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The India-Pakistan WarOf 1971: A Modern WarCSC 1984SUBJECT AREA History

ABSTRACTAuthor: KYLE, R.G., Major, Royal Canadian ArtilleryTitle: Indian-Pakistan War of 1971: A Modern War

Publisher: Marine Corps Command and Staff CollegeDate: 14 March 1964This paper examines the origins, conduct and results of

the war between India and Pakistan of 1971 from which thenation of Bangla Desh emerged. The study compares thedevelopment of religion, culture and economy in East andWest Pakistan which led to the frustration of Bengalinationalism within the "Islamic Nation" founded in 1947.The role of the military government from 1958 to 1971 isalso examined to show how its activities further alienatedthe people of East Pakistan and contributed to both therebellion there and the weakening of its own militarycapability.

The second part of the study examines the developmentof guerrilla war in East Pakistan between March and December1971. The Political and Military organization of theinsurgents is analysed along with the counter-insurgencyactions of the government forces. The effects of the war onIndia and the policies that nation developed to deal with itare also analyzed. The roles played by the United States,China, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations in theconflict are studied.

The study goes on the analyze the military operationsof India and Pakistan during the fourteen days ofconventional war between them. Finally, conclusions aredrawn concerning the conditions which precipitated the

conflict and the reasons for the success of the Bengali andIndian forces.

No primary sources of information were available forthis study. Therefore, the author relied heavily onarticles in military journals as well as several books onthe subject.

WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINARThe India-Pakistan War of 1971

A Modern WarMajor Rodney G. Kyle, Royal Canadian Artillery

2 April 1984Marine Corps Command and Staff College

Marine Corps Development and Education CommandQuantico, Virginia 22134

TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chapter

I. Origins of the Conflict 2II. Rebellion and Repression 18

III. The 14-Day War: 3-16 December 1971 38IV. Conclusion 55

AppendicesI. Map of West Pakistan-India Frontier 1971 57II. Map of East Pakistan 1971 58

Bibliography 59

INTRODUCTIONThis study is concerned with a guerrilla war fought bytwo peoples who had joined together enthusiastically to formthe new nation of Pakistan just twenty-five years before.



It is also concerned with the short, violent conventionalwar fought by India and Pakistan which resulted in the birthof the new nation of Bangla Desh. The conflict wasinfluenced by both the legacies of ancient India and thecontemporary interests of world politics. The study mayinterest the reader concerned with the techniques of modernguerrilla and conventional war, but the study should also

lead the reader to conclude that we cannot understand modernconflict without understanding the historical environment inwhich it occurs.

Unfortunately no primary sources of information wereavailable for this study. Information was gathered frommilitary journals and several books on the subject.

I would like to thank Lieutenant Colonel Donald F.Bittner, USMCR, staff historian of the Marine Corps Commandand Staff College for his help in finding source materialand his many helpful suggestions to improve a very roughfirst draft. A special thanks also must go to Mrs. PamLohman who had to transform this work to typescript. Anyerrors, however, are entirely the responsibility of the

author.CHAPTER I

ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICTWhen Pakistan was formed in 1947, it was a result of

Islamic nationalism of the Moslems of India. Islam had beenintroduced to the Indian sub-continent following the Afghan-Turkish conquest in the 13th century. A large part of thenative population in the area of East Bengal was peacefullycoverted from Hindu to Islam in the following two centuries.

In the 16th century the Moslem sultanate of Bengal wasabsorbed into the north Indian Mughal empire. The Moslemrulers of the empire were non-Bengali. Their culture wasbased on Arabic and Persian influences, and the Urdu

language. Socially, Bengal was divided into a BengaliMoslem peasantry and a Persianized Urdu speaking rulingclass. 1/

In 1764 the English East India Company succeeded theMughals as the government of Bengal. The British ruleencouraged the rise of the Hindu commercial class in Bengalwhile the former Urdu-speaking Moslem rulers and landownerswere displaced from their positions of power. In thisclimate Bengali culture during the 19th century developed ina new direction led by the Hindu elite and influenced by theemerging middle-class of Bengali-speaking Moslems. TheBengali-speaking Moslems became increasingly conscious oftheir ethnic identity and nationalism throughout the 19thcentury. For their part, the British were graduallyloosening restrictions on local institutions and government:Hindu dominated schools and the secular university ofCalcutta played their part in developing Bengali identityamong the Bengali-speaking Moslems. To counter thecontinuing loss of position and status, in 1906 the Urdu-speaking Moslems established the first modern politicalmovement among the Moslems of India called the All-IndiaMoslem League. 2/

The concept of a separate state of Pakistan did notdevelop until the 1930's when India grew closer to self-government. By 1937 there were two political parties in

Bengal which formed a coalition provincial government. Thefirst was a radical peasants and tenants party backed byBengali-speaking Moslems, while the other was the moreconservative Moslem League representing the Urdu-speaking



Moslems. This government proposed the "Pakistan Resolution"calling for the regions of Northwest and Eastern zones ofIndia where there was a Moslem majority to be grouped intoindependent states that would be autonomous and sovereign.A federation of 12 to 14 states with strong localgovernments was envisioned.

Bengal became a war zone during World War II. As well,

in 1943 a famine took more than two million lives. Thedestruction and sacrifices of these catastrophes increasedthe nationalism and solidarity of the Moslem population inEastern India. Support for the "Pakistan Resolution" andthe Moslem League swelled. On August 14, 1947, the nationof Pakistan was created from the regions of India having aMoslem majority. Two states, Bengal in the East and Punjabin the West, were divided into Hindu and Moslem regions.Only the Moslem sections were included into Pakistan.Pakistan itself had two wings separated by 1,000 miles ofIndian land.

The partition of Bengal led to the restoration of powerto the traditional Urdu-speaking Moslems who had led the

Moslem League. However, this elite could only be sustainedby the active support of the Urdu-speakers who controlledWest Pakistan. While the Moslem League had sustained Moslemnationalism in Bengal during the previous decade, it couldnot provide a focus and support for the nationalism whichcontinued to be a potent force among Bengali Moslems. 3/

In East Pakistan, the Bengali-speaking Moslem middle-class was an important social force. This class comprisedsmall land owners, professionals and traders. They had adeep loyalty to Bengali culture, and respect forparliamentary tradition and the rule of law. In WestPakistan, land holdings were larger and concentrated in thehands of fewer people. Power was essentially vested in a

plutocratic and feudal system. West Pakistan had apopulation of 42.9 million in an area six times larger thanEast Pakistan: East Pakistan had a population of 50.8million (1961 census). The two parts of Pakistan wereseparated by about 1,000 miles and, because of hostilitieswith India, it was impossible to maintain land or aircommunications across the intervening Indian territory. Airand sea communications routes were 3,000 miles around thesouthern tip of India. The two wings of Pakistan hada religious belief in Islam in common, but the significantgeographic and social differences increasingly divided thetwo wings. 4/

When Pakistan was formed in 1947, it was to be anIslamic nation. However, the political institutions of thenew nation and the way they would function were leftundefined. The East and West wings could not agree on aconstitution defining the political institutions before thedeadline date for independence. The constitution was leftto be sorted out by the new nation itself, but the differentpolitical traditions and aspirations of the East and Westwings were to be the source of serious, continuing friction.

The British had ruled India (including the territoriesmaking up Pakistan) with a strong central government underthe Viceroy. However, the province of Bengal had developeda provincial democratic parliamentary system much more

advanced than that of the northwestern provinces. For aviable constitution these two traditions had to bereconciled within the concept of the Islamic nation. Aswell, the British since 1905, had designed the provincial



representative institutions on the basis of separateelectorates for members of the main religious groups --Moslem and Hindu. West Pakistan had the majority of Moslems(42.9 million) in the new nation since about one fifth ofthe population (10 million of 50.8 million) of East Pakistanwas Hindu. If Pakistan was to continue the tradition ofseparate electorates, then West Pakistan would dominate.

But if a single electorate was constituted, then EastPakistan would dominate while owing its control to its Hinduminority. Thus, from the beginning, the Islamic nationconcept involved friction between the nationalism and powerof different cultural and social communities within thestate. 5/

For the next seven years, the National Assembly inKarachi wrestled with the drafting of a constitution.However, by 1952 Bengali nationalism was reasserting itselfin a number of political parties, the most important beingthe Awami League led by Sheikh Mujib-ur Rahman.

In provincial elections in 1954 the conservative MoslemLeague was swept from power in East Pakistan by a coalition

of Bengali nationalist parties. When the new governmentleader, Fazlul Haq, of East Pakistan made a speechsupporting the reunification of the old province of Bengal,the national government in Karachi dismissed the provincialcabinet and imposed Governor's rule. Any large increase ofnon-Moslem population in East Pakistan (such as that of WestBengal) would have further unbalanced the power between Eastand West Pakistan as well as brought a real threat of warwith India. With the endless constitutional debate andsteady deterioration of the cohesion of Pakistan, thePresident of Pakistan dismissed the National Assembly.Under threat of imposition of military rule a cabinet withmembers drawn from various sections of political opinion was

appointed and tasked to frame a constitution.By 1956 a constitution had been drafted which included

the concept of parity and equal status between the twocommunities of East and West Pakistan. This concept had thesupport of most leaders in East Pakistan. While thearrangement did not go as far as the original resolution of1937 which called for "autonomous and sovereign" states, itdid maintain a political balance between East and West.However, West Pakistan comprised fourteen states of the oldIndia of which the Punjab was the largest it would dominatethe affairs of West Pakistan: the politicians in the Westcould not agree to accept this arrangement. Although theconstitution was proclaimed law, elections were never held.In 1958 the President, Islamabad Mirza, abrogated theconstitution, and he was soon deposed by the Army Chief ofStaff, General Ayub Khan, who proclaimed martial law. Thearmy had moved to fill the power vacuum created by the lackof workable political institutions. 6/

The military government of General Ayub concentratedpower toward a central executive government. A newconstitution was proclaimed in 1962 replacing sovereignty ofthe people with the sovereignty of Allah. Effectiveelectoral power was given to an equal number of nobilitiesfrom both wings of the nation, but the national andprovincial legislatures were given only minor powers. Most

powers were concentrated in the presidential executivelocated in Karachi. General Ayub had created an autocraticgovernment in the tradition of the Urdu-speaking Moslems.The Bengali movement for autonomy of East Pakistan was left



virtually without influence or power.In the period 1960-1970, the Bengali's felt dominated

economically as well as politically by West Pakistan. EastBengal lacked natural resources, was remote from main traderoutes, and was limited by a large expanding populationwhich was difficult to feed. The main exports were jute andtea. Traditionally, these crops were exported to West

Bengal in exchange of manufactured goods. After partitionin 1947, the economic dependence on West Bengal was shiftedto West Pakistan. Here the central managers controlled theforeign exchange earned by the exports as well as foreignaid and foreign investment. In West Pakistan, the percapita income was 61% higher than in East Pakistan. TheBengalis resented the faster growth and higher incomes ofthe West. They tended to blame the much higher proportionof West Pakistanis in the civil and armed services and manyof the professions for diverting wealth to the West whichwas generated in the East.

As resentment was growing, India and Pakistan went towar over Kashmir in 1965. This conflict ended in stalemate

but it demonstrated the vulnerability of East Pakistan. Thecomplete cessation of economic activity with India hurt EastPakistan and reinforced the Bengalis sense of economicdomination from West Pakistan. 7/

The resentment toward West Pakistan fed growing supportfor the Awami League. By 1967 the League had adopted a six-point manifesto aimed at economic and political autonomy forEast Pakistan. According to the manifesto the centralgovernment should only retain control of foreign affairs anddefense while the provincial government should controleconomic, taxation, trade and foreign aid policies.

The economic expansion in West Pakistan was alsoproducing social strains there. Radical socialists competed

with the traditional land-owning elites on which thegovernment and army were based. By 1968, strong support forAli Bhutto's radical Peoples Party emerged in the West wing.The party's support was based on social justice for the"common man" and hostility toward India. It was alsoopposed to any action which would reduce the political andeconomic status of West Pakistan.

In the rising tide of opposition to his policies,General Ayub called a conference of political leaders toresolve the most pressing conflicts. However, no settlementwas reached. General Ayub resigned on 26 March 1969 to bereplaced by General Yahya Khan, Commander-in-Chief of thearmy. The constitution was again suspended. Pakistan hadreverted back to the position it was at in 1958.

General Yahya quickly promulgated a set of decisionsaimed at reducing political tensions in both wings of thecountry. The first addressed the major grievance of EastPakistan: national elections would be held by December 1970based on a common electorate in both wings to give EastPakistan a majority of seats. The second regrouped the 14political regions of West Pakistan into four provinces moreequal in political power to the Punjab. Later General Yahyaexpanded on these decisions with an outline for the transferof power from military government to constitutionalinstitutions.

a. A new constitution had to be prepared bythe national assembly within 120 days after beingcalled into session.

b. The constitution had to conform to certain



principles which included: a provision that theterritorial integrity and national solidarity ofPakistan should be respected; and a federationshould be established in which provinces wouldhave maximum autonomy but, the federal governmentwould have adequate powers to carry out itsresponsibilities for external and internal affairs

and to preserve the independence and territorialintegrity of the country.c. To ensure that the constitution conformed

to the principles, it had to be approved by thePresident.With these decisions, General Yahya probably intended

to achieve some popular support for the military regimeafter the long period of confusion of General Ayub's rule.The guidelines for the constitution also gave protection tothe central power of armed forces. With the cooperation ofthe Bengali members, the army could thwart Mr. Bhutto'sradical Peoples Party in West Pakistan. 8/

These guidelines were generally acceptable to the

civilian political leaders in both the East and West. Asthe election approached, the two most active parties wereSheikh Mijib's Awami League and Ali Bhutto's People's Party.The results of the election, however, sent shock wavesthrough the nation. Of the 313 total seats in the assembly,the Awami League took 167, a solid majority, all from theEast. Mr. Bhutto's party took 85 seats, all in the west. 9/The Islamic parties of the old elite were decisivelydefeated in both wings, and with this defeat went any hopesthe old elite and the army had of influencing the actions ofthe assembly. With a parliamentary majority the AwamiLeague did not need the army or the old traditional partiesto win support for a draft constitution reflecting the

Bengali concept of autonomy within Pakistani federation.Admittedly, President Yahya would have final approval of theconstitution, but the results of the election clearlyreflected an overwhelming demand for reform. The Presidentcould draw little comfort from the opposition of Ali Bhuttoin the Assembly. The Peoples Party was equally anxious todraft a constitution which limited the traditional powers ofthe army and the Moslem elites. Again power was splitbetween the two geographic regions of the nation. 10/

The strong position of the Awami League persuaded manysupporters that there need be no retreat from the manifestoadopted four years earlier demanding virtual economicsovereignty for East Pakistan. This degree of autonomy wasunacceptable to the military government as well as AliBhutto's party. There was stalemate again.

The military government of General Yahya was highlycentralized but not particularly sensitive to the politicalcurrents of the civil population. Senior officers held keypositions in both the civil and military administrativesystems. These systems were largely parallel and oftencompetitive for power. At the top, Yahya held the officesof Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, Chief Martial LawAdministrator, President and Supreme Commander, Minister ofDefense and Minister of foreign Affairs. Yahyatheoritically had enormous scope for initiative, but the

elite of the army had considerable power which Yahya had totake into account along with the political factions of thecountry. Within the army, opinion generally belonged in oneof three positions: the center, including Yahya, hoped to



nation in 1947, there was no consensus on the form itspolitical institutions should take. The Moslem states inthe West were governed by traditional elitists whoconsidered strong federal government essential to preserveIslamic ideals. The Bengali Moslems' aspirations for moredemocratic institutions responsive to regional politicswould not be accommodated by those in the West. At the same

time, demands for social reform in the West by lower-classeswent unheeded.After more than ten years of political stalemate, the

armed forces, in particular the army, seized power to breakthe political deadlock. The officers of the army werelargely drawn from the traditional Moslem elite of the West.Their administration was highly centralized and emphasizedthe economic development as well as the social welfare ofthe West and the Urdu-speaking traditional Moslems. Thisadministration only added to the frustration of the Bengaliswho increasingly saw East Pakistan as an economic andcultural colony of the West. Indeed, the poorer classes ofpeople of the West also became increasingly disaffected as

they received little benefit from the economic and socialpolicies of the army administration. By 1971, after 12years of military rule, Pakistan was even further frompolitical unity than it was in 1958.

The years of military rule also had a deleteriouseffect on military capability. Government administrationdetracted from the professional education of the officers aswell as the combat training of the army as a whole.Political factions appeared in the army which probablydetracted from the cooperation and trust essential to aneffective military force. When open conflict erupted inMarch 1971, the armed forces were forced to disarm andremove Bengali officers and men. These actions must have

had a serious negative effect on the efficiency of theservices' war fighting capability.

In summary, the common religion of Islam could notovercome the deep divisions of geography, culture andpolitical goals. Pakistan moved toward insurrection andwar.

ENDNOTES(Chapter I)

1/ Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India,Pakistan and Bangla Desh. (New York: Praeger, 1975)p. 9.

2/ Ibid., p. 10.3/ Ibid., p. 14.4/ Ibid., p. 15.5/ Ibid., p. 16.6/ Ibid., p. 18.7/ John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, 3rd ed.,

(New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982), p.8/ Jackson, pp. 22-23.9/ Ibid., p. 24.10/ Robert LaPorte Jr. "Pakistan 1971: The Disinte-

gration of a nation," Asian Survey. 12, No. 2 (Feb 1972),p. 100.

11/ Jackson, pp. 25-27.12/ LaPorte, p. 100; Jackson, pp. 27-28.

13/ Jackson, p. 28.14/ Ibid., p. 33.CHAPTER II

REBELLION AND REPRESSION



When Pakistan's army struck on the night of March 25,1971, all Awami League leaders were arrested, killed or fledinto exile to India. Sheikh Mujib was arrested and flown toWest Pakistan to await trial on unspecified charges.President Yahya stated in a radio broadcast the next daythat the Sheikh's "action of starting his non-cooperationmovement is an act of treason." 1/ Disorder and confusion

reigned in Dacca and other parts of East Pakistan. Manycivilians were killed as the army struck violently to clearbarricades in the cities. The Dacca University was shelledand occupied; this resulted in many casualties. Police andBengali soldiers in Dacca were disarmed and detained. 2/The army became an army of West Pakistanis and was viewed byBengalis as an occupying force.

Outside Dacca the army attacked Bengali officers andmen of the armed forces. The army then moved against otherparamilitary organizations such as the police, bordersecurity forces and the militia. In some cases, the attackslasted several days but almost everywhere there were heavyBengali casualties and destruction. The Bengali military

and police units were scattered throughout the country andmany members began to withdraw toward the borders sabotagingbridges and rail links where possible. The actions werebrutal and had elements of a cultural war: the armyattacked Bengalis, while Bengalis murdered members of theUrdu-speaking minorities. By the end of April 1971, thearmy had secured the major towns in East Pakistan andorganized resistance ceased. However, the nucleus of anarmed and trained guerrilla force had escaped into India andto remote areas on the border. At the border Indian unitswelcomed the fleeing Bengalis but India played no part inthe resistance at that time. 4/ As April drew to a close,the attack by West Pakistan on the Eastern wing had

successfully stopped the immediate possibility of armedrevolt. However, the population was subdued but remainedpassively hostile. The army reacted to this hostility withincreasing brutality and destruction of civilian propertycontinued. Civilian refugees began to pour into India.

As news of the uprising and repression in East Pakistanspread in India, there was considerable public pressure onthe Indian Government to intervene. On March 29, 1971, theIndian parliament passed a resolution pledging sympathy andsupport for the people of East Bengal in their struggle forthe transfer of power to their legally-electedrepresentatives. The parliament expressed confidence that"... the historic upsurge of 75 million people of EastBengal will triumph." 5/ This resolution represented achange in Indian policy toward Pakistan. Previously, Indiahad respected the unity of Pakistan in order to protect herown unity, which had been also threatened by regionalfactions and demands for autonomy.

Indian support to the rebels in the following weeksconsisted of assisting voluntary efforts to help the EastPakistan cause and of encouraging escaped Bengalis to form aprovisional government. India, however, withheld formalrecognition of this government-in-exile. These cautiousactions were probably the result of military advice thatIndia would not be prepared for military action till after

the monsoon season ended in September. 6/In response to India's statement of support for theBengalis, Pakistan protested that India was interfering inPakistan's internal affairs. The apparent object of this



diplomatic effort was to gain international support tooppose any Indian intervention. But on April 2, 1971,Russia publicly appealed to Yahya to quickly put an end tothe repression in East Pakistan. Islamabad replied that thesituation was under control and normal routine was beingestablished. Also on that date, the United States expressedconcern for the human suffering and the need for multi-

national assistance. President Nixon was probably concernedthat the balance of power in Asia would be upset and he wasanxious not to jeopardize the effort to develop closerrelations with China. 7/ The U.S. needed a stable Asia andsupport of China to implement the planned withdrawal fromVietnam.

Although slow in coming, on April 13 China expressedsupport for President Yahya's efforts. Chou En-lai statedthat should India attack Pakistan, China would fully supportthe Pakistani people and government to safeguard "StateSovereignty" and national independence. The phrasing wasimportant as it did not state full support for the unity andintegrity of the nation as Pakistan wanted. From April

onwards, China provided economic and military assistanceappropriate to their statement of support; that is,sufficient to guarantee only that in a war with India theWestern wing would survive, but not necessarily the Easternwing. Both India and the Soviet Union had long standingdisputes with China. China's interests would be served bycontinuing to have Pakistan interposed between the U.S.S.R.and India. Should West Pakistan cease to exist, then Chinawould be surrounded by unfriendly neighbors. On the otherhand, continuing rivalry between Pakistan and India overEast Pakistan would divert India's attention away from herborder with China. Thus survival of West Pakistan wasimportant to China, while the dispute in East Pakistan would

add to the rivalry between India and West Pakistan to ensurethat India's attention would be diverted from her Northernborder with China.

At the United Nations, Secretary General U. Thant askedPakistan to allow United Nations relief agencies to act inEast Pakistan while recognizing that the situation was aninternal matter of Pakistan. President Yahya firmly refusedany outside intervention. 9/ He probably believed that hispolicy of counter-insurgency was sufficient to reestablishcontrol.

By May 1971, organized resistance in East Pakistan hadbeen crushed. Pakistan diplomacy appeared successful asmost countries viewed the affair as an internal problem.However, the flow of refugees into India had turned to aflood. India claimed that the refugees (mostly BengaliMoslems) were arriving at a rate of 60,000 per day andnow totaled 1.5 million. These people moved mostly intoWest Bengal and were costly to India in food and clothing;furthermore, they were causing a severe economic dislocationin a province already impoverished. In this situation,India could do little more than provide indirect support tothe Bengali government-in-exile and provide sanctuary,training and arms for the guerrilla forces. Diplomatically,India stressed that whether or not the problem was aninternal one for Pakistan, the refugees were becoming an

internal problem for India: Pakistan must be responsiblefor developing conditions for the safe return of therefugees. 10/

India's diplomatic efforts began to get results.



Britain and the United States declared no new aid would beextended to Pakistan until the government in Islamabadcooperated with international relief agencies; however,United States aid already approved would continue.Pakistan's economy was weak. There was a shortage offoreign exchange and exports from East Pakistan had slowedsignificantly. 11/ Pakistan needed aid and needed the

return of the economic base of East Pakistan.Thus in mid-May Pakistan informed the United Nations ofits willingness to accept relief aid if the activity wascoordinated by Pakistani officials. Within a week Yahyaappealed to the refugees to return and announced he wouldsoon reveal a plan for the orderly transfer of power to therepresentatives of the people. Refugee reception centreswere set up and a general amnesty announced on June 10,1971. The shift in Pakistani policy eased tensions in EastPakistan. Many influential members of the Awami Leaguesigned a declaration accepting the concept of national unityand supporting the reintroduction of separate electoratesfor Hindus and Moslems. To gain support of the right-wing

factions of the army, Yahya proposed that a new constitutionbe drafted by a committee of experts rather than theNational Assembly. Although India now reported more thansix million refugees, the flow slowed considerably and shewas being pressured to accept international assistance forthe repatriation of refugees. 12/

By June, India had become distrustful of UnitedNations' actions to repatriate refugees. When Pakistanshifted ground to accommodate United Nations' actions, Indiarejected the proposal for posting United Nations observerson her border. 13/ India was probably concerned that EastPakistan would return to the pre-crisis situation withlittle or no gain toward self-determination of East Bengal.

Public opinion in India's turbulent eastern provinces alsofavored severing Pakistan's link with East Bengal as anopportunity to weaken a dangerous enemy. India, therefore,insisted that Pakistan must come to a political solution ofthe crisis founded on self-determination for East Bengalbefore social and economic aid should be extended. On theother hand, the United Nations' approach was to put socialand economic recovery in place before a political solutionshould be attempted. The United States clearly supportedthe U.N. approach which would return the South Asian balanceof power to the pre-crisis condition.

During May and June, leaders of the Awami League whohad fled to India continued to develop the Bangla Deshmovement (as they now called East Pakistan) politically andmilitarily. The government-in-exile was nominally headed bySheikh Mujib, but because he was under arrest in WestPakistan, the real head was Tajuddin Ahmid, the primeminister. 14/

The stated goal of the movement was the independenceof East Pakistan; its unannounced objective was to gainpolitical power for the Awami League. 15/ To this end, thegovernment-in-exile tried to exclude Bengalis representingleft-wing and communist movements. The government-in-exileremained composed principally of Awami League members butits military arm, the Mukti Fanj, eventually incorporated

armed groups organized by other political factions. 16/The government-in-exile pursued three broad strategicprograms to achieve its goal. These were:

(a) organizing the support of the population of East



Pakistan;(b) gaining favorable international support; and,(c) disrupting the economic strength of Pakistan

through attacks on the lines of communication in EastPakistan.

To translate the disaffection of the Bengalis intosupportive action for the Bangla Desh movement, an

underground was organized to publicize its goals. Insurgentpropaganda emphasized the atrocities of the Pakistani armyand described the army as an occupation force restoring thecolonial rule of West Pakistan. This program succeeded toget support in the form of volunteers as well asinformation, supplies and concealment in the rural areas.In the urban areas, the Bengalis were encouraged to boycottschools, offices and factories to further disrupt theeconomy. The insurgents also used terror tactics tointimidate civil servants and factory managers to keep theirfacilities closed. Furthermore, Bengali leaders who openlysupported Pakistan unity or collaborated with the army wereassassinated selectively to discourage others. 17/

To influence the international community, the maineffort emphasized recognition for the Bangla Desh government-in-exile. Many Bengalis who were with Pakistani foreignmissions defected and set about publicizing the legitimacyof the Bangla Desh movement. Although not initiallysuccessful in obtaining formal recognition, these diplomatsdeveloped popular sympathy for the Bangla Desh movement.

The Mukti Fanj was used primarily in an offensive roleto attack the lines of communication and to disrupt themilitary and economic strength of East Pakistan. Themonsoon season of June to September favored guerrillatactics. Two-thirds of the country was water soakedlimiting mobility to roads, railways and river craft. The

roads and railways ran close to the border, crossing manybridges vulnerable to attack. The India-East Pakistanborder itself was 1,400 miles long with no naturalobstacles. The interior of East Pakistan could be reachedeasily by guerrillas from the border area by river and deltachannels. 18/

The Mukti Fanj mounted small, deep raids from theirsanctuaries in India and remote border enclaves.Detachments of the Pakistani army were attacked causingcasualties which were duly reported by the foreign press.These reports conflicted with Pakistani claims that the areawas under control and thus tended to undermine internationalsupport for Pakistan. However, the attack on communicationswas much more successful and had immediate effects.Railways were largely inoperable beyond 30 to 50 miles fromDacca. Roads were cut isolating the principal towns andports. The Pakistani army was left isolated in the urbanareas while the major export crops of jute and tea could notbe moved from the rural areas to markets. 19/

As July closed, the military situation in EastPakistan was worsening. The monsoon was restricting armymobility while the Mukti Fanj (renamed the Mukti Bahini)mounted an increasing number of small raids aimed atsabotage and terror. The army was forced to conductviscious counter-insurgent tactics which increased the

hostility of the disaffected population.After a lull in June, refugees in large numbers againpoured into India. President Yahya continued to press forthe United Nations to force India to withdraw her support to



the Bangla Desh rebels and to decrease border tension toinduce more refugees to return home. He also stated that ifIndia tried to seize a base in East Pakistan for rebeloperations there would be general war. This was followed byreports of Pakistani military build-up along the WestPakistan border with India. 20/

Pakistani diplomacy at the United Nations, supported by

the U.S. was having an effect. U Thant recommended raisingsubstantial relief aid for East Pakistan. The resourceswould be allocated for the refurbishment of transportationsystems as well as food and clothing. India remainedopposed to this plan as well as the U.N. proposal forrepresentatives on the border to facilitate passage ofrefugees back to East Pakistan. It is now clear that Indiawas determined to see East Pakistan independence and wouldnot agree to any measures which increased West Pakistan'sstrength there. By continuing to support the Bangla Deshmovement, India was becoming increasingly isolated at theU.N. Her policy also implied eventual direct militaryintervention since she could not support the enormous number

of refugees and ignore public support for interventionindefinitely. 21/

Up to the end of July, the Soviet Union had tried tomaintain a balanced approach to India and Pakistan in aneffort to increase her influence on the sub-continent.However, when the United States and China moved towardcloser mutual relations and both supported the Pakistaniposition, Moscow concluded Treaty of Peace, Friendship andCooperation with New Delhi on August 9. The Treaty hadlittle effect on India militarily, but it gave support forher position at the United Nations Security Council. TheSoviet Union opposed every proposal for any kind ofintervention which might allow Pakistan to get a political

settlement unacceptable to India, i.e., denial self-determination for the people of East Pakistan. 22/

During August, President Yahya continued to try to winsome support within the population of East Pakistan as wellas satisfy the "hard-liners" in West Pakistan. On August 9,Yahya announced that Awami League members who would supportPakistani unity would be allowed to take their seats in theNational Assembly, while the remainder of the unfilled seatswould be filled by by-elections to be held at end-November.About half the Awami League delegates elected in December1970 signed a document agreeing to this move. Yahya alsoannounced that Sheikh Mujib would be tried by military courton charges of "waging war against Pakistan." These twoproposals were a key compromise of the political factions ofPakistan. 23/

In September more positive aspects of Yahya's planemerged. General Tikka Khan, who was the prime proponentfor military repression, was replaced as Governor of EastPakistan by a civilian, and press censorship was officiallylifted. On September 5, a general amnesty was granted toall civilians and members of the armed forces alleged tohave committed crimes since March 1. A number of detainees,mostly politicians aligned with the Awami League werereleased. 24/ These moves were countered by the government-in-exile which remained committed to complete independence.

the Mukti Bahini intensified its propaganda aimed at theBengali population. As well, assassinations of candidatesstanding for election were increased. For her part, Indiawould not provide assistance for refugees wanting to return



to East Pakistan. These actions were largely successful indiscouraging any popular Bengali support for the authoritiesin Dacca and Islamabad. Candidates failed to stand for 18out of 78 seats of the Assembly available and no significantnumber of refugees returned from India. 25/

India also increased its support to the Mukti Bahinimilitary operations by providing artillery fire across the

border for the guerrillas and stopping the Pakistani armyfrom pursuing them into Indian territory. With their linesof withdrawal more secure the guerrillas undertook deeperraids into East Pakistan to destroy bridges, roads and armyposts. The increased military activity put further pressureon the army to repress the actions and divereted effort fromrebuilding the economy and reestablishing civil order.

On October 12, Pakistan proposed to India mutual troopwithdrawals and posting of United Nations observers in theborder areas. Although India refused, Pakistan went aheadand withdrew its army to stronger positions 10-12 milesbehind the border. 26/ This action was indicative of thesuccess of the guerrillas in their attacks against the

isolated Pakistani outposts.At the same time Pakistani diplomacy emphasized the

requirement for United Nations action to restrain India fromsupporting the rebels of East Pakistan. Pakistan continuedto argue that India was interfering in her internal affairs.New Delhi's position was that the problem was not an "India-Pakistan" problem, but strictly a Pakistani one forIslamabad to correct. Therefore, United Nations' action wasinappropriate Pakistan had only to create conditions inEast Pakistan of peace and security for the refugees toreturn home. 27/ While New Dehli's argument had alegalistic logic, it must have been clear that Pakistancould not create conditions of peace while fighting

guerrillas armed and trained in India. India obviously hadlittle desire to see East Pakistan survive as a province ofher rival in Islamabad.

While the Soviet Union consistently supported Indianpositions at the United Nations, in October Moscow pressuredNew Delhi to soften her policy on Bangla Desh independence.As a result, the Indian Foreign Minister announced thatIndia was committed only to a political solution acceptableto the already elected representative of East Pakistan.With many of these representatives in exile, their leader,Sheikh Mujib, under arrest in West Pakistan it would havebeen unreasonable that these representatives would demandanything less than political automony for East Pakistan. Inany case, President Yahya refused to negotiate with them.India returned to her previous position of demanding self-determination for Bangla Desh. New Delhi had won apropaganda victory and persuaded the Soviet Union tocontinue to support her, all without any material orpolitical cost.

While Pakistan probably could have restored ordereventually in East Pakistan, President Yahya realized he hadlittle hope of prevailing without outside help if Indiainvaded there. He, therefore, tried to persuade China toincrease her commitment to the security of all Pakistan:this the Chinese refused to do. Peking remained committed

to support Pakistan only to the extent required to ensurethe survival of West Pakistan as a nation. Despite publicpronouncements from Islamabad that China would supply allthe weapons Pakistan would need in a future conflict with



India, the Indians never appeared to be in any doubt as tothe true nature of China's commitment. When war came inDecember, several Indian divisions were withdrawn from theSino-Indian border and moved into East Pakistan. 28/

As November drew to a close, Pakistan could no longertolerate Indian military actions in the border area.Shelling and tank fire from the Indian army continued to

inflict casualties on Pakistani posts and provide supportguerrilla operations. Islamabad viewed the conflict asIndia's responsibility and this was endorsed by the UnitedStates who, on November 30, suspended licenses for armsexports to India. 29/ On December 3, 1971, Pakistan struckIndia with air and ground attacks across the border fromWest Pakistan.

The period from March to September was marked by therapid deterioration of the political situation in EastPakistan. When confronted by demands of the electedrepresentatives of the Awani League for economic andpolitical automony, the central military government inIslamabad reacted with a ruthless and brutal repression

which ultimately failed. Islamabad appears to haveseriously underestimated the strength and the organizationof the Bengali nationalist movement embodied in the AwamiLeague. Faced with the arrest of over half its leadership,the remaining Awami League leaders went into exile in Indiawith even firmer resolve to win independence. From therethey were able to quickly transform the party organizationinto a credible government-in-exile with a military arm toprosecute guerrilla warfare. The actions of the Islamabadgovernment worked to the advantage of the Bengali resistanceby providing the elements of a successful revolution.

By arresting and detaining Bengali leaders Islamabadindicated to the world at large and the Bengalis, in

particular, that no political compromise was possible. Theruthless and brutal purge of Bengalis from the armed forcessucceeded in sending a trained and dedicated cadre ofsoldiers into exile in India where they were available tothe Bangla Desh government-in-exile as a cadre for theguerrilla force. At the same time, Pakistani militaryoperations caused such destruction and intimidation ofcivilians that millions also fled to India where they wereavailable and willing to support the Bangla Desh movement.Little attempt was made by the Pakistan government toencourage these refugees to return home. It is possiblethat the Islamabad government consciously followed a policyof forcing large numbers of civilians out of East Pakistanin order to reduce the population to below that of WestPakistan. This would ensure that in future governments WestPakistan would hold a majority of seats in the NationalAssembly and could protect its privileged position in thenation. In any case, these destitute refugees provided alarge pool of manpower opposing the West Pakistanigovernment.

India saw the conflict as an opportunity to weaken hermajor rival in South Asia. Pakistan had humiliated India inthe war over Kashmir in 1965. India at that time had had todivide her forces between East and West while maintainingconsiderable forces on her northern border with China. New

Delhi was determined to not be defeated again by Pakistan.Breaking East Pakistan from the remainder of the nationwould greatly simplify her defense problem. India,therefore, adopted the policy of supporting the Bangla Desh



movement while preparing her own armed forces for war withPakistan should intervention be necessary. The independenceof East Pakistan was pursued consistently and with skillthroughout the period.

Indian public opinion largely supported New Delhi'spolicy. The burden of millions of refugees in India's mostpopulous and impoverished region was costly and caused

social unrest. Furthermore, most Indians saw Pakistan as athreat which would lead to war eventually in any case.When India's goal appeared in danger of being thwarted

by United Nations' intervention, New Delhi quickly found thenecessary Security Council veto by concluding a treaty withthe Soviet Union. This treaty did not place any militaryobligation on either party, but only pledged cooperation.For the Soviet Union the treaty demonstrated to the worldits increasing influence in South Asia while for India thetreaty gave her what she needed most -- an ally with vetopower in the Security Council.

The Awami League which formed the leadership of theBangla Desh movement was thus provided all the essential

elements to prosecute its guerrilla war for the independenceof East Pakistan. The league had safe havens in India fromwhich to organize politically and militarily. The arrestand detention of the popular leader, Sheikh Mujib, providedtangible and symbolic evidence of the persecution of theBengalis by the West Pakistani. The widespread destructionof personal property and the economic deterioration in EastPakistan gave the Bangla Desh movement an enormous pool ofmanpower willing to resist the Pakistani authorities. TheBengali soldiers who had escaped formed a trained anddedicated nucleus for a guerrilla force. Finally, thesupport of India in form of arms and training allowed theguerrillas to move to the offensive quickly and effectively.

By December, it became apparent to Islamabad that itwas not regaining control of East Pakistan. The guerrillaswere striking deeply into East Pakistan in greater strength.India was deploying raids across her border with EastPakistan to support the guerrillas. Pakistan, therefore,mounted an attack on December 3 aimed at destroying as muchIndian combat power as possible before she herself wasattacked by India.

ENDNOTES(Chapter II)

1/ "Presidents Broadcast," Pakistan Affairs, SpecialIssue, (Washington), No. 18, March 31, 1971.

2/ Robert Laporte Jr. "Pakistan 1971: The Disin-tegration of a Nation," Asian Survey, 12, No. 2 (February1972), p. 102.

3/ Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India, Pakis-tan and Bangla Desh, (New York, Praeger, 1975), pp. 34-35.

4/ Ibid., p. 35.5/ Bangla Desh Documents, (New Dehli: Government of

India, 1971), p. 672.6/ Jackson, p. 38.7/ Ibid., p. 42.8/ Ibid., p. 173.9/ Ibid., p. 43.10/ David H. Bayley, "India: War and Political Asset-

tion," Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 2., February 1972, p. 91.11/ Jackson, p. 48.12/ Ibid., pp. 52-54.13/ Ibid., p. 61.



14/ M. Rashiduzzaman, "Leadership, Organization, Stra-tegies and Tactics of the Bangla Desh Movement," AsianSurvey, Vol. 12, No. 3, March 1972, p. 187.

15/ Ibid, p. 193.16/ Jackson, p. 57.17/ Rashiduzzaman, p. 195.18/ Jackson, p. 59.

19/ Rashiduzzaman, p. 196. See also Chopra, p. 59and Jackson, pp. 60-61.20/ Jackson, p. 68.21/ Ibid., p. 69.22/ Ibid., p. 73.23/ Ibid., p. 80.24/ Ibid., p. 81.25/ Rashiduzzaman, p. 198.26/ Jackson, p. 92.27/ Ibid., p. 8226/ Ibid., p. 96.29/ Stroessinger, Why Nations Go to War, 3d ed., St.

Martin's Press. New York, 1982, p. 134.

CHAPTER IIITHE 14-DAY WAR: 3-16 DECEMBER 1971

When general war opened on December 3, India andPakistan had unequal military capacities. India haddeveloped an arms industry with aid from the Soviet Unionand the West which was capable of producing major weaponssuch as tanks and aircraft. India also had received andcontinued to have access to military equipment from Moscow.On the other hand, Pakistan's industry was much lessdeveloped. She had been unable to get arms when cut-off bythe West and Russia in the summer of 1971. China hadprovided military supplies, but these could not redress theimbalance. 1/

The relative strengths of the armed forces of the twocountries are shown in Table 1. It must be noted that Indiamaintained considerable army forces guarding the Himalayanborder with China which reduced the forces available forcombat with Pakistan. 2/

Early in the counter-insurgency phase of the conflict,Pakistan had purged Bangali units from the armed forces.Many Bengalis who belonged to predominantly West Pakistanunits had defected: those who remained were not trusted andthe combat effectiveness of Pakistani units suffered as aresult. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was particularlyaffected because many of the ground crew had been Bengali.Click here to view image

The officer corps of all three Pakistani services hadbeen politicized, especially at the general officer level,by years of military government. The need for politicalbalance in the government often overrode the requirementsfor ability in many senior military appointments. Thisresulted in poor leadership and incompetence as well as lackof cohesion and trust. By 1971, the chiefs-of-staff systemhad been modified so as to be almost unrecognizable. YahyaKhan retained control of army operations in addition to hisduties as President and supreme Commander of all theservices. The structure was overly centralized anddominated by the army. Not surprisingly, communications and

cooperation were poor between General Headquarters co-located with the army at Rawalpindi, and the PAF and navylocated at Peshawar and Karachi respectively. 3/

The Indian system emphasized the distinction between



government and the armed services. Each service had equalstatus and was controlled by a civilian minister of thecabinet responsible to parliament. The service chiefs weremembers of a chief-of-staff committee. A joint planningstaff provided coordination. This system was well-suited torespond to civilian management. 4/

Pakistan's strategy tried to involve the United

Nations to prevent India from intervening militarily. Butwhen it became apparent that this strategy could not preventwar, Pakistan attacked from the West. Yahya probablyconsidered East Pakistan indefensible in the long run, buthe hoped to gain sufficient Indian territory in the Westwhich could be traded for East Pakistan territory in thenegotiations following the cease-fire. The land battle inthe West was thus crucial for Pakistan.

Indian strategy was to act quickly in the East todecisively defeat Pakistani forces there while defendingIndian territory in the West. This strategy reduced thedanger of China intervening as it clearly did not threatenthe existence of West Pakistan. 5/ A quick decision in the

East would ensure an independent nation in East Bengalbefore international action could be mobilized to separatethe Indian and Pakistani armies there and preclude thedecision India sought.

When the PAF struck at 1747 on December 3, Pakistanattempted to disable the superior Indian Air Force (IAF) bya preemptive strike. Airfields at Amritsar, Srinagar,Avantipur, Pathankot and Faridkot were attacked; however,the strike failed to achieve any significant success. TheIAF had dispersed their aircraft to hardened shelters on alarge number of airfields where only a direct hit coulddamage them. The late afternoon forced the attack to bebrief as it could not be sustained in darkness. Not only

were too few airfields struck for too short a time, but only30 percent of the available aircraft were used. Theaircraft may have had a low serviceability or the PAF mayhave attempted to save aircraft since they could not beeasily replaced. In any case, from this raid onwards, theIAF dominated the air-war. 6/ On December 4, the IAF flewover 500 sorties on tactical and strategic targets inPakistan. In 14 days of war, the Western Air Command of IAFalone flew over 4,000 sorties. 7/ The IAF claimed 94aircraft, while the PAF claimed 81. This air campaigndemonstrated again the value of mass and boldness: the IAFinfluenced the war significantly with relatively smalllosses while the PAF flew far fewer sorties with greaterlosses and less effect. 8/

The border between West Pakistan and India followed nonatural topographical feature, but it had been inherited onthe basis of the old pre-1947 borders. There Pakistandeployed ten infantry divisions, two armoured divisions,various brigades and almost all its combat aircraft. Thegeneral deployments are shown in Appendix I. The order ofbattle of the Indians has not been disclosed, but it wasprobably comparable. 9/

On December 3, the Pakistani 26 Infantry Brigadeattacked east from Kahuta toward Punch in northern Kashmir.They had made virtually no progress against Indian ground

defenses and heavy air attacks when the offensive wasterminated two days later. On December 9, a second attacktoward Punch was again thwarted by IAF bombing. The Indiansthen made a series of small attacks which secured several



Pakistani posts north and west of Punch. Further north inthe area of Kargil, the Indians secured all the Pakistanioutposts which overlooked the Zoji La Pass. These actionswere conducted at night at elevations above 16,000 feet atsub-zero temperatures. 10/

To the south, the area of Chhamb was an importantcommunication link to all parts of Kashmir. The II (Pak)

corps attacked on December 3 with four infantry and onearmored brigade with eight artillery regiments in support.After four days, they had succeeded in driving two Indianinfantry battalions out of their prepared defense topositions across on the east bank of the Munnawar TawiRiver. Two days later the Pakistanis took the town ofChhamb and established a bridgehead on the east side of theriver. On December 10 the Indians counter-attacked, sendingthe Pakistanis back across the river. In the next two days,units of II (Pak) Corps recrossed the river two more timesonly to be forced to withdraw. By December 12, when thesector stabilized, the Indians estimated they had lost 17tanks and 440 men killed while the Pakistanis had lost 36

tanks and 1350 men killed. 11/In the Punjab, the Sialkot-Shakargarh salient juts into

India. The Indians launched an attack there to relievepressure on the Chhamb area. They attacked the salient ontwo axes: one from the north to cut the road betweenShakargarh and Zafarwal, the other from the east withShakargarh as the objective. Good Pakistani defensivepositions and extensive mining made progress slow, but bythe time of the cease-fire on December 16, the Indians hadsecured about 1000 square kilometers of the salient. 12/

South of the Shakargarh salient in the area of DeraBaba Nanak and Fazilka, the Indians expected a majorPakistani offensive. Both sides fought local engagements in

effort to gain favorable position. However, no majoroffensive was attempted. Although the 1 (Pak) ArmouredDivision was available to strike, lack of air cover probablykept it from entering the battle. 13/

Actions in the Sind-Rajasthan sector were aimed adrawing strategic reserves of both sides down from the othernorthern sectors. A Pakistani force of one infantrybrigade, supported by a reinforced armoured regiment,crossed the border near Ramgarh on December 4. Without aircover, the Pakistanis were caught in the open and lost anestimated 34 tanks and 100 other vehicles in one day beforewithdrawing. 14/ On December 5, while Pakistani armour wasbeing destroyed north in the desert, the Indians capturedGadra and moved southwest on to Nagar Parkar and the Rann ofKutch. This advance had possibilities of cutting the mainnorth-south lines of communication through Hyderabad toKarachi. Indian progress was slow, but by the time of thecease-fire 11 days later they had advanced to Naya Chorand had captured 4,700 square kilometers of Pakistaniland. 15/ Its quite probable that the Indian advance in theRann of Kutch was deliberately slow in order not tothreaten seriously West Pakistan and thus arouse Chinesemilitary intervention.

At the time of cease-fire the Pakistanis had notachieved any of their objectives. They had no large tracts

of Indian territory to use as bargaining chips for EastPakistan. India had been able to deploy similar militarystrength to a battle which, for them, was defensive. Indianair superiority allowed them flexibility while negating any



Pakistani local ground concentration.The 14-day war was the first full-scale Indian naval

war. India's fleet was much superior to that of Pakistanand was well prepared when war came on December 3. TheIndian navy was able to defend the coast while blockadingEast Pakistan and attacking shore targets in support ofground operations. 16/

Pakistan's surface fleet had neither air cover norweapons to defend against India's missile boats. Therefore,it stayed in Karachi harbour while submarines were given thetask of destroying India's aircraft carrier and cruiser.They were unsuccessful: on December 4, Dafne-classPakistani submarine was sunk by a carrier escort in the Bayof Bengal while a second submarine was sunk off Visakhapatnaharbour. The only Indian loss was the frigate Kukri sunk bya sumbarine in the Arabian Sea on December 9. 17/

India's main naval support effort was in the Bay ofBengal where a carrier task force blockaded the seaapproaches to East Pakistan. Six merchant ships and"numerous" small craft were captured. Carrier based

aircraft struck assembly points of small boats in the Gangesdelta area, preventing the escape or reinforcement ofPakistani army elements. The establishment of airsuperiority early in the war allowed the ships freedom tomaneuver to attack shore targets at Chittagong, Cox's Bazar,Chalna, Kulna and other economic and military targets. 18/These actions had a significant effect on the collapse ofEast Pakistan.

But the decisive theater of the war was East Pakistanshown on the map at Appendix 2. The area is divided bythree major river systems into four parts with Dacca, thecapital, at the center. The Jamuna River runs north tosouth cutting the country in half. West of the Jamuna the

Padma (Ganges) River flows west to east to join the Jamunawest of Dacca. South of the Padma lies the South-WesternSector with the major towns of Kushtia, Jessore, Khulna andChalna. To the north of the Padma the North-Western Sectorcontains the towns of Rangpur, Dinajpur, Bogra and Rajshahi.The Surma-Meghna River flows southwest from Sylhet joiningthe Jamuna south east of Dacca and dividing the remainder ofthe country into the Northern Sector and Eastern Sector.

India deployed six infantry divisions and varioussupporting troops on all sides of East Pakistan. Supportingthe Indian force were eight battalions of Mukti-Bahini andmany irregular Bengali soldiers. 19/ To force a quickdecision, India had to strike deep toward Dacca. Since thetrafficability of most of the region is poor, the combatforces were lightly equipped but they were well trained andwere reinforced with engineers to assist in river crossings.The Indian forces were deployed as follows: II Corpscomprising of two infantry divisions was tasked to advanceeastward through the South-Western Sector in the generaldirection of Dacca; XXXIII Corps with one infantry divisionand two brigades was tasked to attack to the Bogra area inthe Northwestern Sector and then on to Dacca; 101Communications Zone with one brigade was to strike souththrough the Northern Sector toward Dacca; and, IV Corps inthe Eastern Sector had three divisions with missions to

advance westward to Dacca. 20/Opposing the Indians, Pakistan deployed five divisionswith two armoured regiments and supporting artillery. Theforces were deployed forward in strong points based on towns



near the border with light forces screening to the border.In the Southwestern Sector the Indian II Corps advanced

on three axes. Nine (I) Division struck southeast bypassingJessore to the south then moved on the Kulna, Chalna andBarisal. A second element of 9 (I) Division passed north ofJessore on December 5 and, moving cross-country, tookJheneida two days later. A third column composed of 4 (I)

Division moved eastward on the right bank of the Padma andtook Kushtia with its important railway bridge after heavyfighting on December 11. The Pakistani forces based inJessore withdrew piecemeal without a fight when they foundthemselves cut-off by the advancing Indian columns. ByDecember 15, the resistance in this sector hadcollapsed. 21/ The Indians had demonstrated that they couldmove rapidly across the marshy ground and numerous streams.Good training and assistance of Mukti-Bahini guides allowedthem to outflank the major strong points which thencrumbled.

In the Northwestern Sector, XXXIII (I) Corps advancedsoutheast on three axes, bypassing strongly defended areas

at Hilli, Dinajpur and Rangpur. Bogra was capatured onDecember 13, cutting-off the defenders further to the north.In this sector the Indians again proved they could movequickly around static defenses to cut the routes ofwithdrawal and reinforcement. Even though the Pakistaniarmy continued to fight from their strong points they couldnot stop or eject the Indians. 22/

The Northern Sector provided the best approach toDacca for there are no major river obstacles. However, theIndians used only two brigades in this sector. This forcetook Jamalpur early, but was held up at Mymensingh untilDecember 11 before moving south to Tangail, 46 miles fromDacca. The Indians dropped a parachute battalion into

Tangail on December 11 to cut the withdrawal route ofPakistani forces to the north. On December 12, resistanceat Tangail crumbled and by December 16 Indian units were inthe outskirts of Dacca. 23/

In the Eastern Sector three Indian divisions faced twoPakistani divisions. The 8 (I) Division advanced southwestfrom Karimgan, reaching Maulvi Bazar on December 6. ThePakisani garrison at Mualvi Bazar withdrew to Sylhet wherethe elements continued to fight for some days. Meanwhile,the main force of 8 (I) Division continued to Ashuganj onthe Megna River. The 57 (I) Division struck west fromAkhaura reaching Ashuganj on December 9. The 23 (I)Division bypassed Comilla with one column moving southtoward Chittagong while the main body proceeded west toreach the Megna River. Four days later the Indians werewithin 12 kilometers of Dacca. 24/ After artillery hadfired on Dacca on December 15, the Pakistanis requested acease-fire and, on December 16, General Niazi, commander ofPakistan's forces in Dacca, signed an unconditionalsurrender. The war ended and Bangla Desh was a reality.

At the beginning of December, Islamabad had realizedthat the Indians were massing to attack into East Pakistan.Although Pakistan had approximately 40,000 troops deployedthere, the preceeding months of guerrilla war had taken itstoll. The Pakistani army's morale there had been weakened

by terrorist activity and the consistent hostility of thecivilian population. The terrain itself reduced mobilityand forced the army to deploy in strong points near thelarger towns where they would control the major road and



railway networks. These strong points were not mutuallysupporting and there were insufficient forces to fill thegaps between them. At best the Pakistani forces could delaythe likely Indian attack to gain sufficient time for aninternational intervention to pressure India to stop. If,as was entirely possible, no international interventionmaterialized, then Pakistan would need to take Indian

territory elsewhere which could then be traded for thereturn of East Pakistan during cease-fire negotiations. Todo this Yahya had to mount a swift, violent offensive intoIndia from West Pakistan. In the 14-day conventional warPakistan's strategy completely failed for a number ofreasons.

Firstly, the Pakistani forces needed air superiorityand they failed to achieve it. The PAF tried a surprise pre-emptive attack on the Indian Air Force (IAF), but throughpoor intelligence and planning failed to strike Indianairfields in sufficient numbers or depth. IAF operationswere never seriously challenged. In the following days ofthe war, the PAF could not or would not provide sufficient

sorties to gain even local air superiority to support theground forces even though aircraft were available. It isprobable that the PAF command thought it necessary to avoidloss of aircraft so they would be available to counter anIndian offensive into West Pakistan should it arise. Itappears that the Pakistani high command were not aware ofYahya's objectives of gaining Indian territory as a defensefor the integrity of Pakistan as a whole.

Secondly, the Pakistani army attacked along a verybroad front of the western Indian border. But nowhere didthey mass sufficient forces to ensure a rapid breakthrough.Generally, the points of attack were in terrain unsuited forwide maneuver and hence mobility and speed could not be

developed to gain significant amount of Indian land.Although battles were fiercely contested at battalion andbrigade level, the attacks were only loosely coordinated atthe corps and army level, and hence, lacked unity.

Thirdly, the effect of the Indian naval blockage was tocompletely isolate West from East Pakistan. Combined withIndian domination of the air, there was no possibility ofreinforcing or withdrawing army forces in East Pakistan.This could only have further reduced morale and the will ofthe soldiers there to resist. As well the Indian navy wasable to carry the war directly to Karachi while thePakistani navy could not venture out without riskingirreplaceable losses.

The Pakistani navy was simply not equipped to take onthe missiles and aircraft of the Indian fleet in order toprotect its own or commercial ships. Thus, West as well asEast Pakistan was isolated from its major sea supply routes.The state of the navy was indicative of the neglect forreality of the military government in Islamabad.

Lastly, the Army in East Pakistan underestimated theability of the Indians to move forces through the soddenterrain of Bengal. The Pakistanis had deployed in strengthin the towns while leaving the rural areas relativelyunprotected. The Indian army, supported by Bengalis withlocal knowledge, quickly outflanked these strong points.

With no strategic reserve available, the Pakistanis couldnot block the Indian's advance. When the strong points weresurrounded, there was simply no place for the defenders togo and they surrendered in thousands. 25/ The speed of the



Indian advance helped relieve Indian's logistic effort ofimproving roads, bridges and railways necessary to movelarge quantities of supplies for slower, more deliberateoperations. Their forces were lightly equipped to movequickly through to Dacca.

In summary, the conventional phase of the war was oneof limited objectives by both sides. However, the

Pakistanis could not properly coordinate their strategy ortheir forces to realize success. On the other hand, theIndians produced a simple but flexible plan which theyexecuted with determination and skill. East Pakistan fellmuch more quickly than Islamabad had anticipated and therewas no time for international intervention. In the West theIndians defended successfully while making minor gains inthe South. Their actions were entirely consistant withtheir objective of ejecting Pakistan from Bengal withoutinviting intervention from other nations, particularlyChina.

ENDNOTES(Chapter III)

1/ Jackson, p. 107.2/ Accounts vary. At least eight mountain divisions

remained guarding India's northern border. See Jackson, p.107; Chopra, pp. 53-54; and Ravi Kaul, "The Indo-PakistanWar and the Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean,"United States Naval Institute Proceedings, No. 14, May 73,pp. 186-187.

3/ Jackson, p. 108.4/ Ibid., p. 108.5/ Ravi Rikhye, "Why India Won: The 14 Day War," Armed

Forces Journal, 109, April 1972, p. 39.6/ Sir Robert Thompson, ed., War in Peace, (New York:

Harmony Books), 1982, p. 225.

7/ Jackson, p. 122.8/ Thompson, p. 225.9/ Ibid., 226.10/ Jackson, pp. 116-119.11/ Rikhye, p. 40.12/ Ibid., p. 40.13/ Jackson, p. 120.14/ Thompson, p. 227. See also Jackson, p. 120.15/ Jackson, p. 121.16/ Kaul, p. 188.17/ Ibid., p. 191.18/ Ibid., pp. 188-189.19/ Jackson, p. 133.20/ Ibid., p. 133.21/ Chopra, p. 56.22/ Ibid., p. 56.23/ Ibid., p. 58.24/ Jackson, p. 142.25/ Chopra, p. 58.

CHAPTER IVCONCLUSIONS

The course of events which shaped the conflict betweenIndia and Pakistan in 1971 had their origins in history mademany years before. The concept of a single Islamic nationon the Indian sub-continent had brought the peoples of East

and West Pakistan together in the aftermath of Britishcolonial rule. But the concept was not powerful enough tohold the nation in the face of differing race, language,culture and geography.



When the autocratic rulers in the western wing deniedthe democratic aspirations of the Bengalis while continuinga policy of apparent economic domination, resentment wasinevitable. The established rulers had fashioned a severelycentralized government which was incapable of harmonizingthe political and social forces emerging in the western aswell as the eastern wing of the nation. Consequently

military repression of the Bengalis was implemented withouta serious attempt to rectify the causes of the grievances.The millions of refugees who poured into India caused

serious economic and social problems in one of her mostunstable slates, West Bengal. The Indian government, withconsiderable support from the public, seized thisopportunity to decisively weaken her most dangerous rival.By skillfully managing her diplomatic affairs, whileencouraging the Bangla Desh movement, India won time toprepare for military intervention while preventing widerinternational intervention damaging to her aim. And clearlyher aim was to reduce the power of Pakistan by promoting theautonomy of East Bengal.

China considered Pakistan, in particular West Pakistan,vital to restricting Soviet influence on the sub-continent.Should both India and Pakistan be drawn into the Sovietsphere, China's borders would be threatened on all sides.With India and Pakistan rivals, the threat to China fromIndia would be much reduced. For similar reasons, theSoviet Union was initially trying to steer an even course inthe India-Pakistan dispute. However, when rebuffed by Yahyain July 1971, Moscow quickly saw the chance to increase herinfluence with India.

When conventional war finally came in December,Pakistan found herself unable to defend the east orsuccessfully gain in the west. Pakistan's complete failure

in the air was most damaging. Her armies and navy lackedinformation available from reconnaissance. Both the armyand navy could not maneuver without incurring damaginglosses from the Indian Air Force.

In the end, India prevailed because she was able tomaintain the initiative both politically and militarily,guided by a simple but realistic and flexible strategy.

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