Nat Res 3rd Cases

8/12/2019 Nat Res 3rd Cases

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ROMANO, Gerlianne Joy S.

Law 2B

LA BUGAL-BLAAN vs RAMOS

G.R 127882 January 27, 2004

FACTS:President Fidel Ramos approved RA 7942 known as the Mining Act to

"govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineralresources. Shortly, after its effectivity, the President entered into a Financial and

Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with Western Mining Corporation

Philippines (WMCP) which is owned by WMC Resources International Pty., Ltd.(The latter is a wholly owned subsidiary of Western Mining Corporation Holdings

Limited, a publicly listed major Australian mining and exploration company.),

covering 99, 387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kuradat, Davao delSur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary VictorRamos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by

DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.

On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENRSecretary demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942

and DAO No. 96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon.The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter. Petitioners

claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. They

pray that the Court issue an order:(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from

acting on any application for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements;(b)Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as

unconstitutional and null and void;(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules andRegulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR Administrative

Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional

andnull and void; and(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance

Agreement issued to Western Mining Philippines,Inc. as unconstitutional, illegaland null and void.

ISSUES:Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing

fully foreign-owned

corporations to exploit Philippine mineral resources

RULING:RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for

permitting fully foreign owned corporations to exploit Philippine natural resources.Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian doctrine which

states that All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, andother minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential

energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other naturalresources are owned by the State. The same section also states that, exploration

and development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full controland supervision of the State.


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The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is

an exception to the rule that participation in the nations natural resources isreserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly such provision must be construed

strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore RA 7942 is invalid

insofar as said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs thephrase financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987

Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as servicecontracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the

fundamental law.

UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES vs IACGR 69997 September 30, 1987

FACTS:On July 20, 1962, the President of the Philippines granted the following

mining patents on mineral claims located at Ungay Malobago, Rapu-Rapu Albay.

Way back on October 30, 1959, John Canson, Jr. and Carlos Stilianopulos assigned

their rights to their mining claims in favor of the petitioner. The assignment ofrights was recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on December 2,

1959.The aforestated mining patents, after their issuance on July 20, 1962, were all

recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on August 28, 1962 and

transcribed on September 4, 1962 in the Registration Book of the Registry of

Deeds of Albay. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Albay issued therespective original certificates of titles pursuant to Section 122 of Act No. 496 in

the names of John Canson, Jr., Carlos Stilianopulos, and the petitioner.Subsequently, or from 1968 to 1974, the following free patents were granted by the

respondent Director of Lands and the corresponding original certificates of titles

were issued by the Register of Deeds of Albay. The petitioner filed a complaint for

annulment and cancellation of patents against the private respondents and prayedthat all the free patent titles issued in their favor for properties over which original

certificates of title had already been issued in its favor be declared null and void.

On January 25, 1980, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint.It ruled that since the disputed properties form part of disposable land of the public

domain, the action for reversion should be instituted by the Solicitor General in the

name of the Republic of the Philippines and that, therefore, the petitioner lackspersonality to institute the annulment proceedings. The petitioner appealed to the

then Intermediate Appellate Court.On April 5, 1984, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. It

ruled that the titles issued to the petitioner cover mineral lands which belong to thepublic domain and that these cannot be the subject of private ownership. According

to the Court, under Section 101 of the Public Land Law, only the Solicitor Generalor the officer acting in his stead has the authority to institute an action on behalf of

the Republic for the cancellation of the respondents' titles and for reversion of theirhomesteads to the Government.

ISSUE:a) Whether or not the appellate court committed an error of law when it

ruled that the lands in question belong to the public domain; and b) whether or not


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the appellate court erred in discussing the complaint on the ground that the

petitioner had no personality to institute the same.

RULING:

Nowhere in the records of this petition is there any mention of a date beforeNovember 15, 1935 as to when essential acts regarding its mining claims were

executed. It is silent as to when the land was entered, measured, and plotted; whenthe legal posts and notices were put up; when the claim was registered with the

mining recorder; whether or not the annual amount of labor or development, andother requirements under the Philippine Bill of 1902 were followed. These may

have been complied with but not necessarily before 1935.

A mere mention in the Torrens title that the provisions of the Philippine Billof 1902 were followed is not sufficient. The Philippine Bill provides the

procedures for the perfection of mining claims but not the dates when such

procedures were undertaken by any prospector or claimant. The same procedureswould have to be followed even after the Jones Law of 1916 and the Constitutionof 1935 were promulgated, but subject to the restrictions of the fundamental law.

Petitioner has not established by clear and convincing evidence that the

locations of its mining claims were perfected prior to November 15,1935 when theGovernment of Commonwealth was inaugurated. Herefore, applying the

aforequoted provision to the case at bar, we conclude that the issuance of the lodepatents on mineral claims by the President of the Philippines in 1962 in favor of

the petitioner granted to it only the right to extract or utilize the minerals which

may be found on or under the surface of the land. On the other hand, the issuance

of the free patents by the respondent Director of Lands in 1979 in favor of theprivate respondents granted to them the ownership and the right to use the land for

agricultural purposes but excluding the ownership of, and the right to extract orutilize, the minerals which may be found on or under the surface.

The petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION vs BALITEPORTAL MINING

GR 135190 April 3, 2002

FACTS:

On March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine Mining

Act, was enacted. Pursuant to this statute, the MAC cases were referred to aRegional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA) tasked to resolve disputes involving

conflicting mining rights. On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issuedMemorandum Order No. 97-03 which provided that the DENR shall study

thoroughly and exhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the mineralresources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area.

On July 16, 1997, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari,prohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao,

the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC).It prayed for the nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum Order No. 97-03

on the ground that the "direct state utilization" espoused therein wouldeffectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133; and that the

memorandum order arbitrarily imposed the unwarranted condition that certain


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studies be conducted before mining and environmental laws are enforced by the

DENR.The assailed memorandum did not conclusively adopt direct state

utilization as official government policy on the matter, but was simply a

manifestation of the DENRs intent to consider it as one of its options, afterdetermining its feasibility through studies. MO 97-03 was only the initial step in

the ladder of administrative process and did not, as yet, fix any obligation, legalrelationship or right. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was

denied for lack of merit. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

WON CA erred when it concluded that the assailed memorandum order did not

adopt the direct state utilization scheme in resolving the Diwalwal Conflict.

HELD:No, since the challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt direct state

utilization as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the

memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed there under was merely astudy of this option and nothing else. Contrary to petitioners contention, it did not

grant any management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale minersor to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned

to undertake studies to determine its feasibility.

It must likewise be pointed out that under no circumstances may petitioner's

rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute. As correctly held by theCourt of Appeals EP No.133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the

State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded when the nationalinterest so requires. This is necessarily so since the

exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural mineral

resources are matters impressed with great public interest.

The DENR Secretary acted within his authority when he ordered a study ofthe first option, which may be undertaken consistently in accordance with the

constitutional policy enunciated above. Obviously, the State may not be precluded

from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it is the only plausible remedyin sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the gold rush. As implied earlier,

the State need be guided only by the demands of public interest in settling for this

option, as well as its material and logistic feasibility.In this regard, petitioners imputation of bad faith on the part of the DENR

Secretary when the latter issued MO 97-03 is not well-taken. Hence petitiondenied.

PYRO COPPER MINING CORPORATION vs. MINES ADJUDICATION

BOARD-DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURALRESOURCESGR 179674 July 28, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner prays for the setting aside or reversal of the Decision dated 28December 2006 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources

(DENR)-Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) which affirmed the Orders dated 14


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September 2005and 27 December 2005 of the DENR-Panel of Arbitrators, Region

1, San Fernando City, La Union (Panel of Arbitrators), in Case No. 2005-00012-I,dismissing the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the Application for

Exploration Permit of private respondent Montague Resources Philippines

Corporation.Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws

engaged in the business of mining. On 31 March 2000,petitionersApplicationfor Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA), for the exploration,

development and commercial utilization of certain pyrite ore and other mineraldeposits in a 4,360.71-hectare land in Dasol, Pangasinan, was approved and MPSA

No. 153-2000-1 was issued in its favor.

Private respondent is also a corporation organized and existing under thelaws of the Philippines and engaged in the business of mining. Private respondent

filed an Application for Exploration Permit with MGB covering the same

properties covered by and during the subsistence of APSA-SF-000089 and MPSANo. 153-2000-1 of petitioner. In turn, petitioner filed a Verified Protest/Oppositionto the Application for Exploration Permit of the private respondent. It

was allegedly filed with the Panel of Arbitrators on August 30, 2005 and was

received by the latter on September 5, 2005. Prior, however, to petitioners filingof its Verified rotest/Opposition to the private respondents Application for

Exploration Permit, petitioners MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was cancelled, a Motionfor Reconsideration was likewise denied. The MGB issued EP No. 05-001 to

private respondent. Panel of Arbitrators dismissed motu proprio the Verified

Protest/Opposition of petitioner. Petitioner elevated by appeal to the MAB which

was also dismissed. The case was elevated to the Court of appeals but judgmentwas rendered against the petitioner. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the Panel of Arbitrators has jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or

revoke EP No. 05-001issued by MGB to private respondent.

HELD:

The Panel of Arbitrators has no jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or revoke EPNo. 05-001issued by MGB to private respondent Section 77 of Republic Act No.7942 establishes the jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators, thus: Sec. 77. Panel of

Arbitrators.x x x. Within thirty (30) working days, after the submission of thecase by the parties for decision, the panel shall have exclusive and original

jurisdiction to hear and decide on the following: 1. Disputes involving rights to

mining areas; 2. Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits; 3. Disputes

involving surface owners, occupants and claimholders/concessionaires; and 4.Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the date of the

effectivity of this Act.

The Panel of Arbitrators only has jurisdiction over adverse claims, conflicts,

and oppositions relating to applications for the grant of mineral rights, but not over

cancellation of mineral rights already granted and existing.

As to who has jurisdiction to cancel an existing exploration permit, Section

28 of DAO NO. 96-40explicitly provides:


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Section 28. Cancellation of an Exploration Permit . The

Director/concerned Regional Director may cancel the Exploration Permit for

failure of the Permittee to comply with any of the requirements and for violation(s)

of the terms and conditions under which the Permit is issued. For renewed

Exploration Permits, the Secretary upon the recommendation of the Director shallcause the cancellation of the same. According to Section 5 of DAO No. 96- 40,

Director means the Director of the MGB Central Office, while Regional

Director means the Regional Director of any MGB Regional Office. As the

authority to issue an Exploration Permit is vested in the MGB, then the same

necessarily includes the corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the same.

Indisputably, the authority to deny, revoke, or cancel EP No. 05-001 of private

respondent is already lodged with the MGB, and not with the Panel of Arbitrators.

PICOP RESOURCES INC vs BASE METALS MINERAL RESOURCES

CORPORATION

GR 163509 December 6, 2006

FACTS:Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation entered into a

Mines Operating Agreement with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation

whereby the latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for the exploration,

development, and eventual commercial operation of CMMCIs eighteen (18)

mining claims located in Agusan del Sur.Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement,Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease Contracts over the miningclaims with the Bureau of Mines. So that Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines

Temporary Permit authorizing it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found

within its mining claims. Upon its expiration, the temporary permit wassubsequently renewed thrice by the Bureau of Mines, the last being on June 28,

1991.Since a portion of Banahaw Minings mining claims was located in

petitioner PICOPs logging concession in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and

petitioner PICOP entered into a Memorandum of Agreement, whereby, in mutualrecognition of each others right to the area concerned, petitioner PICOP allowed

Banahaw Mining an access/right of way to its mining claims.Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to applications for Mineral

Production Sharing Agreements. While the MPSA were pending, BanahawMining, on December 18, 1996, decided to sell/assign its rights and interests over

thirty-seven (37) mining claims in favor of private respondent Base Metals MineralResources Corporation. The transfer included mining claims held by Banahaw

Mining in its own right as claim owner, as well as those covered by its mining

operating agreement with CMMCI.

On October 7, 1997, private respondent Base Metals amended MPSAapplications were published in accordance with the requirements of the Mining Act

of 1995. On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), an adverse claim and/or opposition to private respondent

Base Metals application. After the submission of their respective position paper,

the Panel Arbitrator issued an Order disapproving private respondent Base Metals


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MPSA on the reasons that adverse claim was filed on time, that the granting of the

MPSA application on area subject of an IFMA or PTLA which is covered by aPresidential Warranty, the panel believes it cannot, unless the grantee consents

thereto, without the grantees consent, the area is considered closed to mining

location (sec. 19) (b) (No. 2), DAO No. 96-40) and that the mining location inforest or timberland is allowed only if such forest or timberland is not leased by the

government to a qualified person or entity and if it is leased the consent of thelessor is necessary, in addition to the area clearance to be issued by the agency

concerned before it is subjected to mining operation. Plantation is consideredclosed to mining locations because it is off tangent to mining. Both are extremes.

They cannot exist at the same time. The other must necessarily stop before the

other operates. Private respondent Base Metals filed a Notice of Appeal withpublic respondent MAB, the latter rendered the assailed decision setting aside the

Panel Arbitrators order. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the MAB.

ISSUE:(a)Whether or not the area covered by Base Metals MPSA is, by law, closed

to mining activities and (b) Whether or not the Presidential Warranty is a contract

protected by the non-impairment clauseof the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:The Court ruled that the area covered by Base Metals MPSA is, by law, not

closed to mining activities. RA 7942 does not disallow mining applications in all

forest reserves but only those proclaimed aswatershed forest reserves. There is no

evidence in this case that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA has beenproclaimed as watershed forest reserves. Even granting that the area covered by the

MPSA is part of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, such does notnecessarily signify that the area is absolutely closed to mining activities.

Contrary to PICOPs obvious misreading of our decision in Apex Mi ning

Co., Inc. v. Garcia, supra, to the effect that mineral agreements are not allowed in

the forest reserve established under Proclamation369, the Court in that caseactually ruled that pursuant to PD 463 as amended by PD 1385, one can acquire

mining rights within forest reserves, such as the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest

Reserve, by initially applying for a permit to prospect with the Bureau of Forestand Development and subsequently for a permit to explore with the Bureau of

Mines and Geosciences. Moreover, Sec. 18 RA 7942 allows mining even in

timberland or forestry subject to existing rights and reservations. Similarly, Sec. 47of PD 705 permits mining operations in forest lands which include the public

forest, the permanent forest or forest reserves, and forest reservations.The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a

contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment ofits concession areas. Such an interpretation would result in the complete abdication

by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and supervise theexploration, development and utilization of the natural resources in the area. The

warranty covers only the right to cut, collect, and remove timber in its concessionarea, and does not extend to the utilization of other resources, such as mineral

resources, occurring within the concession. The Presidential Warranty cannot beconsidered a contract distinct from PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. It is merely a

collateral undertaking which cannot amplify PICOPs rights under its timber


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license. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause cannot

be invoked.

LONEY vs PEOPLE

GR 152644 February 10, 2006

FACTS:Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid and Pedro B. Hernandez are

the Pres. and CEO, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations,respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corp., a corporation engaged in mining in the

province of Marinduque. Marcopper had been storing tailings (mine waste) from

its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran adrainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makulapnit rivers. It appears that

Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnels end. On March 24, 1994,

tailings gushed out of or near the tunnels end. In a few days, Mt. Tapian pit haddischarged millions of tons of tailings in to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.

In August 1996, the DOJ separately charged petitioners in the MTC of Boac,

Marinduque with violation of Art. 91 (B), subparagraphs 5 and 6 of P.D. No. 1067

or the Water code of the Phil., Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 984 or the National PollutionDecree of 1976, Sec. 108 of R.A. No. 7942 or the Phil. Mining Act of 1995, and

Art. 365 of the RPC for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage to Property.In the Consolidated Order of MTC, granting partial reconsideration to its

Joint Order quashing the information for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The

MTC maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Art. 365 of the

RPC. Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC assailingthat the portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for

violation of RA 7942 and the petition was raffled to Br. 94 while publicrespondents appeal assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order quashing the

Information for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984 and this appeal was

consolidated with petitioners petition.

MTC Br. 94 granted the public respondents appeal but denied petitionerspetition. Petitioners then filed for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that

Br. 94 acted with grave abuse of discretion because 1.the Informations for

violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and the Art. 365 of the RPC proceededfrom are based on a single act or incident of polluting the rivers thru dumping of

mine tailings, and the charge for violation of Art 365 of the RPC absorbs the other

charges since the element of lack of necessary or adequate protection,negligence, recklessness and imprudence is common among them, 2. The

duplicitous nature of the Informations contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova.The Court of Appeals affirmed the Br. 94 ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Br. 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,contravenes People v. Relova.

RULING:

The petition has no merit. In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), theadditional fact that must be established is the willful violation and gross neglect on

the part of the accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental


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Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure the

containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog and BoacRivers. If there was no violation or neglect, and that the accused satisfactorily

proved that Marcopper had done everything to ensure containment of the run-off

and silt materials, they will not be liable. It does not follow, however, that theycannot be prosecuted under the Water Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the Revised

Penal Code because violation of the Environmental Compliance Certificate is notan essential element of these laws.

Petitioners reiterate their contention in that their prosecution contravenesruling in People vs. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the courts statement in

Relova that the law seeks to prevent harassment of the accused by multiple

prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonethelesseach constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements. Thus,

Relova is no authority for petitioners claim against multiple prosecutions based on

a single act not only because the question of double jeopardy is not an issue here,but also because, as the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted foran act or incident punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a

national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever fall under the first sentence of Sec. 21,

Art. III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same offense, and not, as inRelova, for offenses arising from the same incident.

DESAMA vs ELISEA GOZUN

GR 157882 March 30, 2006

FACTS:

In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with

foreign companies when it comes to either technical or financial large scale

exploration or mining. In 1995, Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the PhilippineMining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an

Australian company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000ha of land in Quirino and N. Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After the passage of

the law, DENR rolled out its implementing rules and regulations. Didipio

petitioned to have the law and the IRR to be annulled as it is unconstitutional and itconstitutes unlawful taking of property. In seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional, petitioners set their

sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 whichthey claim allow the unlawful and unjust taking of private property for private

purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution

mandating that private property shall not be taken except for public use and the

corresponding payment of justcompensation. They assert that public respondentDENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations,

cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land

without payment of just compensation.In their memorandum petitioners pose whether or not Republic Act No.

7942 and the CAMC FTAA are void because they allow the unjust and unlawful

taking of property without payment of just compensation , in violation of Section9, Article III of the Constitution issues, among others issues.


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ISSUE:

Whether there has been an actual controversy or issue with respect to the

unlawful and unjust taking of property without payment of just compensation.

HELD:

Public respondents are of the view that petitioners eminent domain claim is not

ripe for adjudication as they fail to allege that CAMC has actually taken their

properties nor do they allege that their property rights have been endangered or are

in danger on account of CAMCs FTAA. In effect, public respondents insist that

the issue of eminent domain is not a justiciable controversy which this Court can

take cognizance of. A question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act

being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.

However, the court cannot await the adverse consequences of the law in order toconsider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial intervention.

In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed there

is taking involved but it is not w/o just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 providesfor just compensation as well as section 107 of the DENR RR. To wit,

Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner,occupant, or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly

compensated as may be provided for in the implementing rules and regulations.

Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damagedone to the property of the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a

consequence of the mining operations or as a result of the construction orinstallation of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and

justly compensated.

Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminentdomain to exercise entry, acquisition and use of private lands.

CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION vs MACROASIA

CORPORATION

GR 169080 December 19, 2007

FACTS:

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Infanta Mineral andIndustrialCorporation (Infanta) entered into a Mining Lease Contract V-1050.

Infantas corporate name was then changed to Cobertson Holdings Corporation

and subsequently to its present name, Macroasia Corporation.After sometime,Celestial filed a Petition to Cancel the subject mining lease contracts andother mining claims of Macroasia including those covered by Mining Lease

Contract No. V-1050, before thePanel of Arbitrators (POA) of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR.Blue Ridge, in an earlier letter-petition, also

wrote the Director of Mines to seek cancellation of mining lease contracts and


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other mining rights of Macroasia and another entity, Lebach Mining Corporation

(Lebach), in mining areas in Brookes Point.Celestial is the assignee of 144 miningclaims covering such areas contiguous to Infantas (now Macroasia) mining lode

claims. Celestial also holds an MPSA with the government which covers 2,835

hectares located at Ipilan/Maasin, Brookes Point, Palawan and two pendingapplications coveringanother 4,040 hectares in Barangay Mainit also in Brookes

Point.Celestial sought the cancellation of Macroasias lease contracts. Macroasia

refuted the grounds for cancellation invoked by Celestial.Based on the records ofthe Bureau of Mines and findings of the field investigations, the POAgranted the

petition of Celestial to cancel the Mining Lease Contracts of Macroasia; and found

the claims of the others indubitably meritorious. It gave Celestial thepreferential right to Macroasias mining areas.

It upheld Blue Ridges petition, but only as against the Mining Lease

Contract areas of Lebach, and the said leased areas were declaredautomatically abandoned. It gave Blue Ridge priority right to the aforesaidLebachsareas/mining claims. Blue Ridge and Macroasia appealed before the

MAB.Lebach did not file any notice of appeal with the required memorandum of

appeal; thus, withrespect to Lebach, the above resolution became final andexecutory.

The MAB made a decision upholding the Decision of the POA to cancel theMining Lode/LeaseContracts of Macroasia.However, the MAB, subsequently

issued a resolution vacating its previous decision, holding thatneither the POA nor

the MAB had the power to revoke a mineral agreement duly entered into by

theDENR Secretary. The MAB further held that the power to cancel or revoke amineral agreement wasexclusively lodged with the DENR Secretary.Celestial and

Blue Ridge made an appeal.The CA Special 12th Division affirmed theMAB Resolution which upheld the exclusive authority of the DENR Secretary to

approve, cancel, and revoke mineral agreements. The CA also denied Celestials

Motion for Reconsideration. While the CA Special 10th Division granted Blue

Ridges petition; reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the MAB; and treatedthe cancellation of a mining lease agreement as a mining disputewithin the

exclusive jurisdiction of the POA under Sec. 77 of RA 7942, explaining that the

power to resolve mining disputes, which is the greater power, necessarily includesthe lesser power to cancel mining agreements.

ISSUE:Whether or not it is only the Secretary of the DENR who has the jurisdiction to

cancel miningcontracts and privileges?

HELD:It is only the Secretary of the DENR who has jurisdiction to cancel mining

contracts and privileges. After a scrutiny of the provisions of PD 463, EO 211, EO279, RA 7942 and its implementing rules and regulations, executive issuances, and

case law, we rule that the DENR Secretary, not the POA, hasthe jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral lease contracts or mineral agreements ba

sed on the following reasons: The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineralagreements emanates from his administrative authority, supervision, management,

and control over mineral resources under Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the


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Revised Administrative Code of 1987.It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that

manages, supervises, and regulates the use and development of all mineralresources of the country. It has exclusive jurisdiction over the management of all

lands of public domain, which covers mineral resources and deposits from said

lands. It has the power to oversee, supervise, and police our natural resourceswhich include mineral resources. Derived from the broad and explicit powers of

the DENR and its Secretary under the Administrative Code of 1987 is the power toapprove mineral agreements and necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel said

agreements.

Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision of the DENRSecretary over the MGB to cancel or recommend cancellation of mineral rights

clearly demonstrates the authority of the DENR Secretary to cancel or approve thecancellation of mineral agreements. The DENR Secretarys power to cancel

mining rights or agreements through the MGB can be inferred from Sec. 230,Chapter XXIV of DENR AO 96-40 on cancellation, revocation, and termination of

a permit/mineral agreement/FTAA.

APEX MINING CO vs Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp

GR 152613 & 152628 November 20, 2009

FACTS:

A motion for reconsideration was filed by SEM. The Assailed Decision held

that the assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SEM violated oneof the conditions stipulated in the permit. It also ruled that the transfer of EP 133

violated Presidential Decree No. 463, which requires that the assignment of amining right be made with the prior approval of the Secretary of the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Moreover, the Assailed Decisionpointed out that EP 133expired by non-renewal since it was not renewed before or

after its expiration. It likewise upheld the validity of Proclamation No. 297 absentany question against its validity. In view of this, and considering that under Section

5 of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as the Mining Act of 1995,mining operations in mineral reservations may be undertaken directly by the State

or through a contractor, the Court deemed the issue of ownership of priority rightover the contested Diwalwal GoldRush Area as having been overtaken by the said

proclamation. Thus, it was held in the assailed decision that it is now within theprerogative of the Executive Department to undertake directly the mining

operations of the disputed area or to award the operations to private entitiesincluding petitioners Apex and Balite, subject to applicable laws, rules and

regulations, and provided that these private entities are qualified.Apex, for its part, filed a Motion for Clarification of the Assailed Decision,

praying that the Court elucidate on the Decisions pronouncement that mining

operations, are now, therefore within thefull control of the State through theexecutive branch. Moreover, Apex asks this Court to order the Mines and

Geosciences Board (MGB) to accept its application for an exploration permit.

Balite echoes the same concern as that of Apex on the actual takeover by theState of the mining industry in the disputed area to the exclusion of the private

sector. In addition, Balite prays for this Court to direct MGB to accept its


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application for an exploration permit. Camilo Banad, et al., likewise filed a motion

for reconsideration and prayed that the disputed area be awarded to them. In theResolution, the Court En Banc resolved to accept the instant cases.

ISSUES:1.Whether the transfer or assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 by MMC to

SEM was validly made without violating any of the terms and conditions set forthin Presidential Decree No. 463 and EP 133 itself.

2.Whether Southeast Mindanao Mining Corp. acquired a vested right over thedisputed area, which constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution.

3.Whether the assailed Decision dated 23 June 2006 of the Third Division in this

case is contrary to and overturns the earlier Decision of this Court in Apex v.Garcia (G.R. No. 92605, 16 July1991, 199 SCRA 278).

4.Whether the issuance of Proclamation No. 297 declaring the disputed area as

mineral reservation outweighs the claims of SEM, Apex Mining Co. Inc. andBalite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative over the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.5.Whether the issue of the legality/constitutionality of Proclamation No. 297 was

belatedly raised.

RULING:

1.The assailed Decision did not overturn the 16 July 1991 Decision in ApexMining Co., Inc. v.Garcia. The former was decided on facts and issues that were

not attendant in the latter, such as the expiration of EP 133, the violation of the

condition embodied in EP 133 prohibiting its assignment, and the unauthorized and

invalid assignment of EP 133 by MMC to SEM, since this assignment was effectedwithout the approval of the Secretary of DENR;

2.SEM did not acquire vested right over the disputed area because itssupposed right was extinguished by the expiration of its exploration permit and by

its violation of the condition prohibiting the assignment of EP 133 by MMC to

SEM. In addition, even assuming that SEM has a valid exploration permit, such is

a mere license that can be withdrawn by the State. In fact, the same has beenwithdrawn by the issuance of Proclamation No. 297, which places the disputed

area under the full control of the State through the Executive Department;

3.The approval requirement under Section 97 of Presidential Decree No. 463applies to the assignment of EP 133 by MMC to SEM, since the exploration permit

is an interest in a mining lease contract;

4.The issue of the constitutionality and the legality of Proclamation No. 297was raised belatedly, as SEM questions the same for the first time in its Motion for

Reconsideration. Even if the issue were to be entertained, the said proclamation isfound to be in harmony with the Constitution and other existing statutes;

5.The motion for reconsideration of Camilo Banad, et al. cannot be passedupon because they are not parties to the instant cases;6.

The prayers of Apex and Balite asking the Court to direct the MGB to accepttheir applications for exploration permits cannot be granted, since it is the

Executive Department that has the prerogative to accept such applications, if everit decides to award the mining operations in the disputed area to a private entity.


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LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO vs WMC RESOURCES INTL. PTY. LTD

GR 162331 Novermber 20, 2006

FACTS:

Philippine Government and WMC Philippines, the local wholly-ownedsubsidiary of WMCResources International Pty. Ltd. (WMC Resources) executed a

Financial and Technical AssistanceAgreement, denominated as the ColumbioFTAA No. 02-95-XI (Columbio FTAA) for the purpose of large scale exploration,

development, and commercial exploration of possible mineral resources in aninitialcontract area of 99,387 hectares located in the provinces of South Cotabato, Sultan

Kudarat,Davao del Sur, and North Cotabato in accordance with Executive Order

No. 279 and Department Administrative Order No. 63, Series of 1991.TheColumbio FTAA is covered in part by 156 mining claims held under various

Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA) by Southcot Mining

Corporation, Tampakan Mining Corporation, and Sagittarius Mines, Inc.(collectively called the Tampakan Companies), in accordance with the TampakanOption Agreement entered into by WMC Philippines and the Tampakan

Companies on 25 April 1991,as amended by Amendatory Agreement dated 15 July

1994, for purposes of exploration of the mining claims in Tampakan, SouthCotabato. The Option Agreement, among other things, provides for the grant of the

right of first refusal to the Tampakan Companies in case WMC Philippines desiresto dispose of its rights and interests in the mining claims covering the area subject

of the agreement.

WMC Resources subsequently divested itself of its rights and interests in the

Columbio FTAA, and on 12 July 2000 executed a Sale and Purchase Agreementwith petitioner Lepanto over its entire shareholdings in WMC Philippines, subject

to the exercise of the Tampakan Companies exercise oftheir right of first refusalto purchase the subject shares. On 28 August 2000, petitioner sought the approval

of the 12 July 2000 Agreement from the DENR Secretary. In the interim, on 10

January 2001, contending that the 12 July Agreement between petitioner and

WMC Philippines had expired due to failure to meet the necessary preconditionsfor its validity, WMC Resources and the Tampakan Companies executed another

Sale and Purchase Agreement, where Sagittarius Mines, Inc. was designated

assignee and corporate vehicle which would acquire theshareholdings andundertake the Columbio FTAA activities. On 15 January 2001, Sagittarius

Mines,Inc. increased its authorized capitalization to P250 million. Subsequently,

WMC Resources and Sagittarius Mines, Inc. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale ofShares of Stocks on 23 January 2001.

After due consideration and evaluation of the financial and technicalqualifications of Sagittarius Mines, Inc., the DENR Secretary approved the transfer

of the Columbio FTAA from WMC Philippines to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. in theassailed Order. According to said Order, pursuant to Section 66 of Department

Administrative Order No. 96-40, as amended, Sagittarius Mines, Inc. meets thequalification requirements as Contractor-Transferee of FTAA No. 02-95-XI, and

that the application for transfer of said FTAA went thru the procedure and otherrequirements set forth under the law.

Aggrieved by the transfer of the Columbio FTAA in favor of SagittariusMines, Inc., petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the Order of the DENR

Secretary with the Office of the President. Petitioner assails the validity of the 18


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December 2001 Order of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources (DENR) approving the application for and the consequentregistration of FTAA No. 02-95-XI from WMC Philippines to Sagittarius Mines,

Inc.on the ground that:1) it violates the constitutional right of Lepanto to due

process; 2) it preempts the resolution of very crucial legal issues pending with theregular courts; and 3) it blatantly violates Section 40 of the Mining Act.

In a Decision dated 23 July 2002, the Office of the President dismissed thepetition.

ISSUE:

Whether the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, particularly Section 40

thereof requiring the approval of the President of the assignment or transfer offinancial or technical assistance agreements should have a retroactive

application to the Columbio FTAA.

RULING:Applying the above-cited law retroactively would contradict the

established legal doctrine that statutes are to be construed as having only a

prospective operation unless the contrary is expressly stated or necessarily impliedfrom the language used in the law. In the case at bar, there is an absence of

either an express declaration or an implication in the Philippine Mining Act of1995 that the provisions of said law shall be made to apply retroactively, therefore,

any section of said law must be made to apply only prospectively, in view of the

rule that a statute ought not to receive a construction making it act retroactively,

unless the words used are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaningcan be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot

be otherwise satisfied.

BENGUET CORP VS DENR

GR 163101 February 13, 2008

FACTS:

Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a Royalty Agreement with Option to

Purchase (RAWOP) , wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as the owner of fourmining claims with a total area of 288.8656 hectares. The parties also executed a

Supplemental Agreement. The mining claims were covered by Mineral Production

Sharing Agreement (MPSA) Application No. APSA-V-0009 jointly filed by J.G.Realty as claim-owner and Benguet as operator.

After some time, the Executive Vice-President of Benguet, Antonio N.Tachuling, issueda letter informing J.G. Realty of its intention to develop the

mining claims. However, J.G. Realty, through its President, Johnny L. Tan, thensent a letter to the President of Benguet informing the latter that it was terminating

the RAWOP. The latter alleged that petitioner violated some of the provisions ofthe RAWOP, specifically on non-payment of royalties and non-fulfillment of

obligations stipulated therein.J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation of the

RAWOP. POA issued a Decision, cancelling the RAWOP and its SupplementalAgreement. BENGUET was subsequently excluded from the joint MPSA


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Application over the mineral claims. Subsequent MR was denied. Said decision

was upheld by DENR-MAB. Hence this instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or no the filing of the petition with the Supreme Court is proper.

RULING:The instant petition can be denied outright as Benguet resorted to an

improper Remedy.The last paragraph of Section 79 of Republic Act No. (RA)7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 states, A petition for review by

certiorari and question of law may be filed by the aggrieved party with the

Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision ofthe[MAB].

The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform

rule on appealsfrom quasi-judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from theirjudgments and final orders are nowrequired to be brought to the CA on a verifiedpetition for review. A quasi-judicial agency or body has been defined as an organ

of government, other than a court or legislature, which affects the rights of private

parties through either adjudication or rule-making. MAB falls under this definition;hence, it isno different from the other quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under Rule

43. Besides, the introductory words in Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91 amongthese agencies areindicate that the enumeration isnot exclusive or conclusive

and acknowledge the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies which, though not

expressly listed, should be deemed included therein.

The judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that directresort from administrativeagencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless the

redress desired cannot be obtained from theappropriate lower tribunals, or unlessexceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of aremedy falling

within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.Thus Benguet should

have filed the appeal with the CA.Petitioner having failed to properly appeal to the

CA under Rule 43, the decision of the MAB has become final and executory. Onthis ground alone, the instant petition must be denied.

CARPIO vs SULU RESOURCES DEVELOPMENTCORPORATIONGR 148267 August 8, 2002

FACTS:This case originated from a petition filed by respondent [Sulu Resources

Development Corporation] for Mines Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) No.MPSA-IV-13, covering certain areas in Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioner [Armando C.

Carpio] filed an opposition/adverse claim thereto, alleging, inter alia, that hislandholdings in Cupang and Antipolo, Rizal will be covered by respondents claim,

thus he enjoys a preferential right to explore and extract the quarry resources on hisproperties.

After due proceedings were held, the Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau of the DENR rendered a Resolution upholding petitioners

opposition/adverse claim. Respondent appealed the foregoing Resolution to theMines Adjudication Board.


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Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss appeal on the ground of

respondents failure to comply with the requirements of the New Mining ActsImplementing Rules and Regulations. The Mines Adjudication Board rendered the

assailed Order dismissing petitioners opposition/adverse claim. Petitioner filed a

motion for reconsideration of said Order which was denied by the Board. Anappeal was filed with the CA but same was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appeals from the Decision or Final Orders of the MinesAdjudication Board should be made directly to the Supreme Court as contended by

the respondent and the Court of Appeals, or such appeals be first made to the Court

of Appeals as contended by herein petitioner.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious. Factual controversies are usually involved inadministrative actions; and the CA is prepared to handle such issues because,unlike this Court, it is mandated to rule on questions of fact. In Metro Construction

we observed that not only did the CA have appellate jurisdiction over CIAC

decisions and orders, but the review of such decisions included questions of factand law. At the very least when factual findings of the MAB are challenged or

alleged to have been made in grave abuse of discretion as in the present case, theCA may review them, consistent with the constitutional duty of the judiciary. To

summarize, there are sufficient legal footings authorizing a review of the MAB

Decision under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

First, Section 30 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that [n]olaw shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as

provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent. On the other hand,Section 79 of RA No. 7942 providesthat decisions of the MAB may be reviewed

by this Court on a petition for review by certiorari. This provision Is obviously

an expansion of the Courts appellate jurisdiction, an expansion to which this Court

has not consented. Indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging the appellatejurisdiction of this Court would unnecessarily burden it.

Second, when the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power,

transfers to the CA pending cases involving a review of a quasi- judicial bodysdecisions, such transfer relates only to procedure; hence, it does not impair the

substantive and vested rights of the parties. The aggrieved partys right to appeal is

preserved; what is changed is only the procedure by which the appeal is to be madeor decided. The parties still have a remedy and a competent tribunal to grant this

remedy.Third, the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a

uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals fromtheir judgments and final orders are now required to be brought to the CA on a

verified petition for review. A quasi-judicial agency or body has been defined as anorgan of government, other than a court or legislature, which affects the rights of

private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. MAB falls under thisdefinition; hence, it is no different from the other quasi-judicial bodies enumerated

under Rule 43. Besides, the introductory words in Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91 --among these agencies are-- indicate that the enumeration is not exclusive or


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conclusive and acknowledge the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies which,

though not expressly listed, should be deemed included therein.Fourth, the Court realizes that under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 as amended

by RA No. 7902, factual controversies are usually involved in decisions of quasi-

judicial bodies; and the CA, which is likewise tasked to resolve questions of fact,has more elbow room to resolve them. By includingquestions of fact among the

issues that may be raised in an appeal from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA,Section 3 of Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 and Section 3 of Rule 43

explicitlyexpanded the list of such issues. According to Section 3 of Rule 43, [a]nappeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and

in the manner herein provided whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of

law, or mixed questions of fact and law. Hence, appeals from quasi-judicialagencies even only on questions of law may be brought to the CA.

Fifth, the judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that

direct resort from administrative agencies to this Court will not be entertained,unless the redress desired cannot beobtained from the appropriate lower tribunals,or unless exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy

falling within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction. In brief,

appeals from decisions of the MAB shall be taken to the CA through petitions forreview in accordance with the provisions of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY vs HON. MINISTER OF NATURAL

RESOURCES

GR L-49109 December 1, 1987

FACTS:

Petitioner is a mining corporation, it alleges that it is the holder of fifty validmining claims situated in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, acquired under the

Philippine Bill of 1902.P.D. No. 1214 was issued, requiring holders of subsisting

and valid patentable mining claims located under the provisions of the Philippine

Bill of 1902 to file a mining lease application within one year from the approval ofthe Decree. Petitioner accordingly filed a mining lease application, but "under

protest", with a reservation annotated on the back of its application that it is not

waiving its rights over its mining claims until the validity of Presidential DecreeNo. 1214 shall have been passed upon by this Court.

Three days before filing the disputed mining lease application, petitioner

filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, alleging that it has noother plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to protect its

rights (except by said petition). Petitioner assails Presidential Decree No. 1214 asunconstitutional in that it amounts to a deprivation of property without due process

of law. Petitioner avers that its fifty (50) mining claims had already been declaredas its own private and exclusive property in final judgments rendered by the CFI

Camarines Norte.The cases cited by petitioner recognize the right of a locator of a mining

claim as a property right. This right, however is not absolute. It is merely apossesory right, more so, in this case, where petitioner's claims are still unpatented.

They can be lost through abandonment or forfeiture or they may be revoked forvalid legal grounds.


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ISSUE:

Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional.

RULING:

Even assuming that petitioner was not bound to exhaust administrativeremedies on the question of whether or not its mining claims are still subsisting

before challenging the constitutionality of said Decree. It is a valid exercise of thesovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands of the public domain, of which

petitioner's mining claims still form a part, and over the patrimony of the nation, ofwhich mineral deposits are a valuable asset.

It may be underscored, in this connection, that the Decree does not cover all

mining claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those claims overwhich their locators had failed to obtain a patent. And even then, such locators may

still avail of the renewable twenty-five year (25) lease prescribed by Pres. Dec. No.

463, the Mineral Development Resources Decree of 1974.Mere location does notmean absolute ownership over the affected land or the mining claim. It merelysegregates the located land or area from the public domain by barring other would-

be locators from locating the same and appropriating for themselves the minerals

found therein. To rule otherwise would imply that location is all that is needed toacquire and maintain rights over a located mining claim. This, we cannot approve

or sanction because it is contrary to the intention of the lawmaker that the locatorshould faithfully and consistently comply with the requirements for annual work

and improvements in the located mining claim.

Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV of the 1973

Constitution which states:"All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife,

and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With theexception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential and resettlement

lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license,

concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of

any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-fiveyears, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for

irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of

water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the measure and the limit ofthe grant".

VILLARIN VS PEOPLEGR 175289 August 31, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioner Aniano Latayada (Latayada) and three others namely, BarangayCaptain Sudaria of Tagpangi, CDO, Baillo and Boyatac, were charged with

violation of Section 68, PD No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. CityProsecutor recommended to charge Villarin as well. The Version of the Defense:

In response to the clamor of the residents of Barangays Tampangan, Pigsag-an,Tuburan and Taglinao, all in Cagayan De Oro City, Villarin, decided to repair

the impassable Batinay bridge. The project was allegedly with the concurrence ofthe Barangay Council. Pressured to immediately commence the needed repairs,

Villarin commissioned Boyatac toinquire from Sudaria about the availability of


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timber without first informing the City Engineer. Sudaria asked for the

specifications which Villarin gave. Villarin then asked Baillo and Boyatac toattend to the same. When the timber was already available, it was transported from

Tagpangi to Batinay. However, the timber flitches were seized by the DENR Strike

Force Teamand taken to its office where they were received by Vera Cruz, thesecurity guard on duty. RTC found them guilty. CA affirmed the judgment of

RTC.

ISSUE:SSUE: WON mere possession of timber without criminal intent is

punishable.

RULING:

"There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of

PD No. 705, to wit:(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other

forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public

land, or from private land without any authorization; and (2) Possession of timber

or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest

laws and regulations."The Information charged petitioners with the second offense

which is consummated by the mere possession of forest products without the

proper documents.As a special law, the nature of the offense is malum prohibitum

and as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. "However, the prosecution

must prove that petitioners had the intent to possess (animus possidendi)" thetimber. "Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also

constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the [object of the crime] is

in the immediate physical control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive

possession exists when the [object of the crime] is under the dominion and control

of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over

theplace where it is found."There is no dispute that petitioners were in constructive

possession of the timber without the requisite legal documents. Villarin and

Latayada were personally involved in its procurement, delivery and storagewithout any license or permit issued by any competent authority. Given these and

considering that the offense is malum prohibitum, petitioners contention that the

possession of the illegally cut timber was not for personal gain but for the repair of

said bridge is, therefore, inconsequential. Petition denied.

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION vs. ALBERTO G. BUMOLO

GR 139548 December 22, 2000

FACTS:

Marcopper Mining Corporation registered its mining claims in Pao, Kasibu,

NuevaVizcaya with the DENR from February 02,1982 to October 12, 1982.Private respondents Alberto G.Bumolo and others registered their mining claims in

the same area from 28 July 1981 to 22 September 1988, which claims were

subsequently converted into Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA).


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On March 12, 1982 petitioner entered into Option Agreements over the

mining. Under the Agreements, petitioner was granted the exclusive andirrevocable right to explore the mining claims for three (3) years with provision for

extension. petitioner filed Prospecting Permit Applications (PPA) with the Bureau

of Forest Development, DENR, on the alleged ground that a portion of the areacovered by the mining claims was within the Magat River Forest Reservation

under Proc. 573 of June26, 1969 and with DAR on account of alleged coverage ofthe other portion within the Nueva Vizcaya Quirino Civil Reservation under Proc.

1498 of 11 September 1975.Executive Director Leonardo A. Paat rejected petitioners Prospecting

Permit Application (PPA) on the ground that the Memorandum of July 08, 1991

endorsed by the Regional Technical Director for Mines revealed that the areacovered was outside government reservation; that the prospect claim was in

conflict with existing claims; and, that the area had been extensively explored in

the early 1980's.Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Regional Executive Director Samuel

Paragas recommended to the DENR Secretary that petitioner's request for

reconsideration be denied; that the existing rights of mining claim holders be

respected; and, that the prior legal rights of MPSA/Financial and TechnicalAssistance Agreement applicants over subject area be recognized. As regards

petitioner's PPA filed with the DAR, it appeared that it was issued a clearance toprospect for six (6) months from December 11, 1995.

On August 15, 1997 petitioner appealed to public respondent Mines

Adjudication Board (MAB). Petitioner maintained that subject area was within the

Magat River Forest Reservation. On June 11,1998 the rejection of the PPA wasaffirmed whereas the mining claims of respondents Alberto G.Bumolo et al. that

had been converted into a MPSA, subject to compliance with R.A. 7942 and DAONo. 96-40, were given due course. Petitioner moved for reconsideration.

Respondent MAB denied petitioners motion.

ISSUE:Whether respondent MAB erred in finding that the area subject of the PPA

was outside the Magat River Forest Reservation.

RULING:

Respondent MAB correctly upheld the ratiocination of Regional Executive

Director Paragas indenying petitioner's PPA. The disapproval of Marcoppers PPAmoreover, did not emanate from a single recommendation of the RTD for Mines.

Records would show that as early as May 31, 1989 Bumolo group of PD 463claims which Marcopper has eventually surrounded by filing its own PAO 1-30

group of claims was confirmed by the Forest Engineering Section of the region tobe outside proclaimed watershed areas, wilderness, national parks and existing

government reforestation projects.the area covered by petitioner's PPA is outside the Magat River Forest

Reservation has been adequately established by the following evidence: (a)confirmation asearly as 31 May 1989 by the Forest Engineering Section of

Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (b) the 8 July 1991Memorandum Report of RegionalTechnical Director Punsal Jr.; and, (c) plotting provided by the National Mapping


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and Resources Information Authority per its 2 June 1995 indorsement of the maps

to the office of the Regional Executive Director.Petitioner contests the exclusion of the area subject of its PPA within the

Magat River Forest Reservation based merely on the alleged "typographical error

committed by somebody in the Engineering Section of the DENR." Aside from thefact that the allegation does not have anything to support it, the aforementioned

documents which the Regional Executive Directors relied upon in denying the PPAhad already settled the issue. Furthermore, respondent MAB even fortified the

bases for the rejection of petitioner's PPA. As plotted by the Lands ManagementSector of DENR Region 2 contained in the sketch plan of 11 November 1996and

as shown in the Land Use map of the Community Environment and Natural

Resources Office of Dupax, Nueva Vizcaya, the area covered under the PPA isindeed outside any government reservation.

Nat Res 3rd Cases

Documents

Transcript of Nat Res 3rd Cases