety

training programs

Shut off and isolation valves should be easily approachable in

emergencies

Periodical mock drills should be conducted so as to check the

alertness and efficiency of the DMP and EPP and records should be

maintained

Signboard including phone numbers, no smoking signs and type of

emergencies should be installed at various locations

7.10 Specific Recommendations Specific recommendations for some of the hazardous or flammable

chemical/material, equipment which is to be transported or handled on the jetty are

as follows:


7.39

Benzene: It is highly flammable and slightly toxic.

As an immediate precautionary measure, isolate spill or leak area for at

least 50 meters (150 feet) in all directions

Use water spray, fog or regular foam do not use straight streams move

containers from fire area if you can do it without risk

Eliminate all ignition sources (no smoking, flares, sparks or flames in

immediate area)

All equipment used when handling the product must be grounded. Do

not touch or walk through spilled material. Stop leak if you can do it

without risk

Prevent entry into waterways, sewers, basements or confined areas

A vapour suppressing foam may be used to reduce vapours

Absorb or cover with dry earth, sand or other non-combustible material

and transfer to containers

Use clean non sparking tools to collect absorbed material

Paraxylene: It is extremely flammable and toxic. It may form explosive mixtures with air

and form vapour that can cause vapour cloud explosion.

As an immediate precautionary measure, isolate spill or leak area for at

least 50 meters (150 feet) in all directions

Small fire: Dry chemical, CO2, water spray or regular foam

Large fire: Water spray, fog or regular foam. Do not use straight

streams. Move containers from fire area if you can do it without risk


immediate area)

All equipment used when handling the product must be grounded

Do not touch or walk through spilled material



7.40

A vapour suppressing foam may be used to reduce vapours

Phenol: It is extremely toxic and combustible at high temperatures. It is very

hazardous in case of skin contact, eye contact, and inhalation.

Special measures such as reduced loading rates and increased

monitoring must be observed during “switch loading” operation (i.e.

loading this material in tanks or shipping compartment that previously

contained middle distillates or similar products)

Personal protective equipment (PPE), including neoprene gloves and

apparel / laboratory coat, splash goggles and face shields should be

provided

Safety showers, eye wash/shower unit, supplied breathing air and self-

contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) should be readily available and

properly maintained in the immediate area around phenol storage

Store phenol in a cool, dry, well-ventilated area, away from heated

surfaces or ignition sources

All personnel engaged in phenol operations must at all times wear full

protection

Vinyl Acetate: It is flammable and toxic.

Personal protective equipment (PPE), including approved respirators,

impervious gloves and apparel, splash goggles and face shields should

be provided

Vinyl acetate should be controlled at all times by storing the material in

a cool, well-ventilated location, in properly grounded vessels that

prevent static build-up

Vinyl acetate containers should be equipped with appropriate pressure

relief devices and properly vented routes for the material

Full protective personal protective equipment should be used during

any clean-up procedures


7.41

Always refer to the (Material) Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for guidance

on the appropriate personal protective equipment to be used and on

the safe handling of this material

Acetic Acid: Acetic acid is corrosive and flammable liquid.


immediate area)

If concentration is more than 10 %, the worker should immediately

wash the skin when it becomes contaminated

All equipment used when handling the product must be grounded. Do

not touch or walk through spilled material. Stop leak if you can do it

without risk


A vapour suppressing foam may be used to reduce vapours. Absorb or

cover with dry earth, sand or other non-combustible material and

transfer to containers. Use clean non-sparking tools to collect absorbed

material

A wind direction pointer should be installed at storage site, so that in an

emergency the wind direction can be directly seen and downwind

population cautioned

- Signboards including phone numbers, no smoking signs and type

of emergencies should be increased to cover all the locations of the

plant

Glycol: Glycol is combustible and non-toxic.

Extinguish with alcohol-resistant foam, carbon dioxide, dry powder or

water fog

Self-contained breathing apparatus and full protective clothing must be

worn in case of fire

Wear protective gloves. Avoid contact with skin and eyes. Provide

adequate ventilation


7.42

Avoid spilling, skin and eye contact

Use protective gloves Wear approved safety goggles wear rubber

apron

Wear rubber footwear

Following are the additional measures recommended based on study

finding and the extent of damage distances and precautions.

A wind direction pointer should be installed at storage site, so that in an

emergency the wind direction can be directly seen and downwind

population can be cautioned

7.11 Electricity Hazard All electrical equipments shall be provided with proper earthing.

Earthed electrode shall periodically tested and maintained

Emergency lighting shall be available at all critical locations including

the operator’s room to carry out safe shut down, ready identification of

fire fighting facilities such as fire water pumps and fire alarm stations

All electrical equipments shall be free from carbon dust, oil deposits,

and grease

Use of approved insulated tools, rubber mats, shockproof gloves and

boots, tester, fuse tongs, discharge rod, safety belt, hand lamp,

wooden or insulated ladder and not wearing metal ring and chain

Flame and shock detectors and central fire annunciation system for fire

safety should be provided

Temperature sensitive alarm and protective relays to make alert and

disconnect equipment before overheating

Prevent higher humidity and temperature near electric insulations

Danger from excess current due to overload or short circuit should be

prevented by providing fuses, circuit breakers, thermal protection

Carbon dioxide, halon or dry chemical fire extinguishers are to be used

for electrical fires


7.43

7.12 Oil Leak Plan An Oil leak contingency plan is an important working document that

identifies the oil leak risks, the appropriate response strategies, the

resources required to submit a response and the training and exercises

necessary to ensure practicality and effectiveness of the plan. The

purpose of this document is to provide guidance for the Disaster

Management groups of the Reliance Jamnagar Marine Terminal

(RJMT)

7.12.1 Causes of Disasters Human failure

Accident

Sabotage

Act of God/Natural calamity

7.12.2 Types of emergency that could arise in jetty berths, anchorage Leak during cargo transfer operations Spill during berthing / collision

Slop tank over flow at jetty / ship

Grounding of ship

Mishaps at the tanker terminal.

7.12.3 Levels of Oil Spill Oil spills have been categorised based on tiered response according to the

guidelines given by IMO. These are as follows:

Tier 1:

Operational spillage, which can be dealt with using the resources

immediately available

Tier 2:

Medium sized spillage, which exceed operating companies resources

and require ICG assistance

Tier 3:

Large spillage, which may require National level response


7.44

7.12.4 Objectives of the Oil Leak Plan This plan is intended to assist in dealing with an accidental

discharge/leak of oil

Its primary purpose is to set in motion the necessary actions to stop or

minimise the discharge and to mitigate its effects

This plan guides the HOD Marine and his Duty Staff through the

decisions which will be required in an incident response

For this plan to be effective, it must be:

- Familiar to those marine terminal staff with key response functions

- Regularly exercised

- Reviewed and updated on a regular basis

The pollution control team response should be within 15 minutes

To prepare an organisational chart identifying personnel to coordinate

during oil leak and assign responsibilities on specific functions to be

carried out

To ensure efficient communication process as the communication

plays an important role in the efficient management of an oil leak

response

To identify mutual aid programmes with nearby industries

To ensure adequacy and efficiency of pollution response equipment

such as booms, skimmer etc, personnel protective appliances, medical

services & safety and pollution response training of staff

To prepare a map for showing linkage with other areas and display

them at vantage locations

To maintain weather conditions of each season of local areas

(temperature, wind speed and wind direction) for the instant

identification of evacuation procedure

To maintain the surrounding area map showing location of villages,

industries, hospitals, police stations, rehabilitation centres and

evacuation routes


7.45

7.13 Risks to Personnel Good safety management, strict adherence to safety management

procedures and competency assurance will reduce the risk. Safety practices are

needed to carry out jobs safely and without causing any injury to self, colleagues and

system.

For total safety of any operation, each team member must religiously

follow the safety practices / procedures pertaining to respective operational area. If

every team member starts working with this attitude, zero accident rates is not a

distant dream.

Any operation is a team effort and its success depends upon the sincerity,

efficiency and motivation of all team members. Safety in such operations is not a duty

of a single person, but it is everyone's job.

7.14 Training On job training to the engineers on various facets of risk analysis would go

a long way in improving their horizon which in turn is expected to reflect in the

operation of the facility, especially from the safety stand point. In order to combat with

emergency situations arising out of accident release of hazardous chemicals, it is

necessary for industries to prepare an exhaustive offsite and onsite emergency

preparedness plan.

7.15 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) provides additional protection to

workers exposed to workplace hazards in conjunction with other facility controls and

safety systems.

PPE is considered to be a last resort that is above and beyond the other

facility controls and provides the worker with an extra level of personal protection.

Table 7.15 presents general examples of occupational hazards and types of PPE

available for different purposes. Recommended measures for use of PPE in the

workplace include:

Active use of PPE if alternative technologies, work plans or procedures

cannot eliminate, or sufficiently reduce, a hazard or exposure


7.46

Identification and provision of appropriate PPE that offers adequate

protection to the worker, co-workers, and occasional visitors, without

incurring unnecessary inconvenience to the individual

Proper maintenance of PPE, including cleaning when dirty and

replacement when damaged or worn out. Proper use of PPE should be

part of the recurrent training programs for Employees

Selection of PPE should be based on the hazard and risk ranking

described earlier in this section, and selected according to criteria on

performance and testing established

Table 7.15 Summary of Recommended Personal Protective Equipment

According to Hazard

Objective Workplace Hazards Suggested PPE

Eye and face protection

Flying particles, molten metal, liquid chemicals, gases or vapors, light radiation

Safety glasses with side-shields, protective shades, etc.

Head protection

Falling objects, inadequate height clearance, and overhead power cords

Plastic helmets with top and side impact protection

Hearing protection

Noise, ultra-sound Hearing protectors (ear plugs or ear muffs)

Foot protection

Failing or rolling objects, points objects. Corrosive or hot liquids

Safety shoes and boots for protection against moving and failing objects, liquids and chemicals

Hand protection

Hazardous materials, cuts or lacerations, vibrations, extreme temperatures

Gloves made of rubber or synthetic material (Neoprene), leather, steel, insulation materials, etc.

Respiratory protection

Dust, fogs, fumes, mists, gases, smokes, vapors

Facemasks with appropriate filters for dust removal and air purification (chemical, mists, vapors and gases). Single or multi-gas personal monitors, if available


7.47

Part III: Approach to Disaster Management Plan 7.16 Disaster (Emergency)

A disaster or an emergency in a jetty occurs as a result of a malfunctioning

of the normal operating procedures or an intervention of outside forces such as

cyclone, earthquake, flood or sabotage, and may affect several sections within it

and/or may cause serious disruption outside the works. Apart from earthquakes,

cyclones, flood, arson and sabotage, accidents may take place through explosion in

the boilers, heavy leakage and/or subsequent fire in the oil storage tanks, streams

etc.

Reliance Jamnagar Marine Terminal (RJMT) has a Liquid jetty, marine

terminal dedicated for handling of liquid and gaseous chemicals which are

transferred through pipelines to new berths. The jetty handles products like HSD,

Paraxylene, Benzene, petrochemical naphtha, MEG, Acetic acid etc. A Disaster

Management Plan (DMP) has been delineated to tackle emergencies which may

arise due to handling of chemicals at the jetty.

7.17 Objective of ‘On-site Emergency Plan’ An on-site emergency is caused by an accident that takes place in the jetty

and the effects are confined to the jetty premises involving the people working over

there. The On-site Emergency Plan dealing with eventualities is the responsibility of

the occupier, who is to prepare/implement necessary measures to contain the

severity of cause of disaster to the bare minimum.

Apart from the provisions in the Hazardous Chemicals Rules 1989,

Section 41B(4) of the Factories Act, 1948 (as amended) also states that every

occupier is to draw up an On-site Emergency Plan with detailed disaster control

measures for the factory premises. The obligation of an occupier of hazardous

chemicals to prepare an emergency plan are stipulated in Rule 13 of the

Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989. The

general public living in the vicinity are also to be informed and educated about

safety measures and actions required to be taken in the event of an accident.

The preparation of an on-site emergency plan furnishing relevant information

to the District Emergency Authority for the preparation of the off-site

emergency plan are statutory responsibilities of the occupier of every industry

and other units handling hazardous substances. An on-site emergency plan

should contain the following key elements:


7.48

Safeguard the personnel located in the premises

Minimise damage to property and environment

Organise rescue and treatment of affected persons

Initially contain and ultimately bring the incident under control

Identify any casualties

Provide authoritative information to the news media

Secure the safe rehabilitation of affected persons

Preserve relevant records and equipment for the subsequent enquiry

into the cause and circumstances of emergency

7.18 Identification of Major Hazard Potential 7.18.1 Major Hazard Potential Assessment

The major disasters or emergencies usually occurs from one or any

combination of the following

Slow isolated fires

Fast spreading fires

Explosions

Bursting of pipe lines/vessels

Uncontrolled release of flammable gases/dust.

Floods

7.18.2 Fire Hazard Cables in galleries and on trays in all sections

Fuel oil handling and oil tanks during transfer

Transformer oil handling and oil tanks

7.18.3 Explosion Hazard Turbo generators

Transformer

Boiler


7.49

7.18.4 Bursting of Pipe Lines and Vessels Steam pipes due to high pressure/temperature

Natural Gas lines

7.18.5 Release of Gases/Dust Flue gases from the ducts

7.18.6 Release of Liquid Handling and storage of chemicals

Fuel oil tanks in fuel oil handling section

7.19 Facilities Envisaged 7.19.1 Fire Fighting Facilities at the Jetty

The jetty would be protected against fire hazard and would be well

equipped with fire protection systems. The jetty would also have its own fire fighting

Team. The details of the fire fighting facilities that should be planned at the

jetty are furnished below.

7.19.1.1 Fire Protection System A comprehensive Fire detection and protection system is envisaged

for the complete jetty. This system shall confirm to the recommendations of TAC

(INDIA)/IS:

3034 & NFPA-850: The following protection systems are envisaged:

i) Hydrant system for complete jetty covering main jetty building,

boiler area, turbine and its auxiliaries, all pump houses and miscellaneous buildings

of the jetty. The system shall be complete with piping, valves, instrumentation,

hoses, nozzles, hose boxes/stations etc.

ii) Foam injection system for fuel oil/storage tanks consisting of foam

concentrate tanks, in-line inductors, valves, piping & instrumentation etc.

iii) Automatic high velocity water spray system for all transformers

located in transformer yard and those of rating 10 MVA and above located

within the boundary limits of site, main and unit turbine oil tanks and purifier,

turbine oil/lube oil piping (zoned) in turbine area, generator seal oil system,

lube oil system for turbine driven boiler feed pumps, boiler burner fronts etc.


7.50

This system shall consist of detectors, deluge valves projectors, valves, piping

&instrumentation.

iv) Automatic medium velocity water spray system for un-insulated

fuel oil tanks storing fuel oil having flash point C and below consisting of QB

detectors deluge valves, nozzles, piping, instrumentation, etc.

v) A analogue, addressable type early warning for detection and

alarm system is provided to cover the complete jetty. An ionisation type smoke

detection system is installed particularly for the Control rooms, Switch gear ,Battery,

UPS rooms, MCC room of DM Jetty, Air Compressor, Pump house, Switch

yard control rooms, Fuel oil system, areas below false ceiling of main jetty

and switch yard control room, and inside the cubicles of main jetty and

control equipment room.

7.19.1.2 Fire Fighting System A full-fledged fire fighting system has been set up at the jetty that

would be operated by the fire fighting personnel. The fire fighting system is

equipped with the required facilities to handle the fire promptly and actively .

Apart from all necessary safety and fire fighting appliances, the fire fighting

team is equipped with the following special facilities like breathing apparatus

set, fireman fire suit (NOMEX-3 layer), aluminised fibre glass suit. Adequate

staff will be deployed for fire fighting system in emergencies.

7.19.1.3 Other Aspects available in the Existing Jetty Additionally, following aspects are also functional in the existing jetty:

Emergency water showers are provided near the storage area of acid

and alkali

Emergency Control Centre (ECC): Emergency Control Room will

be set up and marked on the site plan for the knowledge of all

concerned. ECC is the focal point and it will be connected with the

internal and external telephones and furnished with list of personnel

and their addresses, wireless, wind direction and speed indicator etc.

The ECC will be manned by Site Main Controller and Site

Incident Controller. Emergency Co-ordinator, officials nominated as

key personnel and senior officers of outside services called in or

assistance


7.51

Assembly Points: Assembly points, the predetermined safe places,

where people are directed after evacuation from the hazardous locality

have been set up

Alarms: suitable sirens are provided in the jetty for fire, off-site

emergency and “all clear”. The coding of the siren will be as per the

codes given in the DMP

Mutual Aid: There is a mutual aid arrangements made with the

neighbouring facilities which would help in the case of a major disaster.

7.20 Medical Facilities In an emergency, the nearest hospital equipped with all necessary

following facilities should be informed:

Ambulance

Beds

Doctors

Specialists

Medical Staff (other than Doctors)

Emergency Organisation: An emergency organisation is established depending upon the level of

emergency. The organogram of the emergency management team showing the

reporting of various key members for different levels of emergency are as per the

charts below:


7.52

Organization Chart for Oil Leak Management:

(On Scene Commander) Duty Port Captain / HoD Marine

Shift Security Officer

Jetty Officer Jetty Pilot Captain of

the VesselVTC

Officer

Shift Fire Manager

Shift Male Nurse

Fig. 7.2: Level-1 Emergency Organogram

RJMT Organogram:

Fig. 7.3: Level-2 & Level-3 Emergency Organogram

CHIEF, MARINE OPERATIONS

DEPUTY HEAD OF DEPARTMENT

MARINE

E & M

SECTION HEAD ELECTRICAL / MECH / INSTR

CHIEF PORT-

ENGINEER

DUTY PORT CAPTAIN (S)

DAY PORT CAPTAIN

PILOT(S)

IMS Co-ordinator & OR PFSO

Engineer Superintendent

Technical Officer (Dy. Manager)

MECH / ELECT / INST MAINT

ENGR (S)

BOARDING OFFICER (S)

MEDICAL OFFICER(S)

JETTY OFFICER

(S)

VTCO (S)

PANEL OFFICER (S)

(MTF)

HEAD OM& S

SITE PRESIDENT

CHIEF OF OPERATIONS


7.53

Key Members & their Responsibilities: Level-1 Emergency Responsibility of Jetty / SPM Officer

Jetty/SPM Officer

Responsibilities Observe or receive report of oil spill incident

Initiate measures to prevent/reduce further spillage

Maintain communication with other all vessels

Step Actions Additional Information

Alert Duty Port Captain Tugs and other support / response craft

VHF Channel 67

Initial Actions Stop all cargo operations

Verify incident details

Advise all relevant information to Duty Port Captain or SPM Pilot

Initiate personal log

Place tugs/other response craft on stand-by

Further Actions Brief Duty Port Captain / SPM Pilot as necessary

Mobilise response equipment / personnel as directed by Duty Port Captain

Maintain personal log of communications and events

Act as instructed by Duty Port Captain / SPM Pilot

Final Actions Submit personal log to HOD Marine


7.54

Responsibility of Jetty Pilot:

Jetty Pilot

Responsibilities Assist Duty Port Captain

Unberthing / movement of vessels


Alert

Initial Actions Proceed to incident location or POC as requested by Duty Port Captain

Assume role of On-Scene Co-ordinator until relieved by Duty Port Captain

Communicate relevant information to Port Office


Assist Duty Port Captain in conduct of response

Further Actions Liaise with response craft / response teams as instructed by the Duty Port Captain

Keep full log of communications and events


Attend debrief


7.55

Responsibility of Duty Port Captain / HOD Marine:

Duty Port Captain / HOD Marine

Responsibilities Initially assess situation

Verify classification

Provide accurate situation reports to Port Office/HOD Marine

Collect evidence and / or statements

Liaise with Head-Environment (if applicable)

Liaise with incident vessel regarding status of oil spill (if applicable)

Follow Notification Matrix


Alert

Initial Actions Proceed to incident location, assume role of On-Scene Commander

Investigate cause / source of spill

Communicate all information to HOD Marine

Ensure samples of spilled oil taken


Take photographic evidence

Collect evidence and take statements

Stopped or ongoing

Instruct boat crew directly or via Port Controller.

Refer Mar-Ops-05

Further Actions Ensure resources are being deployed as required

Provide co-ordination of the at-sea response

Direct any dispersant spraying operations

Provide detailed situation reports to HOD Marine

Survey the shoreline

Liaise with Head-Environment

Liaise with Head-Fire (if appropriate)


Attend debrief


7.56

Responsibility of HOD Marine:

HOD Marine

Responsibilities Confirm / amend initial classification Manage the RJMT response Authorize expenditure Brief President Liaise with Coast Guard Monitor as appropriate Approve press statements for release


Alert Coast Guard External organizations

Refer Section 9

Initial Actions Verify / amend spill classification Confirm external organizations have been alerted Convene Oil Spill Management Team Predict slick movement Authorize mobilization of contract labour for shoreline clean-up if appropriate Liaise with vessel Agents / Owners as appropriate

Refer Section 5 Refer Section 9

Further Actions Chair the Oil Spill Management Team meetings Constantly review the strategy being employed and advise of changes where necessary Approve all expenditure commitments Brief President Attend all press conferences as required Agree press statements with Corporate Public Relations Chief /President Confirm formal samples have been taken Advise Coast Guard Monitor if oil migrates outside of Local Area

Final Actions Terminate the clean-up Collate personal logs Prepare the incident report Hold full debrief involving all members Amend contingency plan as required


7.57

Responsibility of VTC Officer:

VTC Officer

Responsibilities In-charge of communication, notification Log keeping in emergency logbook, coast guard forms


Alert Harbour Chief HOD Marine Tugs and support crafts Ships in the terminal area Coast guard (Under the instructions of On scene commander) Follow Notification Matrix

VHF Channel 71 VHF Channel 71 Telephone/Fax directory Annexure XXI Annexure XXII

Initial Actions Raise alarm Alert all vessels/ support crafts/tugs on VHF channel 71 and advise them to change over to VHF channel 67 Alert all concerned people as per notification matrix under the instruction of On scene Commander Record all events in emergency log and blank forms as per Coast Guard requirement Send Navigation warning to all crafts

VHF Channel 71/67 Telephone/Fax directory Annexure XXI

Further Actions Co-ordinate communications with On Scene Commander and other parties as required Maintain watch on VHF Channel 67 Maintain personal log of communications and events Act as instructed by On scene Commander

Final Actions Submit personnel log to HOD Marine Attend debrief


7.58

Responsibility of Panel Officer:

Panel Officer

Responsibilities In-charge of product/crude transfer operations

Communication with plant personnel

Keeping log of actions taken during Emergency


Alert MTF Control Room

Fire Control Room

Fire water pump room

Follow Notification Matrix

Telephone/Fax directory

Annexure XXI

Annexure XXII

Initial Actions Raise alarm

Take actions to stop the leak by way of stopping pumps, activating ESD, etc.

Record all actions taken in emergency log

Further Actions Maintain personal log of actions taken

Act as instructed by On scene Commander

Final Actions Submit personnel log to HOD Marine

Attend debrief

7.21 Action Plan The action plan has been drawn which comprises the following features:

First information

Responsibilities of Site Main Controller (SMC)

Responsibilities of Site Incident Controller (SIC)

Responsibilities for declaration of emergency


7.59

Responsibilities of Emergency Co-ordinator (EC)

Responsibilities of key personnel

Responsibilities and actions to be taken by essential staff and

various teams during emergency

Responsibilities for all clear signals.

7.21.1 First Information The first person who observes/identifies the hazardous incident shall

inform, by shouting or by telephone, to the Shift Engineer/Control room about

the hazard. The Shift Engineer will inform to Site Main Controller (SMC), Site

Incident Controller (SIC) and Emergency Co-ordinator, who shall communicate it

to all key personnel about the incident.

7.21.2 Responsibilities of Site Main Controller (SMC) The Site Main Controller on knowing about the hazardous incident

will immediately rush to the incident site and take overall charge and inform the

same to SIC. On arrival, he will assess the extent of emergency and decide if a

major emergency exists and inform the Emergency Co-ordinator, Liasoning officer

accordingly. Following are the responsibilities of Site Main Controller

Decide (if not already decided) whether a major emergency exists or is

likely requiring the emergency services and the off-site emergency plan

Exercise operational control of emergency situation (other then

jetty operational activities) in consultation with the Site incident

controller

Take overall charge of Fire fighting and other emergency operations

Continually review and assess developments and determine the most

probable course of events

Direct evacuation of all, in consultation with the site incident controller

and key jetty personnel

Ensure the casualties are receiving proper attention/first aid and

send to hospital if necessary

Liaison with the fire service and police services

Control the traffic movement within the works


7.60

Co-ordinate with accident management teams

Direct all operations to stop within the affected area taking into

consideration priorities for safety of personnel, minimize damage

to the jetty property and environment and minimize loss of materials

7.21.3 Responsibilities of Site Incident Controller (SIC) The Site Incident Controller will assume overall responsibilities for the

factory / storage site and its personnel in case of any emergency. His responsibilities

would be:

Assess the scale of the incident and take decisions as may be required

Initiate the emergency procedures with the help of available Jetty

Personnel (Field Engineer, Support staff) to secure the safety of

employees, minimize the damage to jetty and property and minimize

the loss of material

Direct rescue and fire-fighting operations

Search for casualties

Arrange for evacuation of non-essential workers to assembly areas

Setup a communication point with the emergency control center –

Jetty Control room

Assume the responsibilities of the site main controller till the person

arrives

Provide support to the emergency services as requested

Issue jetty shut down Instructions in consultation with Jetty Head

(if time permits). Otherwise, depending on the nature of emergency,

he is authorized to initiate any action for protection of Life and Jetty

property

Issue verbal communication to maintenance engineer after

completing all necessary isolations and precautions, this will be

treated as permit to attend emergency situations

Ensure that all clear siren is given in consultation with Site Main

Controller when emergency has been brought under control


7.61

7.21.4 Responsibility for Declaration of Major Emergency The Site Main Controller on hearing the hazardous incident shall proceed

to the scene of the incident, make an informal assessment of the situation and

decide whether a major emergency exists or is likely to develop. He will take the

decision to inform the Jetty Head, SIC and Emergency Co-ordinator and

activate the major emergency procedure. The Site Main Controller who has

knowledge and experience to recognise the occurrence of a major emergency

or the potential for it, will declare a major emergency in consultation with the

Site Incident Controller. Once the emergency alarm is raised, the works

emergency procedures will be activated.

7.21.4.1 Making the Emergency Known inside the Jetty The major emergency will be made known to everyone inside the jetty by

re-sounding the alarm.

7.21.4.2 Emergency Message On receiving the intimation that emergency has been declared,

SMC/SIC will rush to the affected/likely to be affected areas and announce

through fixed/mobile The announcement would be made by the concerned

official in local language and English. Similarly, announcement of termination of

emergency would also be made.

7.21.5 Responsibilities of Emergency Co-ordinator (EC) Panel engineer in control room will assume the charge of emergency

co-coordinator till any of safety committee member reports at control room and

assumes the charge of emergency coordinator On hearing the emergency alarm, he

will proceed to the emergency control centre. His responsibilities would be to:

Communicate between the emergency control teams and with the

outside world viz. the fire, police & medical services

Seek help from external agencies under the instructions of SIC & / or

SMC

Establish communication and intimate other jetties in the vicinity

of the probable danger to their jetty and the precautions that can be

taken

Take down all communications coming to the emergency control room


7.62

Pass emergency messages as is required

Monitor the situation continuously

A range for vehicles to be available on standby

A range to gear up the first aid centre for casualties depending upon

the type of accident

7.21.6 Key Personnel Apart from Site Main Controller and Site incident controller, other works

personnel will play viral roles in providing advice and in implementing the decisions

made by the Site Incident Controller. The key personnel would include:

Safety Committee and First-Aid: This team will be headed by one of the Safety Committee members.

The responsibilities of this team are:

Confirm that partly loaded tankers leave the premises.

Ensure that people who are not assigned any work during the period of

the emergency are assembled in the assembly area.

Control traffics and keeps route open for external help.

Provide First Aid to the injured personnel.

Inform the nearest hospital and call ambulance as needed or co-

ordinate with SIC and arrange vehicle to move injured to the hospital.

Liaison Team: The PRO or the nominated person shall carry out all liaison

activities with the factory inspector, the pollution control board, the media, district

collector, the port trust authority, NGOs etc in consultation with Jetty Head.

Maintenance Team:

Mechanical Maintenance

C&I Maintenance

Electrical Maintenance

Chemist

Head of Personnel and Administration.


7.63

Head of Safety

Medical Officer

Fire & Security Officer

Head of Safety

Medical Officer

Fire & Security Officer

A list of key personnel and their phone numbers shall be provided to all

concerned. If necessary, they will decide the actions needed to shut down jetty,

evacuate personnel, carry out emergency engineering works, arrange for supplies of

equipment, personnel etc, carry out air quality tests, provide catering facilities,

liaison with police, informing relatives of the victims, press media etc.

7.22 Responsibilities of Key Personnel 7.22.1 Departmental Heads

The department heads will provide assistance as required by the Site Main

Controller. They will decide which members of their departments are required at the

incident site.

7.22.2 HOD (Personnel & Administration) The following duties would be assigned:

Report to Site Main Controller

Ensure that all non-essential workers in the affected areas are

evacuated to assembly points in consultation with the Site Incident

Controller

Receive reports from nominated persons from assembly points

and pass on the required information service

Keep liaison with other coordinators to meet the requirements of

services such as materials, security management, transportation,

medical, canteen facilities etc as required during emergency

Be in constant touch with the Site Main Controller and feed him

with correct information of the situation


7.64

Give information to press, public and authorities concerned on

instructions from the Site Main Controller/Site Incident Controller

Ensure that the injured receive adequate attention at medical

centres and arrange necessary additional help and inform relatives of

the injured

Make the entire auto base vehicles ready to proceed for

evacuation or other duties, when called for

Make all arrangements regarding transportation

7.22.3 Medical Officer/Male Nurse The Medical Officer/Male Nurse will render treatment to the injured

and if necessary, will shift the injured to nearby hospitals. Medical Officer will

mobilise extra medical help from outside if necessary. Medical Officer will keep a list

of qualified first aiders of the factory.

7.22.4 Fire & Security Officer On hearing the siren, he will:

Arrange to control the traffic at the gate and the incident area

Direct the security staff to the incident site to take part in the

emergency operations under his guidance and supervision

Evacuate the people in the jetty or in the nearby areas as advised by

the Site Main Controller after arranging transportation through transport

in-charge

Allow only those people who are associated with handling emergencies

Maintain law and order in the area, if necessary with the co-

operation of the police

Maintain communication with Site Incident Controller/Site Main

Controller and Emergency Co-ordinator

Guide the fire fighting crew i.e. firemen and trained jetty personnel and

shifts the fire fighting facilities to the emergency site

Take guidance of the Site Main Controller for fire fighting as well as

assessing the requirement of outside help


7.65

7.23 Essential Staff In the affected areas or likely to be affected areas as decided by

the Site Main Controller/Site Incident Controller, efforts will be needed to

initiate shutdown and make the process units safe. The following employees/staffs

will also be required to help in the above works.

Attendants

First Aiders

Personnel for emergency work engineering, such as providing extra

lighting and providing temporary bypass of the works

Personnel for transporting equipment to the incident site from other

parts of the works

Personnel for moving tankers or vessels from areas of risk

Personnel for acting as messengers in case of communication

difficulties

Personnel for manning jetty entrance in liaison with the police to

direct emergency vehicles entering the jetty, to control traffic leaving

the jetty and to turn away or make alternate arrangements for

visitors and other traffic arriving at the jetty. It is the responsibility of

the Site Incident Controller to identify the above essential staff and

form a task force which would report at defined jetty control centres

so that they can be readily contacted. It is the responsibility of the

Site Incident Controller to remove all non-essential staff to assembly

points

7.23.1 Maintenance Team This group would assist:

Isolate the remaining jetty and keep this area in safe condition

Organize safe shutdown of jetty if necessary

Attend all emergency maintenance jobs on top priority

Organise all support services as operation of fire pumps, sprinkler

system etc.


7.66

Take steps to contain or reduce the level of hazard created due to

disaster

Organise additional facilities as desired

7.23.2 Fire Fighting Team In case fire erupts and emergency is due to fire, the fire fighting

team would be required.

Rush to the spot and extinguish the fire

Seek help from outside fire fighting agencies

Evacuate persons affected due to whatever reasons

7.23.3 Security Team Their responsibilities would include:

Manning of all gates

Barring entry of unauthorised persons

Permitting with minimum delay the entry of authorised personnel

and outside agencies, vehicles etc.

Allowing the ambulance/evacuation vehicles etc. to go through the

gates without normal check

7.23.4 Administration Team This team would be responsible for:

Rescue of the casualties on priority basis

Transporting the casualties to first aid places or medical centres

Accounting of the personnel

Helping to search the missing personnel

Passing information to the kith and kin of the fatal or seriously injured

persons

7.23.5 Safety Team This group would be dedicated to:

Arrange required safety equipment


7.67

Measure gas concentration in case of gas leakage at various places

Guide authorities on all safety related issues

Record accidents

Collect and preserve evidences in connection with accident inquires

7.23.6 Medical Team The medical team would be entrusted with the following duties:

To arrange first aid materials/stretchers immediately and reach them to

the site of incident

To arrange for immediate medical attention

To arrange for transporting the casualties to various hospitals and

nursing homes etc.

To ask specific medical assistance from external agencies including

specialists in consultation with SIC/SMC

7.24 Oil / Chemical Spill Contingency Plan The oil spill could occur due to various reasons at SPMs, Product jetty,

anchorage or approach channel. The spills beyond these areas are not covered in

this plan. These can be broadly classified into the following scenarios.

7.24.1 Leak during Cargo Transfer Operations During cargo transfer operation oil spill can occur either on the shore side

or the ship side due to leakage from flange joints, rupture of hose, etc. Most of these

leaks will be minor in nature due to the various safety interlocks/ other features

provided in the design. Further during cargo transfer operation supervision by

operating personnel is also carried out.

7.24.2 Spill during Berthing / Collision During berthing operation damage to the ship can occur due to contact

with tugs, jetty or other ship due to improper handling or machinery failure, leading to

leakage of bunker or cargo. The quantity of spill will depend on the nature of / extent

of damage.

7.24.3 Slop Tank Overflow at Jetty / Ship Overflow possibility is very remote. It can occur if the instrumentation

system fails and the pump does not start automatically or level instrument is faulty.


7.68

On ship, it can happen if watch-keeping practices are poor or due to poor ship/shore

co-ordination.

7.24.4 Grounding of Ship This can occur if steering or propulsion system of the ship fails in the

channel.

7.24.5 Fire and Explosion Fires and explosions on board ship represent a safety hazard with the risk

of oil.

7.24.6 Spillage of Fuel Oil Fuel oil bunkers will not be supplied to tankers moored to the SPM buoys.

It may, therefore, be necessary for vessels to undertake the internal transfer of fuel

oil for trim or other operational reasons. A bunker tank overflow during such

operations could result in spillages of <1 tonne.

7.24.7 Spillage due to Cargo / COW Piping Failure Spillage of cargo can occur due to failure of deck piping or valve glands

during discharge operations or during COW operations. Good ship board

maintenance and efficient watch keeping will ensure that these are kept to minimum

and detected early to avoid any spillage into water.

Important Contacts: Reliance Industries Ltd. HOD Marine

Sector Chief Tel: 6613607 6613675/6613863

Coast Guard Station Vadinar

Commandant Dy. Commandant

Tel: 256534 Tel: 256560/256970

Gujarat Maritime Board, Jamnagar

The Port officer Tel: 0288-2711806 / 05, 2755207 Fax: 0288-27111815

Gujarat Maritime Board, Gandhinagar

Ex. Officer (GMB)

Tel: 079-23238346/47/48 Fax: 079-23234703/04

Indian Oil Corporation Limited

DGM in Charge of Terminal

Tel: 256527 (office hours) Tel: 256567 (out of hours)

Essar Oil Ltd., Vadinar Capt. Deepak Sachdeva, COOVOTL

Tel: 02833-241377 M : 9925153618

Bharat Oman Refineries Ltd., Vadinar

Sh P. R. Thatte (VP, Projects)

Tel: 02833-256451 (M): 91-9727206501

Kandla Port Trust, Vadinar

Chief operation Manager

Tel: 02833-256749 / 256540 Fax: 02833-256749 / 256540

State Pollution Control Board, Jamnagar

Regional Officer Tel: 2753540/ 2752366 / 2756514

Kandla Port Trust, Gandhidham

Ex. Officer (KPT) Tel: 02836 238055 / 233001 Fax: 02836 232040

Ministry of Environment Gujarat

J K Vyas Director (Environment)

Tel: 079 23222095/96 Fax: 079 23232161

Jamnagar Police (Control room)

Tel: 2550200


7.69

7.25 Natural Disaster 7.25.1 Earthquake

An earthquake is the result of a sudden release of energy in

the Earth's crust that creates seismic waves. At the Earth's surface, earthquakes

manifest themselves by vibration, shaking and sometimes displacement of the

ground. The vibrations may vary in magnitude. Earthquakes are caused mostly by

slippage within geological faults, but also by other events such as volcanic activity,

landslides, mine blasts, and nuclear tests.

Emergency management professionals are responsible for assessing risks

and hazards and identifying potential emergencies and disasters. Emergency

operations personnel recommend appropriate prevention or mitigation strategies that

can reduce the impact of potential emergencies. Large, complex emergencies such

as earthquakes often affect multiple departments or multiple agencies and require

data to be collected and assembled from a variety of locations quickly under adverse

conditions. Part of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) role is to understand the

details of the emergency, order the required response resources, coordinate with

adjoining agencies, and determine the immediate actions necessary to contain the

incident.

Flow chart for Earthquake Emergency Response Plan is given below:

PORT/ TERMINAL CONTROL

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM

DUTY MANAGER

TERMINAL CONTROL

HARBOUR MASTER / PORT MANAGER

HARBOUR TUGS / HARBOUR CRAFTS

LIQ. CARRIER / PILOT

COUNTRY CRISIS MGT TEAM

MEDICAL

INCIDENT CONTROLLER

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earth

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crust_(geology)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seismic_wave

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fault_(geology)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Underground_nuclear_testing


7.70

Following are the actions to be taken by various key persons and jetty

teams to tackle floods caused by earthquake effectively.

Observation Action

Port Control Room Inform Terminal Control

Inform Liquid Jetty Carrier / Pilot

Inform Harbour tugs/ crafts

Terminal Control Inform Duty Manager

Stop discharge from Liquid Jetty Cargo

Terminal Superintendent

Stop Liquid Jetty Cargo discharging

Head Count / Safe Rescue of Personnel

Isolate / water curtains

Stop Terminal Operations

Liquid Jetty Cargo Inform Pilot

Stop Discharge of Liquid Jetty, Isolate/ESD

Master Pilot to bridge

Vessels engines to immediate readiness

Prepare for vacating the berth

Pilot Tugs/mooring boats standby for use

Consider vacating the berth

Port Manager/Harbour To be in VHF contact with Pilot

Master Inform Emergency Response Team

Assess situation

Medical Medical assistance

7.25.2 Flood Following mitigation measures are recommended to tackle flood disaster.

Focus resources on minimizing the spread of water into other areas of

the jetty

Protect property and records by removing items from floors and /or

covering with water resistant coverings

Attempt to move items of value to "higher ground" if possible


7.71

Evacuate personnel as needed. Utilize the fire alarm system if an

immediate evacuation is required

Mitigation measures can be structural or non-structural. Structural

measures use technological solutions, like flood levees. Non-structural measures

include legislation, land-use planning (e.g. the designation of nonessential land like

parks to be used as flood zones), and insurance.

The response phase includes the mobilization of the necessary emergency

services and first responders in the flood area. This is likely to include a first wave of

core emergency services, such as fire-fighters, police and ambulance crews. They

may be supported by a number of secondary emergency services, such as specialist

rescue teams.

7.25.3 Cyclones and Severe Storms

Land use management should provide protection from wind and storm

surge. Engineering of structures should withstand wind forces and

water damage (including storm surge)

Building should be constructed with higher wind-resistant capacity.

Securing of elements such as metal sheeting, roofing, and fences

should be done to avoid severe damages

Safety shelters are to be arranged to tackle cyclones and storms.

Cyclone and severe weather warning systems should be installed.

Community awareness regarding cyclone risk and evacuation plan

should be properly addressed

7.26 Man-made Disaster Emergency Action Plan for Bomb Threat:

When bomb threat call is received the following measures are to be taken.

The site may receive unidentified call / information from intelligence

sources about plantation of bombs in ships, jetty, terminal, offices, vehicles and

expats residence. Safe evacuation of all staff would be ensured at the site in small

groups but away from normal assembly points. Care would be exercised to distribute

the staff in small groups preferably away from known assembly points. This is

required as terrorists may send bomb scare at site and then explode devices by

remote at assembly points to inflict greater damage. Bomb snuffing and diffusing

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergency_service

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergency_service

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disaster_area

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firefighter

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Police

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ambulance


7.72

squad would be requested from the police. All transport vehicles incoming and

outgoing would be checked for unidentified objects.

In The Location Premises: Keep the Fire Hydrant System/all Fire Fighting and Personnel protective

Equipment in readiness. Every one entering the Location must be frisked at the

Gate/check all Hand Bags, Parcels etc., for suspected explosive/dangerous objects.

Have thorough inspection of the Location for any suspected dangerous object.

Materials and other Boxes to be brought in to the Location must be

deposited at Gate for minimum curing period of 48 Hrs.

Organize Employees Vigilance cell for round the clock observation of

industry Premises.

If Suspected object is found: In case of finding of suspected Article, do not disturb its position, but the

area around it should be cordoned off to a distance of 100 meters and more

depending upon the gravity of situation. Adequate Staff or Police Squad posted to

prevent any unauthorized entry into the enforced cordon.

Contact Controller of Explosives immediately, who on reaching the Site will

decide suitable action for defusing and disposal of the suspected object.

Evolution of thick billowing smoke is an indication of impending explosion

and in such a case, with draw or evacuates all personnel from the spot, which has

been identified.

As a general measure regulate the movement of the outsiders inside our

Premises and restrict.

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