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ACADEMIEJAAR 2008 - 2009

RESTORING REPUTATIONS IN TIMES OF CRISIS:

AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SITUATIONAL CRISIS

COMMUNICATION THEORY

aantal woorden: 9406

Abstract

This study attempts to provide empirical evidence for the ideas imposed by the situational crisis

communication theory (SCCT), which provides guidelines for matching crisis response strategies to

crisis types, in order to best restore organizational reputations in times of crisis. Additionally, it tries to

fill a gap in research on stakeholder characteristics that might influence the impact of crises and crisis

response strategies, by studying the moderating effects of locus of control. A 3 x 3 experimental

design manipulated the type of crisis in combination with the crisis response. A total of 379

respondents participated, 316 valid participants remained after considering item missing data.

No interaction effect was found between crisis type and crisis response strategies, therefore no

difference in reputation occurred between matched and mismatched responses. These results imply

that more research is to be carried out considering the basic assumptions of SCCT. Two main effects

did appear, from both crisis type and crisis response strategy. A general preference for rebuild

strategies occurred. Moreover, a negative correlation was found between crisis severity and

organizational responsibility. Future research is suggested on the moderating influence of locus of

control. Results show that compared to people with an internal locus of control, people with an

external locus of control prefer the use of deny strategies. This study has theoretical and practical

implications for the development of the symbolic approach of crisis communication.

Key Words Crisis communication, corporate reputation, crisis responsibility, crisis response

strategy, locus of control

Crises are not solely preserved to organizations that take wrong decisions. Corporations have become

aware that crises do happen to organizations just like themselves (Benson, 1988, p. 49). During these

crisis situations the battle to protect credibility in a hostile business environment is most fierce (Hobbs,

1995, p. 323). In the blink of an eye they can ruin the carefully built reputation of any company

(Groenendijk & Boulogne, 1994, p. 7; Dean, 2004, p. 192). Since a good reputation is a central goal of

communication, there is a need to restore reputations after crises (Benoit, 1995, p. 67; Coombs &

Holladay, 2002, p. 166). “There is increased awareness of the potential for communication

management to significantly diminish the harms of a crisis situation or, conversely, for inept

communication strategies to substantially magnify a crisis situation into a nightmare” (Benson, 1988,

p. 49). Therefore, crisis communication has grown as a field of study (Ulmer, Seeger & Sellnow,

2007).

Despite the popularity of this topic, research about the effectiveness of communication strategies as a

response to a crisis situation (reputation repair) is still in its infancy (Hobbs, 1995, p. 324). Many

scholars only pay attention to the early stages of the reputation process, such as creation, building and

maintenance, since they believe these control later stages (Rhee & Valdez, 2009, p. 146). Yet,

reputation building and repair operate in different ways in that reputation repair involves a reputation-

damaging event and the reactions of the constituencies surrounding a firm’s reputation to the event.

Previous studies have suggested that further research on reputation repair should focus on discovering

the range of image restoration strategies on the one hand, and characteristics of the crisis situation,

such as intentionality, that lead to the necessity of certain reactions on the other (Hobbs, 1995, p. 343).

Rhetorics and social sciences where the first areas that tried to discover a range of strategies with

respect to reputation repair. Today we can find two main theories about restoring reputations within

the symbolic approach (Thomsen & Rawson, 1998; Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 2007a). First, we consider

image restoration theory, which focuses on message options (Benoit, 1997, p. 178). It created several

typologies of image restoration strategies based on case studies. Critics argue that this theory is too

descriptive and that theories should not be limited to the development of a laundry list of potential

strategies (Coombs, 1999a; Rowland & Jerome, 2004). Although the case studies conducted by the

image restoration theory were a good starting point for more research, relying on untested assumptions

weakens the field of crisis communication (Coombs, 1999a; Hobbs, 1995). The lack of systematic

knowledge and theoretical framework analysis, resulted in the fact that we know very little about how

stakeholders react to crises or strategies used to handle crises (Falkheimer & Heide, 2006; Coombs,

2007a).

A second theory was developed to find out which of the possible crisis response strategies managers

should use in order to restore an organization’s reputation as good as possible after a crisis, depending

on the specifics of the crisis situation. The situational crisis communication theory (SCCT) claims that

typologies of crisis types are created separately from typologies of crisis response strategies (Coombs

& Holladay, 2002, p. 168). Therefore, the SCCT developed a framework to integrate crisis types and

crisis response strategies. This framework allows managers to select a certain crisis response strategy,

depending on the type of crisis (e.g., workplace violence). Yet, in contrast to the image restoration

theory, SCCT is still rather new and developing (Coombs, 2007a; Coombs and Holladay, 2002).

Nonetheless, the ideas are growing in importance and being cited and specified by many authors’

works (De Blasio & Veale, 2007; Fortunato, 2008; Lee, 2005). Since managers are encouraged to take

a more scientific approach to communicating with stakeholders, it is important that this theory is tested

in its current form, by a variety of authors and from different perspectives (Fombrun, Gardberg &

Sever, 2000, p. 241).

Unlike most former research, that made use of student samples (Coombs & Holladay, 1996, 2002;

Coombs, 1998) or samples of public relations practitioners (Coombs, 1999a; Huang, Lin & Su, 2005),

this study tries to get a more complete picture of general consumers. Moreover, unlike most previous

studies that tested the effects of separate crisis response strategies on reputation, and following Huang

et al. (2005, p. 231), the matches between crisis types and crisis response strategies were studied by

combining several response strategies into one crisis response. SCCT formulated three clusters of

crisis types, differing in organizational responsibility, and three clusters of crisis response strategies,

differing in the amount of responsibility taken (Coombs, 2007a). When possible, combinations of

several crisis response strategies from the same group were tested.

Finally, a critique formulated by SCCT, is that research in crisis communication has paid little

attention to how personality traits affect respondents’ reactions to crises or to the crisis response

strategies used to manage crises (Coombs, 2007a, p. 163). A construct that could be of interest is locus

of control, which is related to locus of causality (Beretvas, Suizzo, Durham & Yarnell, 2008, p. 98).

The latter can be found in attribution theory, which forms one of the basic theories on which SCCT is

built (Coombs & Holladay, 1996).

A theory of image restoration strategies

The importance of restoring reputations was very high among rhetorics. When a rhetorical act involves

a debate and a judgment by an audience, stasis theory helps to identify the key point of disagreement

(stasis) which has to be judged (Marsh, 2006, p. 42). Rhetorical problems are classified according to

the underlying structure of the dispute that each involves, which helps the practising rhetor to identify

an appropriate argumentative strategy (Heath, 1994, p. 114). Stasis does not incorporate all the

variables of the crisis situation, but it offers crisis managers a hierarchical template for examining the

range and depth of crisis response strategies (Marsh, 2006, p. 46). This classical schema of stasis

inheres accusation and defence or kategoria and apologia (Ryan, 1982, p. 255). The term apologia

should not be confused with the term apology, but is derived from the Greek language and means the

speech of self-defence (Hearit, 2006, p. 4; Ware & Linkugel, 1973, p. 273). The theory of apologia

has equally been a very popular approach, used to analyse the image restoration discourse (Benoit,

1995, p. 13).

Apologia would not exist without instigating kategoria (Marsh, 2006, p. 42). An attack upon a

person’s character, demands a direct response (Ware & Linkugel, 1973, p. 274). The apologia we

know today are reactions to public forms of criticism, who often have an ethical dimension (Hearit,

2006, p. 5). Reputation management benefited being informed by the rhetorical tradition of apologia

(Ihlen, 2002, p. 187). Ware & Linkugel (1973) proposed a theory of apologia to identify four

rhetorical strategies in rhetorical self-defence (Benoit, 1995). They illustrated denial, bolstering,

differentiation and transcendence, and claimed these account for most of the strategies people use

when they speak in their own defence (Ware & Linkugel, 1973). Numerous authors used strategies

like these to understand how organizations defend their reputations during crises (Coombs, 1999b, p.

122). However, the number of strategies apologia offered, turned out to be too limited, so social

sciences attempted to complete the list by using accounts, which are statements made by a social actor

to explain unanticipated or improper behaviour (Scott & Lyman, 1968, p. 46). They are used to shed a

different light on unfavourable actions or someone’s responsibility for them, and thus change the

negative evaluations of others (Buttny, 1993, p. 1). The lists of image restoration strategies developed

in this literature are much more detailed than those in the rhetoric (Benoit, 1995, p. 31).

Apologetic criticism has focused on reactive statements made by individuals who have been

personally attacked (Thomsen & Rawson, 1998, p. 36). Today, research has been expanded to what

organizations do to increase their chances of restoring their reputation. The past decades, the symbolic

approach to impression management provided valuable insights to the offering of public responses to

crises (Huang, 2006, p. 180). It examines the strategies used to respond to crises and therefore

emphasizes how communication can be used as a symbolic resource in attempts to protect the

organization’s image (Coombs & Holladay, 1996, p. 279; Coombs, 1998, p. 177). Discovering the

range of communication strategies available to a corporation was the first step in managing

relationships with stakeholders during crises (Hobbs, 1995, p. 343). The purpose of crisis response

strategies is to keep important audiences adequately informed and to minimize the reputational harm

of the disaster (Benson, 1988, p. 51).

This first step was taken by the theory of image restoration, which assumes that communication is a

goal-directed activity, and focuses on one particular goal in discourse: restoring or protecting one’s

reputation (Benoit, 1995, p. 71). Image restoration theory conceptualizes options available to rhetors

who need to conduct an apologia (Len-Rios & Benoit, 2004, p. 96). Scholars in this area explained the

message strategies used by apologists (Hearit, 1996, p. 235). This was done by carrying out various

case studies on organizations, such as Merrill Lynch’s business fraud (Hearit & Brown, 2004),

Johnson Controls’ Fetal protection policy (Hearit, 1997) and Exxon’s Valdez oil spill (Benoit, 1995).

Several case studies were also conducted on political matters, such as President Nixon’s Cambodia

address (Benoit, 1995) and former President Bush’s war in Iraq (Benoit, 2006). The strategies

embedded in the externally-directed discourse of a corporate actor facing crisis events are identified, in

order to provide a detailed typology of naturally occurring message strategies that could reshape

stakeholders’ attitudes (Allen & Caillouet, 1994, p. 44).

Hearit (1997, p. 217) states that organizations charged with wrongdoing rely solely on differentiation

strategies to extricate themselves from crises. They serve the purpose of separating some fact,

sentiment, object or relationship from a larger context in which the audience views that attribute (Ware

& Linkugel, 1973, p. 278). He calls these strategies dissociations and claims that corporate apologists

deal with the problem of guilt by assuming one of several dissociational stances (Hearit, 1996; Hearit

& Brown, 2004). Benoit (1995, p. 74) formed a typology called image restoration strategies, that

consists of five main categories, of which three have variants. His desire was to offer a typology that is

more complete than those offered by rhetorical literature and avoids the extreme detail found in the

theory of accounts. This typology encompasses denial, evading responsibility, reducing offensiveness,

corrective action, and mortification.

Benson (1988, p. 63) stressed the importance of more studies on communication strategies used in

crisis situations, in order to develop a more complete understanding of the various means by which

organizations communicate effectively in crises. Today however, many rhetorical authors claim issues

of causality and theory building, based on case studies, without properly testing the causality of the

different strategies and outcome variables (Coombs, 2007b, p. 135). Therefore, after providing a

typology of message strategies, a second step, which has been taken more recently, is to discover the

situational variables that lead to differing apologia postures (Hobbs, 1995; Coombs, 2007a).

Consequently, matches between crisis situations and the message strategies best suited to restore

reputations could be formulated and experimentally tested.

Matching crisis types and crisis response strategies

Crisis managers need to know which communication strategies they should apply in specific crisis

situations in order to rebuild reputations as good as possible (Benson, 1988, p. 64). The theoretical

background for developing the necessary framework is based on the neoinstitutionalism and

attribution theory (Coombs & Holladay, 1996; Coombs, 2007a). The former claims an organization

uses communication as a response to legitimacy threats (Coombs & Holladay, 1996, p. 281).

Corporations use mechanisms to convey conformity with their institutional environment, to enhance

legitimacy and survival chances (Allen & Caillouet, 1994, p. 48). Crisis response strategies can show

the challenge is invalid, or attempt to get stakeholders to judge the crisis more mildly and evaluate the

organization more positively (Coombs & Holladay, 1996, p. 281). From the perspective of

neoinstitutionalism, organizations should use those crisis response strategies that reflect efforts to re -

establish legitimacy.

The Attribution theory explains the relationship between a situation and the selection of

communication strategies (Coombs & Holladay, 1996, p. 281). It outlived many of its theoretical

peers, including for example self-perception, because it focuses on the universal concern with

explanation (Weiner, 2000). People will search for the causes of crises. “Attribution theory is a theory

about how people make causal explanations, about how they answer questions beginning with

“why?””(Kelley, 1973, p. 107). Consumers act like naïve scientists, searching underlying causes for

events they observe (Kelley, 1973, p. 107; Dean, 2004, p. 198). In the case of crisis communication,

crises are negative events that lead stakeholders to assess crisis responsibility (Coombs, 2007a).

Consequently, the threat of a crisis is mainly a function of crisis responsibility (Coombs, 2007b, p.

136). If the organization is perceived as being responsible for the crisis, its reputation will suffer.

Therefore, crisis managers should select the best crisis response, based on the characteristics of the

situation.

In order to formulate the right match between crisis situations and crisis response strategies, two

continuums were distinguished. First, several authors have tried to create continuums on which they

placed the range of strategies (Coombs, 1999b, p. 122). McLaughlin, Cody & O’Hair (1983) claimed

strategies could be arrayed along a mitigation-aggravation continuum. They took into account four

strategies. Hearers will recognize excuses and concessions as more mitigating than the strategies of

justification and refusals. A dominant perspective involving a continuum of crisis response strategies

however, is defence-accommodation (Huang et al., 2005, p. 231). Coombs (1999b, p. 122) states that

all continuums reflect actions that are either defensive or accommodative, which is illustrated in figure

one, an assumption that is based on the work of Marcus & Goodman (1991). According to these

authors, corporations confronted with a crisis sometimes appear accommodating and other times

defensive. Accommodative statements show that management accepts responsibility for a crisis and

takes actions to remedy the situation. By using defensive statements, a corporation insists that

problems do not exist and takes action to resume normal operations rapidly.

Figure 1: Accommodative-defensive continuum

Source: Coombs, 1998, p. 181

In a similar way we can place several types of crises on a continuum, ranging from strong to weak

responsibility for the crisis (Coombs, 1999b, p. 126-127). Crisis responsibility means the degree to

which stakeholders blame the organization for the crisis (Coombs, 1998, p. 180). This is not a true or

false proposition (Benoit, 1995, p. 72-73). A reputation will suffer in proportion to the extent to which

an organization is held responsible for the undesirable act. The strategic choice between strategies is

therefore heavily influenced by the specifics of the situation in relation to key variables (Rowland &

Jerome, 2004, p. 199). Coombs (1998, p. 180) claims that crisis responsibility is the natural link

between crisis situations and crisis communication strategies.

Marcus & Goodman (1991) formulated a possible match between these two continuums. They stated

that crises differ in their effects on victims and in their causes. Based on these factors, they

distinguished three types of crisis that enable us to predict how corporate communication during each

crisis might affect investors. Since accidents have identifiable victims and companies can deny

responsibility for them, defensive signals serve shareholder interests after this type of crisis.

Accommodative signals serve these interests after scandals. Product safety and health incidents lie

somewhere in between these two crisis types. Therefore, during crises in which responsibility is

perceived as high, organizations should use more accommodative strategies (Coombs & Holladay,

1996, p. 293). When the organization’s responsibility is low, defensive strategies are best (Coombs &

Holladay, 2002). Though a good starting point, this typology is too broad. SCCT therefore worked out

a further classification of these categories.

Situational crisis communication theory

SCCT is an extension of Coombs’ previous research on matching crisis response strategies to crisis

situations, but also builds on the work of other crisis management scholars (Coombs & Holladay,

2002, p. 167). SCCT research has developed a list of 13 crisis types, based upon attributions of crisis

responsibility, and found that they formed three crisis clusters (Coombs, 2007a; Coombs & Holladay,

2002). Table one shows that the victim cluster has weak attributions of responsibility and involves

crisis types in which harm is inflicted on the organization and stakeholders. The accidental cluster

involves minimal attributions of responsibility and contains crisis types in which the organization does

not intend for the crisis to occur. The preventable cluster has strong attributions of crisis responsibility

and the event is considered to be purposeful.

Table 1: SCCT crisis types by crisis clusters

Source: Coombs, 2007a, p. 168

Moreover, within the continuum of response strategies, Coombs (2007a, 2004) found several clusters

(table two). Deny strategies attempt to remove any connection between the organization and the crisis

by attacking the accuser, claiming no crisis exists (denial) or trying to show it has no responsibility

(scapegoating). These strategies can be found at the defensive end of the continuum. Diminish

strategies argue that a crisis is not as bad as people think (justification) or minimize responsibility

(excuse). Rebuild crisis strategies offer compensation for the crisis or apologize. These are the most

accommodative strategies. To conclude, bolstering strategies can be used with any of the other three

to offer a minimal opportunity to develop reputational assets. The existence of these clusters was

basically confirmed by factor analyses and correlation analyses conducted by Huang et al. (2005).

They found five factors that could be divided into three very similar clusters along the defensive-

accommodative continuum.

Table 2: SCCT crisis response strategies

Source: Coombs, 2007a, p. 170

The reputational threat can be assessed by identifying the crisis type, crisis history and prior relational

reputation (Coombs, 2007a, 2004). This idea is based on the attribution theory, which provides the

rationale for the relationship between many of the variables used in SCCT (Coombs, 2007a). Crisis

managers should select crisis response strategies that are appropriate for the amount of potential

reputational damage a certain crisis may inflict (Coombs & Holladay, 2002, p. 168). Based on these

assumptions, SCCT provides specific guidelines for matching responses to situations (Coombs, 2007a,

p. 173). Table three shows that diminish strategies should be used for victim crises with a history of

similar crises and/or negative prior relationship reputation, or for accident crises without any history of

similar crises and a neutral or positive prior relationship reputation. Rebuild strategies should be used

for accident crises with a history of similar crises and/or negative prior relationship reputation, or for

preventable crises regardless of crisis history or prior relationship reputation. The deny posture at last,

should be used for victim crises without a history of similar crises.

Table 3: SCCT crisis response strategy guidelines

Source: Adapted from: Coombs, 2007a, p. 173

An experimental study showed that responses that match the crisis type, lead to a more positive

reputation than either no response or a mismatched response (Coombs & Holladay, 1996, p. 293). This

match occurred between accidents and distance (a form of excuse), and transgressions and remedial (a

form of mortification where the organization offers compensation). Huang (2006), using different

theoretical foundations and a different typology of crises and crisis response strategies, found very

similar results. Denial was preferred in situations similar to victim crises, justification in crises similar

to accidental crises and a strategy comparable to the rebuild strategies in crises like those from the

preventable cluster. Yet, it was posed that in order to help complete a test of the symbolic approach,

future research was needed to extend the test to other crisis types and examine other matched

responses (Coombs & Holladay, 1996).

Moreover, along the years Coombs made use of different typologies of strategies (Coombs &

Holladay, 1996; Coombs, 2007a). He also used different ways to categorize the strategies. First, he

used the accommodative-defensive continuum (Coombs, 1998). Later on he used the three clusters of

victim, accidental and preventable crises (Coombs, 2007a). Before relying on SCCT, we should test its

assumptions, considering the use of matched response strategies for specific crisis types, using the

typology of strategies it currently offers. Moreover, whereas the image restoration theory was studied

by a variety of authors, such as Ware & Linkugel (1973), Hearit (1997) and Benoit (1995), SCCT

relies mostly on the work of Coombs (1998, 1999a; Coombs & Holladay, 1996, 2002).

More experimental studies of SCCT should thus be conducted. Recently, Coombs & Holladay (2008,

p. 252) themselves claimed that the empirical evidence for the effects of crisis response strategies is

still in its infancy and has room for development. According to them, one area of growth is to

understand the effects of different crisis response strategies used in the same crisis. More research is

also recommended on the examination of different types of crises in one study (Dean, 2004, p. 208).

Moreover, the supposed match between crises and crises response strategy clusters, has not yet

specifically been tested. In his work Benoit (1997, p. 183-184) offers a number of suggestions for

effective image repair discourse. According to the image restoration theory, multiple strategies can

work together. Dean (2004, p. 208) illustrated this by using responses consisting of a combination of

two strategies from Benoit’s typology, to study the consumer reaction to negative publicity. Huang

(2006, p. 200) concluded that for most situations used in her research, a combination of different crisis

response strategies appeared to be the most effective.

Huang’s (2006) study showed that combinations between different crisis response strategies could

consist of response strategies from different crisis clusters. However, this was only the case for

clusters nearest to each other on the accommodative-defensive continuum. The study therefore claims

that strategies from the deny and rebuild cluster should not be combined. Diminish strategies on the

other hand, appeared to be quite effective combined with other strategies. SCCT however, claims that,

depending on the specifics of the situation, managers should use either deny, diminish or rebuild

strategies. Table three shows that strategies from different clusters should not be combined. When

following the advice of both image restoration theory and SCCT, the best option appears to be the

combination of several strategies from one cluster into one response. In order to strengthen each other,

these combined strategies should trigger equal reactions from the audience. Coombs & Holladay

(2008) have empirically tested three rebuild strategies and compared their value. They found that

respondents had similar reactions to sympathy, compensation and apology response strategies. If the

effects of strategies from one cluster are the same, this provides evidence that crisis managers can

combine them.

Based on previous research on SCCT we can therefore assume that, in case of no history of similar

crises and a neutral prior stakeholder relationship, deny strategies match with victim crises, diminish

strategies match with accidental crises and rebuild strategies match with preventable crises (Coombs,

2007a, p. 173). These assumptions lead to a first set of hypotheses:

H1a: The reputation of an organization confronted with a crisis from the victim cluster, will be better

after using strategies from the deny cluster, than after using strategies from the diminish or rebuild

cluster

H1b: The reputation of an organization confronted with a crisis from the accidental cluster, will be

better after using strategies from the diminish cluster, than after using strateg ies from the deny or

rebuild cluster

H1c: The reputation of an organization confronted with a crisis from the preventable cluster, will be

better after using strategies from the rebuild cluster, than after using strategies from the deny or

diminish cluster

Moderating influence of locus of control

Literature in commercial marketing and consumer behaviour shows a variety of research in the field of

personality, and a growth of interest in the identification of personality variables that influence

attitudes (Dutta & Vanacker, 2000). Crisis communication research equally needs to consider

personality traits that might be of interest considering stakeholders during crises. One of the reasons to

develop SCCT, was that we know very little about how stakeholders react to crises or to the crisis

response strategies used to manage crises (Coombs, 2007a, p. 163). Ahluwalia, Burnkrant & Unnava

(2000) found that the effects of negative publicity are moderated by commitment of the consumer

toward the brand. Still, they claim that there has been no systematic research of how consumers

process negative information about brands. These comments reveal that more research is needed to

find out how stakeholders differ in their perceptions of and reactions to these crisis response strategies,

depending on their personality traits. In order to extend the knowledge of SCCT, research must

determine how stakeholders’ perceptions of organizational reputations after crises are moderated by

their characteristics.

Research on person perception shows that deny and diminish strategies attempt to lead consumers to

believe that a crisis is caused by an attribute of the environment (external attribution) rather than by an

attribute of the actor (internal attribution) (Collins, 1974, p. 381). Other theorists focus instead on the

case in which the observer and actor are the same person, that is, self-perception. Research in both

person perception and self-perception traditions focuses on the environmental factors that lead an

observer to make internal and external attributions about behaviour. However, less research has been

conducted on characteristics of the observer that affect causal attribution, even though there is

considerable evidence that many of the conclusions reached by an observer have more to do with the

observer than the stimulus person, which is here represented by the company. Locus of control

involves the attributions a person believes to be operative for behavioural consequences and

reinforcements (Duffy, Downey & Shiflett, 1977, p. 214). Individuals believe either that events are

controlled by internal, personal forces of the actor or that events are controlled by external, situational

forces of the environment. It is a generalized expectancy, operating across a large number of

situations, which relates to whether an individual has power over what happens to him or her

(Lefcourt, 1966, p. 207).

This locus of control is of interest because it is conceptually related to locus of causality, which is a

construct from attribution theory (Beretvas et al., 2008, p. 98). It has also been found to be predictive

of several social behaviours, learning performances and achievement-related activities (Lefcourt,

1966). Rotter (1966, p. 10) stated that although a person’s locus of control is not immediately

connected to the preference for internal or external control in others, it may correlate with the value

the subject places on either internal or external control. This presumption is yet to be studied. If locus

of control does imply the preference for internality or externality, this has implications for the use of

crisis response strategies. Several strategies would be more or less preferred by internals or externals.

When perceptions of crisis responsibility are strong, SCCT advises crisis managers to use more

accommodative strategies and therefore admit responsibility (Coombs, 1998). When perceptions of

crisis responsibility are weak, SCCT advises to use more defensive strategies and deny responsibility.

Therefore deny strategies, that claim no crisis exists or try to show the organization has no

responsibility for it, and diminish strategies that minimize the damage or responsibility, attempt to lead

consumers to believe that a crisis is caused by an attribute of the environment (external attribution)

(Collins, 1974, p. 381; Coombs, 2004, 2007a). Whereas rebuild crisis response strategies, that take full

responsibility for the crisis, show consumers that a crisis is caused by an attribute of the actor (internal

attribution). If Rotter’s (1966, p. 10) presumption is true, internals would assign more value to

organizations that take full responsibility for their own actions, thus stating that they control their own

actions. This would equally imply that externals might assign more value than internals to

organizations that reject responsibility for what happened, thereby stating that the environment

controlled what happened more than the organization itself:

H2: When an organization uses deny strategies, its reputation will be perceived as more positive by

respondents with an external locus of control than by respondents with an internal locus of control

H3: When an organization uses diminish strategies, its reputation will be perceived as more positive

by respondents with an external locus of control than by respondents with an internal locus of control

H4: When an organization uses rebuild strategies, its reputation will be perceived as more positive by

respondents with an internal locus of control than by respondents with an external locus of control

Method

Design & stimuli

The study used a 3 (crisis type) x3 (crisis response) between-subjects factorial experimental design.

The experimental design manipulated two factors: crisis type and crisis response strategy. To

manipulate crisis type, from each cluster (victim cluster, accidental cluster, preventable cluster), one

crisis type was selected. These crisis types were chosen based on practical considerations. The

manipulated crisis types could be linked to actual cases that are less known to Belgian participants and

allow us to describe each crisis type realistically. From the victim cluster product tampering was

selected, which refers to the damage by an external agent against an organization (Coombs &

Holladay, 2002, p. 170; Coombs, 2007a, p. 168). From the accidental cluster technical-error product

harm was used, implying the recall of a product because of technology or equipment failure. To

conclude, organizational misdeed with injuries was chosen from the preventable cluster, which means

management consciously places stakeholders at risk and some are injured.

These three crisis types were described along three scenarios, based on actual crises (cf. appendix A).

A fictitious organization was described along the three scenarios to avoid confounding effects. Each

scenario described that this fictitious American company, named Adwell, was founded in 1995 and

became successful by making fresh beverages from fruits and vegetables. In all three situations, the

crisis occurred in the year 2006 in Germany. To conclude, the crisis damage was controlled for all

situations. All three scenarios mentioned the death of two adults, following each crisis.

To manipulate the response strategy, multiple strategies were selected from each cluster, given that

past research has demonstrated that the combination of strategies leads to better image restoration

effects. From the diminish cluster, both crisis response strategies were used, namely excuse and

justification were combined into one reaction so the company attempted to minimize both

organizational responsibility and perceived damage caused by the crisis (Coombs, 2007a, p. 170).

Both strategies from the rebuild cluster, compensation and apology, were combined as well. This

means that the organization not only offered financial compensation to its victims, it also took full

responsibility for the crisis and asked stakeholders for forgiveness.

Only one crisis response strategy was used from the deny cluster, since all three deny strategies tend to

conflict with one another. Combining strategies will only enhance their individual impacts when the

responses are compatible (Huang, 2006, p. 200). The scapegoat reaction was described, which means

the organization blames some person or group outside of the organization for the crisis. This could

hardly be combined with denial, in which case the company would simply assert that no crisis exists,

or with the strategy of attacking the accuser, were the organization would confront the person or group

that claims something is wrong with the company. The latter would be difficult, since the crisis

condition does not make notice of any accuser, it simply describes what has happened. Each of these

three possible types of response, was adapted to the specifics of the crisis type when needed. This was

mainly necessary for the deny strategy since the possible scapegoats differed from crisis type to crisis

type.

Participants & procedure

Two pre-tests were conducted to guarantee the manipulations to be adequate. For the actual study, data

were collected from 379 respondents. Due to missing data, 316 valid respondents were used in further

analyses. The respondents received an invitation to participate in the study through e-mail, leading

them to the website which contained the questionnaire (cf. Appendix B). They were told that

participation would only take about 15 minutes of their time. The respondents were randomly divided

across the 9 conditions and were instructed to read a scenario for a fictitious company. The scenario

contained a combination of a crisis type with a crisis response. After reading the scenario, respondents

were asked to fill in the questionnaire containing the manipulation checks, reputation measures, the

locus of control scale, and some socio-demographic questions. Participants were Dutch-speaking

Belgian men and women. They ranged in age from 13 to 70 years (M = 34.89, SD = 14.46). About

47% were male and 53% were female.

Measures

Organizational responsibility for a crisis. In measuring the assignment of blame/responsibility,

Griffin, Babin & Darden (1992) tried to find the appropriate bases for the causal attributions and the

suitable terms to capture causality. Organizational responsibility was measured with four items from

this scale (e.g., “How responsible was the organization?”) (Griffin et al., 1992, p. 874; Lee, 2005, p.

375). The first two items were measured on a scale ranging from one (not at all responsible) to 10

(totally responsible). The other items were measured on a scale ranging from one (not at all to be

blamed) to 10 (absolutely to be blamed). Before measuring the reliability of the summated variable for

crisis responsibility, two of the four items, concerning responsibility of fate and circumstances, were

reversely scaled. The four-item scale had a cronbach’s α of .81.

Organizational reputation. The reputation quotient is a construct that combines two factors: Emotional

appeal and rational appeal (Fombrun et al., 2000). Since the design of this study describes a fictitious

organization, some propositions and even dimensions of the RQ could not be judged by respondents.

All propositions as described in the emotional appeal and workplace environment dimension, were

measured. The other four dimensions contained several items that could not be judged, and therefore

were not incorporated in the scale. Respondents judged all propositions on a 10-point scale, ranging

from one (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree).

Organizational credibility. Coombs & Holladay (1996, p. 288) obtained respondents’ perceptions of

the organization’s reputation by measuring credibility. Chief executive officers rate credibility as an

important aspect of an organizational reputation (Coombs & Holladay, 2002, p. 175). Therefore,

credibility was measured on a 10-point scale ranging from one (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly

agree). McCroskey’s (Cited in: Coombs & Holladay, 1996, p. 288) measure of character, as adapted

by Coombs & Holladay (1996) and later on reduced in length (Coombs & Holladay, 2002) was

utilised. These five statements (e.g., “I trust this organization to tell the truth about this incident”) were

reversed into the same direction.

A principle components analysis with varimax rotation was ran using the items from the RQ and

credibility scales. Only one item had an eigenvalue of over one, so no rotation was needed. This single

factor had an eigenvalue of 10.32 and accounted for 73.71% of the total variance. These results

indicate that the RQ and credibility scales measure the same factor. The two scales were therefore

combined to form a general scale of reputation. The Cronbach’s α for this new scale, consisting of 14

items, was .97.

Crisis severity. Even though Coombs (1998) has not been able to prove that crisis damage intensifies

perceptions of crisis responsibility and reputational damage, the author claims that severity modifies

perceptions of crisis responsibility (Coombs & Holladay, 2002, p. 169). To control for possible effects

of the perceived crisis severity, respondents were asked to answer one question on a 10-point scale,

ranging from one (not at all severe) to 10 (very severe): “How severe do you consider the damage

caused by this crisis?”

Locus of control. To measure locus of control, the internal-external (I-E) locus of control scale was

used (Rotter, 1966). Even though some problems have been reported in relation to this scale, it is still

one of the research approaches most often cited to the topic of locus of control (Duffy et al., 1977;

Beretvas et al., 2008; Collins, 1974; Ashkanasy, 1985; Lefcourt, 1966). This is a 29-item, forced-

choice test including 6 filler items, intended to make the purpose of the test more ambiguous.

Respondents are asked to select the one statement of each pair which they more strongly believe to be

the case. The score is the total number of external choices. The I-E scale had a Cronbach’s α of .73

and consisted of nine factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. The two factors with the highest

eigenvalues were labelled control over politics and misfortunes.

Pre-tests

Two pre-tests were conducted to test the manipulated variables, crisis type and crisis response, as

incorporated into the nine scenarios. First, 12 respondents participated in an exploratory qualitative in

depth-interview to check the internal validity concerning the crisis responses. The respondents were

shown each crisis response, containing one or two crisis response strategies from the same crisis

response cluster. Then, they received a list containing all five crisis response strategies used along the

three crisis reactions. They were asked which of these response strategies corresponded with the crisis

reactions. Most respondents judged that the strategies used for each of the three organizational

reactions, were the ones intended by the study (e.g., the deny reaction contained the scapegoat

strategy). Yet, some neutral sentences were mistakenly interpreted as strategies. These lines were

therefore removed from the responses used in the actual study.

The second pre-test checked the manipulation of corporate responsibility for each crisis type, using a

seven-point scale. The crisis from the victim cluster should produce minimal attributions of crisis

responsibility. The accidental cluster causes moderate attributions of crisis responsibility and the

preventable cluster to conclude, produces strong attributions of responsibility. The questionnaire used

a within-subjects design, showing all 21 respondents the three crisis types. Differences in perceived

responsibility were checked by conducting three t-tests. First, the victim crisis (M = 4.31, SD = 1.49)

was compared to the accidental crisis (M = 5.31, SD = .98). A significant difference in crisis

responsibility was found t(40) = -2.56, p = .015. When comparing the victim crisis to the preventable

crisis (M = 5.79, SD = 1.01) a significant difference also occurred t(40) = -3.75, p = .001. However, no

significant difference occurred between the accidental and preventable crisis t(40) = -1.55, p = .13. All

scenarios were slightly adapted based on these results. Additionally, the actual study used a ten-point

scale, which appeared easier to rate for respondents.

Results

Manipulation checks

The pre-test conducted to control for the crisis response strategies implemented in all three corporate

reactions, gave a clear picture of what needed to be adapted for the actual study. Some sentences

possibly referring to unintended response strategies were removed. The pre-test checking

organizational responsibility in all crisis types also showed where changes in the scenarios needed to

be made. However, manipulation checks were run, to assure the differences in responsibility. A series

of one-way ANOVA’s were performed. The mean difference in crisis responsibility between all crisis

types appeared significant, F(2, 313) = 82.93, p < .001. The Scheffé follow-up procedure showed that

the victim crisis (M = 4.78, SD = 2.11) differed significantly from the accidental cr isis (M = 6.81, SD

= 1.87) (p < .001) and from the preventable crisis (M = 8.07, SD = 1.62) (p < .001). Furthermore, the

accidental crisis differed significantly from the preventable crisis (p < .001).

Interaction effect of crisis type and response strategy on reputation

To address the match between crisis type and crisis response strategies as hypothesised in H1a, H1b

and H1c, a univariate two-way ANOVA (general linear model) was used. The interaction-effect of

crisis type and crisis response strategies on reputation was not significant, F(8, 307) = 1.28, p = .28.

Therefore the first set of hypotheses could neither be confirmed nor rejected. However, two main

effects occurred (table four), one for crisis type (F[8, 307] = 94.72, p < .001), and one for crisis

response strategy, F(8, 307) = 4.68, p = .01. To detect the significant differences between the three

conditions of crisis type and crisis response separately, one-way ANOVA’s with Scheffe tests were

further conducted.

Table 4: Interaction between crisis response cluster and crisis cluster

An ANOVA comparing reputation between all three crisis clusters, confirmed the main effect, F(2,

313) = 95.33, p < .001. A significant difference in reputation appeared between the preventable crisis

(M = 2.72, SD = 1.42) and both the victim (M = 5.95, SD = 1.97) (p < .001) and accidental crisis (M =

5.48, SD = 2.04) (p < .001). No significant difference occurred between the victim crisis and the

accidental crisis (p = .18). When considering the summated items used from the reputation quotient as

dependent variable, the reputation scale without the items measuring credibility, an equal main effect

occurred, F(2, 313) = 74.80, p < .001. Significant differences also occurred between the preventable

crisis (M = 2.76, SD = 1.41) and both the victim (M = 5.76, SD = 1.98) (p < .001) and accidental crisis

(M = 5.06, SD = 2.12) (p < .001). Also, a significant difference appeared between the victim crisis and

the accidental crisis (p = .02).

A main effect of crisis response strategies was confirmed when conducting a one way ANOVA

comparing reputation between the different crisis response strategies, F(2, 313) = 4.52, p = .012. The

Scheffé procedure revealed a significant difference between rebuild strategies (M = 5.26, SD = 2.36)

and diminish strategies (M = 4.35, SD = 2.24) (p = .018). No significant differences were found

between deny strategies (M = 4.57, SD = 2.28) and diminish (p = .80) or rebuild strategies (p = .087).

When controlling for socio-demographical variables and severity of the crisis situation, no significant

effects were found. Yet, a significant negative correlation did appear between the severity of the crisis

and organizational reputation, r(314) = - .12, p = .034. These results show that the more severe

respondents perceive a crisis, the worse the reputation of the organization confronted with the crisis

will be.

Moderating influence of locus of control

Two factors from the I-E scale, labelled control over politics (r[314] = - .12, p = .036) and misfortunes

(r[314] = - .17, p = .003), showed a significant negative correlation with corporate responsibility. This

implies that the more one has an external locus of control, the less responsibility he or she will

attribute to the organization in crisis. Therefore internal people tend to assign more responsibility to

the company. These results support the assumptions on which the second set of hypotheses were built.

Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 were tested by means of a univariate two-way ANOVA (general linear model).

The possible interaction between crisis type, response strategy and locus of control was examined. No

significant third order interaction was found, F(17, 298) = 1.50, p = .20. In addition, locus of control

appeared to have no main effect on reputation, F(17, 298) = .52, p = .47. No interaction was found

between locus of control and crisis response strategy (F[17, 298] = .33, p = .72), nor between locus of

control and crisis type, F (17, 298) = .47, p = .63.

Yet, an interaction-effect did occur between crisis response strategy and one of the factors found in the

locus of control scale, labelled misfortunes, F(5, 310) = 3.82, p = .023. This factor had the highest

factor loadings and contains two items considering the causes of people’s misfortunes, which can be

linked to the causes of organizational crises. The plot shown in table five shows a significant

difference in organizational reputation between respondents with an internal locus of control (M =

3.90, SD = 2.20) and those with an external locus of control (M = 5.30, SD = 2.15) (t[105] = -3.33, p =

.001) for the use of deny crisis response strategies. Therefore, compared to internals, externals

significantly prefer the use of deny strategies. This provides evidence that confirms H2. No support

was found to confirm H3 and H4.

Table 5: Interaction between crisis response cluster and locus of control factor

Conclusions & discussion

The situational crisis communication theory advises communication managers to select crisis response

strategies that are appropriate for the amount of potential reputational damage a crisis may inflict

(Coombs & Holladay, 2002). Based on the attribution theory it provides very specific guidelines in

order to repair the reputation of an organization in crisis as good as possible. It claims that diminish

strategies should be used for accident crises, rebuild strategies for preventable crises and deny

strategies for victim crises (Coombs, 2007a). Coombs & Holladay (1996) conducted a partial test of a

symbolic approach to crisis management, which showed that responses that match the crisis type, lead

to a more positive reputation than either no response or a mismatched response. Yet, they did not test

the basic assumptions of SCCT in its current form, nor did they use the crisis types or response

strategies from their latest typology.

The first set of hypotheses aimed to confirm the guidelines provided by SCCT, which is needed to

help gain more systematic knowledge on reputational repair during crises and to confirm the

theoretical framework of SCCT, as proposed by Coombs (2007a). However, no interaction-effect was

found between crisis type and crisis response strategies. Therefore the first set of hypotheses could be

neither confirmed nor rejected. Two main effects did occur for crisis type on the one hand and crisis

response on the other. For crisis type, significant differences in reputation were found between the

preventable crisis and both the victim and accidental crisis. When considering the items used from the

reputation quotient scale a significant difference was also found between the victim crisis and the

accidental crisis. Therefore the difference in organizational responsibility between several crisis types,

does bring about a difference in reputation. Corporate reputations will be significantly worse after

being confronted with a preventable crisis, and best after dealing with a victim crisis.

A main effect also showed for crisis response strategies. No matter which crisis type an organization is

confronted with, its reputation will be served best when using rebuild strategies. These showed a

significant difference in reputation from diminish strategies. The use of diminish strategies therefore

appears less favourable. The observation that rebuild strategies best serve the reputation of a company

in crisis, does not come as a surprise. Former research pointed out that an “unfair” comparison

between an apology and other less accommodative responses results in an over promotion of rebuild

strategies as “the” response (Coombs & Holladay, 2008).

The question remains why this study did not find a significant difference in reputation between

matched and mismatched responses. Why did Coombs & Holladay (1996) find that matched responses

work significantly better than mismatched responses? First of all, they tested two crises and two

strategies. Moreover, these were similar to the ones Coombs (2007a) proposes for SCCT, but not

exactly the same. They matched accidents to distance, which is similar to an excuse, and

transgressions, comparable to preventable crises, to remedial, which is a form of mortification where

the organization offers a compensation (Coombs & Holladay, 1996). Furthermore, their design

resulted in 12 crisis scenarios, that were judged by 116 undergraduate students. Each student

completed two crisis scenarios, meaning each scenario was judged by only about 20 respondents.

These respondents were not simply students, they were students enrolled in communication courses.

Therefore, they might have been familiar with the subject, or had a better view on the logic behind the

questionnaire. Moreover, the two scenarios they had to complete were paired so that no respondent

completed two similar scenarios. This is a very important difference with the current study. After

having read the second scenario, respondents will probably have had a better insight on the purpose of

the study. Moreover, these two scenarios were very different, it is to say, respondents could

subconsciously compare the second match to the first and assess it as better or worse. This difference

could explain why Coombs & Holladay (1996) found significant results.

Results did find evidence confirming the assumption Coombs & Holladay (2002) made about the

impact crisis severity might have on organizational reputation. They claimed that severity intensifies

reputational damage, but did not find proof for this assumption (Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Coombs,

1998). A negative correlation was found between severity of the crisis and organizational reputation.

This shows that the more severe the crisis is perceived, the worse an organization’s reputation will be.

The impact was measured differently than in the work of Coombs (1998), where crisis severity was

operationalized by the amount of damage and seriousness of injuries. The current study used the same

crisis damage for all crisis types, the death of two adults, and measured severity as perceived by

respondents. These results imply that an organization’s reputation during crises is not only determined

by the responsibility it bears for the crisis, as determined by the crisis type, but also by the severity of

the crisis, as perceived by stakeholders.

H2, H3 and H4 examined assumptions about a possible moderating influence of locus of control.

When comparing internals to externals, the former were believed to prefer strategies that take full

responsibility, rebuild strategies. The latter were expected to prefer strategies such as the deny and

diminish strategies, that reject responsibility for what happened. The results showed a significant

interaction between crisis response strategy and one of the locus of control factors, misfortunes. A

significant difference appeared between internals and externals when using the deny strategy. These

results confirm H2, when an organization uses deny strategies, its reputation will be perceived as more

positive by respondents with an external locus of control than by respondents with an internal locus of

control.

Locus of control also seems to moderate attributions of causality. Two factors of locus of control,

control over politics and misfortunes, negatively correlated with corporate responsibility. Therefore

people with a more external locus of control, who believe events are controlled by external, situational

forces of the environment (Duffy et al., 1977), assign less responsibility for crises to the organizations

confronted with them. These results imply that locus of control not only relates to whether an

individual believes he or she has power over what happens to him or her (Lefcourt, 1966), but also to

the causal attributions they make and their preference for internality or externality in others.

Limitations

As with all studies, the present one has methodological limitations. Reputation is a construct based on

organizational perception over time. The use of a fictitious company did not allow for measuring an

actual reputation. It also prevented the use of the complete reputation quotient. What was measured is

therefore rather an attitude toward an organization, than its reputation. Remarks can also be made on

the use of the internal-external (I-E) locus of control scale. In spite of its popularity, evidence has been

provided that it may oversimplify the actual dimensionality of the construct (Duffy et al., 1977).

Indeed, results for locus of control did only appear significant when using two of the nine factors

found within the scale, which confirms the implied multidimensionality. Moreover, the two factors

used, consisted of only two and three items of the I-E scale.

No significant interactions were found between crisis type and crisis response. Perhaps results would

have been more significant if a larger amount of respondents was obtained. Each of the nine scenarios

was read by a minimum of 32 respondents. Moreover, use of a no response condition would have been

useful. No significant differences in reputation were found between the response strategies used in

each crisis situation. A no response condition would have allowed us to see whether there is simply no

significant difference deemed by respondents between each of the responses, or whether it does not

matter to respondents if an organization gives a reaction to a crisis or not.

Furthermore, comparing extremely diverse crisis response strategies is judged to be problematic

(Coombs & Holladay, 2008). These comparisons may allow apology to easily win and provide a

questionable foundation for its recommended use to crisis managers. Results did show a preference for

rebuild crisis response strategies, encompassing apology. To conclude, the use of an experimental

design poses problems concerning external validity. The same problem occurs considering the use of a

fictitious organization. Involvement might moderate respondents’ perceptions of responsibility and

reputation.

Implications

The findings of this study offer both practical and scholarly contributions. First of all, in order to help

communication managers in taking a more scientific approach to communicating with their

stakeholders, the scientific frameworks offered to them and the guidelines these provide, should be

thoroughly tested. The situational crisis communication theory provides very specific guidelines to

communication managers (Coombs, 2007a). Yet, these have not been tested in their current form.

Therefore the current study fills a gap in research on SCCT. It starts from the potential offered by this

new theory and encourages the road that is taken in research of reputational restoration, that of

discovering situational variables that lead to differing crisis response strategies (Hobbs, 1995).

The importance is that it does not just accept the knowledge SCCT offers, which sounds very

plausible. The guidelines offered can only be acceptable if they are supported by additional research.

This study could neither confirm nor reject the guidelines offered by SCCT. The results therefore back

up the belief that more research into its basic assumptions is needed before authors start building

further on the knowledge it provides. However, the potential of the theory is supported. Crisis type and

crisis response strategy have a moderating effect on reputation. A bias toward rebuild strategies was

also confirmed. Additionally, proof was found for the assumption that crisis severity has an impact on

organizational reputation.

This study further attempted to fill another blank in crisis communication, namely that very little is

known about the moderating effects of stakeholders’ personality traits, on perceptions of reputation in

relation to the use of crisis response strategies (Coombs, 2007a; Dawar and Pillutla, 2000). A concept

related to attribution theory, locus of control, was studied. Research concerning reputational

restoration has been mainly concerned with environmental factors that lead an observer to make

internal and external attributions about behaviour, as in studies based on attribution theory (Collins,

1974). Yet, many of the conclusions observers make are more related to the observer than to the

organization in crisis. Results were able to confirm this assumption. The attributions of causality made

by respondents, were correlated to their locus of control. Moreover, support was found for the

supposition that someone’s locus of control determines the value he or she places on internality or

externality in other people or organizations. Therefore, internals and externals would prefer different

crisis response strategies. Results were able to prove this for the preference of externals. Compared to

internals, they perceive a reputation as more positive when organizations use, external, deny crisis

response strategies.

Future research

More research is recommended on the moderating role locus of control might have on the preference

for several strategies. Results showed that externals prefer the external deny strategy. Future research

might find that the same goes for diminish strategies, and that, compared to externals, internals prefer

rebuild strategies. This would confirm that an observer’s personality does have an impact on the

conclusions he or she makes about the organization in crisis. Aside from locus of control, other

characteristics of consumers that might moderate the impact of crises and crises response strategies on

an organization’s reputation, should be studied.

Since this study was not able to confirm the guidelines offered by the situational crisis communication

theory, these should be the subject of more research. These ideas are gaining scientific interest (Ihlen,

2002; De Blasio & Veale, 2007; Fortunato, 2008; Lee, 2005), and are important to offer

communication managers a theoretical framework in order to back up their decisions. Fu ture research

should not only test the match between crisis clusters, including different crisis types than the ones

used in this study, and crisis response clusters, but also compare strategies from within the same

cluster to establish a more realistic assessment of their value in crisis communication. Moreover,

concerning crisis response strategies, studies should determine the different effects on reputation when

using either separate strategies or combinations of strategies. When this knowledge is gained and

supported by several independent studies, research can focus on other variables in crisis situations that

might affect the choice of crisis response strategies and determine the value of bolstering strategies.

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APPENDIX A

1. Product tampering (Victim cluster):

Adwell is een Amerikaans bedrijf dat in 1995 werd opgericht. Het werd erg succesvol als producent

van natuurlijk frisse drankjes, gemaakt van fruit en groenten. Deze sapjes vielen al gauw ook in

Europa in de smaak en worden onder meer in Duitsland op grote schaal verkocht.

Eind 2006 echter is een man van buiten de organisatie erin geslaagd om cyanide aan een hoeveelheid

van deze drankjes toe te voegen. Dit gebeurde na het productieproces bij producten die het bedrijf

reeds hadden verlaten en zich in het magazijn van een distributieketen bevonden. De man, een

Berlijnse werkzoekende, was er in geslaagd de cyanide aan de flesjes toe te voegen in een

distributieketen in het centrum van de stad. Cyanide leidt ertoe dat de celademhaling blokkeert en de

dood in korte tijd (minuten) optreedt. De actie van deze man veroorzaakte in Berlijn en omgeving de

dood van twee volwassenen. De 35-jarige man werd na een zoekactie gearresteerd en blijkt een

psychiatrisch verleden te hebben.

Deny strategy: De oorzaak voor deze gebeurtenissen ligt bij een psychisch gestoorde

man van buiten ons bedrijf. Dit individu is er in geslaagd het middel cyanide toe te

voegen aan de afgewerkte producten die het bedrijf reeds verlaten hadden en zich

reeds in een distributieketen bevonden. De verantwoordelijke is door de polit ie

opgepakt en vormt niet langer een bedreiging voor uw vertrouwen in onze producten.

Diminish strategies: Sinds jaar en dag hanteren wij strikte standaarden wat betreft

kwaliteit en veiligheid. Geen enkel bedrijf kan echter de volledige controle hebben

over het productie –en distributieproces. Het is onmogelijk om voor honderd procent

uit te sluiten dat feiten als deze zich voordoen. Dit had bovendien veel erger kunnen

zijn. De gevolgen bleven, gezien de situatie, beperkt.

Rebuild strategies: We zijn onvoldoende zorgvuldig omgesprongen met de

beveiliging van onze producten. Dit had niet mogen gebeuren. We wensen dan ook

onze diepe spijt te betuigen aan de families van de slachtoffers. We willen ons

verontschuldigen voor wat is gebeurd met onze producten en door ons beleid. Alle

betrokkenen kunnen bovendien rekenen op onze financiële steun.

2. Technical-error product harm (accidental cluster):

Adwell is een Amerikaans bedrijf dat in 1995 werd opgericht. Het werd erg succesvol als producent

van natuurlijk frisse drankjes gemaakt van fruit en groenten. In tegenstelling tot wat vele andere

sappenmakers doen, werden de sapjes van Adwell niet gepasteuriseerd (van bacteriën gezuiverd door

verhitting) tijdens het productieproces. Dit proces verwijdert namelijk zowel smaak als

voedingsstoffen. Om de bacteriën te verwijderen en tegelijk de natuurlijkheid van de drankjes te

bewaren, maakte Adwell gebruik van een proces dat de sapjes koud hield gedurende productie en

distributie. Dit onderscheid vormde de identiteit van de organisatie, die zijn klanten zo kon garanderen

dat de voedingsstoffen in de drankjes werden behouden.

Eind 2006 echter bleek dat hoewel de koude verwerking frisheid en natuurlijkheid garandeert, het de

eindproducten niet kan beschermen tegen de gevaren van e. coli. Deze bacterie is erg zeldzaam en

komt zeker in onze gebieden nauwelijks voor, maar kan bij mensen leiden tot een blaasontsteking of

zelfs een buikvliesontsteking. Dit laatste is een ernstige en potentieel levensbedreigende ziekte. Dit

drankje, dat ook in Europa wordt verkocht, raakte in Duitsland besmet met de bacterie en veroorzaakte

de dood van twee volwassenen. Toen het bedrijf dit vernam, werd de productie onmiddellijk stilgezet

en de betrokken producten moesten wereldwijd uit de rekken worden gehaald. Adwell startte ook een

mediacampagne in de betrokken landen om mensen aan te sporen de producten terug te brengen.

Deny strategy: De oorzaak voor deze gebeurtenissen ligt bij een gevaarlijke

bacterie genaamd e. coli. De producten die hierdoor werden aangetast, zijn

intussen opgespoord, waardoor de bacterie niet langer een bedreiging vormt voor

uw vertrouwen in onze organisatie.

Diminish strategies: Sinds jaar en dag hanteren wij strikte standaarden wat

betreft kwaliteit en veiligheid. Geen enkel bedrijf kan echter de volledige

controle hebben over het productie- en distributieproces. Het is onmogelijk om

voor honderd procent uit te sluiten dat feiten als deze zich voordoen. Dit had

bovendien veel erger kunnen zijn. De gevolgen bleven, gezien de situatie, beperkt.

Rebuild strategies: We zijn onvoldoende zorgvuldig omgesprongen met de

veiligheid binnen ons productieproces. Dit had niet mogen gebeuren. We wensen

dan ook onze diepe spijt te betuigen aan de families van de slachtoffers. We

willen ons verontschuldigen voor wat is gebeurd met onze producten en door ons

beleid. Alle betrokkenen kunnen bovendien rekenen op onze financiële steun.

3. 0rganizational misdeed with injuries (preventable cluster):

Adwell is een Amerikaans bedrijf dat in 1995 werd opgericht. Het werd erg succesvol als producent

van natuurlijk frisse drankjes gemaakt van fruit en groenten. Deze sapjes vielen al gauw ook in Europa

in de smaak en worden onder andere in Duitsland op grote schaal verkocht.

De drankjes worden in Duitsland ook in blik verkocht. Eind 2006 echter bleek dat bij het openen van

deze blikken de kans bestond dat het lipje, het ingeduwde deel van het blik, loskomt en ongemerkt in

het blik valt. Twee volwassenen zijn hierin gestikt. Al snel werd het product uit de rekken gehaald en

teruggeroepen bij de consumenten. Na onderzoek kwam het wangedrag van het management van

Adwell aan het licht. Het bedrijf bleek volledig op de hoogte te zijn van de mogelijke problemen

gepaard met het ontwerp van deze blikken. Dit risico werd echter volstrekt genegeerd door Adwell,

daar het toeliet de productiekosten te drukken en een positieve invloed had op de winsten.

Deny strategy: De oorzaak voor deze gebeurtenissen ligt bij de Chinese

toeleveranciers van onze verpakkingen. Bij het produceren van deze verpakkingen

werden door hen onvoldoende hoge kwaliteitsstandaarden gehanteerd. De

samenwerking met deze toeleveranciers is na de gebeurtenissen onmiddellijk

stopgezet, waardoor dit niet langer een bedreiging vormt voor uw vertrouwen in

onze producten.

Diminish strategies: Sinds jaar en dag hanteren wij strikte standaarden wat

betreft kwaliteit en veiligheid. Geen enkel bedrijf kan echter de volledige controle

hebben over het productie- en distributieproces. Het is onmogelijk om voor

honderd procent uit te sluiten dat feiten als deze zich voordoen. Fouten kunnen

ongezien in het ontwerp van de verpakking sluipen. Dit had bovendien veel erger

kunnen zijn. De gevolgen bleven, gezien de situatie, beperkt.

Rebuild strategies: We zijn onvoldoende zorgvuldig omgesprongen met het

ontwerp van deze verpakkingen. Dit had niet mogen gebeuren. We wensen dan

ook onze diepe spijt te betuigen aan de families van de slachtoffers. We willen

ons verontschuldigen voor wat is gebeurd met onze producten en door ons beleid.

Alle betrokkenen kunnen bovendien rekenen op onze financiële steun.

APPENDIX B

Zo dadelijk leest u een korte tekst over de gebeurtenissen die plaatsvonden bij een bedrijf. Vervolgens

krijgt u ook de reactie die deze organisatie hierop gaf. U zal een reeks vragen lezen over deze

gebeurtenissen. Daarna zal ook gepeild worden naar de manier waarop verschillende belangrijke

gebeurtenissen in onze samenleving verschillende mensen beïnvloeden. Tot slot vragen we een aantal

algemene gegevens. Ik wens u alvast heel hartelijk te bedanken voor uw bijdrage aan mijn onderzoek.

Zo dadelijk leest u meer over de gebeurtenissen die in 2006 hebben plaatsgevonden bij een

Amerikaanse producent van vruchtensappen:

(crisis type)

De reactie van de organisatie op deze gebeurtenissen was de volgende:

(crisisrespons)

Geef antwoord op volgende vragen zonder rekening te houden met de reactie van het bedrijf:

Beantwoord volgende vragen op een schaal gaande van 1 (Helemaal niet verantwoordelijk) tot 10

(Helemaal verantwoordelijk).

1. Hoe verantwoordelijk was de organisatie voor

deze gebeurtenissen?

helemaal niet verantwoordelijk helemaal verantwoordelijk

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

2. Hoe verantwoordelijk waren het lot of de

omstandigheden voor deze gebeurtenissen?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Beantwoord volgende vraag op een schaal gaande van 1 (Helemaal niet ernstig) tot 10 (Bijzonder

ernstig).

3. Hoe ernstig vindt u de schade die deze crisis

heeft teweeggebracht?

helemaal niet ernstig bijzonder ernstig

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Beantwoord volgende vragen op een schaal gaande van 1 (Treft helemaal geen schuld) tot 10 (Treft

alle schuld).

4. In welke mate geeft u de schuld aan de

organisatie?

treft helemaal geen schuld treft alle schuld

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

5. In welke mate geeft u de schuld aan het lot of

de omstandigheden?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Beoordeel volgende stellingen, rekening houdend met de reactie van de organisatie:

Beoordeel volgende stellingen op een schaal gaande van 1 (Helemaal niet akkoord) tot 10 (Helemaal

akkoord).

6. Ik heb een goed gevoel bij dit bedrijf

helemaal niet akkoord helemaal akkoord

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

7. Ik heb bewondering en respect voor dit bedrijf

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

8. Ik heb vertrouwen in dit bedrijf

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

9. Dit bedrijf staat achter zijn producten en

diensten

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

10. Dit bedrijf wordt op uitstekende wijze geleid

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11. Dit bedrijf lijkt een goed bedrijf om voor te

werken

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

12. Dit bedrijf lijkt een bedrijf dat goede

werknemers zou hebben

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

13. Dit bedrijf wordt goed geleid

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

14. Dit bedrijf handhaaft hoge standaarden in de

manier waarop het mensen behandelt

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

15. Dit bedrijf is bezorgd om het welzijn van zijn

publiek

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

16. Dit bedrijf is eerlijk

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

17. Ik heb er vertrouwen in dat dit bedrijf de

waarheid vertelt over het incident

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

18. Dit bedrijf is bekommerd om het welzijn van

zijn publiek

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

19. In de meeste omstandigheden zou ik geneigd

zijn om te geloven wat dit bedrijf zegt

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Elk van volgende vragen toont u twee stellingen. Gelieve van beide stellingen deze aan te duiden

die het meest uw persoonlijke voorkeur geniet. Indien u met geen van beide stellingen echt

akkoord gaat, kies dan die stelling waarin u zich het best kan vinden:

20.

a. Kinderen raken in de problemen omdat hun ouders hen te veel straffen

b. Het probleem met de meeste kinderen vandaag de dag is dat hun ouders hen te mild

behandelen

21.

a. Veel van de ongelukkige zaken die mensen in hun leven overkomen, zijn deels te

wijten aan pech

b. De tegenslagen van mensen zijn het resultaat van de vergissingen die ze maken

22.

a. Eén van de voornaamste redenen waarom we oorlogen hebben, is omdat mensen zich

onvoldoende interesseren voor politiek

b. Er zullen altijd oorlogen zijn, hoe hard mensen ook proberen ze te voorkomen

23.

a. Op lange termijn krijgen mensen het respect dat ze verdienen in deze wereld

b. Jammer genoeg worden de goede karaktereigenschappen van een individu vaak niet

erkend, hoe hard die ook probeert

24.

a. Het idee dat leerkrachten oneerlijk zijn ten opzichte van studenten is onzin

b. De meeste studenten beseffen niet in welke mate hun resultaten worden beïnvloed

door toevallige gebeurtenissen

25.

a. Zonder de geschikte kansen kan men geen effectieve leider zijn

b. Bekwame mensen die er niet in slagen leiders te worden, hebben geen gebruik

gemaakt van hun kansen

26.

a. Hoe hard je ook probeert, sommige mensen vinden je gewoon niet aardig

b. Mensen die er niet in slagen om aardig bevonden te worden door anderen, begrijpen

niet hoe ze moeten overeenkomen met anderen

27.

a. Erfelijkheid speelt de voornaamste rol in het bepalen van iemands persoonlijkheid

b. Het zijn de ervaringen tijdens iemands leven die bepalen hoe iemand is

28.

a. Ik heb al vaak gevonden dat wat gaat gebeuren ook zal gebeuren

b. Vertrouwen op het lot heeft nooit zo goed gewerkt voor mij als het nemen van een

beslissing om een duidelijke aanpak te volgen

29.

a. In het geval van de goed voorbereide student is er nauwelijks zoiets als een oneerlijke

test

b. Dikwijls blijken examenvragen zo weinig te maken te hebben met de cursus dat

studeren erg nutteloos is

30.

a. Succesvol worden is een zaak van hard werken, geluk heeft daar weinig of niets mee

te maken

b. Een goeie job vinden hangt voornamelijk af van op de juiste plaats te zijn op het juiste

moment

31.

a. De gemiddelde burger kan een invloed uitoefenen op overheidsbeslissingen

b. Deze wereld wordt geleid door de weinige mensen aan de macht en er is niet zo veel

dat de kleine man eraan kan doen

32.

a. Wanneer ik plannen maak, ben ik er bijna zeker van dat ik ze kan laten werken

b. Het is niet steeds verstandig om te ver vooruit te plannen omdat veel dingen toch

blijken af te hangen van geluk of pech

33.

a. Er zijn mensen waar gewoon niets goed in zit

b. Er zit wel iets goeds in iedereen

34.

a. In mijn geval heeft krijgen wat ik wil weinig of niets te maken met geluk

b. Vaak kunnen we evengoed beslissen wat te doen door kop of munt te kiezen

35.

a. Wie de baas mag zijn, is vaak afhankelijk van wie voldoende geluk heeft om als eerste

op de juiste plaats te zijn

b. Ervoor zorgen dat mensen de juiste dingen doen, is afhankelijk van bekwaamheid,

geluk heeft er weinig of niets mee te maken

36.

a. Wat wereldzaken betreft, zijn de meesten onder ons de slachtoffers van krachten die

we ofwel niet kunnen begrijpen ofwel niet kunnen controleren

b. Door actief deel te nemen aan politieke en sociale zaken kunnen de mensen

wereldzaken controleren

37.

a. De meeste mensen beseffen niet in welke mate hun levens worden gecontroleerd door

toevallige gebeurtenissen

b. Er is echt niet zoiets als “geluk”

38.

a. Men moet altijd bereid zijn vergissingen toe te geven

b. Meestal is het best om je vergissingen te verbergen

39.

a. Het is moeilijk te weten of iemand je al dan niet echt aardig vindt

b. Hoeveel vrienden je hebt, hangt ervan af hoe leuk je bent als persoon

40.

a. Op lange termijn worden de slechte zaken die ons overkomen in evenwicht gebracht

door de goede

b. De meeste tegenslagen zijn het gevolg van een gebrek aan bekwaamheid,

onwetendheid, luiheid of alle drie

41.

a. Als we voldoende inspanningen leveren, kunnen we politieke corruptie uitwissen

b. Het is moeilijk voor mensen om veel controle uit te oefenen over de zaken die

heersende politici doen

42.

a. Soms kan ik niet begrijpen hoe leerkrachten komen tot de punten die ze geven

b. Er is een direct verband tussen hoe hard iemand studeert en de resultaten die hij of zij

behaalt

43.

a. Een goed leider verwacht dat mensen voor zichzelf beslissen wat ze zouden moeten

doen

b. Een goed leider maakt aan iedereen duidelijk wat ze moeten doen

44.

a. Dikwijls heb ik het gevoel dat ik weinig invloed kan uitoefenen over de zaken die mij

overkomen

b. Ik kan onmogelijk geloven dat toeval of geluk een belangrijke rol spelen in mijn leven

45.

a. Mensen zijn eenzaam omdat ze niet proberen om vriendelijk te zijn

b. Het heeft weinig zin om te hard te proberen mensen tevreden te stellen, als ze je leuk

vinden, vinden ze je leuk

46.

a. In de middelbare school ligt de klemtoon te veel op sport

b. Ploegsporten zijn een uitstekende manier om karakter te kweken

47.

a. Wat mij overkomt ligt in mijn eigen handen

b. Soms heb ik het gevoel dat ik onvoldoende controle uitoefen over de richting die mijn

leven uitgaat

48.

a. Meestal kan ik niet begrijpen waarom politici zich gedragen zoals ze dat doen

b. Op lange termijn zijn de mensen verantwoordelijk voor slecht bestuur op zowel het

nationale als het lokale niveau

Gelieve tot slot nog deze laatste vragen te beantwoorden

49. Wat is uw geslacht?

Man

Vrouw

50. Wat is uw geboortejaar? (Bijvoorbeeld 1985)

51. Wat is uw hoogst behaalde diploma (Indien u nog studeert, duid dan uw huidige studies aan)?

a. Lager onderwijs

b. Middelbaar onderwijs

c. Diploma via avondschool of specifieke opleiding (vb. VDAB)

d. Hoger onderwijs

e. Universitair onderwijs

f. Postuniversitair

52. Hoeveel dagen per week drinkt u vruchtensappen (drankjes gemaakt van fruit en/of groenten,

vb.: sinaasappelsap, pompelmoessap, wortelsap, smoothies, …)?

Nooit

1 dag per week

2 dagen per week

3 dagen per week

4 dagen per week

5 dagen per week

6 dagen per week

7 dagen per week

53. Op dagen waarop u vruchtensap drinkt, hoeveel glazen/drankjes drinkt u dan?

Hartelijk bedankt voor uw medewerking aan dit onderzoek