JASON Magazine 39-3

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*EINDE VAN SIBERIË *LIBIA *NORTHERN IRELAND *GEORGIA Separatisme /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂůĞ ǀƌĞĚĞƐͲ ĞŶ ǀĞŝůŝŐŚĞŝĚƐǀƌĂĂŐƐƚƵŬŬĞŶ Ƈ ũĂĂƌŐĂŶŐ ϯϵ Ƈ ŶƵŵŵĞƌ ϯ Ƈ 2014

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JASON Magazine jaargang 39 (2014) nummer 3 Thema: separatisme

Transcript of JASON Magazine 39-3

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*EINDE VAN SIBERIË  

*LIBIA  

*NORTHERN IRELAND

*GEORGIA

Separatisme2014

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Beste Lezer, Vrijheidsstrijders, of guerrilla’s, zijn termen die vaak ge-bruikt worden als het gaat om separatistisch geweld. De eerste term klinkt wat positiever dan de tweede, maar beiden komen op hetzelfde neer. Vaak betreft het een groep mensen die als gemeenschappelijke doelstelling hebben een bepaald gebied onafhankelijk te maken van de natie waar het tot dan toe toebehoort.

Separatisten hebben gezorgd voor grote con!icten in het verleden. Denk maar aan de Algerijnse vrijheidsbewe-ging in de jaren ’60 die een bloedige oorlog voerde met haar voormalige kolonisator Frankrijk. Of meer recent de strijd in voormalig Joegoslavië waar de verschillende volkeren vochten voor hun eigen grondgebied en hun vrijheid.

In de huidige maatschappij hebben we te maken met tal van separatistische bewegingen, vaak gewelddadig van aard, kijk naar de pro-Russische beweging in Oekraïne. Maar ook de huidige ontwikkelingen in Irak en Syrië hebben te maken met een dergelijke beweging, beter bekend als Islamitische Staat. Of wat dacht u van de FARC die al decennia strijdt in Colombia?

Uiteraard hoeft separatisme niet gewelddadig te zijn. Zo probeerden de Schotten met een referendum hun eigen natie te krijgen, iets wat ze uiteindelijk niet lukten, maar wel een motivatie voor de Catalanen, die ook streven naar onafhankelijkheid.

In dit JASON-nummer zullen we beide vormen van separatisme tegenkomen. Siberië, waar door middel van onder andere migratie een vorm van separatisme ontstaat, en Libië, waar geweld en separatisme de laatste jaren hand in hand gaan. Maar ook artikelen over Nagorno-Karabakh, Zuid-Soedan, Noord-Ierland en Georgië. Kortom, een JASON-magazine met voldoende afwisseling.

Ik wens u veel leesplezier met dit nummer.

Kevin KlerxInterim-hoofdredac-teur JASON maga-zine

VoorwoordInhoudHet eind van Siberië?Werner Kiel

The Battle over Nagorno-­Kara-­bakhDana Cohen

One Step Forward, Two Steps BackIñigo Alexander

Libië: de afwezige staat Christiaan Duinmaijer

Is Taiwan struggling for inde-­pendenceRaphaela Kormoll

4became the clash of religionsKarlijn Arts

Column: Responsibility to protectLeon Wecke

Understanding GeorgiaQuint Hoekstra

African Refugees in IsraelDana Cohen

A short story on separatism-­building in UkraineNatalia Kadenko

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JASON Magazine is het kwartaalblad van stichting JASON

Hoofd-­ en eindredactieKevin Klerx, Natalia Kadenko enIvo Roodbergen

RedactieAlba I. León, Enitsa GabrovskaGijs Kist, Iñigo Alexander, Ivo Roodbergen, Maaike Kooijman,Quint Hoekstra, Rigtje Jeeninga,Karlijn Arts, Dana Cohen en Raphaela Kormoll

VormgevingLilian Timmers, Yoram Otten enSenta Bemelman

Dagelijks BestuurVoorzitter – Michiel BlomaardVicevoorzitter – Erik KoningSecretaris – Werner KielPenningmeester – Jason HalbgewachsHoofdredacteur – Natalia KadenkoActiviteitencoördinator – Yasmin Zahed Public Relations – Hester Torn

Algemeen BestuurDr. Bart Beltman, Dr. Francoise de Companjen, Kolonel b.d. Marco Hekkens, Drs. Simon Minks, Drs. Pim van der Putten, Mw. Marjolein de Ridder MA,Mw. Elsa Schrier MA, Dr. Niels van Willigen en Kapitein-­ter-­zee mr. Niels Woudstra

Raad van AdviesVoorzitter – Dr. W.F. van EekelenProf. dr. J.Th.J. van den BergProf. dr. H. de HaanLuitenant-­kolonel b.d. prof. M. de HaasProf. drs. V. HalberstadtGeneraal-­majoor b.d. mr. drs. C. HomanDrs. D. LeurdijkR.W. MeinesR.D. PraaningMw. drs. L.F.M. SprangersProf. dr. A. van StadenDrs. L. Wecke

AdresStudentencentrum Plexus t.n.v. stichting JASON, Kaiserstraat 25, 2311 GN Leiden

Telefoon: 071-­527 7972E-­mail: [email protected]: www.stichtingjason.nl

ISSN 0165-­8336Stichting JASON noch de redactie van JASON Magazine is verantwoordelijk voor de in de bijdragen weergegeven meningenDrukkerij Noordhoek, Aalsmeer

Inhoud

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Het  einde  van  Siberië?In zijn satirische roman Het Suikerkremlin schetst de postmo-­derne Russische schrijver Vladimir Sorokin een ontluisterend en dystopisch beeld van het Rusland van 2028: een primitieve, neo-­feodale samenleving, het Kremlin wordt bewoond door een Keizer die met harde hand regeert; een grote muur be-­schermt het land tegen eventuele indringers en de Russische taal is doordrongen van Chinese woorden. Fictie en voer voor doemdenkers, of een toekomstschets waarin toch enige reali-­teitszin schuilt? Wie de toekomst van Rusland wil kennen moet naar China kijken, zo menen sommigen.

WERNER KIEL

Terwijl alle ogen zijn gericht op de ‘crisis’ in het oosten van de Oekraïne, ontwikkelt zich in Ruslands verre achterland

– het gebied dat zich uitstrekt van het immense Baikalmeer tot de Berings-traat- een geleidelijke en onzichtbare, maar niet minder bedreigende tragedie. Tenminste, als we de waarnemers in Moskou moeten geloven. Het dunbe-volkte Siberië dat we vooral kennen van Stalins Goelag-kampen, de eindeloze toendra en de onuitputtelijke reserves van grondsto"en en mineralen wordt bedreigd door de (illegale) instroom van Chinese immigranten en vooral, door een sociale en economische crisis. Bovendien wordt de Russische bevolkingskrimp die de strategen in het Kremlin Rusland al tijden hoofd-pijn bezorgt, in deze regio het sterkst gevoeld. De Wit-Russische president Aleksander Loekasjenko legde de vinger op een gevoelige plaats toen hij in zijn reactie op de onrust in Oost-Oekraïne zei dat Rusland “eerst zijn eigen proble-men moet oplossen alvorens naar het buitenland te gaan.” 1 De leiders in het

Kremlin zijn zich duidelijk bewust van de gevaren van het op de loer liggende separatisme in bepaalde delen van het land, en namen in mei 2014 nog een wet aan die hoge stra"en oplegt voor elke uitlating die ook maar enigszins riekt naar separatisme. 2 Hoe kan Rusland een onmetelijke landmassa

als Siberië, waar praktisch niemand wil wonen, binnen de invloedssfeer houden?

Crisis en leegloopDe voornaamste interne factor die de Siberische (autonome) republieken vatbaar maakt voor separatisme is de bevolkingskrimp die overal in Rusland hoog is, maar juist hier hoger dan

gemiddeld en extra sterk gevoeld wordt. In tegenstelling tot de opstandige re-publieken op de Noordelijke Kaukasus zoals Tsjetsjenië en Ingoesjetië, of de republieken Tatarstan en Basjkirostan die een sterke regionale identiteit heb-ben en een grote mate van regionale automie in het bestuur genieten, kan het uitgestrekte oostelijke achterland niet simpelweg worden samengehouden door decentralisatie en extra #nanciële middelen vanuit Moskou. Vandaag de dag loopt Siberië letterlijk leeg, terwijl de metropolen Moskou en Sint-Peters-burg lonken. In de Sovjettijd wist men arbeiders naar de Siberische vlakten te lokken door er steden te bouwen waar het leven volledig om een bepaalde industrie draaide. Magnitogorsk is het ultieme voorbeeld van zo’n volledig geplande stad die uit het niets werd opgetrokken rond een ijzer- en staalfa-briek onder Stalins vij$arenplannen. 3

Toen de Sovjet-Unie aan haar einde was gekomen, kwamen deze fabrieken onder het wildwest-kapitalisme van de woelige jaren ’90 voor een habbekrats in handen van slimme oligarchen. Een

Vandaag de dag loopt Siberië leeg terwijl de metro-­

polen lonken

De Chinese stad Heihe ligt aan de zuidelijke oever van de rivier de Amoer die Rusland van China scheidt. Aan de noordelijke oever vinden we de Russische stad Blagoveshchensk, waar de Russische overheid onlangs een triomfboog met het opschrift “de grond langs de rivier de Amoer zal altijd Russisch zijn” plaatste.1 Het schrille contrast tussen het leeglopende Siberie en de economische groei van China is hier goed zichtbaar. Bron: paulnoll

groot deel van de industrie bleek niet rendabel te zijn en niet opgewassen tegen buitenlandse concurrentie. De fabrieken sloten hun deuren, het leven in de Siberische steden stierf uit en het grootste gedeelte van de bevolking trok er weg. Toen Vladimir Poetin na de eeuwwisseling de veelal dronken president Boris Jeltsin opvolgde, kende het land voor het eerst op zijn minst weer stabiliteit. Poetin had een verleden bij de Russische veiligheidsdiensten en een elite van zogenoemde silovoki – politici uit de militaire- en veiligheids-diensten, vormde het centrum van het centralistische politieke systeem dat hij opbouwde. Om alle regio’s onder deze ‘machtsverticaal’ van het Kremlin te krijgen werden onder andere twee oor-logen gevochten in Tsjetsjenië. Poetin wist de onrustige Kaukasische repu-bliek, tenminste voorlopig, weer onder de controle van Moskou te krijgen door er de Kremlin-marionet Ramzan Kadyrov te installeren en er aanzienlijke #nanciële hulp heen te sturen. Voor Si-berië, echter, is een ander soort strategie noodzakelijk die de structurele econo-

mische en sociale crisis in het gebied aanpakt. En hoewel de (veelal Chinese) immigratie enerzijds een bedreiging vormt, kan Siberië tegelijkertijd niet zonder buitenlandse werkkrachten.

Externe bedreigingenZoals Dimitri Trenin in zijn scherpe analyse uitlegt, wordt Ruslands ‘post-imperiale’ status bedreigd van drie kanten door drie beschavingen bedreigd: in het Westen door Europa, in het zuiden door de Islamieten en in het oosten door de Chinezen.4 De

belangrijkste bedreiging van buitenaf is ongetwijfeld de groeiende economische en politieke macht van China in de regio, door de Russen ook wel de yellow threat genoemd. De meer dan 4000 kilometer lange grens die Rusland en China scheidt is poreus en onmogelijk hermetisch af te sluiten. Gezien het geringe aantal Russen in de zuidelijke regio’s van het Verre Oosten (zo’n 5 miljoen) en het relatief grote aantal Chinezen in Noord-Oost China (104 miljoen), kan een relatief kleine in-stroom van 4 á 5 miljoen Chinezen in Rusland reeds serieuze gevolgen hebben voor de etnische balans in de regio.5 Het is onduidelijk of de grote instroom van Chinese immigranten toeval is, of het gevolg van een doelbewust beleid dat China hier zou kunnen voeren om op de lange termijn voordeel te halen uit de situatie.6 In het uiterste geval zou dit de annexatie van Siberië door China kunnen betekenen. Gedurende de afgelopen driehonderd jaar is de Russisch-Chinese grens verscheidene malen opgeschoven in het voordeel van Rusland, en aan het einde

De belangrijkste bedreiging is de groeiende eco-­nomische en po-­litieke macht van

China

Siberië en separatisme

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van de 19e eeuw bezetten Russische troepen delen van Mantsjoerije om de groeiende invloed van Japan in de regio tegen te gaan.7 Strategisch gelegen eilanden in de rivierstromen van de Amoer, Argoen en Oessoeri rivieren waren lange tijd onderwerp van een bevroren grenscon!ict tussen Rusland en China. Dit con!ict werd lange tijd genegeerd zodat samenwerking op het gebied van bijvoorbeeld wapenhandel kon doorgaan. Aan de Russische zijde leefde echter de angst dat China de regio zou destabiliseren middels migra-

tie en corruptie teneinde de gebieden waarop het aanspraak maakte weer onder controle te krijgen.In 2004 koos Poetin eieren voor zijn geld en werd een grensverdrag gesloten waarbij de geclaimde gebieden eerlijk werden verdeeld.8 Hiermee zette Poetin de deur open voor nauwere banden met China. Na de Russische annexatie van de Krim in maart 2014 kan Rusland een alternatieve handelspartner en afzetmarkt meer dan goed gebruiken. Chinese immigratie in Siberië blijft des-

alniettemin doorgaan, en daarmee blijft vooral onder Russische waarnemers nog steeds de angst dat Siberië uiteindelijk een aanhangsel zal worden van China of misschien zelfs wordt geannexeerd. Betrouwbare cijfers van het aantal Chinezen dat zich op dit moment in Rusland bevindt zijn er niet, maar als we de geruchten moeten geloven gaat het om miljoenen. Moskou en Beijing zijn het er in ieder geval over eens dat het er minstens 500.000 zijn.9 Aange-zien er nauwelijks Russen zijn die in de Siberische provincies willen wonen en werken, en Rusland überhaupt met een bevolkingstekort kampt, kan deze bedreiging enkel worden tegengegaan door een migratiebeleid te voeren waar-bij de regio niet verder verchineest maar een meer diverse stroom immigranten aantrekt zoals Vietnamezen, Indiërs en andere bevolkingsgroepen uit de regio. Verchinezing van de regio zou immers tot separatisme zou kunnen leiden.Andere specialisten, onder wie Ben Judah, schrijver van het gewaardeerde werk Fragile Empire: How Russia Fell In and Out of Love With Vladimir Putin,tro"en tijdens hun reizen door Ruslands verre oosten een situatie aan die geenszins strookt met de werkelijk-heid die specialisten in Moskou en Beijing schetsen: in de provincies Cha-barovsk en Birobidzjan – een provincie die ooit het thuisland van de joodse gemeenschap in de Sovjet-Unie had moeten worden – trof hij alleen op het platteland her en daar wat Aziatische boeren aan die liefst zo snel mogelijk

weer terug naar hun thuisland zouden gaan.10 Opvallend is dat hij er, in plaats van de verwachte massa’s Chinezen, juist veel grotere groepen immigran-ten uit de Kaukasus en Centraal-Azië aantrof.Een ander mogelijk en niet onwaar-schijnlijk scenario is dat de autonome regio’s in het oosten niet voor onafhan-kelijkheid, maar voor oncontroleerbaar-heid zullen kiezen.11 Men kampt er met een sociale en economische crisis, een bevolkingskrimp die hoger is dan het reeds hoge gemiddelde in Rusland en de banden met Europees Rusland zijn er alles behalve nauw. Oncon-troleerbaarheid door Moskou stelt de regio’s in staat om te concurreren voor de hoogste subsidies uit Moskou. Men weet dat Moskou bereid is te betalen voor stabiliteit, aangezien de regering ook grote sommen geld betaalt aan bijvoorbeeld het bewind van Ramzan Kadyrov in Tsjetsjenie. Separatisme in het verre oosten door toedoen van bui-tenlandse invloeden is eigenlijk alleen denkbaar in het geval van de republiek Boerjatië, waar de boeddhistische inheemse bevolking nauw verwant is aan de Mongolen. de geschiedenis van Siberië kent echter slechts één geval van een poging tot separatisme: de volksre-publiek Toeva - ingeklemd tussen het Baikalmeer en Mongolië - verklaarde zich in 1921 tijdens de burgeroorlog onafhankelijk en het zou nog tot 1944 duren voordat Stalin erin slaagde de re-publiek bij de Sovjet-Unie in te lijven.12

Nationale identiteitDe kwestie Siberië legt tevens de vinger op een andere pijnlijke plek: het ontbreken van een nieuwe ideologie en de problematische herde#nitie van het ‘Russisch zijn’ na het uiteenvallen van de Sovjet-Unie. Wat nationale identiteit betreft tast men na twintig jaar nog steeds in het duister. Pogingen tot het ontwikkelen van een nieuwe staatsi-deologie leidden tot weinig meer dan enkele abstracte theorieën waar men in praktijk weinig mee kon. Alleen het zo-genoemde ‘Eurazisme,’ dat in de jaren ’90 nieuw leven werd ingeblazen, leek enige invloed te hebben op het nieuwe beleid. Volgens deze conservatieve #loso#e, van wie Aleksander Doegin ongetwijfeld de meest controversiële vertegenwoordiger is, is Rusland een absolute tegenpool van het trans-Atlan-tische Westen (de Verenigde Staten in het bijzonder) waarmee het onvermij-delijk in con!ict zal komen. Rusland moet zien te overleven door expansie en slimme allianties met Duitsland, Iran en India. Wellicht hadden Kremlin-ideologen als Vladislav Soerkov dit in

Wat nationale identiteit betreft

tast men na twin-­tig jaar nog steeds

in het duister

Enkele eilanden in de rivierstromen van de Amoer en de Oessoeri waren lange tijd onderwerp van een slepend grensconflict tussen de voormalige Sovjet-­Unie/Rusland en China.Bron: The Economist

het achterhoofd bij de oorlogen die in 2008 werden gevoerd in Abchazië en Zuid-Ossetië en de annexatie van de Krim in maart van dit jaar. Over de Russische identiteit zeggen de Eurazisten het volgende: Rusland is een unieke beschaving tussen Europa en Azië in, en moet zijn eigen ‘derde pad’ volgen. Ten aanzien van Europa zullen de Russen, bijna in letterlijke zin, altijd ‘Slaven’ zijn, maar ten aanzien van de Aziaten zijn de Russen een ontwikkel-de, vooruitstrevende natie. In praktijk, echter, zien we dat Russen vooral het Europese gedeelte van hun identiteit benadrukken. Aangezien het grootste gedeelte van het land geogra#sch gezien in Azië ligt, zou men er dus beter aan doen zich op ‘interne expansie’ richting Siberië te concentreren. Volgens de Slavo#elen is de Russische nationale spirituele cultuur onmogelijk zonder de heilige Siberische grond, dus het is zaak voor de autoriteiten in Moskou om deze regio te koesteren.13 Te meer omdat buitenlandse expansie, welke altijd een belangrijke rol heeft gespeeld in de geschiedenis van Rusland, binnen de huidige internationale politieke orde praktisch onmogelijk is geworden.

ConclusieDe bedreiging van Siberië is serieus, maar het lot van de regio is daarmee geenszins beslecht. Rusland zal een einde moeten maken aan de isolatie van de regio door sterke banden met

Europees Rusland te creëren. Immigra-tie vormt een reële bedreiging, maar als men de regio economisch wil laten heropleven kan men hier tegelijkertijd niet zonder. Belangrijk is dat de im-migratiestroom gediversi#eerd wordt. Een veel serieuzere bedreiging dan deze (illegale) migratiestromen, echter, vormen de zwakte van de Russische staat en de sociale en economische crisis in de regio.14 Net als in de rest van Rusland zal het systeem grondig hervormd moeten worden: e"ectievere wetgeving, onafhankelijke rechtspraak en een transparant social-economisch systeem zijn onontbeerlijk als men het gebied onder controle wil houden.15

Wat de Siberische provincies betreft is het vijf voor twaalf, en de leiders in het Kremlin zouden er verstandig aan doen zich op deze interne aangelegenheid te concentreren in plaats van geobsedeerd met het buitenlandbeleid bezig te zijn.

Werner Kiel was voor JASON nauw betrokken bij de organisatie van de conferentie ‘Russia and the Netherlands in International Peace and Security Rela-tions’ die op 6 en 7 juni 2013 plaatsvond in het Vredespaleis. Werner studeerde Liberal Arts & Sciences en Ruslandkunde aan de Universiteit Leiden, leerde Rus-sisch in Sint-Petersburg en Moskou en was enige tijd als stagiair verbonden aan de Nederlandse ambassade in Bakoe, Azerbeidzjan.

The author emphasizes that immi-­gration of Asian people (mainly from China) to Siberia can lead to a threat for this region. Russia has to revise his economic policy to revive this region. However, the weakness of the Russian state and the social and economical crisis in this area is a much bigger threat. Russia has to change its system to keep control over Siberia and to make it for vivid.

SUMMARY

Gaspijpleiding bij de Russisch-­Chinese grens. Kort nadat de V.S. en EU verschillende malen sancties afkondigden tegen Rusland, sloot het staatsbedrijf Gasprom een omvangrijke gasdeal met China. Bron: Paulnoll

Siberië en separatisme

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The  Battle  over  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh

mountainous Nagorno-­Karabakh region has been the dead-­

since 1994, sporadic episodes of violence continue to erupt and claim fatalities. Karabakh-­Armenian forces are still occu-­pying Nagorno-­Karabakh and seven surrounding districts. Alt-­hough the region only comprises 4400 square kilometers and has a population of merely 140,000, a spectacular 20,000 sol-­diers are stationed there.1 As one of the most heavily militarized zones in Europe and surrounded by Caucasian instability, there is a serious risk of war breaking out again in the near future.

DANA COHEN

This article will #rst give some background informa-tion about the con!ict over Nagorno-Karabakh and then

address international law regarding the legal status of the region. %e article will explore Azerbaijanis’ and Armeni-ans’ respective collective identities to explain the main security concerns of both groups. Lastly, it will focus on past peace negotiations and conclude how the situation should be approached.

Background%e Karabakh region has hosted many ethnic groups and minorities, who his-torically lived in peaceful coexistence. For the larger part of modern history the area has been reined by the Ot-toman, Persian, and Russian Empires. From 1822 until nearly a century later, Nagorno-Karabakh was ruled by the Russians. During this period, Azerba-ijani and Armenian nationalism grew and with it resentment towards the other. Violent attacks were still scarce,

but frequently occurred when Russian power weakened.Clashes in which between 3,000 and 10,000 people were killed broke out in 1905, coinciding with the #rst Rus-sian Revolution. In 1917, the Russian empire underwent two revolutions and withdrew its power from the region. %e power vacuum left behind led Azerbaijani and Armenian parties to #ght for control. In March 1918, or Bloody March, between 10,000 and 15,000 people, mostly Azerbaijanis, got killed in clashes in Baku. Armenia soon took control over Armenian-dominated provinces in Russia and began to expel Azerbaijanis and Turks.2

In May 1918 the Republics of Azer-baijan and Armenia were formed; Azerbaijan claimed Nagorno-Karabakh, granting it autonomous status. %e Karabakh-Armenians initially agreed, but the Armenian government rejected it and installed a puppet government. 3 War between Armenia and Azerbaijan – and between Armenia and Turkey

– broke out. Consequently, Armenia committed acts of ethnic cleansing and thousands of Azerbaijanis and Turks living in Armenia were killed.4 In 1920 the USSR o&cially took over Azerba-ijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. Although over 90 percent of the population was now Armenian – a direct result of mass expulsions – the USSR granted it to the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic on 5 July 1921. Speculations abound that Stalin purposefully arranged this, knowing very well it would result in lasting disagreements between Azerbaijanis and Armenians and thereby securing Russia’s powerful position.5

During Soviet times, Armenia repea-tedly requested Moscow to transfer Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenian sovereignty.6 Although small bouts of violence between Karabakh-Armenians and Azerbaijanis occurred, the situation remained relatively calm until February 1988. Anti-Azerbaijani clashes and ethnically-motivated murders took place in Yerevan, causing many Azer-

baijanis to !ee Armenia. %e situation escalated when two Azerbaijani youth were killed near Nagorno-Karabakh. In turn, Azerbaijanis started to kill Arme-nians in Sumgait in front of policemen. At least 26 Armenians were killed and hundreds more injured.7

%e next year Nagorno-Karabakh held unauthorized elections and a majority voted for independence, but Moscow placed the region under Azerbaijani ju-risdiction again. Nevertheless, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh maintained it belonged to the Armenian SSR. Shortly after the fall of the USSR, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic declared national independence. In response, Azerbaijan started to expel and murder Armenian citizens, settling Azerbaijani refugees from Armenia in their place.In 1992 full-pledged war broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan. On February 25, 613 Azerbaijanis (mostly women, children and elderly) were tortured, raped and executed in Khojali. Armenian and Karabakh-Ar-

menian troops won control over most of Nagorno-Karabakh and occupied Azerbaijani-majority regions. While !eeing the approaching Armenians, hundreds of Azerbaijani civilians died in the mountains.8 On May 12, 1994, Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a cease#re agreement brokered by Russia. Armenian-Karabakh forces, however, are still occupying Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding districts. No-wadays almost no Azerbaijanis live in the area, which is de facto outside of Azerbaijani control.9

!e status of Nagorno-Karabakh Azerbaijan claims its territory is oc-cupied by Armenia. Although unwil-ling to give Nagorno-Karabakh up, Baku agrees to grant the territory a maximum of autonomous power. %e Karabakh-Armenians themselves claim independence on the basis of the right to self-determination of peoples. Mean-while, Armenia states it merely sup-ports the Karabakh-Armenians’ right of

secession but is not actually involved in the con!ict. All signs, however, point to the contrary. Armenia is in clear breach of both the prohibition on the use of force and the prohibition against intervention. %e latter includes any-thing from arms supplies and #nancial support to incitement “intended to lead to overthrowing power relationships”. Armenian funding makes up between #fty and ninety percent of Nagorno-Karabakh’s entire budget. %ey are in fact so heavily dependent on Armenia that some are speaking of a ‘de facto an-nexation’.10

%e international community (inclu-ding the United Nations, %e Council of Europe and the OSCE) holds that Nagorno-Karabakh is part of Azerba-ijan and Armenian-Karabakh forces are occupying it illegally. %ere are some11 who claim the international communi-ty is tainted by opportunistic motives. %e United States, Europe and Russia have personal interests in Azerbaijan not only because it borders both Russia

The Azerbaijani city of Khudaferin which was ethnically cleansed and destroyed by Armenian forces Source:Adam Jones, 8 Juni 2012

The Battle over Nagorno-­Karabakh

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During soviet times Armenia repea-­tedly reque-­ sted

moscow to transfer Nagoro-­

Karabakh

Vank, a village in Nagorno-­Karabakh Source: Okokokokdido on Wikipedia, 1 Januari 2005

Map of Nagorno-­ Karabakh and its surroundings.Source:Caricato da Vacio op Wikipedia.org

and Iran, but also due to its prosperity in crude oils and its pipeline structure.12 Dr Heiko Krüger, a German attorney at law, commentator on international and European legal a"airs and Cau-casus secession expert, argues that the internationally held perspective is right nevertheless. In his book ‘%e Nagorno-Karabakh Con!ict: A Legal Analysis’, he gives a highly detailed analysis of the contemporary situation according to international law. His most important points will be summarized below.Under the principle of uti possidetis, Azerbaijan can only call on the princi-ple of territorial integrity if Nagorno-Karabakh was completely under Azerbaijani jurisdiction before the formation of the Republic of Azerba-ijan.13 %is was indeed the case, the deciding factor being the 5 July 1921 decision by the Caucasian Bureau to grant Azerbaijan sovereignty. Nagorno-Karabakh could thus only successfully secede during Soviet times if Soviet Law allowed this. However, unilaterally transferring territory from the Azerbaij-ani to the Armenian SSR was in direct contradiction with Article 78 of the USSR Constitution, which emphasized that territorial alterations could only be implemented with approval of the republic in question.14

Today, Nagorno-Karabakh’s only legal option for independence is interna-tional law, which is rarely in favor of secessionism. Although minorities should be granted equality and political participation, they are not by default entitled to independence. %e principle of territorial integrity to which Azer-

baijan hails thus takes precedence over the right to self-determination of ethnic minorities.15

Armenian identity Until their independence in 1918, Armenians were historically a nation without a land. Nevertheless, the Arme-nian identity, built on a shared langu-age and religion, was strong enough to prevent assimilation into the many host countries. Armenian identity revolves

around – and is strengthened by – the many tragedies it has encountered and the fear of future prosecutions, lea-ding to a self-perception as a ‘nation of martyrs’. Armenians have faced multiple massacres and deportations, including the 1894-96 massacres that saw between 80,000 and 300,000 Armenians killed by Ottoman, Kurdish and Turkish militias and the Armenian genocide of 1915-16 in which over 1 million were killed. %e Armenian narrative speaks of a “thousand years struggle” against the Turks. Since the 20th century, the stereotype of the

‘historical enemy’ has grown to include Azerbaijanis.16

Although during Soviet times violence was scarce, Karabakh-Armenians felt discriminated against by the Azerbaij-ani majority. %e only way to save their cultural heritage and identity was by parting from Azerbaijan and reuniting with Armenia. In reality, inequality only happened in the symbolic domain, for instance by not teaching Armenian in schools. Moreover, Karabakh-Arme-nians felt disadvantaged economically when comparing themselves to Arme-nians in Armenia. In truth, Nagorno-Karabakh was one of the richest pro-vinces in Azerbaijan. As often in ethnic con!ict, “the actual level of grievance is of less importance than the vision of perceived gain.”17

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the economic situation worsened, crime and corruption reached all-time highs, and ethnic minorities’ anxieties exacerbated. %is counted double for Armenians, for whom Russia was a ‘great protector’ who defended Armenia against their hostile Muslim environ-ment. %is, in combination with the fresh memory of the 1988 Sumgait po-grom, motivated Karabakh-Armenians and Armenians to mobilize militarily.18

Azerbaijani identity Like Armenia, Azerbaijan gained in-dependence for the #rst time in 1918. Unlike Armenia, however, Azerbaijan – its name only originating from the late nineteenth century – had never been a uni#ed concept. To unite the di"erent ethnic populations, Azerbaijan conti-nues to focus on identity building in its policies, which are therefore heavily based on ethnicity. A top unifying factor is language, which has bonded all Turkic people. In addition, Turkish troops helped Azerbaijan #ght against Armenian militias. Since Azerbaijan’s independence in 1992, Turkey has supported Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Kara-bakh, albeit merely diplomatically. %ey also share a common goal in limiting Russia’s power in the region.19 A large part of the Azerbaijani narra-tive is based on fear and distrust of the other side. What the 1915 genocide did for Armenian nationalism, Bloody March did for Azerbaijani nationalism. Many independence movements in Azerbaijan took on an anti-Armenian emphasis, and people were radicalized by Armenian atrocities.20 In addition to the Armenians, Azerbaijanis also tend to distrust the Russians. In early Soviet times, the Azerbaijani-Russian relati-onship was relatively good and Azer-baijani society become more uni#ed as

di"erences dissolved. In time, however, many felt the Russians were supporting Armenia over them. %e population radicalized in their nationalism, and became increasingly pro-Turkey and pro-America, anti-Armenia and anti-Russia.21

NegotiationsMany resolutions have been made regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, calling for a withdrawal of snipers, an end to the Armenian occupation and a return to peace negotiations.22 Although the OSCE Minsk Group has mediated negotiations since 1992, the process is currently at a stalemate. %e parties cannot agree on each other’s precondi-tions. Nagorno-Karabakh, for instance, immediately rejects any proposal in which their #nal status is not the #rst priority.23 In combination with ongoing cease#re violations and threats from Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev that Baku will ultimately resort to a military operation if Armenian forces do not leave its territory, renewed widespread violence is not unlikely.A major problem is that both par-ties feel threatened and are therefore unlikely to compromise. Armeni-ans feel unsafe being surrounded by Azerbaijanis and Turks, although this is based more on previous experiences than on the current reality. Turkish-

Russian relations are very good, and Turkey would not undermine them by attacking Armenia. In fact, Azerbaijani-Turkish relations have su"ered due to Turkey’s lack of willingness to intervene militarily. In addition, Armenia and Russia signed a defense agreement in 1997, guaranteeing Russia’s help in face of Azerbaijani aggression.24 Azerbaijanis feel threatened, not to a small degree because of their military defeats. With twenty percent of its territory under oc-cupation and military pacts being made between Armenia and Russia, Azerba-ijan feels more isolated than ever. In addition, they fear giving up Nagorno-Karabakh will lead to the disintegration of the entire country.25 To balance out Russia’s massive in!u-ence, the involvement of American and European organizations is of great importance for the peace negotiations. Both Azerbaijanis and Armenians need to feel they can trust the third parties. Western organizations headed by Chris-tian-majority countries are favorable to Armenians, who often emphasize their distrust of Muslim countries. Azerba-ijan has never fully trusted Russia and feels disappointed in Turkey. However, it has a strong pro-American and pro-Western sentiment. Organizations such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the UN Gene-ral Assembly should therefore remain

involved in the process.Attempts should be made to demili-tarize Nagorno-Karabakh, the border areas, and the seven occupied districts as much as possible. Since neither the Azerbaijanis nor the Armenians are likely to just withdraw their troops, a possibility of UN personnel taking their place should be explored. %is way the territories can be secured while the risk of war remains at a minimum. Furthermore, stronger pressure should be exerted on Armenia to stop viola-ting international law by supporting the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. All proposals should go hand-in-hand with a guarantee that the rights of all ethnic minorities will be closely supervised even long after an eventual treaty.Resolving this deeply intractable con!ict remains a challenge, but that should not deter us from trying. Stabi-lity in Nagorno-Karabakh will not only bene#t Armenians and Azerbaijanis but the whole region. It should not be forgotten that violent con!icts tend to have a spill-over e"ect. As Professor Stephen Blank delicately puts, “What happens in the Caucasus does not stay in the Caucasus.” 26

Dana Cohen is a graduate of the Univer-sity of Utrecht, where she studied Gender Studies during her BA and Con!ict Stu-dies and Human Rights during her MA.

The Battle over Nagorno-­Karabakh

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One  step  forward,  two  steps  back

South  Soudan

South Sudan is the world’s youngest country, and also one of the most troubled ones. In July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan obtained the inde-­pendence it had longed for decades. Unfortuna-­tely the country is currently facing a terrible famine and a civil war, and is distancing the republic from achieving the ambitions it had once the dream of independence became reality. The combina-­tion of both ethnic tensions and the friction over the division of oil revenues have lead South Sudan to another African civil war, and has led many to wonder if history is going to repeat itself. Is South Sudan the new Rwanda?

IÑIGO ALEXANDER

Statue of John Garang, the founder of the SPLM. Source: Amy the Nurse

South Sudan: struggling for peace

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When looking at Sudan’s past, it is challenging to #nd a period where the country is at peace. %e

ethnic, cultural, and religious di"eren-ces between the North and the South are the primary roots of the numerous con!icts. %e North is predominantly Muslim, while the South is mostly Christian, and there are also over two hundred ethnic groups in South Sudan alone, each with their own languages and cultures1, of which the Dinka and the Nuer are the largest. In the late 1970s, a new factor came into play: oil. %e discovery of oil in the South of Sudan #lled the Sudanese popula-tion with views of a brighter future, as they hoped to follow the steps of the oil-rich Arab countries and enrich their economy, as well as their standard of living2. However, the South soon saw their hopes go up in smoke, as the North of the country proved to be the bene#ciary of the exploitation of oil, as it was where the oil re#neries were based 2. %is sparked the country’s

Second Civil War, which lasted over twenty years and resulted in the death and displacement of millions3. In 2005, and end was put to the Civil War as both the central Sudanese Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) agreed to the terms of a peace treaty4. In contrast to the civil war from above, the war South Sudan is facing right now originates not so much from the issue of the division of oil. More important, as I will show in this article, is the stubbornness of the leaders of the country that made the friction that already existed due to the unfair divi-sion of oil revenues even worse. When, thereafter, the international community looked the other way around when #ghting erupted, the clash of interest grew and developed in a situation that lead people to draw similarities between the South Sudanese Civil War and the Rwandan genocide of 1994.

Boycott: where it all began

In 2011, a nationwide referendum was held to determine the future of the South of Sudan. Ninety nine percent of the population voted for the country’s independence, making it the world’s youngest country5. South Sudan appointed Salva Kiir, a Dinka politician, as their president and Riek Machar, a Nuer, became the country’s Vice-President. %e formation of South Sudan as an independent state raised questions about the distribution of revenues from the exploitation of oil, as South Sudan is home to seventy #ve percent of former Sudan’s oil reserves6. However, it was not the debate over the distribution of oil revenues that lead to civil war. In December 2013, Machar and some fellow politicians boycotted a meeting7. %e boycott was not well taken by President Kiir. %is, in turn, lead to a dispute between o&cers of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement following orders from Kiir8. Dinka and Nuer soldiers decided to take matters into their own hands, and #ghting erupted. %e situation quickly got out of hand and resulted on attacks on Nuer civilians in the capital city of Juba on the Dinka soldiers’ behalf 8

Almost unwillingly, the politicians who were meant to lead the country to a brighter future had lead South Sudan straight into a downwards spiral. Both Kiir and Machar’s stubbornness in their ways only made the friction that already existed due to the unfair division of oil revenues worse. President Kiir felt that the best course of action to take following the #ghing in Juba was to accuse Machar of an attempted coup5. However, the amount of truth behind Kiir’s statements is questiona-ble. Machar himself has since denied Kiir’s accusations and, furthermore, be-lieves that President Kiir intentionally created the con!ict out of fear of losing his Presidency9. Kiir has had trouble in guiding South Sudan to accomplish its hopeful dreams of development. South Sudan has failed to make the progress its population hoped to see. So much so, a year after independence, President Kiir announced in an open letter to government o&cials that an estimated four billion dollar worth of public funds had been looted5. %is is, under-standably, a very large loss for the coun-try and heavily delayed South Sudan’s hopes for economic development. Yet, the loss of funds is not the only factor standing in the way of South Sudan’s development. %e revenue made from the country’s oil #elds accounts for 98 percent of South Sudan’s budget5. 38 percent of which is invested directly into the country’s military and security

sectors, with just ten percent being ai-med at the country’s infrastructure and a mere seven percent for education5.

Similarities with the Rwandan genocideAs tends to be the case, the USA has also been present in South Sudan’s movement towards independence. %e United States heavily backed the creation of South Sudan as an indepen-dent state5. Unsurprisingly, the USA was focused on the economic potential of South Sudan, due to its vast oil reserves, and not as concerned with the political consequences of independence; Machar himself was trained by the US Special Forces prior to taking up a life in politics9. Even though the USA has donated billions of dollars’ worth of aid to South Sudan in recent years5, their support of the independence movement has back#red on them. %e USA is no longer the dominant presence in the South Sudanese oil sector, as it has been replaced by China5, who’s presence in Africa is ever increasing. On top of

losing control of the South Sudanese oil industry, the Americans have seen their hopes of the establishment of a new, stable, and promising African nation crumble within a few years.Kiir seems to be su"ering of lust for power, and has shown his authorita-rianism at times by strengthening his control over the military and has even delved into press censorship5. Machar, on the other hand, has accused Kiir of wanting to establish a dictatorship9 and believes the current president must be ousted in order for South Sudan to return to a sound democracy. %e

numerous con!icts between Nuers and Dinkas have lead people to draw similarities between the South Sudanese Civil War and the Rwandan genocide of 1994. It could be argued that South Sudan is undergoing a so-called ‘ethnic cleansing’, as Rwanda previously suf-fered beforehand5. %e combination of both ethnic tensions and the friction over the division of oil revenues have lead South Sudan to civil war, and has led many to wonder if history is going to repeat itself.%e civil war the country is su"ering from is not pushing the country in the right direction, and is distancing South Sudan from achieving the ambitions it had once the dream of independence became reality. %e increasing violence and clashes between Dinka and Nuer forces is only creating more instability and division between the two tribes, who were previously able to coexist happily5. %e days of peaceful coexis-tence between the two tribes seem long forgotten as a clear division can be seen

between the two #ghting factions. %e SPLA has been divided between those loyal to Kiir’s government and the rebels who support Machar. However the loyalty of the soldiers #ghting both on Kiir and Machar’s behalf is questio-nable. %e majority of the soldiers are merely civilians who do not fully un-derstand the situation they are in. Even though both Machar’s so called ‘White Army’, and Kiir’s troops essentially subsist on violence and plunder; many soldiers simply join in the #ghting in the way they believe will best suit their survival and ensure the survival of their family members9. Both Kiir and Ma-char’s SPLA troops #ght over control of the northern areas of the country, where the oil #elds are located as well as the White Nile, and thus the connec-tion to the capital city of Juba9. Cur-rently, both Kiir and Machar seem to be convinced that war is the only way to solve the con!ict. %is is likely to be due to the fact that they both want to see the other out of South Sudan’s

Rebel leader Riek Machar at his field office in rebel controlled territory. Source: REUTERS/Goran Tomasevic

The discovery of oil in the South of

population withthe view of a brighter future

The loyalty of the

both on Kiir and Machar’s behalf is

questionable

South Sudan: struggling for peace

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political scope as soon as possible.

Clash of interest leads to political divisionHowever, what does this civil war, and its possible outcomes and consequen-ces, mean for South Sudan and the international #eld? Uganda is the only country that is openly supporting Kiir and has, on oc-casions, donated troops to Kiir’s forces. Worldwide attention has been focused on other international con!icts. %e World’s big powers have chosen to in-vest their time and attention elsewhere, perhaps they see this as a speed bump in South Sudan’s route to indepen-dence. Since its independence, South Sudan has taken one step forward and two, very large, steps back. %e potenti-al that South Sudan’s independence had was not taken advantage of by the go-verning body. Kiir and his government did not act fast enough in order to set South Sudan on the track to economic development, and moreover, Kiir soon grew too comfortable in his new post as President of a newly independent country and saw it as a chance to adjust the country to his liking. However his vice-President, Machar, also aimed to remold South Sudan to his liking. %is clash of interests proved to be deadly, and the #rst of the two backwards steps. A country as vulnerable as South Sudan was following its independence cannot a"ord to start its route to pros-perity on such a feeble political base. %e second of South Sudan’s two bac-kwards steps was the boycott that spar-

The world's big powers have

chosen to invest their time and

attention elsewhere

ked the civil war and the consequent massacre in Juba. %is step was a clear consequence of the #rst. By December 2013, the di"erences Machar and Kiir had were too vast and were not likely to improve, even for the bene#t of the country they fought so hard for. Instead of acting accordingly and #nding a

compromise, Machar felt it was more sensible to further increase the dif-ferences with Kiir and thus boycott a meeting. Yet, Machar’s plan back-#red on him when President Kiir seized the opportunity to emphasize his presence through the use of the military faction of his party. At this point, there was no turning back for South Sudan, the political division had been made clear, which meant that the development that was hoped for would be put on hold. %e political division would give way to a much more important division: the cultural division between the Dinkas and Nuers. %is proved to be the last piece of the puzzle of South Sudan’s downfall.

Troubled path or a dead end?%e #rst years following a country’s independence are never easy. Yet few, if any, expected the situation in South Sudan to deteriorate to such an extent. Kiir’s, and to some extent Machar’s, greed for power made South Sudan’s path from independence a slippery slope. %e country’s quick political col-lapse increased South Sudan’s vulnera-bility and now the country is battling a dangerous famine as well as a civil war, and the question regarding the division of oil revenues remains unanswered. South Sudan seems to have blindly walked straight into what they hoped to avoid. It is crucial for a new born country to take its initial steps with con#dence and determination, in order to implement a solid base for a prosperous government to !ourish. However, South Sudan is struggling to #nd its footing in the years following its independence. %e combination of a famine and a civil war are likely to take some terrible, long lasting consequen-ces. Who knows if a newer, younger country will be the product of South Sudan’s troublesome independence?

Iñigo Alexander is a student of Internati-onal Studies at Leiden University and his area of expertise is Latin America. He is originally from Madrid and his interests include 20th century history, internatio-nal relations and political developments.

A South Sudanese government troops alter retaking Bentiu, a provincial capital, from rebel forces. Source: AP

Libië:  de  afwezige  staat

Libische rebel bidt met granaat in de hand tijdens burgeroorlog in 2011. Bron: Nasser Nouri

-­dwenen te zijn en lijkt het land het speelveld zijn geworden van botsende regionale en lokale belangen en machthebbers. De Libische regering staat machteloos tegenover milities die oliefaciliteiten bezetten, en eigen gene-­raals die tegen de Islamitische milities in Benghazi en de ‘Islamisten’ in de Libische regering in Tripoli in opstand komen, terwijl politici zich drukker ma-­ken over hun eigen belangen dan over de heropbouw van Libië. Heeft Libië als staat nog wel een kans om voort te bestaan of zal het land uiteenvallen in verschillende regio’s?

CHRISTIAAN DUINMAIJER

South Sudan: struggling for peace Libië en federalisme

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Libië werd pas in de 19e eeuw weer als geogra#sche term in het Arabisch gebruikt.1 Daar-voor zag men Libië als drie

aparte gebieden: Tripolitania in het noordwesten, Cyrenaica in het oosten en Fezzan in het zuidwesten. Deze gebieden lagen aan de grens van de verschillende koninkrijken, emiraten en kalifaten rondom de Middellandse zee en werden bestuurd door lokale stammen die zich fel verzetten tegen inlijving door buitenlandse heersers. Hierbij werd Tripolitania bestuurd vanuit de stad Tripoli, terwijl Cyre-naica bevolkt werd door rondtrekkende bedoeïenenstammen. Pas midden van de 19e eeuw probeerden de Ottomanen een soort centraal gezag te vestigen in de verschillende provincies, die in naam vanaf de 16e eeuw tot het Ottomaanse Rijk behoorden maar feitelijk onafhan-kelijk waren. In 1858 wisten de Otto-manen het laatste verzet in Tripolitania te breken, terwijl zij hun gezag in Cy-renaica wisten te vestigen door samen te werken met de Sanoessiyya.2 Deze moslimbroederschap werd midden 19e eeuw gesticht door Mohammed ben Ali al-Sanoessi (1787-1859) en droeg een mystieke vorm van Islam uit. De

broederschap wist een soort overkoepe-lend gezag te vestigen over de stammen in Cyrenaica en verschillende delen van Centraal Afrika.

Aan het begin van de 20e eeuw werd de macht van de Sanoessiyya en zijn

beschermheer, de Ottomaanse kalief, bedreigd door het oprukkende kolonia-lisme in Afrika en het Midden-Oosten. Zo voerde de Sanoessiyya strijd tegen de Fransen in Tsjaad (1901-13) en de Engelsen in Egypte (1915), maar hun belangrijkste strijd was die tegen de Italianen in Libië. In 1911 dwongen de Italianen het Ottomaanse Rijk zijn

claim op de Libische provincies op te geven en werden deze verenigd in de Italiaanse kolonie Libië.3 Hierop riep de leider van de Sanoessiyya, Ahmed Sha-rif (1873-1933), de heilige oorlog uit tegen de Italianen en claimde Cyrenaica en Fezzan als zijn grondgebied. Vanuit Jebel Nafoesa in het westen organiseer-den Arabische en Berberstammen hun eigen strijd tegen de Italianen. Hoewel de opstandelingen erin slaagden om in 1918 de onafhankelijke Tripolitiaanse Republiek uit te roepen, werd de op-stand ondergraven door de voortduren-de onderlinge rivaliteit en strijd tussen de verschillende Arabische en Berberse stammenleiders.4 Daarom besloten de rebellen in 1922 het gezag over Tripo-litania aan de leider van de Sanoessiyya aan te bieden in de hoop om samen een verenigd front tegen de Italianen te kunnen vormen. De strijders van de Sanoessiyya wisten namelijk de Italia-nen keer op keer te verslaan vanuit hun bolwerk in de Jebel Akhdar in Cyrenai-ca onder leiding van de charismatische Koran leraar Omar Moekhtar (1858-1931).5 Pas toen de Italianen onder lei-ding van Benito Mussolini overgingen op massa-executie en –deportatie van de lokale bedoeïenenbevolking, wisten

zij het verzet te breken. Moekhtar werd in 1931 door de Italianen gevangen genomen en geëxecuteerd, terwijl zij een jaar eerder in Fezzan laatste resten van het bedoeïenenleger uit Jebel Na-foesa hadden verslagen. Hiermee was het inheemse verzet tegen de Italiaanse kolonisator de#nitief gebroken.

Na de Tweede Wereldoorlog boog de Verenigde Naties zich over de vraag wat te doen met de voormalige Italiaanse kolonie Libië.6 Dat het een onafhan-kelijk land zou worden, was duidelijk. De vorm nog niet. De stammen uit Cy-renaica en Fezzan pleitten enthousiast voor een federalistisch emiraat onder leiding van de Sanoessiyya-leider Amir Idris, maar de door Arabisch nationa-lisme geïnspireerde middenklasse uit Tripolitania prefereerde een unitaire re-publiek. Amir Idris wist de discussie in zijn voordeel te forceren door in 1949 met Britse steun het Emiraat van Cyre-naica uit te roepen. Het emiraat kreeg internationaal weinig steun, maar deze stap zorgde er wel voor dat in 1951 Li-bië een onafhankelijke, op federale leest geschoeide staat werd onder leiding van koning Amir Idris. De rivaliteit tussen Tripolitania en Cyrenaica maakten het bestuur van het land zeer lastig (te beginnen met het feit dat de Libische hoofdstad alterneerde tussen Tripoli en Benghazi). Dit leidde uiteindelijk tot de afscha&ng van de federale structuur in 1963. Maar dat was niet het enige pro-bleem waarmee Libië kampte. Hoewel het arme land sinds 1959 een van de grootste olieproducenten in de wereld was geworden, pro#teerden alleen de koning en een kleine elite om hem hen van de olie-inkomsten. Dit leidde tot grote onvrede onder de bevolking wat resulteerde in de coup van de Vrije O&cieren in 1969 onder leiding van de 27-jarige Mo’ammar Gadda# en uitroe-pen van de Libische republiek.

Panarabisme en fanatisme Vanuit huidig oogpunt is het verlei-delijk om de coup door Gadda# te omschrijven als een coup tegen de heersende elite uit Cyrenaica. Hoewel Gadda# afkomstig was uit de buurt van Sirte in Tripolitania, waren hij en zijn mederebellen meer geïnspireerd door het panarabisme en socialisme van de Egyptische president Gamal Abdel Nas-ser dan door regionale belangen.6 Gad-da# ging zelfs zo ver hierin dat hij begin jaren ’70 Libië probeerde te verenigen met andere Arabische republieken (Egypte, Tunesië, Soedan, enz.). Deze pogingen mislukten en teleurgesteld formuleerde hij zijn eigen panarabische, socialistische en anti-imperialistische

theorie, waarin hij ook Islam en het bedoeïenleven verheerlijkte. Op basis van deze Derde Universele %eorie werd Libië in 1976 omgevormd tot een staat van de massa’s (Ar.: Djamahiriyya) bestuurd door volkscomités.

De steeds radicalere staatshervormingen van Gadda# en bijbehorende terreur ge-combineerd met internationale sancties ontwrichtte de Libische samenleving en zorgde voor de opkomst van gewapende oppositiegroepen die Gadda# probeer-den omver te werpen.7 Eerst in de jaren ’80 seculiere oppositiegroepen en later in de jaren ’90 Islamitische gewapende groeperingen. Een van de belangrijkste groepen was de Libische Islamitische Strijdgroep die tussen 1995 en 1998 de rebellie tegen Gadda# in Cyrenaica leidde en verschillende aanslagen op hem pleegde. Gadda# wist de opstand uiteindelijk te bedwingen door de rebellen letterlijk uit de Jebel Akhdar te bombarderen, waar ze zich naar voorbeeld van Omar Moekhtar hadden verscholen. De opstand bewees in de ogen van Gadda# dat de bevolking van Cyrenaica niet te vertrouwen was, hoewel de leiders van de groep, zoals Abdel Hakim Belhadj, uit de buurt van Tripoli kwamen. Gad-da# begon door de groeiende opposi-tie meer en meer steun te zoeken bij bevriende stammen om zijn greep op Libië veilig te stellen.8 Want ondanks de radicale hervormingen van Gadda#

was de stam altijd een centraal onder-deel van de Libische identiteit geble-ven, zelfs onder de groeiende urbane bevolking.

Heerschappij der militiesDe structurele achterstelling van Cyre-naica door Gadda# maakte het gebied tot een broeinest van onrust en het is niet verwonderlijk dat op 17 februari 2011 de bevolking in opstand kwam te-gen Gadda#. Geïnspireerd door de suc-cesvolle volksopstanden in de buurlan-den van Libië verklaarden de steden als Misrata en Zintan zich solidair met de rebellen in Benghazi.9 Midden augustus hadden de door de rebellen gevormde milities Tripoli ingenomen en een maand later werd Gadda# gevangen ge-nomen en standrechtelijk geëxecuteerd. Hoewel de rebellen als snel een eigen regering, de Nationale Overgangsraad, hadden opgericht, lag de feitelijk macht vanaf het begin van de opstand in de handen van de milities. Zo werd het hoofd van het Libische rebellenleger, generaal Abdel Fatah Younis, in 2011 door Islamitische militieleden geëxecu-teerd en weigerden milities Gadda#’s lijk en zijn gevangen genomen zoon aan de Nationale Overgangsraad over te dragen.

Na het einde van de burgeroorlog stak het federalisme weer de kop op wegens de voortdurende onveiligheid en chaos in het land. Op 1 juni 2012 (de 64e

Ahmed al-­Sanoessi bij uitreiking Sakharov Prijs voor Vrijheid van Meningsuiting. Bron: Europees Parlement

Protest tegen federalisme in Tripoli: “Geen oosten, geen westen, Libië is een staat”. Bron: Magharebia

Pas midden van de 19e eeuw

probeerden de Ottomanen een

centraal gezag te vestigen

Libië en federalisme

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verjaardag van het Emiraat van Cyre-naica) riepen stamoudsten en lokale politici uit Cyrenaica de autonomie van Cyrenaica (waartoe men ook het gebied tot de stad Sirte rekende) uit en richt-ten een Overgangsraad van Cyrenaica op onder leiding van Ahmed Zoebair al-Sanoessi, lid van de Nationale Over-gangsraad en familielid van de laatste Libische koning.10 De Overgangsraad van Cyrenaica eiste een eigen regering, parlement en politiemacht, waarbij alleen defensie, olie en buitenlands beleid door de landelijke regering in Tripoli zouden worden geregeld. De Nationale Overgangsraad veroordeelde de autonomieverklaring als aantasting van de nationale eenheid, maar boden wel decentralisatie aan als alternatief voor autonomie. Dit standpunt kon op steun rekenen van een deel van de Libische bevolking, met name in Tripolitania, en de nieuw opgerichte Libische politieke partijen. Opmerke-lijk genoeg stonden de verkiezingen van de 200 leden van het nieuwe Libische parlement in juli 2012 volledig in teken van regionalisme: Tripolitania mocht 100 parlementariërs leveren, Cyrenaica 60 en Fezzan 40.11 Ook de Constitu-tionele Raad, die de nieuwe Libische grondwet zou moeten opstellen, zou op regionale basis worden samengesteld: 20 vertegenwoordigers uit elk van de drie regio’s.

De verkiezingen leverden helaas een weinig slagvaardig en verdeeld parle-ment op, waarin de Islamisten onder leiding van de Libische Moslimbroe-derschap continue overhoop lagen met meer liberale groeperingen in het parlement.12 Daarbij kwamen ge-ruchten over oliesmokkel en misbruik van overheidsgeld door de Islamisten om hun eigen milities te versterken in plaats deze in het Libische leger te integreren. Dit versterkte de roep om federalisme in Cyrenaica, maar ook in Fezzan. Ibrahim Jadran, de leider van de Oliebeschermingsmacht – een groep milities die verantwoordelijk was voor de bewaking van de voornamelijk in Cyrenaica gelegen Libische oliefaci-liteiten en –havens – en het Politieke

Bureau van Cyrenaica, legde vanwege de vermeende corruptie in juli 2013 bijna de gehele Libische olieproductie stil.13 In de maanden daarna richtte hij een eigen leger (Beschermingsmacht van Cyrenaica) van 15-20.000 mi-litieleden, een eigen regering en een eigen oliebedrijf op om olie uit de door hem bezette oliefaciliteiten buiten de regering in Tripoli en staatsoliebedrijf te verkopen. De door Jadran opgerichte Regering van Cyrenaica staat los van de eerder opgerichte Overgangsraad van Cyrenaica. De Libische premier Ali Zeidan reageerde op de acties van Ja-dran met het dreigement om de bezette oliefaciliteiten en –havens met geweld te ontzetten en elk schip met illegale olie te bombarderen.14 Helaas kon Zei-

dan zijn dreigementen niet waarmaken, waarna hij in maart 2014 door het par-lement werd afgezet. Dit was het teken van aan de Islamisten in het parlement verbonden milities om Jadran’s mili-ties aan te vallen, maar zij wisten deze slechts uit Sirte te verdrijven voordat de nieuwe premier, Abdoellah al-%inni, een akkoord met Jadran wist te sluiten.

Helaas kostte dit akkoord de nieuwe premier de kop en moest hij na een controversiële stemming in het parle-ment aftreden.15 Dit werd door Jadran uitgelegd als een staatsgreep door de Islamisten, maar uiteindelijk pakte niet hij, maar generaal Khalifa al-Hafter, de wapens op tegen de Islamisten. Op 16 mei startte al-Hafter een ongeau-

toriseerde, maar onder de Libische bevolking populaire militaire operatie in en rondom Benghazi om Libië te bevrijden van de Islamisten en hun milities, die hij beschuldigde van het vermoorden van militairen.16 Hierbij koos het merendeel van het Libische leger zijn kant en vielen Berbermilities uit Jebel Nafoesa om hem te helpen het parlement in Tripoli aan. Het parle-ment moest hulp van bevriende milities uit Misrata om de aanvallers terug te drijven. Op het moment van schrijven is al-%inni inmiddels door de Libische Hoge Raad in zijn positie als premier hersteld (en daarmee ook het akkoord met Jadran), maar woedt de strijd tus-sen Islamitische milities en het Libische leger nog onverminderd door.

Een staat?Door hun recente gemeenschappelijke geschiedenis lijken Libiërs zich alleen te verenigen bij een gemeenschappelijke vijand, zoals Italiaanse kolonisatoren begin vorige eeuw en Mo’ammar Gad-da# in 2011. Zonder gemeenschappe-lijke vijand lijkt de Libische eenheid als woestijnzand uiteen te vallen in regio’s, stammen, Berbers en Arabieren, Isla-misten en niet-Islamisten, federalisten en aanhangers van de eenheidsstaat. Dit is na 2011 verergerd door een machte-loze en disfunctionele centrale overheid en proliferatie van ongecontroleerde milities. Zolang dit niet verandert, zal Libië als staat steeds verder desintegre-ren.

Op dit punt zal de in februari 2014 verkozen Constitutionele Raad de zware taak hebben om Libië enigszins bij elkaar te houden door alle groepen in de Libische samenleving een plaats te geven in de nieuwe Libische grondwet. Of dit hen zal lukken, blijft een grote vraag mede doordat de Constitutionele Raad feitelijk onvolledig is. Dertien van de zestig leden ontbreken, omdat door aanslagen geen verkiezingen konden worden gehouden in Derna en Berbers de Constitutionele Raad boycotten omdat zij zich met twee afgevaardigden onvoldoende vertegenwoordigd voelden als bevolkingsgroep.17 Ondanks alle goeie intenties van de Constitutionele Raad om een grondwet voor alle Libiërs te schrijven, is het de vraag of hun grondwetvoorstel door alle Libiërs zal worden geaccepteerd of juist zal leiden tot verdere onderlinge verdeeldheid.

Christiaan Duinmaijer is afgestudeerd in Arabische taal en cultuur aan Uni-versiteit Leiden. Tijdens zijn studie heeft hij een jaar aan het Nederlands-Vlaams Instituut in Cairo (NVIC) gestudeerd en zijn master deels aan het Institut Nati-onal des Langues et Civilisations Orien-tales (INALCO) in Parijs gevolgd. Hij is actief betrokken bij het Nederlandse Gezelschap van Internationale Zaken (NGIZ) en Commissie Internationale Politiek van VVD Den Haag en heeft een weblog, Din wa Dawla, over de politiek in het Midden-Oosten.

The author describes the regional dynamism of three provinces of Libya (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan) and how they became one country in the 20th century. The federalist system was abandoned in 1963 and was later

-­arabist and tribal ideals. After the re-­

for more autonomy multiplied in Cy-­renaica and Fezzan due to the poor security situation in the country and the corruption and incompetence of the central government. This lead to clashes between federalists and the central government, while the gover-­nment itself is torn between Islamic and more secular political factions and militias. The author concludes that the recently elected Constituent

give all regions and factions present in Libya a proper and acceptable place in the new constitution.

SUMMARY

De verkiezingen leverden een

weinig slagvaar-­ dig en verdeeld parlement op

Abd Rabbo al-­Barasi, premier van de Regering van Cyrenaica, na mislukte moordaanslag op hem. Bron: Magharebia

Inwoners van Tripoli eisen vertrek van milities in november 2013. Bron: Magharebia

Graffiti met oude koningsvlag en de tekst “Libië is één stam”. Bron: Ben Sutherland

Libië en federalisme

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The occupation of the Legis-lative Yuan, later also the Executive Yuan, between March 18 and April 10 2014

made the headlines for over a month as hundreds were arrested and injured during protests. %e so-called Sun!o-wer Student Movement, a coalition of students and other civic groups, repre-sents one of the #rst violent confronta-tions in Taiwan since the 1990s. It was triggered by the discussion of a Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) between the Republic of China (ROC; Taiwan) and the People's Republic of China (PRC; China). Protesters feared that passing the CSSTA would hurt Taiwan’s economy, negatively a"ect its democracy and leave the country vulnerable to political pressure from Beijing.

%is article puts the current confronta-tion in the context of Taiwan’s struggle for independence. It argues that the Sun!ower Student Movement should be seen as a continuation of the strug-gle between China and Taiwan on authority over the ROC. Seen as such, the protest not only poses a threat to national security but also challenges the regional and international communi-ties.

!e Sun"ower Student MovementIn June 2013 mainland China and Taiwan signed the CSSTA. It is a follow-on to the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed in 2010 and aims at liberalising trade in the service sector. In particular, the treaty would have made investment in service industries like banking, heal-thcare, tourism, telecommunication, etc. possible. Furthermore, it would have made it easier to set up o&ces and branches in the other territories and allocate inde#nitely renewable visas to businessmen.1

%e CSSTA received strong criticism

for its potential negative impact on smaller local businesses. Yet, it quickly becomes evident that a lack of transpa-rency in the process of setting up the agreement caused the protests.

%e leadership of Taiwan’s ruling Kuomintang Party (KMT) pushed for immediate rati#cation of the treaty, lea-ding to closed-door negotiations. %is alerted protesters who compelled the KMT to agree to a clause-by-clause re-view of the treaty and public hearings. Although the KMT agreed on June 25, 2013, it procrastinated the review pro-cess until March 2014. On March 17,

The current round of student protests revi-­ved Taiwan’s indepen-­dence movement from China, which puts the complicated relations-­hip between mainland and island to the test, thereby providing a se-­curity risk to the region.

RAPHAELA KORMOLL

Is  Taiwan  struggling  for  independence?

KMT legislator Chang Ching-chung announced that the review process had gone beyond the 90 days allotted for the process and that the agreement should therefore be submitted for a #nal vote.

According to Cole, “the sudden an-nouncement caught everybody by surprise and sparked anger among the public”. %is led to a sit-in outside the Legislature Yuan of hundreds of

students, academics, civic organisations and others and the occupation of the parliament house by about 300 protes-ters on March 18. Protesters vowed to occupy the legislature until the sche-duled vote for the CSSTA on March 21 unless the review process would be reinstated.2

%e so-called ‘Sun!ower Student Movement’, which derived its name from the gift of sun!owers to the protesters, hit another peak on March 23 with the temporary occupation of the Executive Yuan by around 200 students. %e latter found a bloody

end only hours later. After a dialogue between President Ma and representa-tives of the student protests had failed, the riot police carried out the eviction of protesters armed with batons and water cannons. Between 110 and 137 students and police o&cers were inju-red and about 61 arrested. According to Cheng, such a violent confrontation is rare in Taiwan and marks a split between anti-government militants and a main group seeking dialogue with

President Ma.3 %e occupation of the Executive Yuan was followed by big rallies of pro- and anti-protest groups and ended on April 10 with the vacation of the Legisla-ture Yuan. %is was the response to an announcement made by Legislative speaker Wang Jin-pyng on April 6, who promised to postpone the review of the CSSTA until legislation for monito-ring all cross-strait agreements will have been passed. On June 9, Woody Duh, Taiwan’s economic vice-minister, con#rmed that negotiations over the agreement had been frozen. It was not until the end of June that

contact between mainland and island were reassumed. On June 25, for the #rst time after the Chinese Civil War, a minister of the Chinese mainland was allowed to openly set foot in Taiwan.4 Zhang Zhijun, director of China’s Tai-wan A"airs O&ce, visited the island as part of the 2014 Wang-Zhang Meeting in the hope to warm the people for closer ties with mainland China. Zhang Zhijun and Wang Yu-chi, Taiwan’s Mainland A"airs Council Minister, agreed to establish direct communica-

tion to discuss important matters, the-reby cutting through the bureaucracy.5

Zhang Zhijun’s visit to Taiwan sparked renewed protest amongst the popula-tion. %is suggests that the Sun!ower Student Movement is not only about the economic and democratic impli-cations of the CSSTA, but also – and maybe more importantly - about cross-state relations between mainland China and Taiwan. In the remainder of this article I will explore this relations-hip more closely and place this current round of protest in the context of the Taiwan question.

Understanding the protestAt #rst sight the protest seems to be about the possible economic and demo-cratic implications of the CSSTA for Taiwan. It has been widely argued that the CSSTA would hurt the Taiwanese economy. Yet, a closer look suggests that this is mainly the fear of smaller local businesses, whereas larger com-panies support the CSSTA because they see opportunities for their own development, which would probably bene#t the Taiwanese economy as a whole. Joe Hhung highlighted that ‘even topnotch macroeconomists can only make an educated guess as to how it would a"ect the Taiwanese economy. But their guess is that by and large it would bene#t Taiwan’. He criticizes the student protesters for being ‘too young to understand the complicated e"ect of the trade agreement’.6 Yet, he fails to recognize that the group of protesters is

the protest seems to be about the possible econo-­mic and demo-­

cratic implications

Ma Ying-­jeou: President of the Republic of China -­ Taiwan (2008-­present) and Chairman of the Kuomintang party (2009-­present). Source: Any timeline

Impressions of the Sunflower Student Movement 2014. Source: KUKUYO

Protest in Taiwan

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not only made up of students, but also academics and other civil groups. A further argument put forward by the protesters is that the agreement would have negative e"ects for democracy in Taiwan. %is can be observed at the national level but also in cross-state relations with China. %e Taiwanese democracy is impaired through gover-nance with authoritarian tendencies and a lack of transparency in cross-strait deals, so Cole. 7 %is becomes evident when looking at the rati#cation process of the CSSTA, as President MA Ying-jeou sought to compel the Kuo-mintang (KMT) to ratify the CSSTA in March 2014. %is may suggest that President Ma seeks to prepare Taiwan for uni#cation with China. Vice versa the US-based historian Yu Ying-shih warned that China was trying to undermine Taiwan’s democratic system through the CSSTA in order to prepare for uni#cation.8 Having said this, the current protests could, if successful, mean a further democratisation of Taiwan, so Sui. According to Sui this could provide ‘additional safeguards to let the people, not any political party, decide the fate of the island’.9 Here an allusion to the Wild Lily Movement of

1990 becomes evident. %e latter was a milestone in the democratization of Taiwan.10

While the Sun!ower Student Move-ment can be seen as an important step in the democratization of Taiwan, the previous paragraph also highlighted it links to the so-called Taiwan question. %e latter revolves around whether 1) Taiwan should remain an e"ectively independent territory of the ROC, 2) become uni#ed under the PRC, or 3) declare independence and seek inter-national legitimacy and recognition as the Republic of Taiwan. %is question is closely linked to the relationship between the PRC and the ROC, which I shall brie!y outline, followed by an analysis of the Taiwan question in light of the current round of protests.

!e Taiwan questionBoth, the ROC and the PRC have been engaged in a complicated relationship since 1945. Taiwan has been ruled by the ROC since 25 October 1945. %e ROC is an independent political entity which also ruled mainland China until losing the Chinese Civil War in 1949. %e war represented an ideological

split between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Kuomintang (KMT) and resulted in the creation of two de facto states: the Kuomintang-led Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan and the communist People’s Republic of China (PRC) in mainland China.Until the late 1980s, both governments of the ROC and the PRC adhered to the One-State policy. It stipulates that there is only one sovereign state encom-passing mainland China and Taiwan. Yet, disagreement about the legitimate government of this state characterised

and continues to best describe the rela-tionship between PRC and ROC. While the PRC continues to hold on to the One-China principle and seeks to unify China under its leadership, the end of martial law in Taiwan in 1987 and the acceptance of multi-party democracy opened up further pathways for the Taiwan question, as represented by the Pan-Blue and the Pan-Green Coalitions. %e Pan-Blue Coalition supports the status quo, yet, at the same time, favours Chinese nationalist identity and greater linkage with main-land China, while rejecting immediate reuni#cation. It maintains close links with the Kuomintang, Taiwan’s ruling party which is in favour of uni#cation. Opposite are the Pan-Green Coalition and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which favour Taiwan’s indepen-dence. %ey reject uni#cation, the ‘One China’ and the ‘One Country Two Systems’ principles and aim at formally establishing the Republic of Taiwan by replacing the ROC.Although the modern-day indepen-dence movement led by the Pan-Green Coalition became a viable force in the 1990s, many supporters argued that a formal declaration of independence is

unnecessary because the ROC is already independent from the mainland. %e Democratic Progressive Party forma-lised this position in the ‘Resolution on Taiwan’s Future’ in 1999. It reads that ‘Taiwan is a sovereign independent country, not subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China. %is is both a historical fact and a re!ec-tion of the status quo. It is not only a condition indispensable to Taiwan's existence, but also a crucial element to the development of democratic political practices and the creation of economic miracles’.11 When Chan Shui-bian (DPP) won the elections in March 2000, he moderated the party’s stance on independence. He promised not to declare independence or change the state symbols if the PRC did not attack Taiwan. In 2007 the DPP sought approval for a new reso-lution asserting a separate Taiwanese identity, calling for a new constitution and advocating the use of the name ‘Taiwan’. Yet, the ‘normal country’ reso-lution failed to win the support of the congress.12 Moreover, the party lost the following presidential election in 2008 to the KMT and thus its in!uence on Taiwan’s independence. Since reas-suming governance over Taiwan, the KMT leadership sought closer ties with the Chinese mainland as the earlier dis-cussed Economic Cooperation Frame-work Agreement (2010) and the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (2013) demonstrate. However, the Student Movement indicates that a large part of the Taiwanese population does not support the current line of the KMT, suggesting that support for uni#cation with China is also vanishing.

Indeed, the Taiwan Indicators Survey Research conducted in June 2014 sho-wed that only 28 percent of the respon-dents (3.2 percent less than in October 2013) favour an alliance or uni#cation with China, as opposed to 50.8 percent (7.2 percent more) who are against such an alliance. On the other hand, support for an independent country neither called PRC nor ROC declined. 32.6 percent (in contrast to 41.2 percent in April 2013) said that they would accept such an arrangement, whereas 50.1 percent (opposed to 31.5 percent) rejected the idea.13 %is new low in support of a proposition for a newly named country may re!ect the societies fear about further violent con-frontations with the own police forces and its Chinese neighbour. %is brings about further security concerns at the national and international levels.

Security concerns %e current protest shows that the po-pulation is no longer willing to quietly accept the authoritarian tendencies and the lack of transparency in the current Taiwanese government. %is may raise concern about further societal upheaval against the regime, not only in form of peaceful protest but also in violent confrontations. %is is worrisome in light of the crackdown on the protesters by the riot police during the occu-pation of the Executive Yuan, which received criticism at the national and international level. In a press release the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), said that it ‘seriously condemns the police violence that took place’. Sher-rod Brown, US Senator and founding member of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus, urged President Ma to ensure a non-violent, peaceful resolution. He said: ‘My thoughts are with Taiwanese students and other protesters expressing opposition to a proposed economic pact with China […]. %e message to President Ma is that when you try to jam a trade agreement through, people will resist’.14

Further to the concerns raised at the national level, the protest should shake up the international community as an escalation of the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan could have far reaching consequences. China repeatedly expressed military threats against Taiwan in case the country declared independence. An escalation of the con!ict could lead to the invol-vement of other countries, such as the United States or Japan, as history has shown. %erefore, keeping a close eye on the developments in Taiwan is ad-vised, although I currently see no threat to the international community.In conclusion it may be said that the Sun!ower Student Movement can contribute to consolidating democracy in Taiwan, which in turn strengthens Taiwan’s position vis-à-vis China. For the future of Taiwan this may provide a further step towards a more indepen-dent nation.

Raphaela Kormoll graduated from the University of York (Bachelor) and Leiden University (Master) in International Relations. She is now taking up doctoral research at Durham University, where she focuses on the India-Pakistan con!ict and reconciliation at the regional level. Further to her interest and expertise in peace and con!ict studies and (South) Asia, Raphaela is the co-founder and pre-sident of the MAIS Alumni Association Leiden University and works on career development.

the Student Move-­ment indicates

that a large part of the Taiwanese population does not support the

current line of the KMT’

Taiwanese Student Movement supporters in Los Angeles, California. Source: Flickr

Protest in Taiwan

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the  clash  of  religions

outsider could ever imagine. Especially in the last decades of -­

gions. But why is there so much anger? Why are there tensions anyway? This article will try to answer these questions by give you a simplistic overview about the complex history of the dif-­

the scratch: the arrival of the people of England and Scotland in Ireland until the last period of warfare, also known as ‘the Troubles’. KARLIJN ARTS

If you want to

IRA, you have to do it with muscles,

not with brains

Case:  Northern  Ireland

ueen Elizabeth I conquered almost the whole island of Ireland by the time she passed away in the begin-ning of the 17th century,1 except for the northern part

of Ireland, called the Ulster province.1

%is area was in hands of the so-called ‘Ulster clans’, with Hugh O’Neill as a key #gure. In the 1590’s he led a number of raids against the English in Ireland. After these raids he gained support of the Irishmen and his power grew in the Ulster province. He and the Ulster clans managed to defend Ulster for a long time. But in the long run O’Neill had to !ee from Ireland and the British colonists con#scated the land anyhow.2 In the main time the British colonists, along with the people from Scotland and Wales, had already settled down in the towns located in the plantations of Ulster, were they drove the native Irishmen away. %ese colonists were especially attracted to the plantations of Ulster,

Qtherefore these people are called the ‘Planters’.

But besides the fact that the native Irishmen were driven away from their homes and therefore considering the Planters as intriguers, they also had another religion. %e Irish were Catho-lic and almost all the newcomers were Protestant.3 %ese two factors contribu-ted to a separation: from this moment on the Catholics (the Irish) lived in other areas than the newcomers, the Protestants. But although the groups lived mostly separated, the tension was still there. %is even resulted in several

wars, like the Eleven Years War. %is war started in 1641 by a group of Irish landowners. %ey attempted a coup d’état through seizing some strong-point’s around Ireland. After that they demanded ‘free practice of the Catholic religion, equal rights for Catholics to hold public o&ce and an end to land con#scations’.4 %e plot failed and many conspirators were turned in. Even after the Eleven Years War the positi-ons of the Catholics hadn’t improved. Public practice of this religion was still banned. People who did risked being executed. %ese punishments conti-nued until the end of the 18th century.5 So, since the arrival of the Planters the native Irishmen felt suppressed: they couldn’t practice their own religion in public and mostly they were refused of important political and social jobs. And this in equal treatment continued for a long time.

Times are changingIt was in the 19th century that the na-

tive Irishmen wanted to speak up again. By the 1880s the demand for self-regulation grew. Especially among the Irish Nationalists, a group of Catholic native Irishmen, who wanted to be less dependent on Britain.6 Around that time some groups were even arguing for full independence, but those groups were just a small minority. Eventually the British government granted a demand for self-regulation in 1912, but this immediately caused a counter reaction from the Ul-ster Unionists, a group of Protestant loyalists of England. %ey were against this devolution and they were afraid of possible Irish Nationalists’ resistance. In a counterstrike the Irish Nationalists, also called the Irish Volunteers, formed their own paramilitary organization: the IRA. %ey did so to tackle down the Ulster Unionists.7 In 1916 the Irish Volunteers even demanded a republic. %is demand was written down in the Proclamation of the Republic and it is considered as

the founding document of the IRA. It declared an independent Republic and pledged republicans to "equal rights and equal opportunities" for all the Irish people. %e support for this form of independence was much bigger than the small minority who argued for in-dependence in the 1880s, but still, not everybody appreciated these ideas. %is demand for a republic, also known as ‘the Easter Rising’, was stopped within a week. Almost all the leaders of this movement were executed, sixteen in total.8

!e TroublesAfter a period of relative lesser con!icts,

the tension rose once again by the end of the 1960s. %is tension caused a chain of events, which resulted in the beginning of the period called ‘the Troubles’.9 %ere is no o&cial date for the start of the Troubles, but the reason for this period of warfare was clear: the (Irish) Nationalists had enough of the unfair treatment. %ey experienced job dis-crimination and therefore they pleaded for a same treatment for everyone. Next to that the police force in northern part of Ireland, also called the RUC, was mainly formed by Protestant police-men. %is led to a lot of discrimination against the Catholics.%erefore the Catholics decided to or-ganize some peaceful demonstrations.10 But besides the peaceful demonstra-tions the IRA, the paramilitary orga-nization of the Nationalists, attacked an important statue. %is statue was especially valuable for the Protestants living in the northern part of Ireland. %is event caused a reaction from the

There were over 3500 people kil-­

led by the end of 1998

Northern Ireland and separatism

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willing to give in. A tremendous loss was the result of this clash: there were over 3500 people killed by the end of 1998.13 Including IRA members, UVF members but also children and youngsters, whom were just walking down the street. Becauses of this enormous number of people who got killed and the duration of the Troubles, almost everybody in Northern Ireland knew someone who was killed or injured during the con-!ict: some even experienced multiple tragedies.14 %erefore the aftermath and the consequences of this war are still lasting. Everybody in Northern Ireland lived in uncertainty around that time and they all were drag into a con!ict of violence and hate in which no one could escape.

!e peace processAlthough the violence between the groups has reduced,15 the memories are fresh and the tension is still there. After all these con!icts and sacri#ces it is hard, for both parties, to let the

memories go, which is now a challenge for the new generation. %ey are the ones who could establish an acceptance for each other. Both parties will stay in Northern Ireland and they all have to #nd a way to live with each other. Like in this case, their everlasting con-!ict isn’t going to stop by more hatred, it will only grow. None of the parties is willing to leave Northern Ireland, so they have to accept each other’s presence. Letting the past go and ac-cept each other will take a long breath, because memories from both sides are loaded with a lot of burden. But still, they surely agree about one thing: never those con!icts again.

Karlijn Arts has recently "nished a pre-master in Social and Cultural Anthropo-logy. Besides that she is still following a Bachelor in Communication Science at the VU in Amsterdam. But for this half year she is attending International Secu-rity courses in Zurich, with a special focus on Egypt and the Middle East.

(Ulster) Unionists: they also set up a paramilitary organization, which they called the UVF. %e Unionists did so because they were afraid that the IRA would plan more attacks. By realizing this paramilitary organization they wanted to make sure the IRA, and thereby the Nationalists, wouldn’t cause any more commotion. On 21 may 1966 the UVF declared war against the IRA and they were determined to use brutally violence.11 Like an UVF o&cer quoted: ‘If you want to #ght against the IRA, you have to do it with muscles, not with brains.’12 And that was exactly what happened.From this moment on the situation was getting worse every day. %e tension grew and the parties became more and more seperated. At a certain point both parties didn’t even try to listen to each other anymore. On both sides they started to classify each other into reli-gion and political movement without even looking at the individual. %at caused a clash in which no party was

Het werd in 2005 met groot enthousiasme ontvangen, het beginsel inzake Respon-sibility to Protect: de verant-

woordelijkheid van staten om volkeren in gevallen van genocide, misdaden te-gen de menselijkheid, oorlogsmisdaden en ethnic cleansing te beschermen. Het was weliswaar geen dwingend inter-nationaal recht, maar wel een beginsel waar de hele Verenigde Naties achter stond. Indien het duidelijk zou zijn dat een staat in gebreke bleef zijn burgers tegen de eerder genoemde grootschalige wreedheden te beschermen en vreedza-me maatregelen geen e"ect zouden heb-ben, dan was het de verantwoordelijk-heid van de internationale gemeenschap om te interveniëren met dwingende maatregelen, zoals van economische aard. Militaire interventie zou als laatste redmiddel toegepast kunnen worden. De testcase voor Responsibility to Protect en met name voor militaire interventie als laatste redmiddel, werd Libië. De Arabische Lente was nog niet in een Arabische winter verkeerd en Libië zou naar veler verwachting een van de volgende voorbeelden van succesvolle en snelle revolutie worden. De Libische leider, met wie het Westen tot voor kort veel goede zaken deed, hield op eigen wijze de wind onder zijn etnisch verdeeld volk. Hij was niet van plan het onderspit te delven. Toen ook daar de Arabische Lente zich aandien-de. Niet geheel ten onrechte meende de buitenissige heerser dat hij veel goeds voor zijn volk bereikt had en nog veel meer door hem te verwezenlijken was. Resolutie 1970 van de Veiligheidsraad, waarin met niet-militaire maatregelen gedreigd werd als hij zijn mensenrech-tenschendende actie tegen de rebellen niet zou beëindigen, liet hij dan ook aan zich voorbijgaan. Inmiddels bleek de rebellie wel iets meer dan een inci-dentele opstand. Gadda#’s antwoord, ondermeer aan het rebellenbolwerk Benghazi, was dan ook dat hij de ratten wel zou krijgen en men op een gedegen afrekening kon rekenen. De terechte in-druk ontstond in het Westen dat zoiets als een genocide nabij was. Resolutie

1973 van de Veiligheidsraad hield het realiseren van een no-!y zone in, waar-door de militaire macht van de kolonel voldoende beperkt zou worden en daarmee het volk tegen de eigen heerser voldoende beschermd zou zijn. Het doel was niet regime change, laat staan het vermoorden van het staatshoofd. Rusland en China onthielden zich, de oorspronkelijke doelstelling indachtig

Leon Wecke is werkzaam bij het Centrum voor Internationaal Con!ictanalyse & Management van de Radboud Univer-siteit Nijmegen. Daar¬naast doceert hij aan het Instituut Defensie Leergangen, Instituut Clingendael en de opleiding van de Koninklijke Marechaussee in Apel-doorn. Hij heeft verschillende publicaties op zijn naam staan, onder andere op het gebied van de beeldvorming inzake oorlog en vrede.

Libië:  Responsibility  to  ReconsiderLeon  Wecke

en na lang aarzelen, van stemming, evenals Duitsland, Brazilië en India. De uitkomst van de militaire interventie van de Verenigde Naties, waarvan de uitvoering uiteindelijk aan de NAVO werd toevertrouwd, mondde echter wel uit in regime change en het vermoorden van Gadda#. Men was het doel (bescherming van de bevolking) in de meest letterlijke zin ver voorbijgeschoten. Rusland en China zullen zich met vele andere staten wel een, twee of drie keer bedenken alvorens weer in een dergelijke missie van de Verenigde Naties te participe-ren, en het Libische volk is nog steeds onbeschermd. Drie jaar na Gadda# heerst er alom chaos in Libië. Het gejuich over het door de NAVO zo ef-#ciënt in praktijk gebrachte beginsel van Responsibility to Protect is allang verstomd. De stammenmaatschap-pij, door Gadda# zo uitdrukkelijk in stand gehouden, heerst nog steeds in een land zonder nationale institu-ties waarmee en waarop een nieuwe staatsvorm gebouwd kan worden. Men had dat kunnen weten. De case Libië noopt alle partijen van toen tot een herbezinning op het toepas-sen van Responsibility to Protect: Responsibility to Reconsider. Demo-cratie is soms een moeilijk en soms onmogelijk exportartikel. Veelal is in bepaalde gevallen een dictator, hoe verwerpelijk ook, te prefereren boven een al dan niet opgelegde, maar tot mislukken gedoemde democratie. Een stelling die het westerse bedrijfsleven en ondersteunende politiek wellicht zal beamen.

heerst er alom chaos in Libië

Northern Ireland and separatism Column

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Understanding  Georgia Understanding Georgia’s po-

litics may also help improve our knowledge of the current situation in the Ukraine.

Separatists there too use Russian sup-port as leverage to further their cause. And just like in Georgia in 2008, the central Ukrainian government stub-bornly resists relinquishing control over the disputed territory. So which factors can be attributed to these phenomena? To #nd out, it is time to investigate the Georgian case and discover what happened in those #ve days of war in August 2008. And more importantly, why.

!e Five Day WarGeorgia is a small, Orthodox Christian nation of just four million people. For most of the past few centuries, it has been wedged in by great powers such as the Persian, Ottoman and Soviet empires. It #rst experienced indepen-dence after the First World War, but the Bolshevik revolution in neighbouring Russia soon put an end to that, with the Red Army invading the country in 1920 and incorporating it into the newly created Soviet Union the year after. Yet Georgia always managed to maintain a special status within the communist empire, partly because the former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was born there. After the Soviet Union’s collapse, Georgia’s independence was restored on April 9, 1991, by a speech made by prime dissident and later Ge-orgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia. %is transformed the Georgian nation from being a minority group in a powerful state to small state with many minorities. %ese minorities include the Abkhaz people in the North-West, the Ossets in the central north, the Adjara in the South-West and Armenians,

Ever since Georgia’s independence from the Soviet Union, separatists in Abkhazia, South Os-­setia and Adjara have demanded greater le-­vels of autonomy and even full secession. The central Georgian government in the capital of Tbilisi has sometimes accepted these de-­mands, while denying them at other times and insisting on maintaining Georgia’s territorial in-­tegrity. Six year ago, the latter policy even led to the Russo-­Georgian war. So how can Geor-­

QUINT HOEKSTRA

Separatism and Georgia

Then Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili (shaking hand, left) meets then NATO Secretary-­General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (right) a month after the Russo-­Georgian war. Contrary to the photo’s appearance, Georgian-­NATO’s relationship is inversed in reality, with Saakashvili unsuccessfully attempting to become a NATO member. Source: NATO (2008).

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The Stalin MuseumThe town of Gori illustrates Georgia’s internal divide well. At just an hour’s drive north-­west of Tbilisi and situated just outside the South Ossetian border, residents this town disagree on how to interpret the post-­Soviet world. Gori was Joseph Stalin’s hometown, where he is commemorated in a grand museum, complete with tower, bell and even a lush park. Attracting around 15,000 tourists a year, visitors learn about the Soviet leader’s early struggles in Siberian prison camps and later his life as the Soviet leader. Exuberant foreign dignita-­ries’ gifts to Stalin are on display, and visitors can even enter the bullet proof train he used to travel around in. The gift shop continues to sell small bronze Stalin statutes. Tucked away under the staircase, there is a small room commemorating the estimated 40 million people who died in Stalin gulags. Some of Gori’s residents appear to still respect Stalin for his successes in defeating Hitler and rapidly industrializing the Soviet Union. Others appear to have changed their views. These Geor-­gians acknowledge the museum generates much needed employment and wealth for the town, but are uneasy about celebrating Moscow’s rule in the past considering its current hostility towards Georgia.

Gori’s best known attraction: The Stalin Museum

Russians, Turks, Azerbaijani’s and other minorities throughout the country.Political independence proved to be a di&cult path for the new Georgian state. With its outstanding natural beauty it had long been a popular ho-liday destination for wealthy Russians. In fact, Georgia itself was one of the more a'uent parts of the Soviet Union. But it lacked the state institutions to manage the transition to independence, and it was not long before the economy collapsed. %e #rst democratically elected President in Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, attempted to tie the state back together by increasing state control over peripheral regions. In ad-dition, he sought to solve the problem of minority calls for autonomy and independence by “strengthening the ethnic Georgian primacy in the repu-blic”.1 %is sparked a violent con!ict with South Ossetia and eventually led the President to !ee the country in 1992. %e former Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze succee-ded him in the same year, and used his contacts in Russia to strike a deal with the Osset people.2 Yet armed con!ict did not end there, as the new President opened a new front in Abkhazia. %is too, eventually ended with a cease-#re, one that granted the Abkhaz conside-rable autonomy. Georgia experienced relative stability until 2003, when the Rose Revolution struck. Shevardnadze had come under increased allegations of corruption and was ousted by Mikheil Saakashvili after massive street protests. In 2005, President Saakashvili o"ered Abkhazia increased autonomy but this was rejected by the Abkhaz leaders,

who now said they wanted nothing less than full independence. Meanwhile, the South Ossetians also voted for indepen-dence in an unrecognized referendum. What followed in 2008 is something some readers may still remember. After the outbreak of low-level, small scale #ghting broke out in South Ossetia, President Saakashvili responded by shelling South Ossetia’s capital Tsk-hinvali on August 8.3 %e Ossets then called in help from their ally Russia. Russian President Dimitri Medvedev heeded the call, sending in Russian forces, which swiftly ousted the Geor-gian troops. Georgian troops continued their attacks outside of South Ossetian territory, prompting the Russians to cross the South Ossetian border and entering the city of Gori. %e Georgi-ans, meanwhile, pleaded for help from the United States and European leaders. Yet these powers wanted to avoid ris-king a large scale con!ict with Russia, and merely called for dialogue. Russian troops advanced to just 45 kilometres from the capital Tbilisi, creating great fear amongst Georgia’s leaders of being overrun by the Red Army once again. Eventually, French President Nicolas Sarkozy came to the rescue and me-diated a deal between the belligerents that ended the #ve day war. %e parties agreed on the deployment of a Russian peacekeeping force in South Ossetia.

Analysis Now that the what question has been answered, it is time to delve into the question why the Georgian government acted in the way that it did. Gamsak-hurdia, Shevardnadze and Saakashvili

all demonstrated the same behaviour: in order to sustain the central Georgian state they deemed it necessary to extend Tbilisi’s in!uence to the northern breakaway regions. Whenever the Georgian state was weak it struck a deal with the separatists and granted them some degree of autonomy. When it was relatively strong it repeatedly reneged on previous deals and used force to change the status quo. Georgia’s !ip-!opping policy may be accounted for by the fact that states exist in a condition of anarchy. States fear for their survival, especially the young and small ones. It certainly does not help to have a large, milita-rily strong neighbour, who can quash Georgia’s sovereignty any moment it wishes to. Successive Georgian Presi-dents have therefore walked a tightrope: advance when they can, retreat when

they must. %e Russo-Georgian war of 2008 appears to be a strategic mistake: Georgia was strong enough to take South Ossetia but was neither prepa-red nor able to confront Russia. Being locked in by its own actions it had no option but to hope for outside support, which eventually came not in the form of military assistance but in the shape of international mediation by Sarkozy.Actions by Georgia’s minorities are governed by the same principles as the ones followed by Georgia’s Presidents. %e Abkhaz and Osset people worry that a sign of weakness will tempt Tbi-lisi to seize the moment and overrun their military posts. %ey have solved this problem by striking an alliance. Both minority groups bandwagon with Russia in order to keep the Georgian state at arm’s length. Russia, forever regretting its in!uence loss in the Cau-casus after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, allies with these groups to regain its regional dominance. Georgia, in turn, uses United States support to balance Russia’s power. It also actively seeks NATO membership.4

If Georgia is to resist a possible Rus-sian advance, it knows it must stand as one. %at means it cannot a"ord to yield and grant territorially concen-trated minorities too much autonomy

rights. Instead, it wants to deploy its military as far as possible from the capital in order to create a security buf-fer between Georgia’s heartland and its border to the north. Losing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as Georgian ter-ritory would draw in the Russians too close to the capital. It could also have a domino e"ect on another minority region, the Adjara in the South West. In turn, this could lead to a total state collapse and leave Russia to pick up the pieces. Georgia’s insistence on control-ling its breakaway regions is therefore not guided by the territory’s economic value (it is sparsely populated and has few vital economic or natural resources) but by the grand strategy of preserving the young Georgian state.

ConclusionMost Western media consider Russia to be the initial aggressor in the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. Invading Georgia was indeed a grave breach of internati-onal law. Yet so too was the Georgian government’s disproportionate shelling of South Ossetia, which quickly escala-ted the con!ict.5 In addition, the Osset people had long declared themselves in-dependent from Georgia. %eir request for military assistance of its ally Russia makes strategic sense, seeing as their

survival was at stake. Considering the circumstances, Russia even acted with reasonable self-restraint. With the Red Army’s military supremacy, Medvedev could have taken Tbilisi in mere hours. %is is not to justify Russia’s actions but to highlight Georgia’s folly in underestimating South Ossetia’s ability and impact of drawing in its northern neighbour into the con!ict. %e case study shows nations and states alike go through the same process. In order to survive in the international sys-tem, states strike alliances. When they feel their core (the capital) is secure, they seek to extend their sphere of in-!uence. Georgia went into South Osse-tia and Abkhazia to regain a monopoly on force there, just like Russia entered South Ossetia to increase its sphere of in!uence. %is is what I shall call the capital-periphery problem. Nations and states seek to protect the capital, but doing so requires also controlling the periphery. In the Caucasus, politicians feel the further they have their sp-here of in!uence, the better they have secured the nation’s capital. Each party will therefore seek to enlarge this area, making any territorial gain a zero-sum game. %e constant boundary pushing makes con!ict likely to persist. %is is vastly di"erent from how international

relations are conducted in the West, where borders are approached as dicho-tomous entities: anything until here is mine, anything further is yours. Apart from understanding how events have evolved in the past and may evolve in the future, there is also a lesson to be learned that can be applied to the case of Ukraine. If the same dynamics and attitudes that govern international relations the Caucasus also apply to Ea-stern Europe, then a continued con!ict between Ukraine and Russia is likely. Separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine are likely to pursue institutionalization of Russian support, such as the formation of an o&cial military alliance. Faced with the continued threat of a Russian advance and an end to Ukrainian de facto independence, Kiev is likely to seek European support through the signing of the long-awaited Association Treaty with the European Union.

Quint Hoekstra studied Political Science with a specialization in International Relations and Organizations at Leiden University and is currently enrolled in a Master’s programme in Con!ict, Security and Development at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London.

Map of Georgia. Source: Wikimedia user ChrisO: President Saak-­ashvili responded disproportionally by shelling South Ossetian territory

Separatism and Georgia

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African  Refugees  in  IsraëlIsrael has become a popular destination for Su-­danese and Ertrean refugees. Can this small state

DANA COHEN

Over 54,000 African asylum see-kers have crossed the border into Israel.1Many are considered illegal in-#ltrators, while few have been o&cially recognized as refugees.2 %e internati-onal community harshly condemns Is-rael’s policies and calls upon it to abide by international law. %e situation on the ground, however, is complex and I argue that the international community should cooperate with Israel to absorb the asylum seekers collectively.

%e wave of asylum seekers started in

2005 and consists mainly of Eritrean and Sudanese refugees.3 Eritreans, most of whom Christians, !ed their country due to grave human rights violations including religious and political per-secution, torture, and disappearances. Eritreans caught leaving their country without permission, which is rarely given, face severe punishment.4 Most Sudanese come from Darfur where they !ed persecution and mass murder. Others escaped ongoing civil war and governmental persecution in South Sudan.5

TortureIn 2006 asylum seekers began paying Bedouin smugglers to take them to Israel, a relatively safe practice at #rst. Since 2010, however, smugglers regularly hold asylum seekers host-age in Sinai for ransom. %e hostages are often tortured while on the phone with their families so they can hear the screams. Abuses include mutilation and deformation of limbs, electric shocks, removing of skin, being hanged from the ceiling by their wrists, and rape. Some hostages die from their injuries

or are purposefully killed when they cannot pay the full amount of money the smugglers demand. Survivors are faced with crossing the heavily guarded border with Israel on foot. Egyptian border guards shoot at illegal trespas-sers; between July 2007 and September 2010 at least 85 African asylum seekers have been fatally shot and many more seriously wounded.6

Asylum seekers caught by Egyptian border police are detained for long periods of time, while the United Nati-onal High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is not allowed to visit them. In breach of Egypt’s Law on Combat-ting Human Tra&cking, tra&cking victims are denied medical care, pro-tection, and immunity from criminal charges. Instead, they are charged with immigration o"enses and only released after collecting enough money for an air ticket to Ethiopia. %e charges are particularly immoral considering the fact that large numbers of detainees were kidnapped in Sudan and transfer-red to Egypt against their will. Evidence and eyewitness reports show extensive

collusion between Egyptian police and military and the tra&ckers. Police return escaped hostages to their ab-ductors and turn a blind eye at check-points. In breach of the UN Conven-tion Against Torture, Egypt has failed

to prosecute tra&ckers and o&cials colluding with tra&ckers, even though “it was common knowledge who the tra&ckers were in Sinai.” Many escaped tra&cking victims have died at police stations from their injuries because the police refuse to take them to the hos-pital. At hospitals, some doctors refuse to give treatment to “migrants who are

trying to get to Israel where they will be turned into #ghters and then attack Egypt.”

On the other side of the border, asylum seekers caught by Israeli soldiers are taken to the newly established open detention centre Holot in the Negev. Although technically free to leave the facilities, the asylum seekers are obligated to report for roll call three times a day. %e provisional status which allows them to stay has to be renewed every one to three months.7 If they fail to meet these obligations, they face imprisonment.8 Although Israel does not deport asylum seekers back to Eritrea or Sudan, it pressures them to leave ‘voluntarily’ and o"ers them a $3,500 grant when leaving. Dozens of asylum seekers have agreed to be !own to Uganda and Rwanda, countries with track records of deporting asylum seekers back to their countries of origin. 9 %is policy is likely in breach of non-refoulement as will be explained below.

!e 1951 ConventionAfter World War II, the United Nations

Hostages are of-­ten tortured while on the phone with

their families so they can hear the

screams

Wife of then-­Prime Minister Ehud Olmert meets with Sudanese Refugees. July 2007 Source: Government Press Office

Sudanese refugees from Egypt walking to Israel. April 2012. Source: Hillel Assaf.

African Refugees

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Burden sharing can encourage

Israel to facilitate and provide pro-­tection to all asy-­

lum seekers

constructed the 1951 Refugee Conven-tion to guarantee non-negotiable rights to Holocaust survivors and people !eeing the Communist bloc. %e 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees aims to extend these rights to later refugees. In 1954 Israel rati#ed the Convention and in 1968 it acceded to the Protocol. However, Israel has failed to adopt the Convention into its common law, rendering the legislation unenforceable in its courts.10

A key point of the Convention is the prohibition for states to discriminate against asylum seekers because of their “race, religion or country of origin.”11 Israel, however, classi#es everyone from Sudan as ‘enemy nationals’, thus denying them the chance to submit a request for o&cial refugee status. Israel justi#es this policy on the grounds that Sudan has been involved in sending explosives and weaponry to Palestinian terrorists in Israel and the Gaza Strip. Although Israel is indeed not obliged to provide asylum to persons who threaten its security, direct evidence against in-dividuals is needed and discrimination against entire groups is unlawful.12

Non-refoulementAnother major issue in the Convention is the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits returning asylum seekers to the state they !ed or to countries where they may be persecuted or forcibly returned to their country of origin. Since Israel in fact declared the non-refoulement principle to be binding, it is prohibited from returning African asylum seekers to Egypt where their rights are systematically violated.13 Many asylum seekers in Israel lived in Egypt for several years until the lack of safety and livelihood prompted them to leave.14 Egypt’s reluctance to live up to its obligations has diverted the in!ux of asylum seekers from Egypt to Israel, e"ectively shifting responsibility. Like-wise, the hardening of restrictions on migration to Europe has increased the number of Africans coming to Israel

instead.15 Although this does not relieve Israel from its legal (and moral) obli-gations, I argue that the international community should recognize a shared responsibility for the fate of African asylum seekers.

In the wake of international condem-nation of Israel’s refugee policies, it is noteworthy that many countries vio-late the prohibition of discriminating against certain asylum seekers. %e United Kingdom has singled out So-malian, Liberian, and Libyan refugees, the United States has discriminated against asylum seekers from Haiti, and Macedonia against Kosovar Albanians. Moreover, many states prevent asylum seekers from entering their territorial jurisdiction, thus avoiding their legal obligation towards them. Australia has blocked entry to its territory of a boat carrying four hundred asylum seekers from Afghanistan. Likewise, the Uni-ted States has intercepted and destroy-ed boats with Haitian asylum seekers before returning them to Haiti, also clearly in breach of non-refoulement. Besides Israel, several states, including France and %e Netherlands, have put asylum seekers in group detention to discourage refugees from seeking asylum.16

Israel’s dilemma%e arrival of large numbers of asy-lum seekers is especially di&cult for a small country like Israel. %e in!ux of Africans is disproportionately vast because Israel is the only developed country which shares a land border with Africa. Local UN o&cials even argue that Israel should not o"er long-term solutions for asylum seekers until the Egyptian border is better sealed “as that would dramatically increase their number.”17 Sealing its border shut, on the other hand, is morally questiona-ble since it merely blocks Israel’s legal responsibilities towards the asylum seekers (who are after all not yet on its territory), while leaving them unprotec-ted in Egypt. Although this would be legally acceptable, morally it is of the same severity as breaching the non-refoulement principle.

Notably, Israel has given protection to hundreds of African and non-African refugees. It has given six hundred A5 temporary residence visas to Darfurian refugees in 2007 and two thousand B1 work visas to Eritrean refugees. It has provided refuge to approximately one hundred Albanian Muslim refugees in 1999, one hundred Bosnian refugees in 1993, and several dozen Vietnamese

refugees in the 1970s.18 Social move-ments in Israel often demonstrate for asylum seekers’ rights, sometimes by drawing analogies between African refugees and Holocaust survivors.19 To illustrate, dozens of Israeli soldiers who witnessed asylum seekers being shot by Egyptian soldiers have written to then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert: “We have always accused [western] countries for standing idly by during the Holocaust of the Jewish people… And yet Israel is dodging its moral duty to help these distraught refu-gees.”20 Moreover, Holocaust survivors have distributed gift baskets and water bottles to hundreds of asylum seekers waiting outside the Population and Immigration Authority Bureau in Tel Aviv to renew their visas in a sign of solidarity.21 Several NGOs and student groups aim at helping individual Afri-

cans or at changing the national laws.22

Israel is thus clearly not unwilling to help refugees, but it simply cannot absorb all African asylum seekers on its own without harming its national stability and economy. Moreover, Israel had never before had to deal with the in!ux of great numbers of non-Jewish asylum seekers and therefore does not have the resources to deal with all the asylum applications. It also lacks the legislation to o&cially implement the 1951 Convention’s obligations.23

Burden sharingRather than merely justifying or renouncing Israel’s breach of interna-tional law, however, I propose for the international community to cooperate with Israel in #nding a reasonable solution. %ought should be given to

burden sharing: a cooperative network between countries, in which Israel would function as a passageway station for asylum seekers, responsible for initial and temporary care and revising refugee status applications, but not ne-cessarily the permanent and #nal home. Burden sharing can encourage Israel to facilitate and provide protection to all asylum seekers at its doorstep, while it simultaneously creates a long-term solution for them. Israel can thus provide safety to all asylum seekers who need it, while not having to fear the unreasonable demand to permanently absorb each and every one of them. States willing to cooperate by housing recognized refugees could be provided with economical reimbursement.

Earlier this year Sweden accepted approximately #fty Eritrean asylum see-

kers from Israel in response to a special request by the UN Refugee Agency.24

Possibly it would also be willing to partner with Israel in a structured burden sharing enterprise. Agreements might also be made with Egypt, hope-fully ending its policy of shooting at asylum seekers. By relieving Egypt of the burden to integrate all African asy-lum seekers that arrive in or through its territory, it might also be motivated to live up to its obligations under both na-tional and international anti-tra&cking laws, international human rights law, and national criminal law by investi-gating and prosecuting tra&ckers and o&cials collaborating with tra&ckers.

Dana Cohen is a graduate of the Univer-sity of Utrecht, where she studied Gender Studies during her BA and Con!ict Stu-dies and Human Rights during her MA.

Refugees from Sudan's Darfur region in the Rose garden in Jerusalem. July 2007. Photographer: Milner Moshe (Government Press Office)

African Refugees

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A  short  story  

Almost everyone noticed the war in eastern Ukrai-­

Russian separatists and Ukrainians, an unknown voice is screaming for attention. How a Welsh businessman planted British patriotism in Ukraine in the 19th century.

NATALIA KADENKO

“People of Donetsk! English brothers! %e time is ripe! As you know, Yuzovka (“Donetsk”) is originally an English city, founded by the great English entrepreneur John Hughes. For more than hundred years, we’ve been fooled by Russians and Ukrainians alike: Rus-sians claiming that the city is Russian, and Ukrainians claiming that the city is Ukrainian! We demand a referendum to return Yuzovka to its primordial womb – into the Great Britain! Glory to John Hughes and his city! God save the Queen!”1

WAs the news of separatism in Crimea were making headlines all over the world, little was known of this parti-cular pro-English separatist movement on the Donetsk soil. Starting as an anonymous initiative on the social network group for Donetsk citizens, this particular appeal was followed by an online “Referendum”. Over seven thousand of people have voted, with 61 percent expressing support for joining Great Britain, while sixteen percent preferred wider autonomy with English as a regional language.1

%e Donetsk area with its prominent mining industry owes the founda-tion of its metal works to the Welsh businessman John Hughes. While the settlements have existed long before

he came to Ukrainian (then Russian Imperial) soil, it was thanks to him that “Novorussian society for coal, iron and rails production” gave new life and industry to the area. John Hughes has lived for almost twenty years in the city named “Hughesovka”, or “Yuzovka”, after a Slavicized version of his name. %e walls of his former house are still standing in a silent reminder of the Donetsk’s less known British history.“For United Kingdom in the steppes of Donetsk!” the British patriots called in the comments. “Stop oppressing the English language!” was the angry demand of the Donetsk people. %e de-mand to protect the minority language should have received more attention from the world community; according to the data from 2012, school edu-cation in the area was only given in Russian and Ukrainian in almost equal proportions, with the notable absence of English.2 %e English schools opened for the children of miners and engi-neers that accompanied John Hughes in 1870 never made it past the Bolshe-vik revolution.

No recognition from your ‘homeland’Sadly, the demands of British patriots remained unheard by the world in the subsequent mayhem. Shortly after the historical decision to re-join the UK was made, pro-Russian forces took

control of Donetsk and announced the establishment of a “Donetsk People’s Republic”. No comment on the future status of English language has been given.

SamenvattingIn de internationale media, ook in Nederland, wordt de oorlog die woedt in het oosten van Oekraïne belicht als een strijd tussen Russische separatisten, al dan niet met hulp van Rusland, en Oe-­kraïners. Er is echter meer. De auteur laat een separa-­tistische beweging zien die hereniging met Groot-­Brit-­tannië nastreeft. De groep lijkt overigens op weinig steun vanuit hun ‘thuisland’ te kunnen rekenen.

Meanwhile, the rumors of secret deals between Russian and German leaders have been published in the respected British editions, and surfaced later after the carefully picked quotes of the German chancellor were made public. %e o&cial stance of the UK remained #rm: no recognition for separatism or Crimean annexation. Does that mean that the Brits of Donetsk have no chance to be reunited with their homeland? %e Donetsk British do-minion has to stand up to oppression and #ght for their destiny. Perhaps it is time for the Donetsk people to form local self-defense units – after all, it not unlikely that since 1870 every Donetsk household has kept some British-made weaponry in the cellar.

in  Ukraine

If there was ever a time to use it, it is now.

Natalia is currently busy with her PhD on political problems of international sys-tems and global developments in Ukraine. She studied International Relations in Ukraine and the Netherlands and holds a minor in English translation. Natalia has completed an internship at the Ukrainian embassy in the Netherlands and studied German during di#erent exchange pro-grams in Germany. During her study she wrote for Debat and Vox Discipulorum. Her professional interests lies in the area of international migration and European immigration politics, environment and nuclear energy.

Seven thousand people voted,

with 61 percent expressing support

for joining Great Britain

Donetsk is the English city – God save the Queen!” Source: donbass.ua

Unheard voice in Ukraine

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Volgende keer

of  War

Het decembernummer van JASON Magazine is gewijd aan het thema:

Ontvang gratis JASON Magazine!JASON Magazine is gratis verkrijgbaar voor studenten, young professionals en andere geïnteresseerden. Om u kosteloos te abonneren, geef uw naam, (post)adres en e-mailadres door aan [email protected] of via het contactformulier op onze website (www.stichtingjason.nl/contact/).

Op de hoogte blijven van onze activiteiten?Stichting JASON kondigt zijn activiteiten aan via de acti-viteitenkalender in JASON Magazine, via zijn Facebook-pagina (JASON Institute), website (www.stichtingjason.nl/activiteiten/) en een tweeweekse nieuwsbrief. U kunt zich voor onze nieuwsbrief aanmelden via het contactfor-mulier op onze website (www.stichtingjason.nl/contact/).

VacaturesJASON Magazine is op zoek naar vrijwillige redacteurs (studenten of afgestudeerd) die graag artikelen voor het magazine willen schrijven en geïnteresseerd in internatio-nale betrekkingen zijn. Interesse of meer informatie? Mail ons op [email protected].

Adverteren?Voor bedrijven, universiteiten, instituten en andere orga-nisaties is het mogelijk om te adverteren in JASON Ma-gazine, op de website of activiteiten van stichting JASON. De doelgroep van stichting JASON en JASON Magazine zijn politicologie-, bestuurskunde- en rechtenstudenten, maar ook studenten die los van hun studie geïnteresseerd zijn in internationale betrekkingen en meer speci#ek in internationale defensievraagstukken. Neem voor meer informatie contact met ons op via het contactformulier op onze website (www.stichtingjason.nl/contact/).

DonerenJASON wordt mogelijk gemaakt door hardwerkende vrijwilligers die het hun missie zien om de maatschappij te informeren over internationale vredes- en veiligheids-vraagstukken. De activiteiten van JASON kosten geld en daarom willen wij u vragen om bij te dragen aan onze mis-sie. JASON heeft de ANBI-status, waardoor u uw giften aan de stichting mogelijk mag aftrekken van uw belastin-gen. Het rekeningnummer van de stichting is 667315802. Voor meer informatie kunt u contact met ons opnemen via het contactformulier op onze website (www.stichtingjason.nl/contact/).

Stichting JASON online

Volg stichting JASON online: Facebook: JASON Institute

Twitter: @stichtingjason

Website: www.stichtingjason.nl

Mededelingen   Activiteiten&Aankomende JASON activiteiten

14 novemberBezoek aan Europol over het thema cybersecurity

Eind novemberBezoek aan de Iraanse Ambassade met als thema: rol van Iran in het Midden-Oosten

Februari 2015 Jaarlijkse Brusselreis

Mei 2015Symposium: instabiliteit in het Midden-Oosten

Iedereen die geïnteresseerd is, is welkom om deel te ne-men aan een van de bovenstaande activiteiten. Aanmelden o.v.v. naam en activiteit via [email protected].

 De  bankencrisis  en  internationale  relaties    De  wapenindustrie

JASON Magazine onlineHet huidige en voorgaande nummers van JASON Maga-zine zijn online terug te vinden op www.stichtingjason.nl/magazine. Het huidige nummer is online in kleur verkrijgbaar.

Nieuwe JASON magazine lay-outWas het je opgevallen dat het magazine een nieuwe lay-out heeft? JASON streeft constant naar verbetering. Dat is de reden dat de vormgeving van het magazine is aange-past. Wij zijn erg benieuwd naar wat onze lezer vindt van deze verandering. Daarom stellen wij het zeer op prijs als u ons via [email protected] kort laat weten wat u van het magazine vindt. Heeft u liever het oude ver-trouwde magazine, vindt u het lettertype prettiger lezen, of ziet u liever nog meer veranderingen? Wij staan open voor suggesties, op- en aanmerkingen. Onze dank is groot.

Het Europol Bron: Europol.com

Wat is stichting JASON?Stichting JASON is in 1975 opgericht door een aantal jongeren met als doel om te informeren over internationale vredes- en veiligheidsvraagstukken. De afkorting JASON staat voor Jong Atlantisch Samenwerkings Orgaan Nederland.

In de beginjaren van JASON lag het accent vooral op vredes- en veilig-heidsvraagstukken binnen de transat-lantische betrekkingen. Gaandeweg

verbreedde JASON haar aandachtsveld, mede in aansluiting op internationale gebeurtenissen, haar aandachtsveld tot het gehele spectrum van internationale betrekkingen en veiligheidskwesties. JASON is daarbij niet gebonden aan enige politieke partij en heeft geen levensbeschouwelijke grondslag.JASON informeert op twee manieren. In de eerste plaats door de uitgifte van dit magazine, dat drie à vier keer per jaar verschijnt. In elk nummer wordt getracht een gevarieerd overzicht te

geven van relevante en actuele onder-werpen binnen het brede spectrum van internationale vredes- en veiligheids-vraagstukken.

Ten tweede informeert JASON door het organiseren van tal van activiteiten, zoals conferenties, debatten, lezingen en excursies. Stichting JASON heeft geen leden, het magazine is gratis verkrijg-baar voor iedereen en alle geïnteresseer-den zijn van harte welkom om aan onze activiteiten deel te nemen.

John Kerry ondertekent het wapenhandelsverdrag bij de Verenigde Naties in New York op 25 september 2013 .Bron: US Department of State

Bron:  Contando  EstrelasEen nep kerkhof, opgezet door een Control Arms campagnevoerder naast het gebouw van de verenigde naties. Bron: Control Arms

 Migratie  gedreven  door  drugsoorlogen  Positieve  effecten  van  innovatie  ten  tijde          

         van  oorlog

Een wapencache, ontdekt in 2008 in Shandand, Afghanistan Bron: ISAF

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Stichting JASON organiseert allerlei activiteiten zoals bezoeken aan (in-ter)nationale instellingen, lezingen, symposia en netwerkborrels. Op de website stichtingjason.nl is de agenda te bekijken. Op Facebook (JASON Insti-tute) zijn aankondigingen en foto's van

activiteiten te bekijken. Bovenstaande foto's zijn een impressie van het bezoek aan de luchtmachtbasis in Volkel en het symposium 'Lessons learned from con!icts' in samenwerking met Hague Institute for Global Justice en Youth Peace Initiative.

Foto's  activiteiten

In beeld

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Eindnoten

Het  einde  van  Siberië?1 TV Rain, 2014, viewed on May 22, 2014, http://tvrain.ru/articles/aleksandr_lukashenko_ksenii_sob-­chak_obrabotajte_vnachale_svoi_zemli_a_potom_idite_na_chuzhie_polnaja_versija-­368768/2 Luhn, A. 2014. Russia toughens up punishment for separatist ideas – despite Ukraine. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/24/russia-­toughens-­punishment-­separatist-­ideas [ac-­cessed 8-­7-­2014]. 3 Kotkin, S. (1995) Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization.4 Trenin, D. (2002) The End of Eurasia, p. 131.5 Ibid: p. 2096 Haas, M. de, Russian-­Chinese Security Relations Moscow’s Threat from the East? p. 27. Available at:

7 Dmitri Trenin, The End of Eurasia, p. 2048 Chan, J. (2008) Russia and China settle longstanding territorial disputes. Available at: http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2008/08/ruch-­a14.html [accessed 8-­7-­2014].9 Repnikova, M. & Balze, H.D. (2009). Chinese Migration to Russia: Missed Opportunities, p. 14 10 Judah, B. 2013. Why Russia is not losing Siberia. Available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-­russia/ben-­judah/why-­russia-­is-­not-­losing-­siberia [accessed 8-­7-­2014].11 Trenin, D. (2002). The End of Eurasia, p. 20312 Goble, P. 2008. Window on Eurasia: Separatism Remains Strong in Tuva. Available at: http://window-­oneurasia.blogspot.ru/2008/06/window-­on-­eurasia-­separatism-­remains.html 13 Ilyin, I. (1998). Put k ochevidnosti, Exmo-­Press, Moscow, p. 21914 Judah, B. http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-­russia/ben-­judah/russia-­china-­relations-­fantasies-­and-­reality15 Trenin, D. (2002). The End of Eurasia, p. 218

The  Battle  over  Nagorno-­‐Karabakh1

2 -­zia Wars Reconsidered’. pp. 99-­1003 Krüger, H. p.12-­34 Souleimanov, E. pp.68, 1005 Carley, P. (1998) ‘Nagorno-­Karabakh: Searching for a Solution,’ United States Institute of Peace. Available at: http://www.usip.org/publications/nagorno-­karabakh-­searching-­solution-­0#alternative. [accessed 01-­07-­2014]6 Souleimanov, E. p.1067 Ibid. pp.108-­98 Ibid. pp.110-­19 Ibid. pp.53,11110 Krüger, H. pp.93-­4,109-­11,11711 Zie: Asenbauer, H. E. (1993) ‘Zum Selbstbestimmungsrecht das Armenischen Volkes von Berg-­Kara-­bakh’; Luchterhandt, Otto. (1993) ‘Das Recht Berg-­Karabachs auf Staatliche Unabhängigkeit aus Völkerrechtlicher Sicht’, Archiv des Völkerrechts, vol. 3112 Krüger, H. p.11513

com/u/uti-­possidetis. [accessed 01-­07-­2014]14 Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, adopted at the Seventh (Special) Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Ninth Convocation, on October 7, 1977. Available at: http://www.constitution.org/cons/ussr77.txt [accessed at 01-­07-­2014].15 Krüger, H. pp.40,53,11616 Ibid. p.19; Souleimanov, E. pp.55,6817 Souleimanov, E. pp.105-­6,170,181,184-­518 Ibid. pp.55,68-­9,70-­1,165,17419 Ibid. pp.54-­5,58,139-­4020 Ibid. pp.81,9921 Ibid. pp.84-­5,106-­822 Resolution 822 (1993) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3205th meeting, on 30 April 1993. Available at: http://www.refworld.org/cgi-­bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3b00f15764. [Accessed on: 01-­07-­2014]23 Carley, P.24 Ibid.25 Ibid.26 Blank, Stephen. Qtd in: Souleimanov, E. p.xi

South  Sudan:  one  step  forward,  two  steps  back1 BBC. 2014. ‘South Sudan “most fragile state” in world’. BBC. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-­afri-­ca-­28039164 Accessed: 05/07/20142 Lupai, J. 2013. ‘OIL: Is it a Curse or a Blessing in South Sudan?’. Sudan Tribune. http://www.sudantrib-­une.com/spip.php?article46597 Accessed: 05/07/2014 3 Seymour, L . 2003. ‘Review of Douglas Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars’. African Stud-­

4 Global Security. 2011. ‘Second Sudan Civil War 1983-­2004’. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan-­civil-­war2.htm Accessed: 05/07/20145 Smith, D. 2014. ‘South Sudan: the death of a dream’. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/20/south-­sudan-­death-­of-­a-­dream Acessed: 04/07/20146

04/07/20147 Adwok Nyaba, P. 2014. ‘It wasn’t a coup – Salva Kiir shot himself in the foot’ South Sudan Nation. http://www.southsudannation.com/it-­wasnt-­a-­coup-­salva-­kiir-­shot-­himself-­in-­the-­foot/n Accessed: 05/07/2014 8 Young Pelton, R. 2014.‘Saving South Sudan’. VICE. http://www.vice.com/en_uk/the-­vice-­report/saving-­south-­sudan-­part-­1 Accessed: 05/07/2014

Libië:  de  afwezige  staat  1 De feiten over de geschiedenis van Libië tot en met 1969 zijn afkomstig uit: Lïbiyä, in Bearman, P., Bianquis, Th., Bosworth, C.E., Donzel, E. van en Heinrichs, W.B. (red.), Encyclo-­paedia of Islam, Second Edition, 2014; Collins, C., Imperalism and revolution in Libya, in MERIP Reports nr. 27 (1974), blz. 3-­22; Despois, J., Barka, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2014; Lapidus, I.M., A history of Islamic societies, 2002, blz. 603, 612-­6; Oman, G., Taräbulus al-­Gharb, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 20142 Triaud, J.-­L., Sanüsiyya, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 20143 Groot, A.H. de, al-­Sanüsï, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 20144 Boca, A. del, 2011, hfdst. 3-­115

6 Pargeter, A., , 2012, hfdst. 3 en 47 Ibid., hfdst. 6; Duinmaijer, C., , op Din wa Dawla, 5 september 2012: http://dinwdawla.wordpress.com/2012/09/05/9-­the-­ex-­mujahidin-­in-­libya-­the-­end-­of-­a-­struggle/8 Obeidi, A., Political culture in Libya, 2001, hfdst. 59 Hilsum, L., Sandstorm, 2013, blz. 266-­70; Pargeter, A., , 2012, hfdst. 810 , op website COMTEX, 8 maart 2012; Creation of Cyrenaica Council sparks furious federalism row, in Libya Herald, 27 maart 2012: www.libyaherald.

Libyans debate federalism, op website COMTEX, 6 november 201211 Duinmaijer, C., , op Din wa Dawla, 23 juli 2012: http://dinwdawla.wordpress.com/2012/07/23/8-­will-­the-­elections-­in-­libya-­bring-­national-­unity-­or-­division/12 Mohamed, E. en al-­Majbari, F., , on website COMTEX, 30 oktober 2013; Stephen, C., Libyans fear standoff between Muslim Brotherhood and opposition forces, in The Guard-­ian, 21 augustus 2013 13 , op website BBC, 29 oktober 2013; Welkom in Cyrenaica; Oosten van Libië wil meer autonomie, op website Knack, 4 december

Cyrenaica autonomie move starts with security, op website COMTEX, 9 oktober 201314 East Libyan drama, op website Energy Intelligence Group, 10 januari 2014; Libyan separatists set up Cyrenaica oil company, op website ANSA, 11 november 2013; , op website Cyprus Mail, 2 april 201415 , op website al-­Jazeera English, 9 mei 2014; Waleed, F., , in Libya Herald, 7 mei 2014: www.libyaherald.com/2014/05/07/jadhran-­rejects-­maetigs-­election-­as-­pm16 op website BBC, 21 mei 2014; , op website al-­Jazeera English, 2 juni 2014: www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/05/libya-­armed-­groups-­explained-­201452293619773132.html; Ibrahim, N. en Ahmed, M., , in Libya Herald, 2 juni 2013; Lamloum, I., Crisis eases as court rules Libya PM election invalid, op web-­site AFP, 9 juni 201417 Libya declares oil crisis over, op website al-­Jazeera English, 3 juli 2014: www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/libya-­declares-­oil-­crisis-­over-­20147301210144660.html; body starts work, op website Reuters, 21 april 2014; constitution vision – paper, op website BBC, 11 mei 2014

Pag.  4

Pag.  8

Pag.  12

Pag.  17

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Is  Taiwan  struggling  for  independence?1 (translation 2013). Available at: http://www.ecfa.org.tw/EcfaAttachment/ECFADoc/ECFA.pdf [Accessed 7 July 2014].2 Cole, J.M. (2014). The Diplomat. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/taiwanese-­occupy-­legislature-­over-­china-­pact/ [Accessed 05 Sep-­tember 2014].3 Chung, L. (2014). More than 150 injured as police evict student protesters from Taiwan parliament. South China Morning Post. Available at: http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1455773/taipei-­

4 J. R. (2014). . The Economist. Available at: http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/07/china-­taiwan-­relations-­0[Accessed 8 July 2014].5 Chung, L. (2014). Plan could see mainland China visitors to use Taiwan as transit point. South China Morning Post. Available at: http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1540432/call-­me-­maybe-­visit-­

6 Hhung, J. (2014). Echoes of the Wild Lily Movement. The China Post. Available at: http://www.china-­post.com.tw/commentary/the-­china-­post/joe-­hung/2014/03/24/403513/Echoes-­of.htm [Accessed 8 July 2014].7 See 2.8 Wang, C. (2014). . Taipei Times. Available at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/03/25/2003586494/1 [Ac-­cessed 05 September 2014].9 Sui, C. (2014). What unprecedented protest means for Taiwan. BBC News. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-­asia-­26743794 [Accessed 05 September 2014].10 see 6.11 DPP Resolution on Taiwan’s Future. Available at: http://www.taiwandc.org/nws-­9920.htm [Accessed 8 July 2014].12 Wang, F. (2007). DPP passes ‘normal country’ resolution. Available at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/10/01/2003381145/1 [Accessed 8 July 2014].13 Taiwan Security Research (2014). . Available at: http://www.taiwanse-­curity.org/app/news.php?Sn=5901 [Accessed 5 September 2014]. 14 see 8.

clash  of  religions1 K.D. Boettcher (2001). The Impact and Importance of the Elizabethan Re-­Conquest of Ireland. South-­ern Illinois University Carbondale. Honors Theses. Paper 137.2 Moody T.W., Martin F.X. and Bryne F.J. (1976). A New History of Ireland. Vol. 3, Early Modern Ire-­land:1534-­1691. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. Page 122-­123.3 Darby, J. (1995) . New York: Macmillan Press. Part one, chapter two.4+5 Dorney, J. (2014). The Eleven Years War 1641-­52 – A Brief Overview. Available at: http://www.their-­ishstory.com/2014/01/10/the-­eleven-­years-­war-­a-­brief-­overview/ 6 McConnel, J. (2011). . BBC. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/victorians/home_rule_movement_01.shtml.7 Durney, J. (2004). The Volunteer: Uniforms, Weapons and History of the Irish Republican Army 1913–1997. Naas: Gaul House. 8 Buckley, M. (1956). Irish Easter Rising of 1916. Social Science. Vol. 31(1). Page 49-­55.9 Purdie, B. (1990). Belfast: Blackstaff Press.7+10+12 Lynn, B. (2013). Internet. Available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch1800-­1967.htm.11 Ruene, J. & Todd, J. (1996). -­cipation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Page 1-­37.13 Kelters, S. (2014). Voilence in the Troubels. BBC. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/topics/troubles_violence14+15 O’Callaghan, K. (2010). . BBC. Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YSb_XhN2L6sv

Understanding  Georgia  1.Cheterian, Vicken. 2008. War and Peace in the Caucasus: Russia’s Troubled Frontier. London: Hurst Publishers Ltd, pp. 169.2.Ibid, pp. 184.3

4.In 2006, President Saakashvili unsuccessfully attempted to make Georgia become a NATO member. Source: Jones, Stephen. 2013. Georgia: A Political History Since Independence. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, pp. 265.5

African  Refugees  in  Israël1 “People who have moved across international borders in search of protection under the 1951 Refu-­gee Convention, but whose claim for refugee status has not yet been determined.”, Martin, D. A., et al. in Law and Policy 9, 2007; Lior, I., , in , February 19, 2014: www.haaretz.com/news/national/1.5750282 “Any person who … owing to well-­founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”, 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(A)3 Sabar, G.,

, in African Diaspora 3, 2010, p. 454 Human Rights Watch, “

, February 11, 2014, p. 165 Nakesh, O. et al,

, in 16-­2 (2014), p. 26 Ibid., pp. III, 1, 7, 9, 35, 40, 67, 71, 757 Furst-­Nichols, R. and Jacobsen, K., , in 37, 2011, p. 558 Lior, I and the Associated Press, , in

, January 7, 2014: www.haaretz.com/news/national/1.5674509 Idem note 6; Lior, I., , Rights, in

, April 6, 2014: www.haaretz.com/news/national/.premium-­1.58397310 Perry, A., , in 51, 2010, pp. 160-­211 Idem note 2, art. 312 Idem note 10, pp.163, 174-­513 Idem note 10, pp. 161-­214 Idem note 4, pp. 61-­215 Idem note 616 Idem note 10, pp. 166-­817 Derfner, L., , in U. S. News & World Report 144:7, 200819 Idem note 10, p. 16520 Idem note 321 Idem note 10, p. 17122 Efraim, O., Holocaust Survivors Hand Gift Baskets to Asylum Seekers, in YnetNews.com, March 17, 2014: www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-­4499992,00.html23 Idem note 4, pp. 61-­6224 Idem note 8

1 Kush, L. “V Donetske vspomnili o svoix kornyah i prosyatsya v Velikobritaniyu” [Donetsk remembers its roots and asks to join the UK]. March, 19, 2014. http://www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/ukraine_in_rus-­sian/2014/03/140329_ru_s_yuzovka_donetsk_fb.shtml2 Ostrovskiy, P. “V Donetskoy oblasti ezhegodno rastyot kolichestvo shkol’nikov, kotorye vybirayut ukrainskiy yazuk (INFOGRAFIKA) [In the Donetsk area a number of schoolchildren choosing for Ukrain-­ian is growing every year (Infographic)]. February, 21, 2012. http://novosti.dn.ua/details/174507/

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Page 25: JASON Magazine 39-3

48 Stichting  JASON      Nr.  39   Nummer  3

SEPARATISME

JASON  gaat  digitaalHet  komende  jaar  zullen  alle  39  jaargangen  van  JASON  Magazine  worden  gedigitaliseerd  en  op  de  website  worden  geplaatst.  Zo  kunt  u  lezen  wat  JASON  schreef  over  de  Iraanse  revolutie  in  1979,  de  val  van  de  Sovjet-­‐Unie  in  1991,  11  september  in  2001  of  een  van  de  vele  andere  internationale  vredes-­‐  en  veiligheidsvraagstukken  die  sinds  1976  ter  sprake  zijn  gekomen  in  het  Magazine.

Maar  tot  onze  grote  spijt  ontbreken  een  aantal  nummers  van  JASON  Magazine  in  ons  eigen  archief.  Wij  roepen  dan  ook  onze  trouwe  lezers  op  om  ons  te  melden  als  zij  een  van  de  ontbrekende  exemplaren  in  hun  bezit  hebben,  op  [email protected].

op  zoek:

Jaargang  1  (1976),  nr.  1Jaargang  2  (1977),  nr.  1Jaargang  4  (1979),  nr.  3Jaargang  5  (1980),  nr.  1  en  2Jaargang  6  (1981),  nr.  4Jaargang  16  (1991),  nr.  1Jaargang  17  (1994),  nr.  2Jaargang  21  (1996),  alle  nummersJaargang  23  (1998),  nr.  1Jaargang  25  (2000),  nr.  1,2Jaargang  26  (2001),  nr.  3Jaargang  32  (2007),  nr.  2

is  niet  geheel  zeker  of  deze  ooit  zijn  gedrukt:

Jaargang  1  (1976),  nr.  6Jaargang  19  (1994),  nr.  6Jaargang  22  (1997),  nrs.  3,4Jaargang  23  (1998),  nrs.  3,4Jaargang  24  (1999),  nrs.  3,4Jaargang  25  (2000),  nr.  4Jaargang  27  (2002),  nrs.  3,4Jaargang  30  (2005),  nrs.  3,4Jaargang  31  (2006),  nrs.  2,3,4Jaargang  32  (2007),  nr.  4Jaargang  34  (2009),  nrs.  3,4Jaargang  35  (2010),  nrs.  3,4Jaargang  36  (2011),  nrs.  3,4Jaargang  37  (2012),  nrs.  3,4