Mustafa Kemal & Enver in Conflict, 1919-1922

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     Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Middle Eastern Studies.

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    Mustafa Kemal and Enver in Conflict, 1919-22Author(s): Salahi R. Sonyel

    Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Oct., 1989), pp. 506-515Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283334Accessed: 16-03-2015 16:34 UTC

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    MUSTAFA

    KEMAL

    AND ENVER

    Arabia

    and

    Syria

    was

    recognized

    by

    Russia,

    and

    by

    the Sultan

    of

    Turkey'.9

    Simultaneously,

    Enver

    was

    intriguing

    with the British. On the

    night

    of

    24 February1920, he had an interviewwith Major Ivor Hedley of the

    British

    Military

    Mission

    n

    Berlin,

    to

    whom he disclosedthat

    he was

    going

    to Moscow o

    workwith the Soviet

    government,

    imply

    and

    solely

    to stir

    up

    insurrection

    gainst

    Britain

    throughout

    ts

    Muslim

    possessions.

    However,

    he

    had decided

    to

    delay

    his

    departure

    or

    a few

    days,

    as he

    was

    extremely

    anxious o

    workwith Britain

    rather han

    with BolshevikRussia. He wanted

    Egyptian

    independence

    to be extended

    to the

    Sudan,

    and an

    Anglo-

    Egyptian

    treaty

    concluded;

    self-determination

    o be

    granted

    throughout

    Arabia,

    and the settlement

    of the

    Izmirand

    Thrace

    questions

    n

    Turkey's

    favour.If Britaincame to termswithhim, he wouldremain n Berlinuntil

    everything

    was

    finally

    settled.

    He would

    definitely

    break off

    negotiations

    with

    Moscow,

    and would then travel

    to the

    East where his

    presence

    would

    be

    essential

    f the

    feelings

    towardsBritain

    were

    to

    be

    entirelychanged.

    In the British

    Foreign

    Office,

    W.S.

    Edmonds found Enver's

    ambitions

    'incompatible

    with British rule

    with

    Egypt

    and India'.

    'Even

    if we were

    prepared

    o

    stoop

    to

    treating

    with a man

    whom we

    regard

    as a

    criminal',

    he

    commented,

    it would do

    us no

    good.

    The

    CUP

    and the Bolshevists

    will

    work

    together,

    whatever

    Enver

    maysay,

    and

    if

    we

    made terms

    with

    Enver,

    we should

    only give

    him more

    prestige

    to use

    against

    us'.10

    Enver had

    expressed

    the same idea

    in a letter to

    Cemal

    Pasha,

    dated

    26

    February

    1920,

    under

    his assumed

    name

    'Ali'.

    He

    hoped,

    he

    said,

    to

    work 'for the salvation

    of the Turkish

    and

    Muslim

    world'.1l

    But,

    when

    the

    British

    bluntly

    turned him

    down,12

    he

    went to

    Moscow

    in

    the

    spring

    or

    early

    summer

    of 1920 after a number

    of

    adventurous

    attempts

    to

    get

    there

    by

    air.13

    Despite

    the

    fact that he

    was

    not

    well

    received

    at the

    Baku

    Congress

    held

    in

    September-October

    1920,14

    he

    Bolshevik leaders

    were

    onlytoo pleasedto makefull useof his 'Islamicmage'against he 'Western

    imperialists'.

    They

    showered

    him with

    attention,

    praises

    and

    promises

    of

    military

    and

    monetary

    assistance,

    and

    Enver

    fell for it.

    In

    the

    spring

    of

    1921

    he left

    Moscow and

    visited

    Germany,

    Switzerland

    and

    Italy.

    There he met

    various

    Muslim

    representatives,

    and

    persuaded

    them

    to

    accept

    the Soviet

    government's

    nvitation o a

    meeting

    in Moscow

    during

    June

    in order to co-ordinate

    heir efforts

    in

    the

    Pan-Islamic ause.

    They

    would

    also

    arrange

    the assistance

    which

    they

    would receive

    from

    the Soviet

    government.15

    The

    meeting

    was held

    during

    the second

    week

    of June, and a Pan-Islamiccommittee was established to draw up a

    programme

    of common action for submission

    o

    the Soviet Commissariat

    for

    Foreign

    Affairs,

    which

    promised

    o

    help

    by

    every

    means n its

    power.

    In

    fact,

    all

    funds

    for the

    movement

    were

    supplied

    by

    the

    Soviet

    government.

    The members

    of

    the Pan-Islamic

    Committee,

    n

    additionto

    Enver,

    who

    became its

    president,

    were:

    Emir

    Shekip

    Arslan,

    Feyzi

    Bey

    'representing'

    Tripoli,

    Rahman

    Gargarini,

    a

    representative

    of

    the Tunisian

    Muslims,

    507

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    MIDDLEEASTERN

    STUDIES

    Wahid

    (an

    Indian),

    who later

    resigned

    and

    was

    replaced

    by

    Abdul

    Rab,

    and

    former

    CUP

    leaders

    Dr

    Rifat,

    Dr

    Mansur,

    Dr

    Nazim,

    Ziya Bey

    and

    Bedri

    Bey. ZiyaBey would latersupervisea branchof theorganizationnBerlin,

    Vehip

    Pasha

    and AbdulhamitSait

    in

    Rome,

    Fuat

    Selim,

    Cemalettin

    Mulla

    Sami

    and Harun

    Alica in

    Lausanne,

    and

    CemalPasha n

    Afghanistan.

    The committee

    gave

    sufficient

    guarantees

    to

    uphold

    Communism

    o

    satisfy

    the Soviet

    government,

    but its

    preaching

    of

    Communist

    doctrines

    was

    very

    mild. It

    was evident

    that,

    in

    reality,

    each side was

    using

    the

    other

    as a

    tool.

    After

    the third

    congress

    of

    the

    Third

    International,

    Enver and

    his

    associates

    set out

    to

    work

    to

    give

    effect to their

    programme.

    Their

    object

    was two-fold:directionof the Muslimrevolutionarymovementin India

    and elsewhere

    aimed

    at

    the overthrow

    of

    British

    rule,

    and extension

    of this

    movement

    into North

    Africa

    to

    upset

    the

    French

    and

    Spanish

    regimes.

    Arrangements

    were made to set

    up

    branches

    n

    Europe,

    mainly

    in

    Berlin,

    Rome,

    Lausanneand

    Paris;

    as well as

    in

    Turkey, Afghanistan

    and Persia.

    At the end

    of

    July,

    Enver left Russia to visit

    Germany,

    Switzerland

    and

    Italy

    for the

    second time.

    In

    Rome

    he met Vehib

    Pasha,

    one of

    his

    supporters,

    as confirmed

    by

    Cami

    Bey,

    the Kemalist

    representative

    here,

    who cabledAnkaraon 23

    August

    1921,as follows:

    The

    former

    Minister of

    War,

    Enver

    Pasha,

    came to

    Rome

    from

    Moscow

    via

    Berlin,

    and was the

    guest

    of Vehib Pasha.

    According

    to

    himself,

    he

    enjoys great

    favour

    and confidence

    in

    Soviet

    Russia

    and

    among

    the

    Soviets,

    and

    his future

    activitieswill

    be

    devoted

    to

    cooperation

    with the IslamicSocieties

    in

    Europe,

    taking

    as much

    aid

    fromthe Sovietsas he can .

    .16

    Meanwhile Enver

    was

    busy

    establishing

    branches

    everywhere.

    His main

    objective

    was

    to co-ordinate the

    work of

    the various

    branches,

    and

    to

    transform

    hem

    into a

    joint

    movement.

    For

    that

    reasonhe

    placed

    morethan

    150 formerTurkish

    officersat

    the

    disposal

    of

    branches

    n

    the

    Caucasusand

    in

    the east. These

    brancheswere

    also

    in touch

    with the

    CUP

    organization

    in

    Anatolia.17

    While Enver was expandinghis organization,new developmentswere

    taking

    place

    in Anatolia.

    The Government

    of the Grand

    National

    Assembly18

    which

    was

    established

    in Ankara

    on 23

    April

    1920

    under

    the

    presidency

    of Mustafa

    Kemal,

    and

    which

    was

    waging

    a

    life-and-death

    strugglei

    n orderto

    save

    Turkey

    rom

    extinction,

    aced its most

    crucial

    days

    in

    the

    spring

    and summer

    of

    1921.

    At the

    time,

    the Turkish

    Nationalists

    (Kemalists)

    risked

    losing

    most,

    if not

    all,

    the

    advantages

    hey

    had

    gained

    508

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    MUSTAFA EMAL

    ND

    ENVER

    through diplomatic

    and

    military

    efforts. While

    facing

    the

    onslaught

    of

    the Greek

    army

    in

    Western

    Anatolia,

    and

    inadvertently

    provoking

    the

    enmity

    of

    Britain,

    France

    and

    Italy,

    the

    Kemalists almost fell victim

    to

    the

    intrigues

    of

    Bolshevik

    Russia,

    with whom

    they

    were

    supposed

    to have

    friendly

    relations.

    According

    o Ali

    Fuat

    Pasha,

    then

    ambassador n

    Moscow of the

    GNA

    Government,

    he

    RussianCommissariat

    or

    Foreign

    Affairs,

    and

    the

    Third

    International,

    had

    become

    very

    hostile

    towardsthe

    Kemalists

    who,

    they

    thought,

    would

    come

    to

    an

    agreement

    with

    the WesternPowers.19

    During

    the

    period

    up

    to the second

    Inonii

    victory

    n

    March

    1921,

    relations

    between

    Ankara and Moscow became

    very

    strained. Moscow

    suspected

    that

    the

    TurkishNationalistswould come to an understandingwith the French

    and turn

    against

    the

    Russians.20

    Similarly,

    the

    Kemalists were worried

    in case the

    Russians

    made an

    agreement

    with

    the Western

    Powers,

    thus

    isolating

    them.21

    They

    were

    also

    concernedabout the

    possibility

    of

    losing

    their

    ndependence

    o

    Bolshevik

    Russia,

    having

    saved t

    from

    Britain,

    a

    fate

    which had

    already

    befallen

    the

    Northern

    Caucasus,

    Azerbaijan, Georgia

    and Armenia.22

    It was

    suspected,

    at

    the

    time,

    that the Russians

    were

    planning

    certain

    actions

    n

    the Caucasus.

    Ali

    Fuat,

    in

    a

    report

    despatched

    o Ankara

    owards

    the end of May 1921, observed: '. . .I believe that the Russians will create

    a

    problem

    n the eastern

    region

    that will

    occupy

    our

    great

    attention.

    .

    .23

    Dr Riza

    Nur,

    the Minister

    of

    NationalEducationof

    the

    GNA

    government,

    who

    was

    touring

    he

    Caucasus

    at

    the

    time,

    also

    confirmed hese

    warnings,

    and went

    even further

    by claiming

    hat the

    Russians

    would

    declare

    war on

    Turkey.24

    These

    warnings,

    which

    caused much

    concern in

    Ankara,

    were

    not

    completely

    unfounded,

    because,

    as

    soon

    as

    the

    Soviet Commissar

    for

    Foreign

    Affairs,

    Chicherin,

    ascertained hat the

    Greeks would renew

    their advancein Anatolia, and believingthat the Soviets would have to

    intervene

    n the

    war

    in

    Turkey,

    he

    suggested

    to

    General

    Orjonikidze,

    he

    Commander-in-Chieff the

    Soviet armies

    n

    the

    Caucasus,

    hat

    he

    should

    concentrate he Red

    Army

    on the

    Anatolianborder.25

    In view of

    these

    developments,

    Kemal warned

    Kazim

    Karabekir,

    he

    Turkish

    Army

    Commander

    n

    Eastern

    Anatolia,

    to

    be

    very

    vigilant

    and

    to

    keep

    the Turkish

    Eastern

    Army

    on

    alert

    in

    case of

    an

    attack

    from

    the directionof

    the

    Caucasus.26

    Karabekir,

    who

    was

    already

    acting

    with

    vigilance,

    informed

    Kemal that

    the Russian

    leaders

    wished

    to

    establish

    Communism n Anatolia, and that, having eliminatedthe GNA, they

    would searchfor

    elements that would

    organize

    bloody

    revolutions'.

    They

    had

    already

    made

    lavish

    promises

    to,

    and

    rewarded,

    such

    people

    with

    money.

    Karabekir

    warned:

    'If

    they

    [the

    Russians]

    see that the

    Turkish

    army

    is

    without

    power

    to

    resist,

    they

    would do

    exactly

    what

    they

    have

    already

    done

    in

    Azerbaijan

    and

    Armenia.'27

    During

    the renewed

    Greek offensive in

    the

    Izmir

    front on

    11

    July

    1921,

    509

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    MIDDLE

    EASTERN

    STUDIES

    which

    was

    initially

    successful,

    he relations

    between the GNA

    government

    and

    BolshevikRussia

    became

    strained

    almost

    to

    breaking

    point.

    While

    the

    Greek

    armywas advancing owardsAnkara, the Russians,who believed

    that the

    Turkish national

    movement would

    collapse,

    did not show

    any

    benevolence towardsthe

    Kemalists.

    In

    order to

    oust

    from

    power

    Kemal,

    who,

    they

    believed,

    would be

    exhausted after

    having

    taken the brunt of

    the Greek

    attack,

    they kept

    Enver on the

    Anatolian

    border

    at

    the head

    of

    a

    'revolutionary

    army'.28

    Enver's

    biographer,

    Sevket

    Siireyya

    Aydemir,

    states that

    the

    Pasha,

    who was at

    Batum at the

    time,

    had sent for his

    uniform,

    decorations

    and

    sword,

    which were

    kept

    Istanbul,

    in

    readiness

    to

    enter

    Anatolia.29

    Since his arrival n Moscow in the early springof 1920,Enver hadbeen

    intriguing

    with Chicherin ndhis

    assistant,

    Karakhan,

    oth of whom

    wished

    to

    send

    him

    to Anatolia later

    in

    order to

    replace

    Kemal

    if

    a

    peace

    treaty

    was

    signed

    between

    the Kemalistsand

    the Entente Powers.

    These Soviet

    leaders

    hoped

    to

    provoke

    a

    Red Revolution

    in

    Anatolia

    through

    the

    medium of Enver in order to

    rectify

    the

    failure

    of

    Mustafa

    Suphi,

    the

    Turkish

    communist

    eader,

    to

    spread

    communism

    n

    Turkey.30

    As

    early

    as

    February

    1920

    the BritishWar Office

    was

    aware

    that

    Enver,

    and

    the

    'leading

    extremistsunderthe influenceof the

    Russian

    Bolsheviks',

    wishedto 'throwover' Kemalwhomthey accusedof hesitating o take the

    offensive.

    The

    British General

    Headquarters

    n

    Istanbul

    reported

    to the

    War

    Office

    on 17

    February

    that

    'much

    propaganda

    has

    been made

    by

    the

    Nationalists

    n Anatolia

    regarding

    he intention of

    Enver to marchat

    the head

    of a

    large

    Moslem

    Bolshevik

    army',

    which he was

    stated

    to

    be

    commanding

    from Persiato Marash' n

    south-east

    Turkey.31

    This was

    confirmed

    by

    other 'well-informed'

    British

    observers,

    and

    by

    those on

    the

    spot,

    for

    example by

    Commander

    Harry

    Luke,

    the

    Britishrepresentativeat Tiflis;32by FrankRattigan,actingBritishHigh

    Commissioner

    n

    Istanbul,

    and

    by

    his

    chief

    dragoman,

    Andrew

    Ryan;33 y

    General

    Harington,

    Commander-in-Chief

    f

    the British

    Army

    of

    Occupa-

    tion in

    Turkey;34

    nd

    by

    Sir Horace

    Rumbold,

    British

    High

    Commissioner

    in

    Istanbul.35

    A

    secret

    British

    Intelligence

    Report

    of 12

    August

    1920

    went so

    far as to

    claim

    that

    there were

    two

    parties

    in

    Anatolia;

    the weaker

    one was that of

    Mustafa

    Kemal and the

    Nationalists,

    who,

    'imbued

    by

    patriotic

    and

    reli-

    gious

    motives,

    have

    been,

    and

    are,

    endeavouring

    o

    resist

    the

    peace

    terms

    andresultantdismemberment f Turkey'.They hadfailed, however,and

    their

    adherentswere

    going

    over

    to

    the other and

    'far

    more

    dangerous

    party,

    that of

    Enver,

    Talat,

    and the

    CUP-Jew-German-Bolshevik

    ombination'.

    Enver and

    his associates

    had

    sacrificed

    Turkey

    o

    the Bolshevik

    conception

    of

    Pan-Islam;

    accepted

    the

    principles

    of

    Lenin,

    and

    were

    disseminating

    them in

    Anatolia. Mustafa

    Kemal,

    on

    the

    other

    hand,

    had

    rejected

    Lenin's

    principles,

    and

    was

    consequently

    about to

    be

    discarded n

    favourof Enver

    510

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    MUSTAFAKEMAL

    AND

    ENVER

    and Talat.

    'He

    should

    come over and

    accept

    the

    treaty

    and

    save

    Turkey,

    than

    prolong

    he

    resistanceat

    Angora

    (Ankara)

    until

    Enverhas

    supplanted

    him',commentedD.G. Osborneof the ForeignOffice.36

    Enver himself

    admitted o

    MajorHedley

    of

    the British

    Military

    Mission

    in

    Berlin,

    during

    a

    conversationon 25

    February

    1920,

    that he would

    go

    incognito

    to Istanbul 'to talk

    with the

    leaders there'.37In

    a letter to

    his

    cousinHalil

    Pasha,

    whichhe

    despatched

    on 5

    December 1920from

    Berlin,

    he mentioned he

    possibility

    of

    making

    preparations

    o

    cross into

    Anatolia

    at the head

    of a

    Muslim

    orce,

    the

    so-called Green

    Army'

    (Yesil

    Ordu),

    if

    the Russiansallowed

    it,

    and

    to

    fight against

    he

    Greeks;38

    espite

    the

    fact

    that,

    at the

    time,

    he was

    not

    encouragedby

    KoutchoukHalil Pasha

    to

    do

    so for fear his actionmight eopardize heforthcomingLondonConference

    (February1921)

    to

    which

    the

    Kemalists

    were also

    invited.39

    Nevertheless,

    on 16

    May

    1921

    Talat

    wrote to

    Halil,

    from

    Tuapse,

    as

    follows:

    '. .

    .there

    shouldbe no

    mercy

    towards

    hese men

    (Kemalists)

    any

    more.

    We

    must

    be

    prepared

    or a

    full-scale

    revolution,

    a

    bloody

    revolution'.40

    Both

    Ali

    Fuat

    in

    Moscow41 nd

    Karabekir n

    Eastern Anatolia42 ent

    regular

    reports

    nforming

    Ankara

    about Enver's

    ntrigues,

    whereupon

    he

    Ankara

    government

    began

    to

    act.

    It took

    measures

    against

    the Enver

    supporters

    n

    Anatolia,

    and

    advised

    Karabekir o be

    vigilant

    and to

    take

    similarmeasures.

    Meanwhile,

    Enver

    through

    his

    organization

    known

    both

    as

    the 'Muslim

    Revolutionary

    Society'

    and

    Halk

    uralar

    Firkasi

    (People's

    Shura

    Party),

    tried

    to

    enlist the

    help

    of a

    section of

    the

    Kemalists'

    Eastern

    Army,

    but without success.

    Thereupon

    Ismet

    Pasha,

    the

    Commander

    of

    the

    Turkish

    National

    Forces

    in

    the

    Western

    Front,

    warned

    Karabekir o be

    vigilant

    against

    a

    Bolshevik-Enver

    plot;43

    while

    Fevzi

    Pasha,

    the

    Turkish

    Nationalist

    Minister of

    Defence,

    asked

    Karabekir o

    remove the

    Enver

    supporters rom the EasternArmy; and if Enver and his 'accomplices'

    entered

    Turkey,

    to

    arrestand

    send

    them on to

    Ankara

    under

    strict

    protec-

    tion.44

    Karabekirdid

    not

    neglect

    to

    take all the

    necessary

    precautionary

    measures;45

    nd

    also

    informed

    the

    other

    commanders

    concerned

    about

    Fevzi's

    orders.46At

    the

    same

    time,

    the

    government

    of

    the

    GNA

    instructed

    its

    military

    attache n

    Moscow,

    Staff

    Major

    Saffet

    Bey,

    to

    keep

    Enverunder

    surveillance,

    and

    to

    inform

    Karabekir

    egularly

    about his

    activities.It also

    asked ts

    Moscow

    ambassador,

    Ali

    Fuat,

    to send

    information

    o

    Ankara

    on

    the

    same

    subject.47

    As the Greekadvancebecame more threatening owardsthe middle of

    July

    1921,

    there

    were

    indications in

    Ankara

    that

    the Enver

    supporters

    were

    preparing

    a

    coup

    d'etat.

    The

    new Soviet

    diplomatic

    mission

    under

    M.

    Natzarenus,

    which

    had

    arrived

    n Ankara

    lately,

    became

    involved

    in

    the

    intrigues

    of

    the

    Enver

    supporters.48

    n

    all

    his

    reports

    to

    Moscow,

    Natzarenus

    tressed

    he

    necessity

    of

    overthrowing

    Mustafa

    Kemal n

    favour

    of

    Enver.

    At

    the

    same time

    the

    CUP

    and

    the

    communist

    groups

    ncreased

    511

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    MIDDLE

    EASTERN

    STUDIES

    their

    activities,

    and

    Russia

    concentrated ts

    army

    on

    the Caucasian

    rontier

    of

    Turkey.49

    When

    Ali Fuat saw

    the

    Soviet Commissar or

    Foreign

    Affairs

    in

    Moscow in

    mid-August,

    Chicherin

    uggestedthat,

    as

    the Turksdid not

    desirethe assistanceof a

    Russian

    army,

    Enver

    shouldenter

    Anatolia at

    the

    head of an Islamic

    army,

    and

    promised

    more Russianaid

    for

    Turkey;50

    ut

    this

    was

    bluntly

    urneddown.

    In

    the summerof 1921 the

    Kemal-Enver

    onflict

    became so

    acute that

    the TurkishNationalist

    paper

    Hakimiyet-iMilliye

    (National

    Sovereignty),

    attackedEnver

    on

    13 June

    for

    having

    destroyed

    he

    Ottoman

    Empire,

    and

    for

    wishing

    to do the

    same

    thing

    for

    Turkey.51

    Even

    the London

    paper,

    Morning

    Post,

    on

    12

    December 1921 carried

    what D.G.

    Osborne of

    the

    ForeignOffice describedas 'aninterestingreview',underthe title 'Lenin's

    attempt

    to throw over

    Kemal'.52

    While,

    about

    five weeks

    earlier

    (on

    4

    November 1921 to

    be

    precise),

    Cami

    Bey,

    the

    representative

    n

    Rome of

    the GNA

    government,

    had

    reported

    o

    Ankarathat

    Captain

    Fevzi,

    one

    of

    Enver's

    companions,

    who had

    arrived

    n

    the Italian

    capital,

    had

    declared

    that

    Enver,

    with the

    help

    of

    a secret

    society,

    was

    engaged

    in

    making

    arrangements

    or

    the

    overthrowof

    the Ankara

    government,

    and that

    the

    Russians

    were

    assisting

    him.53

    During

    he Battle

    of

    Sakarya

    August-September

    921)

    when

    the Turkish

    Nationalistswere hardpressedby the Greeks, Enver,HalilPasha,Kuquk

    Talat,

    Dr

    Nazim and other

    CUP

    leaders,

    who met at

    Batum,

    sent their

    agents

    and

    intriguers

    nto

    Anatolia. Enver wrote to

    Yahya

    Kaptan,

    the

    former

    steward

    of

    the stevedores

    at

    Trabzon,

    hat he

    would

    enter

    Anatolia

    under

    the assumedname

    of

    'Ali',

    in

    the

    company

    of

    volunteers,

    and take

    over the

    government

    after a

    putsch.54

    He had

    already

    sent

    a

    similar etter

    to

    Kemal,55

    nd the

    GNA,

    saying

    hat he

    could

    not be

    kept

    out of

    Anatolia

    when

    he

    felt that

    the

    Turkish

    people

    needed him.56

    A secret BritishIntelligenceReportof 22 June 1922claimsthat Enver

    had

    offered

    his services

    to

    MustafaKemal a

    number

    of

    times,

    suggesting

    that

    the

    past

    be

    forgotten,

    but Kemal

    brusquely

    urned his

    down.57

    Hence

    Enver

    became the favourite

    of

    the

    Russians,

    particularly

    when

    the latter

    began

    to

    regard

    he

    Turkish

    Nationalistsas

    a serious

    obstacleto their

    plans

    to

    'bolshevize'Anatolia.

    The

    Soviet

    leaders were

    believed

    to

    have

    urged

    Enver

    to overthrowMustafaKemal's

    government.

    Actually,

    the Russian

    leaders

    themselves

    were

    divided;

    one

    group supporting

    Enver,

    and

    the

    other

    Kemal. As a result

    of the

    Kemalist

    campaignagainst

    communism n

    Anatolia,the group,whichfavouredKemal,wasobligedto yieldto those

    who

    supported

    Enver.

    However,

    the

    victory

    of

    the

    Kemalists over

    the

    Greeks at

    Sakarya

    upset

    the

    plans

    of Enver and

    Moscow. The

    British

    Intelligence

    Report

    of

    22

    June 1922

    also claims

    that

    Kemal,

    who was

    greatly

    concerned

    about

    these

    developments,

    gave

    assurances o

    the

    Russians

    hat he would

    not

    sign

    any agreement

    with

    the

    Entente

    Powers that

    would

    jeopardize

    512

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    MUSTAFAKEMALAND ENVER

    the mutual interests

    of

    Kemalist

    Turkey

    and Bolshevik

    Russia,

    and

    requested

    the Russiansnot to

    force him to

    make an

    open

    declarationof

    adhesionto Bolshevikprinciples:any changesnecessary n the Anatolian

    administrationhould be introduced

    gradually.

    Kemal was

    reported

    to have

    given

    these

    undertakings

    personally,

    in

    writing,

    to

    the Soviet

    government,

    and even Ali

    Fuat

    in

    Moscow knew

    nothing

    about the matter. This 'secret'

    undertaking

    of Kemal was said

    to

    have

    been taken

    to Moscow

    by

    Sami

    Bey.

    The

    Bolshevik eaderswere said

    to

    be satisfiedwiththis

    assurance,

    and

    shortly

    afterwards,

    arriedout a

    very

    skilfully

    conceived

    plan

    to

    prevent

    Enver from

    succeeding

    n his

    attempt

    to

    upset

    Ankara.

    They

    organized

    a kind of

    revolt

    against

    him in

    the Batum

    area,ostensiblyby the Caucasiannationalists.The scheme was carriedout

    with

    such skill that

    Enver was

    thoroughly

    puzzled,

    and

    found he could

    not

    cope

    with the situation.

    Seeing

    all his

    plans destroyed,

    he left for

    Moscow,

    and his

    partisans

    dispersed.

    The

    Bolsheviks

    gave

    him

    a

    good

    reception,

    and

    told

    him that his

    failurewas

    due to

    incomplete

    organization,

    and

    promised

    to

    help

    him

    again.58

    Thus,

    the Russianshad

    no

    alternativebut to

    remove

    Enver

    and

    his

    supporters

    rom

    the

    scene,

    following

    Ankara's

    complaint.

    The

    Soviet

    diplomatic

    epresentative

    n

    Ankara,

    Natzarenus,

    was also later

    removedon

    the

    request

    of

    the

    government

    of

    the

    GNA.59

    Enver, most of whose partisanswere arrested n Anatolia,60was then

    persuadedby

    the

    Russian

    eaders

    to

    proceed

    to

    Turkestan n order to

    help

    quell

    a

    very

    serious

    rebellion which

    had

    erupted

    against

    the

    Bolsheviks

    among

    the Muslims

    of

    Central Asia.61 While he

    was

    there,

    one

    of

    his

    supporters,Haji

    Sami,

    persuaded

    him to

    join

    the

    rebels,

    who

    were

    known

    as

    the

    'Basmaji',

    and

    lead them

    against

    the

    Russians.62

    The reasons that

    compelled

    him

    to

    choose that

    path,

    his

    activities as

    the

    leader

    of

    the

    Basmaji,

    his final

    defeat and death

    at the hands of

    the

    Russians

    will,

    it

    is hoped, be dealt within a forthcomingarticle.

    NOTES

    1.

    Hereafter o be

    referred o as the

    CUP.

    2.

    PublicRecord

    Office,

    BritishFO

    documents,

    FO

    371/3411/196725:

    ritish

    actingHigh

    CommissionerAdmiral

    Webb

    to

    cipher

    elegram,

    Pera26

    Nov.

    1918.

    3.

    Sevket

    Sureyya

    Aydemir,

    Makedonya'dan

    Ortaasya'ya

    Enver

    Papa

    1914-1922

    (Enver

    Pasha rom

    Macedonia o

    Central

    Asia,

    1914-1922),

    Vol.III,

    (Istanbul,

    1972),

    p.494.

    4.

    FO 371/3411/189162: ecret

    British

    IntelligenceReport,

    Berne 12 Nov.

    1918;

    ibid.,

    doc. no.196867: talianambassadoro FO, memorandum, atedLondon23 Nov. 1918;

    FO to

    the Italian

    ambassador,

    etter,

    London

    3 Dec.

    1918;

    bid.,

    doc. no.206293:

    Sir

    Horace

    Rumbold o

    FO,

    cipher

    elegram,

    Berne,

    13 Dec.

    1918.

    5.

    FO 371/4174/118392:Webb

    to

    Lord

    Curzon,

    despatch,

    stanbul

    7

    July

    1919.

    6.

    For

    more

    informationon

    the

    Turkish War of

    Liberation,

    see

    S.R.Sonyel,

    Turkish

    Diplomacy,

    1918-1923

    London,

    1975).

    7.

    Aydemir,

    p.509.

    8.

    Ibid.,

    p.518.

    513

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    514

    MIDDLE

    EASTERNSTUDIES

    9.

    FO

    371/5137/E

    119:

    India Office to

    FO,

    secret

    despatch,

    13 Feb.

    1920,

    attaching

    a

    report

    dated 3 Feb. 1920.

    10.

    FO 371/5211/E 1311:

    Major

    Ivor

    Hedley

    to

    Major-General

    Neill

    Malcolm, letter,

    Berlin23 Feb. 1920.

    11.

    Aydemir,

    p.531.

    12.

    FO

    371/5211/E 311:W. Thwaitesof DMI to

    Curzon, etter,

    17

    March1920.

    13.

    FO

    371/4142/170885:

    ussell to

    Foreign

    Office,

    cipher

    telegram,

    Berne 5

    Jan.

    1920;

    FO

    371/5171/E12473:Secret British

    Intelligence

    Report

    for the week

    ending

    16

    Sept.

    1920,

    BehaeddinSakir

    o

    Talat

    (Sai

    Bey),

    letter,

    Baku 27

    July

    1920.

    14.

    FO

    371/5178/E

    3412:

    SecretPolitical

    Report,

    29

    Sept.

    1920 o

    5

    Oct. 1920.

    15.

    Aydemir,

    p.582.

    16. FO

    371/6535/E12660: Pan-Islamic

    Movement-Enver

    Pasha

    and

    the Russian

    Bolshe-

    viks,

    doc.

    no.435,

    dated 15 Nov.

    1921;

    FO

    371/6531/E

    11086: Secret

    British

    Intelli-

    gence Report,

    Geneva27

    Sept.

    1921.

    17.

    Ibid.; W/23,

    Geneva,

    22 Oct.

    1921;

    see also

    Aydemir,p.550.

    18.

    Hereafter o

    be

    referred

    o as GNA.

    19.

    Ali

    Fuat

    Cebesoy,

    Moskova

    Hatiralari

    Moscow

    Memoirs)

    Istanbul,1955),

    pp.196-7.

    20.

    Ibid.;

    pp.199-200.

    21.

    Ibid.;

    pp.152-4:

    Ali Fuat

    to

    Ankara,

    cipher

    elegram,

    Moscow

    11

    April

    1921.

    22.

    Ibid.,

    pp.180-81:

    Ali Fuat-Enver

    Pasha

    conversation,

    Moscow,

    16

    April

    1921.

    The

    Caucasian tates

    mentionedabove were Bolshevized.

    23.

    Kazim

    Karabekir,

    stiklalHarbimiz

    Our

    War

    of

    Liberation) Istanbul,

    1960),

    p.972;

    Fethi

    Tevetoglu,

    Turkiye'de osyalist

    ve

    Komunist

    Faaliyetler,

    910-1960

    Socialist

    and

    Communistactivities

    in

    Turkey,

    1910-1960) (Ankara,

    1967),

    pp.315-8;

    Ali

    Fuat to

    Ankara,cipher elegram,Moscow26May1921.

    24.

    Karabekir,bid.,

    p.970

    -

    Karabekiro

    Kemal,

    cipher

    elegram,

    Kars

    31

    May

    1921.

    25.

    FO

    371/6473/E8147:

    General

    Harington

    o

    War

    Office,

    cipher

    telegram,

    Istanbul13

    July

    1921.

    26.

    Karabekir,

    op.cit., p.972;

    Ataturk'un

    Tamim,

    Telgraf

    ve

    Beyannameleri

    Circulars,

    telegrams

    and statements

    of

    Ataturk)

    (Ankara, 1964),

    p.383

    -

    Kemal to

    Karabekir,

    telegram,

    Ankara10 June 1921.

    27.

    Kazim

    Karabekir,

    stiklal

    HarbimizdeEnver

    Pa4a

    ve Ittihatve

    TerakkiErkani

    (Enver

    Pasha

    and

    the

    Committeeof Union

    and

    Progress

    eaders

    in

    our

    War of

    Liberation)

    (Istanbul,

    1967),

    p.144.

    28.

    FO 371/6473/E 8417:

    Harington

    to

    War

    Office,

    cipher

    telegram,

    Istanbul 13

    July

    1921.

    29.

    Aydemir,

    p.586.

    30.

    FO

    371/6473/E 074:Secret

    British

    ntelligence

    Report,

    28

    July

    1921.

    31.

    FO

    371/5041/E

    4686:

    War

    Office to

    General

    Headquarters

    n

    Istanbul,

    cipher

    tele-

    gram,

    9

    Feb.

    1920;

    General

    Headquarters

    o

    War

    Office,

    secret

    telegram,

    Istanbul17

    Feb. 1920.

    32.

    FO 371/4946/E11431:

    Harry

    Luke to

    Lord

    Curzon,

    cipher telegram,

    Tiflis 15

    Sept.

    1920.

    33.

    FO 371/6471/E6786:

    Frank

    Rattigan

    o Lord

    Curzon,

    despatch,

    Istanbul

    8

    June

    1921;

    FO

    371/6472/E

    7936:

    'very

    confidential'

    memorandum

    y

    Andrew

    Ryan,

    Istanbul30

    June 1921.

    34.

    FO 371/6473/E

    8417:

    Harington

    o

    War

    Office,

    cipher

    telegram,

    Istanbul13

    July

    1921;

    see also

    minute

    by

    D.G.

    Osborne,

    dated25

    July

    1921;

    ecretBritish

    ntelligence eports,

    Istanbul15 and 26

    July

    1921 n

    FO 371/6472/E

    074 and

    FO 371/6473/E

    417.

    35.

    FO 371/6536/E13331: Sir

    Horace Rumbold

    to Lord

    Curzon,

    despatch,

    Istanbul29

    Nov.

    1921.

    36.

    FO

    371/5178/E

    11702:

    Intelligence eport

    on

    Asia

    Minor,

    entitled Affairs n

    Anatolia',

    dated,

    Istanbul 2

    Aug.

    1920,

    racing

    he

    development

    f Bolshevism

    n

    Anatolia;

    ee also

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  • 8/9/2019 Mustafa Kemal & Enver in Conflict, 1919-1922

    11/11

    MUSTAFAKEMAL

    AND ENVER

    FO

    371/5171/E

    12803:Sir

    John de Robeck

    to Lord

    Curzon,

    secret

    despatch,

    Istanbul

    5

    Oct. 1910.

    37. FO 371/5211/E 1311:

    Major

    Ivor

    Hedley

    to

    Major-General

    Neill

    Malcolm, letter,

    Berlin25 Feb. 1920.

    38.

    Aydemir,

    p.599.

    39.

    Ibid.,

    p.600-

    Halil to

    Enver,

    letter,

    10 Feb.

    1921.

    40.

    Ibid.,

    p.603;

    see also FO 371/6480/E13103:Secret Situation

    Report,

    Istanbul

    22

    Nov.

    1921 o 5

    Dec.

    1921.

    41.

    Cebesoy,p.245.

    42.

    Karabekir,

    stiklalHarbimizde

    Enver

    Pasa,

    op.cit., pp.125-6

    -

    Karabekir

    o

    Ankara,

    cipher

    elegram,

    Sarikami§,

    May

    1921;

    Kemalto

    Karabekir,

    ipher elegram,

    Ankara

    17

    May

    1921.

    43.

    Ibid.,

    pp.133-4

    -

    Ismetto

    Karabekir,

    ipher elegram,

    24

    May

    1921.

    44.

    Ibid.,

    pp.132-3

    and 136-7

    -

    Fevzi to

    Karabekir,

    ipher telegrams,

    Ankara

    24

    and 29

    May

    1921.

    45.

    Ibid.,

    pp.

    138-9

    -

    Karabekiro

    Fevzi,

    cipher

    elegram,

    Sarikamis,

    6

    May

    1921.

    46.

    Ibid.,

    pp.145-7

    -

    Karabekir

    o the

    commanders

    n

    Kars,

    cipher elegrams,

    9

    June

    1921.

    47.

    Ibid.,

    -

    Fevziand

    Kemal

    o

    Karabekir,

    ipher elegrams,

    Ankara15

    June

    1921;

    Aydemir,

    p.604.

    48. FO 371/7947/E 421:

    SecretBritish

    ntelligenceReport,

    22 June 1921.

    49. FO 371/6473/E

    8417:

    Minute

    by

    D.G. Osborne

    of the British

    Foreign

    Office,

    London

    25

    July

    1921.

    50.

    Cebesoy,

    pp.203-29;

    Aydemir,p.585.

    51. FO

    371/6472/E

    8417:

    Secret

    Report

    on the activities

    of

    Enver

    Pasha,

    Istanbul

    1

    July

    1921.

    52. FO

    371/6276/E

    3474.

    53.

    FO

    371/6477/E

    12408: Italian

    Foreign

    Minister to

    the

    Governor of

    Rhodes,

    'most

    secret'

    cipher

    telegram,

    Rome 12 Nov.

    1921,

    enclosing telegram

    from

    Cami

    Bey

    to

    Ankara,

    dated

    4

    Nov.

    1911;

    Aydemir,

    p.604.

    54.

    Sami Sabit

    Karaman: stiklal

    Mucadelemiz e Enver

    Pala

    (Our

    War of Liberation

    and

    Enver

    Pasha)

    (Izmit,

    1949),

    p.32;

    Aydemir,

    p.601.

    55.

    Tanin

    newspaper,

    stanbul,

    February

    945 Enver

    to

    Kemal,

    etter,

    16

    July

    1921.

    56.

    FO

    371/7881/E 47:

    SecretSituation

    Report,

    6 to 19 Dec. 1921.

    57. FO

    371/7947/E

    42.

    58.

    FO

    371/7947/E

    42;

    ibid.

    59. Cebesoy, pp.161-2 and 187-8; Karabekir:Istiklal Harbimiz, pp.954 and 1012-3;

    and

    Istiklal

    Harbimizde

    Enver

    Paa.

    .

    .,

    pp.157-9;

    Hikmet

    Bayur:

    'Turkiye-Rusya

    munasebetleri'

    Turco-Russian

    elations),

    Adalet

    newspaper,

    23

    Jan.

    1965;

    §evket

    SureyyaAydemir,

    Tek

    Adam,

    Mustafa

    Kemal,

    1919-1922

    (The

    Unique

    Man,

    Mustafa

    Kemal,

    1919-1922)

    Istanbul,

    1965),

    p.383.

    60.

    FO 371/6528/E 0122:

    Secret

    IntelligenceReport,

    2

    Sept.

    1921.

    61.

    Tevfik

    Biyiklioglu,

    Ataturk

    Anadolu'da

    Ataturk

    n

    Anatolia),

    Ankara

    1959,

    p.69;

    Mete

    Tuncay,

    Turkiye'de

    Sol

    Akimlar,

    1908-1925

    (Left

    Movements n

    Turkey) (Ankara,

    1967),

    p.128;

    Revuede

    Monde

    Mussulman,

    ,iii,

    1922,

    pp.204-5;

    EdwardHallett

    Carr,

    A

    Historyof

    Soviet

    Russia

    London,

    1966),

    p.474.

    62. Karabekir, p. cit., p.352.

    515

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