Deel 7_Quantificatie Van de Winst

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Transcript of Deel 7_Quantificatie Van de Winst

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    Overzicht1. Representatieve Democratie ideaal versus werkelijkheid

    2. Waarom representatieve democratie ALTIJD afglijdtnaar particratie

    3. Benchmarking the Best in Class

    4. Verklaring van de performantieverschillen

    5. Grondoorzaak de vergeten basiswaarden

    6. Aanbevolen ordening van de samenleving

    7. Quantificatie van de winst

    8. Een nieuwe en andere rol voor politici

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    Quantification of thesavings

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    Public Sector EfficiencyAn International

    Comparison

    ECB working paper number 242, July 2003 "PublicSector Efficiency_An InternationalComparison by Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzihttp://www.pedz.uni-mann

    heim.de/daten/edz-ki/ezb/03/w-paper/ecbwp242.pdf

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    Benchmarking Belgium versus

    SwitzerlandThe ECB working paper number 242, July 2003 "PublicSector Efficiency_An International Comparison byAfonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi, on Public sectors

    Performance Indictors (Table II, in attachment) showsan overall governmental efficiency for all tasksexecuted by the Belgian government a rating of 0.83,while for Switzerland 1.33. (*)

    This means that when Belgium takes over for itsgovernment the AVERAGE Swiss model, the cost of theBelgian government would be reduced, for the sameservice, to 0.83/1.33 = 62%. Since the Belgian

    government takes about 50% of the GNP, this studysuggests a potential savings of (100% - 62%) X 50% =19% of the GNP compared to the average Swiss model.

    (*) ECB working paper number 242, July 2003 "Public Sector Efficiency_An International

    Comparison by Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi http://www.pedz.uni-mannheim.de/daten/edz-ki/ezb/03/w-paper/ecbwp242.pdf

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    Bijkomende efficiecientieverhogingdoor automatische Financiele

    Referenda ?

    Lars P. Feld, John G. Matsusaka, "Budget referendums andgovernment spending: evidence from Swiss cantons Journal

    of Public Economics 87 (2003) 2703 2724

    Lars Feld and Gebhard Kirchgasser, "Local fiscal Referenda:The dampening effect on taxes and spending",EconomicPolicy, 2001

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    20% Bijkomende Efficientieverhoging door

    automatische financiele referenda met lage drempel

    Besparing op Uitgaven Overheid door verplichte automatische

    Financiele Referenda in vergelijking tot het geval dat deze niet

    verplichtend dienen te worden georganizeerd

    -25.0%

    -20.0%

    -15.0%

    -10.0%

    -5.0%

    0.0%

    0 5 10 15 20

    Drempel Financieel Referendum (M CHF)

    B

    esparing(%)

    Alleen kantons met

    verplichte referenda

    Lars P. Feld, JohnG. Matsusaka,"Budget referendumsand government

    spending: evidencefrom Swiss cantonsJournal of PublicEconomics 87 (2003)2703 2724

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    Bijkomende efficientieverhoging door

    Automatische finciele referenda

    There are large differences in Switzerland from canton to canton.

    When financial referendums are made obligatory, Lars P. Feld,John G. Matsusaka (**) found in their economic correlation studiesan efficiency improvement of 14% (very large financial treshold) to

    20% (small financial treshold) compared to the case wherefinancial referenda are not obligatory. I.e. additional efficiencyimprovements occur compared to the Swiss canton.

    (**)Lars P. Feld, John G. Matsusaka, "Budget referendums and government spending: evidencefrom Swiss cantons Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 2703 2724

    http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/I&R%20Research%20and%20History/I&R%20Studies/Feld%20and%20Matsusaka%20-%20Fiscal%20Evidence%20from%20Swiss%20Cantons%20IRI.pdf

    Or http://www.umar.gov.si/fileadmin/user_upload/konference/06/03_feld.pdf

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    Bijkomende efficientieverhoging door

    Automatische finciele referenda

    Introducing automatic financial referenda with lowthresholds in Belgium in addition to the system ofGemeindefreiheit results is savings of governmetal

    costs of 0.083/1.33 x (1-20%) = 50%.Since the Belgian government takes about 50% of theGNP, the combination of the ECB study of Afonso,

    Schuknecht and Tanzi, and the study of Feld andMatsusaka study suggests a potential savings of (100%- 50%) X 50% = 25% % of the GNP.

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    Libertarian View on

    Savings PossibleDavid R Barker

    David R Barker in an interview with StefanMoulyneux estimates the saving which can beobained in a libertarian society to be between20% to 30% of the GNP per capita.

    He asks: Is this worth the trouble to changesociety?

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YasmmiR0PrM&feature=youtube_gdata

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    Additional growth of the GNP

    2.9588772.3965581.55796715

    2.7524442.2609041.5125914

    2.5604132.1329281.46853413

    2.381782.0121961.42576112

    2.2156091.8982991.38423411

    2.0610321.7908481.34391610

    1.9172391.6894791.3047739

    1.7834781.5938481.266778

    1.6590491.503631.2298747

    1.5433021.4185191.1940526

    1.4356291.3382261.1592745

    1.3354691.2624771.1254

    1.2422971.1910161.0923

    1.1556251.12361.06092

    1.0751.061.031

    additional growth of GNP per capita

    7.5%6.0%3.0%invested part (1/3 of savings)

    25%20%10%

    Savings in GNP per capita