Mustafa Kemal & Enver in Conflict, 1919-1922
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Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Middle Eastern Studies.
http://www.jstor.org
Mustafa Kemal and Enver in Conflict, 1919-22Author(s): Salahi R. Sonyel
Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Oct., 1989), pp. 506-515Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283334Accessed: 16-03-2015 16:34 UTC
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8/9/2019 Mustafa Kemal & Enver in Conflict, 1919-1922
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MUSTAFA
KEMAL
AND ENVER
Arabia
and
Syria
was
recognized
by
Russia,
and
by
the Sultan
of
Turkey'.9
Simultaneously,
Enver
was
intriguing
with the British. On the
night
of
24 February1920, he had an interviewwith Major Ivor Hedley of the
British
Military
Mission
n
Berlin,
to
whom he disclosedthat
he was
going
to Moscow o
workwith the Soviet
government,
imply
and
solely
to stir
up
insurrection
gainst
Britain
throughout
ts
Muslim
possessions.
However,
he
had decided
to
delay
his
departure
or
a few
days,
as he
was
extremely
anxious o
workwith Britain
rather han
with BolshevikRussia. He wanted
Egyptian
independence
to be extended
to the
Sudan,
and an
Anglo-
Egyptian
treaty
concluded;
self-determination
o be
granted
throughout
Arabia,
and the settlement
of the
Izmirand
Thrace
questions
n
Turkey's
favour.If Britaincame to termswithhim, he wouldremain n Berlinuntil
everything
was
finally
settled.
He would
definitely
break off
negotiations
with
Moscow,
and would then travel
to the
East where his
presence
would
be
essential
f the
feelings
towardsBritain
were
to
be
entirelychanged.
In the British
Foreign
Office,
W.S.
Edmonds found Enver's
ambitions
'incompatible
with British rule
with
Egypt
and India'.
'Even
if we were
prepared
o
stoop
to
treating
with a man
whom we
regard
as a
criminal',
he
commented,
it would do
us no
good.
The
CUP
and the Bolshevists
will
work
together,
whatever
Enver
maysay,
and
if
we
made terms
with
Enver,
we should
only give
him more
prestige
to use
against
us'.10
Enver had
expressed
the same idea
in a letter to
Cemal
Pasha,
dated
26
February
1920,
under
his assumed
name
'Ali'.
He
hoped,
he
said,
to
work 'for the salvation
of the Turkish
and
Muslim
world'.1l
But,
when
the
British
bluntly
turned him
down,12
he
went to
Moscow
in
the
spring
or
early
summer
of 1920 after a number
of
adventurous
attempts
to
get
there
by
air.13
Despite
the
fact that he
was
not
well
received
at the
Baku
Congress
held
in
September-October
1920,14
he
Bolshevik leaders
were
onlytoo pleasedto makefull useof his 'Islamicmage'against he 'Western
imperialists'.
They
showered
him with
attention,
praises
and
promises
of
military
and
monetary
assistance,
and
Enver
fell for it.
In
the
spring
of
1921
he left
Moscow and
visited
Germany,
Switzerland
and
Italy.
There he met
various
Muslim
representatives,
and
persuaded
them
to
accept
the Soviet
government's
nvitation o a
meeting
in Moscow
during
June
in order to co-ordinate
heir efforts
in
the
Pan-Islamic ause.
They
would
also
arrange
the assistance
which
they
would receive
from
the Soviet
government.15
The
meeting
was held
during
the second
week
of June, and a Pan-Islamiccommittee was established to draw up a
programme
of common action for submission
o
the Soviet Commissariat
for
Foreign
Affairs,
which
promised
o
help
by
every
means n its
power.
In
fact,
all
funds
for the
movement
were
supplied
by
the
Soviet
government.
The members
of
the Pan-Islamic
Committee,
n
additionto
Enver,
who
became its
president,
were:
Emir
Shekip
Arslan,
Feyzi
Bey
'representing'
Tripoli,
Rahman
Gargarini,
a
representative
of
the Tunisian
Muslims,
507
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MIDDLEEASTERN
STUDIES
Wahid
(an
Indian),
who later
resigned
and
was
replaced
by
Abdul
Rab,
and
former
CUP
leaders
Dr
Rifat,
Dr
Mansur,
Dr
Nazim,
Ziya Bey
and
Bedri
Bey. ZiyaBey would latersupervisea branchof theorganizationnBerlin,
Vehip
Pasha
and AbdulhamitSait
in
Rome,
Fuat
Selim,
Cemalettin
Mulla
Sami
and Harun
Alica in
Lausanne,
and
CemalPasha n
Afghanistan.
The committee
gave
sufficient
guarantees
to
uphold
Communism
o
satisfy
the Soviet
government,
but its
preaching
of
Communist
doctrines
was
very
mild. It
was evident
that,
in
reality,
each side was
using
the
other
as a
tool.
After
the third
congress
of
the
Third
International,
Enver and
his
associates
set out
to
work
to
give
effect to their
programme.
Their
object
was two-fold:directionof the Muslimrevolutionarymovementin India
and elsewhere
aimed
at
the overthrow
of
British
rule,
and extension
of this
movement
into North
Africa
to
upset
the
French
and
Spanish
regimes.
Arrangements
were made to set
up
branches
n
Europe,
mainly
in
Berlin,
Rome,
Lausanneand
Paris;
as well as
in
Turkey, Afghanistan
and Persia.
At the end
of
July,
Enver left Russia to visit
Germany,
Switzerland
and
Italy
for the
second time.
In
Rome
he met Vehib
Pasha,
one of
his
supporters,
as confirmed
by
Cami
Bey,
the Kemalist
representative
here,
who cabledAnkaraon 23
August
1921,as follows:
The
former
Minister of
War,
Enver
Pasha,
came to
Rome
from
Moscow
via
Berlin,
and was the
guest
of Vehib Pasha.
According
to
himself,
he
enjoys great
favour
and confidence
in
Soviet
Russia
and
among
the
Soviets,
and
his future
activitieswill
be
devoted
to
cooperation
with the IslamicSocieties
in
Europe,
taking
as much
aid
fromthe Sovietsas he can .
.16
Meanwhile Enver
was
busy
establishing
branches
everywhere.
His main
objective
was
to co-ordinate the
work of
the various
branches,
and
to
transform
hem
into a
joint
movement.
For
that
reasonhe
placed
morethan
150 formerTurkish
officersat
the
disposal
of
branches
n
the
Caucasusand
in
the east. These
brancheswere
also
in touch
with the
CUP
organization
in
Anatolia.17
While Enver was expandinghis organization,new developmentswere
taking
place
in Anatolia.
The Government
of the Grand
National
Assembly18
which
was
established
in Ankara
on 23
April
1920
under
the
presidency
of Mustafa
Kemal,
and
which
was
waging
a
life-and-death
strugglei
n orderto
save
Turkey
rom
extinction,
aced its most
crucial
days
in
the
spring
and summer
of
1921.
At the
time,
the Turkish
Nationalists
(Kemalists)
risked
losing
most,
if not
all,
the
advantages
hey
had
gained
508
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MUSTAFA EMAL
ND
ENVER
through diplomatic
and
military
efforts. While
facing
the
onslaught
of
the Greek
army
in
Western
Anatolia,
and
inadvertently
provoking
the
enmity
of
Britain,
France
and
Italy,
the
Kemalists almost fell victim
to
the
intrigues
of
Bolshevik
Russia,
with whom
they
were
supposed
to have
friendly
relations.
According
o Ali
Fuat
Pasha,
then
ambassador n
Moscow of the
GNA
Government,
he
RussianCommissariat
or
Foreign
Affairs,
and
the
Third
International,
had
become
very
hostile
towardsthe
Kemalists
who,
they
thought,
would
come
to
an
agreement
with
the WesternPowers.19
During
the
period
up
to the second
Inonii
victory
n
March
1921,
relations
between
Ankara and Moscow became
very
strained. Moscow
suspected
that
the
TurkishNationalistswould come to an understandingwith the French
and turn
against
the
Russians.20
Similarly,
the
Kemalists were worried
in case the
Russians
made an
agreement
with
the Western
Powers,
thus
isolating
them.21
They
were
also
concernedabout the
possibility
of
losing
their
ndependence
o
Bolshevik
Russia,
having
saved t
from
Britain,
a
fate
which had
already
befallen
the
Northern
Caucasus,
Azerbaijan, Georgia
and Armenia.22
It was
suspected,
at
the
time,
that the Russians
were
planning
certain
actions
n
the Caucasus.
Ali
Fuat,
in
a
report
despatched
o Ankara
owards
the end of May 1921, observed: '. . .I believe that the Russians will create
a
problem
n the eastern
region
that will
occupy
our
great
attention.
.
.23
Dr Riza
Nur,
the Minister
of
NationalEducationof
the
GNA
government,
who
was
touring
he
Caucasus
at
the
time,
also
confirmed hese
warnings,
and went
even further
by claiming
hat the
Russians
would
declare
war on
Turkey.24
These
warnings,
which
caused much
concern in
Ankara,
were
not
completely
unfounded,
because,
as
soon
as
the
Soviet Commissar
for
Foreign
Affairs,
Chicherin,
ascertained hat the
Greeks would renew
their advancein Anatolia, and believingthat the Soviets would have to
intervene
n the
war
in
Turkey,
he
suggested
to
General
Orjonikidze,
he
Commander-in-Chieff the
Soviet armies
n
the
Caucasus,
hat
he
should
concentrate he Red
Army
on the
Anatolianborder.25
In view of
these
developments,
Kemal warned
Kazim
Karabekir,
he
Turkish
Army
Commander
n
Eastern
Anatolia,
to
be
very
vigilant
and
to
keep
the Turkish
Eastern
Army
on
alert
in
case of
an
attack
from
the directionof
the
Caucasus.26
Karabekir,
who
was
already
acting
with
vigilance,
informed
Kemal that
the Russian
leaders
wished
to
establish
Communism n Anatolia, and that, having eliminatedthe GNA, they
would searchfor
elements that would
organize
bloody
revolutions'.
They
had
already
made
lavish
promises
to,
and
rewarded,
such
people
with
money.
Karabekir
warned:
'If
they
[the
Russians]
see that the
Turkish
army
is
without
power
to
resist,
they
would do
exactly
what
they
have
already
done
in
Azerbaijan
and
Armenia.'27
During
the renewed
Greek offensive in
the
Izmir
front on
11
July
1921,
509
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MIDDLE
EASTERN
STUDIES
which
was
initially
successful,
he relations
between the GNA
government
and
BolshevikRussia
became
strained
almost
to
breaking
point.
While
the
Greek
armywas advancing owardsAnkara, the Russians,who believed
that the
Turkish national
movement would
collapse,
did not show
any
benevolence towardsthe
Kemalists.
In
order to
oust
from
power
Kemal,
who,
they
believed,
would be
exhausted after
having
taken the brunt of
the Greek
attack,
they kept
Enver on the
Anatolian
border
at
the head
of
a
'revolutionary
army'.28
Enver's
biographer,
Sevket
Siireyya
Aydemir,
states that
the
Pasha,
who was at
Batum at the
time,
had sent for his
uniform,
decorations
and
sword,
which were
kept
Istanbul,
in
readiness
to
enter
Anatolia.29
Since his arrival n Moscow in the early springof 1920,Enver hadbeen
intriguing
with Chicherin ndhis
assistant,
Karakhan,
oth of whom
wished
to
send
him
to Anatolia later
in
order to
replace
Kemal
if
a
peace
treaty
was
signed
between
the Kemalistsand
the Entente Powers.
These Soviet
leaders
hoped
to
provoke
a
Red Revolution
in
Anatolia
through
the
medium of Enver in order to
rectify
the
failure
of
Mustafa
Suphi,
the
Turkish
communist
eader,
to
spread
communism
n
Turkey.30
As
early
as
February
1920
the BritishWar Office
was
aware
that
Enver,
and
the
'leading
extremistsunderthe influenceof the
Russian
Bolsheviks',
wishedto 'throwover' Kemalwhomthey accusedof hesitating o take the
offensive.
The
British General
Headquarters
n
Istanbul
reported
to the
War
Office
on 17
February
that
'much
propaganda
has
been made
by
the
Nationalists
n Anatolia
regarding
he intention of
Enver to marchat
the head
of a
large
Moslem
Bolshevik
army',
which he was
stated
to
be
commanding
from Persiato Marash' n
south-east
Turkey.31
This was
confirmed
by
other 'well-informed'
British
observers,
and
by
those on
the
spot,
for
example by
Commander
Harry
Luke,
the
Britishrepresentativeat Tiflis;32by FrankRattigan,actingBritishHigh
Commissioner
n
Istanbul,
and
by
his
chief
dragoman,
Andrew
Ryan;33 y
General
Harington,
Commander-in-Chief
f
the British
Army
of
Occupa-
tion in
Turkey;34
nd
by
Sir Horace
Rumbold,
British
High
Commissioner
in
Istanbul.35
A
secret
British
Intelligence
Report
of 12
August
1920
went so
far as to
claim
that
there were
two
parties
in
Anatolia;
the weaker
one was that of
Mustafa
Kemal and the
Nationalists,
who,
'imbued
by
patriotic
and
reli-
gious
motives,
have
been,
and
are,
endeavouring
o
resist
the
peace
terms
andresultantdismemberment f Turkey'.They hadfailed, however,and
their
adherentswere
going
over
to
the other and
'far
more
dangerous
party,
that of
Enver,
Talat,
and the
CUP-Jew-German-Bolshevik
ombination'.
Enver and
his associates
had
sacrificed
Turkey
o
the Bolshevik
conception
of
Pan-Islam;
accepted
the
principles
of
Lenin,
and
were
disseminating
them in
Anatolia. Mustafa
Kemal,
on
the
other
hand,
had
rejected
Lenin's
principles,
and
was
consequently
about to
be
discarded n
favourof Enver
510
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MUSTAFAKEMAL
AND
ENVER
and Talat.
'He
should
come over and
accept
the
treaty
and
save
Turkey,
than
prolong
he
resistanceat
Angora
(Ankara)
until
Enverhas
supplanted
him',commentedD.G. Osborneof the ForeignOffice.36
Enver himself
admitted o
MajorHedley
of
the British
Military
Mission
in
Berlin,
during
a
conversationon 25
February
1920,
that he would
go
incognito
to Istanbul 'to talk
with the
leaders there'.37In
a letter to
his
cousinHalil
Pasha,
whichhe
despatched
on 5
December 1920from
Berlin,
he mentioned he
possibility
of
making
preparations
o
cross into
Anatolia
at the head
of a
Muslim
orce,
the
so-called Green
Army'
(Yesil
Ordu),
if
the Russiansallowed
it,
and
to
fight against
he
Greeks;38
espite
the
fact
that,
at the
time,
he was
not
encouragedby
KoutchoukHalil Pasha
to
do
so for fear his actionmight eopardize heforthcomingLondonConference
(February1921)
to
which
the
Kemalists
were also
invited.39
Nevertheless,
on 16
May
1921
Talat
wrote to
Halil,
from
Tuapse,
as
follows:
'. .
.there
shouldbe no
mercy
towards
hese men
(Kemalists)
any
more.
We
must
be
prepared
or a
full-scale
revolution,
a
bloody
revolution'.40
Both
Ali
Fuat
in
Moscow41 nd
Karabekir n
Eastern Anatolia42 ent
regular
reports
nforming
Ankara
about Enver's
ntrigues,
whereupon
he
Ankara
government
began
to
act.
It took
measures
against
the Enver
supporters
n
Anatolia,
and
advised
Karabekir o be
vigilant
and to
take
similarmeasures.
Meanwhile,
Enver
through
his
organization
known
both
as
the 'Muslim
Revolutionary
Society'
and
Halk
uralar
Firkasi
(People's
Shura
Party),
tried
to
enlist the
help
of a
section of
the
Kemalists'
Eastern
Army,
but without success.
Thereupon
Ismet
Pasha,
the
Commander
of
the
Turkish
National
Forces
in
the
Western
Front,
warned
Karabekir o be
vigilant
against
a
Bolshevik-Enver
plot;43
while
Fevzi
Pasha,
the
Turkish
Nationalist
Minister of
Defence,
asked
Karabekir o
remove the
Enver
supporters rom the EasternArmy; and if Enver and his 'accomplices'
entered
Turkey,
to
arrestand
send
them on to
Ankara
under
strict
protec-
tion.44
Karabekirdid
not
neglect
to
take all the
necessary
precautionary
measures;45
nd
also
informed
the
other
commanders
concerned
about
Fevzi's
orders.46At
the
same
time,
the
government
of
the
GNA
instructed
its
military
attache n
Moscow,
Staff
Major
Saffet
Bey,
to
keep
Enverunder
surveillance,
and
to
inform
Karabekir
egularly
about his
activities.It also
asked ts
Moscow
ambassador,
Ali
Fuat,
to send
information
o
Ankara
on
the
same
subject.47
As the Greekadvancebecame more threatening owardsthe middle of
July
1921,
there
were
indications in
Ankara
that
the Enver
supporters
were
preparing
a
coup
d'etat.
The
new Soviet
diplomatic
mission
under
M.
Natzarenus,
which
had
arrived
n Ankara
lately,
became
involved
in
the
intrigues
of
the
Enver
supporters.48
n
all
his
reports
to
Moscow,
Natzarenus
tressed
he
necessity
of
overthrowing
Mustafa
Kemal n
favour
of
Enver.
At
the
same time
the
CUP
and
the
communist
groups
ncreased
511
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MIDDLE
EASTERN
STUDIES
their
activities,
and
Russia
concentrated ts
army
on
the Caucasian
rontier
of
Turkey.49
When
Ali Fuat saw
the
Soviet Commissar or
Foreign
Affairs
in
Moscow in
mid-August,
Chicherin
uggestedthat,
as
the Turksdid not
desirethe assistanceof a
Russian
army,
Enver
shouldenter
Anatolia at
the
head of an Islamic
army,
and
promised
more Russianaid
for
Turkey;50
ut
this
was
bluntly
urneddown.
In
the summerof 1921 the
Kemal-Enver
onflict
became so
acute that
the TurkishNationalist
paper
Hakimiyet-iMilliye
(National
Sovereignty),
attackedEnver
on
13 June
for
having
destroyed
he
Ottoman
Empire,
and
for
wishing
to do the
same
thing
for
Turkey.51
Even
the London
paper,
Morning
Post,
on
12
December 1921 carried
what D.G.
Osborne of
the
ForeignOffice describedas 'aninterestingreview',underthe title 'Lenin's
attempt
to throw over
Kemal'.52
While,
about
five weeks
earlier
(on
4
November 1921 to
be
precise),
Cami
Bey,
the
representative
n
Rome of
the GNA
government,
had
reported
o
Ankarathat
Captain
Fevzi,
one
of
Enver's
companions,
who had
arrived
n
the Italian
capital,
had
declared
that
Enver,
with the
help
of
a secret
society,
was
engaged
in
making
arrangements
or
the
overthrowof
the Ankara
government,
and that
the
Russians
were
assisting
him.53
During
he Battle
of
Sakarya
August-September
921)
when
the Turkish
Nationalistswere hardpressedby the Greeks, Enver,HalilPasha,Kuquk
Talat,
Dr
Nazim and other
CUP
leaders,
who met at
Batum,
sent their
agents
and
intriguers
nto
Anatolia. Enver wrote to
Yahya
Kaptan,
the
former
steward
of
the stevedores
at
Trabzon,
hat he
would
enter
Anatolia
under
the assumedname
of
'Ali',
in
the
company
of
volunteers,
and take
over the
government
after a
putsch.54
He had
already
sent
a
similar etter
to
Kemal,55
nd the
GNA,
saying
hat he
could
not be
kept
out of
Anatolia
when
he
felt that
the
Turkish
people
needed him.56
A secret BritishIntelligenceReportof 22 June 1922claimsthat Enver
had
offered
his services
to
MustafaKemal a
number
of
times,
suggesting
that
the
past
be
forgotten,
but Kemal
brusquely
urned his
down.57
Hence
Enver
became the favourite
of
the
Russians,
particularly
when
the latter
began
to
regard
he
Turkish
Nationalistsas
a serious
obstacleto their
plans
to
'bolshevize'Anatolia.
The
Soviet
leaders were
believed
to
have
urged
Enver
to overthrowMustafaKemal's
government.
Actually,
the Russian
leaders
themselves
were
divided;
one
group supporting
Enver,
and
the
other
Kemal. As a result
of the
Kemalist
campaignagainst
communism n
Anatolia,the group,whichfavouredKemal,wasobligedto yieldto those
who
supported
Enver.
However,
the
victory
of
the
Kemalists over
the
Greeks at
Sakarya
upset
the
plans
of Enver and
Moscow. The
British
Intelligence
Report
of
22
June 1922
also claims
that
Kemal,
who was
greatly
concerned
about
these
developments,
gave
assurances o
the
Russians
hat he would
not
sign
any agreement
with
the
Entente
Powers that
would
jeopardize
512
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MUSTAFAKEMALAND ENVER
the mutual interests
of
Kemalist
Turkey
and Bolshevik
Russia,
and
requested
the Russiansnot to
force him to
make an
open
declarationof
adhesionto Bolshevikprinciples:any changesnecessary n the Anatolian
administrationhould be introduced
gradually.
Kemal was
reported
to have
given
these
undertakings
personally,
in
writing,
to
the Soviet
government,
and even Ali
Fuat
in
Moscow knew
nothing
about the matter. This 'secret'
undertaking
of Kemal was said
to
have
been taken
to Moscow
by
Sami
Bey.
The
Bolshevik eaderswere said
to
be satisfiedwiththis
assurance,
and
shortly
afterwards,
arriedout a
very
skilfully
conceived
plan
to
prevent
Enver from
succeeding
n his
attempt
to
upset
Ankara.
They
organized
a kind of
revolt
against
him in
the Batum
area,ostensiblyby the Caucasiannationalists.The scheme was carriedout
with
such skill that
Enver was
thoroughly
puzzled,
and
found he could
not
cope
with the situation.
Seeing
all his
plans destroyed,
he left for
Moscow,
and his
partisans
dispersed.
The
Bolsheviks
gave
him
a
good
reception,
and
told
him that his
failurewas
due to
incomplete
organization,
and
promised
to
help
him
again.58
Thus,
the Russianshad
no
alternativebut to
remove
Enver
and
his
supporters
rom
the
scene,
following
Ankara's
complaint.
The
Soviet
diplomatic
epresentative
n
Ankara,
Natzarenus,
was also later
removedon
the
request
of
the
government
of
the
GNA.59
Enver, most of whose partisanswere arrested n Anatolia,60was then
persuadedby
the
Russian
eaders
to
proceed
to
Turkestan n order to
help
quell
a
very
serious
rebellion which
had
erupted
against
the
Bolsheviks
among
the Muslims
of
Central Asia.61 While he
was
there,
one
of
his
supporters,Haji
Sami,
persuaded
him to
join
the
rebels,
who
were
known
as
the
'Basmaji',
and
lead them
against
the
Russians.62
The reasons that
compelled
him
to
choose that
path,
his
activities as
the
leader
of
the
Basmaji,
his final
defeat and death
at the hands of
the
Russians
will,
it
is hoped, be dealt within a forthcomingarticle.
NOTES
1.
Hereafter o be
referred o as the
CUP.
2.
PublicRecord
Office,
BritishFO
documents,
FO
371/3411/196725:
ritish
actingHigh
CommissionerAdmiral
Webb
to
cipher
elegram,
Pera26
Nov.
1918.
3.
Sevket
Sureyya
Aydemir,
Makedonya'dan
Ortaasya'ya
Enver
Papa
1914-1922
(Enver
Pasha rom
Macedonia o
Central
Asia,
1914-1922),
Vol.III,
(Istanbul,
1972),
p.494.
4.
FO 371/3411/189162: ecret
British
IntelligenceReport,
Berne 12 Nov.
1918;
ibid.,
doc. no.196867: talianambassadoro FO, memorandum, atedLondon23 Nov. 1918;
FO to
the Italian
ambassador,
etter,
London
3 Dec.
1918;
bid.,
doc. no.206293:
Sir
Horace
Rumbold o
FO,
cipher
elegram,
Berne,
13 Dec.
1918.
5.
FO 371/4174/118392:Webb
to
Lord
Curzon,
despatch,
stanbul
7
July
1919.
6.
For
more
informationon
the
Turkish War of
Liberation,
see
S.R.Sonyel,
Turkish
Diplomacy,
1918-1923
London,
1975).
7.
Aydemir,
p.509.
8.
Ibid.,
p.518.
513
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514
MIDDLE
EASTERNSTUDIES
9.
FO
371/5137/E
119:
India Office to
FO,
secret
despatch,
13 Feb.
1920,
attaching
a
report
dated 3 Feb. 1920.
10.
FO 371/5211/E 1311:
Major
Ivor
Hedley
to
Major-General
Neill
Malcolm, letter,
Berlin23 Feb. 1920.
11.
Aydemir,
p.531.
12.
FO
371/5211/E 311:W. Thwaitesof DMI to
Curzon, etter,
17
March1920.
13.
FO
371/4142/170885:
ussell to
Foreign
Office,
cipher
telegram,
Berne 5
Jan.
1920;
FO
371/5171/E12473:Secret British
Intelligence
Report
for the week
ending
16
Sept.
1920,
BehaeddinSakir
o
Talat
(Sai
Bey),
letter,
Baku 27
July
1920.
14.
FO
371/5178/E
3412:
SecretPolitical
Report,
29
Sept.
1920 o
5
Oct. 1920.
15.
Aydemir,
p.582.
16. FO
371/6535/E12660: Pan-Islamic
Movement-Enver
Pasha
and
the Russian
Bolshe-
viks,
doc.
no.435,
dated 15 Nov.
1921;
FO
371/6531/E
11086: Secret
British
Intelli-
gence Report,
Geneva27
Sept.
1921.
17.
Ibid.; W/23,
Geneva,
22 Oct.
1921;
see also
Aydemir,p.550.
18.
Hereafter o
be
referred
o as GNA.
19.
Ali
Fuat
Cebesoy,
Moskova
Hatiralari
Moscow
Memoirs)
Istanbul,1955),
pp.196-7.
20.
Ibid.;
pp.199-200.
21.
Ibid.;
pp.152-4:
Ali Fuat
to
Ankara,
cipher
elegram,
Moscow
11
April
1921.
22.
Ibid.,
pp.180-81:
Ali Fuat-Enver
Pasha
conversation,
Moscow,
16
April
1921.
The
Caucasian tates
mentionedabove were Bolshevized.
23.
Kazim
Karabekir,
stiklalHarbimiz
Our
War
of
Liberation) Istanbul,
1960),
p.972;
Fethi
Tevetoglu,
Turkiye'de osyalist
ve
Komunist
Faaliyetler,
910-1960
Socialist
and
Communistactivities
in
Turkey,
1910-1960) (Ankara,
1967),
pp.315-8;
Ali
Fuat to
Ankara,cipher elegram,Moscow26May1921.
24.
Karabekir,bid.,
p.970
-
Karabekiro
Kemal,
cipher
elegram,
Kars
31
May
1921.
25.
FO
371/6473/E8147:
General
Harington
o
War
Office,
cipher
telegram,
Istanbul13
July
1921.
26.
Karabekir,
op.cit., p.972;
Ataturk'un
Tamim,
Telgraf
ve
Beyannameleri
Circulars,
telegrams
and statements
of
Ataturk)
(Ankara, 1964),
p.383
-
Kemal to
Karabekir,
telegram,
Ankara10 June 1921.
27.
Kazim
Karabekir,
stiklal
HarbimizdeEnver
Pa4a
ve Ittihatve
TerakkiErkani
(Enver
Pasha
and
the
Committeeof Union
and
Progress
eaders
in
our
War of
Liberation)
(Istanbul,
1967),
p.144.
28.
FO 371/6473/E 8417:
Harington
to
War
Office,
cipher
telegram,
Istanbul 13
July
1921.
29.
Aydemir,
p.586.
30.
FO
371/6473/E 074:Secret
British
ntelligence
Report,
28
July
1921.
31.
FO
371/5041/E
4686:
War
Office to
General
Headquarters
n
Istanbul,
cipher
tele-
gram,
9
Feb.
1920;
General
Headquarters
o
War
Office,
secret
telegram,
Istanbul17
Feb. 1920.
32.
FO 371/4946/E11431:
Harry
Luke to
Lord
Curzon,
cipher telegram,
Tiflis 15
Sept.
1920.
33.
FO 371/6471/E6786:
Frank
Rattigan
o Lord
Curzon,
despatch,
Istanbul
8
June
1921;
FO
371/6472/E
7936:
'very
confidential'
memorandum
y
Andrew
Ryan,
Istanbul30
June 1921.
34.
FO 371/6473/E
8417:
Harington
o
War
Office,
cipher
telegram,
Istanbul13
July
1921;
see also
minute
by
D.G.
Osborne,
dated25
July
1921;
ecretBritish
ntelligence eports,
Istanbul15 and 26
July
1921 n
FO 371/6472/E
074 and
FO 371/6473/E
417.
35.
FO 371/6536/E13331: Sir
Horace Rumbold
to Lord
Curzon,
despatch,
Istanbul29
Nov.
1921.
36.
FO
371/5178/E
11702:
Intelligence eport
on
Asia
Minor,
entitled Affairs n
Anatolia',
dated,
Istanbul 2
Aug.
1920,
racing
he
development
f Bolshevism
n
Anatolia;
ee also
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MUSTAFAKEMAL
AND ENVER
FO
371/5171/E
12803:Sir
John de Robeck
to Lord
Curzon,
secret
despatch,
Istanbul
5
Oct. 1910.
37. FO 371/5211/E 1311:
Major
Ivor
Hedley
to
Major-General
Neill
Malcolm, letter,
Berlin25 Feb. 1920.
38.
Aydemir,
p.599.
39.
Ibid.,
p.600-
Halil to
Enver,
letter,
10 Feb.
1921.
40.
Ibid.,
p.603;
see also FO 371/6480/E13103:Secret Situation
Report,
Istanbul
22
Nov.
1921 o 5
Dec.
1921.
41.
Cebesoy,p.245.
42.
Karabekir,
stiklalHarbimizde
Enver
Pasa,
op.cit., pp.125-6
-
Karabekir
o
Ankara,
cipher
elegram,
Sarikami§,
May
1921;
Kemalto
Karabekir,
ipher elegram,
Ankara
17
May
1921.
43.
Ibid.,
pp.133-4
-
Ismetto
Karabekir,
ipher elegram,
24
May
1921.
44.
Ibid.,
pp.132-3
and 136-7
-
Fevzi to
Karabekir,
ipher telegrams,
Ankara
24
and 29
May
1921.
45.
Ibid.,
pp.
138-9
-
Karabekiro
Fevzi,
cipher
elegram,
Sarikamis,
6
May
1921.
46.
Ibid.,
pp.145-7
-
Karabekir
o the
commanders
n
Kars,
cipher elegrams,
9
June
1921.
47.
Ibid.,
-
Fevziand
Kemal
o
Karabekir,
ipher elegrams,
Ankara15
June
1921;
Aydemir,
p.604.
48. FO 371/7947/E 421:
SecretBritish
ntelligenceReport,
22 June 1921.
49. FO 371/6473/E
8417:
Minute
by
D.G. Osborne
of the British
Foreign
Office,
London
25
July
1921.
50.
Cebesoy,
pp.203-29;
Aydemir,p.585.
51. FO
371/6472/E
8417:
Secret
Report
on the activities
of
Enver
Pasha,
Istanbul
1
July
1921.
52. FO
371/6276/E
3474.
53.
FO
371/6477/E
12408: Italian
Foreign
Minister to
the
Governor of
Rhodes,
'most
secret'
cipher
telegram,
Rome 12 Nov.
1921,
enclosing telegram
from
Cami
Bey
to
Ankara,
dated
4
Nov.
1911;
Aydemir,
p.604.
54.
Sami Sabit
Karaman: stiklal
Mucadelemiz e Enver
Pala
(Our
War of Liberation
and
Enver
Pasha)
(Izmit,
1949),
p.32;
Aydemir,
p.601.
55.
Tanin
newspaper,
stanbul,
February
945 Enver
to
Kemal,
etter,
16
July
1921.
56.
FO
371/7881/E 47:
SecretSituation
Report,
6 to 19 Dec. 1921.
57. FO
371/7947/E
42.
58.
FO
371/7947/E
42;
ibid.
59. Cebesoy, pp.161-2 and 187-8; Karabekir:Istiklal Harbimiz, pp.954 and 1012-3;
and
Istiklal
Harbimizde
Enver
Paa.
.
.,
pp.157-9;
Hikmet
Bayur:
'Turkiye-Rusya
munasebetleri'
Turco-Russian
elations),
Adalet
newspaper,
23
Jan.
1965;
§evket
SureyyaAydemir,
Tek
Adam,
Mustafa
Kemal,
1919-1922
(The
Unique
Man,
Mustafa
Kemal,
1919-1922)
Istanbul,
1965),
p.383.
60.
FO 371/6528/E 0122:
Secret
IntelligenceReport,
2
Sept.
1921.
61.
Tevfik
Biyiklioglu,
Ataturk
Anadolu'da
Ataturk
n
Anatolia),
Ankara
1959,
p.69;
Mete
Tuncay,
Turkiye'de
Sol
Akimlar,
1908-1925
(Left
Movements n
Turkey) (Ankara,
1967),
p.128;
Revuede
Monde
Mussulman,
,iii,
1922,
pp.204-5;
EdwardHallett
Carr,
A
Historyof
Soviet
Russia
London,
1966),
p.474.
62. Karabekir, p. cit., p.352.
515
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