83-104 Luiz Eva

download 83-104 Luiz Eva

of 22

Transcript of 83-104 Luiz Eva

  • 8/13/2019 83-104 Luiz Eva

    1/22

    MON AIGNES RADICAL SKEP ICISM

    Luiz Eva*

    [A] It is a pleasant thought to imagine a mind exactly poised betweentwo parallel desires, or it would indubitably never reach a decision, sincemaking a choice implies that there is an inequality o value; i anyone wereto place us between a bottle and a ham when he had an equal appetite

    or drink and or ood there would be no remedy but to die o thirst ando hunger. In order to provide against this diffi culty the Stoics, when youask them how our souls manage to choose between two things which areindifferent and how we come to take one coin rather than another roma large number o crowns when they are all alike and there is no reasonwhich can sway your pre erence, reply that this motion in our souls isextraordinary and not subject to rules, coming into us rom some outsideimpulse, incidental and ortuitous. It seems to me that we could say thatnothing ever presents itsel to us in which there is not some difference,however slight: either to sight or to touch there is always an additionalsomething which attracts us even though we may not perceive it. Similarlyi anyone would postulate a cord, equally strong throughout its length,it is impossible, quite impossible, that it should break. For where would

    you want it to start to ray? And it is not in nature or it all to breakat once. Ten i anyone were to ollow that up with those geometricalpropositions which demonstrate by convincing demonstrations that thecontainer is greater than the thing contained and that the centre is as greatas the circum erence, and which can nd two lines which ever approacheach other but can never meet, and then with the philosophers stone andthe squaring o the circle, where reason and practice are so opposed, hewould perhaps draw rom them arguments to support the bold saying oPliny: Solum certum nihil esse certi, et homini nihil miserius aut superbius.(Tere is nothing certain except that nothing is certain, and nothingmore wretched than Man, nor more arrogant.) 1

    1. Tis short essay that I have quoted here in ull, How our mind tanglesitsel up, was probably composed at the same time as the much longerand better known Apology for Raymond Sebond (or at least part o it).

    * Universidade Federal do Paran, Curitiba, Brazil/ CNPq, Braslia.1 II, 14, 611, 692693. Quotations rom the Essays are made rom M. A. Screechs

    translation. We give, in the ollowing order, books number (according to the rstedition), chapters number, pages number (according to Villeys Edition) and thenpages number rom the translation.

    MAIA NETO_F7_83 104.indd 83MAIA NETO_F7_83-104. indd 83 5/13/2009 5:57:16 PM5/13/2009 5:57:16 PM

  • 8/13/2019 83-104 Luiz Eva

    2/22

    84

    In the Apology , the same topics are dealt with in a ully detailed way,inasmuch as Montaigne considers our cognitive limits in a skepticallight, mostly supported by the works o Cicero and Sextus Empiricus.As noted by Popkin, we can recognize there almost all the Pyrrhoniantropes, and even, I think, a sort o skeptical philosophical engagement byMontaigne himsel .2 Particularly in his criticism o the vanity o humanknowledge (incapable o nding the truth it covets), Montaigne offersa presentation o skeptical philosophy through its principal concepts:epokh or suspension o judgment, ataraxa or tranquility, antinomicargument, skeptical expressions, and the practical criterion that allows

    the philosopher to get on with his li e, the phainmenon. Tis last themeis the object o an important commentary that will lead us to the prob-lem I wish to discuss. Montaigne recognizes in Pyrrhonian skepticisman example o a radical doubting philosophyan endless con essiono ignorance, or a power o judgment that never inclines to one sideor to the other 3and the importance o controversies around thequestion o how a Pyrrhonian could live his philosophy. Nevertheless,he doubts that his position would stop him rom simply living his li e.Tis is how he comments on the anecdotes that claimed that a skepticwould throw himsel under moving carts or jump into an abyss:

    [A] Tat goes well beyond his teaching. He was not ashioning a log or

    a stone but a living, arguing, thinking man, enjoying natural pleasuresand com orts o every sort and making ull use o all his parts, bodily aswell as spiritual[C] in, o course, a right and proper way. [A] Tose

    alse, imaginary and antastic privileges usurped by Man, by which heclaims to pro ess, arrange and establish the truth, were renounced andabandoned by Pyrrho, in good aith. 4

    Once the short essay I quoted at the start is placed beside these lines,it may cause us no little amazement. Isnt the interpretation o philo-sophical skepticism that we nd in the Apology in radical oppositionto what we nd here? Te idea o a radical doubt (a per ect balanc-ing o wishes and o opposite reasons that would support them) was

    2 I will not develop this point urther here, as I discussed it in detail in Eva (2001).However, I think that many passages quoted here, as well as the interpretation thatwill be offered, may provide provisional support. Actually the interpretation o Mon-taigne as a skeptic philosopher, once embraced by his contemporaries, became againalmost a consensus, even i there is o course very different readings on the meaningo his skepticism.

    3 II, 12, 505A, 563.4 Id. ibid.

    MAIA NETO_F7_83 104.indd 84MAIA NETO_F7_83-104. indd 84 5/13/2009 5:57:16 PM5/13/2009 5:57:16 PM

  • 8/13/2019 83-104 Luiz Eva

    3/22

    85

    depicted there as something that would lead us to death (at least i onecould put it into practice). How can we reconcile these texts? Shouldwe conclude that we have here an openly contradictory author? Ormight this problem lead us to a better understanding o the particularcoherence o Montaignean skepticism?

    We will argue here in support o a different answer rom that givenby Myles Burnyeat, who provided one o the main interpretations inthe debate around the scope o Pyrrhonian epokh in ancient skepti-cism. In this debate, on the one hand Michael Frede offered what waslater called an urban interpretation, according to which Pyrrhonian

    epokh encompassed only assent given to non-evident objects ( dela)proposed by dogmatic philosophies, not opposing belie s about whatappears to us, the phainmenon.5 Burnyeat, on the other hand, objectedto what he saw as an anachronism in this interpretation, and to theincompatibility between the true scope o Pyrrhonian arguments (which,according to him, would counter all the evidence that goes beyondassent to the subjective phantasiai ) and the Pyrrhonians aim o livingaccording to the phainomena , in a way that prevents him rom livingcoherently with his skepticism. 6 Te scholarly debate has moved arbeyond Burnyeat and Frede, and I am not here taking a stand on the validity o their interpretations, which I am using only as a contrast tobring out what I think are the merits o Montaignes own skepticism.Indeed some interpreters have already considered this debate as aninterpretative key or interpreting Montaignes skepticism, 7 and Burn-yeat himsel offers us a passing remark about Montaignes version o the same precise problem I have here ormulated. 8 According to Burn-yeat, urban skepticism is the clearest tendency we can pick up in theEssays, even though this work, and Gassendis, rustrate the attemptto nd in them a single, consistent interpretation o [a] Pyrrhonist. 9 Nonetheless, I think that a closer examination o some passages rom

    5 Te terms are taken rom Barnes, 1982, pp. 23. Concerning this interpretation,see Frede (1984).

    6 C . Burnyeat, 1984, especially pp. 230232.7 For other assessments o these questions on Ancient Pyrrhonism, see or example

    Barnes (1982), Stough (1984), Mates (1996) and Bett (2000).8 See Laursen (1992), Wild (2000) and Larmore (2004). Tis last paper considers this

    debate by ocusing not on the problem o the scope o epokh , but on the notion oappearances (see p. 18), which is a different problem that deserves a separate analysis,even though it bears some relation to the present point.

    9 Burnyeat 1984, p. 228, ootnote 9. He re ers to Cave (1979) or his interpretation.

    MAIA NETO_F7_83 104.indd 85MAIA NETO_F7_83-104. indd 85 5/13/2009 5:57:16 PM5/13/2009 5:57:16 PM

  • 8/13/2019 83-104 Luiz Eva

    4/22

    86

    the Essaysmay offer us interesting clues as to how Montaigne himselcould have tried to reconcile skeptical doubt, understood in a consis-tent and at the same time particular way, with the plain use o human

    aculties needed or li e.2. Let us start here with an examination o some texts that seem to

    count as examples o these different interpretations o skeptical doubt. Iwill consider rst an argument taken rom the Apology , more precisely

    rom Montaignes criticism o the philosophical theories that rest uponthe evidence o phainomena as part o a strategy to legitimate theirtheses on the non-evident. What we should criticize, he says (surely

    ollowing the same remarks we nd in Sextus), is not the very actthat ngers move or the ace sometimes blushes and at other timesbecomes pale, but the way philosophers take advantage o this to try toestablish their theories on the relation between body and soul, whichremains to us entirely mysterious. 10 It would there ore not be pertinentto re use sensible impressions that appear to us in our natural stateor even the legitimate and common belie s that, in another text, hetells us he obeys.11

    Clearly, this discussion seems to offer, at rst sight, an example owhat one may take as a specimen o urban skepticism. But we shouldnot ignore this remark ound in the same discussion:

    [A] Whenever a case is ought rom preliminary assumptions, to opposeit take the very axiom which is in dispute, reverse it and make thatinto your preliminary assumption. For any human assumption, anyrhetorical proposition, has just as much authority as any other, unless adifference can be established by reason. So they must all be weighed inbalancestarting with general principles and any tyrannous one. [C] obe convinced o certainty is certain evidence o madness and o extremeuncertainty. 12

    Here the conclusion says literally that all human propositions maybe an object o balancing or suspension, inasmuch as they have thesame authority i reason (a two-edged kni e, in Montaignes words)is a aculty always capable o producing arguments on both sides.

    But instead o restricting the scope o doubt to a context o theoreti-

    10 See or instance II, 12, 538541; 604608); c . Sextus Empiricus (1994), I, 1920.Further re erences to Sextus Hypotyposis will be marked with HP and ollowed by thebook number and the page o the standard edition (Mutschmann-Mau, 1958).

    11 See III, 2, 806B, 909.12 II, 12, 540; 607, I underline.

    MAIA NETO_F7_83 104.indd 86MAIA NETO_F7_83-104. indd 86 5/13/2009 5:57:16 PM5/13/2009 5:57:16 PM

  • 8/13/2019 83-104 Luiz Eva

    5/22

    87

    cal justi cation, Montaigne seems here to extend it. Te balancing opropositions which he calls general and tyrannous is presented as just a starting point o a task that should encompass, i possible, all(human assumptions). Te radical nature o this doubt is stressed bythe paradoxical remark that closes the argument: o be convinced ocertainty is certain evidence o madness and o extreme uncertainty.Moreover, it is interesting to note that this radical ormula is aided bya kind o separation o propositions by their reliability (or inverselyby the urgency o the skeptical work), since, even though all proposi-tions should be balanced, the task has to start with a particular group,

    namely the general (usually held by philosophers), to subsequentlyreach more particular ones.

    Tis same eature is noticeable in other texts which we could take assamples o a more rustic skeptical doubt. For example:

    [B] We avoid the wine rom the bottom o the barrel; in Portugal theyadore its savour, it is the drink o princes. In short, each nation has severalcustoms and practices which are not only unknown to another nationbut barbarous and a cause o wonder ( arouches et miraculeuses) [to theother nations] . . . In my opinion the most commonplace and best-knowncan constitute, i we know how to present them in the right light, thegreatest o Natures miracles and the most amazing o examples, notably on the subject o human actions. 13

    As we know, the examination o human behavior is a central theme inthe Essays, and Montaigne is especially interested in showing it in itsamazing, ambiguous, or even contradictory aspects. But what he sayshere is only that human behavior notably provides the same thingswe could otherwise nd in the most commonplace and best-known,in the ordinary and common things (des plus ordinaires choses etplus communes et cognes). I we take into account other discussionson the same subject, we learn that, according to him, we generally takethings as natural as a result o our becoming accustomed to them, butalways ignoring what nature really is. 14 Yet he says in the Apology thateverything may appear to the sage as monstruous ( miraculeux ),15 pos-

    sibly having in mind the Pyrrhonists, or they can doubt so extremelyas to undermine even the impression o probability we are lef with byexperience (ruining lapparance de lexperience):

    13 III, 13, 1081, 1227 I underline.14 See I, 23, 112AB, 126; I, 27, 179A, 201.15 See II, 12, 526, 589.

    MAIA NETO_F7_83 104.indd 87MAIA NETO_F7_83-104. indd 87 5/13/2009 5:57:16 PM5/13/2009 5:57:16 PM

  • 8/13/2019 83-104 Luiz Eva

    6/22

    88

    [A] . . . And the sole use Pyrrhonists have or their arguments and theirreason is to undermine whatever experience shows to be probable; it iswonder ul how ar our supple reason will go along with their project odenying actual evidence: they can prove that we do not move, that wedo not speak and that there is no such a thing as weight or heat, withthe same orce o argument as we have when we prove the most likelythings to be true. 16

    Brie y, these texts call our attention inso ar as they exhibit two ea-tures o Montaignes skepticism. First, they can all be considered tobe proposing a sort o doubt that we could hardly con ne within thelimits o an urban skepticism (even i a more restricted sort o doubtcould count here as a particular case). We should there ore concludethat things that are not effectively doubted by someone cannot countas offering, according to Montaigne, any epistemically warranted kindo knowledge: neither the natural appearance o things nor experiencein opposition to reason, as he says in the introduction to the essay Onexperience.17 Secondly, this radical stance is in some way moderated orlimited by the separation o objects to which doubt would apply accord-ing to priority. But these objects seem to be different in each case con-sideredphilosophical theories, human behavior, general propositionsor reason (in opposition to experience). Tus, instead o concluding herethat we have an oscillation between two different skeptical pedigrees,

    as Burnyeat does, 18 we may ask which standard could be used here as

    16 II, 12, 571, 644.17 Tere Montaigne re ers to both, reason and experience, as equally incapable o

    providing knowledgereason has so many orms that we do not know how which torestort to, experience has no ewer . . . (III, 13, 1065B, 1207) However it does not mean,he says, that in view o our cognitive interests, when we ace the limits o reason, weshould not employ experience, even i this is a more ragile and less worthy means.

    18 Even though Wild has pointed out correctly, in my view, that Burnyeats interpre-tation is wrong when it tends to see Montaigne as an urban skeptic, I think that hisown interpretation is still too dependent on the same conceptual scheme. He acceptswithout urther justi cation the idea that, since Montaigne is not an urban skeptic,he adopts a rustic skepticism (2000, p. 48), without taking into account the act that,according to Burnyeat, this would amount to a critical rejection o this philosophy.He then nally ollows the same path to recognize the oscillation between the twointerpretations (2000, p. 50), and does not consider that this is not capable o recover-ing the particular coherence o Montaignes skepticism. Larmore, in his turn, despite

    ocusing on a different problem, as I said (see ootnote 8 above), affi rms that il nya aucune indication que (Montaigne) veuille limiter le doute sceptique aux theriesportant sur linobservable (p. 19) and that the originality o Montaignes skepticismmust be ound elsewhere.

    MAIA NETO_F7_83 104.indd 88MAIA NETO_F7_83-104. indd 88 5/13/2009 5:57:17 PM5/13/2009 5:57:17 PM

  • 8/13/2019 83-104 Luiz Eva

    7/22

    89

    a way o mitigating an unrestricted and radical skeptical doubt, at leastpotentially, in order to allow the skeptic to live his li e.

    3. In order to see how Montaigne would deal with it, I nd it use ulto try to separate his exegetical interests in ancient skepticism romhis efforts to recover this philosophy personally at the level o hisown practice. Even though his attention to the ormer appears to be

    ar greater and more acute than is usually acknowledged, he seems tobe equally aware o the obstacles to learning as precisely as he wishedhow the skeptics actually put their philosophy into practice. Abouttheir extreme epokh , or instance, this is what he says: I have tried

    to explain this notion as clearly as I can, because many nd it hard tograsp, and its very authors present it somewhat diversely and ratherobscurely.19 Tis could probably count as a good reason or him to tryto elucidate in a personal way such a central problem in a philosophythat so much interested him. In act, even i his own skeptical argu-ments are mostly taken rom Cicero and especially rom Sextus, wecan also discern, as I have tried to show elsewhere, 20 some others thatseem to be quite original, and which seem to respond explicitly to hisefforts to deal with this matter (that is, in reconstructing a skepticismcompatible with the greater coherence, as we will see, that he appar-ently ound in Pyrrhonian skepticism). 21 Tey may serve, as he says inthe Apology just be ore he presents them, as a sample o those thingswhich, even going beyond the orce o his own understanding, he triesto deal with so as to at least make them more accessible or others who

    19 II, 12, 505A, 563. See also his comments on the lack o a work capable o offeringa honest and care ul account o Ancient opinions on the subject o our Being and ourMorals (including Pyrrhonian ataraxia ), at II, 12, 578, S159. Te relations betweenthis Pyrrhonian goal and Montaignes re ections on tranquility are rightly stressed,in my opinion, by Laursen (1992), pp. 103 ss. For a different reading on this point,see Larmore (2004).

    20 See Eva (2006).21 Larmores interpretation (which goes urther than ours in recognizing differences

    between ancient skepticism and Montaignes skepticism) does not take this point su -ciently into account, in my view. When he comments, or example, on Montaignes

    lemma Que sais-je, he goes so ar as to recognize that even Sextus allows the use oquestions to present the skeptical position (see HP I, 189), but insists that Montaignesskepticism is new because Sextus ne conclut jamais que le sceptique erait mieuxdnoncer la teneur de son point de veu en orme dune question. (see Larmore, 2004,p. 20) But, i it recalls interpretative points about the meaning o ancient skepticismthat should be developed urther and may turn out to be controversial, should we notsimply take the act that Montaigne uses that ormula, as allowed by the skeptic, asevidence o his allegiance to this philosophy (in the limited way he avows he is capableo reconstructing it)?

    MAIA NETO_F7_83 104.indd 89MAIA NETO_F7_83-104. indd 89 5/13/2009 5:57:17 PM5/13/2009 5:57:17 PM

  • 8/13/2019 83-104 Luiz Eva

    8/22

    90

    may consider them in the uture. 22 Te arguments I have in mind areplaced just afer the amous dedicace and ocus rom different sides onthe allibility o our aculties o knowledge in their aim to establish thetruth, including with regard to their own limits:

    [A] . . . We are closer to ourselves than to the whiteness o snow or theweight o a stone: i Man does not know himsel , how can he know whathis properties and powers are? Some true knowledge may perhaps ndlodging in us; i so, that is by chance, since error is received into the soulin the same way and in the same ashion; souls have no means o tellingone rom the other, no means o separating truth rom alsehood.23

    Montaigne then proceeds to show that we are not in possession o aaculty o understanding or judgment that is capable o grasping the

    truth, with which every man was expected to be endowed in exactlythe same way, since we cannot nd any single proposition that is notsubject to debate and controversy, or which cannot be so. 24 Next,the same distrust results rom our con icting individual judgments atdifferent times, because we always take the latest one as superior andde nitive, no matter how contradictory they are. 25 Again, we can rec-ognize some impediments to the proper operation o our aculties incertain speci c situations, such as sickness or drunkenness, but the actthat we cannot perceive their presence more ully does not mean that

    they are not present, or this may just be a result o the limits o theseaculties. I these impediments happen to be more subtle, they may beeven more harm ul, or this very reason, in view o our search or thetruth. 26 In the same line he says, as he does elsewhere, 27 that the actthat our spirit is bound by the need or understanding and persuadingmay paradoxically create some additional diffi culties or itsel , since it isnaturally inclined to orge explanations that, instead o better disclosingthe truth, will serve to hide it even more.

    My hypothesis is there ore that these arguments should be seen aspart o an effort to set out not only a skepticism in its most acute andradical version (which would also be the most coherent), but also one

    22 See II, 12, 560, S139.23 II, 12, 561, 632.24 Ibid., 562A, 633634.25 Ibid., 563564A, 634635.26 Ibid., 564567ABC, 636640.27 Tese particular arguments can be ound, or instance, in I, 31, 205A, 231 and

    III, 11, 1027BC, 11621163.

    MAIA NETO_F7_83 104.indd 90MAIA NETO_F7_83-104. indd 90 5/13/2009 5:57:17 PM5/13/2009 5:57:17 PM

  • 8/13/2019 83-104 Luiz Eva

    9/22

    91

    compatible with the practical acceptance o the apparent acts ( leseffects, in his own words) and with the plain use o our natural aculties(to the extent that they can be used). More precisely, these argumentscreate a general suspicion about the very aculties by which all ourknowledge would be gained, i we could have it:

    [A] I this appearance has once deceived me, i my touchstone regularlyproves unreliable and my scales wrong and out o true, why should Itrust them this time, rather than all others? 28

    But this does not mean that it would be possible, or even desirable, or

    our aculties to simply stop acting as they naturally do, within their ownlimits, in spite o their incapacity to determine the truth.Tis seem to be in accordance with what we nd in this late addition

    with which Montaigne concludes his exposition o the skeptics criterionor action, with the aid o a metaphor taken rom the Academics:

    [C] Yet there is no single school o philosophy which is not orced toallow its Sage (i he wished to live) to accept a great many things whichhe cannot understand, perceive or give assent to. Say he boards a ship.He carries out his design, not knowing whether it will serve his purpose;he assumes the vessel to be seaworthy, the pilot to be experienced andthe weather to be avorable. Such attendant details are, o course, merelyprobable: he let himsel be guided by appearances, unless they are expressly

    contradicted. He has a body. He has a soul. He eels the impulsions o hissenses and the promptings o his spirit. He cannot nd within himsel anysign speci cally suggesting that it be appropriate or him to make an acto judgment: he realizes he must not bind his consent to anything, sincesomething alse may have every appearance o particular truth. Despiteall this, he never ails to do his duty in this li e, ully and ttingly.29

    Even though Montaigne, as we will see, takes Academic skepticism asoffering a problematic criterion as a solution to this problem (at leastin the rst edition o the Apology ) this would not prevent the use othis metaphor to recover the sense o his own skeptical strategy, basedon a critical assessment o the cognitive power o our aculties.30 Te

    28 II, 12, 563, 634635.29 II, 12, 505506C, 563564.30 Some interpreters have stressed that Ciceros Academica is philosophically more

    relevant to Montaignes skepticism than is usually recognized by those who take himto be a pure Pyrrhonist. See or instance Limbrick (1979) and Maia Neto (2004). Butit is a diffi cult question to determine precisely how Academic skepticism is understoodand eventually assimilated by him. I have argued elsewhere (Eva, 2007) that Montaignetends to consider Sextus and Ciceros versions o skepticism as or the most part

    MAIA NETO_F7_83 104.indd 91MAIA NETO_F7_83-104. indd 91 5/13/2009 5:57:17 PM5/13/2009 5:57:17 PM

  • 8/13/2019 83-104 Luiz Eva

    10/22

    92

    coherence o this reconstruction, at the same time, seems to dependupon considering two things separately. On the one hand, there is the

    act that each proposition is generally doubtable. On the other hand, itis a quite distinct problem to know how ar one will be able to developan actual doubt in accordance with this possibilitya problem whoseanswer may depend on different actors that do not necessarily call inquestion the coherence o the judgment concerning the rst point, eveni it is in the end impossible (as we will see below) that this could be doneplainly. It is interesting to note that, in the same discussion, Montaignesconclusion about the unreliability o our judgment leads him to propose

    not an unconditional suspension but a prudential rule:[A] . . . Our condition is subject to error: that ought, at the very least, tolead us to be more moderate and restrained in making changes. We oughtto admit that, no matter what we allow into our understanding, it ofenincludes alsehoods which we accept by means o the same tools whichhave ofen proved contradictory and misleading. 31

    We can also notice that Montaignes skepticism, understood along theselines, comes closer in some o its eatures to that which Descartes laterseems to have had in mind (at least, that is, inso ar as they propose asort o radical doubt and at the same time separate a theoretical doubt

    rom practical certainties). But it should be stressed that the Cartesian

    re utation o skepticism goes through a methodical procedure, carriedout in the First Meditation, to effectuate an actual doubt correspond-ing to the hypothesis o a universal lack o certitude o his opinions.Tis is precisely the stance that may have appeared to Montaigne, imy interpretation is correct, as being conducive to an un easible and

    harmonious, rom the rst versions o the Essays, even though in the earlier texts thedistance seems to be more pronounced in relation to certain points (due to the actthat he based himsel mostly on Sextus) than in later ones (written during or aferrereading Ciceros work). But we should not orget that even i Montaigne looked atthese sources while trying to recover coherently the philosophies he holds in highestesteem, this recovering is always personal, and acknowledged as relative to his own judgement and capacities.

    31 II, 12, 564, 635. o explain how Montaignes skepticism could at the same timepropose a suspension o judgement and be compatible with practical li e, Laursen sug-gests that the best answer would be ound in using judgement in two different senses,as it is related to metaphysics or as it is taken as a aculty to make decisions in condi-tions o uncertainty. (1992, p. 101) But, in addition to the act that Montaigne neverre ers to such a split in this concept, it seems to reinstall a sort o Fredean solutionto the problem (which tends to trans orm him into an urban skeptic), which wouldbe incompatible, in my view, not only with his radicality, but also with Montaigneanremarks on the impossibility o xing boundaries to our soul, as commented below.

    MAIA NETO_F7_83 104.indd 92MAIA NETO_F7_83-104. indd 92 5/13/2009 5:57:17 PM5/13/2009 5:57:17 PM

  • 8/13/2019 83-104 Luiz Eva

    11/22

    93

    even contradictory position, and the conclusions we would be led toby this path probably appear to be equally deserving o his suspicion(since they would be produced by the very aculties whose powers werecalled in question).

    Anyway, this hypothesis may also help us to eventually understandother essays better, such as On virtue, where the same problem isdiscussed:

    [A] Like all other true philosophers, Pyrrho, the man who built upignorance into so pleasing a science, made an essay at con orming hisli e to his doctrine. And because he maintained that the eebleness ohuman judgement was so extreme as to be unable to incline towardsany decision or persuasion and wanted to keep it orever hanging in thebalance, regarding and welcoming all things as adiaphora ( indifferentes),stories are told ( on conte) how he always maintained the same mannerand expression: when he started to say anything he never ailed to go onto the end, even i the man he was speaking to had walked off . . . Now itis one thing to bring your soul to accept such ideas; it is quite another(cest plus) to combine theory and practice. Yet it is not impossible. Butwhat is virtually incredible is that you should combine them with suchperseverance and constancy as to make it your regular routine in actionso ar rom common custom.32

    Here Montaigne is not alling into contradiction, as he would do i hepersonally assumed here the Laertian interpretation o skepticism thathe openly re uses in the Apology , or he merely says it is said (onconte) that he kept the same expression. We should rather take thisdiscussion in the light o the descriptions he offers o his own intel-lectual practice in the Essays, that is, as a sample o an exercise thatallows him to employ different ideas and arguments, even those heavows not to understand plainly, in order to discover the limits o hisown understanding or to regard them rom an unexpected viewpoint,so as to clari y something about them. 33 Yet he remarks elsewhere thathe may even employ ctitious testimonies, inasmuch as they may revealto us something about human capacities. 34 I we apply these statementsto this example, we may stress the conditional nature o his re ectionhere: i that were the consequence o our radical incapacity to detectthe truth, it would there ore also be impossible to put it into practice,

    32 II, 29, 705706A, 800.33 See I, 50, 301302A, 337338.34 I, 21, 105BC, 119.

    MAIA NETO_F7_83 104.indd 93MAIA NETO_F7_83-104. indd 93 5/13/2009 5:57:17 PM5/13/2009 5:57:17 PM

  • 8/13/2019 83-104 Luiz Eva

    12/22

    94

    at least in a permanent way. 35 We have here a picture o an extremeskepticism very close to that which we nd later in Hume, and thisis one which Montaigne did not think that we could per orm. Butaccording to him it does not seem to harm the coherence o a radicalskeptical diagnosis o our condition. It instead offers him an occasionto measure, according to his experience, a [great] difference betweenthe leaps and sallies o the soul and a settled constant habit. 36

    4. We cannot see yet, however, how Montaigne would differentiatemore reliable propositions rom those which could be more readilydoubted. In act, it seems that i he were to propose a theoretical cri-

    terion or that he would just be led back to the same problem that hehad at the start (and maybe to a version o an urban skepticism heseemed to re use). Tis would be the case even i this criterion wereto change according to the particular case consideredinasmuch, aswe saw, as this particularity seemed to be relevant, according to him,in order to put skepticism into practice. We should there ore perhapslook here, ollowing the remarks made by Sextus on this point, or akind o practical criterion. It is at any rate important to recall that,when Montaigne depicts philosophy in a avorable light, he views itessentially as an exercise or activity ,37 whose results depend on theway it is put into practice, as well as on the philosophers intellectualcapacities. In accordance with this view o philosophy, I propose hereto consider Montaignes view o skepticism as a sort o movement bywhich the re ection becomes deeper (as also does our capacity to employour intellectual aculties), at the same time that doubt grows so as toaffect, inso ar as this is possible, that which at a given moment mayhave appeared as evident. 38 In this skepticism, largely identi ed with

    35 Te same remark seems to apply to the text re erred to in ootnote 15 above. Eveni to the wisest men everything should appear as miraculous, this does not mean thatthis could be really put into practice.

    36 II, 29, 705A, 799, just be ore the text quoted above (see ootnote 32).37 See particularly the Essay I, 26. Tis is an aspect o Ancient Pyrrhonism stressed

    by some interpreters like Barnes (1982) and Annas (1986), but it seems to me thatMontagines skepticism differs rom the picture they offer in several important aspects( or it doesnt mean, or example, that it doesnt make sense to ask or the epistemo-logical scope o theepokh that lies under his interpretation).

    38 Larmore stresses rightly, in my opinion, the importance o the movement o thesoul to reconstruct the particularity o Montaignes skepticism (see Larmore, 2004,pp. 21, 27), although my point concerns here, more particularly, its relationship tothe notions o ztesis and epokh ; that is, as an inde nite but oriented movement thatdeepens the examination o what may seem acceptable at a particular time, resulting

    MAIA NETO_F7_83 104.indd 94MAIA NETO_F7_83-104. indd 94 5/13/2009 5:57:18 PM5/13/2009 5:57:18 PM

  • 8/13/2019 83-104 Luiz Eva

    13/22

    95

    the very practice o the essay , the ztesis (the quest itsel ) tends to gaina prominent and somewhat autonomous role, and the suspension o judgment tends to become mostly an ending point, sometimes repre-sented by means o a paradox (that signi es to our understanding the very limits he is aced with throughout this search). And this practicewould naturally be accepted as coherent with a potentially unlimitedskepticism, in the sense that every proposition could in principle betaken as its object.

    Tis image seems to t in well with some relevant passages o theEssays. A rst example could be ound again in the Apology , in the

    discussion about our incapacity to x boundaries or our soul, whichcomes between the dedicace and the arguments on the uncertainty oour judgment that I have just considered. Tis discussion consists oa series o arguments connected, in a critical way, with the problemo determining how ar our knowledge can go. First, Teophrastussposition, according to which we should re rain rom our search or thecauses when it goes beyond the study o natural phaenomena , is praisedby Montaigne as a moderate opinion. It must nevertheless be aban-doned, he argues, or it is impossible to establish such a limit, so thatone would be obliged to re rain rom all knowledge (as he says, ollow-ing an Academic skeptical argument). But next it is the very Academiccriterion, the veri simile (vraysemblable), that is rejected, this time bymeans o a Pyrrhonian argument that ocuses on the inconsistency oAcademic efforts to replace the truth by the true-seemingwhich turnagainst themselves the same criticism they proposed, so to speak, ina negative version, since now the problem concerns the limits o ourknowledge in determining its own limits .39 However, it is important tonote that according to Montaigne the Academic criterion is offeredby these philosophers as an attempt to avoid the bizarre diffi culties

    or which our intellect can hardly nd room, that appear when weconsider equally doubt ul the movement o a stone thrown by ourhand and that o the Eighth Sphere. In its turn, the Pyrrhonist posi-tion is presented in a paradoxical way, at the same time bolder (that is,more radical than those o the Academics) and more true-seeming. In

    act, this last quali cation only doubles the paradox, since its superior

    rom Montaignes efforts to reconstruct a radical skepticism compatible with thecoherence he ound in the Pyrrhonian diagnosis o the matter.

    39 C . II, 12 561562AC, 632633, c . HP II, 7475.

    MAIA NETO_F7_83 104.indd 95MAIA NETO_F7_83-104. indd 95 5/13/2009 5:57:18 PM5/13/2009 5:57:18 PM

  • 8/13/2019 83-104 Luiz Eva

    14/22

    96

    coherence over Academic skepticism is described by means o the veryAcademic concept he has just rejected, inasmuch as the results o thiscritical progress only show more acutely the lack o oundations o our

    aculties, leading us to such diffi culties.40A second example o the same paradoxical skeptical procedure,

    although less clear than the one I have just considered, could be oundin the very text with which I started, How our mind tangles itselup. As we saw, it starts by examining the idea o a choice betweentwo per ectly balanced wishes, also called Buridans Ass, which, takenas a case o opposition between reason and acts (as parallels that

    converge inde nitely and never meet), becomes an illustration o anextreme conclusion ascribed to Pliny: Nothing so certain as incerti-tude, nothing more miserable and proud than man. What demands

    urther examination here is the meaning o the opposition between thetwo explanations proposed on the same subjectone ascribed to theStoics and the other offered by Montaigne himsel that is, the choicebetween two equally acceptable alternatives. As we saw, while the Stoicsre er to this movement o the soul as extraordinary, coming out o anexternal, ortuitous and accidental impulse, Montaigne pre ers to thinkthat nothing presents itsel to us in which there is not some difference,however slight. Should we take this stance as an alternative theory thathe sees as closer to the truth than the other? And what relation doesit bear to the radical and paradoxical conclusion that ollows rom theopposition between reason and acts at the end o the essay?

    We certainly have room here or different hypotheses, but whatparticularly calls our attention is the act that Montaigne does not offerany reason to support his own explanation. Both are just offered sideby side, and he limits himsel to introducing his own choice this way:we could better say, it seems to me, that nothing appears to us withoutany difference. Might we not eel temptedat least in a demandingreading which would not be content to simply ollow Montaignesauthorityto ask at this point what must incline us to ollow his choice,instead o that o the Stoics? I think the temptation would be strong,since even though Montaigne goes on re erring to the differences oursenses always nd in things, the central theme o the essay is preciselythe choice between alternatives that are equivalent rom a rational point

    40 Ibid., S140. For different readings o this text, see Maia Neto (1994) and Larmore(2004).

    MAIA NETO_F7_83 104.indd 96MAIA NETO_F7_83-104. indd 96 5/13/2009 5:57:18 PM5/13/2009 5:57:18 PM

  • 8/13/2019 83-104 Luiz Eva

    15/22

    97

    o view. Tus, i we have to balance these opposite explanations offeredin relation to the same problemi.e., to know how action occurs in the

    ace o the limits o our reasonis it not the same problem reinstatedat a higher level?

    Moreover, the problem just gets deeper when we ocus our attentionon the content o each choice. Could we accept that, or lack o reasons,Montaigne regards his own position as pre erable in a ortuitous way?Certainly not, or that would, paradoxically, support the Stoics, whosay that this is how we choose. But, on the other hand, there seems tobe no imperceptible difference that could do the job o justi ying this

    choice: not only because, i it is imperceptible, it will justi y nothing,but especially because it will lead us into a circular argument, since thisis the point that must be independently proved. As we see, the veryproblem that the text implicitly sets up, rom this perspective, turnsinto yet another paradox, alongside the others that are offered in thesame essay (to say nothing about other chapters, like the Apology , whereMontaignes de ence o Sebond shows paradoxical turns very similarto these). Here the paradox has the effect, it seems, o leading us toa sort o suspension o judgment regarding this point: how do we actin the ace o things that are equal rom the point o view o reason?I we choose, it depends on something, but we cannot really choosebetween rival explanations as to how we make choices, and we could just go on inde nitely asking how we could explain the reasons whywe choose in the absence o reasons. Nevertheless we choose, at least iwe are pressed by practical needs.

    Montaignes own explanation, in this light, instead o being a theoreti-cal position he chooses rom amongst others, reveals itsel as possessinga deeper meaning; that is, it reveals a new panorama o the limits o ourreason, which appears as more deeply incapable o a choicein thiscase, between diverse theories on this very pointthan it appeared to beat rst sight (at least i we are more demanding about the subject thatis under examination in the essay). In other words, i this hypothesiscan be accepted, we could read this essay as conducting us to a newmeaning o suspension by a sort o movement that leads us to deepenthe comprehension o its themehow our soul entangles itsel andso, at the same time, the skeptical doubt it proposes. We had at the startonly a rather vague picture o skeptical doubt, one that could equallywell t the example o Buridans Ass as well as the anecdotes we nd inDiogenes Laertius or Galen, and according to which the skeptic couldnot live his skepticism: too loose a picture to correspond to the acute

    MAIA NETO_F7_83 104.indd 97MAIA NETO_F7_83-104. indd 97 5/13/2009 5:57:18 PM5/13/2009 5:57:18 PM

  • 8/13/2019 83-104 Luiz Eva

    16/22

    98

    understanding Montaigne exhibits in the Apology , and in contradic-tion, as we saw, with the interpretation o the Pyrrhonists assent tothe phainmenon which he then offers. But the paradoxes in which weare enmeshed here, in this short essay, invite us to replace this picturewith another (at least i we are concerned with the possible coherenceo the text as a whole), and to perceive that in the end they seem torest mostly upon viewing skepticism as a sort o theoretical positionas to how should we conciliate radical doubt and practical li e. Tesecontradictions seem to change their philosophical meaning and so ceaseto harm the coherence o his philosophical posture, i skepticism is

    taken as essentially an argumentative practiceone that may be turnedradically to the criticism o every proposition, and which includes asone o its modes, according to Sextus, opposition between what appearsand what is thought; 41 a practice through which we could observe ourincapacity to x boundaries or our soul in its own movement o goingon inde nitely in the critical assessment o what seems at any momentto be acceptable. I , in the end, our soul entangles itsel and becomesimmobile, this may be seen, at same time, as an example o the epokh it arrives at afer considering the point under examination, and also asthe result o a trans ormation in the sense o theepokh (that is preciselythe point under examination). It does not reveal itsel as incapable oacting in an absolute and general sense, but only recognizes its incapac-ity to reconcile what reason seem to offer (the rst conclusion aboutwhat should ollow rom its eebleness, according to which we shoulddie) with the way acts occur (even regarding the way our belie s keeppresenting themselves, in spite o what reason seem to en orce).

    5. How could we sum up the philosophical view o skepticism thatwe then nd here? In accordance with Sextuss de nition o skepticism,Montaigne sees it essentially as a philosophical practice. However, morethan a simple procedure o opposing theses, it becomes an intellectualactivity that he judges capable o producing intellectual reedom. 42 Skepticism is there ore associated with a re exive work by which itbecome possible to deepen the reach o our understanding and to assesscritically, on every subject, everything that could at a given momentpresent itsel as indubitable, at least in principle. As Montaigne says,

    41 C . HP I, 31.42 See particularly how Montaigne depicts skepticism in II, 12, 503504AC,

    560562.

    MAIA NETO_F7_83 104.indd 98MAIA NETO_F7_83-104. indd 98 5/13/2009 5:57:18 PM5/13/2009 5:57:18 PM

  • 8/13/2019 83-104 Luiz Eva

    17/22

    99

    there is an ignorance that requires no less knowledge to conceive itthan does knowledge. 43 But in accordance with what I said about theprominent role assumed by the ztesis, skepticism then becomes able to

    oster what he calls la formation du jugement , the act o orming ouraculty o judgment.44 Te use o paradox seems to constitute, at least in

    part, a tool or this purpose, inasmuch as it requires the reader to puthis intellectual aculties in action to solve it. 45 However, the course othis investigation does not necessarily remove entirely the paradox thatset it in motion, even i it may sometimes occur. But this result is notseen by Montaigne as the proo o some truth, it shows only his own

    incapacity or going urther. Everything remains, in principle, undersuspicion, as a possible object o doubt, in view o the ailures o ourintellectual aculties which produced it, and the limit o this practicecannot be ascribed to any intrinsic orce o the results ound, but toour possible incapacity to go urther in displaying our cognitive limitsmore clearly. It is easy to see, afer all, that this could never be donecompletely, since all the results will themselves be a product o the same

    aculty that is under suspicion. Tis seems to be in accordance withhow Montaigne depicts our cognitive situation, by mean o a able, ina later text rom the Essays:

    [B] . . . Men ail to recognize the natural sickness o their mind which does

    nothing but range and erret about, ceaselessly twisting and contrivingand, like our silkworms, becoming entangled in its own works: Mus in pice. [a mouse stuck in pitch] It thinks it can make out in the distancesome appearance o light, o conceptual truth: but, while it is chargingtowards it, so many diffi culties, so many obstacles and resh diversionsstrew its path that they make it dizzy and it loses the way. Te mind isnot at all that different rom those dogs in Aesop which, descrying whatappeared to be a corpse oating on the sea, being unable to get at it, setabout lapping up the water so as to dry out a path to it, [C] and su -

    ocate themselves . . . [B] It is only our individual weakness which makesus satis ed with what has been discovered by others or by ourselves inthis hunt or knowledge: an abler man will not be satis ed with it. Tereis always room or a successor[C] yes, even or ourselves[B] and adifferent way to proceed. Tere is no end or our inquiries: our end is in[another] world. [C] When the mind is satis ed, that is a sign o dimin-ished aculties or weariness. No power ul mind stops within itsel : it isalways stretching out and exceeding its capacities. It makes sorties which

    43 III, 11, 1030C, 1166.44 See Essay I, 26.45 Further examination o this can be ound in Eva (2001).

    MAIA NETO_F7_83 104.indd 99MAIA NETO_F7_83-104. indd 99 5/13/2009 5:57:18 PM5/13/2009 5:57:18 PM

  • 8/13/2019 83-104 Luiz Eva

    18/22

    100

    go beyond what it can achieve: it is only hal -alive i it is not advancing,pressing orward, getting driven into a corner and coming to blows; [B]its inquiries are shapeless and without limits; its nourishment consists in[C] amazement, the hunt and uncertainty. 46

    Our incapacity to actually put in doubt every proposition that couldpossibly be doubted shows that our spirit is aced with goals that it isincapable o achieving. More than this, these various attempts to con-ciliate suspension o judgment with acceptance o the acts (even i wecan compare them with regard to their relative coherence) show howour spirit entangles itsel , inasmuch as they still represent an effort in

    the search or knowledge (about our cognitive situation). Yet Montaignecould clearly see his own attempt to deal with the problem (showingthe eebleness o our aculties and their paradoxical eatures, sincethey ollow cognitive norms that they do not meet) as a target or thesame criticism it generates. But this paradox, instead o a reason orre using his skeptical conclusions, is just another sign o the blindnesso our aculties as regards their own limits, inasmuch as they will notbe able to produce a reliable, de nitive picture o that by themselves.Here too we can just go on and on in our search without ever beingable to reach the end we yearn or. 47 Would it not bear some relationto a well-known metaphor by means o which Sextus tells us that theskeptics apply their own expressions to themselves, as purgatives that

    46 III, 13, 1068, 1211.47 Te acknowledgement o human alibility and imper ection is, in my opinion, a

    very important aspect o Montaignes skepticism, rightly stressed by Laursen (1992,pp. 102 passim). A different path seems to be taken by Maia Neto when he proposesthat the ancient skeptics epokh , according to Montaigne, was a sort o per ection(Maia Neto, 2004), understood as ull acomplishment o ones own nature. ( ibid .,p. 37) In a great deal, we hold similar views, inasmuch he indicates that, according toMontaigne, nature is limited, inasmuch men cannot attain knowledge, and also thatskepticism osters the best employ o our aculties.

    I certainly do not wish to diminish the act that Montaigne personally rates skepti-cism as the highest philosophical achievement among the Ancients, and that skepticismshould lead man to employ his natural aculties as best as he can. But I think that theconcept o per ection would be misleading even i it is intended to mean just a ullemployment o our aculties, and not in the sense o achievement o a per ect state, inso-

    ar it seems to presuppose some evaluation o what should be an ideal state accordingwith mans nature. Montaigne never re ers to epokh himsel as a kind o per ection,maybe because it would be incompatible with the radicalism o his skepticism in thesense I have tried to show that he takes it. It is worth noting that Montaigne directlyrelates our incapacity to recognize the truth to the act that we appear to lack judge-ment as a aculty equally present in each man. (see II, 12, 526, S139).

    MAIA NETO_F7_83 104.indd 100MAIA NETO_F7_83-104. indd 100 5/13/2009 5:57:18 PM5/13/2009 5:57:18 PM

  • 8/13/2019 83-104 Luiz Eva

    19/22

    101

    are expelled together with the humors? 48 Here, by means o anothermetaphor, Montaigne gures out his skeptical conception o our cogni-tive situation, and the very conception gured out is no exception atall, even though it does not destroy the coherence o the philosophicalpractice that governs this re ection. On the contrary, it re ects theeffort to take it as ar as possible in its radicalism.

    Sextus also re ers to the skeptical use o language by means o themetaphor o the ladder, which allows him to get where he wants andcan then be thrown away. In the same way, this re exive course thatleads us to the paradox does not ail, in a certain sense, to achieve its

    philosophical purpose, in spite o the act that the results will alwaysrustrate our cognitive expectations, since they may lead us to a di -erent intellectual attitude. o the question about whether the skeptic

    can live his skepticism, Montaignes answer, along the same lines, couldthere ore be that the quest to gain an absolute coherence is a sort oillusion, even though, like Aesops dogs, we cannot be rid o that, sinceour intellectual aculties always operate with this quest in view. Te very problem about how to reconcile a radical skepticism with practi-cal li e is no exception at all. However, it seems that we do not havehere just a kind o allibilism, turned to a rede nition o our notion oknowledge as one we could live with, even i this term could apply insome other sense to his skepticism. 49 But what counts most here is thatthis philosophical attitude seems to require, according to Montaigne,an active skeptical practice.

    Montaignes radical skepticism, in a nutshell, is an effort to restorethe Pyrrhonian diagnosis o our incapacity to detect the truth, whichwas, according to him, the boldest and most coherent skepticism.Montaigne draws on different skeptical sources and personal concep-tual approaches that allow him to do this reconstruction in a coherentwayas in the case o his criticism o judgment, which plays a pivotalrole, as we saw. Yet this amounts to a paradoxical result. Te judgmentcannot avoid the quest or the truth, even concerning the problemo knowing its own incapacity to reach the truth and to understandhow we act in the ace o its limits, but it is never capable to reachthe truth adequately. All we can do is to reassess critically, as ar as

    48 HP I, 206.49 Larmore (2004), pp. 3031, proposes that this term could be used to describe

    Montaignes skepticism, in that Montaigne does not give himsel entirely to the belie she adopts, always regarding them with a certain reserve.

    MAIA NETO_F7_83 104.indd 101MAIA NETO_F7_83-104. indd 101 5/13/2009 5:57:19 PM5/13/2009 5:57:19 PM

  • 8/13/2019 83-104 Luiz Eva

    20/22

    102

    we can, the provisional coherence with which we can deal with thisproblem. We can enlarge our view o the matter up to a point beyondwhich we cannot go any urther, since judgment is always incapableo grasping its limits by itsel , and so always becomes, at some de nitepoint, immobile and suspended. But then, i we accept and recognizethe situation, this skepticism seems to reveal a deeper philosophicalmeaning, or it becomes a way o conducting us to new insights aboutour natural condition. We become more conscious and capable o ullyliving a human li e as it actually is, according to its radical limits. Ashe says at the end o On Vanity:

    [B] I everyone were to look attentively into themselves as I do, theywould nd themselves, as I do, ull o emptiness and tom oolery. I cannotrid mysel o them without getting rid o mysel . We are all steeped inthem, each as much as the other, but those who realize this get off, as Iknow, a little more cheaply. Tat commonly approved practice o lookingelsewhere that at our own sel has served our affairs well. Our sel is anobject ull o dissatis action: we can see nothing there but wretchednessand vanity. So as not to dishearten us, Nature has very conveniently castthe action o our sight outwards. We are swept on downstream, but tostruggle back towards our sel against the current is a pain ul movement;thus does the sea, when driven against itsel , swirl back in con usion . . .Tat commandment given us in ancient times by that god at Delphi wascontrary to all expectation [paradoxale] . . . It is always vanity in yourcase, within and without, but a vanity which is less, the less it extends.Except you alone, O Man, said that god, each creature rst studies itsown sel , and, according to its needs, has limits to its labors and desires.No one is empty and needy as you, who embrace the universe: you arethe seeker without knowledge, the judge with no jurisdiction and, whenall is done, the jester o the arce . . .50

    Bibliography

    Annas, Julia (1986). Doing Without Objective Values in M. Scho eld and G. Striker,eds., Te Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics (Cambridge: C.U.P.), 329.

    Burnyeat, Myles (1983). Can the Skeptic Live His Skepticism? in Myles Burnyeat, ed.Te Skeptical radition (Berkeley: University o Cali ornia Press), 117148.

    Barnes, Jonathan (1982). Te Belie s o a Pyrrhonist, Proceedings of the CambridgePhilological Society , 208 (New Series 28), 129.

    50 III, 9, 10001001B, 11321133. I would like to thank John Christian Laursen orhis comments and corrections on an earlier version o this paper, which contributedgreatly towards improving it.

    MAIA NETO_F7_83 104.indd 102MAIA NETO_F7_83-104. indd 102 5/13/2009 5:57:19 PM5/13/2009 5:57:19 PM

  • 8/13/2019 83-104 Luiz Eva

    21/22

    103

    Bett, Richard (2000), Pyrrho, his Antecedents and his Legacy (Ox ord: Ox ord Uni- versity Press).

    Cave, erence (1979) Te Cornucopian ext: Problems of Writing in the French Renais-sance (Ox ord: Clarendon Press).

    Eva, Luiz (2001) Montaigne: o Ensaio como Ceticismo, Manuscrito 24:2: 741. (2006) Montaigne: ceticismo acerca das aculdades da alma, Analytica 10:1:

    129175. (2007) A Figura do Filsofo. Ceticismo e Subjetividade em Montaigne (So Paulo:

    Loyola).Frede, Michael (1984). Te Sceptics wo Kinds o Assent and the Question o the

    Possibility o Knowledge, in R. Rorty, J. Scheewind, Q. Skinner, eds.,Philosophy inHistory (New York: Cambridge University Press), 225254.

    Larmore, Charles (2004). Un scepticisme sans tranqilit: Montaigne et ses modlesantiques, in V. Carraud, et J.-L. Marion, eds., Montaigne: scepticisme, mtaphysiqueet thologie (Paris: PUF. Col. Epimethe), 1531.

    Laursen, John Christian (1992) Te Politics of Skepticism in the Ancients, Montaigne,Hume and Kant (Leiden, New York, Koln: E.J. Brill).

    Maia Neto, J. R. (2004), Epoch as per ection: Montaignes view o Ancient Pyr-rhonism, in J. R. Maia Neto & R. Popkin, eds., Skepticism in Renaissance and Post-Renaissance Tought. New Interpretation. (New York: Humanity Books), 1342.

    Mates, Benson (1996), Te Skeptic Way (Ox ord: Ox ord University Press).Montaigne, Michel de (1988) Les Essais, ed. Villey, Pierre/Saulnier, V.-L., (Paris,

    PUF)., Michel de (2003) Te Complete Essays. ranslated by M. A. Screech. (London:

    Penguin Books).Sextus Empiricus (1994) Outlines of Pyrrhonism. ranlated by Julian Annas and Johna-

    than Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Stough, Charlotte (1984). Sextus Empircus on Non-assertion, Phronesis 29: 136

    164.Wild, Markus (2000). Les deux Pyrrhonismes de Montaigne, Bulletin de la Societ des

    Amis de Montaigne, viiie srie, 1920, juillet dcembre 2000.

    MAIA NETO_F7_83 104.indd 103MAIA NETO_F7_83-104. indd 103 5/13/2009 5:57:19 PM5/13/2009 5:57:19 PM

  • 8/13/2019 83-104 Luiz Eva

    22/22

    MAIA NETO_F7_83 104.indd 104MAIA NETO_F7_83-104. indd 104 5/13/2009 5:57:19 PM5/13/2009 5:57:19 PM